Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Military simulation

Military simulation, formally termed military modeling and simulation (M&S), consists of methods to develop and apply models that represent real-world military activities, interactions, and systems over time, primarily for training, experimentation, analysis, and operational planning.^[1]^[2] The discipline spans a spectrum from constructive simulations involving human-in-the-loop decision-making without real forces, to virtual simulations of synthetic environments for individual training, and live simulations integrating real people and equipment with simulated elements. Historically rooted in ancient strategic games and formalized in the 19th century through Prussian Kriegsspiel—a terrain-based wargame employing dice and umpires to adjudicate outcomes—military simulation has enabled commanders to test tactics and strategies empirically without expending lives or resources.^[3] This evolution progressed to computer-driven systems post-World War II, incorporating mathematical models for predictive analysis and force-on-force exercises that replicate combat dynamics.^[4] Key achievements include substantial reductions in training costs and risks, as simulations permit thousands of virtual repetitions of rare or hazardous scenarios, enhancing readiness while minimizing live-fire expenditures and environmental impacts.^[5]^[6] Despite these benefits, military simulation encounters defining limitations and controversies, such as difficulties in fully capturing nonlinear human behaviors, fog of war uncertainties, and adaptive adversary responses, which can foster overconfidence in modeled outcomes over real-world adaptability.^[7] The 2002 Millennium Challenge exercise exemplified this when an opposing force employing asymmetric tactics "defeated" U.S. simulation assets, prompting a controversial reset that highlighted tensions between scripted fidelity and unscripted realism in evaluating vulnerabilities.^[7] Nonetheless, ongoing advancements in distributed simulation architectures and integration with emerging technologies like artificial intelligence continue to refine its causal fidelity to actual military causation.^[8]

History

Ancient and Pre-Modern Origins

In ancient India, chaturanga emerged around the 6th century CE as a strategic board game simulating the four divisions of the military—infantry, cavalry, elephants, and chariots—allowing players to practice tactical maneuvers and decision-making without real combat risks.^[9] This game, an early precursor to chess, was employed to train young princes and military leaders in the art of war, emphasizing the coordination of forces across varied terrains and scenarios.^[10] Similarly, in China, weiqi (also known as Go), dating back to at least the Zhou dynasty (circa 1046–256 BCE), served as a stylized simulation of territorial control and encirclement tactics, akin to battlefield envelopment, and was valued for cultivating strategic foresight among generals.^[11] Ancient texts such as Sun Tzu's The Art of War (5th century BCE) advocated visualizing and rehearsing battles through analogous methods, underscoring the value of pre-combat simulation to anticipate enemy actions and terrain effects, thereby minimizing unforeseen losses.^[12] In the Roman Empire, military commanders utilized sand tables—mounded earth or sand models augmented with icons representing troops and fortifications—to replicate terrain and test siege tactics or troop deployments, as evidenced in planning for campaigns like those against Carthage.^[4] These physical models enabled empirical testing of formations and logistics, reducing errors in execution by allowing iterative adjustments prior to engagement, a practice rooted in practical necessity rather than formalized theory. During the medieval period in Europe and Asia, abstracted board games like chess variants evolved from chaturanga and weiqi, functioning as low-risk exercises for nobles and officers to explore maneuver warfare and resource allocation, though lacking the detailed rules of later systems.^[11] Mock maneuvers and scaled representations in texts such as Byzantine military manuals further echoed these origins, prioritizing causal prediction of outcomes—such as supply line vulnerabilities—over live drills, which carried inherent dangers and costs.^[13] This pre-modern emphasis on visualization laid empirical groundwork for wargaming, demonstrably aiding planning in conflicts by aligning theoretical dispositions with realistic contingencies, as inferred from surviving accounts of successful pre-battle preparations.

19th and 20th Century Developments

The Prussian Kriegsspiel, pioneered in the early 19th century, marked the formalization of structured wargaming for military training. Conceived around 1812 by Georg von Reisswitz the elder, a Prussian civil servant, it was refined by his son, Lieutenant Georg Heinrich von Reisswitz, into a system featuring topographical maps, wooden terrain blocks, unit markers, and dice rolls to account for combat uncertainty and terrain effects. Officially adopted by the Prussian General Staff in 1824 after demonstrations to King Frederick William III, the game emphasized tactical decision-making under incomplete information, distinguishing it from earlier recreational board games.^[14]^[15] Under Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Kriegsspiel became a cornerstone of Prussian officer education from the 1850s, fostering analytical skills that contributed to decisive victories in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War and 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War by enhancing staff coordination and contingency planning. This analog heuristic approach spread internationally, influencing military preparedness through repeated scenario testing that revealed doctrinal weaknesses prior to real conflicts.^[16]^[17] In the United States, wargaming gained traction at the Naval War College, where Lieutenant William McCarty Little introduced formalized procedures in late 1887, adapting Prussian methods to naval fleet maneuvers using charts and counters to simulate battleship engagements. Concurrently, British naval enthusiast Fred T. Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships (first edition 1898) supplied precise vessel specifications—displacement, armament, and speed—that underpinned early 20th-century fleet simulations, while Jane developed accompanying rules in 1898 and 1906 for tabletop naval Kriegspiel-style games, enabling realistic modeling of squadron tactics and gunnery duels. These tools sharpened pre-World War I naval strategies by quantifying relative fleet strengths and testing formation responses to hypothetical threats.^[18]^[19] Aviation simulation advanced with Edwin A. Link's mechanical flight trainers in the 1920s; his "Blue Box" prototype, patented in 1929, employed bellows, valves, and a tiltable cockpit to replicate instrument flight conditions, turbulence, and navigation errors without risking aircraft. Widely adopted by the U.S. Army Air Corps by the 1930s, it trained over 500,000 pilots before and during World War II, reducing fatal crashes from disorientation. On land, sand table models evolved into detailed topographic replicas for operational planning, particularly amphibious assaults; by World War II, they facilitated rehearsals for landings like those in the Pacific and Normandy, using scaled sand, models, and flags to visualize beach defenses, tidal flows, and troop movements, thereby linking analog visualization to coordinated multi-domain execution.^[20]^[21]

Post-WWII Computerization

The transition to computerized military simulations accelerated in the late 1940s and 1950s, leveraging emerging electronic computers to address the limitations of manual wargaming amid Cold War strategic demands for rapid, scalable analysis of complex scenarios such as nuclear air campaigns.^[22] Pioneering efforts at the RAND Corporation employed Monte Carlo methods—stochastic simulation techniques involving repeated random sampling to model probabilistic outcomes—which were first formalized around 1946-1949 for problems intractable to analytical solutions.^[23] By 1951, RAND applied these methods to evaluate reconnaissance plans in strategic bombing operations, simulating logistic constraints and attrition rates to inform U.S. Air Force doctrine on force sizing and targeting efficiency.^[24] These early models prioritized empirical data from WWII operations, integrating first-principles approximations of physics and supply chain dynamics to generate distributions of campaign results, though computational constraints limited runs to thousands of iterations on vacuum-tube machines like the IBM 701.^[25] In the 1960s, the U.S. Air Force's SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) system marked a leap in real-time computational simulation for air defense, integrating data from hundreds of radars into AN/FSQ-7 computers to predict and intercept bomber threats.^[26] Operational from 1958 to the 1980s, SAGE employed digital simulations to model incoming aircraft trajectories, fusing radar tracks with predefined threat libraries to automate intercept calculations and vector fighter responses, thereby enabling command centers to process 400 tracks per minute.^[27] This system, developed by MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, relied on deterministic algorithms grounded in kinematic equations rather than pure stochastic methods, reflecting causal modeling of radar physics and electronic warfare effects to counter Soviet bomber fleets.^[28] By the 1970s, advancements in minicomputers facilitated high-fidelity standalone flight simulators for aircraft design and pilot training, exemplified by those supporting the F-16 Fighting Falcon's development starting in 1972.^[29] These simulators used digital computers to replicate aerodynamic forces via six-degree-of-freedom models derived from wind-tunnel data and computational fluid dynamics precursors, allowing engineers to test fly-by-wire controls and stability augmentation without risking prototypes.^[30] The U.S. Air Force's Advanced Simulation Program for Training (ASPT), incorporating F-16 modules by the mid-1970s, emphasized physics-based fidelity to predict handling qualities under high-angle-of-attack maneuvers, reducing development costs by validating designs through thousands of virtual sorties.^[29] Such tools underscored the era's focus on deterministic, equation-driven simulations to scale testing beyond physical constraints, informing procurement decisions amid escalating defense budgets.^[31]

Digital and Networked Era (1980s–Present)

The Digital and Networked Era of military simulation emerged in the 1980s with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Simulator Networking (SIMNET) project, launched in 1983, which connected tank simulators across geographically dispersed sites to enable collective training in shared virtual environments.^[32] SIMNET demonstrated the feasibility of distributed interactive simulation, allowing operators to engage in realistic maneuver warfare exercises without the logistical demands of live field training, and laid the groundwork for standards like Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) in the 1990s.^[33] This approach addressed post-Cold War shifts toward smaller, more agile forces requiring efficient, scalable rehearsal capabilities for expeditionary operations.^[34] By the 2000s, networked simulations expanded to support counterinsurgency training amid conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, with systems like Bohemia Interactive's Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2), adapted for military use around 2007, providing customizable, interactive scenarios for company-level and below tactical drills in virtual terrains.^[35] Similarly, the U.S. Army's America's Army, released in July 2002, functioned as a first-person shooter-based simulator to familiarize recruits and soldiers with small-unit tactics, marksmanship, and Army values through multiplayer networked sessions.^[36] These platforms facilitated distributed training across units, reducing dependency on co-located forces and enabling after-action reviews via recorded data. Empirical assessments from the U.S. Department of Defense highlight substantial cost efficiencies from networked simulations compared to live training, with Government Accountability Office analyses in the 2010s confirming that simulation-based methods avoid expenses associated with fuel, ammunition, and equipment wear, often deemed less costly by Army and Marine Corps officials.^[37] For instance, simulator integration has been linked to per-hour training costs orders of magnitude lower than live equivalents, supporting sustained readiness amid budget constraints following the Cold War drawdown.^[38] Such systems emphasized causal linkages between virtual repetition and real-world performance, prioritizing empirical validation over resource-intensive alternatives.

Types of Military Simulations

Live Simulations

Live simulations involve real personnel operating actual military equipment and systems in field exercises to replicate combat conditions as closely as possible.^[39] This approach, part of the U.S. Department of Defense's Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) framework, emphasizes the use of live forces and hardware to achieve high-fidelity training that captures unscripted human interactions and physical realities absent in simulated environments.^[40] A primary example is the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, where brigade combat teams conduct rotational exercises since 1981, employing real vehicles, weapons, and troops in force-on-force scenarios across a 1,000-square-mile desert terrain.^[41] NTC integrates instrumentation such as the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), which uses eye-safe lasers mounted on weapons and vehicles to simulate hits and casualties without live ammunition, allowing after-action reviews based on precise event data collection.^[42] These exercises enforce realistic constraints, including limited resupply and opposition forces played by professional observer-controllers using similar instrumented equipment.^[43] Live simulations provide causal advantages through direct exposure to physical factors like equipment wear, terrain-induced mobility limitations, logistical delays from actual supply chains, and environmental variables such as weather impacting sensor performance and soldier fatigue—elements that virtual simulations approximate but cannot fully replicate due to their reliance on digital models.^[44] This realism fosters adaptive decision-making under genuine physiological and mechanical stresses, distinguishing live exercises from virtual ones that prioritize controlled repetition over holistic operational friction.^[45]

Virtual Simulations

![Soldiers training in a 360-degree virtual simulation tent][float-right] Virtual simulations engage real human operators with computer-generated representations of equipment and environments, enabling individual skill acquisition in controlled settings that mitigate risks to physical hardware and personnel. These systems prioritize sensory immersion through visual displays, auditory feedback, and haptic interfaces to mimic operational conditions, focusing on tasks like control manipulation and procedural execution rather than collective force interactions. High-fidelity examples include cockpit simulators that replicate instrument panels, flight dynamics, and environmental variables without expending fuel or exposing aircraft to wear.^[46] In aviation training, simulators for advanced aircraft such as the F-35 employ motion platforms to simulate acceleration and orientation changes, providing vestibular cues that approximate low-to-moderate G-forces during maneuvers; however, sustained high-G effects are limited, relying on visual and proprioceptive illusions for higher intensities. These devices, certified under standards like those from the Federal Aviation Administration, support pilot proficiency in scenarios from takeoff to emergency procedures. For ground forces, virtual systems from the 1990s onward incorporated early virtual reality technologies, such as head-mounted displays, to train dismounted infantry in marksmanship and navigation within simulated urban or terrain models, reducing ammunition costs and live-fire hazards.^[47]^[48]^[49] Empirical assessments of training transfer demonstrate that virtual simulations yield proficiency levels approaching those of live exercises, with Federal Aviation Administration studies confirming positive transfer for most flight tasks, including instrument approaches and upset recovery, often at 70-90% effectiveness relative to aircraft-based training depending on fidelity and scenario complexity. Military applications similarly report sustained skill retention through repeated virtual rehearsals, validated by comparative performance metrics in subsequent live evaluations, though transfer efficacy varies with simulator realism and operator experience.^[50]^[51]^[52]

Constructive Simulations

Constructive simulations model interactions among computer-generated forces, equipment, and environments without real human operators controlling individual entities, allowing for efficient exploration of large-scale scenarios at aggregate levels such as battalions, brigades, or divisions.^[8] These simulations emphasize command-level decision-making by aggregating entity behaviors into higher-order outcomes, incorporating algorithms for automated tactics, logistics, and combat resolution to assess force employment and operational effectiveness.^[53] Stochastic processes are frequently integrated to replicate variability in factors like weather, equipment reliability, or human performance, enabling multiple runs to generate probabilistic results for risk assessment in force-on-force engagements.^[54] The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS), a real-time entity-level tool, exemplifies constructive approaches by simulating battles from individual soldiers to joint task forces, with aggregation capabilities for battalion-scale analysis in training and experimentation.^[55] Developed under U.S. Department of Defense sponsorship, JCATS uses terrain databases and behavioral models to adjudicate engagements, supporting non-real-time replays and scenario variations for tactical planning without human intervention in simulated unit actions.^[56] Similarly, systems like the Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF) extend this to multi-domain operations, modeling aggregated units across land, air, sea, and space with customizable databases for over 300 entity types. In applications, constructive simulations facilitate force structure evaluation by running iterative scenarios to test unit compositions, sustainment requirements, and doctrinal changes at scale.^[57] For instance, U.S. military analysts in the 2000s utilized aggregate-level constructive models during Iraq operations planning to simulate troop surges, projecting outcomes for up to 30,000 additional personnel deployments and their impacts on stability metrics like insurgent activity rates.^[58] These tools prioritize computational efficiency over individual fidelity, enabling commanders to iterate "what-if" analyses for resource allocation and contingency development in closed-loop environments.^[59]

Technologies and Methodologies

Simulation Fidelity and Spectrum

Simulation fidelity in military contexts denotes the extent to which a simulation replicates real-world operational conditions, encompassing physical replication of environments and equipment, functional emulation of system behaviors and interactions, and psychological induction of cognitive and emotional responses akin to combat stress.^[60] Low-fidelity simulations, such as manual tabletop wargames or basic analytical models, abstract complex scenarios into simplified rules and maps, enabling rapid iteration for strategic exploration at low computational and monetary cost—typically under $10,000 per setup—but sacrificing granular detail for speed.^[61] In contrast, high-fidelity simulations employ advanced rendering, physics engines, and sensor data integration to mirror battlefield dynamics, as seen in Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) architectures that synchronize live instrumented forces with virtual simulators and constructive computer-generated entities, allowing scalable training across echelons from squad to joint operations. Fidelity is assessed across three primary metrics: physical fidelity, which includes visual, auditory, haptic, and motion cues (e.g., 360-degree immersive displays with force feedback); functional fidelity, evaluating how accurately simulated systems respond to inputs like weapon ballistics or vehicle maneuvers under varying environmental conditions; and psychological fidelity, measuring user immersion, stress inoculation, and decision-making fidelity under time pressure, often enhanced by biofeedback integration.^[62] High physical and functional fidelity typically bolsters psychological fidelity by creating believable cues that trigger realistic behavioral responses, though empirical validation shows psychological effects can emerge even in medium-fidelity setups if core task cues are preserved.^[60] For instance, U.S. Army studies emphasize that psychological fidelity drives transfer of learned tactics to live environments, with haptic and multi-sensory feedback correlating to 20-30% improvements in reaction times during simulated urban combat.^[62] The fidelity spectrum embodies inherent trade-offs between realism and practicality: escalating from low-fidelity heuristics, which prioritize analytical insight over immersion and cost as little as 1/100th of high-end systems, to ultra-high-fidelity LVC integrations demanding millions in hardware, validation data from field tests, and real-time processing of terabytes of sensor inputs, often exceeding $50 million for joint exercises.^[61] While higher fidelity enhances causal accuracy—better capturing nonlinear effects like fog-of-war disruptions or supply chain failures—over-specification risks "fidelity creep," where marginal gains in detail yield disproportionate costs without proportional training benefits, as evidenced by Department of Defense analyses showing diminishing returns beyond functional thresholds matched to specific learning objectives.^[60] ^[61] Empirical military studies, including RAND evaluations of Army collective training, confirm that calibrated medium-to-high fidelity optimizes transfer effectiveness, with low-fidelity tools sufficient for conceptual planning but high-fidelity LVC reducing live training needs by up to 40% in aviation and ground maneuver scenarios, predicated on rigorous validation against historical data like Gulf War engagements.^[60] This correlation holds in controlled trials where higher-fidelity exposure improved tactical proficiency metrics by 15-25% over low-fidelity baselines, underscoring fidelity's role in bridging simulation-to-reality gaps without assuming maximal replication is universally optimal.^[63]

Modeling Approaches: Heuristic vs. Stochastic

Heuristic models in military simulations rely on deterministic rule-based approximations to simplify complex combat dynamics, producing fixed outputs from predefined inputs for efficient, repeatable analyses. These approaches, prevalent in early manual wargames such as those conducted by Prussian staff officers in the 19th century, prioritize speed and interpretability over exhaustive variability, employing approximations like Lanchester equations to estimate attrition without probabilistic elements.^[64] Such models facilitate quick scenario testing but inherently underrepresent uncertainties like random equipment failures or human error, as they assume perfect knowledge of inputs leading to unique outcomes.^[65] In contrast, stochastic models introduce probabilistic mechanisms to capture real-world variability, incorporating random variables to simulate phenomena such as the fog of war or fluctuating unit effectiveness through techniques like Monte Carlo methods or agent-based modeling. Monte Carlo simulations, for instance, generate thousands of iterations by sampling from probability distributions to produce outcome distributions rather than point estimates, enabling quantification of risk in military planning as demonstrated in U.S. Air Force applications for uncertain events.^[66] Agent-based variants model individual entities with stochastic behaviors, aggregating emergent effects in combat networks, which aligns with causal uncertainties in decentralized operations.^[67] These methods better emulate chaotic battlefield conditions by explicitly modeling input randomness, yielding metrics like confidence intervals for predictions.^[68] The primary trade-off lies in computational demands: heuristic models enable rapid prototyping on limited resources, suitable for real-time decision aids, whereas stochastic approaches, requiring extensive sampling to achieve statistical convergence, impose higher costs but provide empirically validated uncertainty bounds, as seen in deployment simulations where variability quantification improved resource allocation foresight over deterministic baselines.^[69] For example, stochastic airlift models during the 1990-1991 Gulf War era incorporated random delays and capacities to assess logistics under uncertainty, revealing potential shortfalls not evident in rule-based heuristics.^[70] Validation through repeated runs confirms stochastic fidelity to observed variances, though experts note deterministic averages may approximate means efficiently for low-variability scenarios, underscoring the need for hybrid selection based on scenario complexity and available compute power.^[68]^[65]

Integration of AI, VR/AR, and Emerging Technologies

Artificial intelligence enhances military simulations by enabling adaptive scenarios that evolve in real time based on participant decisions, thereby improving training outcomes through dynamic opposition rather than scripted responses. The DARPA Deep Green program, launched in 2006, pioneered this approach by integrating simulation tools to generate predictive courses of action and compare them against unfolding events, facilitating commander adjustments during operations.^[71] Deep Green's state space modeling pre-computed options to counter uncertainty, drawing on empirical battlefield data to minimize reliance on preconceived assumptions about adversary behavior.^[72] Contemporary AI applications extend this to generative models that simulate autonomous adversaries with tactics derived from historical and probabilistic data, reducing human-introduced biases in enemy representation. For example, machine learning frameworks automate scenario generation for military exercises, adapting narratives to reflect real-world variability in threats like peer adversaries.^[73] These systems have demonstrated verifiable improvements in strategic readiness, as AI-driven wargames introduce unpredictable elements that enhance decision-making under pressure, per evaluations in professional military education.^[74] Virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies augment simulation immersion by superimposing interactive digital layers onto physical or virtual spaces, allowing trainees to experience overlaid threats and environmental cues. The U.S. Army's Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), prototyped from 2018 onward with version 1.2 fielded by 2023, employs AR headsets to deliver high-resolution sensor feeds and virtual enemies during live training, enabling soldiers to engage hybrid threats without full-scale deployments.^[75] IVAS integrates over 260,000 hours of soldier input to refine overlays for realistic navigation and targeting, yielding measurable gains in situational awareness as validated in Army field tests.^[76] Emerging synergies between AI, VR/AR, and adjunct technologies like haptics further elevate fidelity; the Army's Synthetic Training Environment, advanced by 2025, combines AI-generated scenarios with AR/VR haptic feedback to simulate tactile combat effects, such as weapon recoil or terrain resistance, for more comprehensive sensory training.^[77] This integration supports scalable rehearsal of complex maneuvers, with evidence from program metrics showing accelerated skill acquisition compared to traditional methods.^[78]

Applications

Training and Tactical Preparation

Military simulations enable soldiers and small units to develop tactical proficiency through repeated drills in controlled settings, focusing on skills like close-quarters battle, fireteam maneuvers, and weapons handling without incurring the physical or logistical costs of live training. The U.S. Army's Dismounted Soldier Training System (DSTS), introduced in the early 2010s, utilizes virtual reality to immerse dismounted infantry in realistic urban and field scenarios, allowing practice of movement under fire and squad coordination.^[79] Similarly, the Synthetic Training Environment (STE), initiated in 2017, combines virtual simulations with real-world data to train units at platoon and company levels, emphasizing decision-making in dynamic tactical situations.^[80] These systems support individualized feedback and scenario variability, enhancing muscle memory and tactical judgment prior to live integration. Empirical evidence underscores simulations' role in mitigating training risks; by substituting virtual repetitions for initial live-fire iterations, they reduce exposure to ammunition mishaps and vehicle incidents, contributing to broader safety improvements such as the U.S. Army's record-low 24 training deaths in 2020, down from prior years.^[81] Government analyses confirm that human error drives most non-combat training accidents—over 80% in special operations from 2012–2022—yet simulator-based preparation addresses skill gaps in high-risk activities like vehicle control and marksmanship, yielding safer transitions to field exercises.^[82] This approach also optimizes resource use, enabling thousands of virtual engagements versus limited live rounds, while preserving unit readiness through scalable, weather-independent sessions. However, simulations' abstracted nature limits their capacity for full stress inoculation, as they cannot replicate physiological responses to genuine peril, such as elevated heart rates or improvised adaptations under duress, potentially hindering adaptation to combat's unpredictability.^[83] Proponents advocate hybrid regimens—pairing virtual tactical drills with selective live validations—to bridge this gap, ensuring skills transfer without excessive real-world hazards, though ongoing evaluations stress the need for fidelity enhancements to maximize effectiveness.^[84]

Mission Planning and Operational Wargaming

Military simulations for mission planning involve virtual or constructive rehearsals that allow commanders and staffs to execute proposed operations in a controlled environment, testing sequencing, timing, and resource allocation against simulated enemy actions. This process reveals causal pathways to success or failure, such as identifying synchronization gaps that could lead to ineffective strikes or unintended engagements, enabling iterative refinements before commitment of forces. By modeling terrain, weather, and adversary behaviors with high fidelity, these simulations establish direct links between planning decisions and operational outcomes, prioritizing empirical validation over assumptions.^[85] Operational wargaming forms a core component of this planning, integrated into the joint operation planning process as detailed in Joint Publication 5-0. During course of action (COA) analysis, wargaming employs action-reaction-counteraction iterations to simulate friendly maneuvers against anticipated enemy responses, assessing feasibility, acceptability, and completeness of each COA. Staff sections portray opposing forces, support elements, and environmental factors, recording critical events like decision points and risk nodes on synchronization matrices or event templates. This methodical cycling, typically conducted over multiple iterations per COA, uncovers causal dependencies—such as how delayed air support might expose ground units to counterattacks—informing commander selection of the optimal plan.^[86] In the 1991 Gulf War air campaign, simulations modeled integrated strike packages under the Instant Thunder framework, simulating over 2,000 sorties in the opening phase to validate target lists and weaponeering against Iraqi defenses. These rehearsals causally contributed to operational precision by exposing vulnerabilities in radar jamming and suppression tactics, resulting in fewer than 100 coalition fixed-wing losses despite intense air defenses. Post-operation analyses credited such pre-mission simulations with minimizing errors, including reduced fratricide incidents—totaling around 35 U.S. friendly fire deaths out of 148 battle deaths—through rehearsed identification protocols that mitigated misidentification risks in dynamic airspace.^[87]^[88]^[89] Empirical evidence from wargaming-supported planning underscores causal reductions in fratricide via pre-execution risk mitigation; for instance, simulated rehearsals allow forces to practice rules of engagement and deconfliction zones, directly lowering error rates in subsequent live operations by 20-50% in controlled studies of combined arms maneuvers. This contrasts with un-rehearsed operations, where unaddressed causal factors like communication lags amplify friendly fire probabilities.^[90]^[91]

Strategic and Political-Military Simulations

Strategic and political-military simulations encompass high-level modeling exercises that integrate military operations with diplomatic negotiations, economic constraints, policy trade-offs, and alliance dynamics to assess grand strategy, crisis escalation, and long-term deterrence at the national or multinational scale. These simulations, often conducted as tabletop exercises or computer-assisted games, aim to test decision-making under uncertainty by simulating interactions among state actors, incorporating variables such as leadership resolve, public support, and international repercussions. Unlike tactical simulations, they prioritize macro-level outcomes, such as war termination conditions or alliance cohesion, drawing on historical data and probabilistic scenarios to inform policymakers.^[92] Pioneered during the Cold War, such simulations at institutions like the RAND Corporation in the 1950s utilized game theory and economic frameworks to model bipolar deterrence dilemmas, including the risks of miscalculation in crises like potential Soviet invasions of Western Europe. These efforts, such as the Systems Studies Division games, framed international politics as rational bargaining processes, aiding the development of flexible response doctrines that emphasized credible escalation control. Empirical track records from these simulations contributed to strategies that averted direct superpower confrontations, as modeled outcomes highlighted the mutual costs of nuclear exchange and reinforced signaling mechanisms during events like the Berlin Crisis of 1961, where simulated paths informed de-escalatory diplomacy.^[93]^[94] Contemporary examples include the U.S. Space Force's Schriever Wargames, series initiated in 1998 and evolving through annual iterations to 2025, which blend military space operations with political alliance considerations to evaluate future force architectures against peer competitors. In the 2025 edition, participants from the U.S. and nine partner nations simulated coalition-led responses to contested space environments, identifying gaps in policy integration for resilient satellite networks and joint command structures. These exercises have refined deterrence modeling by quantifying the impacts of delayed reinforcements or diplomatic hesitancy, supporting acquisitions like enhanced space domain awareness systems.^[95]^[96] Critics, however, highlight tendencies toward over-optimism in these simulations, particularly in underestimating asymmetric threats where conventional superiority does not guarantee political victory; for instance, U.S. politico-military exercises like the 1964 war game accurately forecasted a protracted stalemate in Vietnam due to insurgent adaptability and limited escalation options, yet such insights were sidelined in favor of graduated pressure strategies. The Pentagon's Sigma series from 1962 to 1967 similarly demonstrated the ineffectiveness of air campaigns against dispersed forces but failed to alter commitments, revealing causal gaps in modeling Hanoi’s resolve and South Vietnamese instability. This pattern underscores limitations in capturing non-quantifiable factors like cultural motivations or alliance fragility, leading to scenarios that overemphasize material balances over adaptive adversary behaviors.^[97]^[98]^[92]

Validation and Effectiveness

Validation Techniques and Empirical Metrics

Validation in military simulations encompasses a range of techniques to ensure models accurately represent real-world dynamics, with emphasis on empirical substantiation over anecdotal assessment. Face validation involves subject matter experts reviewing simulation outputs for plausibility and consistency with observed phenomena, serving as an initial qualitative check before quantitative analysis.^[99] Statistical validation follows, employing historical data comparisons, sensitivity analyses, and confidence interval assessments to quantify model accuracy against empirical benchmarks.^[100] Transfer validation specifically evaluates whether skills or decisions honed in simulation translate to live environments, often through comparative trials measuring performance deltas between simulator-trained and field-trained personnel.^[101] Red-teaming augments these methods by introducing adversarial elements to probe simulation robustness, simulating opponent tactics or injecting deliberate perturbations to expose hidden assumptions or biases in model behavior.^[102] This technique, rooted in military experimentation, facilitates causal inference by isolating variables in controlled scenarios, akin to A/B testing where variant simulations are pitted against baselines to discern impactful factors.^[103] The U.S. Department of Defense mandates such rigorous processes under its Verification, Validation, and Accreditation framework, requiring documentation of test protocols tailored to the simulation's intended use.^[104] Empirical metrics prioritize quantifiable transfer effectiveness, with the Transfer Effectiveness Ratio (TER) serving as a core indicator: TER = (simulator-trained performance - untrained baseline) / (live-trained performance - untrained baseline), where values approaching 1.0 denote near-equivalent efficacy.^[105] In military aviation contexts, TERs have ranged from 0.25 to 0.75 across tasks, correlating simulator hours to equivalent live training reductions; for instance, a TER of 0.48 implies one simulator hour substitutes for 0.48 live hours.^[101]^[106] Additional metrics include sim-to-live performance correlations (e.g., Pearson r > 0.7 for tactical decision-making fidelity) and error rate differentials in controlled experiments, ensuring causal links via randomized group assignments.^[107] These data-driven benchmarks, derived from DoD-accredited studies, underpin accreditation by linking simulation fidelity to measurable operational outcomes.^[108]

Proven Benefits and Cost-Efficiency

Military simulations offer substantial cost advantages over live exercises by minimizing expenditures on fuel, ammunition, equipment maintenance, and personnel logistics. Department of Defense assessments indicate that simulation-based training is generally less costly than equivalent live training, with potential savings from reduced wear on assets and avoidance of high-risk maneuvers.^[109] For instance, in aviation contexts, flight simulators enable effective skill acquisition at a fraction of the cost of actual flight hours, as evidenced by analyses showing equivalent training outcomes with lower operational expenses.^[110] These efficiencies scale across domains, such as ground vehicle or weapons systems training, where virtual replication avoids the multimillion-dollar logistics of field deployments.^[111] Empirical studies confirm proficiency improvements from simulations, countering claims of inferior realism. Meta-analyses of flight simulator training report large effect sizes (e.g., d ≈ 0.88) for performance enhancements in perceptual-motor skills and transfer to real operations, equating to meaningful gains in operational readiness.^[112] In military nursing and procedural training, simulation interventions yield verifiable boosts in knowledge, skills, and abilities, often surpassing traditional methods in controlled evaluations.^[113] Such data underscore simulations' role in saving lives during peacetime by mitigating training accidents; for example, aviation programs attribute avoided fatalities to simulator-induced error reduction without live hazards.^[114] Strategic applications further demonstrate efficiency, as seen in wargaming exercises informing responses to contingencies like the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Pre-2022 RAND simulations of Russian invasion scenarios provided insights into aid requirements and operational dynamics, enabling more targeted resource allocation post-invasion and validating simulations' predictive value for policy decisions.^[115] Overall, these benefits—quantified through reduced accident rates, accelerated skill acquisition, and optimized budgeting—establish simulations as a high-return investment, with return-on-investment analyses projecting multimillion-dollar savings over deployment cycles.^[116]

Case Studies of Real-World Impact

Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. military units employed simulations such as the Close Combat simulation system to rehearse operational maneuvers, including the advance to Baghdad, enabling coordinated execution of rapid conventional advances that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in approximately three weeks.^[117] The Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame, conducted earlier that year at a cost of $250 million, integrated live exercises and computer simulations to test U.S. forces against asymmetric threats, where the opposing force's use of low-technology tactics like missile swarms initially overwhelmed blue team assets, foreshadowing potential guerrilla challenges.^[7] However, exercise officials controversially reset the scenario to favor conventional U.S. dominance, a decision critics attribute to an overemphasis on high-tech superiority that contributed to inadequate preparation for the ensuing Iraqi insurgency, as simulations largely prioritized blitzkrieg-style operations over prolonged irregular warfare.^[118] This shortfall manifested in post-invasion instability, where U.S. forces faced unanticipated urban combat and sectarian violence, underscoring simulations' limitations in modeling socio-political dynamics and human factors driving insurgencies.^[119] In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Army accelerated adoption of virtual simulation technologies in 2020 to sustain training amid social distancing mandates, replacing disrupted live exercises with synthetic environments that preserved unit readiness without physical gatherings.^[120] This pivot allowed for continued skill development in tactics and equipment operation, mitigating readiness gaps during lockdowns that halted field maneuvers across bases.^[121] While effective for short-term maintenance of core competencies, such virtual shifts faced critiques for potentially diminishing the realism of live-fire integration and team cohesion under stress, though empirical data from post-pandemic assessments affirmed overall efficacy in averting proficiency declines.^[120]

Limitations and Criticisms

Technical and Fidelity Challenges

Military simulations face inherent limitations in replicating the full spectrum of real-world physics and environmental interactions, particularly in chaotic or dynamic scenarios where incomplete data and computational approximations introduce discrepancies. High-fidelity models must balance detailed physical representations—such as fluid dynamics, material stresses, and electromagnetic propagation—with practical constraints, often relying on simplified algorithms that diverge from empirical outcomes in edge cases. For instance, simulations of projectile trajectories or vehicle dynamics in variable terrains frequently underperform due to gaps in granular environmental data, leading to fidelity shortfalls that compound in multi-domain operations.^[122] A core challenge lies in modeling human intangibles, such as unit cohesion, morale, and the will to fight, which defy precise quantification and integration into probabilistic frameworks. RAND Corporation analyses highlight that while factors like leadership, fatigue, and ideological commitment influence combat persistence, empirical data on these elements remains sparse and context-dependent, rendering simulations prone to over- or underestimation of breaking points. Models attempting to simulate will to fight at the unit level, for example, incorporate variables from historical case studies but struggle with causal linkages, as real-world behaviors exhibit nonlinear responses not fully captured by agent-based or stochastic methods.^[123] Scalability poses another barrier, as achieving high-fidelity depictions of large-scale engagements demands exascale computing resources to process millions of entities and interactions in near-real time. Large-scale military simulations require high-performance computing clusters to handle the data volume from entity behaviors, terrain rendering, and sensor fusion, yet even advanced systems face bottlenecks in parallel processing and memory allocation for full-battle scenarios involving thousands of participants. These demands often force trade-offs, such as reduced resolution in subordinate elements, which erode overall validity.^[124] Empirical validation reveals persistent gaps in complex environments, notably urban warfare, where simulations frequently underrate the chaos induced by improvised threats, civilian interference, and three-dimensional maneuverability. Studies of heavy combined arms modeling indicate that even validated datasets fail to replicate urban friction, resulting in optimistic projections of force effectiveness and maneuver speeds that mismatch historical data from operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such discrepancies underscore the difficulty in tuning models to account for unmodeled variables like ad hoc adaptations, necessitating hybrid approaches with live exercises for calibration.^[125]^[126]

Risks of Overreliance and Misapplication

Overreliance on military simulations can foster undue confidence in modeled outcomes, treating them as oracles rather than approximations constrained by assumptions and data limitations. In the 2002 Millennium Challenge exercise, the U.S. Joint Forces Command simulated a conflict pitting advanced "blue" forces against a rogue state's "red" team, costing $250 million and involving over 13,000 personnel across multiple sites; initial red team successes using asymmetric tactics were negated by scripted interventions that "refloated" sunk ships and restricted unconventional methods, ensuring a predetermined blue victory and exposing how biased rules can misrepresent real-world adaptability.^[7] Critics, including red team commander Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, labeled the event a "sham" designed to validate unproven concepts like rapid decisive operations, underscoring the peril of tailoring simulations to preconceived strategies rather than testing them rigorously.^[7] Confirmation bias exacerbates these issues, as modelers and users may unconsciously design parameters or interpret results to align with existing hypotheses, eroding critical evaluation. For instance, in military feasibility studies using simulations, initial favorable outcomes on checkpoint effectiveness were accepted without scrutiny, only later revealed as artifacts of incomplete rule sets that ignored adversarial adaptations.^[127] Similarly, insufficiently diverse input data can create echo chambers, where simulations reinforce narrow scenarios and fail against unforeseen variables, such as novel tactics or environmental factors not captured in historical datasets.^[127] These risks, while substantive, are often mitigated through hybrid live-virtual-constructive (LVC) frameworks that integrate real-world live training with virtual and constructive elements, avoiding the isolation of pure simulation environments. LVC blends enable synthetic threats to augment live exercises—such as multiaxis missile simulations in naval strike group drills since 2016—enhancing complexity and volume without sole dependence on modeled fidelity, thus grounding decisions in empirical feedback loops.^[128] Empirical reviews of such integrations indicate they promote more resilient training outcomes compared to unhybridized approaches, with historical misapplications like Millennium Challenge prompting doctrinal shifts toward unscripted red teaming to counter overconfidence.^[7]^[128]

Debates on Strategic and Ethical Implications

Proponents of military simulations contend that they bolster strategic deterrence by revealing operational vulnerabilities and informing resource allocation against existential threats. For instance, a series of 24 wargames conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2023 simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan consistently showed U.S., Taiwanese, and Japanese forces prevailing, albeit at enormous cost—including the loss of two U.S. aircraft carriers, over 900 aircraft, and 3,200 ground troops—but underscored the necessity for prepositioned munitions, hardened bases, and integrated allied logistics to sustain defense. These findings have directly supported arguments for increased U.S. defense budgets, such as the prioritization of long-range anti-ship missiles and submarine production, demonstrating through iterative testing how simulations translate threat assessments into credible capabilities that deter aggression without real-world escalation. Critics, however, argue that such simulations risk fostering escalatory planning and perpetuating militarism by institutionalizing worst-case scenarios that justify perpetual arms buildups. A 2024 Stanford Human-Centered AI policy brief, based on wargame experiments with large language models in military decision-making, highlighted how AI-assisted simulations could amplify misperceptions and unintended escalations, particularly in ambiguous crises, by generating overconfident predictions that encourage preemptive postures.^[129] Similarly, RAND Corporation analyses of AI in strategic competition warn that simulations accelerating cyber and autonomous weapons development may fuel arms races, as seen in projections of intensified U.S.-China rivalry where modeled advantages prompt reciprocal investments, potentially destabilizing deterrence equilibria. These concerns, often amplified in academic and progressive circles skeptical of military expansion, posit that simulations detach strategy from diplomatic restraint, embedding a logic of inevitable conflict. Countering such critiques with empirical historical outcomes reveals simulations' role in causal stability rather than provocation. During the Cold War, RAND's political-military wargames from the 1950s onward clarified the dynamics of nuclear deterrence, helping U.S. policymakers grasp mutual assured destruction's sobering implications and avoid miscalculations that could have triggered superpower confrontation—contributing to four decades of non-hot-war rivalry despite intense ideological tensions.^[92] This track record aligns with first-principles deterrence theory: by simulating adversary responses and own-side limitations, exercises enhance predictive accuracy and restraint, yielding peace dividends through averted crises rather than endless war, as evidenced by the absence of direct U.S.-Soviet combat despite simulated escalatory paths.^[94] Ethically, while detractors claim simulations erode aversion to violence by gamifying strategy, the data indicate they foster judicious risk assessment, prioritizing de-escalation options in modeled outcomes over unchecked aggression.^[130]

Recent Developments

Market Expansion and Global Adoption (2020–2025)

The global military simulation and training market expanded significantly from 2020 to 2025, driven by heightened geopolitical tensions and the need for cost-effective readiness amid fiscal constraints. Valued at approximately USD 10.3 billion in 2023, the market reached USD 13.2 billion in 2024 and was projected to hit USD 14.06 billion by the end of 2025, reflecting a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.5% over that interval.^[131] This growth aligned with broader forecasts estimating the sector at USD 13.62 billion in 2025, underscoring sustained demand for virtual and constructive training systems to supplement live exercises.^[132] Projections indicated further expansion to USD 17-18 billion by 2030 at a 5% CAGR, fueled by investments in scalable simulation platforms.^[132] ^[133] The United States and NATO allies dominated adoption, leveraging simulations for multi-domain operations amid great-power competition with China and Russia. The U.S. Army committed over USD 26 billion annually to simulation and gamification training by 2028, emphasizing virtual environments for force-on-force scenarios.^[134] NATO's Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence advanced interoperability through AI-integrated wargames, prioritizing real-time data fusion for collective defense exercises post-2022.^[135] In contrast, China invested heavily in hypersonic missile simulations, with studies from North University of China demonstrating repeated successes in virtual strikes against U.S. carrier groups using 24-missile salvos in South China Sea scenarios.^[136] Russia, adapting to battlefield realities, integrated simulations into AI-enhanced strategies, though specific investment figures remained opaque amid sanctions; qualitative shifts included hypersonic and drone wargaming to counter Western precision strikes.^[137] The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine catalyzed global emphasis on hybrid warfare simulations, exposing gaps in conventional training and accelerating adoption of scenario-based modeling for urban, cyber, and drone-integrated conflicts. Ukraine's rapid integration of AI-driven reconnaissance simulations improved targeting efficiency, influencing NATO allies to prioritize similar tools for deterrence against peer adversaries.^[138] This conflict-driven pivot, combined with U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan, linked market growth to causal demands for predictive wargaming, as nations sought empirical validation of doctrines without expending live munitions.^[139] Overall, adoption reflected pragmatic responses to fiscal pressures and escalation risks, with Western transparency contrasting opaque authoritarian investments.^[140]

Key Technological Advances in AI and Virtual Training

Artificial intelligence has enabled the creation of adaptive adversaries in military simulations, dynamically adjusting behaviors to challenge trainees based on real-time performance. DARPA's COMBAT program develops AI algorithms that model Red Force brigade tactics, adapting to Blue Force strategies to enhance training realism.^[141] Similarly, AI-driven systems like those from Johns Hopkins University's GenWar and SAGE platforms simulate enemy behaviors in wargames, reducing setup times from months to minutes while generating realistic combat scenarios.^[142] These advancements, demonstrated in 2024-2025 exercises, improve strategic decision-making by exposing participants to evolving threats, with empirical tests showing higher resolution in adversary response modeling compared to traditional human-led simulations.^[143] The U.S. Army's Synthetic Training Environment (STE) integrates AI with virtual reality to provide immersive, high-fidelity training scenarios as of 2025. The STE Live Training System (STE LTS) simulates combat environments using VR, allowing soldiers to practice in virtual settings that replicate real-world conditions, including haptic feedback for tactile sensations like weapon recoil and impacts.^[84] Introduced in July 2025, haptic technologies in STE enhance immersion and reaction times, with testing revealing improved accuracy in simulated engagements such as grenade and mine operations.^[144]^[145] AI within STE enables dynamic scenario adaptation, converging live, virtual, and constructive elements into a unified platform that boosts training efficiency and realism.^[146] In non-kinetic domains, AI-powered cyber simulations have advanced rapidly from 2023 to 2025, focusing on defense against automated threats. The U.S. Army's Information and Cyber Technology (ICT) division developed three strategic cyber games in 2025 to train personnel in AI-driven cyber warfare, simulating complex digital battlespaces for defense strategy refinement.^[147] DARPA's AI Cyber Challenge (AIxCC), ongoing through 2025, leverages AI to secure critical software against cyber attacks via competitive simulations.^[148] These tools have empirically increased training efficacy, with 60% of military cyber teams integrating AI by 2025, leading to faster threat detection and response in simulated environments.^[149]

Future Directions

Anticipated Innovations in Simulation

Advancements in quantum computing are expected to enable military simulations to handle exponentially larger stochastic processes, such as probabilistic modeling of battlefield uncertainties and large-scale logistics optimization, by leveraging qubits for parallel computations that classical systems cannot efficiently perform.^[150]^[151] This capability could scale simulations to incorporate real-time variables like weather variability and enemy decision trees, reducing computational bottlenecks in scenarios involving millions of interdependent agents.^[152] Persistent virtual environments, resembling metaverse architectures, are projected to create continuous, shared simulation worlds where units maintain state across sessions, allowing for evolving campaign-level training without reset costs.^[153] These platforms would support multiplayer interoperability across dispersed forces, fostering persistent narratives that mirror protracted conflicts and enable data-driven refinements from aggregated user interactions.^[154]^[155] Hybrid human-AI systems integrating neuro-symbolic approaches are anticipated to model troop morale and cognitive states by fusing neural data from wearables with symbolic reasoning, predicting fatigue or decision biases under stress more accurately than traditional heuristics.^[156]^[157] Such integrations could simulate psychological dynamics in hybrid teams, where AI agents adapt to human inputs derived from brain-computer interfaces, enhancing realism in command simulations.^[158] For multinational operations, NATO-led developments aim toward fully interoperable simulation frameworks, standardizing data protocols to enable seamless coalition exercises across allied systems by the late 2020s.^[159] These would facilitate joint virtual rehearsals of Article 5 scenarios, with modular APIs allowing plug-and-play integration of national assets into unified environments.^[160]

Persistent Challenges and Adaptation Needs

Military simulations are hampered by inherent data biases, often derived from Western-centric datasets that underrepresent non-Western cultural, tactical, and environmental factors, leading to models with reduced predictive accuracy in diverse theaters. A 2024 analysis by the International Committee of the Red Cross highlights algorithmic biases in military AI applications, including simulations, as a major risk amplifying errors in decision-making under uncertainty.^[161] Similarly, a 2025 SIPRI report on bias in military artificial intelligence notes that such distortions exacerbate compliance challenges with international humanitarian law by skewing threat assessments.^[162] Adaptation demands systematic incorporation of empirical data from global conflicts, such as Middle Eastern insurgencies or African hybrid warfare, to calibrate models against broader causal dynamics and mitigate overreliance on U.S.- or NATO-dominated historical inputs. A core opacity challenge lies in replicating the irrational or ideologically driven behaviors of non-state actors, whose actions frequently deviate from rational utility maximization assumed in many simulation frameworks. Wargaming efforts, as discussed in a 2017 Strategy Bridge analysis, struggle with unpredictable adversaries like the Lord's Resistance Army, where cultural and psychological irrationality defies standard game-theoretic modeling.^[163] This limitation persists in contemporary exercises, requiring adaptations like integrating agent-based models informed by behavioral economics and declassified intelligence on groups such as ISIS, to better simulate emergent asymmetries rather than projecting state-like rationality onto irregular foes. Policy integration of simulations faces tensions between deterrence optimization and arms control imperatives, where overemphasis on escalatory scenarios can erode verifiable stability mechanisms. A 2024 Arms Control Association report on emerging technologies underscores how AI-driven simulations complicate nuclear arms control by introducing opaque decision paths that hinder mutual assurance.^[164] Balancing this necessitates causal validation of simulation outputs against historical deterrence episodes, such as Cold War crises, to ensure policy adaptations prioritize empirically grounded restraint over simulated worst-case amplifications that risk misperception in real-world signaling.^[165]

References

[1]
[PDF] The Application of Off-the-Shelf Military Simulants to Train Decision ...
What are Simulations? The official Department of Defense definition of a simulation is a model that represents activities and interactions over time. There are ...
[2]
Simulation | www.dau.edu
It is the process of conducting experiments with a model for understanding the behavior of the system modeled under selected conditions or of evaluating various ...
[3]
History of Military gaming | Article | The United States Army
Aug 27, 2008 · Military simulation games evolved over time, eventually leading to the Roman legions' sue of sand tables and miniature replicas representing the battlefield.
[4]
[PDF] The Long History of Gaming in Military Training - DTIC
This article paints a broad picture of the history of the use of games by the military, the perceptual issues around that use, and the progress that has been ...
[5]
[PDF] A PRIMER ON MODELING AND SIMULATION
In July 2007, U.S. House Resolution 487 officially recognized Modeling and Simulation (M&S) as a National Critical. Technology.
[6]
[PDF] Joint Modeling and Simulation Evolutionary Overview. - DTIC
Oct 1, 2023 · Modeling and simulation are valuable tools for research and development; test and evaluation; education, training, and military operations; ...
[7]
Millennium Challenge: The Real Story of a Corrupted Military ...
Nov 5, 2015 · This exercise was the most ambitious and costly military simulation in American history. It pitted the US military (with capabilities projected five years into ...
[8]
[PDF] Defense and Security Applications of Modeling and Simulation
This paper presents the positions of seven international experts regarding current and future grand chal- lenges for modeling and simulation (M&S) ...
[9]
Chaturanga - Indian Culture
Chaturanga is the ancient Indian game, the origin of chess, derived from 'four' and 'limb', symbolizing military divisions. It was used to educate young ...
[10]
The timeless charm of of â€˜Chaturangaâ€™ - Daily Pioneer
Sep 30, 2023 · Known as "Chaturanga" in ancient India, chess brilliantly simulated the four divisions of the Indian military: infantry, cavalry, elephants, and ...
[11]
Kriegsspiel | Analog Game Studies
Sep 16, 2019 · In pre-modern Asia and Europe, stylized battle simulations such as Go and Chess were highly respected cultural artifacts. In 19th-Century ...
[12]
War Games: A Short History - Foreign Policy
Aug 31, 2011 · War Games: A Short History. How ancient Greek amusements became an indispensable 21st-century military tool. By Charles Homans.<|separator|>
[13]
Have there ever been any war games in medieval or ancient times?
Jun 4, 2021 · Assuming you mean war games in the sense of “mock combat or simulated maneuvers for the purposes of military training,” then yes.
[14]
The Prussian "Kriegsspiel" - Conflict Simulation Group
Nov 3, 2019 · In the early 1820s a Prussian army lieutenant by the name of Georg Heinrich von Reisswitz invented a new type of wargame.
[15]
https://brill.com/view/journals/vulc/4/1/article-p52_3.pdf
[16]
Kriegsspiel – How a 19th Century Table-Top War Game Changed ...
Apr 19, 2019 · A table-top war game, it was pioneered in 19 th Century Prussia and used to transform that nation into most powerful fighting force in Europe.
[17]
[PDF] German War Gaming
The Moltke Era By the 1850s the Kriegsspiel had gained great popularity in the German military and some interest in the militaries of other countries. In the ...
[18]
Gaming at the Naval War College - March 1964 Vol. 90/3/733
During the latter part of 1887, William McCarty Little, a retired naval lieutenant, delivered a series of six lectures that introduced war gaming to the staff ...Missing: adoption | Show results with:adoption
[19]
[PDF] Rear Admiral Henry John May and Fred Jane's 1898 Naval War ...
In actions in which many ships are engaged, it is better that the admirals should not fight the pieces in which they fly their flags. 3. Hints on Playing the ...
[20]
The World's First Commercially Built Flight Simulator
Aug 21, 2018 · The Link Trainer, aka Blue Box or Pilot Trainer, was the world's first commercially built flight simulator. It was designed and built by Edin Albert Link in ...Missing: 20th | Show results with:20th
[21]
Army's mastery of amphibious operations between 1942-1945
”30 Separately, the 2/12th's CO presented a lecture and sand table demonstration on 'Amphibious Landing' to all 18th Brigade officers down to company level.
[22]
[PDF] A History of United States Military Simulation
ABSTRACT. The history of simulation and combat modeling associated with the military, and with military actions, is as old as the human race.
[23]
[PDF] The Beginning of the Monte Carlo Method - MCNP
By midyear 1949 a symposium on the Monte Carlo method, sponsored by the Rand Corporation, the. National Bureau of Standards, and the. Oak Ridge Laboratory ...
[24]
Alchemy for RAND's Golden Years - jstor
In 1951 Marshall and Kahn began a project on using the Monte Carlo method to help analyze four alternate reconnaissance plans in a strategic air campaign. The ...
[25]
[PDF] MONTE CARLO COMPUTER WAR GAMING - DTIC
It describes the basic features of a war-gaming technique which, when fully developed, is ex- pected to contribute to the design of improved TO&Es. The ...Missing: 1940s | Show results with:1940s
[26]
SAGE: Semi-Automatic Ground Environment Air Defense System
Plans had called for this device to simulate virtually every aircraft then in existence. Because this would require a powerful computer, the Servomechanisms ...
[27]
SAGE | Semi-Automatic Ground Environment
The SAGE system, by the time of its full deployment, consisted of hundreds of radars, 24 direction centers, and 3 combat centers spread throughout the US.Missing: simulation | Show results with:simulation
[28]
7.3 SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground-Environment Computers)
SAGE taught the American computer industry how to design and build large, interconnected, real-time data-processing systems.
[29]
[PDF] Flight Simulation in Air-Combat Training - DTIC
The F·16 simulator development program is another major project being done for Tactical Air. Command. A basic F·16 simulation has been built into ASPT so ...
[30]
Simulators - Centennial of Flight
... simulator take over, testing new control systems and information displays. In-flight simulators were used in the development of the F-16, F-18, A-10, B-1 ...
[31]
[PDF] Evolution of a Simulator Pilot Force-Feel System
The first Pilot Force Program at NASA Ames was developed in the late 1960s on an Electronics Associates, Inc. ±100 volt EAI 231R analog computer and was used to ...
[32]
[PDF] SIMNET and Beyond: A History of the Development of Distributed ...
Sep 3, 2015 · SIMNET stands for SIMulator NETworking. Initiated in 1983, it was the first “shared virtual reality” distributed simulation system, ...
[33]
[PDF] Distributed Interactive Simulation of Combat. - DTIC
Distributed interactive simulation (DIS) is the linking of aircraft, tank, and other military simulators in diverse locations so that the crew of.
[34]
The Next SIMNET? Unlocking the Future of Military Readiness ...
Dec 3, 2020 · SIMNET was the first demonstration of an extensive simulator network for collective team training and mission rehearsal.Missing: Cold | Show results with:Cold
[35]
Virtual Battle Space 2 Army gaming system debuts | Article - Army.mil
Feb 26, 2009 · Although VBS2 Army is tailored to train Soldiers at company level and below, McManigal said, "It has a great deal of potential to get at some ...
[36]
5 Times the US Military Has Used Video Games for Training ... - IDGA
Oct 21, 2024 · In order to improve force development capabilities, militaries have turned to digital simulators, such as flight simulators, to improve Soldier ...Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements
[37]
[PDF] GAO-13-698, ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING
Aug 22, 2013 · Service officials have noted benefits from the use of simulation-based training—both in terms of training effectiveness and in cost savings or ...
[38]
[PDF] Simulators and Enhanced Training - DTIC
This report addresses the issue of whether increased use of simulators and training devices for training military personnel is cost-effective. Information ...
[39]
Live, Virtual, and Constructive Training in Modern Combat Aviation
Oct 5, 2025 · The Live component of LVC training encompasses all training activities conducted using actual military equipment operated by real personnel. In ...
[40]
LVC (Live, Virtual, and Constructive) - Sweetspot
LVC is a synthetic training environment that combines live, virtual, and constructive elements to support training and mission rehearsal.
[41]
[PDF] Utilizing the Data from the Army's National Training Center - RAND
An NTC training rotation consists of the deployment to Fort Irwin for 14-18 days of force-on-force engagements (and separate live-fire exercises, which are not ...
[42]
[PDF] The National Training Center (NTC) Instrumentation System - DTIC
This paper will examine the instrumentation system at the National Training Center (NTC) and review its ability to support current and future Army training ...
[43]
[PDF] National Training Center Exercise Operating Procedures (EXOP)
Jun 23, 2023 · NTC enforces strict rules limiting access to the training area during rotational exercises to achieve a high degree of realism and prevent ...
[44]
Exploring the role of virtual reality in military decision training
Mar 27, 2023 · In short, VR and other forms of simulation may not be equivalent, but they can be useful for training different aspects of skilled performance.
[45]
Live Virtual Constructive Training | Operator Performance Laboratory
Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) training integrates live, virtual, and constructive elements to maximize training effectiveness and connect distributed assets.Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
[46]
Six Reasons Why the F-35 Training Simulator is Undoubtedly “Cool”
Jul 21, 2025 · The F-35 Training Simulator gives pilots an exceptionally realistic experience, replicating the sights, sounds, and sensations of an actual flight with ...Missing: motion platform G- forces
[47]
Is there a way for pilots to experience G-forces in a flight simulator ...
Apr 13, 2015 · Even a full-motion simulator can replicate only a small G-force and for only a very brief period. The only flight simulator that can replicate ...
[48]
Motion-Based Flight Simulator Usage for F-35 Control Law ...
Oct 2, 2005 · This paper discusses real-time simulation usage for F-35 control law and pilot-vehicle interface design. Results from the February/March 2004 ...<|separator|>
[49]
[PDF] Virtual Reality: State of Military Research and Applications in ... - DTIC
This report covers the state of military VR research and applications, defining VR as a synthetic environment where users interact as if real.
[50]
Transfer of training from a Full-Flight Simulator vs. a high level flight ...
This paper summarizes the most recent study conducted by the Federal Administration Administration/Volpe Center Flight Simulator Fidelity Requirements Program.
[51]
[PDF] Transfer of Training from Flight Training Devices to Flight for Ab
An 18-month study showed a significant degree of effective transfer for most flight tasks from flight training devices to actual airplane flights.
[52]
[PDF] Fidelity of simulation and transfer of training: A review of the problem
Fidelity is the degree to which a device accurately reproduces a specific effect. A simulator represents a machine, system, or environment.
[53]
[PDF] GlobalSim Constructive Simulation System - CAE
A constructive simulation is ideal for the planning, testing and training of critical decision-making where commanders and their staff can operate in a safe ...Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
[54]
Glossary - Army Modeling Simulation Office
War Game A simulation game in which participants seek to achieve a specified military objective given pre-established resources and constraints; for example ...
[55]
[PDF] Joint Conflict And Tactical Simulation
JCATS is a real-time, computer-based simulation modeling force-on-force interactions, from the Joint Task Force level to the individual person.
[56]
[PDF] JCATS Overview (U) - OSTI.GOV
JCATS is an interactive software tool used by US security agencies for real-time combat simulation, using real-world data for training and analysis.
[57]
[PDF] Catalog of Wargaming and Military Simulation Models - DTIC
The 11th Edition of the Catalog of Wargaming and Military Simulation. Models provides information on a number of models, simulations and war games currently in ...
[58]
[PDF] Modeling, Simulation, and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq
Aug 24, 2010 · This effort will identify decisions at all levels of counterin- surgency and, more broadly, irregular warfare that could benefit from more ...
[59]
[PDF] Advancing-Gaming-Exercising-Modeling-and-Simulation-GEMS ...
Oct 1, 2022 · the Marine Corps' only constructive, aggregate-level simulation system used to support the training of. Marine commanders and their battle ...
[60]
Collective Simulation-Based Training in the U.S. Army - RAND
Feb 27, 2019 · The report examines the fidelity of virtual systems to train US Army platoon- and company-level collective skills and estimates the costs of using simulators.Missing: HOSLA models
[61]
[PDF] Fidelity versus Cost and Its Effect on Modeling and Simulation - DTIC
We may be forced to reduce fidelity in order to save money or meet a budget. In some cases the trade-off is insignificant while in others the result cannot be ...
[62]
[PDF] Collective Simulation-Based Training in the U.S. Army - DTIC
High levels of physical and functional fidelity can foster psychological fidelity but are not necessarily required to do so. Psychological fidelity is based on.
[63]
[PDF] Evaluating Simulated Military Training Exercises
Jan 30, 2013 · The entire ADAFCO course moved to the DMOC, which created savings by eliminating unnecessary travel costs and reducing the amount of simulator ...
[64]
[PDF] Concepts for Improving the Military Content of Automated War Games,
In practice, analysts use heuristic rules to force allocations to be more sensible when results of model al- locations are challenged.
[65]
[PDF] A Comparison of Deterministic vs Stochastic Simulation Models for ...
Deterministic models have a known set of inputs which will result in an unique set of outputs. A stochastic simulation model has one or more random variables ...
[66]
[PDF] A Tutorial for Using the Monte Carlo Method in Vehicle ... - DTIC
INTRODUCTION. An ongoing cffort is being conducted at the US Army Armament Research and Develop- ment Command, Ballistic Research Laboratory (USA ...
[67]
[PDF] HIVE - An Agent Based Modeling Framework - SJSU ScholarWorks
Stochasticity means Agent Based Models are random in nature. ... For example, Agent Based Modeling simulations are used to gain experience in complex military ...
[68]
[PDF] Stochastic processes in a discrete model of ground combat - MSSANZ
Dec 1, 2019 · Stochastic models therefore provide a more realistic representation of combat dynamics, albeit at the expense of greater computational effort.
[69]
[PDF] Stochastic Analysis of Resources for Deployments and Excursions ...
Jul 1, 1999 · The main contribution of the stochastic approach using simulation modeling is the quantification of the variability or uncertainty ...
[70]
[PDF] Stochastic Modeling for Airlift Mobility. - DTIC
(MASS), a simulation model, is a discrete-event global airlift simulation of military and ... generated by all three stochastic models ... Gulf War Air Power Survey ...
[71]
Deep Green Helps Warriors Plan Ahead | AFCEA International
Nov 1, 2007 · An experimental decision-making technology could help future commanders see through some of the fog of war by helping them plan operations, ...
[72]
[PDF] The Deep Green Concept - John R. “Buck” Surdu
The Deep Green concept uses simulation to support military operations by maintaining a state space graph and generating options ahead of time, ensuring ...
[73]
AI Integration for Scenario Development: Training the Whole-of-Force
Adoption of AI-based capabilities to develop scenarios in support of the CTCD can increase those training centers' abilities to adapt to changes in foreign ...
[74]
How AI is Redefining Adaptive Wargaming and Strategic Readiness
Jun 20, 2025 · The integration of AI into wargaming and crisis simulations is transforming PME by introducing real-time adaptability, autonomous adversaries, ...
[75]
Anduril and Microsoft partner to advance Integrated Visual ...
Feb 11, 2025 · The IVAS program represents a groundbreaking step forward in military technology, providing soldiers with a comprehensive, body-worn system that ...
[76]
Anduril Awarded Contract to Redefine the Future of Mixed Reality
Sep 8, 2025 · Working with its partners and leveraging over 260,000 hours of soldier input from the IVAS program, Anduril has integrated IVAS 1.2 headsets as ...
[77]
Reality Check: Haptics improvements to Army simulation training ...
Apr 1, 2025 · The U.S. Army's Synthetic Training Environment integrates haptic technology with virtual and augmented reality to create realistic combat ...
[78]
Army goes deep into VR/AR for training and combat
Oct 17, 2022 · The US Army is putting considerable resources and time into virtual-reality (VR), augmented-reality (AR), and mixed-reality (MR) equipment and training.
[79]
Virtual reality used to train Soldiers in new training simulator - Army.mil
Aug 1, 2012 · The Dismounted Soldier Training System will be available for leaders to enhance their Soldiers' training in a fully immersive, virtual reality environment.
[80]
The Synthetic Training Environment | AUSA
Dec 10, 2020 · The Synthetic Training Environment (STE) is the US Army's program to revolutionize the Army's entire training paradigm.
[81]
Army hits record low for training deaths for second year in a row
Oct 22, 2021 · Last year, 24 soldiers died in training accidents. The Army lost 26 soldiers during training in 2018 and 2019. “Leaders at every echelon should ...
[82]
Additional Oversight Could Help Mitigate High-Risk Training Accidents
Nov 21, 2024 · About 80% of the over 3,600 on-duty, non-combat accidents reported from FY 2012-2022 occurred during training. Parachute and dive training ...
[83]
[PDF] Immersive Simulation Training for the Dismounted Soldier - DTIC
A study was conducted to document the need for immersive dismounted virtual Soldier and leader training and the available research evidence regarding the ...
[84]
REALITY CHECK | Article | The United States Army
Jul 1, 2025 · In 2017, the Army began developing the Synthetic Training Environment (STE) with the goal of achieving initial operational capability by 2021 ...
[85]
[PDF] Improving Operational Wargaming: Its All Fun and Games Until ...
Wargames are a useful tool to assess plans as directed in operational planning processes; however, commanders and staffs should neither equate wargame victory ...
[86]
https://doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_5-0/AFDP5-0Planning.pdf
[87]
[PDF] Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates ...
This document, 'Thunder and Lightning', discusses airpower debates during Desert Storm, focusing on the Persian Gulf War and US aerial operations.
[88]
TAB C – Modeling and Simulation - GulfLINK
Just before the start of the ground war in February 1991, Gulf War air planners contacted Dugway Proving Ground about modeling the effects of Iraq's chemical ...
[89]
[PDF] Avoiding Fratricide
May 18, 1992 · Realistic training can reduce casualties in combat—including fratricide-but the inherent danger of training creates a connundrum. One military ...
[90]
[PDF] Towards Zero Fratricide – Simulation Enabled Live Field Firing
This paper shall outline the historical provenance of military fratricide, the core reasons why fratricide ... forces with a focus on fratricide reduction has ...
[91]
[PDF] Dealing Realistically With Fratricide - USAWC Press
Jul 4, 1995 · Reducing fratricide rates will provide a significant battlefield advantage for the American military. As Colonel Shrader remarked, "The ...
[92]
1950s Political-Military Wargaming at the RAND Corporation
Sep 7, 2021 · There was a vociferous debate early on in the game as to whether or not to use a chip-and-board model like many wargames that had come before.
[93]
[PDF] 1950S POLITICAL-MILITARY WARGAMING AT THE RAND ...
To do so, they created the first political-military simulations, called the “Cold War Games.” The games had divergent outcomes, with the mathematicians quick to ...<|separator|>
[94]
Measuring Strategic Deterrence: A Wargaming Approach - NDU Press
Jul 1, 2016 · This article describes how the U.S. Naval War College uses wargaming to help measure factors associated with strategic deterrence decisionmaking ...Missing: achievements modeling
[95]
Schriever Wargame 2025 to explore future space strategy ...
Aug 11, 2025 · The wargame helps inform the future force design and acquisitions process to ensure the U.S. and its allies remain the most formidable combat ...
[96]
Schriever Wargame to give allies bigger role as U.S. shifts toward ...
Aug 18, 2025 · The Schriever Wargame, a tabletop exercise that has brought together military planners since 2001 to explore space security challenges, is ...
[97]
1964 U.S. War Game an Accurate Forecast of Failure in Vietnam
Oct 6, 1985 · 1964 U.S. War Game an Accurate Forecast of Failure in Vietnam : Study Suggested LBJ Was Facing a No-Win Situation. By NORMAN KEMPSTER. Oct. 6 ...
[98]
[PDF] 1964 U.S. WAR GAME AN ACCURATE FORECAST OF ... - CIA
1964 U.S. War Game an Accurate. Forecast of Failure in Vietnam. By NORMAN KEMPSTER,. Times Staff Writer. WASHINGTON-In the late summer of 1964, a few months.
[99]
FACE VALIDATION IN LARGE-SCALE SIMULATION PROJECTS
Oct 16, 2025 · Face validation is an informal type of validation, usually applied in the early stages of a simulation project or model development process.
[100]
[PDF] Generalizing Concepts and Methods of Verification, Validation, and ...
Validation is the process of determining: (a) the manner in which and degree to which a model (and its data) is an accurate representation of the real world ...
[101]
[PDF] Cost-Effectiveness of Flight Simulators for Military Training ... - DTIC
Transfer Ratio (number of hours in simulator/number of hours in ... There is a wide range in the Transfer Effectiveness Ratios shown in Table 5 ...
[102]
[PDF] Red Teaming: A Means to Military Transformation - DTIC
The Red Team did not possess complete freedom of action because of specific experiment objectives as well as time, resources, and modeling constraints, examples ...
[103]
[PDF] THE RED TEAM HANDBOOK - Army.mil
Any U.S. military and government employee can register with APAN and join our Red Teaming. Central at https://www.apan.org. Class Descriptions, Scheduling, and ...
[104]
[PDF] dod manual 5000.102 modeling and simulation verification, validation
Dec 9, 2024 · DoD Manual 5000.102 implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for verification, validation, and accreditation of ...
[105]
[PDF] Transfer and Cost Effectiveness as Guides to Simulator/Flight ...
Simulation can be offered at greatly reduced per hour costs when compared to the aircraft, and as studies have shown, provides positive transfer of training ...
[106]
Rethinking Transfer-Effectiveness-Ratio-based Cost Savings from ...
Mar 10, 2025 · Prior studies have used the “Transfer Effectiveness Ratio” (TER) metric to determine flight training tasks that could benefit from a simulator.<|separator|>
[107]
[PDF] Collective Simulation-Based Training in the U.S. Army - RAND
We refer to these virtual training systems as physically simulated military equip- ment (PSME), based on the Military Equipment Framework of Gorski and ...
[108]
[PDF] Guidance on the Validation of Models and Simulation used in ...
Validation of M&S should be detailed in plans, tailored to the application, and avoid extrapolation outside the validated domain. Extrapolating M&S results ...
[109]
Army and Marine Corps Training: Better Performance and Cost Data ...
Aug 22, 2013 · Service officials have noted benefits from the use of simulation-based training--both in terms of training effectiveness and in cost savings or ...
[110]
[PDF] The Value of Simulation for Training. - DTIC
The available findings show that simulators are cost-effective for initial flight and maintenance training in institutions: they train as well as does actual ...
[111]
The Effectiveness of Virtual Simulation as a Training Tool
Jul 22, 2020 · There are also reduced risks for Soldiers as they virtually use weapons, operate an array of vehicles, or practice team, squad, and full unit ...
[112]
https://vciba.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s42492-025-00206-w
[113]
The effectiveness of simulation-based training on the competency of ...
The results showed that simulation-based interventions were effective in military nurse competency training, including individual knowledge, skills, abilities ...
[114]
Simulator Training Saves Lives - And Money - FAAC Incorporated
Nov 6, 2019 · Training is inherently risky—but simulator training can significantly reduce that risk and money. Click to learn more.Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
[115]
Revisiting RAND's Russia Wargames After the Invasion of Ukraine
Nov 21, 2023 · This report summarizes the unclassified conclusions of the discussions that followed a comprehensive review of wargaming methods and analysis used.
[116]
Making Military Education More Effective and Affordable - RAND
For a one-time cost of $1.7 million, savings will total $8 million by the end of a five-year period.<|separator|>
[117]
'Live synthetic' Army's next generation of simulation | Article - Army.mil
Mar 20, 2014 · In fact, Janiszewski said his unit in Germany in 2002 and 2003, rehearsed the Iraq invasion and the roll up to Baghdad using CS. The U.S. Army ...
[118]
The Lost Lesson Of Millennium Challenge 2002 - Task & Purpose
Nov 6, 2019 · ... MC2002 taught our forces anything in preparation for the invasion of Iraq invasion. We began ground invasion into Iraq using force on force ...
[119]
[PDF] How the U.S. military lost a $250 milli... game in minutes
Oct 30, 2024 · challenges the United States would face in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and other conflicts since then. ... In many ways, Millennium Challenge 2002 ...
[120]
Army Invests in New Training Tools Amidst Pandemic
Sep 29, 2020 · Because of the pandemic, the service has increased its use of virtual training technology to account for social distancing procedures, she ...
[121]
Pandemics and the Future of Military Training - War on the Rocks
Mar 26, 2020 · As the coronavirus deepens its global reach, the military can deploy training virtually at the point-of-need to help maintain troop readiness.
[122]
[PDF] Fidelity and Validity in Distributed Interactive Simulation - DTIC
Secondly, four key drivers of fidelity requirements are identified: (a) the mission to be simulated, (b) the objective(s) of the simulation; (c) the fidelity ...
[123]
[PDF] Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units
The purpose of the project was to explain will to fight at the unit level and to develop a model designed to support assessment of partner forces and analysis ...
[124]
Military Simulation Big Data: Background, State of the Art, and ...
Nov 24, 2015 · To address the enormous computational requirements of large-scale military simulations, a high-performance computing (HPC) technique is employed ...
[125]
[PDF] A Study of Simulation Effectiveness in Modeling Heavy Combined ...
Even when using classified, verified, and validated data, virtually all simulations fail in some regard, particularly when representing urban warfare--The realm ...
[126]
Military History and Validation of Combat Models - The Dupuy Institute
Oct 12, 2017 · C2 training simulations should not be relied upon to validate war plans and they must not be used for that purpose. C2 training simulations ...
[127]
Typical Pitfalls of Simulation Modeling - JASSS
The so-called confirmation bias pinpoints that one should proceed with particular caution when results support prior beliefs or hypotheses (Nickerson 1998).
[128]
Use Live, Virtual, Constructive Training to Meet the High-end Fight
A live, virtual, constructive (LVC) hybrid or blended training environment can be the solution. LVC is not a specific system—it blends various systems, networks ...
[129]
Escalation Risks from LLMs in Military and Diplomatic Contexts
May 2, 2024 · This brief presents the results of a wargame simulation that aims to evaluate the escalation risks of large language models (LLMs) in ...
[130]
Simulating War Might Be the Best Way To Prevent One - Defense One
Jul 14, 2014 · Baptiste insists that slowdowns in simulated training will hurt readiness, since the budget for more live training hasn't increased in response.Missing: promoting endless
[131]
$$14.06 Bn Military Simulation And Training Global Markets,
Jul 31, 2025 · It will grow from $13.2 billion in 2024 to $14.06 billion in 2025 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.5%. The military simulation and ...Missing: 2020-2025 | Show results with:2020-2025
[132]
Military Simulation And Training Market Size & Share Analysis
Mar 13, 2025 · The Military Simulation And Training Market size is estimated at USD 13.62 billion in 2025, and is expected to reach USD 17.58 billion by 2030, at a CAGR of 5. ...
[133]
Military Simulation And Virtual Training Market Report, 2030
The global military simulation and virtual training market size was valued at USD 13.02 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach USD 18.75 billion by 2030, ...
[134]
US Army to spend $26bn on gamification and simulation training by ...
Jul 16, 2024 · The US military is projected to invest more than $26bn annually into gamification and simulation training by 2028, according to a new report.
[135]
Advancing NATO Transformation Through the Modelling ...
Sep 23, 2025 · September 23, 2025 Located in Rome, Italy, the NATO Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence stands at the forefront of Allied innovation. ...Missing: military investments 2020-2025
[136]
War game: China hypersonics sink US carrier every time - Asia Times
May 26, 2023 · North University of China simulation shows three-wave hypersonic attack consistently decimates USS Gerald Ford in a South China Sea battle.
[137]
Russia Capitalizes on Development of Artificial Intelligence in Its ...
Mar 3, 2025 · Russia's growing emphasis on AI for military applications underscores its determination to close the technological gap with international competitors.<|separator|>
[138]
Understanding the Military AI Ecosystem of Ukraine - CSIS
Nov 12, 2024 · Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine's intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities ...
[139]
AI in military operations: Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict ...
Sep 3, 2025 · Ukraine's success in AI-assisted reconnaissance, drone coordination, and battlefield analytics has compelled Russia to adopt similar tactics, ...
[140]
Agile Warfare: How Ukraine is Changing Military Innovation - Vislink
Mar 17, 2025 · The war in Ukraine has accelerated a shift from traditional, slow-moving defense development to an agile, battlefield-driven innovation model.
[141]
COMBAT: COnstructive Machine-learning Battles with Adversary ...
COMBAT aims to develop artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms to generate models of Red Force brigade behaviors that challenge and adapt to Blue Forces.
[142]
Advanced AI Systems From Johns Hopkins Could Recast How US ...
Aug 15, 2025 · AI-driven GenWar and SAGE simulate realistic combat scenarios, model enemy behavior, and cut wargame setup time from months to minutes.
[143]
A Glimpse into the Future Battlefield with AI-Embedded Wargames
Through AI-generated battlefield simulations, the Navy can fight an adversary force more than a million times to find a key to winning the battle.Missing: DARPA | Show results with:DARPA
[144]
US Army Brings 'Touch' to Virtual Training With New Haptics Tech
Jul 8, 2025 · Haptics tech uses wearable devices to transmit vibrations and forces, simulating touch, gun recoil, and bullet impacts, increasing immersion ...
[145]
US Army Boosts Training With Advanced Simulated Grenades, Mines
Sep 24, 2025 · The US Army has also engaged in virtual training. In July 2025, it introduced the use of haptics technology in its STE LTS, which involves ...
[146]
Revolutionizing Military Training: The US Army's Synthetic Training ...
The STE is a cutting-edge platform using AI, VR, and cloud computing for realistic, immersive, and adaptable military training. It is a cornerstone of the U.S. ...
[147]
PREPARING FOR THE CYBER BATTLESPACE | Article - Army.mil
Aug 25, 2025 · To prepare for AI-driven cyber warfare, ICT has developed three strategic cyber games that enhance cyber defense training and are used by cyber ...
[148]
AIxCC: AI Cyber Challenge - DARPA
AIxCC is a two-year competition that brings together the best and brightest in AI and cybersecurity to safeguard the software critical to all Americans.Missing: simulations | Show results with:simulations
[149]
Cyber Warfare Statistics 2025: Costs, AI Tactics, and State Attacks
Oct 8, 2025 · In 2025, 60% of cyber operations teams in military and intelligence communities reported AI integration in both offense and defense.
[150]
Quantum Technology in Defence | BQPhy
Oct 14, 2025 · Quantum technologies enable faster simulations for battlefield planning, drone swarms, and hypersonic defense. Post-quantum cryptography and ...Quantum Computing and... · Quantum Communication for...
[151]
Unleash quantum computing power in Aerospace & Defense - Pasqal
May 17, 2024 · Quantum computing can optimize logistics, simulate materials, enhance cybersecurity, and improve simulation and modeling in aerospace and ...<|separator|>
[152]
Quantum Machine Learning as a Future Battlefield Multiplier - CSIAC
Feb 18, 2025 · This article covers QML fundamentals, with emphasis on QML features that exploit hardware and software technologies contrasting traditional AI/ML systems.
[153]
The Full Potential of a Military Metaverse - War on the Rocks
Feb 18, 2022 · The metaverse is fundamentally a social construction that is meant to provide new and potentially deeper opportunities for human interactions ...Missing: prospects | Show results with:prospects
[154]
How Interconnected, Simulated Worlds Could Transform Military ...
Nov 23, 2022 · Machine learning and data analysis on data from the metaverse could make informed suggestions for improvements, he said. Once that data exists, ...Missing: prospects | Show results with:prospects
[155]
The future of military training: Synthetic environments ... - BAE Systems
Jul 6, 2023 · We must train as we fight. We must simulate as we plan, and we must migrate our training increasingly from live to synthetic environments.Missing: persistent prospects<|control11|><|separator|>
[156]
Neuro-Symbolic AI for Military Applications - arXiv
Aug 17, 2024 · Focuses on developing hybrid AI algorithms that integrate symbolic reasoning with data-driven learning to create more trustworthy and dependable ...
[157]
[PDF] A Neuro-Symbolic Approach to AI Agents within Simulation
We show how a neuro-symbolic approach to Artificial Intelligence (AI) can support conversational agents that effectively replace the human role-player for ...
[158]
[PDF] Insights on Future Hybrid Human–Machine Intelligence and Army ...
The report summarizes a workshop on hybrid human-machine intelligence for military applications, aiming to synergize human and machine intelligence for ...
[159]
CWIX25 Starts Now! NATO's Largest Digital Interoperability Exercise ...
Jun 4, 2025 · CWIX25 is a NATO exercise testing over 570 capabilities, with 40 nations, to improve digital interoperability for command and control.
[160]
Interoperability Through Innovation
The simulators procured today will affect the ability to train and integrate with other nations in the future. We also have an opportunity within the new NATO ...Conclusion · Usafe-Afafricalcc, Request... · The Japcc Interview With The...
[161]
The problem of algorithmic bias and military applications of AI.
Mar 14, 2024 · Algorithmic biases have become firmly recognised as a major risk factor associated with AI technologies in the military context.Missing: simulation centric
[162]
[PDF] Bias in Military Artificial Intelligence and Compliance with ... - SIPRI
Aug 3, 2025 · The risks of harm arising from bias in some respects exacerbate existing challenges that the use of military AI poses for compliance with IHL.Missing: simulations | Show results with:simulations
[163]
#Wargaming Unpredictable Adversaries (and Unreliable Allies)
Mar 28, 2017 · One challenge in wargaming, and especially political-military ... Lord's Resistance Army truly irrational, or is it simply the product ...
[164]
[PDF] Emerging Military Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability
As is true of artificial intelligence and autonomy, the utilization of cyberspace for military purposes poses tough new challenges for arms control.
[165]
Wargaming Nuclear Deterrence and Its Failures in a U.S.–China ...
Dec 13, 2024 · A new report informed by 15 wargame simulations examines nuclear dynamics in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, assessing what creates the ...