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Political class

The political class refers to the organized minority within society that monopolizes political power, governance, and policy influence, distinguishing itself through professionalization, internal cohesion, and mechanisms that insulate it from the broader, less coordinated populace.^[1]^[2] This concept, rooted in elite theory, posits that rule by such a class is inevitable in any complex society, as articulated by Gaetano Mosca, who described it as a ruling stratum possessing superior organizational skills, intellectual qualities, and material resources to maintain dominance.^[3]^[4] In theoretical terms, the political class emerges from the interplay of formal institutions and informal networks, including career politicians, high-level bureaucrats, lobbyists, and allied intellectuals, who collectively shape public policy to align with their interests rather than mass preferences.^[5]^[6] Empirical studies of policy outcomes, particularly in liberal democracies, demonstrate this dynamic: economic and regulatory decisions disproportionately reflect the priorities of economic elites and organized interests over those of average citizens, underscoring the class's effective control despite electoral facades.^[7] Defining characteristics include a tendency toward self-perpetuation via incumbency advantages, familial dynasties, and revolving-door employment between government and private sectors, fostering a professional ethos detached from productive economic activity.^[8]^[9] Critics highlight controversies surrounding the political class's role in systemic inefficiencies, such as regulatory capture and fiscal profligacy, which empirical data link to concentrated power rather than competitive markets or direct accountability.^[7] While proponents argue it provides governance stability absent in pure majoritarian systems, causal analyses reveal how its insulation contributes to policy drift toward oligarchic tendencies, as foreseen in Mosca's framework where the class circulates internally but rarely yields ground to outsiders.^[3]^[5] This structure manifests globally, from entrenched party bureaucracies in Europe to administrative states in the Anglosphere, often provoking populist backlashes as evidence of eroded public trust in elite stewardship.^[8]

Definition and Conceptual Foundations

Origins and Etymology

The term "political class" derives from the Italian classe politica, coined by the political scientist Gaetano Mosca to denote the organized minority that exercises de facto rule in every society, irrespective of constitutional forms.^[6] Mosca introduced this concept in his seminal 1896 work Elementi di Scienza Politica (Elements of Political Science), where he argued that such a class arises from the inevitable inequality in organizational capacities between elites and masses, enabling the former to dominate governance and resource allocation.^[3] In English translations, including the 1939 edition titled The Ruling Class, Mosca's classe politica is often rendered as "political class" to emphasize its active role in politics, distinct from broader socioeconomic elites, though sometimes interchangeably translated as "ruling class" to highlight its governing function.^[10] The conceptual origins of the political class lie in Mosca's elite theory, which rejected egalitarian ideals by positing that all historical societies—from ancient tyrannies to modern democracies—are stratified by a compact, cohesive minority that monopolizes power through superior coordination, ideological justification (termed the "political formula"), and control of coercive apparatuses.^[11] This framework, developed amid Italy's post-unification challenges like regional fragmentation and parliamentary instability, underscored causal mechanisms such as the masses' disorganization and the elites' adaptability, ensuring the political class's persistence even under nominally democratic systems.^[12] Mosca's formulation influenced subsequent theorists like Vilfredo Pareto, who extended it to circulation of elites, but retained its core realism: power concentrates in a self-perpetuating stratum due to human nature's hierarchical tendencies rather than institutional failures alone.^[3] Empirical support for Mosca's origins drew from historical analyses, including Roman senatorial dominance and medieval ecclesiastical hierarchies, where informal networks supplanted formal equality.^[4]

Theoretical Frameworks

Elite theory posits that political power in modern societies is concentrated among a small, cohesive group of elites who dominate decision-making processes, often transcending formal democratic institutions. Originating with thinkers like Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this framework argues that elites arise due to inherent inequalities in knowledge, resources, and organizational skills, forming a "political class" that circulates among itself rather than representing mass interests.^[7]^[13] Empirical studies, such as those analyzing policy outcomes in the United States, support elite theory by showing that economic elites and organized interest groups exert disproportionate influence over government responsiveness compared to average citizens.^[7] Robert Michels' iron law of oligarchy, articulated in his 1911 book Political Parties, extends this by asserting that all complex organizations, including political parties and democracies, inevitably evolve into oligarchies ruled by a professionalized leadership cadre—a "political class" insulated from the rank-and-file. Michels attributed this to technical necessities of organization, the psychological inertia of masses, and leaders' self-preservation incentives, observing it in the German Social Democratic Party where initial egalitarianism gave way to bureaucratic control.^[14] This law challenges idealistic views of participatory democracy, positing causal mechanisms like delegation of authority that empower elites while disempowering bases, with historical examples including labor unions and socialist movements devolving into hierarchical structures.^[15] Public choice theory, developed by economists like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in the mid-20th century, applies rational choice principles to politics, modeling politicians, bureaucrats, and voters as self-interested utility maximizers rather than benevolent public servants. This framework explains the political class as a self-perpetuating group exploiting information asymmetries, concentrated benefits, and diffuse costs to secure rents, such as through regulatory capture or pork-barrel spending—evident in analyses of legislative logrolling where elites trade favors to maintain power.^[16] Unlike pluralist theories assuming competitive equilibria, public choice highlights institutional failures like log-rolling and bureaucratic expansion, supported by data on government growth correlating with elite incentives over voter preferences.^[17] These theories collectively underscore causal realism in elite dominance, prioritizing structural incentives over normative ideals of representation.

Core Characteristics

Professionalization and Insulation

The professionalization of the political class manifests as the transformation of public office into a full-time career trajectory, characterized by early entry, specialized training in political roles, and progression through hierarchical positions such as aides, local officials, and higher elected bodies, rather than intermittent civic duty. In Western democracies, this trend accelerated post-World War II, with indicators including formalized career ladders, increased campaign expenditures, and a decline in amateurs entering politics directly from non-political professions.^[18] In the United States, the share of senators self-identifying as professional politicians rose from 15 in 1979 to 49 by the 116th Congress (2019–2021), reflecting a 227% increase driven by incumbency advantages and structured pathways.^[19] Congressional Research Service data further show average House tenure stabilizing around 9–10 years since the 1980s, up from shorter pre-1960s stints, while many members trace pre-elected careers to law (historically dominant but declining from near-50% in the late 19th century to about 37% in recent decades) or prior government service.^[20]^[21] This professionalization inherently insulates the political class from everyday economic and social realities, as sustained immersion in government ecosystems—often concentrated in urban centers like Washington, D.C.—limits exposure to private-sector risks and diverse constituencies. Empirical analyses reveal persistent perceptual gaps, with U.S. political elites overestimating public support for certain policies while underestimating opposition on issues like trade and immigration; for instance, surveys of elite respondents (including policymakers) show divergences of 20–30 percentage points from mass opinion on economic redistribution.^[22]^[23] Overrepresentation of elite-educated individuals exacerbates this detachment: in advanced democracies, politicians from selective private institutions outnumber public-school graduates relative to population shares, correlating with reduced institutional trust as publics perceive unrepresentative governance.^[24] Insulation is reinforced by self-selecting networks and informational bubbles, where career incentives prioritize intra-elite alliances over broad public engagement, leading to systematic errors in representing voter priorities. Longitudinal data from 1975–2018 on U.S. foreign policy attitudes indicate elite-public divides widening amid professional entrenchment, with politicians exhibiting motivated reasoning that aligns policy with peer consensus rather than median preferences.^[23] Such dynamics contribute to policy inefficacy, as evidenced by governors with prior congressional careers pursuing more ideologically extreme fiscal policies decoupled from state-level public sentiment.^[25] While some counterarguments posit that professional expertise enhances governance efficiency, causal evidence links prolonged tenures to diminished responsiveness, as insulated actors face fewer electoral penalties for misaligned decisions.^[26]

Revolving Door and Elite Networks

The revolving door refers to the frequent movement of individuals between government positions and private-sector roles, particularly in industries subject to regulation, enabling the political class to leverage public authority for personal or networked gain. In the United States, approximately 48% of former members of the 115th Congress (2017–2019) transitioned to lobbying firms upon leaving office, with an additional 11% becoming lobbying clients.^[27] This pattern facilitates regulatory capture, where former officials influence policies favoring their future employers; empirical analysis of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office examiners shows they grant 10% more patents to companies they later join compared to those they do not.^[28] Such transitions amplify elite networks, comprising interconnected alumni from selective institutions, think tanks, and corporate boards that sustain the political class's insulation from broader societal inputs. Revolving door lobbyists, often with prior congressional staff ties, account for 56% of total lobbying revenue, deriving value from these connections that enhance their placement on high-revenue accounts.^[29]^[30] In executive branches, about 55% of appointees who later register as lobbyists do so post-government, perpetuating cycles where policy expertise circulates among a narrow cadre.^[31] These dynamics entrench power concentration, as networks prioritize intra-elite reciprocity over public accountability; for instance, firms hiring former regulators experience expedited approvals in preceding months, suggesting preemptive favoritism.^[32] While proponents argue the door imports private expertise to government, evidence indicates it predominantly extracts value for connected entities, with lobbyists losing over 20% in revenue ($177,000 annually on average) when former political allies exit office, underscoring dependence on sustained ties.^[33] This structure, observed across sectors like finance and health, exemplifies how the political class maintains dominance through relational capital rather than meritocratic openness.^[34]

Historical Evolution

Early Modern Foundations

The early modern period (c. 1500–1800) witnessed the embryonic formation of a political class through the centralization of monarchical authority, which demanded specialized administrators to manage expanding state apparatuses amid the decline of feudal fragmentation. In absolutist regimes, rulers curtailed noble autonomy by integrating elites into royal councils and bureaucracies, creating insulated networks reliant on patronage and expertise rather than hereditary land ties. This shift prioritized administrative efficiency for warfare, taxation, and territorial control, fostering a proto-professional cadre distinct from both the sovereign and the broader populace.^[35] France under Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) exemplified these developments, as the king centralized power through a Versailles-based court that domesticated the nobility, transforming them into courtiers dependent on royal dispensation for status and resources. By 1682, Versailles housed over 10,000 courtiers, serving as a mechanism to monitor and co-opt potential rivals while delegating governance to ministers like Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who from 1665 onward reorganized state finances via specialized intendants—royal commissioners enforcing policy in provinces without local interference. This system, building on Cardinal Richelieu's 1634–1636 creation of intendants as itinerant overseers, marked an early form of bureaucratic insulation, where officials derived authority from the crown rather than provincial estates, enabling consistent revenue extraction that funded armies exceeding 400,000 men by the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714).^[36]^[37] Parallel structures emerged elsewhere, as in Brandenburg-Prussia, where the Great Elector Frederick William (r. 1640–1688) imposed Kriegsrat military councils and domain administrations by the 1660s, professionalizing officials with fixed salaries to bypass noble diets and secure fiscal autonomy for militarization. In England, the post-1688 Glorious Revolution entrenched a parliamentary elite via the Privy Council and ministerial offices, though less absolutist, emphasizing patronage networks that rewarded loyalty with sinecures, as seen in the 1694 Triennial Act's rotation of MPs to balance factional power. These innovations reflected causal pressures from interstate competition, where states with cohesive administrative elites—often numbering in the hundreds by 1700—outcompeted decentralized rivals in mobilizing resources, laying groundwork for modern entrenchment by prioritizing insider expertise over popular accountability.^[38]^[39] Intellectually, Niccolò Machiavelli's The Prince (1532) provided a realist framework influencing elite self-conception, advocating virtù—decisive action by rulers and advisors—to navigate fortuna, emphasizing power consolidation through cunning alliances and force over moralistic governance. While not prescribing a class per se, Machiavelli's separation of politics from ethics rationalized elite insulation, impacting subsequent theorists like Hobbes, whose Leviathan (1651) justified sovereign absolutism via delegated authority to prevent civil strife. Such ideas, disseminated amid the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which killed up to 8 million and underscored administrative necessities, reinforced the view of politics as a specialized domain for the capable few.^[40]^[41]

20th-Century Expansion and Bureaucratization

The expansion of the political class in the 20th century was driven primarily by the growth of national bureaucracies, as governments assumed expanded roles in economic regulation, social welfare, and wartime mobilization, leading to a professionalized administrative elite insulated from electoral pressures. In the United States, federal civilian employment in the executive branch rose from 231,000 in 1901 to 645,000 by 1920, reflecting gradual increases tied to Progressive Era reforms and World War I demands.^[42] This trajectory accelerated under the [New Deal](/page/New Deal) starting in 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt's programs created numerous agencies for relief, recovery, and reform—such as the Works Progress Administration and Social Security Administration—resulting in the largest bureaucratic expansion in U.S. history between 1933 and 1945, with employment surging to a World War II peak of 3.37 million in 1945.^[43]^[44] By 1960, despite post-war demobilization, executive branch civilian employment stabilized at around 1.8 million, incorporating ongoing Cold War and Great Society initiatives that further entrenched career bureaucrats.^[42] In Europe, bureaucratization paralleled these trends but intensified after World War II through the establishment of comprehensive welfare states, which required vast administrative apparatuses to manage social insurance, healthcare, and unemployment benefits. Countries like the United Kingdom and Sweden saw public sector employment expand significantly from the 1940s onward, as wartime state capacities—honed for mobilization and rationing—were repurposed for peacetime redistribution, with social spending rising from about 4.7% of GDP in 1913 to 10.5% by 1937 in the UK alone, escalating further post-1945.^[45]^[46] The legacy of total war enhanced bureaucratic expertise in surveillance and planning, fostering a political class of technocrats who prioritized long-term policy implementation over direct democratic accountability, as evidenced by the proliferation of civil service roles in nascent European institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.^[47] This bureaucratization reinforced the political class's professionalization, with career politicians and administrators forming interlocking networks less tethered to private sector experience. In the U.S. Congress, average tenure for representatives increased nearly fourfold from the early 1900s to the late 20th century, correlating with the rise of committee systems and staff expansions that rewarded incumbency and policy specialization.^[48] Similarly, in Western Europe, post-war parliaments saw a shift toward MPs with prior roles in unions, parties, or public administration, diminishing outsider entry and solidifying an elite cadre managing expanded state functions.^[49] Globally, the century's ideological contests—between capitalism, socialism, and fascism—legitimized larger apparatuses, as states competed to deliver public goods, inadvertently concentrating power in unelected officials who outlasted transient elected leaders.^[50]

Empirical Manifestations and Evidence

Metrics of Entrenchment

One key indicator of entrenchment is the high rate of incumbent re-election in legislative bodies, particularly in the United States Congress, where structural advantages such as name recognition, fundraising networks, and gerrymandered districts contribute to sustained tenure. In the 2024 general elections, 95% of incumbents nationwide were re-elected, following a 94% rate in 2022; these figures reflect a longstanding pattern where House incumbents have won over 90% of races since the 1990s.^[51] Similar dynamics appear in other democracies, though rates vary; for instance, in the UK Parliament, incumbency advantages have yielded re-election success above 80% in recent cycles, bolstered by first-past-the-post systems that favor established candidates.^[52] Socioeconomic metrics further highlight entrenchment through disparities in wealth and education between the political class and the general population. The median net worth of U.S. members of Congress exceeds $1 million, approximately five to twelve times the median U.S. household net worth of around $193,000 as of 2022, with congressional wealth growing faster than average citizen assets over time.^[53]^[54] Educationally, while 94% of the 118th Congress holds at least a bachelor's degree—far above the U.S. adult rate of about 38%—a disproportionate share attended elite institutions; roughly one-third graduated from top-tier universities, including Ivy League schools, despite these comprising less than 1% of U.S. higher education enrollment.^[55]^[56] Network-based entrenchment is evident in political dynasties and the revolving door between government and influence industries. Historically, about 8.7% of U.S. Congress members have hailed from dynastic families, with over 700 such families accounting for roughly 10% of all congressional service since 1789; contemporary examples include relatives of prior officeholders comprising around 5% of sitting members.^[57]^[58] The revolving door amplifies this, as nearly half of former members of recent Congresses transition to lobbying firms or related roles, where ex-officials leverage connections for higher success rates in advocacy—up to 63% efficacy compared to non-revolvers.^[27]^[59] These patterns suggest self-perpetuating elite cohesion, as measured by longitudinal studies of tenure, kinship ties, and post-office career paths in democratic systems.^[30]

Case Studies in Power Concentration

In France, the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), established in 1945 under President Charles de Gaulle to train high-level civil servants, exemplifies power concentration within a narrow technocratic elite known as énarques. Graduates of ENA have historically dominated key positions in government, with alumni occupying approximately 25% of ministerial roles under recent presidents and controlling a majority of prefectures and senior administrative posts as of 2019.^[60] This system's selectivity, drawing disproportionately from affluent and urban backgrounds—over 70% of entrants from Paris-region preparatory schools—fostered a self-perpetuating class insulated from broader societal input, contributing to policy rigidities evident in responses to events like the 2018 gilets jaunes protests.^[61] President Emmanuel Macron, himself an ENA alumnus, announced its dissolution on April 8, 2021, citing the need to dismantle "social reproduction" and enhance diversity, though critics argued the reform merely rebranded the elite pipeline without addressing underlying network entrenchment.^[62] The European Union's Brussels-based bureaucracy provides another instance, where an unelected administrative apparatus exercises significant agenda-setting authority over 27 member states. The European Commission, comprising around 32,000 officials as of 2023, holds monopoly on legislative proposals under the EU treaties, enabling it to shape policies on trade, competition, and regulation with limited direct accountability to national electorates.^[63] This structure has concentrated influence among a cosmopolitan elite, often recycled from national civil services or international organizations, as seen in the 2019-2024 von der Leyen Commission, where key appointees like Ursula von der Leyen (former German defense minister) leveraged opaque selection processes to consolidate executive prerogatives, including during the COVID-19 vaccine procurement centralized in 2020-2021.^[64] Empirical analyses highlight how this insulation correlates with democratic deficits, such as the EU's use of infringement procedures to override national policies, with over 1,200 such actions initiated between 2010 and 2020, disproportionately targeting non-aligned governments.^[65] While proponents cite technocratic efficiency, data from public opinion surveys indicate widespread perceptions of elite detachment, with 68% of EU citizens in 2023 viewing the bureaucracy as remote from everyday concerns.^[66] In the United States, the national security apparatus illustrates power concentration through entrenched networks spanning intelligence agencies, defense contractors, and policy think tanks. The intelligence community's 17 agencies, with a combined 2023 budget exceeding $100 billion, have demonstrated autonomy in operations, as evidenced by the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation launched in July 2016 without full presidential oversight and the CIA's withholding of certain briefings from incoming administrations.^[67] This "contractor state," encompassing over 700,000 private personnel in security clearances as of 2024, amplifies elite influence via revolving-door placements, where former officials like those from the NSA or Pentagon secure lucrative industry roles, sustaining policy continuity across partisan changes—foreign aid and military commitments remained above $800 billion annually from 2017 to 2023 despite electoral shifts.^[68] Studies of elite networks reveal that shared institutional affiliations, such as Ivy League educations and Council on Foreign Relations memberships, correlate with uniform stances on interventions, as in the near-unanimous advocacy for the 2003 Iraq invasion among security elites, underscoring causal mechanisms of group cohesion over electoral mandates.^[69] Such dynamics, while framed by some as conspiratorial, align with documented instances of bureaucratic resistance, including leaked memos from 2017 detailing efforts to constrain executive directives on immigration and trade.^[67]

Criticisms and Failures

Corruption and Rent-Seeking

Members of the political class frequently engage in rent-seeking by expending resources to obtain government-granted privileges, such as tariffs, subsidies, or regulatory barriers, which transfer wealth from the public to favored entities without generating net economic value.^[70] This process, analyzed in public choice economics, imposes deadweight losses on society as resources are diverted from productive uses to competitive bidding for political favors.^[71] Empirical studies link such activities to reduced innovation and growth, as incumbents lobby for protections that entrench market positions, exemplified by increased patent thickets and regulatory hurdles post-lobbying surges in sectors like pharmaceuticals and finance.^[72] In the United States, lobbying exemplifies rent-seeking, with firms and interest groups spending billions annually to shape legislation for private advantage, often resulting in policies that distort markets, such as agricultural subsidies totaling $20 billion in fiscal year 2023, disproportionately benefiting large agribusiness over small producers.^[70] Economic analyses show that these expenditures correlate with inefficient outcomes, including higher consumer prices and suppressed competition, as lobbyists secure exemptions or mandates that exclude rivals.^[73] For instance, corporate political connections enable procurement contracts through influence rather than merit, with studies finding connected firms winning 10-20% more bids at inflated prices in government tenders.^[74] Corruption manifests directly when political actors abuse office for personal enrichment, as seen in high-profile cases involving bribery and embezzlement. In July 2024, former U.S. Senator Bob Menendez was convicted on 16 felony counts, including bribery, for accepting gold bars, cash, and luxury goods valued at over $150,000 in exchange for influencing foreign policy and regulatory decisions on behalf of Egyptian interests.^[75] Similarly, New York City Mayor Eric Adams faced federal charges in September 2024 for a bribery scheme involving Turkish officials, where campaign contributions and free flights were traded for favorable immigration policies and diplomatic support.^[76] These incidents highlight systemic vulnerabilities, with data from the FBI's public corruption docket showing over 1,500 convictions annually in the U.S. from 2018-2023, many tied to elected officials and bureaucrats exploiting discretionary power.^[77] Insider advantages further blur into corruption, particularly through stock trading by legislators with access to confidential information. Analysis of 2024 disclosures revealed that portfolios of at least 50 U.S. Congress members outperformed the S&P 500 by an average of 5-10%, with trades timed around committee briefings on economic policy and pandemics.^[78] A 2022 study of House members found selective selling during market downturns yielded abnormal returns of up to 11 basis points, suggesting non-public insights informed decisions despite disclosure laws like the 2012 STOCK Act.^[79] Such practices erode public trust, with surveys post-scandal exposure indicating a 15-20% drop in compliance with tax and regulatory norms, as citizens perceive elite impunity.^[80] Globally, rent-seeking by political elites correlates with resource booms, where mining windfalls in Latin America and Africa enabled corrupt allocation of concessions, yielding 20-30% higher rents for connected politicians but stifling long-term development.^[81] In insecure property rights environments, elites distort policies to capture rents, as evidenced by World Bank analyses of post-colonial states where bureaucratic favoritism reduced GDP growth by 1-2% annually through misallocated public investments.^[82] These patterns persist due to weak enforcement, with Transparency International reporting that 70% of grand corruption cases involve political officeholders diverting public funds via kickbacks on infrastructure projects exceeding $1 trillion globally from 2010-2020.^[83] Countermeasures like independent audits have curbed excesses in select jurisdictions, but entrenched networks often evade accountability, perpetuating inefficiency.

Policy Inefficacy and Cultural Elitism

Critics argue that policies advanced by the political class frequently underperform due to entrenched incentives favoring elite networks over empirical outcomes, as evidenced by multivariate analyses showing economic elites and business interests exert disproportionate influence on U.S. government policy relative to average citizens.^[7] This dynamic contributes to inefficacy, where intended goals like poverty reduction or public safety yield suboptimal results; for example, the U.S. War on Drugs, launched in 1971, has incurred costs exceeding $1 trillion through 2021, including $50 billion annually in recent years, yet failed to curb drug availability or prevalence, with overdose deaths surpassing 100,000 in 2021 alone.^[84]^[85] Similarly, in housing markets, local regulatory restrictions—zoning laws, environmental reviews, and permitting delays—have suppressed supply amid rising demand, creating shortages estimated in the millions of units and driving median home prices to $412,000 by mid-2023, far outpacing wage growth.^[86]^[87] Such failures often stem from political pathologies in complex systems, including overreliance on top-down interventions that ignore local feedback and unintended consequences, as analyzed in frameworks of government failure akin to market failure.^[88] In education and welfare, decades of expanded federal involvement since the 1960s War on Poverty have correlated with stagnant mobility rates—only 7.5% of children born in the bottom income quintile reach the top by 2010s data—despite trillions in spending, suggesting bureaucratic capture and rent-seeking dilute efficacy. These patterns reflect a broader insulation, where policymakers, often insulated from electoral accountability through gerrymandering or careerism, prioritize symbolic or interest-group-aligned measures over cost-benefit rigor. Cultural elitism compounds this by revealing a persistent attitudinal chasm between the political class and broader publics, with meta-analyses of 162 elite-mass comparisons documenting systematic gaps on value-laden issues like redistribution, immigration, and social norms.^[23] On immigration, elites consistently assign lower priority to enforcement and border control than the public; surveys from 1994 to 2018 show opinion leaders favoring laxer policies by margins of 20-30 points, even as public support for reductions holds steady at 50-60%.^[89]^[90] This disconnect extends to crime, where elite preferences for decarceration diverge from public demands for deterrence amid urban homicide spikes—up 30% in major U.S. cities in 2020— and to education, with policymakers endorsing curricula emphasizing identity over core skills, despite polls indicating 70% parental priority for basics like math and reading proficiency.^[91] Such elitism manifests as a cosmopolitan worldview—prioritizing global integration, merit dilution via quotas, and urban-centric norms— that alienates working-class constituencies rooted in community stability and traditional metrics of success.^[92] Empirical polling underscores this: while 64% of the public in 2025 favored pathways to status for some undocumented immigrants tied to strict enforcement, elite discourse often frames restrictions as nativist, ignoring causal links between unchecked inflows and wage suppression for low-skilled natives, estimated at 5-10% in affected sectors.^[93] This cultural insulation not only erodes policy legitimacy but perpetuates inefficacy, as measures like open-border advocacy overlook public concerns over resource strain, evidenced by overburdened schools and hospitals in high-immigration locales. Critics, drawing from public choice insights, attribute this to self-reinforcing networks where elite signaling trumps mass preferences, fostering governance detached from causal realities of social cohesion.^[95]

Counterarguments and Purported Benefits

Institutional Expertise

Proponents argue that members of the political class, through prolonged immersion in governmental institutions, develop specialized knowledge of legislative processes, bureaucratic operations, and policy interconnections that outsiders lack, facilitating more adept policy formulation and execution.^[96] This expertise manifests in superior legislative effectiveness, as evidenced by studies showing that prior governmental experience correlates with higher rates of bill passage and committee influence in state legislatures.^[97] Empirical analyses of U.S. governors with congressional backgrounds reveal they secure greater federal funding for their states, attributed to honed skills in intergovernmental negotiation and resource allocation—outcomes not replicated by novices.^[25] Similarly, political tenure has been linked to expedited government performance in policy implementation, as experienced incumbents navigate entrenched bureaucracies more efficiently than short-term officeholders.^[98] Critics of term limits, drawing on political science evidence, contend that such restrictions diminish institutional expertise, leading to diminished legislative quality and competence; for instance, data from state-level experiments indicate term-limited bodies produce less informed oversight and policy continuity.^[96] While education levels among politicians also predict efficiency gains in public services like elder care, institutional tenure amplifies this by embedding practical mastery of regulatory frameworks and stakeholder dynamics.^[99] These advantages, however, hinge on accountability mechanisms to mitigate risks like entrenchment, underscoring expertise's role in countering rather than compounding governance failures when paired with electoral checks.

Stability in Governance

Proponents of an entrenched political class contend that it contributes to governance stability by ensuring policy continuity and institutional expertise, reducing the disruptions associated with frequent leadership turnover. Empirical analyses indicate that political stability, often maintained through consistent elite networks, correlates with sustained economic growth; for instance, a study of 113 countries from 1950 to 1999 found that higher political instability—measured by irregular leadership changes—negatively impacts per capita GDP growth by increasing policy uncertainty and deterring investment. Similarly, cross-country regressions show that improvements in political stability indices contribute to long-term economic development, with stable governance environments fostering environments conducive to capital accumulation and institutional trust.^[100] In parliamentary systems, where political classes often exhibit lower turnover due to party discipline and incumbency advantages, this continuity manifests in more predictable policymaking. Research on consensus democracies highlights how power-sharing among established elites promotes environmental policy durability and overall institutional resilience, as fragmented opposition is less likely to upend long-term frameworks.^[101] Evidence from term limits debates further supports this, with political science reviews concluding that restricting long-term service diminishes legislative competence and institutional knowledge, potentially exacerbating volatility in decision-making bodies.^[96] For example, U.S. state-level experiments with term limits have not demonstrably enhanced governance efficacy and may instead fragment expertise accumulated over incumbencies.^[102] However, causal links remain contested, as stability from elite entrenchment can border on stagnation, with some analyses suggesting that moderate instability in competitive democracies spurs innovation and accountability without systemic collapse.^[103] Nonetheless, in contexts of external shocks—such as economic crises—entrenched political classes have historically provided ballast; Germany's 16-year Merkel chancellorship (2005–2021), anchored by CDU continuity, navigated the Eurozone debt crisis and refugee influxes with relative institutional steadiness, averting the internal warfare that defines unstable systems.^[104] This underscores the purported benefit of elite persistence in buffering against radical policy swings, though outcomes depend on alignment with broader legitimacy rather than mere longevity.^[105]

Global Variations

Western Democracies

In Western democracies, the political class maintains entrenchment through persistently high incumbent reelection rates, which reflect structural advantages like superior fundraising, media access, and gerrymandering in single-member districts. In the United States House of Representatives, incumbents have secured reelection in over 90% of races annually since the 1960s, with rates exceeding 95% in many cycles, such as 98.4% in 1996 and 97.7% in 2018.^[52] Comparable advantages exist in the UK Parliament, where first-past-the-post systems amplify personal incumbency effects, yielding reelection rates around 70-80% for major parties in general elections like 2019, bolstered by constituency service and party machines. In continental Europe, proportional representation tempers but does not eliminate this, as seen in Germany's Bundestag where incumbents often retain safe list positions, contributing to average tenures exceeding 10 years for many MPs. The revolving door between public office and private interests exemplifies the political class's self-perpetuating networks, enabling influence peddling and policy capture. In the US, over 400 former members of Congress have lobbied since 1998, with examples including 52% of retiring lawmakers from the 112th Congress (2011-2013) entering lobbying or consulting roles within five years. In the European Union, at least 20 former commissioners since 1985 transitioned to corporate directorships or advisory positions, such as José Manuel Barroso joining Goldman Sachs in 2016 after serving as Commission president from 2004-2014, prompting ethics scrutiny over access to insider knowledge.^[106] Such movements, facilitated by cooling-off periods often deemed insufficient, correlate with increased corporate lobbying success rates, as ex-officials leverage Rolodexes for regulatory leniency. Political dynasties underscore familial transmission of power, providing heirs with inherited name recognition, donor networks, and campaign infrastructure that lower entry barriers. In the US, roughly 6% of legislators since 1789 belong to dynasties, accounting for over 10% of congressional seats historically, with families like the Bushes (four members serving as president, senator, or governor) and Kennedys exemplifying multi-generational holds.^[107] Across Europe, 13% of presidents and prime ministers from 2000-2017 descended from political lineages, including figures like Emmanuel Macron's ties to elite administrative tracks and hereditary influences in countries like Italy, where 15-20% of parliamentarians in recent terms have familial precedents. These patterns persist despite democratic norms, as dynastic candidates win at premiums of 5-10% in vote shares, per cross-national analyses, fostering oligarchic tendencies within ostensibly meritocratic systems. Bureaucratic insulation complements electoral entrenchment, with unelected civil servants and supranational bodies like the EU Commission ensuring policy continuity across governments. In the US, the federal bureaucracy's 2.1 million civilian employees (as of 2023) operate with tenure protections, influencing implementation amid partisan shifts, while in the EU, the Commission's 32,000 staff—predominantly drawn from elite universities—shape directives with limited direct accountability, as evidenced by consistent regulatory expansion from 1993 Maastricht Treaty onward despite electoral volatility in member states. This cadre's homogeneity, often from narrow socioeconomic strata, correlates with policy biases toward globalism and interventionism, per empirical studies of elite backgrounds.^[58]

Non-Western Contexts

In non-Western contexts, political classes often exhibit greater centralization of power through party apparatuses, security structures, familial networks, or monarchical lineages, with limited mechanisms for external accountability compared to electoral rotations in many Western systems. These elites frequently prioritize regime stability and resource control over broad meritocratic competition, leveraging patronage systems that bind subordinates via economic rents or coercive tools. Empirical analyses indicate that such structures correlate with lower policy innovation and higher corruption indices, as measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, where non-Western autocracies average scores below 40 out of 100 as of 2024. This entrenchment stems from historical contingencies like post-colonial state-building or revolutionary consolidations, where elites co-opted state institutions to suppress rivals rather than foster competitive governance. In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutes the core political class, with its elite cadre system selecting approximately 2,000 top officials through a nomenklatura process controlled by the Politburo Standing Committee. As of 2022, the CCP elite remains overwhelmingly male and Han Chinese, with factional alignments—such as Xi Jinping's dominance over prior coalitions—determining promotions via loyalty assessments rather than public contests. This system, formalized post-1949, enables rapid policy execution, as seen in the zero-COVID campaign from 2020-2022, but fosters opacity and purges, exemplified by the 2022 removal of over 100 officials in anti-corruption drives that targeted potential rivals.^[108]^[109]^[110] Russia's political class centers on the siloviki, a network of security and military veterans who ascended under Vladimir Putin since 2000, occupying key roles in government, energy firms, and intelligence agencies. Comprising figures from the FSB and GRU, this group—estimated to control over 20% of top positions by 2023—prioritizes regime defense, as evidenced by their role in suppressing dissent post-2011 protests and coordinating the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Unlike Western bureaucratic elites, siloviki loyalty is enforced through personal ties and shared KGB-era experiences, yielding a militarized governance model with low turnover; Putin allies like Nikolai Patrushev have held influence for decades despite lacking electoral mandates.^[111]^[112]^[113] In democratic India, the political class features pronounced dynastic elements, with 21% of sitting MPs, MLAs, and MLCs in 2025 hailing from political families, perpetuating a birth-based hierarchy across parties like Congress and regional outfits. This pattern, rooted in post-1947 party organization where leaders like Nehru groomed kin, undermines intra-party democracy; for instance, the Gandhi family's hold on Congress leadership since the 1970s has correlated with electoral declines, yet persists via voter recognition in low-information rural constituencies. Dynastic prevalence exceeds 30% in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, correlating with policy stasis on issues like agricultural reform.^[114]^[115]^[116] Middle Eastern monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, embed political classes within royal families that monopolize executive, legislative, and economic levers, distributing oil rents to co-opt tribal and business elites. In Saudi Arabia, the Al Saud clan—numbering over 15,000 members—controls 80% of senior posts as of 2021, sustaining stability through Vision 2030 diversification while suppressing challenges like the 2017 anti-corruption purge of princes. Gulf regimes' resilience, unlike republican collapses in Iraq or Libya, arises from inclusive elite pacts that align monarchs with merchant classes via sovereign wealth funds exceeding $3 trillion regionally.^[117]^[118]^[119] Across sub-Saharan Africa, post-colonial political classes emerged from Western-educated strata, often perpetuating "big man" rule via ethnic patronage and resource extraction, with elite persistence evident in Sierra Leone where pre-1960 colonial names dominate politics and business into the 2020s. In countries like Kenya and Nigeria, independence-era leaders transitioned into enduring cliques, controlling 70-80% of parliamentary seats through clientelism; for example, Nigeria's PDP and APC cycles since 1999 recycle military-era figures, yielding governance metrics like the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators scoring below -1 standard deviation for voice and accountability. This contrasts with Western merit-based bureaucracies by emphasizing kinship ties, fostering coups and instability—Africa recorded 200+ attempted seizures since 1960.^[120]^[121]^[122]

Interplay with Populism and Reform

Populist Challenges

Populist movements have mounted significant electoral challenges to entrenched political classes by framing them as disconnected elites prioritizing globalist agendas over national interests, drawing support from voters disillusioned with policy outcomes on trade, immigration, and economic stagnation. In the United States, Donald Trump's 2016 presidential victory exemplified this dynamic, securing 304 electoral votes despite losing the popular vote by 2.1 percentage points, with particular strength among non-college-educated white voters who comprised 67% of his coalition compared to 37% for Hillary Clinton. This appeal resonated amid stagnant wages for working-class Americans, where real median household income had declined 2.4% from 2000 to 2016 after adjusting for inflation, fueling perceptions of elite neglect.^[123]^[124] In the United Kingdom, the 2016 Brexit referendum delivered a 51.9% to 48.1% majority for leaving the European Union, overriding endorsements from major political parties, business leaders, and academics who overwhelmingly favored remaining. Leave voters, concentrated in regions with lower education levels and higher exposure to manufacturing decline—such as the North East of England, where unemployment averaged 8.5% in 2015—cited sovereignty and immigration control as key drivers, reflecting grievances against supranational governance perceived as bypassing domestic accountability. Post-referendum data indicated that 52% of Leave supporters felt the political establishment ignored their concerns, amplifying the vote as a direct rebuke to elite consensus.^[125]^[126] Across Europe, right-wing populist parties have seen vote shares rise from an average of 7.9% in national elections before 2015 to over 15% by 2022, capturing power in countries like Italy where Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy surged from 4.4% in 2018 to 26% in 2022, forming a coalition government. Similar gains occurred in Sweden, with the Sweden Democrats increasing from 12.9% to 20.5% in 2022, and in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán's Fidesz has maintained supermajorities since 2010 by emphasizing border security amid the 2015 migrant crisis that saw over 1.8 million asylum applications continent-wide. These successes correlate with public distrust metrics, such as Pew surveys showing only 22% of Americans trusting government "most of the time" in 2024, and analogous sentiments in Europe where 63% of respondents in 2023 viewed national politicians as self-serving.^[127]^[128] Empirical analyses attribute these challenges to tangible factors like income inequality—Gini coefficients rising in most Western democracies since the 1980s—and cultural shifts from rapid demographic changes, rather than mere demagoguery, as populist rhetoric often aligns with voter priorities on issues elites downplayed, such as net migration exceeding 300,000 annually in the UK pre-Brexit. While critics from institutions like Brookings decry populism's anti-pluralist tendencies, data on governance outcomes under populist rule, such as Hungary's sustained 2-3% GDP growth post-2010 amid EU tensions, suggest it compels political classes to address overlooked causal drivers of discontent, including regulatory capture and fiscal policies favoring urban cosmopolitans over peripheral regions.^[129]^[130]

Proposed Structural Reforms

Various proposals seek to structurally limit the entrenchment and influence of the political class through mechanisms that enhance turnover, competition, and accountability. Term limits for elected officials represent one of the most prominent reforms, aimed at preventing career politicians from accumulating indefinite power and insulating themselves from voter scrutiny. Public support for congressional term limits stands at 87% among U.S. adults, reflecting widespread perception of incumbency advantages fostering elite capture.^[131] Legislative efforts include constitutional amendments capping House members at three two-year terms and senators at two six-year terms, as introduced in H.J.Res.12 during the 119th Congress and endorsed by figures like Senator Ted Cruz in August 2025. Proponents argue such limits disrupt rent-seeking networks and compel fresh perspectives, with historical data showing incumbents winning reelection at rates exceeding 90% in recent cycles, which sustains a professionalized political class detached from constituent pressures. The Heritage Foundation has advocated term limits as essential to counter congressional self-perpetuation, estimating that without them, spending and regulatory capture by entrenched interests persist unchecked.^[132]^[133]^[134] Electoral system reforms, such as ranked-choice voting (RCV) and nonpartisan primaries, aim to erode the two-party duopoly and incumbency protections that favor the political class. RCV, implemented in jurisdictions like New York City via top-four primaries, allows voters to rank candidates, potentially elevating outsiders by reducing the spoiler effect and strategic voting that benefits establishment figures. Analysis from the Brookings Institution indicates RCV can alter campaign dynamics, fostering broader discourse less dominated by elite-backed frontrunners, though short-term effects vary by prior turnout levels. These changes challenge elite gatekeeping by increasing viable challengers, as evidenced in Alaska's 2022 adoption, where RCV contributed to upsetting long-term incumbents.^[135] Decentralization initiatives propose devolving authority from national political elites to subnational levels, diluting centralized rent-seeking and promoting localized accountability. In multi-level systems, such reforms involve legal reallocations of fiscal and administrative power, often negotiated by elites but intended to fragment their monopoly. World Bank analyses highlight how decentralization counters elite capture by aligning incentives with regional interests, though implementation risks elite resistance or uneven power shifts. Empirical studies link successful devolution—such as in federal expansions—to reduced national-level corruption, as local competition erodes the political class's unified influence.^[136] Additional structural measures include strengthening checks like independent redistricting commissions and public campaign financing to curb gerrymandering and donor dependencies that entrench elites. The Protecting Our Democracy Act, for instance, targets executive overreach while bolstering congressional oversight, addressing how administrative growth enables unelected bureaucratic alliances with politicians. Critics of the status quo, drawing from political economy research, contend these reforms must prioritize causal mechanisms like enforced rotation to break feedback loops of self-preservation, rather than procedural tweaks that elites can co-opt. Overall, such proposals emphasize empirical evidence of incumbency biases over institutional defenses of expertise, aiming for governance renewal through enforced dynamism.^[137]

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This paper analyzes immigrants' views about immigration, contributing to the behavioral literature on the subject.<|control11|><|separator|>
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Who influences whom? Inequality in the mutual responsiveness ...
This question has been asked by many scholars in the recent past. Mirroring the elitism-pluralism debate of the 1950s and 1960s (Dahl, Citation1961; Domhoff, ...
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Term Limits - Center for Effective Government
Jan 25, 2024 · On net, theory and evidence from political science suggest that term limits would likely reduce the quality and competence of elected officials ...Missing: tenure | Show results with:tenure
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[PDF] Prior Experience and State Legislative Effectiveness
Aug 28, 2024 · The results suggest that some narrow types of experience may help lawmakers be more effective in office, but that general experience in ...
[98]
Political tenure, term limits and corruption - ScienceDirect.com
Political tenure (experience) is a double-edged sword: expediting government performance, while increasing political power with potentially harmful (corruption ...
[99]
Educated politicians and government efficiency - ScienceDirect.com
Consistent with survey data, the estimates show that better-educated politicians induce higher levels of efficiency, particularly for old-age care services. A ...
[100]
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948652
[101]
Continuity and Change: Dealing with Political Volatility to Advance ...
The institutional structures of a consensus democracy are the primary drivers behind political stability and continuity that creates better environmental ...
[102]
Term limits and electoral accountability - ScienceDirect.com
Term limits induce politicians to choose policies closer to their own preferences. •. Such “truthful” behavior in turn results in better screening of incumbents ...
[103]
Political Instability as a Source of Growth - Hoover Institution
The effect of "unstable" leadership is stronger in democracies than autocracies because democratic political systems have institutions that promote competition ...
[104]
Political system - Stability, Governance, Institutions | Britannica
The simplest definition of a stable political system is one that survives through crises without internal warfare.
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Does continuity of a regime guarantee stability and development?
Apr 29, 2024 · Continuation of power for a government or an individual for a long time does not necessarily ensure stability. Instead, it poses the risk of ...
[106]
[PDF] Revolving doors in the EU and US - European Parliament
The flow of officials and politicians between the public and private sector has in the past few years given rise to calls for more transparency and ...Missing: examples | Show results with:examples
[107]
Dynasties in democracies: The political side of inequality - CEPR
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The Chinese Communist Party | Council on Foreign Relations
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the founding and ruling political party of modern China, officially known as the People's Republic of China.Introduction · Xi's Power · The CCP's Origins and... · Power Structure
[109]
The Powerful Factions Among China's Rulers - Brookings Institution
China's political elite is now dominated by two factions, but ... China is a one-party state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) monopolises power.
[110]
The Makeup of the CCP Elite (Updated) - China Data Lab
Aug 5, 2022 · The data reveal that the CCP continues to be a political party with one of the worst gender imbalances in the world. Among this powerful elite ...
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Reading Russia: The Siloviki in Charge | Journal of Democracy
The holders of political power in Russia today are the siloviki (sometimes called “securocrats” by political scientists).
[112]
Who Are the 'Siloviki'? Russia's Elite Security Faction - Newsweek
Jan 23, 2023 · Many of the most powerful people in Russia make up the Siloviki faction—the elite group of businessmen and other leaders with close ties to ...
[113]
The Political Elite Under Putin
Siloviki, political figures who rose to power in the security services, such as Mikhail Fradkov, Rashid Nurgaliev, and Viktor Ivanov, are good examples of this ...
[114]
Analysis of Sitting MPs, MLAs and MLCs in India with Dynastic ...
Sep 12, 2025 · Dynastic politics divides the society by creating a birth based ruling class. The prevalence of dynastic politics is also attributed to India's ...
[115]
dynastic politics in india: meaning, challenges, way forward - IAS Gyan
What is dynastic politics in India? It refers to political power concentrated in families, with 21% of MPs, MLAs, and MLCs from dynastic backgrounds (ADR, 2025) ...
[116]
Understanding layered dominance of political dynasties in India
Apr 2, 2023 · The article attempts to problematise the nature of dynastic politics in India and offers a framework to analyse the causes of its dominance.
[117]
Middle Eastern monarchies: how do Arab ruling families hold on to ...
May 7, 2021 · Indeed, most royal elites created systems to place themselves at the apex of wealth or favour redistribution schemes that are baked into the ...
[118]
Middle Eastern monarchies: how do Arab ruling families hold on to ...
May 11, 2021 · Royals not only rule in these states, but in most cases members of the royal family dominate positions of influence in government and business sectors.
[119]
[PDF] Ruling Families and Business Elites in the Gulf Monarchies
Nov 3, 2016 · In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the business elites kept a firm grip over the economy until the mid-1970s, meanwhile using their personal ...
[120]
Where Do African Elites Come From? - The Elite Africa Project
Popular representations of African elites repeat stereotypes of prominent "big men" in politics and business, which emanate from an outdated understanding of ...
[121]
Elite persistence in Sierra Leone: what can names tell us?
Sep 17, 2024 · We measure elite persistence in politics, education and business since 1960 and discuss the social reproduction strategies of these two communities.
[122]
Colonial Education, Political Elites, and Regional Political Inequality ...
Mar 14, 2021 · East and West African colonies provide a unique opportunity to study political elites when independent governments first form and to move ...
[123]
The educational rift in the 2016 election - Brookings Institution
In this year's presidential election, Donald Trump attracted a large share of the vote from whites without a college degree, receiving 72 percent of the white ...Missing: turnout | Show results with:turnout
[124]
An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters
Aug 9, 2018 · Even the special surveys conducted by major news organizations on Election Day – the “exit polls” – face challenges from refusals to participate ...<|separator|>
[125]
EU Referendum: The people v the elites? - BBC News
Jun 8, 2016 · The Remain side can call on many political heavyweights to support their campaign, but the Leave side is appealing more directly to gut ...
[126]
how political alienation was related to support for Brexit
Feb 20, 2020 · A common interpretation of the UK's 'Brexit vote' is that of an alienated majority of voters, left behind by economic development and let down ...
[127]
European populist parties' vote share on the rise, especially on right
Oct 6, 2022 · Elections in Italy and Sweden have underscored the growing electoral strength that populist parties have displayed in Europe in recent ...
[128]
Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 - Pew Research Center
Jun 24, 2024 · As of May 2024, 22% of Americans say they trust the government in Washington to do what is right “just about always” (2%) or “most of the time” (21%).
[129]
Populism and inequality: Does reality match the populist rhetoric?
Our paper looks at what populists do about inequality once they assume power, not how economic and social inequality may drive them to power.
[130]
The populist challenge to liberal democracy - Brookings Institution
The divisions are moral as well as empirical. Populism understands the elite as hopelessly corrupt, the people as uniformly virtuous—meaning that there is no ...Missing: data | Show results with:data
[131]
10. How Americans view proposals to change the political system
Sep 19, 2023 · An overwhelming majority of adults (87%) favor limiting the number of terms that members of Congress are allowed to serve.
[132]
H.J.Res.12 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): Proposing an ...
This joint resolution proposes an amendment to the Constitution establishing term limits for individuals serving in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
[133]
Sen. Cruz, Rep. Norman, Colleagues Introduce Constitutional ...
Aug 1, 2025 · The amendment would limit US Senators to two six-year terms and Members of the US House of Representatives to three two-year terms after its enactment.
[134]
Term Limits: The Only Way to Clean Up Congress
Term limits would ameliorate many of America's most serious political problems by counterbalancing incumbent advantages, ensuring congressional turnover.
[135]
The future of the instant runoff election reform - Brookings Institution
Dec 11, 2024 · In this paper, I examine ranked-choice voting (also known as instant runoffs) to see how it affects campaign discourse and election outcomes.
[136]
Publication: The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms
This volume presents a preliminary framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for ...Missing: class | Show results with:class
[137]
It's Time to Enact Reforms to Curb Executive Branch Abuses
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would help restore checks and balances in the federal government that have degraded.