Southern Theater Command
The Southern Theater Command is one of five theater commands of the People's Liberation Army, responsible for coordinating joint operations across southern China and the South China Sea to defend territorial claims, secure borders, and protect maritime interests.[1][2] Established in early 2016 as part of the PLA's reforms to replace military regions with theater-focused structures for improved combat readiness and integration of services, it draws from the former Guangzhou Military Region and portions of the Chengdu Military Region, encompassing an area with over 320 million people and key economic hubs like Guangdong Province and Hong Kong.[2][3] Headquartered in Guangzhou, the command oversees provinces including Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, and Yunnan, extending responsibility to land borders with Myanmar and Vietnam as well as maritime domains in Southeast Asia.[2][4] The Southern Theater Command integrates forces from the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, commanding approximately 104,000 ground troops, over 350 fighter aircraft, multiple destroyer and submarine flotillas, and ten missile brigades, with specialized units such as amphibious marine brigades and special operations forces like the "Sword of the South."[1] It maintains the South Sea Fleet, including nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carrier task groups, to support patrols, live-fire exercises, and responses to perceived encroachments in disputed waters.[2][1] Central to China's strategy in the South China Sea, the command enforces sovereignty through coordinated actions with the China Coast Guard and maritime militia, conducts bilateral and multilateral exercises, and prepares for contingencies involving Taiwan or regional conflicts, reflecting the PLA's emphasis on systems confrontation and multi-domain operations.[1][2]History and Establishment
Pre-2016 Military Regions
Prior to the establishment of the Southern Theater Command in 2016, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) organized its forces in the southern region primarily through the Guangzhou Military Region, which served as the main administrative and operational entity covering key coastal and inland areas facing the South China Sea and Southeast Asia.[2] This region also incorporated elements from the adjacent Chengdu Military Region for southwestern border responsibilities, particularly in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, reflecting the PLA's pre-reform structure of seven geographically delineated military regions optimized for ground force administration rather than joint operations.[5] The Guangzhou Military Region was headquartered in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, and maintained oversight of provincial military districts, garrisons, and naval assets including the South Sea Fleet based in Zhanjiang.[6] The Guangzhou Military Region traced its origins to the Central South Military Region formed in late 1949 following the PLA's advance into southern China during the Chinese Civil War, but it was formally delineated as one of the seven military regions in a 1955 reorganization that divided the PLA into administrative commands aligned with major theaters of potential conflict.[6] Its area of responsibility encompassed Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, and Hainan provinces, along with garrisons in Hong Kong and Macau after their respective handovers in 1997 and 1999.[2] This jurisdiction positioned it to address threats from the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait periphery, and land borders with Vietnam and Myanmar, though operational focus remained fragmented by service branch under the ground force-dominated military region system.[7] Structurally, the Guangzhou Military Region commanded approximately 300,000-400,000 personnel in the mid-2010s, organized into two main group armies (the 41st and 42nd), multiple infantry divisions transitioned to combined arms brigades in earlier reforms, air force units under the Guangzhou Military Region Air Force, and subordinate units of the South Sea Fleet for maritime defense.[6] It included five provincial military districts (Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hainan, and Guizhou) and two garrison commands, emphasizing territorial defense, internal security, and limited power projection capabilities amid the PLA's legacy Soviet-influenced model that prioritized army-centric control over integrated joint commands.[8] Key developments included border clashes with Vietnam in 1979, which highlighted deficiencies in joint coordination, and subsequent modernization efforts in the 1990s-2000s focused on naval and air enhancements to counter regional maritime disputes.[9] The Chengdu Military Region, covering Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, and Chongqing, contributed ground forces and logistics for the southwestern flank, with its 14th Group Army handling high-altitude and border operations that later integrated into southern structures.[2] These military regions operated under the PLA's General Staff Department, with limited joint exercises and a peacetime administrative bias that the 2015-2016 reforms sought to rectify by dissolving them on February 1, 2016, to create theater commands emphasizing wartime joint operations reporting directly to the Central Military Commission.[5] The transition absorbed Guangzhou's coastal and naval assets alongside Chengdu's inland forces, addressing pre-reform silos where regional commanders lacked authority over full-spectrum operations across army, navy, air force, and strategic support elements.[7]2016 Reforms and Creation
The 2016 military reforms of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), spearheaded by Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping, sought to overhaul command structures for improved joint operations and alignment with national strategic priorities, moving away from the decentralized, army-centric model inherited from earlier decades. On November 24, 2015, the CMC approved the core reform plan, followed by the release of detailed guidelines on January 1, 2016, emphasizing the need to streamline layers of command, enhance cross-service integration, and place theater-level operations directly under CMC oversight.[9][10] These changes dismantled the seven military regions—Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Jinan—whose boundaries had been drawn primarily for ground force mobilization during the Cold War era, replacing them with five geographically oriented theater commands to facilitate rapid response to regional threats.[11][12] The Southern Theater Command emerged from this restructuring as the PLA's southern-facing joint operational hub, primarily drawing personnel, units, and infrastructure from the Guangzhou Military Region while incorporating elements from adjacent areas to cover maritime and terrestrial domains. On February 1, 2016, Xi Jinping formally inaugurated the command by conferring its ceremonial flag during a ceremony in Beijing, marking its official activation alongside the Eastern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands.[13][14] Headquartered in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, the new command assumed responsibility for defending China's southern maritime approaches, including the South China Sea, and land borders with Vietnam and Myanmar, with an emphasis on integrated air, naval, and ground force coordination to address disputes over island chains and exclusive economic zones.[2] This creation addressed longstanding inefficiencies in the prior system, where service branches operated semi-autonomously under regional commanders, often hindering unified action in complex environments like amphibious or anti-access scenarios. The reforms reduced redundant headquarters, cut approximately 300,000 personnel across the PLA by late 2017, and empowered theater commanders with authority over subordinate services to execute missions without inter-service friction, though implementation challenges persisted due to entrenched bureaucratic habits.[15][16] Initial leadership appointments, including Admiral Wang Hai as the first commander, underscored the navy's growing prominence in the command's focus on sea control and power projection southward.[2]Post-Establishment Evolution
Following its establishment on February 1, 2016, the Southern Theater Command (STC) underwent progressive enhancements in joint operational authority, aligning with broader People's Liberation Army (PLA) reforms that devolved campaign-level command from service branches to theater headquarters. This shift enabled STC to integrate forces across the navy, air force, army, and marine corps for maritime-focused missions, particularly in the South China Sea (SCS), with operational control over conventional units under Central Military Commission direction.[1] By 2023, STC oversaw specialized units including the 74th and 75th Group Army special operations forces brigades and the PLA Navy Marine Corps special operations brigade, facilitating amphibious and domain superiority exercises.[1] STC's operational tempo intensified post-2016, with routine combat readiness patrols in the SCS to assert sovereignty claims and counter foreign activities, including U.S. freedom of navigation operations. In 2023, it conducted live-fire drills and amphibious training near PRC-occupied SCS features, alongside bilateral exercises with Laos, Singapore, and Cambodia, and hosted the multilateral Peace and Friendship-2023 exercise in Guangdong involving Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.[1] The command also executed border security operations, such as live-fire drills with howitzers and counter-battery radars along the PRC-Burma border in November 2023 and late April 2023, responding to regional instability following Operation 1027.[1] Naval assets under STC, including the Shandong aircraft carrier, participated in three far-seas training deployments in April, September, and November 2023, with operations extending near Guam and integration into Joint Sword exercises.[1] Capability enhancements included the assignment of advanced platforms, such as at least four Type 055 Renhai-class cruisers by May 2024, bolstering surface fleet power projection in the SCS.[17] STC maintained high operational demands, balancing SCS maritime coercion with Myanmar border contingencies, which strained resources but demonstrated improved multi-domain integration.[18] By mid-2025, patrols escalated in response to external drills, including joint combat patrols near Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) on August 7 and ongoing sea-airspace operations around Nansha (Spratly) islands since June, involving warnings against Philippine intrusions.[19][20] These activities underscored STC's evolution toward sustained gray-zone enforcement and rapid-response joint operations.[1]Area of Responsibility
Geographic Boundaries
The Southern Theater Command (STC) encompasses southern China, including the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Yunnan, and Guizhou, as well as the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.[1] Its land boundaries extend along China's southwestern and southeastern frontiers, bordering Vietnam to the southwest and Myanmar to the west via Yunnan province.[2] Maritime jurisdiction covers the South China Sea (SCS), including PRC-claimed features such as the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, with operational focus on disputed areas overlapping with claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.[1] The STC's area of responsibility also includes coordination for Taiwan Strait contingencies in overlap with the Eastern Theater Command, emphasizing sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to PRC trade and energy imports.[1] This geographic scope, established under the 2016 PLA reforms, prioritizes maritime domain awareness and border security against Southeast Asian threats.[2]Strategic Focus Areas
The Southern Theater Command (STC) prioritizes maritime security and sovereignty enforcement in the South China Sea, where it conducts routine patrols, live-fire drills, and coercive operations against foreign military assets operating in disputed areas.[1] This focus aligns with China's "near-seas active defense" strategy, emphasizing control over strategic sea lanes and support for nuclear submarine deployments in waters averaging 1,200 meters deep.[21] STC coordinates with the China Coast Guard and maritime militia to assert claims within the nine-dash line, including tracking and intercepting U.S. freedom of navigation operations.[1] A secondary but significant focus involves supporting potential cross-strait operations in the Taiwan Strait, particularly through amphibious and naval assets in coordination with the Eastern Theater Command.[22] STC's two marine brigades and South Sea Fleet, including the aircraft carrier Shandong, enable power projection for unification scenarios, as demonstrated in exercises like JOINT SWORD in April 2023 near Taiwan.[1] These activities enhance joint operational readiness, with STC providing southern flank support in contingencies involving U.S. intervention.[22] Border defense along southwestern frontiers constitutes another key area, addressing tensions with India and Vietnam. STC manages disputes such as the 2020 Galwan Valley clash and 2022 Tawang incident with India, deploying special operations forces and conducting mobility-focused drills.[1] Joint exercises with neighbors like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, such as Peace and Friendship-2023 in Guangdong, aim to stabilize relations while bolstering regional deterrence.[1] Overall, these priorities reflect STC's role in anti-access/area denial strategies and theater-wide logistics modernization under 2016 reforms.[1]Organizational Structure
Joint Command Framework
The Southern Theater Command (STC) operates within the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) joint command framework, established through reforms announced in November 2015 and implemented in February 2016, which reorganized the prior seven military regions into five theater commands to prioritize integrated, multi-service operations over service-specific structures.[23] This framework vests the STC with operational authority over assigned forces from the PLA Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and strategic support elements within its area of responsibility, enabling unified command for contingencies such as South China Sea maritime disputes and border defense.[4] The Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping, retains strategic oversight, while theater-level commands handle tactical execution, separating force generation (managed by service headquarters) from operational control to foster jointness.[23][1] Central to the STC's structure is the Theater Joint Operations Command Center (T-JOCC), which serves as the nerve center for wartime command and control, organizing joint formations, synchronizing fires across domains, and executing campaigns under the theater commander's direction.[23] The commander, typically a senior officer with cross-service experience—such as Admiral Yuan Yubai, the first naval appointee to lead the STC from 2017—oversees peacetime joint training and wartime operations, supported by a political commissar for ideological oversight and deputy commanders representing key services.[23][4] Subordinate joint staff departments, including operations, intelligence, logistics, and equipment bureaus, mirror elements of the national Joint Staff Department, facilitating information sharing, reconnaissance integration, and logistics support tailored to the STC's maritime-heavy focus.[4] This framework emphasizes "system-of-systems" operations, integrating naval assets like the South Sea Fleet with air and ground units for amphibious and anti-access/area-denial missions, as evidenced by exercises simulating South China Sea scenarios.[4] Reforms have streamlined command chains by divesting service arms of direct operational roles, though challenges persist in achieving full interoperability due to historical Ground Force dominance and ongoing modernization of command networks.[1] The STC's joint staff has published doctrinal articles underscoring the need for theater-level authority in multi-domain warfare, reflecting iterative adaptations since 2016.[24]Service Component Commands
The service component commands under the Southern Theater Command provide operational forces from the People's Liberation Army Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and assigned Rocket Force elements to support joint theater missions, particularly in maritime and border defense scenarios.[25] These components exercise administrative control while the theater joint command holds operational authority, enabling integrated campaigning across domains.[23] Ground Force ComponentThe Southern Theater Command Ground Force oversees land-based units, including the 74th Group Army and 75th Group Army, which conduct defensive operations along southern borders with Vietnam and Myanmar, as well as amphibious support roles.[26] These group armies incorporate combined-arms brigades reformed in 2017, emphasizing mobility and integration with naval and air assets for potential contingencies in the region.[27] Navy Component
The South Sea Fleet functions as the naval service component, headquartered in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, and is tasked with securing maritime interests in the South China Sea, including patrol, anti-access/area denial, and power projection.[26] It commands surface, submarine, aviation, and three marine brigades, with bases at Yulin (Hainan) and Guangzhou supporting carrier operations and amphibious capabilities.[28] Air Force Component
The Southern Theater Command Air Force manages fixed- and rotary-wing assets for air defense, strike, and reconnaissance, operating from bases in Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and surrounding areas to cover the theater's airspace and maritime approaches.[29] It fields multirole fighters such as J-10, J-11, and J-16 variants, integrated with ground-based air defenses for joint maritime patrols.[4] Rocket Force Integration
Unlike the other services, the Rocket Force lacks a dedicated theater component command but assigns multiple missile brigades and bases within the Southern Theater's area, focusing on conventional precision strikes against naval and island targets in the South China Sea.[30] These units, including short- and medium-range systems, operate under theater operational control for deterrence and rapid response, with nine reported short- and medium-range missile units supporting anti-ship and area denial missions.[31]
Subordinate Units and Brigades
The Southern Theater Command's subordinate units are organized under its joint command framework, with primary combat elements drawn from the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Rocket Force (PLARF). These include group armies, flotillas, aviation brigades, and missile brigades tailored for operations in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait periphery, and border regions. Ground force units emphasize amphibious and light infantry capabilities for island-hopping and rapid deployment, while naval and air assets focus on maritime denial and power projection.[1][32] PLAGF units under the Southern Theater Ground Force, headquartered in Nanning, Guangxi, consist of the 74th and 75th Group Armies, each commanding approximately six combined arms brigades (light, medium, or heavy types with 4,500–5,000 personnel), plus supporting artillery, air defense, aviation, special operations, engineer, and sustainment brigades. The 74th Group Army, based in Yunnan Province, includes two amphibious combined arms brigades optimized for South China Sea contingencies, alongside infantry and mechanized units for border security with Southeast Asia. The 75th Group Army, located in Guangxi, features light combined arms brigades suited for rugged terrain and rapid response, with special operations forces designated "Sword of the South." Overall, the theater fields 12 combined arms brigades, including two amphibious and two infantry-focused, supported by three artillery brigades and two army aviation brigades equipped with helicopters for assault and reconnaissance. In 2023, three PLAGF brigades were reassigned to the PLAN Marine Corps, enhancing amphibious integration.[1][33][32] The PLAN's South Sea Fleet serves as the primary naval subordinate, operating from bases in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, and Yulin, Hainan, with two submarine flotillas, two destroyer flotillas, and one aircraft carrier task group. It includes multi-role surface combatants such as Type 055 Renhai-class cruisers and Type 052D Luyang III-class destroyers for area air defense and anti-surface warfare, alongside Type 054A Jiangkai-class frigates and Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines for littoral operations. The fleet maintains approximately 22 frigates, four destroyers, and four attack submarines in the theater's area of responsibility, supported by coastal patrol vessels for militia augmentation. A nuclear submarine base at Longpo handles Type 093 Shang-class attack submarines and Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, though the latter primarily align with strategic deterrence rather than theater-specific tasks.[1][34] PLAAF units comprise two air bases commanding 14 fighter and ground-attack brigades equipped with J-10, J-11, and J-16 multirole fighters for air superiority and strike missions, plus one transport brigade, one special mission aircraft division for electronic warfare and reconnaissance, and one bomber division with H-6 variants for maritime patrol. These brigades support routine intercepts and long-range patrols over the South China Sea, integrating with PLAN aviation for joint operations.[1][4] PLARF contributions include nine brigades equipped with short- and medium-range conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, such as DF-21D and DF-26 variants, for anti-access/area denial in the South China Sea, subordinate to theater missile commands but operationally aligned with joint task forces. These units, numbering in the 967XX series for brigades, focus on precision strikes against naval and island targets.[35][36][31]Leadership
Commanders
General Wang Jiaocheng (王教成) served as the inaugural commander of the Southern Theater Command from its establishment in February 2016 until January 2017.[11][21] A career army officer previously commanding the Shenyang Military Region, he emphasized the command's role in securing China's southern maritime approaches during early interviews.[23] In January 2017, Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai (袁誉柏) succeeded him, becoming the first naval officer to lead a PLA theater command and underscoring the strategic priority of South China Sea operations.[37][38] Formerly commander of the North Sea Fleet, Yuan held the position until June 2021, during which the command conducted intensified patrols and exercises in disputed waters.[39] General Wang Xiubin (王秀斌), an army officer and prior deputy in the Eastern Theater Command, assumed command in June 2021 and served until July 2024.[40] His tenure coincided with heightened tensions in the South China Sea, including confrontations with Philippine and U.S. forces, though he later faced scrutiny amid broader PLA leadership purges.[41] General Wu Yanan (吴亚男), a navy officer with prior fleet command experience, took command in July 2024 and remains in the role as of October 2025.[42][40] Under his leadership, the command has sustained routine deployments while engaging in high-level dialogues, such as video calls with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command counterparts.[29][43]| Commander | Service Branch | Tenure |
|---|---|---|
| Wang Jiaocheng | Army | February 2016 – January 2017[21] |
| Yuan Yubai | Navy | January 2017 – June 2021[37] |
| Wang Xiubin | Army | June 2021 – July 2024[40] |
| Wu Yanan | Navy | July 2024 – present[42] |
Political Commissars
The political commissar of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command holds a position equivalent in rank to the commander, typically a general, and shares dual command authority over the theater's joint operations while directing the political work apparatus across all services and support elements. This role emphasizes ensuring ideological alignment with Chinese Communist Party directives, conducting political education, managing cadre selection and discipline, and fostering unit morale and loyalty, as integral to the PLA's "party command gun" principle.[44] The commissar chairs the theater's Party committee and supervises commissars at subordinate levels, including those in service components like the navy and air force.[42] Wang Wenquan has served as political commissar since December 2023, when he was appointed following prior roles in political work within the PLA Army.[45] On December 25, 2023, Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping promoted Wang to the rank of general in recognition of his leadership in the theater's political domain.[45] As of October 2025, Wang remains in the post amid ongoing PLA personnel adjustments, including purges targeting corruption in political work systems elsewhere, though no such actions have been reported for the Southern Theater Command's leadership.[46] Preceding Wang, Wang Jianwu held the position from December 2018 until his transfer, during which he oversaw political integration in joint exercises and border engagements in the command's area of responsibility, including visits to garrisons in Macao.[44] The role's continuity reflects the theater's strategic emphasis on South China Sea operations and territorial defense, where political commissars enforce discipline amid heightened readiness requirements.[2]Key Appointments and Changes
The Southern Theater Command was established on February 1, 2016, with General Wang Jiaocheng appointed as its inaugural commander, drawn from his prior role commanding the Shenyang Military Region, and General Wei Liang as political commissar.[47][11] This initial leadership reflected the transition from the former Guangzhou Military Region to the joint theater structure under the 2015-2016 PLA reforms. In early 2017, Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai replaced Wang Jiaocheng as commander, becoming the first naval officer to lead a theater command and signaling heightened priority on maritime operations amid South China Sea tensions.[38][21] Yuan, previously commander of the North Sea Fleet, held the position until succeeded by General Wang Xiubin, who emphasized integrated joint operations in the region. A notable recent change occurred in July 2024, when General Wu Yanan, aged 61 and formerly commander of the 73rd Group Army, was appointed commander, replacing Wang Xiubin in a low-profile transition reported amid ongoing regional frictions.[40][48] Wu's army background contrasts with Yuan's naval expertise, potentially shifting operational emphases within the command's joint framework. On the political side, General Wang Wenquan serves as the current political commissar, having been promoted to full general rank on December 25, 2023, by order of Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping, affirming continuity in ideological oversight.[45] These appointments align with broader PLA patterns of rotation to mitigate patronage and enforce loyalty, though specific motivations for STC changes remain opaque absent official disclosures.[42]Capabilities and Modernization
Naval Forces and Assets
 The naval component of the Southern Theater Command consists of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) South Sea Fleet, tasked with securing maritime interests in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait approaches, and beyond the first island chain. The fleet integrates with other theater services for joint operations, emphasizing anti-access/area denial strategies against potential adversaries. It operates from multiple bases, including two primary PLAN facilities and a dedicated nuclear submarine base, supporting submarine patrols, surface combatant deployments, and logistical sustainment for extended operations.[1] Key surface and subsurface assets assigned to the South Sea Fleet include modern combatants optimized for blue-water engagements and littoral control. The fleet fields two destroyer flotillas equipped with four destroyers, primarily Luyang III-class (Type 052D) vessels armed with vertical launch systems for anti-ship, anti-air, and land-attack missiles. Frigate strength stands at 22 units, mainly Jiangkai II/III-class (Type 054A/C), providing multi-role capabilities including anti-submarine warfare with towed-array sonar and helicopters. Submarine forces comprise two flotillas with four attack submarines, focusing on diesel-electric Yuan-class (Type 039A/B) platforms for stealthy regional denial, alongside access to nuclear-powered assets for strategic deterrence. Amphibious elements feature Yuzhao-class landing platform docks (eight in total PLAN inventory, with allocations to the fleet) and Yushen-class (Type 075) landing helicopter assault ships, enabling expeditionary operations and support for marine brigades.[1]| Asset Category | Approximate Number | Principal Types and Capabilities |
|---|---|---|
| Destroyers | 4 | Luyang III (Type 052D): YJ-18 anti-ship missiles, HHQ-9 SAMs, long-range precision strikes.[1] |
| Frigates | 22 | Jiangkai II/III (Type 054A/C): ASW focus with YU-7 torpedoes, modular upgrades for extended range.[1] |
| Attack Submarines | 4 | Yuan-class (Type 039A/B): AIP for quiet operations, anti-surface/sub-surface warfare.[1] |
| Medium Landing Ships | 51 | Support amphibious assaults, logistics in contested littorals.[1] |
| Amphibious Ships | Variable allocation | Yushen (Type 075) LHAs: Rotorcraft operations, over-the-horizon maneuvers; Yuzhao LPDs: Vehicle/helicopter transport.[1] |
Air and Missile Capabilities
The Southern Theater Command incorporates aviation assets from the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aviation, organized under the Southern Theater Command Air Force headquartered in Guangzhou. As of 2023, it commands 14 fighter and ground attack brigades, including naval aviation units, alongside one bomber division, one special mission aircraft division, and one transportation brigade, operating from two primary air bases. These units support regional operations focused on the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, emphasizing air superiority, strike capabilities, and reconnaissance. Modernization efforts include integration of fifth-generation fighters and unmanned systems, reflecting broader PLAAF transitions to brigade-based structures since 2011.[1] Key PLAAF brigades under the theater include the 124th Air Brigade at Bose/Tianyang equipped with J-10A and J-10S fighters; the 4th and 5th Air Brigades at Foshan and Guilin/Li Jia Tsun with J-20 stealth fighters; the 26th at Huiyang operating J-16 multirole fighters and J-16D electronic warfare variants; and the 125th at Nanning/Wuxu with J-16s. Bomber assets feature the 8th Bomber Division's 23rd and 24th Regiments at Leiyang and Shaodong, deploying H-6K, H-6J, and H-6KG strategic bombers capable of launching long-range cruise missiles, with an estimated 101-150 H-6 variants in the division. Additional units such as the 6th, 67th, and 129th Air Brigades at Suixi maintain Su-30MKK, Su-35S, and JH-7A aircraft for multirole operations. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are prominent, with the UAV Regiment at Mangshi using GJ-2 (Wing Loong II) and other brigades employing WZ-7, WZ-10, and Soar Dragon platforms for reconnaissance and strike. Older J-7G interceptors persist in units like the 52nd Air Brigade at Wuhan/Shanpo.[49][1] Missile capabilities in the Southern Theater are provided by allocated brigades from the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which maintains operational control under theater commands despite centralized administration across six bases. The theater hosts approximately 10-11 PLARF missile brigades and two combat missile bases, focusing on conventional short- and intermediate-range systems for anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea and against potential Southeast Asian or maritime targets. Key units under Base 61 include the 96714 Brigade at Yong’an (Fujian) and 96716 Brigade at Ganzhou (Guangdong) transitioning to DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle missiles with 27-36 launchers each, while the 96715 Brigade at Meizhou retains DF-11 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) at similar scale. Base 62 features DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) brigades, such as the 96725 at Jianshui (Yunnan) and 96726 at Qingyuan (Guangdong), each with 36 launchers optimized for anti-ship roles with dual conventional-nuclear capability. The 96727 Brigade at Puning conducts operational testing with DF-17 systems. Nuclear forces include DF-5 ICBM silos operated by the 631st and 633rd Brigades in southern China, with 10 and 6 silos respectively, some under construction as of 2023.[1][36]| Missile System | Type | Estimated Launchers per Brigade | Key Southern Bases/Brigades |
|---|---|---|---|
| DF-11 | SRBM | 27-36 | 96715 (Meizhou) |
| DF-15 | SRBM | Transitioning | 96716 (Ganzhou) |
| DF-17 | Hypersonic SRBM | 27-36 | 96714 (Yong’an), 96716 (Ganzhou), 96727 (Puning) |
| DF-26 | IRBM (anti-ship) | 36 | 96725 (Jianshui), 96726 (Qingyuan) |
| DF-5 | ICBM (silos) | 6-10 silos | 631st, 633rd Brigades |