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Sinjar

Sinjar District is an administrative division in Iraq's Nineveh Governorate, encompassing the town of Sinjar and adjacent territories bordering Syria, approximately 120 kilometers west of Mosul, and dominated by the Sinjar Mountains that rise to elevations exceeding 1,400 meters.^[1] The district, established in 1934, serves as a primary settlement area for the Yazidi ethno-religious community, whose ancestral beliefs and practices have endured despite historical persecutions.^[1] In August 2014, Islamic State militants overran Sinjar following the withdrawal of defending Kurdish Peshmerga forces, initiating a targeted campaign of mass killings, sexual enslavement, and forced displacement against the Yazidi population, recognized internationally as genocide, with estimates of 2,000 to 5,000 deaths and tens of thousands fleeing to Mount Sinjar amid dire humanitarian conditions.^[2]^[3] This atrocity displaced over 400,000 Yazidis, many of whom remain internally displaced a decade later due to destroyed infrastructure, ongoing militia presence, and territorial disputes between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government.^[2] The district's strategic location has perpetuated its role as a flashpoint for transnational conflicts involving Turkish operations against PKK affiliates and Iranian-backed groups, complicating reconstruction and security stabilization efforts.^[4] Historically, Sinjar featured as a minting center under medieval Islamic dynasties like the Zengids, underscoring its longstanding geopolitical significance in the Jazira region.^[5]

Geography

Location and Topography

Sinjar District lies in Nineveh Governorate, northern Iraq, at approximately 36.32° N latitude and 41.88° E longitude.^[6] Positioned about 115 kilometers west of Mosul as measured by straight-line distance, it extends westward to the Syrian border.^[7] The district's administrative boundaries encompass the town of Sinjar and adjacent subdistricts, forming a self-contained unit within Iraq's federal structure.^[1] The topography features the Sinjar Mountains, an east-west trending anticline range that rises prominently amid surrounding flat plains.^[8] This double-plunging structure reaches a maximum elevation of 1,356 meters at its highest peak.^[9] Steep escarpments define the mountain's edges, with dense valleys dissecting the lower slopes and alluvial fans spreading into the adjacent lowlands toward Syria.^[10] These formations create natural isolation for the district, with the rugged terrain acting as a barrier between the Mesopotamian plains to the east and the Syrian desert to the west.^[11] The Sinjar Mountains' escarpment and elevated plateaus provide defensive advantages through limited access routes and elevated vantage points, while the encircling plains facilitate isolation from broader regional connectivity.^[12] South of the range, the town of Sinjar sits at around 517 meters elevation, embedded in undulating foothills that transition to arid steppe.^[13] This configuration underscores the district's strategic physical layout, bounded by natural features that constrain movement and enhance topographic defensibility.^[10]

Climate and Natural Resources

Sinjar experiences a semi-arid climate characterized by hot, dry summers and cold, wetter winters, with average annual temperatures around 23.6°C. Summer daytime highs reach approximately 40.9°C in July, while winter nights drop to about 5°C in January, contributing to seasonal extremes that limit year-round habitation and agriculture without irrigation. Precipitation is low, averaging 378 mm annually, with over 90% falling between November and May, primarily as winter rain that supports rain-fed crops but leaves summers arid and dust-prone.^[14]^[15]^[16] The region's natural resources center on agriculture and limited extractives, with pre-conflict livelihoods deriving about 75% of income from farming olives, wheat, barley, and livestock herding, reliant on rain-fed systems and groundwater wells. Sinjar Mountains host minor deposits of natural gas and heavy minerals, though these remain underdeveloped due to insecurity and lack of infrastructure. Proximity to Nineveh's oil fields offers potential, but extraction within Sinjar itself is negligible, forcing dependence on surface water flows from valleys and inefficient irrigation that heightens vulnerability to scarcity.^[17]^[1] Conflict has intensified environmental degradation, with post-2014 destruction of wells, canals, and equipment by ISIS causing 75-95% livestock losses and slashing agricultural output by up to 50% in recent years amid droughts. Water scarcity, exacerbated by a 40% decline in groundwater recharge from damaged infrastructure and inefficient practices, has driven food insecurity and displacement, as noted in UN and NGO assessments linking low rainfall to failed harvests and reliance on costly alternatives like diesel pumps. These dynamics perpetuate cycles of instability, as arid conditions amplify conflict over scarce resources in an already marginal ecology.^[18]^[19]^[20]

History

Ancient and Pre-Islamic Periods

The Sinjar region, encompassing the Sinjar Mountains and surrounding plain in northern Mesopotamia, exhibits evidence of early agricultural settlements dating back to prehistoric periods, with systematic surveys identifying numerous small sites characterized by mud-brick structures and pottery indicative of Neolithic and Chalcolithic occupations.^[21] Excavations in the Sinjar District have uncovered high mounds yielding pottery spanning prehistoric eras through the Early Dynastic and Assyrian periods, including ring-base and flat-base forms, suggesting continuous low-density habitation rather than large-scale urbanization.^[22] These findings point to the area's role in early Mesopotamian agrarian economies, facilitated by fertile plains suitable for dry farming, though lacking the monumental architecture of major centers like Nineveh due to its peripheral location amid rugged terrain.^[23] By the early 2nd millennium BCE, Assyrian influence expanded into the Sinjar plain, as evidenced by the foundation of settlements like Tell al-Rimah around 1800 BCE, featuring defensive mud-brick walls enclosing residential and administrative buildings.^[23] Singara, the ancient precursor to modern Balad Sinjar, emerged as an Assyrian stronghold in northern Mesopotamia, integrated into the kingdom's trade and military networks linking the core Assyrian heartland to frontier zones.^[24] The city's Assyrian phase persisted until its conquest by the Neo-Babylonian Empire circa 612–605 BCE following the fall of Nineveh, after which it experienced periods of Achaemenid Persian oversight with minimal attested development.^[24] In the Hellenistic and subsequent eras, Singara functioned primarily as a fortified outpost on trade routes traversing the Sinjar Mountains, which served as a natural barrier between Mesopotamian lowlands and upper Jazira highlands.^[24] Under Parthian control from the 2nd century BCE, it transitioned to a Roman military base following Trajan's conquest in 114 CE, hosting the Legio I Parthica and featuring extensive fortifications documented in inscriptions and coinage.^[25] The site endured as a contested frontier during Roman-Sassanid conflicts, with Sassanid recapture around 363 CE under Shapur II, yet archaeological traces reveal persistent settlement continuity through layered strata of non-Arab material culture, including Aramaic-influenced artifacts predating Arab migrations.^[24] This pattern underscores the region's role in sustaining indigenous Mesopotamian populations amid imperial shifts, without evolving into a dominant urban hub.^[23]

Islamic Conquest to Ottoman Rule

Sinjar fell to Arab Muslim forces during the conquest of Mesopotamia, with commander Iyad ibn Ghanm capturing the region in the 640s CE, integrating it into the Rashidun Caliphate's Jazira province.^[26] Under subsequent Umayyad and Abbasid rule, the area experienced gradual Islamization, though pockets of pre-Islamic religious practices persisted amid the predominantly Syriac Christian and Zoroastrian populations. By the 11th-12th centuries, under Seljuk and Zengid influence, Sinjar functioned as a semi-autonomous atabegate; the Zengid ruler Qutb al-Din Muhammad governed from 1197 to 1219, issuing coinage from local mints that symbolized regional administrative independence within the broader Islamic framework.^[27] Yazidism emerged as a distinct syncretic faith in the early 12th century, coalescing around the teachings of Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir, a Sufi mystic who settled in the Lalish valley near Sinjar around 1117 CE and died in 1162 CE.^[28] This development fused local Kurdish ancestral beliefs with Islamic mysticism, but orthodox Muslim authorities increasingly branded Yazidis as heretics and devil-worshippers due to veneration of Tawûsî Melek (the Peacock Angel), equated by outsiders with Iblis (Satan).^[29] The faith's endogamous structure and rejection of proselytism solidified its isolation, fostering resilience in Sinjar's rugged terrain, which repeatedly served as a natural fortress against assimilation or eradication. Under later Muslim dynasties, including Safavids and Ottomans, Yazidis endured recurrent persecutions, including forced conversions and massacres targeting Sinjar communities. Ottoman sultans issued multiple fermans authorizing campaigns against them, viewing their non-Abrahamic elements as apostasy beyond the protections afforded to dhimmis; 19th-century expeditions, such as those in the 1830s-1840s under provincial governors, resulted in thousands killed or displaced.^[30] Excluded from the Ottoman millet system—which granted communal autonomy to recognized religious minorities like Christians and Jews—Yazidis relied on tribal mirs for de facto self-governance, paying tribute while leveraging Sinjar Mountains' defensibility to evade total subjugation.^[31] This geographic causality, combined with adaptive social cohesion, enabled demographic persistence despite systemic hostility from Sunni and Shia authorities alike.^[32]

20th Century Under British Mandate and Ba'athist Iraq

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Sinjar fell under the British Mandate for Mesopotamia established in 1920, administered as part of the Mosul vilayet within the provisional Iraqi state.^[33] The 1925 decision by the League of Nations to award the Mosul region, including Sinjar, to Iraq rather than Turkey ensured its incorporation into the emerging Arab-majority state, despite the area's predominant Yazidi Kurdish population.^[34] Upon Iraqi independence on October 3, 1932, Sinjar's integration proceeded amid tensions, with the Yazidi community—estimated at 17,550 individuals in 1932—resisting central authority through communal strategies that emphasized religious and tribal solidarity against state-driven national integration efforts.^[33]^[35] Yazidi opposition intensified over mandatory military conscription, perceived as a direct threat to endogamous religious practices and ethnic cohesion, leading to sporadic desertions and localized unrest in the 1930s.^[33] This culminated in the October 1935 Yazidi revolt in Sinjar, triggered by conscription enforcement and broader grievances against Arab-dominated governance; Iraqi forces under Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi deployed aircraft and ground troops to suppress the uprising, resulting in dozens of Yazidi casualties and reaffirmation of central control.^[35] Such events underscored the Yazidis' marginalization in the new state's nation-building, where their non-Muslim, Kurdish-speaking identity clashed with pan-Arabist policies, though no formal autonomy was granted. The 1968 Ba'ath Party coup marked a shift to systematic Arabization in northern Iraq, including Sinjar, aimed at demographic engineering to consolidate Arab political dominance in minority-heavy areas.^[36] From the 1970s onward, the regime forcibly displaced thousands of Yazidis and other Kurds from rural Sinjar villages, relocating them to southern Iraq or fortified urban complexes (mujamma'at) like those near Kirkuk, while incentivizing Arab settlement through land grants and subsidies to alter ethnic balances.^[36] Declassified Iraqi documents and survivor accounts indicate that by the early 1980s, Arab families from central and southern governorates had been resettled in over a dozen Sinjar locales, reducing the Yazidi share of the district's population from near-majority status in prior decades.^[36] These policies echoed broader anti-Kurdish measures, with Sinjar villages targeted for destruction during the 1980s counterinsurgency operations preceding the Anfal campaign of 1988, though Sinjar lay outside the campaign's core zones in Iraqi Kurdistan.^[37] Iraqi military records detail the razing of at least 20-30 Yazidi hamlets in Sinjar by 1987, using bulldozers and explosives to clear land for Arab agricultural collectives, displacing approximately 5,000-7,000 residents and eroding traditional pastoral economies.^[36] The Ba'athist approach prioritized causal control over territory via population replacement, viewing Yazidi religious isolationism as incompatible with state secularism, yet empirical outcomes included persistent low-level resistance and demographic resentment that persisted into later decades.^[33]

Post-2003 Instability

Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, Sinjar district in Nineveh Governorate fell under the de facto control of Peshmerga forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), exploiting the resulting power vacuum and governance collapse in peripheral areas.^[38]^[39] This administration included local security and basic services, but Sinjar's status as disputed territory under Article 140 of Iraq's 2005 constitution—intended for a normalization and referendum process to resolve Kurdish claims—fostered competing authorities between Erbil and Baghdad, undermining stable integration into federal structures.^[40]^[41] By the late 2000s, Baghdad under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sought to reassert central control, deploying Iraqi army units to Sinjar around 2008–2009 amid escalating friction with the KRG over disputed territories, including armed standoffs and administrative dualism that left local governance fragmented.^[42] This tug-of-war reflected broader post-invasion failures in state-building, where de-Ba'athification and Shia-majority dominance in federal institutions alienated Sunni Arabs in Nineveh, creating fertile ground for insurgent revival without unified security.^[41] The U.S. military withdrawal in December 2011 exacerbated these gaps, as Maliki's government pursued policies perceived as discriminatory against Sunnis—such as mass arrests of Sunni politicians and security officials under anti-terrorism laws—sparking protests in Nineveh and Mosul from late 2012 that were met with force, including the violent dispersal of a Hawija sit-in in April 2013 killing dozens.^[43] These grievances, rooted in exclusion from power and economic marginalization, were exploited by precursors to ISIS, such as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which rebuilt networks in Sunni-majority areas of Nineveh through tribal alliances and attacks on federal forces, numbering operations that killed hundreds by 2013.^[44] Yazidis in Sinjar, comprising the district's majority but a religious minority amid surrounding Sunni Arabs, remained vulnerable due to historical displacements under Ba'athist rule and their peripheral position in a sectarianized landscape, relying on KRG-aligned Peshmerga for protection amid faltering federal oversight.^[45] The absence of resolved Article 140 implementation perpetuated administrative silos, where KRG influence provided relative stability but tied Yazidi security to Kurdish partisan interests rather than neutral federal institutions, exposing gaps in broader counterinsurgency efforts against rising jihadist activity in Nineveh.^[38]

Demographics and Society

Ethnic and Religious Composition

Sinjar district's pre-2014 population was ethnically and religiously diverse, with Yazidis forming the largest group as an ethno-religious minority concentrated around Sinjar Mountain. Local estimates from municipalities and mukhtars placed the district's total at 444,934, including 193,430 Yazidis (43.5%), 31,129 Arabs (7.0%), 19,000 Sunni Kurds (4.3%), 10,400 Shia Kurds (2.3%), 1,550 Turkmen (0.3%), and 150 Christians (0.03%).^[1] In sub-districts like Shimal, adjacent to the mountain, Yazidis comprised about 88% of residents (130,968 out of 147,970), reflecting their dominance in core areas, while mixed zones such as Markaz Sinjar hosted most non-Yazidi groups, including concentrated Sunni and Shia Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians.^[1] Yazidism, the faith of the Yazidis, is a monotheistic religion with roots in pre-Zoroastrian Iranian traditions, centered on belief in one supreme deity who entrusted the world's governance to seven holy beings or angels.^[46] Distinct from Islam, it incorporates syncretic elements from ancient Mesopotamian, Zoroastrian, and other influences, rejects proselytism, enforces endogamy, and prohibits apostasy or acceptance of converts, rendering forced conversions ineffective under Yazidi doctrine.^[46] The remaining population adhered predominantly to Islam, with Sunni Arabs and Kurds forming the main Muslim communities, alongside negligible Christian adherents, likely Assyrian.^[1] Ethnic classification of Yazidis remains contested: the Kurdistan Regional Government categorizes them as Kurds, aligning with linguistic and historical ties, yet many Yazidis self-identify as a distinct ethno-religious group rather than Kurds, a view strengthened after 2014 to underscore unique communal vulnerabilities.^[47]^[48] This divergence highlights tensions between regional political claims and minority self-perception, with Yazidi advocacy groups rejecting imposed identities to preserve autonomy.^[48]

Historical Population Shifts and Current Estimates

Prior to the 2014 ISIS offensive, Sinjar District experienced demographic shifts driven by Ba'athist policies of Arabization from the 1970s onward, which involved the forced displacement of Yazidis and other non-Arabs alongside the settlement of Arab families from central and southern Iraq to alter ethnic compositions in northern regions.^[36] These campaigns reduced the relative Yazidi majority in Sinjar, with Arab populations increasing significantly by the 1980s, though exact figures remain imprecise due to the absence of reliable censuses amid ongoing conflict.^[49] Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, some Yazidis returned to Sinjar, partially reversing Arabization as Arab settlers faced pressures from Kurdish authorities and local dynamics, yet the process remained incomplete, leaving mixed ethnic demographics with Yazidis still predominant but Arabs comprising a notable minority.^[50] Estimates for Sinjar District's total population in 2013 ranged from approximately 250,000 to 400,000 residents, with Yazidis forming the overwhelming majority—potentially up to 90 percent—concentrated in rural villages and the eponymous town of around 88,000 inhabitants.^[1] The 2014 ISIS assault on August 3 triggered one of the largest displacements in modern Iraqi history, with over 250,000 to 400,000 Yazidis fleeing Sinjar District amid massacres and enslavement, primarily to Mount Sinjar, the Kurdistan Region, or Syria; United Nations agencies documented this exodus as affecting nearly the entire Yazidi population in the area, exacerbating prior vulnerabilities from Arabization-era disruptions.^[51]^[52] As of 2023, returns to Sinjar remain limited, with International Organization for Migration data indicating a 42 percent return rate among affected households, leaving approximately 183,000 to 200,000 Sinjaris—85 percent of whom are Yazidis—displaced in camps or urban settlements, primarily in the Kurdistan Region.^[51]^[53] Current district population estimates hover around 100,000 to 150,000, reflecting partial repopulation amid destroyed infrastructure, though empirical assessments attribute stalled returns less to physical damage alone and more to entrenched political rivalries among Yazidi factions, Baghdad, Erbil, and militias, which fragment governance and deter investment in reconstruction.^[54]^[55] These dynamics have prevented demographic stabilization, with ongoing internal displacement perpetuating a de facto partition of the district rather than homogenization or full recovery.^[56]

2014 ISIS Offensive

ISIS Advance and Peshmerga Response

On August 3, 2014, Islamic State (ISIS) forces launched a coordinated offensive into Sinjar district, capturing the town of Sinjar after Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Peshmerga units withdrew without mounting significant resistance.^[41]^[57] The retreat left an immediate security vacuum, enabling ISIS fighters—numbering in the thousands and equipped with captured U.S. weaponry from earlier Iraqi army collapses—to overrun the area in hours.^[58] This rapid advance built on ISIS's momentum from the June 2014 fall of Mosul, where Iraqi security forces disintegrated, abandoning positions and accelerating territorial gains across northern Iraq amid the post-2011 U.S. troop withdrawal's lingering institutional weaknesses.^[59] Peshmerga forces, estimated at several thousand in the district prior to the offensive, had been positioned to defend Sinjar since assuming control in the power vacuum following Mosul's capture, but their pullback to lines nearer the Kurdistan Region was executed abruptly, stranding local Yazidi militias and civilians.^[58] The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) later described the withdrawal as a tactical repositioning amid overwhelming odds and disputed command chains with Baghdad, yet eyewitness accounts and subsequent analyses highlight a lack of coordinated defense or evacuation warnings, prompting widespread accusations from Yazidi survivors and independent observers of abandonment by KDP-aligned forces.^[41]^[45] This decision reflected broader Peshmerga prioritization of core Kurdish territories over peripheral disputed areas like Sinjar, where federal Iraqi authority had historically been nominal.^[38] In the ensuing vacuum, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants rapidly intervened, deploying fighters from nearby positions in Iraq and Syria to Mount Sinjar, where they clashed with ISIS units and established a makeshift escape corridor allowing thousands of Yazidis to flee westward toward Syrian Kurdish-controlled areas.^[60]^[57] This ad hoc response by PKK elements, affiliated with Syrian YPG forces, filled the gap left by the Peshmerga retreat, providing initial armed resistance and facilitating evacuations before international airstrikes commenced on August 8.^[41] Survivor testimonies corroborate the corridor's role in enabling over 20,000 escapes in the first days, though ISIS blockades and terrain limited its scale amid ongoing fighting.^[61]

Massacres, Enslavement, and Genocide Recognition

In August 2014, ISIS militants executed systematic massacres targeting Yazidi males in Sinjar, killing an estimated 2,100 to 4,400 men and boys over the first week of the offensive, according to demographic analyses cross-verified with survivor testimonies and satellite imagery.^[62] These killings involved separation of males from females at checkpoints, followed by shootings and burials in mass graves, with forensic exhumations in Sinjar confirming hundreds of remains through DNA identification and ballistic evidence.^[63] ^[64] Overall mortality estimates for the Yazidi population in the region range up to 5,000, reflecting the scale of targeted executions aimed at eradicating male lineages.^[65] ISIS fighters abducted and enslaved approximately 7,000 Yazidi women and children, subjecting them to sexual violence, forced marriages, and sale in markets as part of a doctrinal policy revived from classical Islamic jurisprudence on captives.^[62] The group's religious rulings, or fatwas, explicitly permitted this by classifying Yazidis as polytheists or devil-worshippers outside the fold of protected peoples, thereby legitimizing their reduction to slavery as spoils of war rather than treating them as fellow Muslims or apostates requiring only execution.^[66] ^[67] This enslavement practice was ideologically driven by ISIS's Salafi-jihadist framework, which drew on puritanical interpretations emphasizing takfir (declaring unbelief) and the permissibility of enslaving non-believers, contrasting with mainstream media tendencies to frame the atrocities primarily as territorial conquest rather than religiously motivated eradication.^[68] The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria determined in June 2016 that ISIS's actions against the Yazidis constituted genocide, citing intent to destroy the group through killings, serious bodily harm, enslavement, and conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction.^[69] ^[70] This finding, based on over 200 witness interviews and forensic evidence from mass graves, affirmed the acts as meeting the legal threshold under the 1948 Genocide Convention, with the enslavement of women serving as a mechanism to prevent demographic recovery.^[65] Subsequent recognitions by entities including the European Parliament and several national governments have reinforced this classification, though accountability efforts, including International Criminal Court referrals, have progressed slowly due to jurisdictional challenges in non-state actor cases.^[71]

Immediate Aftermath and Escapes

As ISIS forces overran Sinjar district starting August 3, 2014, tens of thousands of Yazidis fled to Mount Sinjar, where they endured a siege amid extreme conditions including dehydration, starvation, and exposure to harsh summer heat.^[62] Humanitarian assessments reported hundreds of deaths on the mountain in the first days, primarily from thirst and exhaustion, with children particularly vulnerable as families lacked water and shelter.^[65] The U.S. military initiated humanitarian airdrops of food and water on August 7, 2014, delivering over 75,000 meals and 20,000 gallons of fresh water in initial operations to alleviate immediate starvation risks, coordinated with Kurdish Peshmerga ground assessments.^[72] PKK fighters, operating from Syrian territory, established a perilous corridor through ISIS-held areas toward the Syrian border, enabling the escape of approximately 20,000 Yazidis between August 8 and 10, 2014, who then transited to safety in Syrian Kurdistan before relocating to Iraqi Kurdistan.^[73] These evacuations succeeded despite ambushes and relied on local Arab tribal guides for navigation, contrasting with the Peshmerga's initial retreat that left escape routes exposed; U.S. airstrikes supported the corridor by targeting ISIS positions but did not directly secure it.^[74] By August 13, combined U.S. strikes and advancing Kurdish forces declared the mountain siege broken, allowing remaining holdouts to descend, though scattered ISIS pockets persisted.^[72] The town of Sinjar remained under ISIS control until a November 2015 offensive, launched on November 12, involving around 7,000 Peshmerga troops from the Kurdistan Regional Government, backed by over 250 U.S.-led coalition airstrikes that destroyed ISIS command centers and supply lines.^[75] PKK-affiliated YBS militias and emerging Yazidi units advanced from the west, while Popular Mobilization Forces approached from the south, recapturing the town by November 13 after street fighting that killed over 200 ISIS fighters.^[75] This coalition effort severed key ISIS resupply routes to Syria but exposed underlying frictions, as Peshmerga and PKK forces operated in parallel without full integration, foreshadowing post-liberation territorial disputes despite the tactical success in expelling ISIS.^[76]

Post-2014 Security and Governance

Militia Entrenchment and Power Vacuum

Following the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS control on November 13, 2015, by a coalition of Kurdish Peshmerga forces, PKK-affiliated fighters, and elements of the People's Protection Units (YPG), a security vacuum emerged due to fragmented control and subsequent withdrawals. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-aligned Peshmerga, which had initially retreated from the area during the 2014 ISIS advance, re-entered but maintained influence primarily in northern districts like Rabia and Zummar, leaving southern Sinjar contested. This gap allowed the entrenchment of multiple armed groups, including the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a predominantly Yazidi militia formed in July 2015 with direct operational ties to the PKK's Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and its People's Defense Forces (HPG). YBS forces, numbering several hundred fighters, established checkpoints and administrative outposts across central and southern Sinjar, effectively consolidating de facto PKK influence in the district according to assessments from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Turkish intelligence reports. Concurrently, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units, such as the 30th (Yezidi Gold Division) and 50th Brigades under Baghdad's command, deployed to eastern areas, while fragmented Peshmerga remnants loyal to other Kurdish factions held pockets, resulting in overlapping claims and sporadic clashes over territory.^[77]^[41] These militias filled the void by preventing ISIS remnants from regaining footholds, with YBS and PMF patrols disrupting sleeper cells and smuggling routes that could facilitate jihadist incursions, as evidenced by joint operations that neutralized dozens of ISIS affiliates between 2016 and 2018. Local Yazidi factions aligned with the YBS credited PKK-linked groups with providing the initial safe corridor for thousands of fleeing civilians during the 2014 genocide, viewing their sustained presence as essential for communal defense amid perceived abandonment by KDP Peshmerga. However, this security came amid criticisms of overreach, including reports of extortion rackets targeting returnees and traders, as well as forced recruitment of young Yazidi men into YBS ranks, drawn from testimonies of displaced families in camps near Dohuk. PMF units faced similar accusations of illegal checkpoints imposing fees on goods and arbitrary detentions, exacerbating economic strain in the depopulated district where over 80% of structures remained damaged.^[4]^[42]^[78] Perspectives on militia dominance diverged sharply: pro-YBS Yazidi leaders portrayed PKK affiliates as liberators who imposed no alien ideology but rather empowered local self-defense, contrasting with KRG portrayals of YBS as PKK proxies eroding Erbil's authority through ideological indoctrination and cross-border smuggling to Syria. Baghdad officials echoed concerns over non-state actors supplanting federal control, while Turkish analyses framed the entrenchment as a terrorist foothold enabling PKK logistics, though without direct evidence of imposed secularism on Yazidi religious practices. This competition perpetuated a de facto partition, with YBS dominating Mount Sinjar's slopes and PMF securing plains access routes, hindering unified governance and fostering low-level turf disputes that displaced an additional 10,000 residents by 2017.^[79]^[45]^[57]

Sinjar Agreement and Normalization Efforts

The Sinjar Agreement, signed on October 9, 2020, between the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), sought to establish a unified administrative and security framework for Sinjar district following years of militia control and displacement. Brokered with involvement from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the pact mandated the withdrawal of KRG Peshmerga forces and federal Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias from the area, to be replaced by a new local police force of approximately 2,500 personnel—primarily Yazidi recruits—reporting to Iraq's Interior Ministry.^[80]^[38]^[81] Core provisions included joint Baghdad-Erbil appointments for key positions, such as the district mayor and sub-district mayors, alongside commitments to reconstruction, service provision, and normalization to enable the safe return of internally displaced Yazidis. The agreement envisioned demilitarization as a prerequisite for stability, prohibiting non-state armed groups and establishing federal oversight to resolve the post-ISIS power vacuum. Initial steps post-signing involved technical committees for implementation planning, with some progress in nominating administrative officials by late 2020.^[82]^[38]^[83] Despite these aims, implementation has stalled significantly, with none of the administrative, security, or reconstruction elements fully realized as of 2025. Partial measures, such as limited mayor appointments, faced repeated vetoes from federal and regional authorities, while militia withdrawals did not occur, perpetuating fragmented control. KRG reports from 2023 to 2025 highlight empirical non-compliance, attributing delays to the entrenchment of PMF factions and PKK-affiliated groups like the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), which rejected the deal for lacking local Yazidi input and ceding ground to perceived rivals.^[84]^[85]^[86] Causal barriers to unity stem from the agreement's top-down structure, which sidelined grassroots Yazidi factions and failed to enforce demobilization amid competing external influences, resulting in ongoing veto power by armed actors over federal and KRG directives. While the pact offered potential for coordinated stability and IDP returns through integrated governance, its exclusion of de facto local stakeholders enabled sustained rejection and minimal adherence, as evidenced by persistent militia presence documented in regional assessments.^[87]^[83]^[88]

Reconstruction and Return Challenges

The Sinjar district experienced severe infrastructural devastation from ISIS occupation and liberation battles, with local authorities reporting up to 80% damage to villages and UN-Habitat assessments confirming widespread destruction. Approximately 80% of public infrastructure and 70% of civilian homes were destroyed or heavily damaged.^[1]^[89] In April 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani directed the launch of a reconstruction drive for Sinjar and adjacent Ninewa Plain areas, backed by an allocation of about $34.2 million (45 billion Iraqi dinars), yet progress stalled amid disputes between federal and Kurdistan Regional Government authorities over jurisdiction and funding disbursement. Human Rights Watch documented that political rivalries prevented site clearance and rebuilding initiation by mid-2023, exacerbating delays in service restoration.^[55]^[90] Yazidi return rates remain limited, with only 43% of the over 300,000 displaced from Sinjar resettled by April 2024 according to International Organization for Migration figures, primarily due to persistent security threats, inadequate housing rehabilitation, and unaddressed compensation for losses. While compensation payments commenced in November 2024 following prolonged delays, earlier government failures to process claims left thousands in camps.^[91]^[92]^[93] Property seizures and induced demographic changes further impede returns, as Iraqi officials have enabled land allocations to Sunni and Shia Arab settlers, shifting the area's ethnic balance from its Yazidi-majority pre-2014 status. Historical Arabisation efforts and post-ISIS grabs by various groups, including militias, have complicated reclamation, with Yazidi properties often occupied or redistributed without due process.^[94]^[95]

Controversies and External Interventions

PKK/YBS Role and Turkish Counteroperations

The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), formed in late 2015 as a predominantly Yazidi militia affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), assumed a prominent security role in Sinjar following the territorial defeat of ISIS, establishing parallel administrative structures modeled on PKK governance systems.^[41]^[96]^[57] Composed largely of local Yazidi recruits, including orphans from the ISIS genocide, the YBS rejected integration into Iraqi state forces or the Kurdistan Regional Government's Peshmerga, maintaining operational independence and control over key areas, which has perpetuated factional divisions and hindered centralized authority.^[41]^[56] In September 2025, YBS commanders explicitly refused disarmament demands under the 2020 Sinjar Agreement, citing ongoing security needs despite PKK announcements of organizational dissolution earlier that year.^[97]^[98] Turkey, designating the PKK as a terrorist organization responsible for decades of attacks within its borders, has conducted recurrent airstrikes and ground operations against YBS and PKK positions in Sinjar since 2016 to neutralize perceived cross-border threats, including potential launches of rockets or incursions into southeastern Turkey.^[99]^[100] These include drone strikes in October 2024 killing five YBS members and November 2024 eliminating five PKK fighters, part of broader campaigns that have neutralized hundreds of PKK-linked militants across northern Iraq while drawing accusations of civilian harm from local and international observers.^[101]^[102]^[103] Ankara justifies the operations as essential self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, arguing that PKK entrenchment in Sinjar—mere 100 kilometers from the Turkish border—enables logistics, recruitment, and attack planning that directly endanger Turkish sovereignty and civilians.^[99]^[100] Critics, often from outlets aligned with Kurdish advocacy, highlight incidental civilian casualties and sovereignty violations, whereas Turkish and aligned analyses emphasize the PKK's terrorist designation by Turkey, the EU, and the US as validating preemptive action against a group with a history of over 40,000 deaths attributed to its insurgency.^[103]^[104]

Disputes Between Baghdad, Erbil, and Local Factions

The administrative and security control of Sinjar district remains a flashpoint between the Iraqi federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil, stemming from the failure to implement Article 140 of Iraq's 2005 Constitution, which mandates normalization of demographics altered under Ba'athist rule, a census, and a referendum to determine the status of disputed territories including Sinjar.^[105]^[106] The provision's original deadline of December 2007 passed without action, leaving Sinjar's sovereignty ambiguous and enabling parallel governance claims that prioritize factional influence over unified administration.^[38] Erbil argues that Sinjar's integration into the KRG aligns with historical Kurdish-majority demographics and pre-2014 Peshmerga protection, viewing Baghdad's centralization as an overreach that neglects local needs.^[107] Baghdad, conversely, frames KRG assertions as separatist, emphasizing federal authority post-2017 when Iraqi forces, backed by PMF units, retook disputed areas from Peshmerga control amid heightened tensions following the KRG independence referendum.^[39] Security disputes intensified after ISIS's 2014 advance exposed Peshmerga withdrawal from Sinjar, which Erbil attributes to tactical repositioning but local Yazidis often cite as abandonment, eroding trust in KRG protection claims.^[38] Baghdad has since entrenched PMF presence, with Iran-backed factions like the 30th Brigade asserting dominance in parts of the district, leading to covert recruitment drives such as a PMF battalion formation in Sinjar reported in September 2023.^[108] Peshmerga remnants, aligned with KRG interests, maintain footholds but face restrictions, fueling clashes and a fragmented security landscape where federal forces outnumber and outmaneuver Kurdish units.^[109] The October 2020 Sinjar Agreement, intended to unify administration under federal oversight with KRG input, has stalled due to these rivalries, with Erbil citing non-compliance by PMF-linked groups as of October 2025, preventing demobilization and joint policing.^[86]^[83] Intra-Yazidi rifts compound these Baghdad-Erbil tensions, dividing local factions between pro-KRG leaders favoring Peshmerga ties and those aligning with Baghdad's PMF for perceived stability or resources.^[56] Pro-KRG elements, often KDP-affiliated, decry federal neglect and PMF Shia dominance as existential threats to Yazidi autonomy, while pro-Baghdad voices highlight KRG's 2014 retreat and post-2017 territorial losses as evidence of unreliable protection.^[42] These splits manifested in defections, such as hundreds of Yazidi fighters leaving KDP-linked Peshmerga for PMF's Babylon Brigades in March 2025, signaling shifting allegiances amid stalled reconstruction.^[110] Political fragmentation has undermined representation, with Yazidi candidates proliferating in Iraqi elections—threatening traditional KDP quota dominance by 2021—but resulting in intra-community disputes that dilute unified advocacy and enable external manipulation.^[111] Human Rights Watch noted in June 2023 that such infighting, intertwined with federal-KRG deadlock, blocks Yazidi returns and governance reforms, perpetuating a cycle where local agency yields to higher-level power struggles.^[55]

Criticisms of Iraqi and International Responses

The Iraqi government's security forces, including Peshmerga units, collapsed in Sinjar on August 3, 2014, abandoning positions without sustained resistance against ISIS advances, a failure attributed to systemic corruption, inadequate equipment, and sectarian favoritism that prioritized Arab Shia areas over minority regions like Yazidi-dominated Sinjar.^[112] ^[113] This retreat left approximately 50,000 Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar, enabling mass killings and enslavements that ensued immediately thereafter, with critics arguing that pre-existing governance failures—such as embezzlement of military funds and ethnic discrimination in force deployment—directly caused the unchecked ISIS incursion rather than mere tactical surprise.^[114] Internationally, the Obama administration delayed decisive intervention despite early warnings of impending genocide, authorizing limited airstrikes only on August 7, 2014, after thousands had already fled or been captured, reflecting hesitancy rooted in aversion to ground involvement post-Iraq withdrawal and underestimation of ISIS's rapid sectarian targeting of non-Muslims.^[115] ^[116] This lag exacerbated civilian exposure, as initial humanitarian airdrops proved insufficient against the scale of deprivation, with subsequent strategies criticized for prioritizing coalition-building over immediate minority protection, thereby allowing ISIS to consolidate control.^[117] Post-liberation aid efforts by the UN and US have delivered humanitarian relief valued at hundreds of millions since 2014 but faced inefficiencies from bureaucratic hurdles, corruption in fund allocation, and failure to condition assistance on resolving security vacuums, resulting in stalled reconstruction where only partial infrastructure repairs occurred amid ongoing displacement of over 200,000 Yazidis as of 2025.^[118] ^[55] The 2025 USCIRF Annual Report highlighted non-enforcement of the 2020 Sinjar Agreement, urging Baghdad and Erbil to implement demilitarization and local policing to enable returns, critiquing international donors for overlooking militia dominance that perpetuates instability over verifiable security benchmarks.^[119] Mainstream narratives often frame these lapses as inevitable "complexities" of regional politics, yet empirical accountability gaps—such as unprosecuted abandonments and aid diversion—reveal causal neglect prioritizing diplomatic optics over empirical prevention of recidivist threats.^[38]

Cultural and Economic Aspects

Yazidi Heritage and Sites

The Yazidi heritage in Sinjar is anchored in ancient shrines scattered across the Sinjar Mountains, which function as key pilgrimage sites within the community's monotheistic faith. These structures, often mausoleums dedicated to saints or angels, embody beliefs in divine stabilization of the landscape, with local lore holding that God placed a mausoleum on each summit to maintain the mountain's balance.^[120] Prominent examples include the 12th-century Mam Rashan Shrine, honoring Pîr Mehmed Reşan as a patron of agriculture and harvest, and the Chermera Temple (also known as Chel Mera or "40 Men" Temple), situated on the range's highest peak and revered for its sanctity.^[121] This localized heritage draws from the broader Yazidi spiritual framework centered at Lalish Temple, the faith's holiest site housing the tomb of Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir, which influences rituals and cosmology across Yazidi communities including Sinjar.^[122] Oral traditions form the core of Yazidi religious transmission, encompassing hymns, myths, and genealogies passed down without written scriptures, reinforcing a stratified social system of castes such as sheikhs, pirs, and murids that delineates spiritual and communal roles.^[123] In August 2014, ISIS forces systematically demolished dozens of these shrines during their campaign against Yazidis, targeting sites like Mam Rashan as part of genocidal efforts to eradicate cultural markers.^[121] Post-liberation initiatives have pursued partial restorations, with organizations documenting and rebuilding select structures to preserve tangible elements amid ongoing threats to intangible practices like oral histories.^[124] UNESCO has supported inventories of Yazidi tangible and intangible heritage in Iraq since 2023, aiding efforts to safeguard traditions resilient despite historical persecutions.^[125]

Economy and Livelihoods

Sinjar's economy has historically centered on agriculture, with olives, wheat, and barley forming the backbone of livelihoods and contributing to about 75% of pre-2014 income in the district.^[17] Farmers cultivated extensive olive groves and grain fields on the fertile plains surrounding Mount Sinjar, supplemented by limited livestock rearing, though water scarcity and rudimentary irrigation constrained yields even before the conflict.^[126] Industrial activity remained minimal, confined to small-scale processing of agricultural products, while informal cross-border trade and smuggling routes to Syria provided supplementary income for some households amid porous frontiers.^[4] The 2014 ISIS invasion causally devastated this agrarian base through systematic destruction of farmland, orchards, and irrigation infrastructure, rendering vast areas uncultivable and displacing over 400,000 residents, which halted production and market access.^[127] Post-liberation in 2015, agricultural output plummeted, with harvests like the 2020-2021 season yielding only 15,000 tons of wheat and barley despite some replanting efforts, far below pre-conflict levels due to ongoing insecurity and lack of inputs.^[128] Unemployment surged amid the economic void, fostering heavy dependence on international aid for basic needs, as formal employment opportunities evaporated without viable farming or trade revival.^[38] Militia control by Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units has further disrupted recovery, with reports of unauthorized taxes, checkpoints, and resource monopolization imposing costs on remaining agricultural trade and informal activities, exacerbating aid reliance and deterring investment.^[129] Potential sectors like religious tourism tied to Yazidi shrines and minor oil exploration nearby remain stalled by persistent violence and factional disputes, preventing diversification beyond subsistence farming.^[4] Regional infrastructure initiatives, such as the Development Road project linking southern Iraq to Turkey, offer indirect prospects for enhanced trade connectivity that could benefit northern areas like Sinjar through spillover logistics, though militia entrenchment risks undermining these gains.^[130]

Notable People

[Notable People - no content]

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May 13, 2024 · According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), about 183,000 people from Sinjar remain displaced, including 85 percent of the ...
[94]
2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq
Sources said some government officials continued to facilitate arbitrary demographic change by providing land and housing for Shia and Sunni Muslims to move ...Missing: shifts | Show results with:shifts
[95]
The Forced Displacement of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in ... - jstor
Jul 29, 2022 · The Yazidi minority was almost entirely uprooted and displaced to cities in the Kurdistan. Region. This study covers contextual developments and ...<|separator|>
[96]
Unraveling the Peace in Sinjar - EPIC
Dec 9, 2016 · ... Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS); today, the PKK's ranks in Sinjar are mainly filled by Yazidi soldiers. These units operate alongside the Sinjar ...
[97]
PKK-backed fighters in Sinjar refuse to surrender arms, official says
Sep 16, 2025 · The Sinjar Protection Units (YBS), affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), refused to give up their weapons at this stage, the ...Missing: control | Show results with:control
[98]
PKK expected to remain in Shingal despite dissolution - Rudaw
May 12, 2025 · The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is expected maintain bases in the Yazidi heartland of Shingal (Sinjar) in western Nineveh province, despite announcing its ...Missing: administration | Show results with:administration
[99]
'PKK presence in Mosul, Sinjar threatens Iraqi sovereignty, Turkey ...
Oct 1, 2021 · The terrorist group's presence in the region compels Turkey to carry out cross-border operations for the sake of border security and stability, ...Missing: rationale | Show results with:rationale
[100]
[PDF] Turkey's Cross-Border and Counterterrorism Operations
Therefore, in order to secure its borders and cut off the threat of terrorism, Turkey relied on Article 51 of the UN. Charter to justify the launch of Operation ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[101]
Five killed in Turkish strikes on PKK allies: Iraqi local sources
Oct 25, 2024 · "A series of Turkish air strikes targeted the Sinjar Resistance Units," a security official told AFP, reporting a total of five people killed, ...Missing: operations 2016-2025
[102]
Five Killed in Turkish Drone Strikes on PKK Members in Northern Iraq
Nov 10, 2024 · Turkish drone strikes killed five members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan's counter-terrorism service and security ...
[103]
As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish militants, Iraqi civilians suffer
Oct 10, 2023 · According to Reuters' analysis of ACLED's data, more than 500 civilians and nearly 2,600 members of the PKK, SDF and affiliates were killed in ...
[104]
Turkey's War in Northern Iraq: By the Numbers
Jul 28, 2022 · Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict's rising profile ...Missing: threats | Show results with:threats
[105]
Disputed Territories: An Unresolved Issue - Kurdishglobe
Sep 15, 2025 · Today, more than 15 years later, Article 140 remains unimplemented. Successive governments have failed to carry out even the first stage. This ...
[106]
KRG Minister Urges Implementation of Article 140 and Sinjar ...
Sep 1, 2025 · The deadline for implementation was December 2007, but successive Iraqi governments have failed to enforce it, leaving the issue unresolved and ...
[107]
KDP Official: No Stability in Sinjar Without Return to Kurdistan
Aug 15, 2025 · KDP official Vian Dakhil tells Kurdistan24 that stability in Sinjar is impossible until it returns to the Kurdistan Region under Article 140, ...
[108]
PMF forming battalion in Sinjar - Kurdistan24
Sep 2, 2023 · Kurdistan 24 has learned that the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) groups are covertly recruiting Sinjar residents to form a special force in the region.<|separator|>
[109]
Escalating Tension between Iran-Backed P.M.F. Groups and ...
May 15, 2017 · Kurdish President Masoud Barazni has also reportedly ordered the peshmerga forces to stop P.M.F. units from entering into Kurdish cities and has ...
[110]
Yazidi fighters defect from Peshmerga, join Iraqi PMF militia
Mar 6, 2025 · Hundreds of Yazidi fighters defected from a KDP-affiliated Peshmerga force to the Christian Babylon Brigades, part of Iraq's PMF, sources told The New Arab.
[111]
Iraq elections 2021: Yazidis divided but determined on eve of polls
Oct 9, 2021 · The beleaguered minority, persecuted by IS and still largely displaced, have more candidates than ever before, threatening long-standing KDP ...Missing: boycotts | Show results with:boycotts
[112]
Sectarian Entrepreneurs: How the U.S. Broke Iraq - Dissent Magazine
Aug 26, 2014 · ... corruption and exacerbated rather than dampened sectarianism in Iraq. ... In December 2013, ISIS attacked and killed Iraqi military ...
[113]
[PDF] Sectarianism, Governance, and Iraq's Future | Brookings Institution
government's lack of support within the local population could enable an ISIS ... have aimed to raise awareness of government corruption and, accordingly, to ...Missing: Peshmerga response Sinjar
[114]
Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War | United States Institute of Peace
They also called out officials for corruption. Even amid the fight against ISIS in 2015 and in subsequent years, Iraqis pressured the government for reforms.Missing: criticisms | Show results with:criticisms
[115]
Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS - The New York Times
Aug 7, 2014 · President Obama spoke about actions taken by his administration ... Obama called “genocide.” “Earlier this week, one Iraqi cried that ...
[116]
Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Iraq
Aug 8, 2014 · ... Yazidi population that is facing such a dire situation. ... As you heard the President say, this raises the prospect of an act of genocide ...
[117]
Opinion | The U.S. strategy leaves Yazidis exposed to the Islamic State
Nov 5, 2014 · THE OBAMA administration ... One can be seen in the plight of the Yazidis, the embattled Iraqi minority community threatened with genocide by the ...Missing: delay | Show results with:delay
[118]
Iraq's Reconstruction Ailments | Council on Foreign Relations
The reconstruction of Iraq has been hampered by a number of hurdles, including government bureaucracy, corruption, and security concerns.Missing: criticisms Sinjar inefficiencies
[119]
[PDF] 2025 USCIRF Annual Report
returning to the Sinjar district, which the Islamic State of Iraq and. Syria (ISIS) had devastated a decade earlier. Many of the 200,000 remaining displaced ...
[120]
The Yazidi mausoleums of Sinjar - MESOPOTAMIA HERITAGE
According to popular belief, God created Mount Sinjar with a mausoleum on each of its summits so the mountain could remain stable.
[121]
Mam Rashan Shrine - World Monuments Fund
Among them was Mam Rashan Shrine, named for the saint associated with agriculture, rain, and the annual harvest. The Yazidi People of Northern Iraq. The Yazidis ...
[122]
Lalish Temple - UNESCO World Heritage Centre
Apr 15, 2020 · It is the temple of the family of the great philosopher, politician, and teacher Confucius (6th to 5th century BC).
[123]
Yazidi Cultural Preservation - Yazda
Jamaya Sheshms is a yearly summer festival at Sheshms temple in Jafriye, north of Mount Sinjar. People (Sheshms followers) gather and celebrate to honor the ...
[124]
Culture - Nadia's Initiative
Cultural Preservation and Memorialization. For centuries, Yazidis have been targeted for their unique religious beliefs. ISIS' destruction of Yazidi sites of ...
[125]
UNESCO supports to the inventory of Yezidi community's intangible ...
Jul 2, 2023 · UNESCO supports to the inventory of Yezidi community's intangible and tangible cultural heritage in Iraq | United Nations in Iraq.Missing: oral | Show results with:oral
[126]
[PDF] SINJAR EMERGING MARKETS: OPPORTUNITIES AND ...
This section provides a closer look at 3 examples from the agricultural and livestock sector on the bottlenecks these experiences. Agriculture (Olives). Diagram ...
[127]
[PDF] Dead Land: Islamic State's Deliberate Destruction of Iraq's Farmland
In September 2018, Amnesty International conducted research on the destruction of Iraq's rural environment and the subsequent effects on people living off the ...<|separator|>
[128]
Yazidis of Sinjar cultivate their lands but with no prospect of harvest
Jul 20, 2023 · Yazidis in Sinjar are seventy per cent dependent on agriculture, which has declined by fifty per cent over the past two years due to poor ...Missing: natural | Show results with:natural
[129]
2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq
Sunni Muslims are approximately 40 percent of the population, of which Arabs constitute 24 percent, Kurds 15 percent, and Turkomans the remaining 1 percent.Missing: composition census
[130]
Reviving Turkish-Iraqi ties with the Development Road - Daily Sabah
Oct 23, 2024 · Central to this cooperation is the Development Road Project, which is set to transform regional dynamics through shared economic progress and ...