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Climate security

Climate security refers to the effects of climate change on national and international security, encompassing risks to infrastructure, political stability, alliances, and the potential for increased political violence or conflict exacerbation. Defined in U.S. law under 50 USC § 3060, it highlights how observed climatic shifts—such as accelerated Arctic warming at four times the global average and thawing permafrost threatening military installations—can amplify vulnerabilities in strategic regions like Alaska, where six bases and 49 National Guard posts face degradation.^[1]^[2] The concept gained prominence in U.S. defense policy following directives from the Secretary of Defense in 2021, integrating climate considerations into strategies via assessments like the Department of Defense Climate Adaptation Plan, which addresses geostrategic risks such as resource competition and operational disruptions from extreme weather.^[3] Empirical analyses frame climate change primarily as a "threat multiplier," intensifying existing stressors like poverty and weak governance rather than directly causing conflicts; for instance, reduced agricultural yields in the Sahel have heightened farmer-herder tensions affecting 50 million livelihoods, but outcomes depend heavily on local institutions and socio-economic factors.^[4]^[5] Studies across regions like West Africa and South Asia reveal sparse direct causal links to violence, with evidence indicating that governance failures and economic conditions mediate any climate-security interactions more than climatic variables alone.^[6]^[7] Notable achievements include military adaptations, such as U.S. Department of Defense tools for climate risk assessment and collaborative exercises with partners to build resilience against transboundary threats like wildfires and sea-level rise.^[8] Controversies persist over securitization, with critics arguing it risks militarizing environmental issues or overstating causal chains amid mixed evidence; for example, the UN Security Council's 2021 failure to adopt a resolution designating climate change as a direct threat to peace underscores debates on its appropriate institutional role, as opposed to development-focused responses.^[9]^[10] This framing has prompted policy shifts, including North American defense ministerial commitments to climate resilience, yet empirical reviews emphasize that prioritizing adaptive governance over alarmist narratives yields more robust security outcomes.^[11]^[12] ![Army-green gets greener, USARPAC Soldiers test clean energy sources during RIMPAC][float-right]

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Core Concepts

Climate security refers to the effects of climate change on national security infrastructure, political stability at subnational, national, and regional levels, the security of international allies and partners, and the incidence or potential for political violence. This definition, codified in U.S. law under 50 USC § 3060, underscores a focus on observable impacts rather than speculative projections, distinguishing it from broader environmental security by emphasizing anthropogenic climate shifts as a systemic stressor.^[1] A foundational concept is the "threat multiplier," which posits that climate change does not independently cause conflicts but exacerbates underlying vulnerabilities such as weak governance, resource scarcity, and socioeconomic tensions. Originating in a 2007 report by the Center for Naval Analyses, this framing has been adopted by U.S. military assessments to describe how events like droughts or floods can intensify existing risks, as seen in heightened competition over water and arable land in fragile states.^[13]^[14] Core concepts encompass direct physical threats to security assets—such as erosion of coastal military bases from sea-level rise or disruptions to operations from extreme weather—and indirect pathways, including forced migration, livelihood losses, and strains on food, water, and energy supplies that can undermine societal stability. These effects are characterized as non-linear and multidimensional, involving interactions across political, economic, and ecological domains, though empirical linkages remain contested in scope and causality. Human security framings prioritize resilience in vulnerable populations, contrasting with national security views centered on defense readiness and geopolitical positioning.^[15]^[16]^[1]

Historical Development

The discourse on environmental security, which laid the groundwork for climate security, originated in the 1970s amid concerns over resource scarcity and conflict, with early analyses linking environmental stress to geopolitical tensions in works like those from the Club of Rome and subsequent policy debates.^[17] By the 1990s, climate change entered national security frameworks, as evidenced by the U.S. National Security Strategy under President George H.W. Bush in 1991, which explicitly recognized global warming as a potential threat to stability through disruptions in agriculture, water, and ecosystems.^[18] A pivotal shift occurred in the early 2000s with military assessments framing climate impacts as strategic risks. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense commissioned a study on abrupt climate change, published in 2004, projecting scenarios of mega-droughts, famine, and resource wars that could destabilize regions like Europe and the Middle East, emphasizing rapid shifts over gradual warming.^[18] This report, leaked to media, amplified internal Pentagon discussions on climate as a "threat multiplier"—a concept formalized in 2007 by a U.S. military advisory panel under the CNA Corporation, which argued that climate change would exacerbate existing vulnerabilities in fragile states, such as water disputes in the Middle East and migration pressures in sub-Saharan Africa, without being a primary driver of conflict.^[19] International institutionalization accelerated in 2007 when the United Kingdom initiated the first United Nations Security Council debate on climate change, peace, and security, where 50 member states discussed its role in amplifying risks like food insecurity and displacement, though consensus was limited by objections from developing nations viewing it as a development rather than security issue.^[20] Subsequent milestones included the 2009 UN General Assembly resolution linking climate to international peace, U.S. National Security Strategy integrations under the Obama administration in 2010 and 2015 treating climate as a core risk, and repeated UNSC debates in 2011, 2019, and beyond, reflecting growing but contested securitization amid empirical debates over causal strength.^[21] By the 2020s, frameworks like the EU's 2021 Climate Security Strategy and U.S. DoD directives embedded climate risk assessments into planning, driven by observed events such as the 2018 Syrian drought's indirect conflict linkages, though critics argue this framing risks overemphasizing climate amid dominant socioeconomic drivers.^[22]

Empirical Evidence

Direct Impacts on Conflict and Instability

A systematic review of 55 empirical studies on climate and armed conflict found that a majority reported positive associations between climatic variables, such as temperature anomalies and precipitation deviations, and higher levels of violent conflict, though results varied by conflict type, region, and time scale.^[23] These associations are often interpreted as direct impacts when extreme weather events acutely disrupt local stability, such as through immediate resource competition or heightened aggression linked to heat stress.^[24] However, establishing strict direct causation remains challenging due to confounding socioeconomic factors, with many analyses relying on statistical correlations rather than experimental controls.^[25] Elevated temperatures have been associated with increased interpersonal violence and, at larger scales, civil conflict risk. For instance, a study of African countries from 1981 to 2002 estimated that a 1°C warming above mean temperatures raised the probability of civil war onset by approximately 2.3 percentage points annually in the subsequent year.^[26] Laboratory and field experiments support a direct physiological mechanism, where heat exacerbates human aggression via reduced cognitive control and impulse inhibition, potentially scaling to group-level instability in fragile settings.^[24] In sub-Saharan Africa, interannual temperature variations explained up to 20-30% of observed conflict variance in some econometric models, independent of economic growth or institutional quality controls.^[27] Precipitation extremes, particularly droughts, show similar patterns in direct disruption. Analyses of global data from 1960 to 2000 indicated that rapid-onset dry spells increased the likelihood of civil conflict by 6-11% in agriculturally dependent societies with weak governance.^[28] In the Sahel region, the 1970s-1980s Sahelian drought correlated with a spike in pastoralist-farmer clashes, where water scarcity directly fueled over 200 documented violent incidents annually by the mid-1980s, as herders encroached on settled lands.^[29] Flood events have likewise triggered short-term instability; post-1998 Cyclone in India, affected districts saw a 15% rise in rioting within months, attributed to immediate displacement and property loss.^[30] Case-specific evidence underscores these patterns but highlights conditionality. The 2011 East Africa drought, exacerbating famine in Somalia, directly contributed to clan-based violence escalation, with conflict events doubling from 2010 levels amid resource grabs, as documented in Uppsala Conflict Data Program records.^[31] Similarly, in Pakistan's 2010 floods, inundating 20% of farmland, immediate looting and vigilante actions surged by 25% in relief distribution areas, per incident reports from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.^[32] These instances suggest direct impacts are most pronounced in low-capacity states where rapid environmental shocks overwhelm adaptive institutions, though long-term trends dominate overall risk profiles.^[33]

Indirect Effects via Resources and Migration

Climate variability, including prolonged droughts and erratic rainfall, can diminish renewable resources like freshwater and arable land, intensifying competition in regions with high population densities and limited governance capacity. Empirical analyses indicate that such scarcity contributes to conflict risks primarily when interacting with preexisting vulnerabilities, such as ethnic fractionalization or economic dependence on subsistence agriculture; a systematic review of 69 peer-reviewed studies found positive associations between climate-induced resource stress and civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, though direct causality remains contested due to confounding factors like political instability.^[23]^[24] Sharp spikes in global food prices, often exacerbated by climate-driven crop failures, have historically correlated with social unrest. During the 2007–2008 crisis, droughts in key producing regions like Australia and the Black Sea area contributed to wheat prices surging 130% and rice prices tripling, sparking riots and protests in over 30 countries including Egypt, Haiti, and Côte d'Ivoire, where urban poor faced acute affordability crises.^[34]^[35] A subsequent spike in 2010–2011, linked to La Niña-induced floods and droughts in Pakistan and Russia, saw food prices rise 30–50% above 2008 peaks, fueling instability in the Middle East and North Africa, including contributing to preconditions for the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.^[36] These events underscore how resource shocks amplify grievances in import-dependent, low-income states, though econometric models attribute only 10–20% of price volatility to weather anomalies, with speculation and policy failures playing larger roles.^[37] Climate-related displacement, encompassing internal migration from floods, droughts, and gradual sea-level rise, can indirectly heighten security risks by overwhelming host communities' resources and exacerbating intergroup tensions. In 2022, weather hazards triggered 32 million internal displacements globally, a 41% increase from 2008 levels, predominantly in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where migrants compete for water, jobs, and shelter in urban peripheries.^[38] Studies in the Sahel region document how drought-induced rural-to-urban migration strains social cohesion, with empirical models showing a 1% rise in migrant inflows correlating to 0.5–1% increases in local violence incidence when combined with weak state presence.^[39] Projections for sea-level rise, expected to reach 0.7 meters by 2100 under median scenarios, anticipate displacing up to 47 million people from low-lying coastal zones in Bangladesh, Vietnam, and small island states, potentially sparking resource disputes over remaining fertile land.^[40] However, longitudinal data reveal that while acute events like cyclones displace millions temporarily—e.g., Cyclone Amphan in 2020 uprooted 2.4 million in Bangladesh—net out-migration remains low, and conflict linkages are mediated by adaptation failures rather than displacement alone; reviews find no consistent evidence that flooding boosts long-term mobility or violence without institutional breakdowns.^[41] In peripheral areas of the Global South, such migrations have escalated intergroup violence over scarce renewables when state mediation is absent, as seen in pastoralist-farmer clashes in East Africa amplified by erratic rains.^[42]^[43]

Data Limitations and Statistical Debates

Empirical studies linking climate variability to conflict face significant data limitations, including coarse spatial and temporal resolutions that aggregate diverse local conditions and obscure causal mechanisms. For instance, many analyses rely on grid-cell data spanning thousands of square kilometers and annual or decadal averages, which fail to capture subnational variations in vulnerability or conflict onset driven by localized weather events. This aggregation bias can inflate or mask apparent relationships, as demonstrated in sensitivity tests where finer-scale data altered conclusions about climate-conflict links. Similarly, conflict datasets, often derived from event-based reporting like the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, suffer from underreporting in remote or unstable regions, introducing measurement error that correlates with climate-impacted areas.^[44]^[45] Long-term historical data, while extending analyses back centuries, introduce additional challenges such as inconsistent proxies for climate (e.g., tree rings or sediment cores) and conflict (e.g., qualitative chronicles prone to hindsight bias), limiting robust inference on modern anthropogenic trends. Recent reviews highlight gaps in integrated datasets that combine biophysical, socioeconomic, and conflict variables, with insufficient longitudinal coverage in fragile states where interactions might be most pronounced. Moreover, endogeneity persists: climate shocks may correlate with conflict not causally but through omitted variables like weak governance, as evidenced by studies controlling for institutional quality that diminish climate coefficients to statistical insignificance.^[46]^[24] Statistical debates center on the fragility of reported associations, with meta-analyses revealing that effect sizes for climate on violence are small (often <1% risk increase per degree warming) and context-specific, failing to replicate across regions or conflict types. Critics, including Halvard Buhaug, argue that early findings of robust links (e.g., in sub-Saharan Africa) evaporate under alternative specifications, such as fixed effects for country-year or lagged variables, suggesting reverse causality or spurious correlation rather than direct influence. Proponents counter with multi-method approaches showing heightened risks post-disasters in low-capacity settings, yet acknowledge that climate explains minimal variance compared to socioeconomic drivers, with odds ratios rarely exceeding 1.1-1.5. These inconsistencies underscore debates over model selection—e.g., linear vs. nonlinear responses—and the overreliance on p-values without effect size reporting, prompting calls for preregistered replications and causal inference techniques like instrumental variables.^[47]^[48]^[49]^[50] Attribution challenges further complicate debates, as disentangling climate from confounders requires quasi-experimental designs often infeasible due to data scarcity; for example, synthetic controls or difference-in-differences applied to drought events yield mixed results, with positive associations in agrarian societies but null elsewhere. Peer-reviewed critiques emphasize that while temperature extremes correlate with interpersonal violence (e.g., assaults rising 0.2-2% per standard deviation anomaly), extrapolation to interstate or civil wars lacks empirical support, with variance decomposition attributing <5% of conflict risk to climate in global panels from 1960-2020. These limitations have led to policy brief recommendations for qualitative case studies and disaggregated data to bridge quantitative gaps, rather than overgeneralizing aggregate correlations.^[24]^[51]^[52]

Alternative Causal Factors

Socioeconomic and Governance Drivers

Low per capita income emerges as one of the strongest structural predictors of civil war onset, with empirical analyses of conflicts from 1945 to 1999 showing that countries with GDP per capita below approximately $1,000 face significantly elevated risks compared to wealthier states, independent of climatic variables.^[53] This socioeconomic vulnerability facilitates insurgency by limiting state capacity for counterinsurgency and providing recruitment pools amid economic grievances, rather than through direct environmental stressors.^[54] Weak governance institutions, including low bureaucratic quality, high corruption, and unstable political systems, further amplify conflict propensity by undermining effective resource allocation and grievance resolution.^[55] Cross-national studies indicate that improvements in rule of law and government effectiveness correlate with reduced civil war incidence, as robust institutions deter rebellion by enhancing accountability and service delivery.^[56] In post-conflict settings, persistent poor governance—marked by ethnic favoritism or elite capture—elevates recurrence risks, explaining patterns in regions like sub-Saharan Africa where institutional deficits outweigh climatic fluctuations as explanatory factors.^[57] Comparative assessments underscore that socioeconomic underdevelopment and governance failures account for the bulk of variation in armed conflict onset, with climate variability showing negligible predictive power when controlling for these variables; for instance, African civil wars from 1980 onward align more closely with low development indices and political instability than rainfall or temperature anomalies.^[48] Strong civil society networks, indicative of better horizontal governance, also mitigate onset by providing non-violent channels for mobilization, as evidenced in quantitative models spanning multiple decades.^[58] These drivers highlight causal priorities rooted in human systems over exogenous environmental shocks, informing security analyses that prioritize institutional reforms over climate-centric narratives.^[59]

Geopolitical and Institutional Influences

Geopolitical rivalries among major powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia, serve as primary drivers of international conflicts through competition over strategic territories, alliances, and economic dominance, often independent of environmental variables. For instance, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine stemmed from longstanding disputes over NATO expansion, historical territorial claims, and regional influence, with energy resource control exacerbating but not originating the confrontation. Similarly, tensions in the South China Sea arise from overlapping sovereignty assertions and military posturing by claimant states, where fossil fuel reserves and maritime routes motivate escalation more than climate variability.^[60] Empirical analyses indicate that such rivalries suppress interstate cooperation and elevate militarization risks, with data from 1816–2007 showing enduring strategic competitions correlating with higher war probabilities than resource scarcity alone. These dynamics persist across eras, as seen in Cold War proxy conflicts driven by ideological and power-balancing motives rather than ecological pressures.^[61] Institutional factors, including the strength of governance structures, rule of law, and accountability mechanisms, exert a robust influence on domestic stability, outperforming climatic stressors in predictive models of civil war onset. Cross-national studies from 1946 to 2008 demonstrate that countries with high institutional quality—measured by indices of corruption control, bureaucratic effectiveness, and democratic constraints—experience civil war incidences rates up to 50% lower than those with weak institutions, even under comparable environmental stresses.^[56]^[62] Poor institutional environments mediate potential climate-security links by undermining adaptive capacity and fostering grievance amplification; for example, in sub-Saharan Africa, governance failures in resource allocation and conflict resolution account for instability patterns more than drought or temperature anomalies, as weak states fail to equitably distribute aid or enforce property rights during shocks.^[63] This causal primacy holds in panel data regressions controlling for climatic variables, where institutional variables retain significant negative coefficients on conflict risk.^[64] International institutions, such as the United Nations and regional bodies, can either mitigate or exacerbate geopolitical tensions depending on enforcement credibility; however, their uneven application—evident in veto powers blocking resolutions on territorial aggressions—highlights how power asymmetries within these bodies perpetuate instability over addressing root institutional deficits.^[65]

Critiques and Controversies

Weak Causal Evidence and Threat Multiplier Fallacy

Empirical analyses of historical data reveal only weak and inconsistent causal relationships between climate variables, such as temperature anomalies or precipitation variability, and the onset or intensity of violent conflicts. For instance, large-scale studies across Africa and Asia have concluded that climate variability serves as a poor predictor of armed conflict, with political and socioeconomic factors providing far stronger explanatory power.^[66] Similarly, assessments of drought and temperature extremes as drivers of asylum migration—often linked to conflict precursors—demonstrate these factors as marginal predictors when controlling for governance and economic conditions.^[67] Even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) acknowledges that while climate change may indirectly elevate vulnerability in conflict-prone areas, the evidence for direct causation remains limited, with effects dwarfed by dominant drivers like inequality and institutional fragility.^[68] The "threat multiplier" paradigm, popularized in U.S. military assessments since a 2007 CNA Corporation report, posits that climate change amplifies preexisting security risks through resource scarcity or displacement, potentially escalating conflicts nonlinearly. However, quantitative reviews challenge this as an overstatement, finding climate impacts additive at best and negligible in multivariate models of conflict risk, rather than multiplicative. Critics argue this framing persists despite evidence gaps due to institutional incentives in academia and policy, where alarmist narratives secure funding and influence, even as rigorous causal inference—employing techniques like instrumental variables or synthetic controls—fails to substantiate amplification beyond baseline trends.^[68] For example, post-2000 datasets on intrastate wars show no robust uptick attributable to climatic stressors when isolating from governance failures.^[69] This evidentiary shortfall underscores a broader methodological issue: many pro-causation studies suffer from endogeneity, omitting key confounders like ethnic tensions or state capacity, leading to inflated effect sizes in media and UN reports. Mainstream outlets and international bodies, often aligned with precautionary worldviews, amplify selective findings while downplaying null results, as seen in the IPCC's own internal debates over confidence levels in conflict projections.^[70] Consequently, securitizing climate overlooks more proximate threats, diverting analytical focus from empirically dominant factors.

Securitization Risks and Policy Distortions

The securitization of climate change, which frames environmental shifts as existential threats akin to military aggression, carries inherent risks of amplifying perceived dangers beyond empirical warrant, potentially fostering alarmist policies that prioritize short-term interventions over long-term resilience. Critics argue this approach exaggerates climate's causal role in instability, drawing parallels to historical securitizations like the "war on drugs" that led to overreach without proportional threat mitigation.^[71] ^[72] For example, portraying climate as a "threat multiplier" has prompted calls for militarized responses, yet empirical analyses show weak direct linkages to conflict onset, risking the sidelining of proven governance reforms.^[73] This framing, often advanced by institutions with incentives to expand mandates, can erode public trust when predictions fail to materialize, as seen in unfulfilled forecasts of climate-induced mass migrations or wars by dates like 2020.^[74] Policy distortions arise when securitization elevates climate agendas within security budgets, diverting funds from immediate threats like great-power rivalry. In the United States, the Department of Defense's 2021 Climate Adaptation Plan committed resources to greening bases and supply chains, with fiscal year 2022 allocations exceeding $2 billion for energy resilience projects, amid critiques that such expenditures compromise warfighting readiness by favoring unproven technologies over reliable fossil fuels.^[75] Similarly, NATO's 2021 strategic concept integrated climate as a defining challenge, prompting member states to reorient military R&D toward low-carbon systems, which analysts contend increases vulnerability to supply disruptions in contested environments.^[76] These shifts reflect a broader pattern where securitized narratives justify subsidies for intermittent renewables—totaling over $7 trillion globally in climate finance since 2015—often yielding higher costs and lower reliability, as evidenced by Germany's Energiewende policy, which raised energy prices by 50% from 2010 to 2020 while failing to reduce emissions proportionally.^[77] ^[78] Securitization further distorts by conflating symptoms with root causes, promoting top-down interventions that neglect local adaptation capacities and exacerbate inequalities. In development aid, this has led to misallocated climate finance, with multilateral banks directing 80% of funds in low-income countries toward mitigation projects like solar farms rather than resilient agriculture, despite evidence that socioeconomic factors drive 70-90% of vulnerability variance.^[78] ^[79] Such policies, critiqued for favoring elite-driven technocracy over decentralized solutions, risk entrenching dependency; for instance, securitized frames in the UN Security Council have spurred resolutions like 2349 (2017) on Sahel instability, yet subsequent aid packages emphasized climate monitoring over anti-corruption measures, correlating with persistent conflict escalation.^[80] Ultimately, these distortions undermine causal realism by subordinating evidence-based threat prioritization to narrative imperatives, potentially weakening overall security postures against verifiable adversaries.^[81]

Economic Trade-offs of Climate-Centric Approaches

Climate-centric approaches to security, which prioritize mitigation and adaptation measures as existential threats, impose substantial opportunity costs by diverting resources from interventions with higher returns on human welfare and stability. Analyses by the Copenhagen Consensus Center, drawing on Nobel laureates' cost-benefit evaluations, indicate that expenditures on aggressive greenhouse gas reductions yield benefits dwarfed by investments in areas like malnutrition reduction, education, and disease control, which enhance societal resilience more effectively against both climate and non-climate risks.^[82] For instance, the expert panel ranked optimal climate research and adaptation spending far below priorities such as expanding access to clean water and sanitation, estimating that reallocating funds could deliver 50 times greater welfare gains per dollar spent.^[83] Pursuing net-zero emissions by mid-century exemplifies these trade-offs, with global implementation projected to require $9-12 trillion in annual incremental investments through 2050, encompassing subsidies, infrastructure overhauls, and technology deployments, while yielding temperature reductions of only 0.1-0.3°C by 2100 under optimistic scenarios.^[84] Economic modeling by Bjørn Lomborg, informed by integrated assessment models, pegs the per capita cost at over $4,000 annually across the century, far exceeding the discounted value of avoided damages, which remain below 3% of GDP even under high-emission pathways.^[85] In security terms, such fiscal burdens strain national budgets, potentially curtailing defense modernization or economic growth needed for geopolitical deterrence; Europe's experience illustrates this, where pre-2022 commitments to phase out nuclear and coal power contributed to energy price volatility, with wholesale electricity averaging €250/MWh in 2022 versus €50/MWh in 2020, eroding industrial competitiveness and fiscal space for security outlays.^[86] For developing nations, climate-centric mandates exacerbate trade-offs by constraining access to affordable fossil fuels essential for industrialization and poverty alleviation, where per capita energy consumption lags far behind developed economies. Brookings Institution analysis argues that imposing near-term net-zero timelines on low-income countries risks perpetuating energy poverty, as alternatives like intermittent renewables currently fail to match baseload reliability without massive subsidies, hindering GDP growth rates needed to stabilize societies against unrest.^[87] Empirical data from sub-Saharan Africa show that fossil fuel expansion has historically correlated with electrification gains—lifting 800 million from energy poverty since 2000—yet securitized climate policies via international aid conditionality prioritize green transitions, diverting funds from infrastructure that could bolster food security and migration controls more directly.^[88] Military applications of climate-centric strategies further highlight inefficiencies, as allocations for "green" bases, electric vehicles, and resilience planning compete with conventional capabilities amid rising peer threats. The U.S. Department of Defense's 2024 Climate Adaptation Plan outlines billions in forthcoming expenditures for climate-proofing installations, yet critics note these overlook opportunity costs: for every dollar shifted to solar microgrids or emissions tracking, resources are unavailable for cyber defenses or munitions stockpiles, where return on investment in deterring aggression exceeds speculative adaptation gains.^[89] Integrated assessments suggest that while climate impacts may elevate operational costs by 1-4% of defense budgets by 2050, prioritizing mitigation over adaptive flexibility—such as diversified supply chains—could amplify vulnerabilities if economic slowdowns from policy-induced recessions reduce overall funding.^[90]

Policy Responses

International Mechanisms

The United Nations Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), established in 2018 by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and UN Development Programme (UNDP), integrates climate considerations into peace and security efforts across UN mandates.^[91] It advances peace-positive climate action, catalyzes climate-informed peace and security approaches, and builds evidence on climate-security linkages through tools like risk assessments and the Conceptual Approach for systematic analysis.^[92] In 2024, the CSM supported over 20 country-level initiatives, including early warning systems and resilience-building in fragile states, while forging partnerships with regional actors.^[93] The UN Security Council has addressed climate-security intersections through debates and country-specific resolutions, recognizing climate change as a "threat multiplier" that exacerbates vulnerabilities in conflict-prone areas, such as in resolutions on the Sahel (e.g., Resolution 2480 in 2019) and Lake Chad Basin (Resolution 2349 in 2017).^[94] By 2023, the Council had issued over 70 resolutions and presidential statements referencing climate-related peace and security implications, though it has not adopted a standalone resolution defining climate change as a direct threat to international peace and security.^[68] A 2021 draft resolution to integrate climate risks into Council considerations failed due to vetoes, reflecting divisions over expanding its mandate beyond armed conflicts.^[95]^[9] Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), established in 1992, mechanisms emphasize mitigation and adaptation to reduce indirect security risks from climate impacts, with the Paris Agreement (2015) committing nearly 200 parties to nationally determined contributions for emissions reductions and resilience-building.^[96]^[97] The Agreement's adaptation provisions support vulnerable nations through finance and technology transfer, potentially mitigating resource scarcities linked to instability, though it lacks explicit security framing.^[98] Complementary efforts include the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace (2023), endorsed by over 50 countries, which urges integration of climate resilience into humanitarian and peacebuilding responses in conflict-affected regions.^[99] NATO's Climate Change and Security Action Plan, adopted in 2021, mainstreams climate risks into alliance doctrine, including enhanced environmental intelligence and adaptation for military operations amid projected increases in extreme weather affecting deployments.^[100] The 2024 Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment evaluates threats like melting permafrost impacting infrastructure and rising sea levels altering maritime domains, informing the 2022 Strategic Concept's recognition of climate as a defining challenge.^[101] NATO's Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, established in Montreal, facilitates multinational training and research on these dynamics.^[102] These mechanisms, while advancing awareness, face implementation gaps due to varying national capacities and debates over causal attributions between climate variability and security outcomes.^[103]

National and Military Adaptations

National governments have increasingly incorporated climate risk assessments into security planning to mitigate potential disruptions from environmental changes. In the United States, over 20 federal agencies released updated climate adaptation plans in June 2024, expanding efforts to address vulnerabilities in infrastructure, operations, and supply chains that could affect national security.^[104] Germany has prioritized climate as a collective global security factor in drafting its National Security Strategy, emphasizing integrated risk management across policy domains.^[105] The U.S. Department of Defense's 2024-2027 Climate Adaptation Plan focuses on ensuring operational continuity amid projected increases in extreme weather, such as 7 to 10 times more high-heat days by 2050 under moderate to high emissions scenarios and exposure of 7% of buildings to sea-level rise by 2085.^[89] It structures adaptations around five lines of effort: integrating climate data into decision-making via tools like the DOD Climate Assessment Tool with $3.1 billion allocated in FY 2023 for resilience projects; preparing a climate-ready force through specialized training such as wildland fire academies and equipment testing for heat and precipitation effects; hardening infrastructure with measures like building elevations and $5 million in 2024 for nature-based solutions; bolstering supply chain resilience for critical materials like microelectronics; and enhancing international partnerships, including the International Climate and Energy Security Forum.^[89] Concrete actions include $3 billion for rebuilding Camp Lejeune after Hurricane Florence in 2018 and pilot nature-based projects at Tyndall Air Force Base to counter wildfire and flood risks.^[89] Militaries in NATO member states are adapting to operational challenges from climate variability, including equipment degradation, disrupted training due to permafrost thaw and coastal flooding, and heightened health risks from extremes.^[106] NATO's 2022 Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment recommends equipping forces for intensified heat and cold, adopting sustainable technologies like alternative fuels and smart energy systems, and embedding climate projections into doctrine, procurement, and infrastructure resilience planning to maintain deterrence and defense capabilities.^[106] These measures aim to address both direct threats to assets and indirect effects like resource scarcity potentially exacerbating geopolitical tensions.^[106]

Adaptation Strategies and Resilience Building

Adaptation strategies in climate security focus on enhancing the capacity of military installations, critical infrastructure, and national systems to withstand and recover from climate-related disruptions, such as extreme weather events that could impair operational readiness or supply chains. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) integrates climate risk assessments into planning and decision-making as directed by the National Defense Strategy, prioritizing resilience measures like hazard identification and implementation of protective infrastructure upgrades.^[89] These efforts address vulnerabilities observed in events like the 2018 Camp Pendleton wildfires and Hurricane Florence, which damaged facilities and disrupted training.^[89] Military resilience building includes retrofitting bases with elevated structures, advanced drainage systems, and renewable energy sources to mitigate risks from sea-level rise, flooding, and energy supply interruptions. DoD Directive 4715.21, issued in 2025, mandates improvements in installation resilience, including collaboration with allies to develop shared capabilities against climate hazards.^[107] Natural infrastructure solutions, such as wetlands restoration and forested buffers, have been employed under the Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative (REPI) to reduce flood risks and enhance recovery times, with investments emphasizing cost-effective, ecosystem-based adaptations over purely engineered barriers.^[108] At the national level, adaptation targets critical functions like energy, transportation, and food supply, employing strategies such as supply chain diversification and infrastructure hardening to counter potential climate-induced scarcities. RAND Corporation assessments identify tailored actions, including microgrid deployments for energy security and predictive modeling for transport disruptions, drawn from risk evaluations of chronic stressors like drought.^[109] The 2024 U.S. Framework for Climate Resilience and Security advocates investing in resilient supply chains and physical installations, with federal funding supporting local implementations to avoid over-reliance on vulnerable centralized systems.^[110] Partnerships between military entities and civilian communities further bolster resilience by aligning adaptation plans, such as joint vulnerability assessments that incorporate off-base natural solutions to protect adjacent ecosystems critical for base operations.^[111] These approaches emphasize iterative updates to strategies based on evolving climate data, recognizing that while empirical links between climate variability and direct security threats remain context-specific, proactive hardening reduces cascading risks from localized events.^[112]

Case Studies

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa faces acute climate vulnerabilities due to its heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture, which accounts for over 60% of employment and 25% of GDP in many countries, making the region susceptible to droughts, erratic rainfall, and floods that exacerbate food insecurity and livelihood stresses.^[113] Empirical analyses indicate that while temperature rises of approximately 1°C since pre-industrial levels have contributed to yield declines in staple crops like maize by 5-10% per decade in parts of East Africa, these impacts are compounded by non-climatic factors such as soil degradation, limited irrigation infrastructure, and rapid population growth exceeding 2.5% annually.^[114] Security implications arise primarily through indirect pathways, including heightened competition for scarce resources, though rigorous studies emphasize that weak governance and ethnic tensions often mediate any climate-related risks rather than climate acting as a primary driver.^[115] In the Lake Chad Basin, encompassing parts of Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon, the lake's surface area has fluctuated but recent satellite data from 2000-2020 show it has not undergone net shrinkage, stabilizing around 1,500-2,500 km² seasonally due to variable inflows rather than solely climate desiccation.^[116] Despite narratives linking the basin's environmental stresses to the rise of groups like Boko Haram, which has displaced over 2.5 million people since 2009, evidence suggests conflict dynamics are driven more by political marginalization, corruption, and illicit economies than direct hydrological changes; for instance, insurgency predates recent warming spikes and persists in areas with adequate water access.^[117] Food production around the lake has declined by up to 30% for fisheries-dependent communities, contributing to migration, but adaptive measures like cross-border resource sharing have mitigated escalation in some locales.^[118] Farmer-herder clashes in the Sahel, such as those in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria, have intensified since the 2010s, with over 10,000 deaths reported between 2018 and 2022, often attributed to southward pastoralist migrations prompted by droughts reducing Sahelian rainfall by 20-30% below 20th-century averages.^[119] However, econometric analyses reveal no robust direct causal pathway from precipitation variability to violence onset; instead, conflicts correlate more strongly with state fragility, arms proliferation, and land tenure disputes, where climate acts at best as a "threat multiplier" in contexts of poor institutional capacity.^[120] A 2009 study across African countries found warmer temperatures associated with a 4.8% per 1°C increase in civil war risk, linked to agricultural disruptions reducing incomes and sparking grievances, but subsequent replications highlight endogeneity issues and the role of confounding variables like economic inequality.^[121] In resilient communities, such as those employing traditional conflict resolution, environmental stresses have prompted cooperation over confrontation.^[122] Broader security challenges include climate-influenced migration and health risks, with projections estimating 10-20 million additional internal displacements by 2050 from combined drought and conflict in the Horn of Africa, though baseline conflict remains the dominant push factor.^[123] Disease vectors like malaria have expanded due to warmer, wetter conditions in highlands, affecting military readiness, as seen in Ethiopian operations where heat stress reduced troop effectiveness by 15-20% during exercises.^[124] Critiques of securitizing climate in the region warn that overemphasizing environmental determinism—prevalent in reports from international organizations—diverts attention from root causes like authoritarianism and foreign interventions, potentially justifying maladaptive policies such as forced relocations.^[26] Adaptation efforts, including drought-resistant crop varieties adopted by over 5 million farmers in Kenya and Ethiopia since 2015, demonstrate that targeted resilience building can decouple climate variability from security threats more effectively than mitigation-focused securitization.^[125]

Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region exhibits acute vulnerabilities to climate variability, including prolonged droughts, rising temperatures exceeding the global average by a factor of two, and diminishing precipitation patterns, which compound preexisting water stress and agricultural dependencies.^[126] ^[127] Annual per capita water availability in MENA stands at approximately 480 cubic meters, far below the global scarcity threshold of 1,000 cubic meters, driven by rapid population growth, inefficient management, and overexploitation of aquifers.^[128] These conditions manifest in events such as the 2006–2011 Syrian drought, which displaced over 1.5 million rural farmers and strained urban resources, though empirical analyses attribute subsequent unrest primarily to governance failures and policy responses rather than drought as a direct causal driver.^[129] ^[130] Water scarcity poses transboundary security risks, particularly along shared basins like the Nile, where Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), operational since 2020, has heightened tensions with downstream Egypt and Sudan by potentially reducing Nile flows by 25% during filling phases, exacerbating Egypt's reliance on the river for 97% of its freshwater.^[131] Similarly, upstream damming on the Tigris-Euphrates by Turkey and Iraq has contributed to Iraq's water inflows dropping by 50% since the 1990s, fueling local protests and militia activities over irrigation shortfalls in 2022.^[132] In North Africa, advancing desertification threatens to render 20–30% more land unproductive by 2040, intensifying competition in Libya and Algeria where groundwater depletion rates exceed recharge by factors of 5–10.^[133] Systematic reviews of MENA conflict data indicate that while climate stressors like heatwaves and crop failures correlate with localized violence spikes—e.g., a 10–20% increase in conflict events during extreme drought years—these effects operate as amplifiers in fragile states with weak institutions, rather than independent triggers.^[129] ^[134] Security implications extend to migration and food insecurity, with projections estimating 10–20 million internal displacements in MENA by 2050 due to uninhabitable heat thresholds (wet-bulb temperatures above 35°C) in Gulf states and reduced yields of staples like wheat by 15–25% under moderate warming scenarios.^[135] Yemen's compounding crises illustrate this nexus: climate-exacerbated floods in 2020 displaced 300,000 amid civil war, while groundwater depletion has halved agricultural output since 2015, sustaining famine risks for 17 million people and enabling proxy escalations over ports and aquifers.^[136] However, securitized framings of these dynamics have drawn critique for overstating determinism, as evidenced by the limited direct climate-conflict causality in peer-reviewed datasets spanning 1990–2020, where socioeconomic grievances and authoritarian resilience explain 70–80% of variance in instability.^[137] Gulf monarchies like the UAE and Saudi Arabia mitigate risks through desalination capacity expansions—reaching 5.5 million cubic meters daily in the UAE by 2023—and diversified economies, underscoring that adaptive capacity, rather than exposure alone, determines security outcomes.^[138]

Arctic and High-Latitude Regions

The Arctic region has experienced amplified warming, with surface air temperatures from October 2023 to September 2024 ranking as the second-warmest on record since 1900, at 1.20°C above the 1991–2020 average.^[139] This phenomenon, known as Arctic amplification, has resulted in regional warming rates approximately three to four times the global average over recent decades, driven primarily by feedbacks such as sea ice loss and permafrost thaw.^[140] ^[141] These changes have reduced summer sea ice extent, facilitating greater maritime access and altering traditional patterns of navigation and resource extraction.^[142] In terms of security, diminished ice cover has enabled expanded shipping along routes like Russia's Northern Sea Route, where cargo volumes reached a record 37.9 million metric tons in 2024, an increase of about 8% from 35 million tons in 2023, primarily involving energy exports to Asia.^[143] This heightened accessibility raises concerns over domain awareness and potential disputes in international waters, as non-Arctic states like China pursue investments in polar infrastructure and shipping.^[144] Geopolitical competition centers on untapped resources, including hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals estimated to hold 13% of global undiscovered oil and 30% of natural gas reserves, prompting overlapping territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.^[145] Russia's assertive posture, including the reactivation of Soviet-era bases and deployment of advanced missile systems along its Arctic coast since the early 2010s, underscores efforts to secure these assets amid perceived NATO encroachment.^[146] ^[147] High-latitude military dynamics have intensified, with Russia conducting large-scale exercises involving nuclear submarines and hypersonic weapons, while the United States has responded by enhancing its Arctic strategy through increased icebreaker procurement and joint operations with allies.^[148] ^[149] Permafrost degradation poses risks to existing infrastructure, such as radar stations and pipelines, potentially straining logistics for both civilian and military operations in remote areas.^[150] Indigenous communities face indirect security challenges from shifting wildlife patterns and coastal erosion, which disrupt subsistence economies and heighten vulnerability to external economic pressures from resource development.^[151] Overall, while climate-driven changes amplify strategic opportunities, they also exacerbate rivalries without evidence of imminent existential threats, emphasizing the need for verified surveillance over speculative securitization.^[152]

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Jan 19, 2023 · The shrinkage had devastating effects, but the size of the lake subsequently increased and is now argued to be stable at around 14,000 km².
[118]
How climate-related security risks affect prospects for stability in ...
Oct 9, 2024 · This article presents the findings of the climate-security nexus assessment of the Lake Chad region to inform response options for the region.
[119]
Climate change and the farmer-Pastoralist's violent conflict
A key driver of clashes between Nigerian farmers and herders is climate-induced migration of herders seeking grazing sites.
[120]
Does climate change cause conflicts in the Sahel?
An emerging narrative points to global warming as a driver of conflict in the Sahel – but this narrative risks glossing over the real root causes.
[121]
Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa - PNAS
We find strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with warmer years leading to significant increases in the likelihood of war.
[122]
A Heated Debate: Climate Change and Conflict in Africa
Under certain conditions, climate change can lead to increased conflict but also cooperation in affected communities across Africa. New research needs to ...
[123]
Conflict Drives Displacement Amidst Rising Climate Shocks
Mar 26, 2024 · Conflict and violence remain the main drivers of displacement and movements in sub-Saharan Africa in 2022, exacerbated by increasing climate shocks and hazards.<|separator|>
[124]
Climate change, health, and conflict in Africa's arc of instability - PMC
Nov 17, 2021 · Climate change is exerting a multiplier impact on health challenges and conflict in the Sahel region. An arc of instability has been created ...
[125]
Climate change impacts and mitigation strategies in Sub-Saharan ...
May 20, 2025 · This review paper comprehensively examines the impacts of climate change on livestock farming systems in the region.
[126]
How the Middle East and Central Asia Can Better Address Climate ...
Nov 29, 2023 · The Middle East and Central Asia face a sobering climate reality. Temperatures have risen twice as fast as the global average, and rainfall has ...
[127]
Vulnerability, climate laws, and adaptation in the Middle East and ...
Oct 30, 2024 · The MENA region is highly vulnerable to climate change across several dimensions. The region faces severe climatological challenges that ...
[128]
Building a Water-Secure Future in the Middle East and North Africa
Apr 9, 2025 · MENA is the most water-scarce region in the world. Average annual per capita water availability stands at 480 cubic meters, compared to a global ...
[129]
Climate Change and Violent Conflict in the Middle East and North ...
Nov 15, 2023 · Abstract. Previous research has demonstrated that climate change can escalate the risks for violent conflict through various pathways.
[130]
The Climate Change-Conflict-Displacement Nexus in the MENA ...
May 21, 2024 · This report takes stock of the existing evidence, and considers how countries in the MENA region can mitigate concerns over natural resource scarcity.
[131]
The Looming Climate and Water Crisis in the Middle East and North ...
Apr 19, 2024 · Addressing water scarcity and improving water management will be immensely important for ensuring the region's stability, sustainability, ...
[132]
Surviving Scarcity: Water and the Future of the Middle East - CSIS
Mar 22, 2024 · The Middle East is facing a water crisis. Decades of poor water management, exploding populations, and rising temperatures have degraded the region's land.Missing: implications | Show results with:implications
[133]
Ecological Security Threats in North Africa for 2040: Water Scarcity ...
Jul 18, 2024 · North Africa faces a critical ecological security threat in the form of water scarcity and advancing desertification, which is expected to worsen by 2040.
[134]
The MENA Region Is Headed for More Insecurity Due to Climate ...
Jan 8, 2024 · We conducted a systematic review of 41 peer-reviewed publications, assessing the evidence linking climate change and violent conflict in the MENA region.
[135]
A Systematic Review on the Outcomes of Climate Change in the ...
Dec 13, 2024 · The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region ranks among the most susceptible areas worldwide to the impacts of climate change. Notably, ...
[136]
[PDF] Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks in the Middle East and ...
Climate change in MENA includes extreme weather, water scarcity, and food insecurity. These impacts, combined with weak governance, can accelerate breaking ...
[137]
Climate Change and Vulnerability in the Middle East
Jul 6, 2023 · In sum, these various critiques of an overly securitized and deterministic reading of climate change have important policy implications for ...
[138]
Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Middle East
The Middle East has suffered from protracted instability in recent decades, and climate-related disasters compound existing suffering.
[139]
Surface Air Temperature - NOAA Arctic
Nov 14, 2024 · Arctic (60-90° N) annual surface air temperatures for October 2023-September 2024 ranked 2nd warmest since 1900. Autumn 2023 and summer 2024 ...
[140]
The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since ...
Aug 11, 2022 · In recent decades, the warming in the Arctic has been much faster than in the rest of the world, a phenomenon known as Arctic amplification.
[141]
Arctic warming trends and their uncertainties based on surface ...
While in 1979–2020, the Arctic warming trends (0.66 ± 0.100 and 0.55 ± 0.080 °C per decade) increase to 3.1–3.5 times of the global warming trend (0.19 ± 0.023 ...<|separator|>
[142]
2024 Arctic Report Card: Arctic has second-warmest year on record ...
Dec 10, 2024 · Temperatures across the Arctic (60–90°N) were 1.20°C (2.16°F) above the 1991–2020 average for the period October 2023–September 2024.
[143]
Russia Sets New Arctic Shipping Record, Transports 38Mt in 2024 ...
Jan 2, 2025 · Total tonnage transported via the Northern Sea Route rose to 38 million tonnes, up from 35 Mt in 2023. Over the past decade cargo volume has increased ten-fold.
[144]
Addressing Arctic Vulnerabilities - CSIS
Dec 17, 2024 · The most immediate priority to alleviate Arctic security concerns should be bolstering maritime domain awareness in the region, which directly ...
[145]
Changing Geopolitics in the Arctic | Council on Foreign Relations
What's at Stake With Rising Competition in the Arctic? A changing climate and growing competition for resources is raising tensions among Arctic nations.
[146]
Russia's Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against ...
Oct 31, 2024 · The Russian leadership fears that a more accessible Arctic will bring along more military activity from NATO and its allies in the European ...
[147]
The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)militarisation of the Arctic
Mar 9, 2022 · Over the last decade, Russia has considerably ramped up its military presence in the Arctic. This is something that attracted much attention ...
[148]
How the US & NATO Can Confront Russian Arctic Aggression - CEPA
Dec 5, 2024 · Geopolitics and strategic competition mean the Arctic security landscape is changing fast. The US and NATO must deter Russian aggression.
[149]
New DOD Strategy Calls for Enhancements, Engagements ...
Jul 22, 2024 · The strategy acknowledges how environmental changes are affecting the Arctic region, details the implications for U.S. security and spells out ...
[150]
[PDF] Enhancing Security in a Changing Arctic - RAND
Nov 29, 2023 · This report examines potential issues related to U.S. access in the Arctic region, particularly in comparison with Russian and Chinese access, ...Missing: implications | Show results with:implications
[151]
Consequences of Rapid Environmental Arctic Change for People
Dec 1, 2022 · Changes in seasonal patterns for harvesting (see Food Security section below) have dramatic consequences for safety. Fatal falls through sea, ...Missing: implications | Show results with:implications
[152]
The Arctic in transition: Energy, resilience & national security
This discussion will highlight the opportunities of the Arctic region to ensure environmental protection and resilience, common security, appropriate resource ...