Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Transferable development rights

Transferable development rights (TDRs) constitute a voluntary, market-oriented tool that enables landowners in designated "sending" areas—typically rural, agricultural, or environmentally sensitive parcels—to sever and sell their unused development potential to developers in "receiving" areas where denser construction is permitted or incentivized. This mechanism severs the right to develop from the land itself, preserving the sending parcel through permanent easements or restrictions while compensating the owner via the sale of those , which can fund conservation efforts or provide economic relief against regulatory restrictions on growth. Originating as an alternative to direct downzoning or , TDRs seek to internalize the externalities of sprawl by directing urban expansion to infrastructure-ready sites, theoretically achieving preservation without sole reliance on public acquisition of land. The concept traces its roots to New York City's 1968 Landmarks Preservation Law, which authorized transfers of adjacent to historic structures to offset losses from height restrictions, marking the first statutory implementation of severed development rights in response to constitutional challenges over property takings. By the 1970s and 1980s, TDR frameworks proliferated for farmland and open-space protection, with pioneering rural programs in places like , and , where sending-area densities were reduced in exchange for transferable credits redeemable in urban fringes. These early applications demonstrated potential for conserving thousands of acres— alone preserved over acres through TDRs by facilitating more than 400 transactions—but empirical evaluations reveal uneven outcomes, as program success hinges on robust demand in receiving areas, clear legal severance of rights, and avoidance of speculative banking of credits. Despite their appeal as a compensatory alternative to blunt regulatory takings, TDRs have sparked debates over and ; while some jurisdictions measurable preservation gains tied to transferred densities, broader reviews indicate many programs yield few transactions due to mismatched supply-demand dynamics, administrative complexity, or insufficient incentives, sometimes functioning more as symbolic overlays than active markets. Critics contend that TDRs can distort land values by artificially inflating development potential in receiving zones, potentially exacerbating urban congestion without proportionally curtailing sprawl, and raise takings-clause concerns if credits prove illiquid or devalued by policy shifts. Proponents counter that successful implementations, often bolstered by state enabling legislation, achieve causal preservation by monetizing rights that would otherwise pressure fragile lands, though rigorous longitudinal data underscores the need for tailored designs over one-size-fits-all adoption.

Conceptual Framework

Definition and Core Principles

Transferable development rights (TDR) constitute a zoning-based regulatory mechanism that enables the severance and market-driven transfer of a property's inherent development potential from parcels designated for preservation—known as sending areas—to other parcels zoned for intensified growth, termed receiving areas. This process transforms unused development capacity into transferable credits or certificates, which landowners in sending areas can sell to developers, thereby compensating owners for forgone building opportunities while enforcing permanent restrictions, such as easements, on the originating land. At its core, TDR operates on the principle of voluntary participation, leveraging market incentives to redirect urban expansion away from environmentally sensitive, agricultural, or historically significant lands without relying solely on regulatory prohibitions or public expropriation. Sending area owners retain title to their property but relinquish future development entitlements in exchange for financial gain from credit sales, while receiving area owners purchase these credits to exceed baseline zoning densities, such as by increasing floor area ratios or unit counts. This framework presupposes that development rights exist as a distinct, alienable bundle within property ownership, separable under local ordinances without constituting a compensable taking, provided the transfers align with established zoning baselines. Fundamental to TDR's efficacy is its reliance on defined ratios for allocation and density bonuses, calibrated by municipal planners to balance preservation goals with or supply needs; for instance, one TDR might equate to a specific increment of buildable square footage, determined via formulas accounting for parcel size, , and ecological value in sending zones. The system promotes efficient by concentrating growth in infrastructure-ready locations, mitigating sprawl's fiscal and environmental costs, though success hinges on robust market demand for credits and administrative clarity to avoid underutilization. Empirical implementations, such as those in New Jersey's Pinelands since 1985, demonstrate how TDR can preserve over 300,000 acres by facilitating transfers that generate landowner revenues averaging $10,000 to $20,000 per .

Operational Mechanism

Transferable development rights (TDRs) operate through a market-based system that severs excess development potential from preserved lands—known as sending areas—and reallocates it to designated receiving areas where intensified development is permissible, thereby compensating landowners for restrictions while directing growth. Local governments establish programs via ordinances that define sending areas (e.g., farmland, wetlands, or historic sites) and receiving areas (e.g., urban centers or infrastructure-adjacent zones), often requiring public processes for designation to balance for credits. The severance process begins when a sending-area landowner voluntarily enrolls in the program, typically by recording a perpetual or deed restriction on the property, which legally detaches development rights and prohibits future subdivision or beyond minimal uses. This , often facilitated by downzoning in mandatory programs (e.g., reducing from 1 unit per 5 acres to 1 unit per 25 acres in ), generates TDR credits quantified by formulas accounting for parcel size, prior , environmental features, or —such as 1 credit per 5 acres in Montgomery County or 1 per 3 acres in certain Maryland counties. Local planning authorities certify these credits upon verification, issuing transferable certificates or instruments that represent the severed rights, ensuring they cannot be reattached to the restricted land. Credits enter a where sending landowners sell them to receiving-area developers through private transactions, real estate brokers, or public TDR banks operated by municipalities to stabilize supply (e.g., the Pinelands Development Credit Bank in has facilitated preservation of over 100,000 acres). Transfers require recording deeds of conveyance, public filing for transparency, and sometimes county approval to prevent speculation or imbalance; prices vary by demand, ranging from $3,800 to $45,000 per credit in Maryland programs as of the early , reflecting local values. In receiving areas, purchasers retire credits by attaching them to their parcels via applications, enabling bonuses or height increases beyond baseline limits—such as elevating residential from 2 to 11 units per acre in Montgomery County or adding commercial floor area—subject to reviews, minimum credit thresholds (e.g., two-thirds usage), and capacity checks. Governments track retirements to enforce permanence, preventing reuse, and may impose ratios (e.g., 1 TDR per additional unit) to calibrate growth incentives. This has enabled over 6,000 TDR transfers in Montgomery County since the , preserving 43,000 acres while concentrating development. Programs can be optional, relying on landowner participation, or mandatory, where downzoning compels credit generation for compensation, though administrative oversight ensures legal validity under property rights doctrines.

Historical Development

Origins and Early Adoption

The origins of transferable development rights (TDRs) trace to early 20th-century urban innovations in the United States, where mechanisms for reallocating building intensities emerged to accommodate vertical growth without uniform height restrictions. City's 1916 zoning resolution introduced a precursor by authorizing owners of adjacent lots to combine or transfer "air rights" upward, enabling taller structures on merged parcels while preserving light and air standards across the district. This voluntary transfer system laid foundational principles for severing and reallocating development potential from land parcels, though it focused on intensification rather than preservation. The modern TDR framework crystallized in 1968 with 's Landmarks Preservation Law, the first ordinance explicitly creating transferable rights severed from restricted historic properties. Under this law, owners of designated landmarks could sell unused development rights—typically —to adjacent or nearby receiving sites, generating revenue to offset preservation mandates that limited demolition or alteration. This approach addressed constitutional concerns over regulatory takings by providing a market-based compensation mechanism, avoiding outright government purchase of restricted properties. The U.S. Supreme Court's 1978 ruling in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. affirmed its legality, holding that such transfers constituted a valid exercise of police power when alternative economic uses persisted, thereby encouraging broader experimentation. Early adoption in the 1970s extended TDRs beyond urban landmarks to rural preservation, particularly farmland and coastal areas facing sprawl pressures. , implemented the first county-level TDR ordinance in 1974, designating agricultural sending areas where density rights could be sold to urban receiving zones, with amendments in 1979 refining transfer ratios and eliminating contiguity requirements to boost participation. Similarly, programs in New Jersey's Pinelands region and , followed by the late 1970s, adapting the model to cluster development away from sensitive ecosystems, though initial transactions remained limited due to untested markets and legal uncertainties. These pioneering efforts demonstrated TDRs' versatility in balancing growth accommodation with , influencing state enabling legislation in subsequent decades.

Expansion and Key Milestones

The expansion of transferable development rights (TDR) programs accelerated in the 1980s, marking the first major wave of adoption beyond initial urban preservation efforts, with approximately 60 programs implemented during the decade to address farmland and open space protection amid suburban growth pressures. , established a pioneering rural TDR program in 1980 by downzoning sending areas to one dwelling unit per 25 acres, enabling transfers to receiving areas with , which preserved 48,584 acres by May 2006 and served as a template for subsequent initiatives due to its integration with agricultural easements. , followed in 1978 with further refinements through downzoning in 1999 and 2003, achieving preservation of about 13,000 acres by 2006 by incentivizing TDR use over direct development. In the 1990s, TDR adoption spread to additional jurisdictions, often tied to comprehensive land-use plans emphasizing rural-urban boundaries. , launched its program in 1987, expanding it in 1995 with a Critical Area component and refining receiving zones in 2004, resulting in the preservation of roughly 10,000 acres by 2005, alongside rising TDR values from $35,000 to $250,000–$265,000 per credit. , operationalized its program in 1993 (adopted 1992), targeting 64,000 acres of rural land and linking transfers to state farmland preservation eligibility, with 2,000 acres protected via 690 TDRs by 2005. , activated its effort in 1990 following 1988 planning recommendations, with 2002 amendments permitting TDRs in rural zones and yielding about 1,000 acres preserved by 2006. Chesterfield Township, New Jersey, introduced a "new-generation" program in 1998, featuring TDR auctions that preserved 3,200 acres by 2007 while directing 1,095 units to a designated village. The 2000s saw further proliferation and innovation, including government TDR banks and state-level enabling legislation to overcome market barriers. , piloted its program in 1998 before permanent adoption in 2001, establishing a county TDR bank that acquired 1,124 credits by 2007 to safeguard over 90,000 acres of rural and separator lands, with 455 private-market transfers emphasizing urban growth containment. In , County expanded its framework in 2002–2003 to encompass rural fringe and lands programs, building on a 1974 precursor and preserving 2,200 acres by 2007 through noncontiguous transfers. New Jersey's 2004 state legislation formalized TDR auctions, enhancing program viability in areas like the Pinelands, whose comprehensive model from the early had already preserved vast tracts and influenced national replication. By 2012, TDR programs numbered at least 239 across the , reflecting sustained growth driven by these adaptations, though many faced challenges in generating sufficient transfers without ongoing incentives like bonuses or purchases. A subsequent census identified 375 programs by the early 2020s, underscoring their evolution into tools for broader environmental and growth management objectives.

Property Rights and Severance Doctrine

In Anglo-American , ownership of is understood as a , encompassing the rights to possess, use, exclude others, and alienate the land, with each component potentially separable and transferable independently. Within this framework, the development right—defined as the legal entitlement to utilize the land at a specified intensity, such as maximum density, , or height permitted under —forms a distinct "stick" in the bundle that can be quantified and severed from the estate. The doctrine, derived from longstanding precedents allowing the division of property interests (e.g., subsurface minerals or ), enables landowners to legally detach and convey this development right while retaining surface ownership, subject to perpetual restrictions like easements or covenants that extinguish future development on the sending parcel. In transferable development rights (TDR) programs, is operationalized through municipal ordinances that appraise baseline development potential—often via formulas tied to acreage, , or environmental metrics—and issue certificates representing the severed units, which may then be banked, sold, or transferred to receiving properties. This process transforms an intangible regulatory into a marketable , compensating owners for forgone uses without requiring outright purchase of the . Legally, TDR severance aligns with law's emphasis on alienability and voluntary , as it preserves the owner's while facilitating market-based allocation of pressure. Courts have consistently upheld its constitutional validity, rejecting takings challenges under the Fifth Amendment on grounds that the mechanism is optional, provides just compensation through TDR sales, and does not eliminate all economically viable uses of the sending (e.g., or open space). For instance, early implementations in the United States, such as City's 1968 program for , relied on this severance to preserve historic structures by transferring unused , a model later expanded to farmland and wetlands protection without judicial invalidation of the core concept. Critics, however, argue that severance presupposes government-created "" via zoning baselines, potentially undermining absolute ownership absent regulation, though empirical outcomes show TDRs enhancing owner autonomy compared to outright downzoning.

Takings Clause Challenges and Resolutions

Transferable development rights (TDR) programs have faced challenges under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, which prohibits the government from taking for public use without just compensation, on grounds that density restrictions in sending areas constitute regulatory takings by substantially diminishing property value without physical invasion or direct appropriation. Courts assess such claims using frameworks from cases like Penn Central Transportation Co. v. (1978), which employs a fact-specific balancing test weighing the economic impact on the claimant, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. In Penn Central, the referenced TDR mechanisms as a potential mitigation, observing that owners could transfer unused to adjacent parcels under the same , thereby preserving economic value and supporting the denial of a per se taking claim against 's landmark preservation law. However, the Court noted limitations where TDR markets prove illiquid or transfers impractical, as appellants argued the restricted market for Grand Central Terminal's failed to provide reasonable compensation. Subsequent litigation has tested whether TDR severance itself effects a taking by reallocating development potential without monetary payment. In Suitum v. Tahoe Agency (1997), the Supreme Court held that a landowner's takings claim was not ripe for review because she could sell allocated TDRs on an established market, retaining the ability to realize economic benefit from restricted lakefront property under the Tahoe Compact's density controls. This ruling affirmed TDRs as a compensable interest, akin to a severed easement, where market transferability supplies "just compensation" in kind rather than cash, distinguishing programs from total deprivations under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992). Legal scholars argue that TDRs align with Takings Clause purposes by internalizing preservation costs through voluntary trades, avoiding the all-or-nothing outcomes of strict per se rules, provided programs ensure demand via bonuses in receiving areas. Resolutions to challenges often hinge on program design ensuring TDR viability, with courts upholding initiatives where transferable rights maintain property's value. For instance, the 's TDR system withstood scrutiny by demonstrating active trading, with over 1,000 certificates exchanged since 1987, preserving 300,000 acres while compensating restricted owners. In contrast, flawed implementations risk invalidation; a 2015 federal complaint in Midtown TDR Ventures LLC v. City of New York alleged that unused TDRs from sites constituted an uncompensated taking due to regulatory barriers stifling transfers, though the case settled without precedent-setting ruling on TDR takings. Empirical reviews indicate successful programs, such as County's in since 1980, evade successful challenges by capping sending-area densities at 0.1-0.25 units per acre while granting 0.5-1.0 bonus densities in receiving zones, yielding over $500 million in transfers by 2010 without federal takings findings. The has not directly invalidated a TDR program as a taking, viewing them as market-based alternatives to that respect property expectations when rights remain alienable.

Economic Rationale

Theoretical Market-Based Efficiency

Transferable development rights (TDRs) establish a for allocating potential across parcels, theoretically enhancing by enabling voluntary transactions that direct growth to locations where it generates the highest net social . Under TDR programs, landowners in designated sending areas, often valued for preservation due to environmental or agricultural attributes, sever and sell their rights to buyers in receiving areas suitable for denser use, such as urban infill sites. This of rights allows prices to reflect supply constraints and demand pressures, ensuring that preserved land remains undeveloped only if the compensation received exceeds the forgone , while additional in receiving areas is priced to cover externalities like strain. From a first-principles economic perspective, TDRs align with the Coase theorem's assertion that clearly defined property rights, when tradable with minimal transaction costs, facilitate bargaining toward Pareto-efficient outcomes in the presence of externalities, such as sprawl-induced habitat loss or concentrated . Rigid without transferability imposes uniform restrictions that prevent mutually beneficial trades, potentially stranding value in low-development-potential areas while underutilizing high-value sites; TDR markets mitigate this by permitting reallocation based on revealed preferences, where buyers pay premiums reflecting marginal gains. Economic analyses indicate this approach reduces deadweight losses compared to command-and-control regulations, as it internalizes preservation costs through market signals rather than arbitrary caps, fostering development patterns that maximize overall . Theoretically, TDR hinges on and low barriers to , enabling the to equilibrate for intensity across jurisdictions. When sending areas hold rights equivalent to baseline densities—severable upon preservation easements—and receiving areas offer bonuses scaled to absorption capacity, the resulting trades approximate competitive , preserving where or ecological values exceed rents while concentrating growth where or economic benefits dominate. This market-based rationing avoids the fiscal distortions of subsidies or taxes for , as voluntary participation ensures compensation aligns with costs, theoretically minimizing government intervention while achieving targeted land-use goals. Empirical models suggest such systems can outperform fee-simple purchases by leveraging private capital for preservation, with gains materializing when programs minimize administrative frictions like right valuation disputes or geographic transfer limits.

Empirical Evidence of Outcomes

In , the transferable development rights (TDR) program, established in 1980, has preserved over 40,000 of farmland by severing and transferring development rights from rural sending areas to urban receiving zones, enabling higher densities in the latter while restricting subdivision in the former. This has supported the broader goal of maintaining a 93,000- Agricultural Reserve, where one TDR equates to the right to develop one single-family home on one , with sending parcels required to retain one TDR per 25 for eligibility in preservation easements. Empirical confirms high market activity, with thousands of TDRs traded, compensating landowners at market rates often exceeding $20,000 per credit in recent years and reducing pressure on compared to unregulated . However, geospatial studies reveal limitations, as preserved lands show promising retention of agricultural and forested areas but fail to consistently concentrate development in designated receiving zones, allowing some peripheral sprawl. The Pinelands Development Credit (PDC) program, operational since , provides a contrasting in regional preservation, safeguarding over 50,000 acres of ecologically sensitive and farmland through a mandatory TDR spanning multiple municipalities. Credits generated from restricted preservation areas (one per 40 acres in rural zones) have been redeemed in growth zones at ratios up to 2.8:1, fostering denser residential and commercial builds while credits traded at prices rising from $10,000 to over $100,000 per unit by the , per commission records. This has slowed urban expansion rates in the Pinelands relative to statewide averages, with econometric models attributing 20-30% of preserved acreage directly to PDC transfers rather than regulatory downzoning alone. Broader U.S. evaluations of over 140 TDR ordinances indicate mixed efficacy, with only about 10-20% generating active markets sufficient for substantial preservation, often requiring TDR banks to seed supply and reduce costs averaging 10-15% of credit value. In , panel data from 1980-2000 show TDRs redirected growth from farmland but at lower volumes than anticipated, preserving roughly 5,000 s amid high legal and appraisal fees that deterred smallholders. Programs with bonus ratios exceeding 1:1 (e.g., 1.5-3:1) exhibit 2-3 times higher transfer rates, per surveys of 49 leading initiatives, yet many fail to offset fiscal losses in sending areas or fully mitigate speculative holding of credits. Overall, while TDRs prove cost-effective versus direct buyouts in high-demand contexts—saving 20-50% on funds per preserved —empirical regressions link underperformance to fragmented sending/receiving designations and regulatory uncertainty.

Implementation Models

Sending and Receiving Area Designations

Sending areas in transferable development rights (TDR) programs are designated as zones from which development rights are severed to preserve land with high value, such as agricultural fields, forests, wetlands, or environmentally sensitive habitats. Local governments typically identify these areas through comprehensive processes, prioritizing parcels based on criteria including soil productivity for farming, ecological significance, flood risk, or , often guided by state enabling legislation or local ordinances. Once designated, sending properties are subject to restrictive easements or downzoning that permanently limit density, allowing owners to transfer unused rights while retaining land for compatible low-intensity uses like . The designation process for sending areas involves and amendments approved by commissions and elected bodies, ensuring voluntary participation by landowners who receive compensation via sales. For instance, in programs like Montgomery County's Agricultural Reserve in , established in the 1980s, rural density zones were classified as sending areas to redirect growth away from 93,000 acres of preserved farmland, with designations updated periodically based on agricultural land evaluations. Empirical assessments, such as those from the American Farmland Trust, indicate that effective sending designations correlate with higher preservation rates when tied to quantifiable metrics like prime acreage rather than vague environmental goals. Receiving areas, conversely, are zones permitted to absorb transferred development rights, enabling bonus density or height beyond baseline zoning to concentrate urban growth. These are selected for their infrastructure readiness, including water, sewer, and transportation capacity, as well as market demand for intensified development, often within urban growth boundaries to avoid sprawl. Designation requires careful calibration of receiving capacity—calculated as the ratio of transferable rights to allowable increases—to prevent overload; for example, New York State guidelines emphasize proximity to sending areas and economic viability to facilitate transactions. In , receiving areas were zoned as TDR-R districts in 2021 town plans, limited to areas with existing urban services and projected to accommodate up to 1.5 times baseline via transfers from agricultural sending zones. Challenges in designation include balancing supply of rights from sending areas with demand in receiving zones; studies show programs falter if receiving sites lack developer interest due to regulatory hurdles or insufficient bonuses, as seen in early TDR implementations where transfers averaged under 10% of potential without market incentives. Successful models, like those in , integrate receiving designations with growth management acts, certifying areas via public hearings to ensure alignment with regional plans.

Notable Domestic Programs

The , TDR program, launched in 1980 alongside the designation of a 93,000-acre Agricultural Reserve, severs one development right per five acres from protected farmland and transfers them to urban receiving areas for density bonuses up to 2.5 times baseline . This market-driven mechanism has preserved over 40,000 acres of agricultural land by compensating owners for forgone development, while directing an estimated 25,000 additional housing units to planned growth zones without net loss of county-wide capacity. The Pinelands Development Credit program, authorized by the 1979 National Parks and Recreation Act and operationalized through the 1980 Comprehensive Management Plan, spans 1.1 million acres and allocates credits from preservation, forest, and agricultural sending zones for redemption in regional growth areas. Credits are severed via deed restrictions and traded privately or through a state-managed bank established in 1985, yielding 58,078 acres of permanent protection as of June 2024, primarily safeguarding pine-oak forests and farms from suburban sprawl. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's TDR framework, adopted in 1987 under the bistate Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, caps post-1987 development by requiring acquisition of transferable units (such as single-family equivalents or coverage area) from retired sensitive parcels, often in stream zones or meadows degraded by mid-20th-century expansion. Transfers to town centers include incentives like up to five bonus units per transferred unit, contributing to over 19,000 acres preserved by 2000 and ongoing reductions in expansion across the 207,000-acre basin.

International Adaptations

Transferable development rights (TDR) have been adapted internationally, primarily in developing countries to facilitate , fund , and balance rural-urban , though programs remain less widespread and often modified from the U.S. model due to differing frameworks and state involvement. In these contexts, TDR typically involves government-issued certificates for additional building potential, auctioned or traded to incentivize preservation or acquisition without direct costs. In , TDR has been extensively implemented since the early 1990s, particularly in , where landowners receive certificates granting extra floor space index (FSI) in exchange for surrendering land for public uses such as road widening, slum rehabilitation, or heritage conservation. These rights, categorized as road TDR, slum TDR, or heritage TDR, are transferable to high-demand receiving areas, enabling developers to exceed base limits and accelerating urban densification while compensating restricted owners. By 2020, TDR mechanisms had become integral to municipal control regulations in major cities, reducing government acquisition expenses and promoting efficient , though challenges include speculative pricing and uneven market uptake. Brazil employs a variant through Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construção (CEPACs), introduced in in 2000 and expanded to in 2001, where municipalities auction transferable certificates for excess construction potential in designated zones, directing revenues to infrastructure and upgrades. In Curitiba's Reserva Particular do Patrimônio Natural Municipal (RPPNM) program, landowners voluntarily restrict development on environmentally sensitive parcels, selling TDR to urban developers, which has preserved over 1,000 hectares since inception while generating market-based compensation. These public auction models differ from private U.S. transfers by emphasizing state revenue capture, yielding billions in funds for projects but facing criticism for inflating construction costs and favoring large developers. China piloted TDR in 2015 to reconcile farmland protection with urban expansion, notably in , where rural villages transfer development quotas to urban construction land banks, enabling consolidated development and compensating villagers via shares in urban projects. Empirical analysis of 37 districts shows TDR increased rural-urban land transfers by facilitating indicator trading, though state dominance in allocation limits pure market dynamics and has led to uneven spatial outcomes, such as concentrated . Limited adaptations exist elsewhere; has explored TDR for heritage and growth management in since the 1990s, drawing U.S. lessons to trade rights from constrained sites. In , proposals since 2012 advocate TDR for historic building preservation, allowing owners to transfer rights to non-historic parcels amid legal ambiguities. and feature few operational programs, with Canadian examples like Alberta's environmental TDR concepts emphasizing sending-receiving districts but lacking widespread empirical success, while European transfers remain fragmented due to rigid .

Purported Benefits

Land Preservation Incentives

Transferable development rights (TDR) programs incentivize land preservation by enabling owners in designated sending areas—typically environmentally sensitive or agriculturally valuable lands—to sever and sell their development rights to buyers in receiving areas where denser development is permitted, thereby receiving market-based compensation without forgoing land ownership. This mechanism aligns private economic interests with public goals, as preserved parcels are bound by perpetual conservation easements that restrict future development, ensuring long-term protection of open spaces, farmland, and natural habitats. Empirical outcomes demonstrate the incentive's effectiveness in specific programs; for instance, County's TDR initiative, operational since 1980, has preserved over 40,000 acres of farmland through the sale of more than 12,600 TDRs, primarily to private developers, which equate to development credits sufficient for substantial housing units while maintaining agricultural viability in the Agricultural Reserve. Studies indicate that such programs yield promising results in retaining and forests, as the financial returns from TDR sales often exceed those from conventional development in restricted zones, encouraging voluntary participation over outright buyouts or regulatory bans. By decoupling development potential from preservation value, TDRs foster a market-driven approach that minimizes landowner associated with uncompensated restrictions, potentially preserving larger contiguous areas than fee-simple acquisitions alone, though depends on robust in receiving areas and clear . In , the voluntary TDR framework has steered growth away from rural zones, conserving habitats without mandating sales, thus leveraging landowner choice to achieve and scenic preservation objectives.

Compensation for Restricted Owners

In transferable development rights (TDR) programs, owners of restricted properties in sending areas—such as farmland or environmentally sensitive sites subject to preservation easements—receive compensation by severing and selling their unused development rights as transferable credits to developers in designated receiving areas. This market-driven process allows restricted owners to obtain financial payment determined by supply, demand, and local conditions, without developing their land or transferring ownership of the underlying property. Upon sale, a perpetual is typically recorded on the sending property, permanently limiting future development while enabling the owner to retain compatible uses like . This compensation mechanism addresses potential regulatory takings concerns under the U.S. Fifth Amendment by providing economic value equivalent to the forgone development potential, rather than relying on government-funded or outright purchase. Programs often allocate credits based on baseline density rights, such as one TDR per five acres in downzoned rural areas, with sales prices varying widely by and market; examples include $10,000 to over $50,000 per credit in established U.S. programs. In Montgomery County, Maryland's program, operational since 1980, sending-area owners have generated revenue through TDR sales that fund placements, preserving over 100,000 acres of without direct public expenditure on acquisitions. Empirical data indicate that TDR compensation can substantially offset restrictions for participating owners, with voluntary participation ensuring only those benefiting from the transaction engage. In New Jersey's Pinelands program, for instance, credits have averaged around $20,000 each, translating to meaningful per-acre payouts for conserved farms based on allocated rights. However, effectiveness depends on robust receiving-area demand and low transaction barriers; studies of U.S. programs show higher payouts in areas with enhanced transfer ratios exceeding 1:1, incentivizing purchases and yielding net gains for sellers comparable to or exceeding alternative preservation methods like fee-simple buys. While some analyses critique TDRs for potentially under-compensating in low-demand s, successful implementations demonstrate market prices aligning closely with appraised values, enabling owners to diversify income streams such as continued farming alongside credit proceeds.

Criticisms and Limitations

Transaction Costs and Market Failures

High transaction costs in transferable development rights (TDR) programs encompass expenses related to identifying counterparties, negotiating terms, obtaining legal and regulatory approvals, surveying properties, and verifying compliance, often borne by both sending and receiving area participants. Empirical analysis of TDR transactions in Maryland's Calvert, , , and St. Mary's Counties reveals that these costs typically range from 13% to 21% of the total TDR sale value per transaction, with search and bargaining costs averaging around 5-7% and enforcement costs adding further burdens over time. Such elevated costs, including property appraisals and legal documentation, can exceed thousands of dollars per deal and disproportionately affect smaller landowners unable to absorb them relative to potential gains. These transaction frictions contribute to failures by creating thin, illiquid markets for , where low trading volumes prevent efficient reallocation to highest-value uses and discourage participation from marginal actors. For instance, programs lacking centralized clearinghouses or brokerage—unlike some minimized-cost designs—exhibit persistent low rates, as sellers face prolonged in finding buyers, leading to or undervaluation of . Information asymmetries, such as uneven of TDR values or regulatory nuances among participants, further inflate costs and distort pricing, mirroring broader Coasean critiques where high bargaining expenses undermine the theorem's efficiency assumptions in real-world property markets. Critics argue that these dynamics result in allocative inefficiencies, where preserved land in sending areas yields incomplete compensation, while receiving areas underutilize density bonuses due to or mismatched supply-demand signals. Inadequate regulatory frameworks exacerbate failures, potentially fostering , inequitable access favoring large developers, or gaps if low-income owners cannot navigate the process. Programs with weak demand in receiving zones, often from rigidities or developer hesitancy, compound these issues, rendering TDRs ineffective at internalizing externalities without supplemental interventions like subsidies or streamlined approvals. Overall, while TDRs theoretically harness markets to avert command-and-control pitfalls, indicates transaction costs often erode net benefits, prompting calls for design reforms to mitigate failures observed in underperforming U.S. implementations.

Unintended Consequences on Development Patterns

TDR programs have occasionally fostered leapfrogging, whereby development circumvents preserved sending areas and expands into unregulated peripheral zones outside program boundaries. In , the initiative preserved 40,583 acres of farmland through transfers but redirected urban growth to neighboring counties lacking equivalent controls, as local TDR mechanisms failed to address metropolitan-scale patterns. Similarly, in Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, dispersed sending parcels and non-contiguous development nodes have prompted critiques of induced sprawl, with preserved lands often situated far from high-pressure corridors like the Bay Bridge, potentially inflating overall regional build-out. Concentration of growth in suboptimal receiving zones has also emerged as an issue, straining and altering intended compact patterns. Calvert County, Maryland's program channeled TDR-enabled into rural community districts rather than urban centers, heightening dispersed rural sprawl despite preserving 12,200 acres via private sales and 5,500 acres through public efforts by 2006. In , competing density bonuses from planned unit developments prior to 2002 eroded TDR uptake, permitting scattered rural subdivisions at 1 dwelling unit per 5 acres and yielding just 1,000 acres of preservation by August 2006. Underutilization exacerbates persistence of undesired sprawl, as limited receiving-area capacity discourages transfers. County's rural density transfer zone, downzoned to 1 unit per 25 acres, saw TDRs applied in only 4% of subdivisions (82 out of 2,122) from 1981 to 2004, allowing ongoing low-density rural builds like a 28-unit approval on an 800-acre parcel. Such outcomes underscore how market frictions and alternatives can sustain fragmented patterns, with "super TDRs" priced at $200,000–$500,000 versus standard $20,000 credits reflecting uneven incentives. Regional analyses attribute these dynamics to insufficient inter-jurisdictional coordination, enabling externalities like shifted sprawl without commensurate containment.

Recent Developments

Policy Innovations Post-2020

In response to heightened climate risks, policymakers have increasingly explored transferable development rights (TDR) mechanisms to facilitate from vulnerable coastal and hazard-prone areas, allowing owners in high-risk sending zones to transfer unused development potential to safer receiving zones while preserving open space. A 2024 policy memorandum from Harvard Law School's Environmental and Energy Law Program advocates TDR programs as a key adaptation strategy, enabling jurisdictions to redirect growth away from floodplains or erosion zones without full , with mechanisms such as density bonuses in resilient urban cores compensating sending parcel owners. This approach builds on pre-existing frameworks but innovates by integrating TDR with sea-level rise projections and resilience planning, as seen in exploratory applications for Hawaii's beachfront areas where additional (FAR) incentives could offset retreat costs. Local governments have adopted targeted TDR expansions to support infrastructure and preservation amid post-pandemic growth pressures. In , the Canyon Park Subarea Plan, adopted on May 16, 2023, introduced TDR provisions for essential public facilities—such as transit hubs or waste sites—that fall short of minimum density requirements, permitting transfers of unused rights (in 1,000 sq ft units) to medium- or high-density receiving sites for increased FAR without height changes, alongside parking reductions and mitigation for transportation impacts. This innovation aligns TDR with regional growth strategies, enabling public facility viability in employment centers while directing density to transit-accessible nodes. Similarly, the Town of , applied TDR on March 28, 2023, to permanently protect a 152-acre forested parcel in Manorville within the Central by shifting its development rights to a receiving site in Yaphank near the Expressway, yielding annual aquifer recharge of approximately 87 million gallons at no direct cost to the municipality and safeguarding habitats for species like . These post-2020 applications demonstrate TDR's evolution toward hybrid uses combining environmental protection, public infrastructure support, and hazard mitigation, though program efficacy depends on clear sending-receiving designations and market demand for bonuses, as uneven transaction volumes have limited broader uptake in some regions.

Integration with Housing and Tax Strategies

In recent years, transferable development rights (TDR) programs have been integrated into housing strategies to concentrate development in urban or infill areas, thereby increasing residential density and supply while preserving rural or environmentally sensitive lands. For instance, municipalities employ TDR to allow developers in receiving zones—often designated for growth—to purchase rights from sending properties, enabling higher-density housing projects that address shortages without sprawling into preserved areas. This approach has gained traction post-2020 as cities adapt TDR for adaptability, with programs facilitating the transfer of rights to support multifamily and affordable housing construction, as seen in expansions that preserved over 200,000 acres nationwide by 2021 while boosting urban housing capacity. TDR mechanisms have also been linked to affordable housing preservation efforts, where rights from existing low-income structures are transferred to prevent displacement amid redevelopment pressures. In such programs, owners of affordable units in gentrifying areas can sell TDRs, securing financial compensation that offsets lost development potential and incentivizes retention of housing stock. Proposals in cities like New York have explored flexible TDR systems requiring a portion of transferred rights to fund or mandate affordable units in receiving projects, akin to inclusionary zoning but market-driven. By 2024, implementations in places like Detroit formalized TDR frameworks to align preservation with urban housing revitalization, directing transfers toward sites primed for residential intensification. On the tax front, TDR transactions integrate with strategies that mitigate fiscal burdens for participants, such as qualifying sales of development rights for like-kind exchanges under Section 1031 of the , allowing deferral of capital gains taxes when rights are reinvested in qualifying . For sending properties, transferring rights often reduces the site's assessed value post-preservation easement, lowering ongoing property taxes and providing a fiscal for . Additionally, TDR has been combined with (TIF) districts, where increased property values from denser receiving-site developments generate captured tax revenues to fund housing-related infrastructure, as demonstrated in hybrid models that redirect increments toward public improvements supporting residential growth. These integrations, evident in programs updated through 2024, enhance TDR's viability by aligning land-use with objectives, though transaction taxes on TDR sales may apply in some jurisdictions.

References

  1. [1]
    Transfer of Development Rights (TDR)
    Apr 18, 2024 · TDR is a market-based mechanism that encourages the voluntary transfer of growth from areas a community wants to conserve to urban areas.
  2. [2]
    Transfer of Development Rights - WeConservePA Library
    Transfer of Development Rights is a zoning technique that conserves land by redirecting development that would otherwise occur on the land (the sending ...
  3. [3]
    Transfer of Development Rights (TDRs) - Planning for Hazards
    A transfer of development rights (TDR) program allows additional density where the community wants to grow in exchange for preservation of sensitive areas.
  4. [4]
    [PDF] A Preservationist's Guide to Urban Transferable Development Rights
    History of TDRs ... New York City became the first to adopt TDRs through its 1968. Landmark Preservation Law—the ordinance famously upheld by the. U.S. Supreme ...
  5. [5]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights - World Bank Documents & Reports
    New York has four main TDR mechanisms: zoning lot mergers (ZLM), landmark transfers under sections 74-79, Special District transfer mechanisms, and transfer ...
  6. [6]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights in U.S. Communities
    Historical efforts to preserve land from development in many jurisdictions around the country have included downzoning as an initial mechanism.5. And tdr ...
  7. [7]
    Building Coalitions Out of Thin Air: Transferable Development ...
    May 10, 2020 · Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) were supposed to be a solution to the intractable problems of land use, a bit of institutional design ...INTRODUCTION... · WHAT IS A TDR? HISTORY... · JUSTIFYING TDRS: WHY...
  8. [8]
    Transfer of Development Rights in U.S. Communities: Evaluating ...
    TDRs allow for development rights to be transferred from one area to another, preserving land in the “sending areas” and permitting higher than baseline density ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  9. [9]
    [PDF] Transferable Development Rights - University of Connecticut
    Creating transferable development rights avoids legal issues with constitutional “takings” that could arise from restrictive re-zoning prohibiting development ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  10. [10]
    [PDF] Transferable Development Rights | Maine.gov
    Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) is a voluntary, market-based implementation tool that promotes the conservation of high-value agricultural land, ...
  11. [11]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights | NY.Gov
    An example of how TDR operates is as follows: Land in a rural zoning district is zoned to permit one dwelling per acre. Land somewhere else in the municipality, ...
  12. [12]
    Transfer of Development Rights - NJ.gov
    TDR is a realty transfer mechanism permitting owners of preservation area land to separate the development rights of their property from the property itself and ...
  13. [13]
    [PDF] Introduction-to-Transferable-Development-Rights.pdf
    This report offers an introduc- tion to transferable development rights and presents a series of case studies of TDR programs around the United States. These ...
  14. [14]
    [PDF] 3. Transfer of Development Rights
    TDR is based on the premise that land ownership confers upon the owner a bundle of specific development rights, as shaped by municipal zoning regulations, State ...
  15. [15]
    A national inventory and analysis of US transfer of development ...
    Aug 9, 2025 · This paper describes a census of 375 TDR programs in the United States, documenting primary program attributes and adoption year and ...<|separator|>
  16. [16]
    Glossary of TDR Terms - King County, Washington
    Usually when someone purchases land, they purchase the entire bundle of rights associated with the land. Some of the more common rights include ownership of ...
  17. [17]
  18. [18]
    Code of Virginia Code - Article 7.1. Transfer of Development Rights
    "Transfer of development rights" means the process by which development rights from a sending property are affixed to one or more receiving properties.Missing: mechanism | Show results with:mechanism
  19. [19]
    Chapter 17.46 TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS OVERLAY ...
    “Receiving area” means an area zoned with the transfer of development rights receiving ... transferable development rights credits that have been authorized for a ...
  20. [20]
  21. [21]
    [PDF] The Takings Clause and Transferable Development Rights Programs
    TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS. 839 that the development rights did not provide her a constitution- ally sufficient use that could prevent a taking. 174. The ...
  22. [22]
    What are transferable development rights? - Pacific Legal Foundation
    Apr 30, 2010 · The whole concept of transferable development rights is based on the faulty notion that government is the source of all rights and that it can ...Missing: validity severance
  23. [23]
    Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City | 438 U.S. 104 ...
    A city does not need to pay compensation to a property owner under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when it designates their property as a landmark ...
  24. [24]
    [PDF] united states district court - SDNY Blog
    Sep 28, 2015 · Plaintiffs Midtown TDR Ventures LLC and Midtown GCT Ventures LLC are limited liability companies organized and existing under the laws of the ...<|separator|>
  25. [25]
    [PDF] Markets for Development Rights - Resources for the Future
    Transferable development rights (TDRs) are a market-based approach to land conservation. They allow the development rights from one property to be ...
  26. [26]
    A Market Approach to Land Preservation - Resources Magazine
    Jun 27, 2003 · In this way, TDR markets promote more efficient development patterns and compensate landowners for lost development potential. TDRs were first ...
  27. [27]
    [PDF] An Economic Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights
    TDRs are generally superior to other methods of protecting valuable landscapes and landmarks because they impose rela- tively little cost on the public, they ...
  28. [28]
    [PDF] TDRS AND OTHER MARKET-BASED LAND MECHANISMS
    Transferable development rights (TDRs) programs are distinguished from other land conservation instruments by their focus on the concept of a right to develop ...
  29. [29]
    Policy Monitor : U.S. Experience with Transferable Development ...
    To address the externalities that arise from local land uses, some communities in the United States have turned to Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) as ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  30. [30]
    [PDF] Recent Trends In TDR - Networks Northwest
    Apr 16, 2025 · This first transfer of development rights, or TDR, mechanism appeared in the New York City Landmark Preservation. Law in 1968. Since then, this ...
  31. [31]
    Agricultural Land Preservation - Montgomery County Government
    One Transferable Development Right (TDR) for every 25 acres of land must be retained with the property prior to easement application to be eligible for the ...
  32. [32]
    Using markets for land preservation: Results of a TDR program
    The study found that the program is achieving many of the county's land preservation goals because of the high level of activity in the TDR market. However, ...Missing: outcomes empirical
  33. [33]
    Land Preservation Under the Transfer of Development Rights Program
    Dec 9, 2020 · The TDR program showed promising effects on preserving agricultural land and forest but also insufficiency in advancing desirable development patterns and ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
  34. [34]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights in New Jersey - A Background Paper
    TDR is a land-use tool transferring development potential from preservation areas to growth areas, where landowners receive compensation for restricting  ...<|separator|>
  35. [35]
    Pinelands Development Credit Program - NJ.gov
    The Pinelands Development Credit (PDC) Program is a regional transfer of development rights program that preserves important agricultural and ecological land.
  36. [36]
    The Pinelands Development Credit Program - UC Press Journals
    Jan 4, 2022 · The PDC program is a regional “transfer of development rights” market allowing landowners to sell their rights to further develop their property.
  37. [37]
    [PDF] Empirical Evidence from Bucks County, - Review of Regional Studies
    faction alternative regulations, including a method known as the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR), have been proposed. redirecting aggregate areas growth ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
  38. [38]
    What Makes Transfer of Development Rights Work?: Success ...
    Dec 30, 2008 · Research support: None. Keywords: transferable development rights · TDR · land preservation · sending areas · receiving areas.
  39. [39]
    Making Markets for Development Rights Work: What Determines ...
    Many economists see current land use patterns as inefficient due to various market failures, and planners argue that current patterns do not follow sound ...Missing: criticisms | Show results with:criticisms
  40. [40]
    Can transfer of development rights programs save farmland in ...
    Jun 9, 2019 · An Analysis of the factors influencing transaction costs in transferable development rights programmes. Ecological Economics, 156, 409–419 ...
  41. [41]
    [PDF] Planning Implementation Tools Transfer of Development Rights (TDR)
    TDR procedures include establishing what will be used to de- termine the number of development credits received (i.e. acres protected, amount of prime ...
  42. [42]
    Transferable Development Rights - Montgomery Planning
    The Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) Program helps preserve farmland and farming in the Agricultural Reserve. Farming cannot continue without a substantial ...Missing: acres | Show results with:acres
  43. [43]
    13 Components of a Successful Transferable Development Right ...
    The program was adopted in 1980. The Montgomery County TDR program has become a model that a number of jurisdictions across the county have followed, but in ...
  44. [44]
    Transfers of development rights - Local Housing Solutions
    Transfers of development rights (TDR) programs are voluntary programs that allow the owner of one property (the “sending site”) to transfer its development ...
  45. [45]
    [PDF] Guide to Transfer of Development Rights in Town Plans
    Feb 11, 2021 · TDR allows landowners to trade development rights, using TDR-S (sending) and TDR-R (receiving) zoning districts, with TDR-S allowing transfer ...
  46. [46]
    Chapter 17.580 TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
    The purpose of this chapter is to create a process for certification and transfer of transferable development rights (TDR) from designated sending areas to ...
  47. [47]
    Development Rights|Tahoe Regional Planning Agency — TRPA
    Visit the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) Marketplace. Development rights are land use units someone must acquire before a property is developed.Missing: details | Show results with:details
  48. [48]
    Land Preservation - An Essential Ingredient in Smart Growth
    As of 2000, more than 19,000 acres of land had been preserved through the transfer of development rights program (Brennan et al. 2000). The Lake Tahoe ...
  49. [49]
    Transferable development rights: A robust policy tool to address ...
    Sep 16, 2020 · These rights are used only in certain areas of the city designated for public investments. The rights are sold to developers to raise funds, ...
  50. [50]
    Transferable development rights: international applicability - isurv
    Nov 15, 2019 · The concept of TDRs is simple: vulnerable land and buildings in a location designated as the sending area can be protected by persuading owners ...
  51. [51]
    Transferable Development Rights (TDR) - Kotak Mahindra Bank
    Oct 10, 2024 · In India, TDR is a building permit detached from a property's ownership. People owning restricted land, such as farmland and heritage sites ...
  52. [52]
    Spontaneous allocation through transferable development rights in ...
    CEPACs are transferable additional development rights and are sold in public auctions. The revenues are used to finance public infrastructure within the project ...
  53. [53]
    [PDF] Reserva Particular do Patrimonio Natural Municipal (RPPNM)
    Landowners may also sell these development rights to developers, an example of. Transferable Development Rights (TDR). The RPPNM program was considered a win ...
  54. [54]
    A Case Study from Chongqing - PMC - PubMed Central
    To address the conflicts between urban development and farmland protection, the Chinese government introduced the transferable development rights (TDR) program ...
  55. [55]
    Effects of Transfer of Land Development Rights on Urban–Rural ...
    The introduction of TDR in China has partially facilitated rural–urban land transfers. As evidenced by the case of 37 districts and counties in Chongqing, TDR ...
  56. [56]
    Transferable development right in NSW - ResearchGate
    Aug 5, 2025 · Tradeable development rights (TDRs) are one type of MBI that have been used widely throughout the US to preserve open space and agricultural ...
  57. [57]
    A Technical Proposal for the Implementation of Transfer of ... - MDPI
    Jun 7, 2022 · However, the method of transfer of development rights (TDR) can be a good option for this task in Turkey as well. Although there have been some ...
  58. [58]
    [PDF] Environmental Tools: Transfer of Development Rights (TDR)
    There are three basic elements to a TDR program: the sending district (where the credit is created), the receiving district (where the credit is used) and the ...
  59. [59]
    Transfer of Development Rights - King County, Washington
    The Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) Program is a voluntary, incentive-based, and market-driven approach to conserve land and steer development growth.
  60. [60]
    [PDF] FACT SHEET - WeConservePA Library
    Twenty-two programs, or 44 percent, have not protected any agricultural land. Since 1980,. Montgomery County, Maryland, has protected. 40,583 acres using TDR, ...
  61. [61]
    Land Preservation Under the Transfer of Development Rights Program
    The TDR program showed promising effects on preserving agricultural land and forest but also insufficiency in advancing desirable development patterns and ...Missing: evidence | Show results with:evidence
  62. [62]
    What are the benefits of Transfer of Development Rights?
    Jun 15, 2023 · TDRs goal is to balance conservation and urban development by allowing for appropriate growth while safeguarding open space, historic areas or ...
  63. [63]
    Transfer of Development Rights Programs
    This paper examines TDR programs, their benefits and their costs and suggests why the adoption of this tool has been limited.Missing: origins | Show results with:origins
  64. [64]
    [PDF] What Makes Transfer of Development Rights Work?
    Mar 12, 2008 · The owners of sending sites can choose to record a perpetual easement on their land in return for a marketable commodity called transferable ...
  65. [65]
    [PDF] The Transferability of Development Rights
    2' To be transferable, development rights must be based upon a general right to develop which is not limited to one particular parcel.2 Proponents of the ...
  66. [66]
    [PDF] APPRAISAL GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING DEVELOPMENT ...
    The total credit allocation for these farms is 675 TDRs (or an average of 1 TDR for every 4 acres). The formula is _ = Sx/n or. $13,500,000/675 = $20,000/TDR ...
  67. [67]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights Questions and Answers - Granicus
    Sending areas are the places where development rights can be sold off of the land and transferred, or sent, to receiving areas. Sending areas include all ...
  68. [68]
    [PDF] OLO Report 2023-1: Transferable Development Rights and Building ...
    Jan 17, 2023 · The TDR program compensates owners for development rights, while the BLT program compensates for foregoing development to preserve farming. ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
  69. [69]
    What Makes Transfer of Development Rights Work - Academia.edu
    The research found that 75% of leading programs used enhanced transfer ratios, often exceeding 1:1, incentivizing developers to acquire TDRs.
  70. [70]
    (PDF) Estimates of Transaction Costs in Transfer of Development ...
    Aug 4, 2025 · Total transaction costs range from 13% to 21% of total TDR costs per transaction. Our findings are based on data reported by participants and ...
  71. [71]
    Timing and distributional aspects of transaction costs in Transferable ...
    This paper analyses the effects of transaction costs throughout the life of four TDR programmes (Calvert, Montgomery, St. Mary's, and Charles Counties)
  72. [72]
    [PDF] Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits - Harvard University
    transferable development rights program was due to its design which minimized transaction costs (by the government taking on a feeless brokerage role).
  73. [73]
    An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Transaction Costs in ...
    This paper explores the transaction costs that may arise in TDR programmes with the specific objective of gaining a better understanding of which factors ...
  74. [74]
    [PDF] Review of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) - Atlantis Press
    Abstract. The use of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) has been going on for decades, but the level of application varies among countries. The specific.
  75. [75]
    [PDF] A Study of the Feasibility of a Transfer of Development Rights ...
    Other very effective TDR programs include the arrangement between King County, Washington and the city of Seattle, as well as the incredibly effective TDR ...
  76. [76]
    The State as Both Regulator and Player: The Politics of Transfer of ...
    Jan 14, 2020 · In China, the state's grip on land is reinforced through TDR, in which the state is both regulator and player.
  77. [77]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights as Climate Adaptation
    Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) programs can be an important tool for state and local governments as part of a broader climate adaptation strategy.<|separator|>
  78. [78]
    [PDF] City of Bothell Determination of Significance and Adoption of ...
    May 16, 2023 · The Canyon Park Subarea Plan includes policies addressing transfer of development rights (TDR) for essential public facilities that cannot meet ...Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
  79. [79]
    News Flash • Announce Town's Transfer of Development Rights
    Mar 28, 2023 · Announce Town's Transfer of Development Rights to Preserve 152 Acre Parcel in Manorville. Town Seal. Farmingville, NY – –Supervisor Ed Romaine ...
  80. [80]
    Using Transferable Development Rights to Improve City Adaptability
    Jun 19, 2020 · Municipalities across the United States employ TDR programs to expand housing supply and simultaneously advance preservation goals, such as ...Missing: integration strategies
  81. [81]
    [PDF] Transfer of Development Rights for Affordable Housing
    A TDR program for preserving existing affordable housing can be a tool to prevent residential displacement as neighborhoods undergo change and redevelopment.
  82. [82]
    [PDF] Designing a More Flexible System for Transferring Development ...
    TDRs can be controversial, how- ever. Some community members decry the buildings that result from the accumulation of development rights because those build-.<|control11|><|separator|>
  83. [83]
    2024-09-04: Transferable Development Rights (TDR) | City of Detroit
    Sep 4, 2024 · 2024-09-04: Transferable Development Rights (TDR). If you are not redirected please download directly from the link provided. Download.Missing: developments tax 2020-2025
  84. [84]
    Using a 1031 Exchange for Transferrable Development Rights
    Jul 30, 2024 · Transferrable Development Rights are development rights eligible to be moved from one property to another and the qualify as like-kind ...Missing: developments | Show results with:developments
  85. [85]
    Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Meets Transfer of Development ...
    TIF is a tool for financing public infrastructure improvements in designated areas by redistributing property tax collections within those areas.