At-large
An at-large election is a method of electing representatives in which candidates are chosen by voters across an entire jurisdiction, such as a city, county, state, or nation, without restriction to specific geographic subdivisions or districts.[1][2] This system contrasts with district-based elections, where voters select officials only for predefined local areas, and has been employed historically at federal, state, and local levels to ensure representatives address jurisdiction-wide concerns rather than parochial interests.[3][4] In the United States, at-large voting was common for U.S. House seats in the early republic and persists today in some state legislatures, municipal councils, and non-partisan bodies, though federal law now mandates single-member districts for multi-seat states to promote accountability.[5] Proponents argue it fosters cohesive policy-making and reduces factionalism, while critics contend it can dilute minority voting influence by allowing majorities to dominate outcomes, leading to legal challenges under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prompted shifts to district systems in numerous localities.[6][7] Empirical analyses reveal mixed effects on representation: at-large systems may enhance gender diversity on councils but often underrepresent racial minorities compared to districts, depending on jurisdictional demographics and electoral rules.[8][9]Definition and Principles
Core Concept of At-Large Representation
At-large representation refers to an electoral method in which officials are chosen by the entirety of voters within a jurisdiction, rather than by voters confined to predefined geographic sub-units such as districts.[3] This system enables every eligible voter to participate in selecting representatives who are accountable to the overall population, fostering a structure where elected members address jurisdiction-wide interests without localized boundaries dictating their constituencies.[10] In practice, for single-seat contests, the candidate with the most votes prevails; for multi-seat bodies like city councils, voters typically nominate multiple candidates, and the top vote recipients secure the positions, often under plurality rules without requiring a majority.[11] The core principle underlying at-large systems emphasizes holistic governance, where representatives must appeal to diverse voter preferences across the full electorate to gain election, contrasting with segmented representation that might prioritize parochial concerns.[12] This approach traces to early American practices, such as the "general ticket" system for U.S. House seats before 1842, when multiple representatives from a state were elected statewide by popular vote, though Congress later mandated districting to ensure more granular accountability.[5] Today, at-large elections predominate in smaller municipalities and certain statewide roles, like Alaska's single at-large congressional district, where the representative serves the state's undivided population of approximately 733,000 as of 2020.[5] Mechanically, at-large voting avoids redistricting complexities tied to population shifts, as no sub-jurisdictions require periodic boundary adjustments under laws like the Voting Rights Act, though it demands candidates to campaign broadly, often favoring those with resources for widespread outreach.[3] Empirical implementations, such as in cities electing full councils at-large, demonstrate that turnout and candidate pools can vary, with all voters influencing every seat, potentially amplifying majority preferences while integrating minority input through cumulative or ranked-choice variants in some locales.[13]Distinctions from District and Proportional Systems
At-large representation involves electing multiple officials from a single, undivided jurisdiction, allowing voters across the entire area to participate in selecting all seats rather than confining choices to localized subdivisions. In contrast, single-member district (SMD) systems partition the jurisdiction into geographic districts, each electing one representative through plurality or majority voting, which emphasizes accountability to specific locales and can amplify local interests or parochialism.[3] This territorial focus in SMDs often results in more fragmented representation, as evidenced by empirical studies showing SMDs correlate with higher levels of pork-barrel spending tied to district-specific projects compared to at-large systems, where representatives must appeal to the broader electorate.[14] Proportional representation (PR) systems, by design, allocate seats in multi-member constituencies based on the proportion of votes received by parties or candidate groups, typically employing mechanisms like party lists, the d'Hondt method, or single transferable vote (STV) to minimize vote waste and ensure minority viewpoints secure legislative seats.[15] At-large systems, however, generally operate under non-proportional rules such as block voting—where voters cast multiple votes for candidates and the top vote-getters win—which can produce winner-take-all outcomes favoring dominant groups and exacerbating disproportionality, as seen in U.S. local elections where at-large plurality has historically underrepresented racial minorities relative to their population share.[16] Unlike PR, which prioritizes vote-seat proportionality (often achieving ratios closer to 1:1 across parties), standard at-large elections lack such compensatory formulas, leading to overrepresentation of plurality winners; for instance, data from U.S. municipalities indicate at-large systems yield less ideological diversity than PR variants like STV.[17] A key mechanistic distinction lies in ballot structure and aggregation: SMDs aggregate votes district-by-district for binary outcomes, PR aggregates across larger units with thresholds or transfers to reflect coalition strengths, and at-large aggregates all votes jurisdiction-wide under majoritarian heuristics without inherent proportionality safeguards.[18] This can render at-large systems more akin to expanded SMDs in their majoritarian bias but without geographic anchors, potentially diluting concentrated minority support more severely than SMDs, where cohesive communities might form viable districts—though PR empirically outperforms both in minority inclusion metrics, with studies showing PR systems electing 20-30% more diverse legislatures in comparative contexts.[7][19] While some at-large implementations incorporate proportional elements (e.g., cumulative voting), these are exceptions; pure at-large remains distinct for lacking PR's explicit equity mechanisms.[20]Historical Development
Early Adoption in the United States
At-large elections, in which voters select representatives from the entire jurisdiction rather than geographic subunits, were a primary method for choosing members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the early republic. Under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, states retained authority over the "times, places and manner" of congressional elections, subject to congressional override, enabling widespread use of the general ticket system—whereby voters cast ballots for as many candidates as seats allocated, with the top vote-getters winning. This approach prevailed in the absence of federal mandates, reflecting practical considerations in sparsely populated states and a preference for statewide majorities to secure cohesive delegations.[21] In the elections for the First Congress (1788–1789), multiple states employed at-large voting for their full House apportionments, including Connecticut (5 seats), Georgia (3 seats), New Jersey (4 seats), New Hampshire (3 seats), and South Carolina (5 seats), among others; voters simply nominated candidates statewide, often without formal parties initially structuring contests. By the 1790s through the 1820s, at least six states continued exclusive reliance on at-large systems for periods, such as Georgia in the Sixth Congress (1800–1801), where strategic voting by Federalists secured an entire delegation despite a Democratic-Republican popular majority. This method facilitated broad voter participation without district boundaries but frequently amplified majority factions, as seen in outcomes favoring organized slates over dispersed preferences.[22][23] State legislatures also adopted at-large elements early, often electing multi-member delegations from counties or the state as a whole under post-independence constitutions, prioritizing population-based apportionment over strict single-member districts to accommodate varying settlement patterns. For instance, provisions in state charters from 1776 onward emphasized equal representation by numbers, leading to county-wide at-large contests in bodies like Virginia's House of Delegates or Pennsylvania's assemblies before gradual shifts to subdivided districts. Federal intervention ended general-ticket dominance for Congress with the Apportionment Act of 1842, which required contiguous single-member districts to curb perceived partisan sweeps, though at-large persisted in some state and local contexts.[24][25]Global Spread and Adaptations
The at-large electoral system, initially developed in the United States during the early 19th century, saw limited but notable adoption abroad, particularly through American colonial administration in the Philippines. Following the U.S. acquisition of the archipelago in 1898, the Philippine Senate was established in 1916 as part of the American-modeled governance structure, with its members elected at-large to represent national interests over provincial ones.[26] The 1935 Philippine Constitution formalized a 24-member Senate elected nationwide by plurality-at-large voting, allowing qualified voters to select up to 12 candidates per election for half the seats every three years, an adaptation retained post-independence in 1946 to emphasize broad, non-regional representation.[27][28] This system influenced legislative coherence by prioritizing candidates with nationwide appeal, though it has faced criticism for favoring major parties and incumbents due to the block-voting mechanism. Beyond the Philippines, variants of multi-member at-large systems, such as block voting—where voters cast ballots for multiple candidates in a single constituency without sub-districts—have appeared in approximately 10 countries, primarily in Asia (5 countries) and the Middle East (2 countries), accounting for elections involving around 139 million people as of late 1990s data.[29] These adaptations often serve to allocate seats in diverse or confessional societies, as seen in systems blending plurality-at-large with reserved quotas, though empirical evidence on their spread remains sparse outside U.S.-influenced contexts, with most global parliaments favoring single-member districts or proportional representation.[29] In Europe and Africa, pure at-large models are rare at the national level, limited mostly to compensatory seats (e.g., Norway's 19 nationwide leveling seats in a mixed proportional system since 1989) or subnational applications, reflecting adaptations for proportionality rather than wholesale unity-focused governance.[30] Adaptations globally have included hybrid forms, such as combining at-large elections with district-based lower houses to balance local accountability and overarching policy views, as in the Philippine bicameral setup post-1940 constitutional amendments.[31] However, international usage has not proliferated widely, with block voting's persistence in select Asian and Middle Eastern legislatures tied to historical majoritarian traditions rather than deliberate diffusion from U.S. practices, and often yielding higher disproportionality in seat shares compared to district systems per cross-national analyses.[29] Empirical studies indicate these systems can enhance executive-legislative alignment in unitary states but risk underrepresenting minorities without thresholds or reservations.Advantages
Promotion of Unified Governance
At-large electoral systems promote unified governance by compelling candidates to cultivate support across the entire jurisdiction, thereby incentivizing representatives to prioritize comprehensive policy solutions over localized concerns. Unlike district-based elections, where officials may advocate primarily for their specific area's interests—potentially leading to fragmented decision-making and resource competition—at-large representatives must appeal to diverse voter preferences within the whole polity, fostering a broader perspective on governance. This mechanism aligns elected officials' incentives with jurisdiction-wide outcomes, reducing parochialism and encouraging cohesive policymaking that reflects median voter priorities rather than district-specific medians.[3][6] Theoretical models demonstrate that at-large voting produces policies closer to the overall electorate's preferences, as winning candidates represent the jurisdiction-wide median voter, whereas district systems aggregate district medians into council decisions that may diverge from city-level consensus. For instance, in simulations accounting for voter distributions, district elections yield suboptimal outcomes relative to unified voter interests, as council medians often skew toward non-representative subgroups, undermining policy coherence. Proponents contend this structure minimizes inter-district conflicts, such as disputes over infrastructure allocation, by promoting equitable resource distribution and a shared vision for the polity.[32][6] Empirical observations support these dynamics in municipal contexts, where at-large councils exhibit greater emphasis on citywide priorities, such as integrated urban planning, over neighborhood silos that can stall broader initiatives in district systems. This approach has been associated with streamlined governance in jurisdictions avoiding gerrymandering and factional logrolling, though it requires robust voter engagement to fully realize unified benefits.[3][6]Empirical Benefits for Policy Coherence and Diversity
Empirical analyses indicate that at-large election systems foster policy coherence by orienting legislative outcomes toward the median voter preference across the entire jurisdiction, in contrast to district-based systems where representatives prioritize localized medians that may diverge from the overall consensus.[32] This alignment reduces fragmentation, as council members in at-large setups are incentivized to address community-wide priorities rather than parochial district interests, leading to more unified decision-making processes.[33] For instance, theoretical models demonstrate that district elections can produce policies suboptimal for minorities when district medians exclude substantial portions of the population, whereas at-large systems better capture inclusive median preferences, potentially improving policy relevance for dispersed groups.[32] Regarding diversity, at-large systems empirically enhance gender representation on city councils, with studies of over 7,000 U.S. municipalities revealing significantly higher proportions of female councilors compared to single-member district arrangements.[33] [8] Specifically, the probability of white women's representation rises from 64% in district systems to 67% under at-large elections, attributed to multicandidate dynamics that allow broader voter coalitions without zero-sum geographic constraints.[8] In cases of dispersed minority populations, at-large voting has also resulted in overrepresentation of African Americans on school boards relative to their population share, countering underrepresentation risks in fragmented districting.[33] These patterns hold particularly in contexts lacking high minority concentration, where at-large competition favors candidates appealing to cross-cutting interests, thereby broadening descriptive diversity beyond racial enclaves.[8]Criticisms and Controversies
Allegations of Vote Dilution
Allegations of vote dilution in at-large elections assert that such systems undermine the voting strength of racial or ethnic minorities by enabling a cohesive majority to capture a disproportionate share of seats, thereby reducing minority electoral influence relative to their population proportion. In these systems, all qualified voters in a jurisdiction select multiple representatives without geographic subdistricts, which critics argue facilitates majority bloc voting that submerges minority votes, preventing the election of minority-preferred candidates at rates commensurate with demographic shares.[34][35] These claims gained legal traction under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982 to incorporate a "results test" that prohibits practices yielding unequal electoral opportunities based on race, without requiring proof of discriminatory intent. The U.S. Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) outlined three preconditions for establishing dilution in multimember or at-large schemes: (1) the minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the group must be politically cohesive; and (3) the majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidates.[34][35] Most Section 2 challenges since 1965 have targeted at-large systems, evaluating the "totality of circumstances" including histories of discrimination, racially polarized voting, and low minority electoral success rates.[34] Empirical analyses support proponents' contentions of underrepresentation, with studies of U.S. municipalities showing minorities achieve fewer council seats in at-large elections than in district-based systems. An examination of 268 cities with populations over 25,000 and at least 10% Black residents found Black council penetration—a ratio of Black members to Black population share—averaged 0.399 in at-large systems, compared to 0.771 in district systems, indicating substantial underrepresentation.[17] Regression models further revealed at-large structures yield the least proportional outcomes, with slopes of 0.589 linking minority population shares to representation, versus 0.900 for districts.[17] Such findings have prompted numerous jurisdictions, including California cities under state analogs to the federal Voting Rights Act, to transition to district elections following successful dilution challenges.[36]Legal and Empirical Counterperspectives
Legal counterperspectives to vote dilution allegations emphasize that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not categorically prohibit at-large systems but requires plaintiffs to demonstrate specific preconditions under Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), including geographically compact minority populations, cohesive minority voting, and consistent white bloc voting against minority-preferred candidates.[35] Failure to meet these thresholds has led courts to reject numerous claims, as the absence of legally significant racially polarized voting precludes a finding of dilution in many jurisdictions. For instance, empirical assessments in post-Gingles litigation often reveal insufficient evidence of submergence, particularly where electoral success by minority candidates occurs through crossover support or multi-seat at-large formats allowing proportional outcomes.[35] Empirically, while some analyses document increased descriptive minority representation following switches to single-member districts, evidence on substantive policy impacts challenges the presumption of uniform dilution in at-large systems. A formal model of electoral competition demonstrates that districting can produce council medians skewed toward non-minority district preferences, yielding policies less aligned with city-wide minority interests, whereas at-large elections compel candidates to appeal to the overall median voter, potentially enhancing minority influence on outcomes like public goods allocation.[37] This holds even under complications such as non-voting, where at-large structures mitigate the exclusion of minority voices from district-specific majorities. Mixed empirical patterns in representation—such as sustained minority wins in multi-winner at-large contests without bloc dominance—further indicate that dilution effects are context-dependent rather than inherent, often overstated in critiques assuming perpetual polarization.[37]Implementation in the United States
Federal Congress
In the United States House of Representatives, at-large elections apply to states apportioned a single seat following decennial census-based reapportionment, with the representative elected statewide rather than from a sub-state district. As determined by the 2020 census apportionment, effective for the 118th Congress (2023–2025) and continuing into the 119th, six states qualify: Alaska, Delaware, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. These at-large members possess full voting rights on the House floor, equivalent to district-elected representatives from multi-seat states, and serve two-year terms. Historically, at-large systems extended to multi-seat states, with some electing entire delegations statewide or in combination with districts until the Reapportionment Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-196), which mandated single-member districts for all states with more than one seat to promote geographically specific accountability.[23] Prior enactments, such as the Apportionment Act of 1842 and the 1929 Permanent Apportionment Act, encouraged but did not strictly enforce districting, allowing practices like Alabama's all-at-large elections from 1876 to 1964, which persisted amid reapportionment delays and avoidance of localized scrutiny.[23] This shift reflected congressional intent to balance statewide perspectives with localized representation, though single-seat at-large elections remain standard for smaller states to ensure proportional voice without artificial subdivision.[23] Non-voting delegates from the District of Columbia and U.S. territories also serve at-large, elected jurisdiction-wide to advocate for constituents lacking full representation. These include delegates from the District of Columbia (elected biennially since 1971), Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Northern Mariana Islands (all biennial since their respective enabling acts), plus Puerto Rico's resident commissioner (quadrennial since 1917).[38] Numbering six as of 2025, these members introduce legislation, participate in committees with voting rights therein, and may speak on the floor but cannot vote in full House proceedings, a limitation upheld to preserve the constitutional structure reserving voting membership for states.[38] Their at-large status ensures broad territorial input, originating from Continental Congress precedents like the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.[38] Empirical data indicate at-large federal configurations minimize intra-state gerrymandering risks for single-seat entities while enabling cohesive state-level advocacy, though critics argue they dilute urban-rural divides in larger jurisdictions—a concern addressed by the 1967 mandate.[23] No multi-member at-large seats have been used in the House since 1968, reflecting sustained policy against them post-civil rights era reforms.[23]House of Representatives Configurations
In the United States House of Representatives, configurations for electing members incorporate both single-member districts and at-large elections, governed by federal statute to ensure structured representation aligned with population apportionment. States entitled to more than one representative are required to establish an equal number of congressional districts, with each representative elected from a separate single-member district, prohibiting multi-member at-large elections.[39] This mandate, enacted through the Uniform Congressional District Act of 1967 (Public Law 90-196), took effect for elections starting in 1970, standardizing single-member districting nationwide for states with multiple seats to promote geographic accountability and equal population distribution.[40] States apportioned only one House seat, by contrast, elect their sole representative at-large from the entire state, as no subdistricting is feasible or required under the law. Following the 2020 Census apportionment, these states are Alaska, Delaware, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming, each allocated one voting representative based on their resident populations falling below the threshold for additional seats.[41] At-large elections in these jurisdictions typically involve plurality voting, where the candidate with the most votes statewide wins, without primaries in some cases yielding general election contests between major party nominees.[23] District configurations for multi-seat states must comply with equal population standards per the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote principle, as affirmed in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), requiring districts to be as numerically equal as practicable while states handle redistricting decennially after each census.[42] Deviations for contiguity, compactness, or preserving communities of interest are permitted but scrutinized under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to prevent dilution of minority voting power.[23] No state has employed multi-member districts since the 1967 Act, shifting from earlier 19th- and early 20th-century practices where at-large systems sometimes elected entire delegations, often favoring majority parties through block voting.[23] These configurations balance federal uniformity with state autonomy, as Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution delegates election manner to states subject to congressional override, which has enforced single-member districts to mitigate perceived advantages of at-large systems in amplifying partisan sweeps.[39] Empirical analysis post-1967 shows reduced variance in district competitiveness compared to prior at-large usage, though gerrymandering critiques persist in single-member setups.Non-Voting and Territorial Districts
The United States House of Representatives seats six non-voting members to represent the District of Columbia and five unincorporated territories: American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.[38] These include five delegates elected by their respective jurisdictions and one resident commissioner from Puerto Rico, established under statutory authority dating to the late 19th and early 20th centuries for territorial representation.[38] The delegates serve two-year terms aligned with House elections, while the resident commissioner from Puerto Rico, unique among these positions, serves a four-year term.[38] These non-voting members exercise parliamentary rights comparable to voting representatives in several respects, including introducing bills and resolutions, offering amendments, and engaging in floor debate when recognized by the chair.[43] They hold full voting privileges on standing, select, and conference committees to which they are assigned, as well as on joint committees since the 116th Congress (2019-2021).[43] In the Committee of the Whole, they gained the ability to vote and preside starting in the 116th Congress, though any vote by a delegate or resident commissioner that would prove decisive—such as breaking a tie—is vacated, requiring revote without their participation.[43] They may also make motions on the floor, except for the motion to reconsider, and have occasionally managed bills or offered motions to suspend the rules.[43] Limitations on their role stem from House rules, which exclude them from voting in the House sitting as such or from being recorded as present for quorum purposes.[38] The territorial delegate position originated with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided for a delegate from the Northwest Territory, with the first such member seated in 1794 by James White representing that territory.[38] Puerto Rico's resident commissioner began service in 1901 following the Foraker Act of 1900, while delegates for other insular territories were authorized post-Spanish-American War acquisitions, with Guam's in 1971, the Virgin Islands' in 1972, American Samoa's formalized in 1980, and the Northern Mariana Islands' in 2008 via the Consolidated Natural Resources Act.[38] The District of Columbia's delegate position was created by the 23rd Amendment ratification in 1961 and implemented in 1971.[38] These arrangements provide representational voice without full legislative voting power, reflecting the constitutional distinction between states and territories or federal districts.[38]State and Local Applications
In U.S. state and local governments, at-large elections enable voters within a jurisdiction to select multiple representatives without geographic subdistricts, contrasting with district-based systems that confine votes to specific areas. This method is applied sparingly at the state legislative level due to constitutional mandates and judicial precedents emphasizing population-based districting, but it remains common in municipal and county settings, where over one-third of cities with populations exceeding 10,000 used pure or hybrid at-large systems for council elections as of recent analyses. Such implementations aim to promote jurisdiction-wide perspectives but have faced legal scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for potential minority vote dilution, leading to shifts toward districts in some areas.[3][7]State-Level Elections
At-large elections for state legislative seats are rare in the modern U.S., as nearly all 50 states apportion their houses and senates into single-member or multi-member districts to satisfy equal protection clauses under the Fourteenth Amendment, as affirmed by Supreme Court rulings like Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, which invalidated statewide at-large systems for diluting individual votes. No state currently employs pure at-large voting for its entire legislative chamber, a departure from 19th-century practices in states like Pennsylvania and Illinois, where multi-seat at-large contests were common before apportionment reforms. Instead, elements of at-large-style voting appear in multi-member districts (MMDs), where voters in a defined area elect two or more legislators simultaneously; as of 2024, ten states, including Arizona (House), Idaho (House), and Vermont (House), use MMDs for portions of their legislatures, with district sizes typically electing two members to balance local and broader representation. These MMDs function akin to sub-jurisdictional at-large but remain geographically bounded, avoiding the vote concentration issues of full at-large systems.[23][17]Municipal and County Elections
Municipal at-large elections are widespread for city councils, particularly in smaller or mid-sized cities seeking unified policy-making; for instance, Columbus, Ohio, elects its entire seven-member council at-large, with voters selecting candidates citywide and the top vote-recipients securing seats in non-partisan races held every two years. Similarly, Beaufort, South Carolina, uses at-large voting for its five city council positions, where all eligible voters participate in choosing the highest vote-getters, a system in place since at least the late 20th century. Nationwide, as of 2020, about 25% of cities over 50,000 population operated under pure at-large council elections, often praised for reducing parochialism but challenged in over 200 cases under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for impeding minority representation.[44][11][3] County governments frequently adopt at-large systems for commissions or boards, especially in less populous areas; Ocean County, New Jersey, for example, elects its five-member Board of County Commissioners at-large across 33 municipalities, with staggered four-year terms and all county voters participating, a structure formalized under state law. In North Carolina, several counties, such as Wake and Mecklenburg, have employed at-large or hybrid models for commission seats, though transitions to districts occurred post-2010 redistricting in response to demographic shifts and legal pressures. These at-large county setups, used in roughly 40% of U.S. counties as of 2023, facilitate countywide fiscal decisions but have drawn empirical criticism for correlating with lower minority officeholding rates compared to district systems in diverse jurisdictions.[45][46][47]State-Level Elections
In the United States, at-large elections at the state level primarily manifest in multi-member legislative districts (MMDs), where voters within a defined district elect two or more representatives simultaneously, with all district voters participating in selecting candidates for each seat.[48] These systems often employ plurality-at-large voting, block voting, or post-based methods, such as assigning specific seats to numbered "posts" to stagger terms or designate positions.[48] As of 2024, ten states maintain MMDs in at least one chamber, a decline from broader historical use prior to the 1960s reapportionment reforms under Reynolds v. Sims, which mandated equal population districts and reduced statewide at-large legislatures.[48] [17] The following table summarizes states with MMDs, including chamber, typical members per district, and voting mechanics:| State | Chamber | Members per District | Voting System |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arizona | House | 2 | Bloc with partial abstention |
| Idaho | House | 2 | Post system |
| Maryland | House | 3 | Bloc/post hybrid |
| New Hampshire | House | 1–11 (incl. floterial) | Bloc with partial abstention |
| New Jersey | House | 2 | Bloc with partial abstention |
| North Dakota | House | 2 | Bloc with partial abstention |
| South Dakota | House | 2 | Bloc/post hybrid (select districts) |
| Vermont | Senate | 1–3 | Bloc with partial abstention |
| Vermont | House | 1–2 | Bloc with partial abstention |
| Washington | House | 2 | Post system |
| West Virginia | Senate | 2 | Staggered terms |