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EMV

EMV (originally standing for Europay, Mastercard, and Visa) is a global technical standard for secure payment cards and terminals, specifying the use of integrated circuit chips to authenticate cardholder transactions and replace vulnerable magnetic stripe technology with dynamic data generation for fraud prevention.^[1] Developed in the 1990s by Europay, Mastercard, and Visa to address rising fraud in card-not-present and counterfeit attacks on magnetic stripes, the standard enables interoperable, chip-based payments across diverse payment ecosystems.^[2] The first EMV specifications were published in 1996 as the EMV ‘96 Integrated Circuit Card Application Specification, marking the formal introduction of chip technology for debit and credit cards.^[2] In 1999, EMVCo was established as an independent organization to oversee the development, maintenance, and certification of these specifications, ensuring worldwide compatibility and security.^[2] Today, EMVCo is equally owned by six major payment networks—American Express, Discover, JCB, Mastercard, UnionPay, and Visa—which collaborate on technical advancements while maintaining equal governance.^[3] Over its 25-year history, EMV has expanded beyond basic chip authentication to encompass contactless payments (introduced in the early 2000s), EMV 3-D Secure for e-commerce fraud reduction (2007), payment tokenization (2014), QR code specifications for mobile wallets (2017), and contactless kernel standards for streamlined acceptance (2022).^[2] These evolutions support seamless transactions via cards, mobile devices, and emerging formats like electric vehicle charging.^[2] As of the end of 2024, the adoption of EMV technology had reached significant scale, with over 14.7 billion EMV chip cards in circulation globally, 72% of all issued payment cards EMV-enabled, and 96% of card-present transactions processed using EMV methods, substantially lowering fraud rates compared to legacy systems.^[4]^[5]

Introduction

Definition and Purpose

EMV is a global technical standard for secure payment processing using chip-based smart cards and acceptance terminals, originally developed jointly by Europay, Mastercard, and Visa, and now managed by the nonprofit organization EMVCo to promote worldwide interoperability.^[6]^[3] The standard defines the protocols for chip cards to communicate with payment systems, ensuring consistent functionality across diverse devices and networks.^[1] The primary purpose of EMV is to replace vulnerable magnetic stripe cards with integrated circuit chips embedded in payment cards, enabling dynamic authentication that generates unique transaction data for each use rather than static information.^[7] This shift addresses key weaknesses in traditional cards by supporting cryptographic verification between the card and terminal, significantly reducing risks of counterfeit fraud and fraud from lost or stolen cards.^[7] EMV delivers enhanced security through on-chip cryptographic operations that validate card authenticity and authorize transactions without exposing sensitive data, while also accommodating both contact (via physical insertion) and contactless (via proximity tapping) interfaces for versatile use cases.^[7] Additionally, its standardization fosters compatibility across multiple payment schemes, allowing issuers, acquirers, and merchants to deploy uniform solutions globally without proprietary barriers.^[1] To ensure reliability, EMV certification is structured in two levels: Level 1 verifies the physical interface, including hardware components like the chip module and electrical signaling for contact and contactless interactions; Level 2 evaluates the application layer, confirming that software implementations correctly execute EMV protocols for secure data exchange and transaction processing.^[8]

Global Adoption and Impact

By 2025, the global adoption of EMV technology has reached near-universal levels in payment infrastructure, with over 97% of EMV-enabled terminals worldwide supporting contactless payments, an increase from 94% in 2024.^[9] This milestone reflects ongoing upgrades in terminal capabilities to accommodate faster, tap-and-go transactions, driven by consumer demand and regulatory pressures in major markets. As of 2025, over 14.7 billion EMV chip cards are in circulation globally.^[9] EMV chip transactions now account for approximately 96% of all card-present payments globally, underscoring the standard's dominance in securing in-person commerce.^[9] The EMV cards market has experienced steady expansion, valued at US$4.3 billion in 2024 and projected to reach US$6.3 billion by 2030, growing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.5%.^[10] This growth is fueled by the integration of contactless features and the rising need for secure payment solutions amid increasing digital transaction volumes. Furthermore, the migration to EMV has significantly reduced counterfeit fraud, with reports indicating reductions of up to 87%, as the chip's dynamic authentication thwarts card duplication attempts more effectively than magnetic stripe technology.^[11] Economically, EMV adoption has shifted fraud liability from issuers to non-compliant merchants, incentivizing widespread upgrades and reducing overall costs for financial institutions through lower fraud losses. This liability framework has encouraged merchants to invest in compatible systems, minimizing chargebacks and operational risks while promoting the broader shift to digital payments, including mobile wallets and contactless methods that enhance transaction efficiency. Issuers benefit from decreased exposure to counterfeit claims, fostering a more stable payment ecosystem that supports global commerce growth.^[12]^[13]

History

Origins and Development

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the proliferation of magnetic stripe cards facilitated a surge in payment fraud, including skimming and counterfeit card creation, as the static data on the stripes proved easy to replicate and exploit.^[14] This vulnerability prompted major payment networks to seek more robust alternatives, leading Europay, Mastercard, and Visa to form a collaborative consortium in 1994 aimed at developing unified chip-based standards for secure transactions.^[15] The partnership yielded its initial technical output with the release of the EMV 3.0 specifications on June 30, 1996, which outlined protocols for integrated circuit cards in payment systems, emphasizing dynamic data generation to thwart fraud.^[16] These specifications marked the foundational framework for embedding microchips in cards, enabling cryptographic authentication between cards and terminals. To oversee ongoing maintenance and evolution, the founding companies established EMVCo in 1999 as an independent entity, initially owned by Europay, Mastercard, and Visa, dedicated to ensuring global interoperability and security enhancements.^[3] Early adoption trials demonstrated the potential of chip technology; in France, pilots began in 1992, integrating chips into bank cards to address domestic fraud ahead of broader EMV alignment.^[15] Similarly, the United Kingdom launched EMV-based Chip and PIN trials in Northampton in May 2003, followed by a national rollout in October, significantly reducing counterfeit fraud in card-present environments.^[17]

Evolution of Standards

The evolution of EMV standards progressed significantly with the EMV Contactless Specifications for Payment Systems version 1.0, released in March 2004, which marked the introduction of contactless capabilities through proximity payment systems, enabling faster transactions via NFC-enabled cards and terminals while maintaining chip-based security protocols.^[18] This advancement built on the core EMV framework to support seamless in-person payments, reducing reliance on magnetic stripes and fostering global interoperability for proximity-based interactions.^[19] By 2011, EMV version 4.3 further expanded the specifications to accommodate emerging mobile devices, incorporating provisions for secure element integration in smartphones and laying foundational elements for tokenization by enhancing data protection mechanisms in application specifications.^[20] These updates emphasized backward compatibility while addressing the growing need for mobile payment ecosystems, including initial support for dynamic data authentication in non-contact scenarios.^[21] In 2019, EMVCo published the EMV Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) Specification version 1.0 for streamlined online checkouts. Enhancements to EMV 3-D Secure (3DS) version 2.2, released in December 2018, improved frictionless authentication through risk-based assessments and device data sharing to bolster e-commerce security.^[22]^[23] In 2024, EMVCo launched a reduced range approval process for Level 1 type approval, tailored for TapToMobile device integration, defining compliance levels with adjusted read-range requirements to facilitate broader adoption of consumer and enterprise smartphones as payment acceptors.^[24] Concurrently, the ISO/IEC 24760-3:2025 standard provided a framework for tokenized identity management, outlining practices for handling identity information in secure systems, including token lifecycle processes aligned with EMV tokenization principles.^[25] Looking ahead, EMVCo initiated development of the EMV TEST PCD-2 specification in 2025 to refine proximity coupling device testing for contactless interfaces, with a public comment period open until November 30, 2025, inviting industry input to ensure robust performance in evolving payment environments.^[18]

Technical Specifications

Chip Architecture and Components

The EMV chip is a microprocessor-based integrated circuit (IC) embedded in payment cards, designed to securely store and process transaction data. It typically incorporates a central processing unit (CPU), often an 8-bit or 16-bit processor, to execute instructions and manage operations. The chip includes various memory types: read-only memory (ROM) for storing the permanent operating system and fixed data, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) for application data and keys that can be updated, and random access memory (RAM) for temporary processing during transactions. Additionally, a dedicated cryptographic coprocessor handles encryption, decryption, and authentication algorithms such as DES, 3DES, or RSA to ensure secure computations without exposing sensitive information.^[26]^[27]^[28] Physically, EMV chips support both contact and contactless interfaces to enable versatile payment methods. The contact interface adheres to ISO/IEC 7816 standards, utilizing eight electrical contacts (C1 to C8) on the card's surface for communication with terminals: these include pins for power supply (VCC), reset (RST), clock (CLK), ground (GND), input/output data (I/O), and auxiliary functions like programming voltage (VPP) and auxiliary I/O. This wired connection allows for reliable data exchange at speeds up to 9600 baud initially, scalable to higher rates. In contrast, the contactless interface follows ISO/IEC 14443 specifications, operating via near-field communication (NFC) or radio-frequency identification (RFID) at 13.56 MHz, enabling wireless interactions within a short range (typically up to 10 cm) without physical insertion, using modulated electromagnetic fields for power and data transfer.^[29]^[30] Logically, the chip runs a card operating system (COS), which is a firmware layer embedded in ROM that oversees file management, input/output operations, and resource allocation to support multiple applications on a single card. The file structure follows a hierarchical model defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4, featuring a master file (MF) at the root, dedicated files (DFs) for specific applications (e.g., payment or loyalty programs), and elementary files (EFs) containing data elements like cardholder information or certificates. Each application is identified by a unique application identifier (AID), composed of a registered application provider identifier (RID) assigned by ISO and a proprietary application identifier extension (PIX) defined by the issuer, allowing the terminal to select and interact with the appropriate application during transactions.^[31]^[32]^[33] To ensure interoperability and reliability, EMV chips undergo Level 1 certification testing, which verifies compliance with electrical, mechanical, and basic communication protocols outlined in the EMV specifications. This includes assessments of contact interface integrity, signal timing, power consumption, and contactless field strength, conducted by accredited laboratories to confirm the chip meets global standards before personalization and issuance.^[8]^[34]

Data Elements and Commands

In EMV transactions, communication between the integrated circuit card (ICC) and the terminal follows the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) format specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4, which structures exchanges as command-response pairs. A Command APDU (C-APDU) comprises a four-byte header consisting of the class byte (CLA), instruction byte (INS), parameter bytes (P1 and P2), an optional length field (Lc) indicating the data length, and an optional data field carrying input parameters. The corresponding Response APDU (R-APDU) includes an optional data field with output results followed by two status bytes (SW1 and SW2), where the value 90 00 signifies successful command execution without errors, while other values such as 69 82 indicate security-related issues like authentication failure.^[20]^[35] EMV defines several standardized C-APDUs for core operations, executed by the card's embedded microcontroller to manage application selection, data retrieval, and security processing. The SELECT command (INS = A4) identifies and activates a specific application using its Application Identifier (AID) as the data field, enabling the terminal to choose from multiple supported applications on the card. The READ RECORD command (INS = B2) retrieves records from elementary files (EFs) in the card's file structure, such as application-specific data, by specifying the file ID in P1/P2 and record number. The VERIFY command (INS = 20) authenticates the cardholder by comparing a provided PIN against the stored reference, with P1/P2 indicating the PIN format (e.g., plain or encrypted). Additionally, the GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command (INS = A8), unique to EMV, prompts the card to return processing parameters and initiate generation of an application cryptogram, including a Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) in the response to guide further terminal actions.^[20]^[36]^[35] Central to these commands are standardized data elements, encoded as tagged data objects using the TLV (Tag-Length-Value) format for interoperability. The Application Identifier (AID, tag 4F) is a variable-length identifier (5-16 bytes) that uniquely distinguishes payment applications, combining a Registered Application Provider Identifier (RID) from ISO/IEC 7816-5 and a Proprietary Application Identifier Extension (PIX) for scheme-specific details, such as Visa's AID starting with A0 00 00 00 03 for its domestic application. The Application Label (tag 50), up to 16 characters, provides a human-readable name for the application (e.g., "VISA CREDIT") displayed on the terminal for user selection. Track 2 Equivalent Data (tag 57), a variable-length field mirroring magnetic stripe Track 2 per ISO/IEC 7813, encodes the Primary Account Number (PAN), expiry date, service code, and discretionary data, excluding sentinels and check digits, to support fallback compatibility. The Application Cryptogram (AC, tag 9F26 for type and 9F27 for 8-byte value) is a dynamic cryptographic output generated by the card, representing types like Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC) for online verification or Transaction Certificate (TC) for approval.^[33]^[37]^[38] EMV leverages specific cryptographic primitives to secure data elements and command responses, balancing legacy compatibility with modern strength. Symmetric encryption relies on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and its strengthened variant, Triple DES (3DES) with two or three keys, for operations like PIN protection and session key derivation in earlier specifications. Asymmetric cryptography employs RSA (typically 1024-2048 bits) for issuer and ICC public key certificates, enabling offline authentication through digital signatures. Since the 2010s, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128-256 bit keys has been integrated for enhanced symmetric operations, including data encryption during personalization and cryptogram generation, offering superior performance and security over 3DES while maintaining backward compatibility.^[39]^[40]

Transaction Flow

Initiation and Application Selection

The initiation of an EMV transaction occurs when the payment terminal detects an EMV-compliant chip card. In contact-based transactions, the card is inserted into the terminal's slot, prompting the terminal to issue a reset signal; the card then responds with the Answer to Reset (ATR), a sequence that conveys the card's supported protocols, historical bytes indicating compliance levels, and initial interface parameters such as baud rate and parity. This ATR exchange establishes the basic communication link between the terminal and the integrated circuit card (ICC), adhering to ISO/IEC 7816 standards for electrical and protocol specifications. For contactless transactions, detection relies on proximity coupling devices (PCD) in the terminal energizing the card's proximity integrated circuit card (PICC) via a 13.56 MHz radio frequency field, as defined in ISO/IEC 14443. The terminal performs an anti-collision procedure—a binary tree search algorithm—to resolve conflicts if multiple cards are present, uniquely identifying and selecting one PICC before eliciting an initial response similar to the ATR, including protocol and historical information. This process ensures reliable card activation without physical contact, supporting faster transaction starts typical of near-field communication (NFC) environments. Once the card is detected, the application selection phase identifies a mutually supported payment application. The terminal issues a SELECT command with the Application Identifier (AID) of the Payment System Environment (PSE) for contact cards (AID: '1PAY.SYS.DDF01') or the Proximity Payment System Environment (PPSE) for contactless cards (AID: '2PAY.SYS.DDF01'), prompting the card to return a File Control Information (FCI) template listing available applications, their AIDs, and associated details like kernel identifiers. The terminal then evaluates this list using partial AID matching—comparing the most significant bytes of its supported AIDs against the card's offerings—to select the highest-priority common application, issuing another SELECT command for the chosen AID. This method allows multi-application cards to dynamically choose the appropriate scheme, such as Visa or Mastercard, without predefined sequences. If no matching AID is identified during selection, the transaction may fallback to a magnetic stripe equivalent, where the terminal prompts the cardholder to swipe the card's magstripe track data for processing under legacy rules; however, EMV specifications and payment network guidelines strictly limit such fallbacks to technical failures, aiming to minimize non-chip usage for security reasons.^[41] Application selection employs Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) commands standardized in EMV protocols to exchange data efficiently. The entire initiation and selection process is constrained by timing requirements to maintain transaction velocity, with card responses expected within hundreds of milliseconds for contactless (typically 300-700 ms total) and up to 10 seconds for contact interfaces to prevent timeouts and ensure user-friendly performance.^[42]

Authentication and Verification

Authentication and verification in EMV transactions ensure the legitimacy of the chip card (ICC) and the integrity of transaction data before proceeding to authorization. This phase occurs after application selection and involves cryptographic mechanisms to prevent fraud, such as counterfeiting or data alteration, without requiring immediate online issuer involvement. The primary methods rely on public key infrastructure (PKI) and symmetric cryptography to validate the card's authenticity offline. Offline Data Authentication (ODA) is a foundational verification process that uses the card's digital signature to confirm its authenticity and the unaltered state of critical data elements, such as the primary account number (PAN) and expiry date. There are three variants of ODA, each offering increasing levels of security. Static Data Authentication (SDA) employs a static RSA signature generated by the issuer on fixed card data; the terminal verifies this signature using the issuer's public key to ensure the data has not been modified since issuance, though it is susceptible to replay attacks if the card is cloned.^[28] Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) enhances security by generating a dynamic RSA signature on transaction-specific data, including a challenge from the terminal, using the card's unique private key; this proves possession of the genuine card as the signature cannot be reused.^[28] Combined Dynamic Data Authentication (CDA), the most advanced, integrates DDA with the transaction certificate in a single signed step, verifying both card authenticity and the card's approval decision for the transaction.^[28] EMV employs a certificate chain rooted in a trusted Certification Authority (CA) to enable secure key validation during ODA. The Issuer Public Key Certificate contains the issuer's public key and associated data, signed by the CA's private key; the terminal verifies this using the pre-loaded CA public key to recover the issuer public key. The Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Public Key Certificate, signed by the issuer's private key, holds the card's public key and is validated using the recovered issuer public key, completing the chain and confirming the card's cryptographic credentials.^[28] This hierarchical PKI structure, based on RSA algorithms, ensures that only legitimate cards from certified issuers can pass authentication. Following ODA, the card generates an Application Cryptogram to further verify the transaction details. The Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC) is produced using a session key derived from the card's symmetric keys (typically 3DES or AES), combined with transaction data like the amount and unpredictable number; this cryptogram is sent online to the issuer for validation, proving the card's participation in the specific session.^[43] The session key is uniquely generated per transaction from the card master key to prevent reuse and enhance security.^[44] In contactless EMV transactions, authentication and verification prioritize speed while maintaining security, often using lower transaction thresholds to bypass certain checks. Contactless interfaces comply with ISO/IEC 14443 standards, employing Type 3 (FeliCa) or Type 4 (ISO 14443-compliant) proximity integrated circuit card (PICC) tags for rapid data exchange. For low-value payments below scheme-defined limits (e.g., $100 for Visa and Mastercard in the United States (as of 2025)), ODA is performed, potentially using a simplified method such as SDA, though DDA or CDA remains supported for higher-risk scenarios.^[45]^[46] These adaptations balance convenience with fraud prevention in high-volume environments like transit or retail.^[45]

Risk Management and Authorization

Terminal Risk Management (TRM) is a critical function performed by the payment terminal to mitigate fraud risks for the acquirer by evaluating transaction characteristics before proceeding further. This process encompasses three primary checks: floor limit verification, which allows offline approval for transactions below a predefined threshold amount set by the acquirer; velocity checking, which monitors the frequency and volume of transactions from the same card within a specified time frame to identify potential abuse; and random transaction selection (RTS), a probabilistic mechanism that occasionally routes low-risk transactions online to ensure periodic issuer oversight regardless of other parameters. These checks are configurable based on acquirer policies and are executed after application selection and before deeper analysis, helping to balance transaction speed with security.^[20] Following TRM, Terminal Action Analysis (TAA) enables the terminal to assess overall transaction risk using parameters such as the transaction amount, cardholder verification results, and TRM outcomes, ultimately deciding whether to approve the transaction offline, decline it, or forward it for online authorization. If the analysis indicates low risk—such as when the transaction falls within acceptable limits and no red flags are raised—the terminal may generate an offline approval by requesting a Transaction Certificate (TC) from the card. Conversely, higher-risk scenarios trigger an online request, where the terminal prompts the card to produce an Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC), building on the cryptograms established during prior authentication steps. This decision-making ensures that only suitable transactions proceed offline, reducing exposure to fraud while maintaining efficiency.^[20] Card Action Analysis (CAA) complements terminal efforts by allowing the EMV chip to independently evaluate risk using its embedded issuer-defined models, which consider factors like cumulative transaction counters, offline limits, and local card history. Based on this assessment, the card generates an appropriate application cryptogram: a TC to signal offline approval if risks are deemed acceptable; an Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC) to indicate an offline decline if thresholds are exceeded; or an ARQC to mandate online processing for further scrutiny. This card-centric layer provides an additional safeguard, enabling issuers to enforce personalized risk controls without relying solely on terminal logic.^[20] In the online authorization flow, when an ARQC is generated—either through TAA or CAA—the terminal packages it into an authorization message along with transaction details and forwards the request to the acquirer, who relays it to the issuer's host for real-time validation. The issuer authenticates the ARQC, verifies cardholder and merchant legitimacy, and responds with approval or denial, ensuring dynamic risk evaluation for potentially suspicious transactions. This process integrates seamlessly with payment network protocols, enhancing overall system integrity.

Completion and Post-Processing

Following the authorization phase, the terminal issues a second GENERATE AC command to the integrated circuit card (ICC), incorporating the authorization response from the issuer or acquirer if the transaction was processed online. This command prompts the card to generate either a Transaction Certificate (TC) to approve and finalize the transaction or an Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC) to decline it, based on the combined results of the card's internal risk management and the external authorization decision. The TC confirms that the card has validated the transaction details and is authorizing the payment, while the AAC indicates rejection due to factors such as exceeded limits or security checks.^[20] After the card responds to the second GENERATE AC, the terminal may process any issuer scripts included in the authorization response. These scripts consist of a series of application protocol data unit (APDU) commands sent by the issuer to modify card parameters, such as updating spending limits, blocking the card, or changing the PIN, without interrupting the transaction flow. Script processing occurs post-authentication to ensure the primary payment authorization completes first, and the card executes the commands sequentially, reporting the outcome via status words for each. If script execution fails, the terminal sets the 'Script processing failed after final GENERATE AC' bit in the Terminal Verification Results (TVR) to indicate the issue, though this does not reverse the transaction approval.^[20]^[47] Upon successful completion of the second GENERATE AC and any applicable script processing, the transaction concludes with the terminal generating a receipt for the cardholder, detailing key elements such as the amount, date, merchant information, and approval code, while also logging the full transaction data for acquirer reconciliation and settlement. This logging captures cryptograms, tags, and verification results to support batch processing and dispute resolution, ensuring auditability across the payment ecosystem. In contactless scenarios, the process aligns similarly but may abbreviate certain steps for speed.^[48] Error handling in the completion phase relies on status words returned by the card in response to commands, providing diagnostic codes for issues like declines or partial authentications. For instance, a successful response uses status word '9000', while declines due to authorization failure return '6985' (conditions of use not satisfied) or '63Cx' for counter exceedance, prompting the terminal to abort and notify the user. In contactless transactions, partial authentication (e.g., via AAC without full online approval) may trigger specific handling, such as falling back to online processing or declining if thresholds are unmet, with the terminal updating the TVR accordingly.^[20]

Security Features

Offline Data Authentication

Offline Data Authentication (ODA) is a cryptographic mechanism in EMV standards that enables terminals to verify the authenticity of a chip card without real-time communication with the issuer, relying on public key infrastructure (PKI) to prevent counterfeiting and tampering.^[49] This process uses digital signatures generated during card personalization and verified using certificates in a certification hierarchy, starting from a root certification authority down to the issuer's public key.^[28] ODA supports three primary methods—Static Data Authentication (SDA), Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA), and Combined Data Authentication (CDA)—each offering varying levels of security against cloning and modification attacks.^[50] Static Data Authentication (SDA) is the simplest form of ODA, where the card provides static application data, such as the Track 2 Equivalent Data, signed by the issuer's private key during card issuance.^[49] The terminal verifies this Signed Static Data (SSD) using the issuer's public key, recovered from the Issuer Public Key Certificate stored on the card, confirming that the data has not been altered since personalization.^[28] However, SDA is vulnerable to cloning because the signed data remains unchanged across transactions, allowing an attacker to copy the chip contents and produce identical counterfeit cards that pass verification.^[50] Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) enhances security by generating a transaction-specific signature, proving the card's possession of its private key without revealing it.^[49] Upon receiving an unpredictable number from the terminal, the card computes a digital signature over dynamic data—including the unpredictable number, transaction data, and card-specific elements—using its internal private key and provides the Signed Dynamic Application Data (SDAD).^[50] The terminal verifies this signature with the card's public key, obtained from the card's public key certificate, ensuring the card is genuine and not a static copy.^[28] DDA requires the card to perform RSA computations internally, making it more resource-intensive but resistant to cloning attacks that plague SDA.^[49] Combined Data Authentication (CDA) builds on DDA for scenarios like contactless transactions, integrating the dynamic signature with the card's application cryptogram to provide a unified proof of authenticity and transaction validity.^[50] In CDA, the SDAD is computed over a combination of the unpredictable number, card issue data, the dynamic cryptogram (e.g., Application Request Cryptogram or ARQC), and a hash of transaction data, allowing offline verification of both card legitimacy and cryptogram integrity.^[50] This method supports key recovery, where the terminal recovers and validates the signed elements from the SDAD against expected formats and values, such as those defined in EMV Book 2, to ensure no tampering occurred.^[51] CDA is particularly suited for low-value, high-speed transactions, as it minimizes the need for separate authentication steps while maintaining dynamic protection.^[49] Within the broader EMV transaction flow, ODA serves as an initial card verification step to establish trust before proceeding to risk management or authorization.^[49]

Cardholder Verification Methods

Cardholder verification methods (CVMs) in EMV transactions serve to authenticate the legitimate cardholder, reducing the risk of unauthorized use after the card itself has been authenticated. The card's chip contains a CVM List (tag 8E), a variable-length data object that defines a prioritized sequence of verification methods supported by the application, including applicable conditions (e.g., transaction amount, terminal type) and actions upon success or failure (e.g., try next method or fail the transaction).^[20] The terminal evaluates the list sequentially during the transaction flow, selecting the first method that matches the current context, and records the outcome in the CVM Results (tag 9F34) for inclusion in authorization messages.^[20] This flexible structure allows issuers to tailor verification based on risk, supporting combinations of methods rather than a single mandatory approach.^[52] The EMV specifications define up to seven core CVM types, encompassing variations of PIN, signature, and no verification, which can be configured in the CVM List with specific conditions like floor limits or terminal capabilities.^[52] Each entry in the list consists of a three-byte CV Rule: the first byte is the CVM Code identifying the method (e.g., 1F for plaintext PIN by ICC, 1E for enciphered offline PIN, 1D for enciphered online PIN, 5E for signature, and 00 for no CVM), the second byte specifies conditions, and the third byte defines the action on failure.^[53] If no method succeeds, the transaction may be declined unless a bypass is allowed.^[54] Chip and PIN Chip and PIN relies on a personal identification number entered by the cardholder at the terminal for verification, either offline or online, making it a primary method for higher-security transactions. In offline PIN (CVM Code 1E), the terminal enciphers the entered PIN into a PIN block using the card's public key, recovered from the certificates during offline data authentication, then sends it to the card via the VERIFY command (CLA=00, INS=20) for comparison against the stored PIN.^[20] The card decrypts and checks the PIN, updating the PIN Try Counter (tag 9F17) if incorrect and potentially locking after three failed attempts; success allows the card to proceed with generating an application request cryptogram.^[48] This method is preferred in Europe, where EMV chip-and-PIN rollout since the early 2000s has significantly lowered counterfeit fraud rates compared to magnetic stripe systems.^[55] For online PIN (CVM Code 1D), the enciphered PIN block is forwarded to the issuer during authorization for remote verification, often required for amounts exceeding offline thresholds.^[54] Plaintext PIN (CVM Code 1F) is a less secure variant where the PIN is sent unenciphered to the card, rarely used due to vulnerability risks.^[56] Chip and Signature Chip and signature uses a dynamic data authentication from the chip combined with the cardholder providing a handwritten signature on the receipt, which the merchant visually compares to the card's signature panel. The CVM Code is 5E, typically applied when the terminal lacks PIN capabilities or for conditions like attended terminals and amounts below a limit, serving as a fallback in the CVM List.^[56] Upon success, the merchant retains the signed receipt as proof; failure leads to the next method or transaction decline. This approach is common in the United States, where EMV adoption has favored signature over PIN to align with existing merchant practices and reduce implementation costs.^[57] Variants in the CVM List may pair signature with prior PIN attempts (e.g., offline PIN followed by signature if PIN fails), balancing security and usability.^[52] No CVM and Biometrics No CVM (CVM Code 00) applies to low-risk scenarios, such as transactions below the terminal's floor limit or contactless payments under defined thresholds (e.g., $50 in many regions), where chip authentication alone suffices without further cardholder proof.^[54] In contactless EMV, this is often the default for small amounts, with conditions like "unattended terminal not allowed" ensuring applicability.^[56] For enhanced security in no-CVM cases, especially contactless, Combined DDA/AC Generation (CDCVM) flags may be used to require additional dynamic checks, though this is more relevant to device-based implementations. Biometrics, such as fingerprint or iris scans, are not core CVM types in standard EMV but can be integrated as issuer-specific extensions or via Consumer Device CVM (CDCVM) in mobile or biometric-enabled cards, where the device performs verification before emulating the card.^[58] EMVCo provides security requirements for such device-based methods to ensure consistency with traditional CVMs.^[59]

Non-Face-to-Face Transactions

Challenges for Online and Remote Payments

EMV technology, designed primarily for physical card interactions, encounters significant limitations in non-face-to-face transactions such as e-commerce, phone orders, and mail orders, where the chip's dynamic authentication cannot be utilized.^[60] In these card-not-present (CNP) scenarios, payments rely on static data like the card verification value (CVV), which remains unchanged across transactions and is easily compromised in data breaches, exposing sensitive information without the protective cryptographic exchanges of chip-based verification.^[61] This incompatibility shifts fraudsters toward remote channels, as the standard EMV transaction flow—initiated by physical card insertion or tap—cannot occur without the card's presence.^[62] CNP transactions heighten risks of account takeover, where attackers use stolen credentials to make unauthorized purchases, and friendly fraud, in which legitimate cardholders dispute valid charges to receive refunds while retaining goods.^[63] These vulnerabilities contributed to CNP fraud rising significantly in the years leading up to widespread 3-D Secure adoption, driven by the ease of exploiting static data in expanding online commerce. Prior to the 2010s, online and remote payments predominantly depended on magnetic stripe data, which was susceptible to skimming and cloning, resulting in elevated chargeback rates as merchants absorbed losses from unverified transactions.^[64] This reliance amplified fraud in CNP environments, as stripe data provided no real-time validation, leading to billions in disputed charges before EMV's broader implementation shifted protections to in-person use cases.^[65] As of 2024, CNP fraud accounted for the majority of total card fraud losses globally, representing around 70% in the UK, 74% in the US, and around 80% in Europe.^[66]^[67]^[68]

Solutions like EMV 3-D Secure and Secure Remote Commerce

EMV 3-D Secure (3DS) is a protocol developed by EMVCo to enable risk-based authentication for card-not-present (CNP) transactions, reducing fraud in e-commerce while minimizing user friction.^[69] It facilitates secure online payments by allowing issuers to assess transaction risk using data shared from merchants, card networks, and devices, often resulting in seamless authentication without additional consumer input.^[70] The protocol supports dynamic authentication methods, including biometrics such as fingerprint or facial recognition, integrated via the 3DS SDK on consumer devices.^[71] Version 2.2 of EMV 3DS, released in December 2018, introduced enhancements for frictionless flow, where low-risk transactions proceed without challenging the cardholder, thereby improving conversion rates and user experience.^[72] This version optimizes exemptions under regulations like PSD2 in Europe by incorporating advanced risk modeling and device-specific data collection, such as operating system details and behavioral signals.^[73] EMV 3DS 2.2 also enables biometric verification within the merchant's app or website, supporting two-factor authentication without redirecting users to external pages, which addresses previous challenges in remote payment verification.^[74] By 2024, the global 3D Secure payment authentication market had reached approximately USD 3.95 billion, reflecting widespread integration in e-commerce platforms driven by regulatory mandates and fraud prevention needs.^[75] In 2025, EMVCo updated the EMV 3DS white paper to help banks, solution providers, and merchants optimize the EMV 3DS payment authentication experience.^[76] Secure Remote Commerce (SRC), specified by EMVCo, provides a standardized framework for token-based remote payments, streamlining e-commerce checkouts through services like Click to Pay.^[22] Initially released in 2018, the specification received key updates in 2021 to enhance interoperability and support for digital wallets, allowing consumers to store payment credentials securely and complete transactions with a single click across participating merchants.^[77] SRC integrates with EMV payment tokenization by using surrogate values in place of sensitive card details during transmission, reducing the risk of data interception in non-face-to-face scenarios.^[78] In EMV ecosystems, tokenization replaces the primary account number (PAN) with a unique, limited-use token, such as a Device Account Number (DAN) in mobile wallets like Apple Pay, to limit exposure of sensitive data.^[79] DANs, which are provisioned to specific devices, ensure that even if intercepted, the token cannot be repurposed for unauthorized use without additional validation.^[80] This approach aligns with PCI DSS requirements by scoping out systems handling tokens from full cardholder data compliance, thereby lowering operational risks and audit burdens for merchants and processors.^[81] SRC leverages these tokens to enable secure, wallet-integrated payments, with initial implementations and pilots emerging in high-growth regions like Asia-Pacific to support expanding digital commerce.^[82]

Vulnerabilities and Mitigations

Historical Attacks and Exploits

In 2010, researchers demonstrated a man-in-the-middle attack on EMV Chip and PIN systems using hidden hardware to disable PIN verification on stolen cards. This exploit involved inserting a thin device, akin to a shim, between the card's chip and the terminal's reader to intercept communications. The hardware suppressed the PIN Verify command sent from the terminal to the card, responding instead with a success code (0x9000) to convince the terminal that verification had succeeded, thereby allowing fraudulent transactions without the correct PIN. The attack was prototyped with affordable components like an FPGA board and could be miniaturized to evade detection, exploiting the protocol's lack of strong authentication between card and terminal.^[83] The following year, in 2011, a CVM downgrade attack was revealed that enabled PIN harvesting by manipulating the Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) list during skimming. Attackers used an EMV skimmer to intercept and modify the CVM list (tag 8E) returned by the card, downgrading it to prioritize "plaintext PIN verification performed by the ICC" (code 01 or 41) over secure options like online PIN or signature. This forced the terminal to send the entered PIN in cleartext to the skimmer, which harvested it while simulating successful verification to the card; action codes were also altered to avoid offline declines and ensure online authorization. The exploit targeted Static and Dynamic Data Authentication (SDA/DDA) cards, common at the time, and invalidated claims of PIN protection since logs could not distinguish tampered verifications.^[84] EMV's no-CVM transactions for low-value purchases provided another PIN bypass vector, as terminals below a merchant-set threshold (e.g., $50–$100 in the US or €25–€50 in Europe, varying by network and region as of 2019) required no cardholder verification, allowing stolen cards to be used without PIN entry. This feature, intended for speed, exposed users to shoulder-surfing—where observers visually capture PINs during higher-value uses—or malware on point-of-sale devices that logged keystrokes for later exploitation. Such bypasses compounded risks, as a single observed PIN could enable unlimited fraud on the same card.^[85] Magnetic stripe cloning persisted as a pre-EMV fallback exploit, where harvested track data from skimmers could be encoded onto blank stripe cards for use on non-upgraded terminals. During EMV migration, many systems defaulted to magstripe mode if chip reading failed, even on chip-enabled cards, allowing cloned data to authorize transactions without chip security. This backwards-compatibility flaw enabled widespread fraud until full EMV adoption shifted liability to non-compliant merchants.^[86]

Modern Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures

In recent years, contactless EMV transactions have faced relay attacks, where adversaries employ man-in-the-middle techniques to extend the effective communication distance between a legitimate card or mobile device and the payment terminal, enabling unauthorized remote transactions.^[87] These attacks exploit the short-range nature of NFC protocols by relaying signals through intermediate devices, potentially allowing fraudsters to initiate payments from afar without the cardholder's physical presence.^[88] To counter this, distance-bounding protocols have been proposed in research for potential integration into EMV specifications, which measure the round-trip time of challenge-response messages to verify proximity and reject relayed signals exceeding predefined thresholds.^[88]^[89] A 2025 systemization of knowledge on EMV contactless payment systems highlights ongoing vulnerabilities, such as the plaintext transmission of untokenized Track 1/2 data (including primary account numbers and expiry dates), enabling eavesdropping attacks using commercial NFC readers.^[90] Tokenization in mobile EMV implementations, while designed to replace sensitive primary account numbers with secure tokens, can still expose risks if untokenized data is transmitted in plaintext, allowing eavesdropping on PAN and expiry dates via NFC readers.^[90]^[91] Key countermeasures include mandating online PIN verification for high-value contactless transactions to prevent unauthorized approvals, implementing end-to-end encryption across the payment chain to protect data in transit, and requiring regular updates to EMV contactless kernels to patch emerging vulnerabilities. These measures collectively strengthen EMV's resilience against evolving threats in mobile and remote environments.^[92]

Global Implementation

Regional Adoption Patterns

Europe led the global adoption of EMV technology, driven by a mandate for Chip and PIN implementation across the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), achieving nearly 100% card and terminal compliance by 2011.^[93] The United Kingdom initiated its nationwide rollout between 2003 and 2005, becoming one of the first markets to fully transition to chip-based payments, which significantly reduced counterfeit fraud.^[94] In North America, Canada completed its EMV migration ahead of many peers, reaching full adoption of chip-enabled cards and terminals by 2012, with over 90% of ATMs also compliant by that time.^[95] The United States followed with a slower pace but accelerated after the 2015 liability shift, which transferred fraud responsibility to non-compliant merchants and issuers; as of 2025, approximately 68% of payment cards in circulation were EMV-enabled, contributing to an 87% decline in counterfeit fraud since the shift.^[96]^[97] The Asia-Pacific region saw varied but robust EMV uptake, with Malaysia emerging as an early adopter by completing its nationwide migration to chip cards in 2005, the first in the area, resulting in an 85% reduction in card fraud from 2003 levels.^[98]^[99] Australia enforced a mandate in 2014, leading to widespread compliance and high integration with contactless features, where contactless transactions now account for a significant portion of payments.^[100] Latin America experienced later but determined adoption, with Brazil achieving full EMV migration for contact cards by 2015, followed by Mexico reaching 100% compliance by the same year, though broader regional rollout continued into the early 2020s.^[101] In the Middle East and Africa, implementation has been more heterogeneous, with the United Arab Emirates attaining high EMV adoption through coordinated industry efforts, while South Africa has initiated efforts to transition fleet and retail payments to chip technology.^[102]^[103] As of Q4 2024, global EMV chip card deployment reached 71.98% of issued cards, with 96.20% of card-present transactions processed via EMV methods; regional variations persist, with Europe and parts of Asia-Pacific nearing full compliance.^[4]

Integration with Contactless and Mobile Payments

EMV contactless payments enable secure, tap-to-pay transactions using near-field communication (NFC) technology, where cards or devices are held near a terminal without physical insertion. This functionality is built on the EMV Contactless Chip specifications, which ensure compatibility with existing payment infrastructure while maintaining chip-based security features like dynamic data authentication.^[18] Major payment networks have branded implementations: Mastercard's PayPass and Visa's payWave, both adhering to EMV standards for interoperability.^[104]^[105] By 2025, contactless adoption has reached over 90% in many global markets, such as 97% in Singapore, reflecting widespread terminal support for these EMV-compliant transactions.^[106] In mobile payments, EMV integrates with digital wallets through Host Card Emulation (HCE), a software-based approach that allows smartphones to emulate contactless cards without relying solely on hardware secure elements. On Android, HCE enables apps to handle NFC interactions directly, processing EMV kernels for transaction authorization.^[107] iOS introduced HCE support in version 17.4 and later, permitting developers to implement contactless payments within apps using EMV-compliant protocols.^[108] Leading mobile wallets like Apple Pay and Google Pay leverage these EMV kernels to execute secure tap transactions, combining device-bound keys with network authentication for fraud prevention.^[109] Apple Pay primarily uses a dedicated secure element for credential storage, while Google Pay employs HCE for broader flexibility across devices.^[110] EMV tokenization enhances mobile payment security by replacing sensitive primary account numbers (PANs) with unique, device-specific tokens provisioned via the EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification. Token service providers (TSPs) issue these tokens through a standardized framework, enabling secure provisioning to NFC-enabled devices or wallets while restricting token usage to authorized domains.^[79] This process supports seamless integration in contactless scenarios, as tokens are validated during EMV kernel processing without exposing the underlying card details.^[111] The specification outlines roles for issuers, networks, and TSPs to ensure tokens are cryptographically bound and revocable, bolstering protection against interception in mobile environments.^[112] Despite these advancements, EMV mobile implementations face challenges, including trade-offs between secure elements (hardware-based isolation for credentials) and HCE (software emulation reliant on device OS and cloud verification). Secure elements offer tamper-resistant storage but limit flexibility due to carrier or manufacturer control, whereas HCE enables easier provisioning yet increases vulnerability to malware or network dependencies.^[113] Battery life concerns arise in HCE scenarios, as frequent NFC polling and cryptographic operations can accelerate drain compared to passive secure element modes.^[114] In 2024, EMVCo addressed range-related issues for wearables and Tap-to-Mobile devices by introducing a reduced range approval process, defining compliance levels with minimized read distances to improve usability and power efficiency on resource-constrained hardware.^[24] This initiative supports broader adoption of EMV in wearables by optimizing NFC interactions for shorter, more secure taps.^[115]

Standards and Documents

Core EMV Books and Levels

The EMV specifications are organized into a series of foundational "books" that outline the technical requirements for integrated circuit card (ICC) payment systems, ensuring interoperability and security across global payment infrastructures. These books form the core of the EMV standard, with Book 1 addressing application-independent aspects of the interface between the ICC and the terminal. It defines the general requirements for data elements, commands, and responses exchanged during transactions, independent of specific payment applications, to facilitate consistent communication protocols.^[116] Book 2 focuses on security and key management, specifying the cryptographic mechanisms used to authenticate cards and protect transaction data. It details offline and online data authentication methods, such as static and dynamic data authentication, along with key generation, distribution, and management procedures to prevent fraud and ensure data integrity.^[116] Book 3 covers the application specification, with a particular emphasis on personal identification number (PIN) handling as part of cardholder verification methods (CVMs). It outlines the functional requirements for application selection, transaction processing, and verification processes, including how the terminal and card negotiate and perform PIN-based authentication to confirm the cardholder's identity.^[116] Book 4 specifies the requirements for interfaces between the cardholder, attendant, and acquirer in payment systems, including cardholder verification (such as PIN entry and signature capture), attendant interactions, and acquirer scripting for post-issuance updates. Note that contactless payments are addressed in supplemental EMV Contactless Specifications, including Books A (Application), B (Security), and C-series kernels.^[116] EMV certification operates through a hierarchical structure of three levels to validate compliance with these specifications. Level 1 certification tests interface compliance, focusing on the physical, electrical, and transport layer requirements of terminals and cards to ensure they meet hardware standards like ISO/IEC 7816 for contact interfaces. Contactless interfaces undergo similar Level 1 testing for compliance with EMV Contactless Specifications, including physical and electrical requirements specific to contactless communication.^[8] Level 2 certification evaluates protocol testing, verifying that the software kernel implementing the EMV books, including contactless kernels, correctly handles command-response sequences, data authentication, and transaction flows.^[8] Level 3 certification assesses application-level integration, confirming that the full payment solution, including host systems, processes EMV transactions end-to-end without errors or vulnerabilities.^[117] The baseline version for these core books is EMV 4.3, released in November 2011, which serves as a foundational reference with subsequent errata bulletins addressing clarifications and minor corrections. Kernel validation during certification relies on integrated circuit card data (ICD) files, which provide test vectors and scenarios derived from the specifications to simulate real-world interactions and verify implementation accuracy.^[116] Public access to the EMV specifications, including the core books up to version 4.3, is available through the EMVCo website, where registered users can download documents for implementation purposes; however, certain proprietary elements, such as detailed test scripts or member-specific extensions, remain confidential to EMVCo associates.^[116]

Recent Updates and Future Directions

In 2024, EMVCo published the Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) specifications for public access on May 8, establishing a standardized framework for secure e-commerce payments that simplifies online checkouts across devices and merchants.^[116] Later that year, on September 10, EMVCo introduced the Reduced Range Level 1 Type Approval Process, defining compliance levels for contactless payment acceptance on consumer devices such as smartphones, enabling enhanced Tap to Mobile experiences with optimized reading ranges for better usability in everyday scenarios.^[24] Additionally, on October 16, EMVCo launched the testing process for the EMV Contactless Kernel Specification, providing detailed guidance on certification requirements to ensure interoperability and security in contactless payment kernels.^[118] Moving into 2025, EMVCo issued Directive and Specification Bulletin (DSB) No. 315 on EMV TEST PCD-2, a new standard for testing proximity coupling devices used in contactless EMV systems, with the public comment period scheduled to conclude on November 30 to refine tools for more accurate validation of payment terminals.^[116] Looking ahead, EMVCo is actively monitoring advancements in quantum-resistant cryptography through collaboration with NIST, with plans to assess and potentially integrate these into future EMV specifications to mitigate long-term threats from quantum computing, which are not anticipated to impact current infrastructure until at least 2040.^[119] The organization also envisions expanded application of SRC technology to Internet of Things (IoT) payment scenarios, such as seamless integration for electric vehicle charging stations, as demonstrated in ongoing pilots that leverage SRC for secure, automated transactions without physical cards.^[120] These directions build on core EMV books by evolving specifications to address emerging digital ecosystems while maintaining backward compatibility.^[121]

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[PDF] EMVCo Updates EMV® 3-D Secure Specification
Dec 14, 2018 · EMV 3DS specification version 2.2.0 builds upon the current specification version 2.1.0 which is available today on the EMV 3DS Test ...Missing: 5.0 SRC
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[PDF] European EMV 3DS 2.2.0 Implementation Guide | Visa
Sep 14, 2020 · The latest version, EMV 3DS 2.2.0, provides critical new functionality that is fundamental to the optimisation of the application of PSD2 SCA ...Missing: SRC | Show results with:SRC
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What's the difference between 3D Secure 1, 2.1 and 2.2?
Rather than only relying on static passwords, 3DS2 enables the use of dynamic authentication through biometrics and token-based authentication methods. With the ...
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3D Secure Payment Authentication Market Size, Share & Trends
The 3D Secure Payment Authentication market Size was valued at USD 3.95 billion in 2024. The market is expected to reach USD 10.13 billion by 2032, ...Missing: SRC | Show results with:SRC
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EMV® Secure Remote Commerce Updates in 2021 - EMVCo
Jul 23, 2021 · The EMV SRC Specification enables a common and secure consumer e-checkout, known as, Click to Pay, and provides the opportunity for all mer ...Missing: wallets | Show results with:wallets
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Supporting the Growth of E-Commerce with EMV® 3DS, SRC and ...
Dec 10, 2021 · In this video, we explore the EMV® Specifications that are helping to support secure, convenient and reliable online transactions, ...Missing: based wallets
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EMV® Payment Tokenisation - EMVCo
The EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification – Technical Framework defines the roles, functions and requirements that need to be considered when introducing EMV ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Tokenisation And Encryption In Digital Payments
Device Account Number (DAN) for Apple Pay. Digitized PAN (DPAN) for Samsung ... Reduces the scope of PCI DSS compliance by minimising the number of systems ...
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PCI DSS Requirements for Tokenization and Encryption
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EMVCo in 2021: Enabling Secure and Seamless Payments, Together
Jan 14, 2021 · EMV Secure Remote Commerce. Specifications. 3-D Secure · Contact · Contactless · Level 3 Testing · Mobile · Payment Tokenisation · QR Codes ...Missing: wallets | Show results with:wallets
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[PDF] Chip and PIN is Broken - University of Cambridge
The technology was advertised as a solution to increasing card fraud: a chip to prevent card counterfeiting, and a PIN to prevent abuse of stolen cards.
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[PDF] Chip & PIN - Media.blackhat.com…
This whitepaper details the CVM downgrade attack presented in our "Chip & PIN is definitely broken" presentation [1]. The technique aims to expose the ...Missing: exploits | Show results with:exploits
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[PDF] PIN Bypass in the U.S. Market - U.S. Payments Forum
In these situations, for transactions below the merchant's “No CVM Required” limit, the cardholder will not be prompted for a PIN or signature even if the card ...Missing: shoulder- surfing malware
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[PDF] Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack - arXiv
Sep 12, 2012 · Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we ...
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[PDF] Another Look at Relay & Distance-based Attacks in Contactless ...
May 21, 2018 · Indeed, the EMV. (Europay, Mastercard and Visa) payment protocols, in their contactless version, are prone to relay attacks [7]. Proximity ...Missing: extension | Show results with:extension
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Jan 15, 2021 · We present the concept of relay attacks, and discuss distance-bounding schemes as the main countermeasure. We give details on relaying mechanisms.Missing: extension | Show results with:extension
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[PDF] SoK: Security of EMV Contactless Payment Systems - arXiv
The kernel initiates the transaction by sending a Select Proximity. Payment System Environment (PPSE) message, to which the card responds with File Control ...
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This white paper discusses important security mechanisms such as tokenization, biometrics, secure card provisioning, fraud management, and the significance of ...Missing: flaws | Show results with:flaws
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[PDF] Annual Report / 2024 | EMVCo
Jan 29, 2025 · 2024 represented a significant milestone for EMVCo, marking. 25 years since the organisation was first formed in 1999. EMVCo's original focus ...Missing: ownership | Show results with:ownership
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Advancing Seamless and Secure Payments in 2025 - EMVCo
Jan 30, 2025 · In this post, Soumya Chakrabarty, Chair of the EMVCo Board of Managers, reflects on a landmark 2024 and explores EMVCo's key initiatives for 2025.
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[PDF] EMV® Security - EMVCo
What is EMV security? EMV Chip technology secures the communication channel between the payment device. (card/smartphone/wearable) and the payment terminal.Missing: countermeasures PIN end- end kernel 2024
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EMV: the story so far - Electronic Payments International
Apr 13, 2009 · Europe's move to EMV. At the end of 2008, 63.83 percent of cards in the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) were EMV-compliant, · The US refuses to ...
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EMV takes aim at U.S. - SecureIDNews
May 26, 2009 · The country most advanced towards EMV implementation is the UK, the banks their were the first to adopt chip and PIN, says Merschen. Other ...
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Canada Puts Down Chip Card Roots - Digital Transactions
Jun 1, 2011 · 70% of cards issued in Canada, 55% of point-of-sale terminals, and 90% of ATMs deployed by financial institutions were EMV-compliant.
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Did Card-Present Fraud Rates Decline in the United States After the ...
Feb 12, 2025 · The counterfeit fraud rate has not declined, and the lost-or-stolen fraud rate and overall card-present fraud rate have increased.
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rate of EMV adoption in restaurant statistics - Restroworks
Aug 14, 2025 · The counterfeit card fraud has dropped by 87%, thanks to the widespread EMV chip adoption after the 2015 liability shift. Before EMV, cloned ...
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[PDF] The dawn of a new era in Malaysia's payment systems
May 22, 2017 · In 2005, the financial industry collaborated to adopt the EMV Chip technology to enhance the security and interoperability of domestic ...
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[PDF] Survey on implementation of EMV across the world
EMV is a global standard for chip-based payment cards and terminals, ensuring compatibility and security for authenticating transactions. It is being phased in ...
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EMV: Why the world adopted it | ZDNET
Apr 13, 2015 · The benefits have been so rewarding for Australia that the country's dependence on contactless payments has begun moving beyond using EMV- ...Missing: 95%
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[PDF] The state of contactless payments in Latin America
Mexico reached. 100% migration to EMV contact cards by. 2013 and Brazil did so by 2015. Colombia and Argentina will do so around the year. 2020. Consequently, ...
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5 Digital Payment Trends in 2021: By Abhinav Paliwal
Jun 22, 2021 · Not only this, but according to Masterclass, In March 2020, UAE recorded 100% growth in contactless payments than last year. As a result ...<|separator|>
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EMV Fleet Migration - Payment Association of South Africa (PASA)
The EMV Fleet Migration project is a PASA initiative to transition fleet cards to chip-and-PIN technology, using EMV, Conexxus, Mastercard and Visa standards.Missing: 2018 | Show results with:2018
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Is an EMV Chip Card the same as a contactless payment (PayPass ...
Is an EMV Chip Card the same as a contactless payment (PayPass™, payWave™)? No. Instead of waving or tapping your card in front of a device as you do with ...
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Contactless Payments - Visa
Contactless payment technology lets users pay with just a wave of their card or device. Contactless payment cards are embedded ...<|separator|>
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Oct 16, 2024 · EMV certification has three levels: Level 1 tests chip reader, Level 2 tests the software, and Level 3 tests merchant terminal conformity.
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Host-based card emulation overview - Android Developers
May 5, 2025 · This topic describes how host-based card emulation (HCE) works on Android and how you can develop an app that emulates an NFC card using this technique.Missing: iOS kernels
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HCE-based contactless NFC transactions for apps in the European ...
iOS 17.4 or later includes APIs for developers to support contactless transactions from within compatible iOS apps using host card emulation (HCE).サポート · Assistance · Supporto · 지원Missing: EMV Google kernels
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Host Card Emulation on iOS | IDEMIA
May 12, 2025 · Wallet providers and issuers can now activate contactless payments directly within their own apps using Host Card Emulation (HCE), a capability already ...Missing: kernels | Show results with:kernels
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Apple Pay vs Google Wallet : The Secure Element | Ganeshji Marwaha
Oct 2, 2014 · Today, Google wallet v3.0 does not use a device-based Secure Element. It uses a technology called Host-based card emulation (HCE) instead, where ...
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[PDF] EMV Payment Tokenization Primer and Lessons Learned
Tokenization substitutes placeholder characters or a surrogate, called a payment token, for the primary account number (PAN) in a financial transaction. As used ...Missing: DAN | Show results with:DAN
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EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification: Technical Framework ...
May 1, 2025 · The framework provides a comprehensive blueprint for token issuance, provisioning, presentment, and processing, ensuring compatibility with global payment ...Participant Roles · Operational Dynamics: A Case... · Emv 3-D Secure (3ds)
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SE vs. HCE: What is more secure for NFC mobile payments?
Oct 17, 2014 · HCE benefits more since it is designed to utilize these backend systems more effectively, but SE is less reliant on “always on” networks. Apple ...
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SECURE ELEMENTS VS CLOUD-BASED HCE: WHAT IS MORE ...
Oct 16, 2014 · Banks and merchants can deliver secure mobile payments to consumers today using HCE with tokenization, device fingerprinting, risk modeling and ...
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EMV® Specifications & Associated Bulletins Archive | EMVCo
EMV Specifications are technical requirements for designing payment products to work seamlessly and securely everywhere. Overview · EMV 3-D Secure. EMV 3DS ...Missing: official | Show results with:official
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What is EMV® Level 3 Testing? - EMVCo
Oct 15, 2025 · EMV® Level 3 (L3) testing aims to validate the integration of an EMV acceptance device with its acceptance infrastructure to help ensure the ...Missing: levels | Show results with:levels
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[PDF] EMVCo Launches the EMV® Contactless Kernel Testing Process
16 October 2024 – Global technical body EMVCo has confirmed the testing process for the new EMV®. Contactless Kernel Specification (EMV® Contactless ...Missing: certification guide
[114]
Quantum Computing and EMV® Chip – What's the Threat? - EMVCo
Jun 3, 2025 · Offline EMV cryptograms using ECC and RSA are vulnerable to quantum attacks, but online cryptograms using symmetric cryptography are resistant. ...
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Exploring EMV® Electric Vehicle Open Payments - EMVCo
Sep 22, 2025 · Watch this demo to learn how EMV® Secure Remote Commerce (SRC) technology can be used to integrate EMV-based payments at EV charging ...