Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Basslink

Basslink is a 370 km monopolar (HVDC) electricity linking the power grids of and across , comprising approximately 290 km of with a rated of 500 MW for bidirectional transfer. Commissioned for commercial operations on 29 April 2006 at a of around $875 million, it integrates into the , facilitating the export of the island's renewable hydroelectric power to the mainland while providing import during periods of low local generation. Owned and operated by Basslink Pty Ltd, a of APA Group since 2022, the has supported Tasmania's energy economy by enabling revenue from power exports and maintaining relatively low transmission s for consumers, estimated at about $8 annually per Tasmanian residential user. A significant controversy arose from a fault on 20 2015, approximately 100 km offshore from , which halted operations for 174 days until repairs in June 2016, exacerbating low hydro storage levels and triggering an energy shortfall that necessitated imports and imposed financial s of $140–180 million on . Independent investigations, including by Cable Consulting International, could not conclusively determine the fault's cause, amid disputes between Basslink operators and the over responsibility, highlighting vulnerabilities in reliance on a single for grid stability.

Overview

Project Description and Purpose

Basslink is a 370 km (HVDC) comprising a that links the grids of and in . It connects the George Town terminal station in northern to the Loy Yang terminal station in the of , traversing with approximately 290 km of subsea cable. The became operational in 2006, enabling bidirectional flows with a nominal capacity of 500 MW to support energy trading between the regions. Its core purpose is to facilitate the export of 's surplus renewable to the mainland during periods of high generation, while allowing imports to amid local shortages from variable hydro output or demand spikes. This setup bolsters supply security for , which relies heavily on hydro resources, and integrates isolated renewable capacity into the interconnected Australian grid without requiring additional mainland fossil fuel generation. Developed as a private initiative, Basslink was originally owned and operated by National Grid Australia Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of the UK-based , underscoring market-driven investment in large-scale transmission infrastructure over public funding models.

Route and Capacity

The Basslink spans a total route length of 370 km, linking the Loy Yang substation in , , to the Bell Bay substation near George Town in northern . Of this distance, approximately 290 km consists of crossing , with the remaining land-based sections comprising underground and overhead lines. The portion was laid between 2004 and 2005 using specialized vessels, with over 95% of the installed in pre-trenched seabeds via water jetting to achieve burial depths suitable for soft sediment conditions prevalent in the strait. This burial approach minimizes exposure to anchor damage, fishing gear, and seabed abrasion, though the remains susceptible to geological shifts in unburied segments. Basslink employs a monopolar HVDC with a metallic return path, operating at a rated voltage of 400 kV DC and a nominal of 500 MW for bidirectional power transfer. The system supports overload operation up to 600 MW for short durations, such as 10 hours per day under favorable thermal conditions, providing flexibility for without immediate infrastructure upgrades. The metallic return enhances reliability by offering a dedicated low-resistance path, reducing reliance on or electrodes during faults, though the design lacks the inherent redundancy of systems. ratings reflect limits tied to converter stations and thermal margins, with submarine sections using mass-impregnated to withstand the pressures and temperatures encountered at operational depths.

History

Development and Commissioning (1990s-2005)

The Basslink project emerged from feasibility studies initiated in the early by the Tasmanian (now ) in collaboration with Victorian counterparts, assessing the viability of an undersea HVDC to link Tasmania's isolated grid to the mainland . These studies, completed around 1991-1992, identified economic benefits from exporting Tasmania's surplus hydroelectric generation during periods of high mainland demand, motivated by market price differentials rather than public subsidies. Development advanced through a consortium led by Basslink Pty Ltd, achieving financial close on 29 November 2002 with a projected cost of approximately $500 million, later escalating to $780 million by mid-2003 due to design refinements and construction complexities. relied on a mix of and from private investors, minimizing direct taxpayer exposure as the project operated on a basis, capturing revenues from arbitrage without guaranteed government payments. Construction commenced in 2003, encompassing converter stations at , and Loy Yang, Victoria, supplied by , alongside the 360 km manufactured by ABB using advanced HVDC light technology tailored for the Bass Strait's rugged seabed. Cable laying, executed by specialized vessels and contractors, progressed from 2004 with initial sections deployed in 2005, overcoming environmental and logistical challenges through engineered solutions like articulated pipes for stability. Commissioning tests culminated on 1 December 2005, when power first flowed across the link, validating the system's 500 MW bipolar capacity and enabling Tasmania's hydro exports to generate merchant revenues by integrating the island's variable renewable output with mainland demand. This private-led engineering achievement prioritized commercial viability and technical reliability over subsidized alternatives, fostering grid driven by economic incentives.

Operational Challenges and 2015-2016 Outage

The Basslink experienced a major fault on December 20, 2015, when the undersea (HVDC) cable suddenly tripped offline mid-afternoon, halting power flows between and . Initial assessments indicated an electrical insulation failure within the cable, prompting a shutdown to prevent further damage, though the precise trigger remained undetermined at the time. This event occurred amid high export demand from Tasmania's hydro system, which was strained by prolonged dry conditions reducing reservoir levels and increasing reliance on the link for balancing supply. Subsequent investigations, including analyses by independent experts commissioned by , identified the root cause as the cable operating beyond its thermal design limits for an extended period, leading to overheating, repetitive cooling cycles, and eventual electrical discharge that compromised the insulation. Basslink operators had pushed the system to transmit near or above its MW rated capacity during periods, exacerbating internal stresses in the and cable components not intended for sustained overload. Early speculation of external damage, such as from ship —potentially linked to vessels like the Star trawler in the vicinity—lacked confirmatory evidence from fault location tests or marine surveys, which instead pointed to no clear or foreign object impact. Basslink classified the incident as a force majeure event attributable to unforeseen internal degradation rather than or external . Repair efforts involved locating the fault approximately 90 km offshore from , , followed by splicing a replacement section using specialized cable ships, delayed by adverse weather and mobilization logistics. The remained offline for nearly six months, from December 20, 2015, to June 13, 2016, with repair costs exceeding estimates due to vessel hire rates of around $100,000 per day and additional onshore testing. During this period, Tasmania's grid faced acute supply shortages, as hydro storage dropped below 15% capacity, necessitating increased gas-fired generation and emergency imports via alternative means, though blackouts were avoided through targeted demand reduction and load shedding protocols. The outage exposed vulnerabilities in operating the HVDC system under prolonged high-load conditions without adequate , highlighting limits in and planning for dependencies. Wholesale prices in the Tasmanian region spiked intermittently, reaching levels that strained market participants, though regulated retail tariffs buffered most consumers initially. Post-repair, enhanced operational protocols were implemented, including stricter power flow limits during low-hydro scenarios, to mitigate recurrence risks from similar overload dynamics.

Financial Distress, Receivership, and Ownership Changes (2016-2022)

Following the prolonged outage from 2015 to 2016, Basslink Pty Ltd faced significant financial strain due to operational underperformance and disputes with its primary customer, , over hedging contracts intended to mitigate revenue risks from electricity market volatility. These contracts obligated Basslink to guarantee minimum energy transfers, but failures in delivery post-outage prompted claims of . In December 2020, an arbitrator ruled in favor of and the State of Tasmania, awarding A$38.5 million in damages against Basslink for non-compliance, rejecting the operator's defense related to the outage, and declaring additional es under the services agreement. Basslink's refusal to pay the award, combined with accrued costs exceeding A$70 million in total obligations to the state entities, triggered default notices in November 2021. Escalating losses—reported at over A$14 million in immediate pre-insolvency trading—and unresolved pressures led Basslink's owners, Singapore-based Keppel Infrastructure Trust, to initiate voluntary on November 12, 2021, for the Basslink group including Holdings Australia Pty Ltd and Australia Management Pty Ltd. Lenders appointed receivers from , who replaced prior appointees amid a failed prior sale attempt and stalled refinancing tied to the Hydro Tasmania disputes. The prioritized recovery from Basslink's secured portfolio, while operations continued under interim arrangements to maintain grid interconnectivity. The insolvency concluded through a , enabling to acquire Basslink on October 17, 2022, for A$773 million, funded via existing debt facilities and covering the syndicated secured debt acquired by earlier that year. This transaction resolved outstanding claims, including outcomes, and transferred ownership from Keppel to infrastructure firm , restoring financial stability without state intervention. The sale yielded recoveries for creditors and affirmed private market valuation of the asset's long-term utility, despite prior operational liabilities.

Regulatory Transition and Recent Operations (2023-2025)

In May 2023, APA Group, the owner of Basslink since its acquisition in October 2022, applied to the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to convert the interconnector's services from a contracted market network service to a prescribed transmission service, aiming to transition to regulated Transmission Network Service Provider (TNSP) status for enhanced revenue certainty and alignment with customer interests. The AER issued a draft decision in December 2024 denying the conversion, citing concerns over market impacts and regulatory fit, but reversed this in its final decision on June 26, 2025, approving the transition effective July 1, 2026. Under the approved framework, Basslink's revenue determination for 2026–2030 proposes total revenues of approximately $428.8 million over four years, with APA's allocation suggesting 75% to and 25% to based on regional connections and benefits. The existing revenue contract with expired on June 30, 2025, after which APA shifted Basslink's bidding from fixed low-price offers (previously 0/MWh under the [agreement](/page/Agreement)) to market-responsive [pricing](/page/Pricing) around 10/MWh in both directions, resulting in increased northbound flows ( to ) as 's renewable generation, including and , responded to mainland price signals. This interim trading period from July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026, has supported higher export volumes amid 's push for renewable exports, though it introduces exposure to price volatility absent under prior contracting. APA updated its revenue proposal in August 2025, incorporating actual (capex) data through 2024 and forecasts emphasizing reliability enhancements, such as operational adjustments post-historical outages to mitigate overload risks. From to mid-2025, Basslink maintained stable operations with no major outages reported, contrasting earlier disruptions, while AER oversight focused on capex and inter-regional in the pending cap. Monitoring continues for potential overloads during peak renewable dispatch, informed by post-2016 operational protocols that prioritize dynamic management. The regulatory shift underscores empirical needs for reliability in an evolving with growing interconnectors, though critics note risks of caps constraining incentives for absent discipline.

Technical Specifications

HVDC System Design

The Basslink HVDC system utilizes a monopolar configuration with metallic return, operating at a rated DC voltage of +400 and a rated DC of 1250 A, enabling a nominal power transfer capacity of 500 MW in bidirectional mode. This setup achieves dynamic ratings up to 626 MW from to under certain operating conditions, leveraging line-commutated converter () technology based on valves for efficient rectification and inversion. converters, as implemented by , prioritize high power handling and stability for long-distance transmission, contrasting with voltage-source converters by relying on system commutated turn-off for thyristors, which suits the interconnector's requirements for linking asynchronous grids without synchronizing 's isolated 50 Hz network to 's mainland . Power flow control in the system is automated through modulation of firing angles at the converters, allowing rapid reversal from export (inverter mode at Loy Yang) to import ( mode) or vice versa, with a minimum stable transfer of 50 MW due to thyristor hold-on characteristics. Fault integrates hierarchical schemes, including pole differential relaying, line via traveling wave detection, and converter-specific safeguards against commutation failures or overcurrents, ensuring selective isolation during disturbances while minimizing outage propagation to connected grids. The design incorporates smoothing reactors and filters to suppress harmonics and maintain current stability, contributing to overall losses of approximately 3% across the 370 km link—substantially lower than equivalent submarine cable alternatives, which suffer higher capacitive charging and resistive losses over distance. This HVDC facilitates frequency-independent operation between endpoints, Tasmania's -dominated —prone to output variability—from Victoria's and gas baseload, thereby enabling stable export of surplus renewable hydro power without risking mainland grid stability. Engineered for a 40-year with minimal maintenance, the system's components emphasize robustness through water-cooled valves and modular redundancy, reducing operational downtime compared to mechanically complex AC synchronizing schemes.

Cable and Converter Infrastructure

The Basslink extends 290 kilometers across , with an additional approximately 70 kilometers of land cable, forming a total route of 370 kilometers. The submarine section employs mass-impregnated non-draining (MIND) paper-insulated (HVDC) cable rated at 400 kV DC, bundled with a metallic return conductor insulated by (XLPE). This insulation type provides robust dielectric performance under hydrostatic pressures up to depths exceeding 100 meters in , with mechanical armoring via galvanized steel wires to withstand hazards like gear and seismic activity. The monopolar configuration, utilizing a dedicated metallic return path, incorporates against insulation faults by isolating power conduction from return, reducing vulnerability to complete outage from a single conductor breach. Land cables transition to XLPE for flexibility in terrestrial , maintaining the 400 rating and supporting bi-directional flows up to 500 MW. Cable diameters reach up to 260 mm in armored sections, enabling burial depths of 0.5 meters in trenched segments for added protection. Converter stations at Loy Yang (Victoria) and George Town (Tasmania) feature line-commutated thyristor bridges based on direct light-triggered thyristors (LTT), arranged in 12-pulse configuration to inherently suppress lower-order harmonics. AC harmonic filters, including triple-tuned damped types, further mitigate distortion to meet grid codes, while converter transformers employ oil-immersed dielectric systems for high-voltage isolation and cooling. These components support rated operation at 1250 A DC current, with design margins for overloads during transient conditions. Maintenance protocols include periodic visual inspections of converter equipment, high-voltage yards, and auxiliary systems, alongside testing of oil-filled components to detect early. integrity is monitored via specialized loading prediction systems, ensuring sustained performance without structural upgrades to capacity since commissioning. Bundled dark within the cable bundle enable ancillary telecommunication leasing, leveraging existing infrastructure for revenue diversification while preserving reliability.

Integrated Telecoms Capabilities

The Basslink interconnector incorporates an integrated optic telecommunications system within its , enabling the leasing of capacity for alongside flow. This dual-use design, implemented during the cable's and laying completed in 2005, allows for the provision of high-speed bandwidth services between and without requiring a dedicated separate . The optic component, spanning approximately 298 km undersea plus land extensions to form a exceeding 900 km, supports connectivity between key points such as and , with multiple points of presence for carrier access. Basslink Telecoms Pty Ltd, a subsidiary dedicated to telecommunications operations, manages the leasing and maintenance of this fiber infrastructure as dark fiber or lit capacity to third-party providers, establishing it as an alternative to incumbent networks like Telstra. Services commenced in July 2009, following the power system's earlier activation, and have included agreements with entities such as AARNet, which assumed operational control in 2025 to enhance Tasmanian connectivity. This leasing generates a supplementary revenue stream independent of electricity transmission earnings, historically comprising a minor but consistent portion—less than 5% based on disclosed power contract dominance—while contributing to overall project financial stability through diversified income. The integrated setup yields operational synergies by sharing installation, protection, and maintenance costs across power and telecom functions, improving return on investment compared to standalone telecom cables. Critically, the telecom system demonstrates resilience to power transmission disruptions, as fiber operations remain unaffected by HVDC faults due to electrical isolation; for instance, during the 2015-2016 Basslink outage, telecom services persisted without interruption, underscoring the value of this separation for reliability in data services. This capability positions Basslink Telecoms as a robust backhaul option for regional internet and enterprise needs, with potential for capacity upgrades via wavelength multiplexing to meet growing demand.

Infrastructure Sites

George Town Converter Station (Tasmania)

The George Town Converter Station functions as the Tasmanian endpoint of the Basslink high-voltage direct current (HVDC) interconnector, situated in George Town in northern Tasmania adjacent to Four Mile Bluff. It interconnects with the 220 kV alternating current (AC) transmission network operated by TasNetworks at the nearby George Town Substation, enabling seamless integration between the HVDC system and Tasmania's predominantly hydroelectric power grid. The station employs monopolar HVDC technology with line-commutated converters utilizing direct-light-triggered s for AC-to-DC conversion, housed within dedicated valve halls that accommodate suspended valve structures and protruding bushings from single-phase three-winding converter transformers rated at 194/97/97 MVA. Cooling systems incorporate wire-in-water technology for the valves, delivering water and fiber optics from overhead supplies to manage thermal dissipation without requiring valve disassembly for maintenance. A centralized features redundant pole units in active/hot-standby configuration, station-level reactive , and valve base electronics for real-time monitoring, interfaced via a interface with the Australian Operator. mitigation relies on triple-tuned damped filters targeting orders such as the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 11th/13th, and 23rd/25th, complemented by 313 Mvar of shunt (comprising five 43 Mvar and one 98 Mvar units) to maintain and voltage stability during 630 MW export operations. Commissioned in 2005, the facility's design supports bidirectional power transfer rated at 500 MW and 400 kV DC, with seismic-resilient flexible joints in the valve halls and a maximum ambient operating temperature of 30°C. This engineering configuration allows for efficient tie-ins to the local AC grid, facilitating the dispatch of hydroelectric generation from upstream assets like those managed by Hydro Tasmania by providing a high-capacity outlet for surplus renewable output or an import pathway to supplement storage during low-inflow periods. The station's inland placement amid bushland emphasizes compact infrastructure with minimal land disturbance, prioritizing harmonic emission control and grid synchronization over expansive site development.

Loy Yang Converter Station (Victoria)

The Loy Yang Converter Station serves as the Victorian mainland terminal for the Basslink HVDC interconnector, situated in the region of , adjacent to the complex. This location facilitates integration with 's coal-fired baseload generation, enabling efficient export of surplus power from the 500 kV (AEMO) grid to during periods of high Victorian supply. The station connects directly to the Loy Yang switchyard via approximately 3.2 km of 500 kV AC overhead transmission line, allowing bidirectional power flows up to 500 MW while leveraging the proximity to Loy Yang's 3,300 MW coal capacity for grid stability in a mixed energy system dominated by fossil fuels. The infrastructure employs a monopolar HVDC with line-commutated converter () technology, rated at 400 and 1,250 A, utilizing water-cooled valves for power conversion between and . From the converter, a 61 km overhead extends eastward to the coastal landing point near the coast, where it transitions to the subsea cable; an offshore seawater provides the return path, similar to the Tasmanian setup but adapted for Victorian coastal conditions to minimize environmental impact. This design supports southbound imports to during Tasmanian hydro surpluses, though operational data indicates predominant northbound flows from coal-heavy , underscoring Basslink's role in balancing fossil generation against intermittent renewables. Following Group's acquisition of Basslink in October 2022, the Loy Yang station has undergone upgrades including a comprehensive replacement of control and protection systems to enhance reliability and compliance with evolving grid codes, amid Victoria's transition toward higher renewable penetration that necessitates robust performance for frequency control and import flexibility. These enhancements, approved by the Australian Energy Regulator, aim to sustain 500 MW capacity without physical expansion but with improved operational resilience, particularly as Loy Yang A faces potential earlier pressures from shifts.

Undersea Cable Route and Landings

The Basslink undersea cable spans approximately 290 kilometers across on the continental shelf between northeastern and southeastern , linking Four Mile Bluff near , to McGaurans Beach near Giffard in , . The route navigates varying seabed conditions, including soft sediments predominant in much of and localized harder substrates such as outcrops, with water depths ranging from less than 15 meters near shorelines to 32–72 meters in deeper sections. Shore landings at both ends employed horizontal for the subsurface approaches to traverse profiles and nearshore zones, minimizing surface disruption and environmental exposure before transitioning to marine burial. In the marine path, over 95% of the is buried via water-jet trenching in feasible soft areas, targeting a depth of about 1 meter to the top of the ; where trenching was impractical due to hard , protective measures such as cast-iron half-shell encasements were applied. infill in shallower trenches (<15 meters depth) typically renders the cable and its furrow indistinguishable from the natural within one to two years post-installation. The path intersects shipping lanes and areas of potential anchor deployment in Bass Strait's dynamic marine environment, but burial depths and route substantially reduce exposure to mechanical threats from anchors or demersal gear, which account for the majority of faults globally. Geophysical assessments during accounted for Bass Strait's low-to-moderate seismic activity and sediment mobility, with post-lay surveys using underwater video and diver inspections confirming effective integration into the . Ongoing employs remotely operated vehicles to verify burial status and detect any exposure risks from currents or storms.

Economic and Market Impacts

Energy Trade Enablement and Revenue Generation

Basslink enables bidirectional energy flows of up to 500 MW continuously, and 630 MW for limited export periods from , allowing the export of surplus hydroelectric generation to during high-inflow years when Tasmanian supply exceeds local demand. This capacity supports opportunities in the (), where dispatches low-marginal-cost renewable output to capture higher wholesale prices on the mainland, contributing to revenue through trading driven by regional price differentials. Exports have historically dominated flows in wetter periods, with leveraging its assets to optimize economic dispatch across interconnected regions. In periods of low inflows, such as droughts, Basslink facilitates imports to meet Tasmanian baseload needs, preserving levels for and control ancillary services (FCAS) while dampening local price volatility that would otherwise arise from isolated supply constraints. Following Group's acquisition in October 2022, operational enhancements—including the commissioning of previously unavailable dynamic transfer capacity—have expanded effective utilization, enabling greater responsiveness to market signals and increased trade volumes without compromising intermittency management. By linking to the , Basslink reduces the premium costs of standalone island operations, fostering efficient resource allocation and ancillary streams from 's dispatchable flexibility, which complements renewables across . has incentivized these market-oriented optimizations, affirming the 's role in generation via competitive bidding rather than rigid allocation.

Reliability Risks and Outage Consequences

The Basslink represents a for 's electrical interconnection with the mainland, exposing the island's grid to heightened risks during outages, particularly in periods of low hydroelectric inflows. As the sole HVDC link capable of bi-directional power flows up to 594 MW, its disruption isolates , compelling reliance on local resources augmented by gas-fired generation, which lacks the scale to fully offset export losses or needs without significant cost escalation. A prominent instance occurred with the cable fault on December 20, 2015, rendering Basslink inoperable until June 13, , amid concurrent record-low dam inflows from September 2015 to April . This outage, attributed to operations exceeding the 's design limits, amplified Tasmania's energy shortfall, as prior high exports via Basslink had depleted reservoirs. Gas generation filled the gap, supplying approximately 30% of Tasmania's in the first quarter of compared to virtually none in the same period of , straining limited gas infrastructure and elevating wholesale prices. Economically, the 2015-2016 outage imposed costs estimated at over $400 million on Tasmania's economy, encompassing higher generation expenses, reduced industrial output, and , though no widespread blackouts ensued due to and gas ramp-up. While Basslink's lifetime availability exceeds 97%, with only one major subsea failure in nearly two decades of operation since , such events underscore how intermittent downtimes—concentrated rather than evenly distributed—exacerbate vulnerabilities in Tasmania's hydro-dominant, , where faith without redundant capacity risks disproportionate supply disruptions during hydrological stress.

Controversies and Criticisms

Causation and Accountability for Failures

The Basslink experienced a critical fault on December 20, 2015, resulting in an outage lasting until June 13, , during which the cable transmitted no power between and . An initial six-month investigation by independent engineering firm Cable Consultants International (CCI) in concluded that the precise cause could not be determined, classifying the event as despite evidence of possible anchor drag from a passing . This assessment, while noting subsea disturbances, did not identify operational factors as primary, leading Basslink Pty Ltd (BPL) to invoke contractual protections against liability. Subsequent engineering analyses in 2017 by GL, commissioned by , attributed the failure's root cause to BPL exceeding the cable's design thermal and electrical limits through repeated polarity reversals and high-load operations, which induced internal discharges and accelerated . These operations, involving rapid heating and cooling cycles under stress, likely initiated micro-damage that propagated to rupture, with any external trigger such as contact serving only as a probable but non-exclusive precipitant rather than the fundamental vulnerability. 's experts emphasized that adherence to specified limits—intended to prevent such cumulative stress—would have avoided the breakdown, rejecting attributions to unverified externalities like shipping incidents alone or unsubstantiated environmental factors. Accountability centered on operational decisions by BPL, prompting to pursue compensation claims exceeding $70 million for breach of service agreements, though no regulatory fines were imposed by bodies like the . The disputes culminated in BPL entering voluntary in November 2021 amid unpaid defaults, underscoring contractual rather than punitive enforcement. These findings drove post-outage upgrades, including enhanced monitoring and limit enforcements, without validation for broader narratives implicating or systemic neglect beyond evidenced lapses.

Financial and Policy Debates

In December 2020, an arbitrator ruled in favor of and the State of in disputes with Basslink over outage-related payments and claims stemming from the 2016 cable failure, ordering Basslink entities to pay $38.5 million in damages. These proceedings exposed flaws in the original risk allocation under the Basslink Services Agreement and associated hedging contracts, which were designed to manage financial exposures from variable energy flows across the but failed to adequately insulate parties from prolonged outages. Contract enforcement through underscored the primacy of legal obligations in private deals, countering narratives that portrayed such mechanisms as inherently anti-market; instead, they facilitated resolution without public subsidy. Policy debates have centered on the risks of privatized like Basslink, with critics arguing that public entities such as bore disproportionate exposures through guarantees and hedging commitments, potentially amplifying taxpayer liabilities during defaults. However, empirical outcomes demonstrate that Basslink's enablement of Tasmanian hydro exports to the generated substantial revenues for —exceeding $1 billion cumulatively by the mid-2010s—outweighing isolated default costs and supporting energy price stability via arbitrage opportunities. This contrasts with anti-privatization , as the project's incentivized efficient and , yielding net economic benefits despite outages, per market data on flows and pricing. Proposals for a second interconnector, , have sparked viability concerns amid escalating costs projected above $5 billion for even a single cable, prompting Tasmanian authorities to question its financial stacking against Basslink's proven throughput. Independent analyses highlight Marinus's lower cost-recovery prospects relative to Basslink, given dependencies on uncertain renewable dispatch and higher capital outlays without guaranteed hedging offsets. Basslink's 2021 entry into voluntary administration and subsequent receivership—triggered by $40 million-plus debts to —ignited debates framing it as a market correction rather than a case for bailouts, with creditors enforcing absent government intervention. The asset's acquisition by APA Group in October 2022 for $773 million via a Deed of Company Arrangement validated its underlying value, as private capital absorbed risks and restored operations without fiscal rescues, affirming privatization's resilience when contracts are upheld. This outcome prioritized creditor recovery and asset continuity over protectionist policies, with APA's investment signaling confidence in Basslink's role despite past disputes.

Future Developments

Regulatory Framework Evolution

Prior to its transition to regulated status, Basslink operated under a merchant model, deriving revenues through bidding into the wholesale electricity spot markets in the (), without prescribed revenue caps or regulatory asset base (RAB) determinations. This approach exposed the interconnector to market volatility, including risks from fluctuating demand, generation outages, and competitive dynamics, as evidenced by its historical revenue dependence on opportunities between and . In May 2023, Basslink Pty Ltd, owned by APA Group following its October 2022 acquisition, applied to the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to convert its services from unregulated market network services to regulated transmission network services, designating it as a transmission network service provider (TNSP). The AER's draft decision in December 2024 initially rejected the conversion, citing concerns over market impacts and regulatory fit, but reversed this in its final decision on June 26, 2025, approving regulated operations effective July 1, 2026. In the interim period through June 30, 2026, Basslink continues trading, with flows no longer constrained by prior mandates, such as temporary pricing floors that had limited merchant flexibility. The AER's revenue determination process for 2026–2030 incorporates scrutiny of (capex) based on actual outlays from 2023–2025, alongside forecasts, to establish an opening RAB and allowable s. Its September 12, 2025, draft decision sets an opening RAB of $720.51 million for 2026–27 (in real terms), $32.27 million below Basslink's revised , and proposes total s of $428.8 million over the four-year period, reflecting adjustments for benchmarks and allocation. This framework aims to enforce reliability through standardized TNSP obligations, including and outage , while providing revenue stability to support long-term investments, though it introduces capex approval gates that could constrain operator agility compared to the merchant era. While the AER's oversight prioritizes cost recovery aligned with prudent expenditures and , it does not eliminate risks of underinvestment or operational shortfalls, as regulatory approvals may lag behind technological or market shifts, potentially stifling innovation in a sector prone to excesses under fixed models. The underscores a broader evolution toward regulated interconnectors for , balancing merchant-driven efficiency with enforced reliability standards.

Role in National Energy Integration

Basslink interconnects Tasmania's predominantly hydroelectric generation system with the Victorian transmission network, enabling the seamless integration of Tasmania's renewable output into the (NEM). Tasmania's electricity generation relies on hydroelectric sources for approximately 95% of its supply under normal conditions, with managing storages that allow excess power—up to Basslink's bidirectional capacity of 500 MW export from Tasmania—to flow to the mainland during periods of ample inflows. This linkage positions Tasmania as a net exporter in wet years, supplying dispatchable that complements the NEM's variable wind and solar resources in Victoria and New South Wales by providing flexible, on-demand capacity. The interconnector facilitates energy , where bids Basslink's transport capacity into the to capitalize on price differentials, storing water in dams during low-demand periods and generating for export when mainland wholesale prices peak—often driven by and . This mechanism enhances NEM-wide renewable penetration by effectively leveraging Tasmania's as a large-scale , smoothing supply variability without requiring additional mainland investments in the near term. Notwithstanding these benefits, Basslink's role highlights hydro's vulnerability to hydrological constraints; Tasmania's storages, which underpin exports, have faced depletion during extended dry spells, such as the multi-year intensifying in 2024-2025, forcing imports via the link and reliance on gas-fired to meet local demand. This sensitivity necessitates a diversified NEM approach, prioritizing multiple and storage modalities over over-reliance on weather-dependent exports to mitigate systemic risks. Basslink's capacity suffices for current integration demands through the medium term, but concerns have spurred the , a proposed 1,500 MW HVDC slated for partial operation by July 2029, to parallel Basslink and bolster resilience amid rising renewable shares. The Australian Energy Regulator's June 2025 approval of Basslink's conversion to a regulated service ensures revenue certainty, supporting coordinated planning with Marinus to sustain national cohesion without undue exposure to single-link failures.

References

  1. [1]
    Basslink - APA Group
    Following successful installation and commissioning, dynamic capacity was made available on Basslink for commercial operations from 17th June 2024. APA bids ...
  2. [2]
    [PDF] Inquiry into Hydro Tasmania and the Termination of the Basslink ...
    Jun 17, 2024 · On 20 December 2015, Basslink ceased operations as a result of a fault in the interconnector, approximately 100 kilometres off the Tasmanian ...
  3. [3]
    Financial impact on Hydro Tasmania of response to energy supply ...
    Sep 14, 2017 · Hydro Tasmania estimates that the net cost of responding to the energy supply challenge is between $140 million and $180 million, including an ...Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements
  4. [4]
    [PDF] ANNUAL MARKET PERFORMANCE REVIEW 2016 - Final report
    May 16, 2017 · An investigation into the cause of the Basslink fault, undertaken by Cable Consulting. International, concluded that it was not possible to ...<|separator|>
  5. [5]
    [PDF] UNCORRECTED PROOF ISSUE - Parliament of Tasmania
    Dec 8, 2016 · The Tasmanian Government does not accept Basslink's position on the cause of the cable fault. It is important that we properly understand the ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  6. [6]
    AER accepts application to convert Basslink to regulated service
    Jun 26, 2025 · Basslink is a 500 MW undersea transmission cable that links Loy Yang in Victoria to George Town in Tasmania. It was built in 2006 and acquired ...Missing: bidirectional km
  7. [7]
    Basslink opened by Victorian and Tasmanian premiers
    May 9, 2006 · It is the world's longest undersea electricity cable spanning 360 km across the Bass Strait. The $A780m ($598m) interconnector was ...Missing: length | Show results with:length
  8. [8]
    [PDF] Basslink
    Sep 15, 2023 · Basslink is a 370 km HVDC interconnector connecting Tasmania and Victoria, enhancing security of supply and protecting against energy shortages.
  9. [9]
    [PDF] Revenue - Australian Energy Regulator
    Sep 15, 2023 · Basslink is a 370km long HVDC electricity interconnector between Victoria and Tasmania. ... No increase in the maximum capacity of the Basslink ...
  10. [10]
    Laying the backbone of the world - Prysmian
    Another important project implemented in 2004-2005 was the Basslink, a 500 MW - 450 kV DC submarine cable system of 370 kilometres (of which almost 300 km at ...
  11. [11]
    Installation and operational effects of a HVDC submarine cable in a ...
    This paper describes an investigation into the effects of laying and operating the Basslink High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) cable and its associated metallic ...
  12. [12]
    3 awesome HVDC projects in Australia you should know about | EEP
    Aug 17, 2017 · The Basslink HVDC Interconnector consists of a monopolar metallic return scheme, with a rated DC voltage of 400 kV, a rated DC current of 1250 A ...
  13. [13]
    HVDC and FACTS Go Global - Renewable Energy World
    The nominal power is 500 MW at a DC voltage of 400 kV and a current of 1,250 A. The overload capacity of the transmission system is 600 MW during 10 hours per ...
  14. [14]
    [PDF] Basslink Condition Assessment - Australian Energy Regulator
    Sep 6, 2023 · This is a Basslink Condition Assessment document, issued on 06 September 2023, for the exclusive use of Amplitude's client.Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  15. [15]
    BASSLINK TO BENEFIT TASMANIA, VIC: STUDY - AFR
    Oct 14, 1991 · A feasibility study into the sub-sea power link, dubbed "Basslink", has just been completed by a joint committee from the Tasmanian Hydro- ...
  16. [16]
    Basslink Feasibility Study : environmental and social issues ...
    Basslink Feasibility Study : environmental and social issues ... Tasmania. Hydro-Electric Commission. Copyright: In ... Publication date: 1992. Copyright status may ...
  17. [17]
    [PDF] AUDITOR-GENERAL SPECIAL REPORT No. 80 Hydro hedges May ...
    May 21, 2009 · 29 November 2002 which was the date of financial close. In addition ... wrapped up into the Basslink Facility Fee at financial close.
  18. [18]
    Basslink project blows out by $280 million - ABC News
    Jun 2, 2003 · The cost of Tasmania's Basslink project has blown out by $280 million. State Energy Minister, Paul Lennon told a budget estimates committee.Missing: 2002 | Show results with:2002
  19. [19]
    Basslink cost blow-out - Green Left
    Jul 2, 2003 · Basslink was originally projected to cost $500 million. A number of aspects of the Basslink proposal were controversial. Two of these could ...
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Basslink - Attachment 5 – Regulatory asset base
    Sep 15, 2023 · In any given year, the combined amounts of debt and equity should sum up to the running total opening capital base calculated up to that point ...
  21. [21]
    [PDF] CITYSPRİNG - Infrastructure Trust - Keppel
    The acquisition of Basslink will be financed through a committed senior debt funding package of approximately 75% of the purchase price, as well as a bridge ...
  22. [22]
    [PDF] Electricity Ten Year Statement Appendix E – Technology Sheets ...
    The converter stations were supplied by Siemens and the cables by ABB. Basslink: the link connects Victoria, on the Australian mainland to George Town, Tasmania ...
  23. [23]
    Work begins on massive power cables across Bass Strait - ABC News
    Jun 10, 2004 · Basslink is due to be commissioned by the summer of 2005/2006. Get a morning news briefing in your inbox. Subscribe to our ABC NewsMail ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
  24. [24]
    First Basslink section laid - Modern Power Systems
    Apr 6, 2005 · The Basslink project – worth almost A$800 million ($56m) – will allow Tasmania to export hydro power and give Victoria and South Australia ...
  25. [25]
    [PDF] INTRODUCTION - ResearchGate
    Jun 15, 2003 · Hydro Tasmania is supporting the development of the Basslink cable which will connect Tasmania to the National Energy Grid. Basslink will ...
  26. [26]
    [PDF] Media Statement - Keppel
    Dec 22, 2015 · The Basslink interconnector experienced a fault mid-‐afternoon on Sunday 20 December 2015. While the exact cause of the fault has not been ...
  27. [27]
    Basslink Cable Fault Caused by Force Majeure, CEO Says
    Dec 5, 2016 · The Basslink subsea cable fault that led to the December 2015 outage has been described as 'cause unknown' by the investigating team.
  28. [28]
    Tasmania Solo: A Basslink Story - Australian Energy Council
    Jul 4, 2018 · Recently the 500MW Basslink was offline from 24 March to 5 June. What happened to the Tasmanian electricity market? We take a look.
  29. [29]
    Basslink cable failure investigation - Hydro Tasmania
    Dec 20, 2017 · The Basslink cable failed because it exceeded its design limit due to overheating and cooling, likely from electrical discharge during polarity ...Missing: Geelong Star anchor drag
  30. [30]
    Cause of Basslink cable outage finally revealed - iTnews
    Dec 20, 2017 · The cause of the high-profile Basslink subsea cable failure in late 2015 has finally been identified, after an initial six-month internal investigation.
  31. [31]
    Hydro experts find 'root cause' of Basslink failure | The Mercury
    Dec 20, 2017 · THE failure of the Basslink electricity interconnector in December 2015 was caused by the operators exceeding the power cable's design limit ...
  32. [32]
    Tests fail to pinpoint cause of Basslink cable's failure - ABC News
    May 9, 2016 · Weeks of analysis on the faulty section of Tasmania's Basslink cable has failed to determine the cause of the breakdown.
  33. [33]
    Basslink Interconnector Fault Pinpointed - SubTel Forum
    In simple terms, water got in and damaged the cable – this now needs to be removed. Consequently, an additional mobilisation phase is required in Geelong to ...Missing: Star anchor drag
  34. [34]
    Basslink Still Unsure Where Cable Fault is, Facing 'Phenomenal ...
    “If you've got a submarine cable which is 300 kilometres and you need to fix it it's $100,000 a day for a vessel, minimum,” he said. “The repair costs are ...<|separator|>
  35. [35]
    Weather Beaten: Basslink Repair Finished – After Six Months
    Jun 9, 2016 · The prolonged outage is thought to have cost the island state more than $500 million, according to an energy market analyst. But that count ...
  36. [36]
    Basslink Failure Row Continues - SolarQuotes Blog
    Dec 28, 2017 · ... cause of the Basslink cable failure in December 2015 was due to Basslink Pty Ltd (BPL) exceeding its design limit. “BPL believed its cable ...
  37. [37]
    Electricity price spikes caused by energy companies 'gaming' the ...
    Aug 11, 2016 · Analysis finds fossil fuel generators may have withheld electricity at 'strategic' times and got an additional $30.3m windfall.
  38. [38]
    Failure of Basslink cable revealed - Utility Magazine
    Dec 21, 2017 · Two global experts have found Tasmania's undersea Basslink cable failed because it was run for too long.
  39. [39]
    Basslink operator to pay Tasmanian Govt $38.5m in compensation ...
    Dec 3, 2020 · The arbitrator found in favour of the State and Hydro Tasmania in the disputes, awarding damages of $38.5 million against Basslink. "He further ...
  40. [40]
    Update on Basslink arbitration outcome - Hydro Tasmania
    Oct 27, 2021 · The arbitrator awarded over $70 million to the State and Hydro Tasmania, finding BPL breached the agreement. BPL failed to pay costs, and no ...
  41. [41]
    Basslink put into voluntary administration owing Hydro Tasmania ...
    Nov 11, 2021 · An arbitrator ordered the companies in the Basslink group to pay Tasmania $40m in December last year after finding in favour of the state and ...Missing: 2016-2022 | Show results with:2016-2022
  42. [42]
    Award-Winning Restructuring Deal: Basslink Pty Ltd - FTI Consulting
    Aug 22, 2023 · FTI Consulting operated and successfully sold Basslink Pty Ltd, owner of the critical 370km subsea electricity cable connecting Tasmania to mainland Australia, ...
  43. [43]
    Basslink goes into voluntary administration after failed sale and ...
    Nov 11, 2021 · The companies that own and operate the Basslink undersea power cable between Tasmania and Victoria have been placed into voluntary administration.
  44. [44]
    Basslink collapses after APA Group pulls out of deal - AFR
    Nov 12, 2021 · The debt-ridden Basslink power cable venture has been placed in receivership after a hoped-for sale to pipeline giant APA Group stalled, ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  45. [45]
    APA agrees $773m deal for Basslink - AFR
    Oct 17, 2022 · APA Group has agreed a deal to acquire Basslink – which operates the interconnector between Victoria and Tasmania – from administrators for $773 million.
  46. [46]
    APA to Acquire Basslink - APA Group
    APA Group entered a Deed of Company Arrangement to acquire Basslink and its subsidiary, Basslink Telecoms, after creditors approved the DOCA.
  47. [47]
    Basslink - Determination 2025–30 - Australian Energy Regulator
    On 19 May 2023, APA Group lodged an application: to convert Basslink's network services from market network services to prescribed transmission services ...Draft decision · Proposal · Decision · Decision to amend...
  48. [48]
    AER releases draft decision on Basslink regulation proposal
    Dec 17, 2024 · The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) has released a draft decision not to convert Basslink into a regulated Transmission Network Service Provider (TNSP).
  49. [49]
    Australian Energy Regulator releases its final decision to convert ...
    Jun 26, 2025 · APA applied to the AER in May 2023 to have Basslink converted from a contracted Market Network Service Provider (MNSP) into a regulated asset.
  50. [50]
    AER consults on draft decision for Basslink's transmission revenue ...
    Sep 12, 2025 · On 26 June 2025, we accepted APA Group's application to convert Basslink's services to a prescribed transmission service. Basslink is a 500 MW ...Missing: transition | Show results with:transition
  51. [51]
    Basslink flows shift since end of agreement on 30th June 2025
    Jul 25, 2025 · We gather the network services agreement between APA Group (owner of Basslink) and Hydro Tasmania ended on 30 June 2025.
  52. [52]
    [PDF] Basslink HVDC Interconnector - System Design Considerations
    Additionally, the. HVDC system has a dynamic power transfer capacity of up to. 626 MW from Tasmania to Victoria to meet Victorian peak load demands. 2 Project ...
  53. [53]
    Basslink HVDC interconnector-system design considerations
    Two types of high-voltage direct current (HVDC) technologies, namely, line commutated converters (LCC) and voltage source converters (VSC-HVDC), are described ...
  54. [54]
    Prysmian & Siemens commission HV transmission link in Australia
    It is equipped with a turntable with a capacity of 7,000 tons of high voltage cables and with a capstan machine capable of operating with a pulling tension of ...
  55. [55]
    [PDF] Frequency Operating Standard Submission – Issue 1.0 i - AEMC
    Apr 23, 2008 · Basslink has a minimum power transfer of 50MW due to the minimum hold on characteristic of the thyristor based converters. Viewing Diagram 1 ...Missing: specifications | Show results with:specifications
  56. [56]
    [PDF] HVDC Links in System Operations - entso-e
    Dec 2, 2019 · The East West Interconnector (EWIC) is a 500 MW HVDC link connecting the British and Irish electricity transmission systems. EWIC is owned by ...
  57. [57]
    Prysmian & Siemens commission HV transmission link in Australia
    Prysmian delivered and installed the 295 kilometer ( 180 mile ) long submarine power cable , paper insulated mass impregnated type, 1500 sqmm copper conductor ...
  58. [58]
    Basslink (Australia) - Subsea Cable Protection
    Contractor. Pirelli Cavi e Sistemi Energia SpA./ Asso.subsea Ltd. · Year. 2004 · Cable Diameter. 121mm / 260mm · Trenching Length & Burial Depth. 55 km / DOB 0.5m.
  59. [59]
    [PDF] Interconnector Capabilities - Australian Energy Market Operator
    Sep 25, 2025 · The maximum capability of Basslink for flows from Victoria to Tasmania is 478MW (measured at George Town). Transfers are mainly limited by the ...Missing: bidirectional length km
  60. [60]
    Basslink - Submarine Cable Map
    TeleGeography's comprehensive and regularly updated interactive map of the world's major submarine cable systems and landing stations ... Cable Length298 km ...Missing: route portion
  61. [61]
    History of the Atlantic Cable & Submarine Telegraphy - Cable Timeline
    1.87 Tb/s. Four fiber pairs. As of 2015, after two upgrades, TAT-14 is listed as having a total design capacity of 9.38Tb/s and ...
  62. [62]
    Basslink Pty Ltd - 3 Data Centers - See Locations
    Basslink Telecoms network consists of over 900km of optical fibre cable carrying traffic between Melbourne and Hobart. With 10 Point of Presence (POPs) ...
  63. [63]
    [PDF] Basslink submission - DTCS FAD - ACCC
    Basslink Telecoms Pty Ltd (Basslink Telecoms) is pleased to provide this submission in response to the ACCC Discussion paper for a public enquiry into a final ...
  64. [64]
    APA Group signs agreement with AARNet to deliver improved ...
    Mar 28, 2025 · APA Group and AARNet have signed a partnership agreement under which AARNet will operate the telecommunications services on the Basslink fibre optic ...
  65. [65]
    [PDF] Meeting Network Planning Requirements at George Town
    Nov 29, 2024 · It is the connection point for generation and Basslink, the HVDC interconnector which links the Tasmanian and Victorian networks. It also.Missing: Converter | Show results with:Converter
  66. [66]
    [PDF] Basslink outage and under frequency load shedding in Tasmania on ...
    Mar 12, 2017 · ... Basslink ... in Victoria and George Town in Tasmania using thyristor–based converters with water cooling. The thyristor cooling system ...
  67. [67]
    [PDF] HVDC Transmission Systems - OPAL-RT
    Stringent requirements from the utilities for filtering harmonics,. • Availability of PWM VSC converters at high power and low losses.. Control converter active.
  68. [68]
    https://powersystems.technology/news/basslink-and-siemens-create-new-standard-for-hvdcs-transformer-technology.html
  69. [69]
    [PDF] 2022 Safety Performance Report on Victorian Electricity Networks
    In Victoria, its assets comprise the Loy Yang converter station connected to the 500kV transmission system via 3.2 km of overhead line. From the converter ...
  70. [70]
    [PDF] Basslink- Land Use and Development Controls
    The main components in Victoria are: Approximately 3 km of 500 kV AC overhead transmission line from the switchyard to a converter station.
  71. [71]
    The critical role of the Basslink electricity interconnector - APA Group
    Mar 5, 2024 · Basslink's important role was again demonstrated immediately following the Victorian coal power station, Loy Yang A, going off-line on 13 ...Missing: details | Show results with:details<|separator|>
  72. [72]
    [PDF] Basslink Transmission - Australian Energy Regulator
    The initial agreement with Hydro Tasmania was terminated in 2022, when APA acquired the asset, and replaced with a new agreement that extended the relationship ...
  73. [73]
    [PDF] Control and Protection System Upgrade - Update
    Aug 29, 2025 · Basslink is based on LCC technology. •. Voltage Source Converters (VSC), also referred to as either 'HVDC plus' (Siemens) or 'HVDC light'.Missing: bipole configuration
  74. [74]
    [PDF] Offshore Wind Energy Transmission
    Victoria's largest coal-fired power station, Loy Yang A, will close in 2035, a decade earlier than expected. We urgently need to change our power grid to carry.
  75. [75]
    The Victoria-Tasmania Shore Approach Using Horizontal Directional ...
    The work involved the installation of the landfalls at Seaspray in Victoria and Five Mile Bluff in Tasmania by way of horizontal directional drilling. The ...
  76. [76]
    [PDF] Basslink Optimised Replacement Cost - Australian Energy Regulator
    Amplitude is of the view that undertaking the installation of the cable for the Basslink Modern. Equivalent would most likely have to be done in two, or ...
  77. [77]
    [PDF] ICPC News Release - International Cable Protection Committee
    Dec 22, 2016 · • Off Victoria, in water depths <15 m, the trench and cable were buried by sand and became indistinguishable from the natural seabed within ...Missing: trenching | Show results with:trenching
  78. [78]
    [PDF] Feasibility of a second Tasmanian interconnector - Energy.gov.au
    This report investigated a 600 MW transfer capacity of second Bass Strait interconnector. A feasible option to transfer 600 megawatts (MW) over about 300 km ...
  79. [79]
    Tasmania could cut its energy bills by prioritising household ... - IEEFA
    Mar 28, 2024 · Tasmania is already benefiting from electricity trading with the mainland using its existing Basslink interconnector, which allows it to ...
  80. [80]
    Basslink failure has cost Tasmanian economy $560 million to date
    Jun 2, 2016 · Basslink failure has cost Tasmanian economy $560 million to date ... Tasmania, even without the Basslink failure. Victorian gas saviour.
  81. [81]
    Tassie energy crisis could cost island state more than $400m - AFR
    Apr 5, 2016 · Tasmania's energy crisis could cost the tiny island state more than $400 million, a leading energy expert has warned.
  82. [82]
    Hit from Basslink power cable failure $560m and rising: EnergyQuest
    Jun 2, 2016 · The highest previous estimate of the economic impact of the outage was a $400 million back-of-the-envelope estimate from Brisbane-based energy ...
  83. [83]
    Basslink subsea cable outage caused by exceeding design limit
    Dec 19, 2017 · The Basslink subsea cable outage of 2015-16 was caused by Basslink (BPL) exceeding its design limit, which then degraded the cable, according to reports by two ...
  84. [84]
    Basslink: a 'waste of public money' - Green Left
    Sep 4, 2002 · Basslink is controversial, however, because the company constructing it will secure a guaranteed profit while the substantial risk will be borne ...Missing: privatization revenue gains
  85. [85]
    https://tasfintalk.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-case-for-basslink.html
  86. [86]
    Tasmania questions whether Marinus Link "stacks up" as project ...
    Aug 7, 2023 · News of “material and significant” cost increases for Marinus Link cause Tasmania to revisit its support for the project.
  87. [87]
    Marinus Link remains viable despite costs topping $5B
    Jul 11, 2025 · An updated cost-benefit analysis of Project Marinus has revealed construction costs will now total more than $5 billion dollars.Missing: doubts | Show results with:doubts
  88. [88]
    How to value transmission? Why Marinus has less chance of ...
    Mar 11, 2022 · Basslink cost $750 million and, if we assume a 6% cost of capital and that operating and maintenance costs are 20% of total costs, we then we ...Missing: repair | Show results with:repair
  89. [89]
    AER approves application for Basslink to be converted into a ...
    Jun 26, 2025 · APA Group acquired Basslink in October 2022, and submitted an application in late 2023 to transition its operations to a regulated service.
  90. [90]
    Green light for Basslink conversion - Energy Magazine
    Jun 26, 2025 · APA expects that Basslink will operate as a regulated asset from July 2026. In the interim, APA will trade Basslink on the electricity spot ...Missing: capacity MW bidirectional km date
  91. [91]
    Draft decision: Revenue determination - Australian Energy Regulator
    Sep 12, 2025 · On 12 September 2025 we published our draft decision on APA Group's transmission revenue proposal for Basslink for the 2026–30 regulatory ...
  92. [92]
    AER releases draft determination on Basslink - Listcorp
    Sep 12, 2025 · APA submitted its initial revenue proposal in September 2023 and made subsequent updates in August 2025 following extensive stakeholder ...
  93. [93]
    [PDF] AER - Basslink Electricity Transmission Determination 2026 to 2030 ...
    Sep 12, 2025 · Our transmission determination imposes control over revenues that a transmission network service provider (TNSP) can recover from its ...
  94. [94]
    PHES in Tasmania: AER approves Basslink conversion in Australia
    Jun 27, 2025 · The Basslink interconnector is a 500MW high-voltage direct current (HVDC), 370km interconnector stretching from the Loy Yang Power Station ...Missing: length | Show results with:length<|separator|>
  95. [95]
    Basslink gets all-clear to become regulated asset, in change of heart ...
    Jun 26, 2025 · A bid to convert the Basslink undersea cable that links Tasmania to Australia's mainland grid into a regulated transmission asset has been approved.
  96. [96]
    https://www.hydro.com.au/docs/default-source/clean-energy/battery-of-the-nation/unlocking-tasmania%27s-energy-capacity_december-2018.pdf
  97. [97]
    [PDF] Battery of the Nation - Australian Renewable Energy Agency
    A range of studies show that variable renewable energy such as wind and solar are likely to be the lowest cost energy source in the future NEM, and that energy ...
  98. [98]
    Tasmania's renewable energy boast looking shaky with fossil fuels ...
    posing a threat to the state's claim of being "100 per cent ...
  99. [99]
    Hydro Tasmania says state is in 'worst multi-season drought' in ...
    Aug 28, 2025 · Tasmania has been importing more electricity than it sends out via Basslink and the Tamar Valley gas-fired power plant has been booted up to ...
  100. [100]
    [PDF] 2024 Electricity Statement of Opportunities
    Aug 2, 2024 · The purpose of this publication is to provide technical and market data that informs the decision-making processes of market.