Interserve
Interserve plc was a United Kingdom-based multinational company specializing in construction, support services, and facilities management, headquartered in Reading, Berkshire, until its entry into administration in 2019.[1][2] The firm originated in 1884 as the London and Tilbury Lighterage Company Limited and evolved through mergers, including with RM Douglas in 1991 to form Tilbury Douglas, before rebranding as Interserve plc in 2001 to emphasize its growing emphasis on maintenance, facilities management, and citizen services.[3][4] At its peak, Interserve employed around 12,000 people and operated across three main segments: support services (including facilities management and citizen services), construction, and equipment rental, serving both public sector clients—such as government departments and the Ministry of Justice—and private enterprises with projects in infrastructure, healthcare, and transport.[5][1] Notable achievements included major UK public contracts for services like prison management and rail station maintenance, exemplified by operations involving specialized cleaning equipment at sites such as Liverpool Street station.[6] However, the company faced defining challenges from aggressive expansion, including losses in its justice services division and delays or cancellations in high-profile construction projects like hospitals and schools, which eroded profitability and ballooned debt.[7] In March 2019, shareholders rejected a proposed debt-for-equity restructuring backed by its largest creditor, HSBC, leading to administration overseen by Ernst & Young, with the holding company owing creditors over £100 million amid ongoing receipt of £660 million in public contracts in the preceding period.[8][9] A pre-pack administration sale transferred core trading subsidiaries to a new entity ultimately controlled by HSBC, preserving some operations under rebranded entities like Tilbury Douglas for construction, while Interserve plc itself was formally wound up by January 2022.[10][11][12] The collapse highlighted vulnerabilities in the UK outsourcing model, particularly reliance on government contracts amid lax oversight of contractor financial health.[9]History
Maritime and Early Foundations (1880s–1945)
In 1884, brothers Edmund and Augustus Hughes founded the London and Tilbury Lighterage Company Limited, specializing in the transfer of goods via sailing barges between the London Docks and the Tilbury region on the Thames Estuary.[4] This operation addressed the surging demands of late Industrial Revolution-era trade, where efficient lighterage services were critical for handling cargo from larger vessels unable to navigate upstream to central London docks.[4] The firm's early focus on Thames maritime logistics built foundational capabilities in vessel handling and port-adjacent transport, amid Britain's expanding imperial commerce and naval infrastructure needs. By the early 20th century, the company restructured as the Tilbury Contracting and Dredging Company Limited on April 19, 1906, reconstructing its lighterage undertakings into broader maritime contracting activities, including dredging to maintain navigable depths in estuarine and riverine channels.[13] This evolution reflected empirical shifts in port engineering requirements, as deepening waterways and sediment management became essential for accommodating larger steamships and supporting dockyard expansions.[13] Such work honed technical expertise in hydraulic engineering under variable tidal and weather conditions, positioning the firm for contributions to coastal infrastructure vital for both commercial shipping and military logistics. During World War I, the company's tug fleet was requisitioned for Royal Navy service, underscoring its maritime assets' utility in wartime mobilization and supply chain support.[14] Requisitioning intensified in World War II from 1940 to 1945, with tugs integrated into Royal Navy examination services for harbor security and convoy operations, operating in environments marked by heightened risks from aerial and submarine threats.[15] These experiences validated the firm's engineering resilience, as its vessels and dredging knowledge aided in sustaining naval dockyard functionality and Allied maritime throughput despite resource constraints and combat damage. By 1945, this maritime base had established a proven track record in specialized engineering, setting the stage for post-war adaptations without direct extension into terrestrial civil works.Post-War Transition to Civil Engineering (1945–1990s)
Following the end of World War II, Tilbury Contracting Group Limited, previously engaged in maritime lighterage and dredging, redirected its operations toward civil engineering amid Britain's extensive infrastructure reconstruction needs. This pivot capitalized on government-initiated public works programs to repair war damage and modernize utilities, roads, and utilities, with the firm undertaking land reclamation, rubbish disposal from bombed sites, and initial contracting for civil projects in a less regulated environment that favored fixed-price agreements for predictable revenues.[16][17] By the 1950s and 1960s, as the UK motorway network expanded under national development plans, Tilbury contributed to broader civil engineering efforts, including groundwork aligned with the era's road-building surge, though specific contracts were often sub-contracted or preparatory to larger builds. The acquisition of RM Douglas in 1991 enhanced these capabilities, integrating prior expertise in motorway sections such as parts of the M1, M40, M42, and M6, completed in the preceding decades, which bolstered the group's portfolio in high-volume infrastructure amid sustained public sector demand.[18][4] Into the 1990s, Tilbury Douglas—formed post-acquisition—began internal diversification toward maintenance services for built infrastructure, reflecting a pragmatic response to cyclical risks in pure contracting by securing recurring revenues from utilities and road upkeep, even as core civil works remained central to operations until the century's end. This evolution was evidenced by steady project logs and the firm's rebranding preparations, prioritizing stability over expansion into non-core areas.[4]Expansion into Support Services (2000s)
During the early 2000s, Interserve shifted strategically from primarily construction-focused operations toward integrated support services, capitalizing on the UK's expanding outsourcing market driven by public-private partnerships (PPP) and private finance initiative (PFI) frameworks. This transition was facilitated by the acquisition of the Building & Property Group in 2000, which bolstered capabilities in maintenance and facilities management, aligning with broader deregulation trends that encouraged bundled service delivery for public infrastructure projects.[19][4] The move reflected a market response to government policies promoting long-term outsourcing, enabling firms like Interserve to offer end-to-end solutions from construction through ongoing operational support, thereby securing recurring revenue streams over traditional one-off builds.[20] Key to this expansion was the 2006 acquisition of MacLellan Group for £116 million in a cash-and-shares deal, adding expertise in hygiene, catering, security, and estate maintenance to Interserve's portfolio.[21][22] This deal enhanced the bundled model, where initial construction contracts transitioned seamlessly into support services, driving operational scale through cross-selling opportunities in sectors like healthcare and education. By integrating these acquisitions, Interserve reported a pre-tax profit of £36 million in 2004, reversing a £2.9 million loss from 2003, with services increasingly contributing to profitability.[23] Growth accelerated via PFI/PPP contracts, which by 2007 encompassed 26 operational projects plus five at preferred bidder status, involving substantial capital commitments for integrated design, build, and maintain phases.[24] Notable wins included a £400 million Ministry of Defence South-east regional prime contract, which exemplified efficiency gains from unified service provision, as privatization incentives rewarded consortia capable of lifecycle management over fragmented bidding.[25] These mechanisms, rooted in policy shifts toward risk transfer to private entities, allowed Interserve to achieve revenue diversification, with support services forming a growing share—over 45% of group turnover by the late 2000s—while delivering cost controls through in-house synergies.[20]Acquisition Strategy and Operational Growth (2010s)
In the early 2010s, Interserve adopted an acquisition-focused strategy to accelerate expansion in facilities management and engineering services, seeking vertical integration between its construction capabilities and ongoing support operations to capture synergies in project lifecycles. This approach diversified revenue streams beyond traditional civil engineering toward recurring support services contracts, with acquisitions targeted at bolstering geographic reach and service depth.[26][27] A pivotal early move occurred in November 2010, when Interserve acquired the U.S.-based CMC Construction Services, a formwork and shoring specialist, for £22 million. The deal added approximately $18 million in annual revenues from assets, personnel, and facilities, enhancing Interserve's engineering division presence in the American market and supporting integration with its existing international construction projects.[26][28] The strategy intensified with the March 2014 completion of the £250 million cash acquisition of Initial Facilities from Rentokil Initial plc, a major facilities management provider with £542.2 million in 2013 revenues and £8.8 million in operating profit. This purchase significantly scaled Interserve's support services arm, creating one of the UK's largest integrated facilities providers and enabling bundled offerings from design and build through to maintenance, though it introduced operational complexities from merging disparate contract portfolios and systems.[29][30] Collectively, Interserve's 2012–2014 acquisitions exceeded £300 million in spend, driving segment operating profits higher—such as a near-50% rise to £81.4 million in support services by 2014, combining acquisitive gains with 9% organic growth. These efforts aimed at long-term efficiencies through end-to-end service control but amplified managerial demands from integrating acquired entities' client bases and technologies, as reflected in subsequent operational reviews.[27][31]Onset of Financial Pressures (2017–2018)
In 2017, Interserve recorded a pre-tax loss of £244.4 million for the year ended 31 December, widening from £94.1 million in 2016, amid an "extremely poor" performance attributed to an inefficient operating model and excessive cost structure that exposed the group to underperformance in its UK operations.[32][33] The UK construction division shifted from a £25 million profit in 2016 to a £19.4 million headline loss, driven by high exposure to fixed-price contracts where project overruns eroded margins already thin by industry standards—averaging around 1.5% for major UK contractors that year.[32][34][35] Specific pressures arose from energy-from-waste (EfW) projects, including delays and design failures at the Derby facility (completion pushed to H1 2018) and ongoing losses from the terminated Glasgow contract, contributing £35.1 million in charges and £95.9 million in cash outflows tied to inadequate risk controls and subcontractor issues under fixed-price terms.[32] Non-underlying items exacerbated the downturn, totaling approximately £299 million, including £86.1 million from contract reviews (with £42.4 million in balance sheet writedowns and £43.7 million for onerous contracts) and £60 million in goodwill impairments, reflecting historical undisciplined contract selection and pricing in support services.[32] Net debt surged to £502.6 million by year-end, more than doubling from £274.4 million in 2016, fueled by cash strains from EfW investments and prior acquisitions such as Tilbury Douglas in 2016, which added to borrowings without commensurate returns amid rising overheads.[32][36] Into 2018, early refinancing efforts underscored board-level responses to liquidity risks, with facilities extended to £834 million maturing in September 2021, including a £350 million US private placement, as part of the "Fit for Growth" restructuring plan incurring £33.2 million in costs to address the unfit cost base.[32][37] UK construction margins remained negative at -1.9%, below the sector's low single-digit averages, highlighting persistent vulnerabilities from fixed-price bidding in a competitive market prone to cost inflation and execution shortfalls.[38][39]Restructuring Efforts and Shareholder Conflicts (2018–2019)
In late 2018, Interserve pursued a deleveraging plan to address mounting net debt of £614 million, announcing on December 10 considerations for a debt-for-equity swap that would materially dilute existing shareholders while converting portions of its obligations to lenders.[40][41] On December 21, the company formalized this as a restructuring proposal amid discussions with bankers, aiming to reduce leverage to approximately 1.5 times earnings through debt conversion and operational adjustments.[42] These efforts stemmed from prior management decisions, including aggressive acquisitions that inflated debt without commensurate profitability, exacerbating vulnerabilities in low-margin public sector contracts prone to cost overruns and payment delays.[41] By February 2019, Interserve reached a tentative agreement with creditors—including banks like RBS and hedge funds—for a £480 million debt-for-equity swap on February 6, which would transfer near-total control to lenders and leave shareholders with minimal equity, prompting backlash from investors who viewed it as punitive given the company's underlying operational assets. Coltrane Asset Management, holding approximately 27% of shares as the largest stakeholder, rejected this on February 22 by proposing an alternative transaction involving partial debt conversion and asset sales to preserve more shareholder value, though Interserve's board dismissed it for failing to resolve immediate cash shortfalls.[43] Tensions escalated in early March, with Coltrane advancing revised rescue demands on March 4 that spurned lender terms, only for the board to rebuff them on March 6, citing risks to short-term liquidity amid ongoing contract delays and cancellations that had already strained working capital.[44][45][46] Liquidity pressures intensified through 2018–2019 due to specific setbacks, such as delays and outright cancellations in key construction projects, which eroded cash flows despite reported revenues; for instance, loss-making fixed-price public sector deals—comprising a significant portion of operations—amplified exposure to unforeseen cost escalations without flexible pricing mechanisms.[7] Empirical figures underscore management culpability over creditor avarice: pre-crisis profits had turned to losses from over-expansion (e.g., debt-fueled bids into prisons and healthcare), not isolated greed, as evidenced by the £815 million total debt load by early 2019 versus diluted operational margins in government-reliant segments.[41] Coltrane's opposition, while self-interested in seeking higher equity recovery, reflected broader shareholder calculus prioritizing speculative alternatives over lender-backed stability, culminating in the March 15 rejection of the deleveraging plan by over 59% of votes, which prioritized potential upside against evident insolvency risks.[47] This dynamic highlighted causal roots in strategic missteps—public sector dependency fostering brittle cash conversion—rather than narratives framing hedge fund actions as sole precipitants, as lender concessions still entailed substantial haircuts absent viable counters.[7]Administration, Breakup, and Wind-Up (2019–2022)
On 15 March 2019, Interserve entered pre-pack administration following the rejection of a shareholder rescue proposal, with Ernst & Young appointed as joint administrators.[8][43] The company's assets were immediately transferred to a new entity, Montana 1 Limited, owned by its senior lenders including Highland European Equity Fund, which assumed control to stabilize operations and protect ongoing public contracts.[48] This process safeguarded approximately 45,000 jobs and ensured continuity of services, as confirmed by the UK government, which emphasized minimal disruption to public sector obligations despite the insolvency.[49][50] Subsequent divestitures fragmented the group. In June 2020, Interserve's facilities management division was sold to Mitie for £271 million, with the transaction completing on 1 December 2020, integrating around 30,000 employees and forming the UK's largest facilities management provider with 77,500 staff total.[51][52] The construction and engineering arms were rebranded as Tilbury Douglas Construction and Tilbury Douglas Engineering on 2 March 2021, reviving a historic name to signal operational independence while retaining key personnel and contracts.[53][54] Interserve Plc's administration concluded with a compulsory winding-up order issued by the High Court on 21 January 2022, transitioning oversight to joint liquidators Robert Hunter Kelly and Alan Michael Hudson of EY.[55][6] This followed the separation of Tilbury Douglas as a standalone entity in June 2022, with liquidators pursuing recovery of Interserve's stake in a Qatari subsidiary amid creditor distributions.[56][11] Job retentions exceeded losses across sales, with the pre-pack and transfers preserving the bulk of the workforce—estimated at over 40,000 roles—while targeted redundancies remained limited to non-core functions.[57]Business Model and Operations
Core Service Offerings
Interserve's core service offerings centered on integrated support services, facilities management, and outsourcing solutions tailored for public and private sector clients. Facilities management encompassed a range of hard services, including mechanical, electrical, and building fabric maintenance, alongside soft services such as cleaning, catering, security, and waste management.[58] These were often delivered through bundled contracts that combined multiple functions to streamline operations and minimize service disruptions.[59] Support services outsourcing formed a key pillar, involving the management of operational activities like estates maintenance, healthcare staffing, workplace support, and training programs.[59] Engineering services complemented these by providing design, installation, and equipment hire, with an emphasis on integrating upfront construction or fit-out with long-term operational support to achieve coordinated lifecycle delivery.[60] This model relied heavily on Public-Private Partnership (PPP) frameworks, where Interserve handled bundled responsibilities from asset development through ongoing service provision, such as in justice and healthcare sectors.[43] The scale of operations supported broad service integration, with Interserve employing around 75,000 staff globally as of 2017 to execute large-volume contracts.[32] Outsourcing approaches like these enabled specialization, where private providers applied standardized processes and economies of scale to public service delivery, empirically lowering operational costs in specific bundled FM case studies by optimizing resource allocation over in-house management.[58] Such efficiencies stemmed from competitive tendering and performance-based incentives inherent in PPP structures, though outcomes varied by contract design.[60]Divisional Structure and Key Contracts
Interserve's organizational structure prior to its 2019 administration centered on three core divisions: Support Services, Construction, and Equipment Services, following a 2019 restructuring that consolidated over 40 prior units into this streamlined framework to enhance operational efficiency.[61][62] The Support Services division encompassed facilities management operations across the UK and international markets, including cleaning, maintenance, and catering for public and private sector clients, with sub-units handling hard and soft services.[63] In December 2018, this division absorbed the Citizen Services unit, which specialized in community rehabilitation and welfare-to-work programs, to simplify reporting lines and integrate client-facing operations.[64][65] The Construction division managed building and civil engineering projects, while Equipment Services provided specialized rentals such as scaffolding and formwork through subsidiaries like RMD Kwikform.[48] These divisions operated with regional hierarchies, primarily concentrated in the UK with headquarters in Reading, Berkshire, and supported by localized teams for project execution; international operations extended to the Middle East (e.g., UAE, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia) via Construction and Support Services units, enabling cross-regional resource allocation for large-scale contracts.[66] Divisional interdependence facilitated integrated service delivery, where Support Services often complemented Construction on government projects, allowing shared client relationships and resource pooling to distribute operational risks across service lines rather than concentrating exposure in single areas.[48] Key contracts were predominantly with UK government entities, positioning Interserve as the largest strategic supplier by value in 2017 with £938 million in awards, representing 11% of total government procurement that year.[67] Major clients included departments such as the Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Transport, Ministry of Justice, and National Health Service, encompassing facilities management for hospitals, schools, and prisons, as well as probation services supervising approximately 40,000 offenders under post-2014 privatization contracts.[68][69] An additional £660 million in public sector contracts was secured in the lead-up to administration, primarily through Support Services for maintenance and citizen-facing programs.[9] These relationships emphasized long-term frameworks, with volumes tied to public infrastructure needs, though executed via divisional specialization to align capabilities with client requirements.[70]Project Delivery Approach
Interserve adopted a collaborative project delivery methodology centered on supply chain integration and whole-life asset management, encompassing phases from business case development through design, procurement, construction, and maintenance.[71] This approach emphasized early involvement of specialist subcontractors to mitigate risks and enhance value, distinguishing it from traditional sequential models by prioritizing joint planning over adversarial bidding.[72] A key element was the two-stage open book (2SOB) procurement model, particularly under frameworks like PPC2000, where an initial pre-construction phase allowed transparent cost benchmarking and design refinement before committing to a target cost or fixed-price agreement for execution.[73] In this system, Interserve shared detailed cost data with clients and tier-1/tier-2 suppliers, enabling collaborative risk allocation—such as through pain/gain share mechanisms in NEC contracts—while fixed-price elements were applied post-refinement for defined scopes.[74] Target cost models incentivized efficiency by aligning incentives for cost control, with evidence from industry applications showing potential for 10-20% savings via optimized supply chain input, though they demand robust governance to prevent scope creep absent strong client-contractor alignment.[72] Fixed-price contracts, conversely, shifted performance risks fully to Interserve, suiting stable projects but exposing margins to unforeseen variables like material fluctuations, as observed in broader construction sector data where underestimation led to disputes in 15-20% of such deals.[75] Interserve differentiated through in-house engineering and design capabilities, enabling integrated design-build execution for greater control over interfaces and quality, as demonstrated in BIM-enabled developments that reduced coordination errors by up to 30% per project benchmarks.[76] Innovations included off-site prefabrication for components like volumetric prison cells, reducing on-site labor by 50% and accelerating timelines through pre-assembly, verified in government-backed trials.[77] This contrasted with competitors reliant on fragmented outsourcing, allowing Interserve to internalize expertise for causal risk management—prioritizing empirical sequencing over speculative bids—and fostering repeatable efficiencies across public sector contracts.[71]Financial Performance
Revenue, Profitability, and Key Metrics
Interserve's revenue grew steadily through the 2000s and early 2010s, reaching approximately £2.3 billion in 2011, before peaking at around £3.7 billion in 2016 amid expansion in support services and construction contracts.[78][79] Post-2015, revenues began a decline, falling to £3.25 billion in 2017, £2.90 billion in 2018, and £2.24 billion in 2019, reflecting reduced activity in key divisions.[80][81] Profitability remained characterized by thin margins, particularly in the construction division, where operating margins hovered between 1% and 3% in the mid-2010s. For instance, construction margins stood at 1.8% in 2014, dipping to 1.6% in 2015, and averaging around 2% in earlier years like 2011 and 2012.[82][83][84] Underlying operating profit pre-non-underlying items declined from £155 million in 2016 to £75 million in 2017 and further pressured in subsequent years.[79] These margins aligned with sector norms for construction and support services, where peers often reported similar low single-digit figures due to competitive bidding and fixed-price contracts.[82] Key metrics included EBITDA, which fluctuated from £122 million in 2015 to a high of £194 million in 2016 before dropping to £116 million in 2017 and £135 million in 2018.[79][80] The order book, indicative of secured future revenues, peaked at £7.6 billion in 2016–2017, then contracted to £7.1 billion in 2018 and £6.1 billion in 2019.[79][81]| Year | Revenue (£ billion) | EBITDA (£ million) | Order Book (£ billion) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 3.2 | 122 | - |
| 2016 | 3.7 | 194 | 7.6 |
| 2017 | 3.3 | 116 | 7.6 |
| 2018 | 2.9 | 135 | 7.1 |
| 2019 | 2.2 | - | 6.1 |
Debt Accumulation and Pension Obligations
Interserve's net debt escalated markedly during the mid-2010s, rising from £274 million at the end of 2016 to £513 million by March 2017, primarily due to strained working capital from loss-making contracts and the financing demands of its low-margin support services model.[85] This buildup reflected repeated refinancing cycles to sustain operations amid cash outflows in public sector outsourcing, where long payment terms and fixed-price deals amplified leverage risks in a sector prone to cost overruns.[37] By fiscal year 2018, net debt had climbed further to £631 million, exacerbating covenant pressures and necessitating creditor negotiations to avert default.[62] The company's defined-benefit pension scheme, closed to future accrual by 2009, carried persistent deficits stemming from legacy obligations transferred via TUPE regulations in public contracts, which mandated alignment with generous public-sector pay and indexing norms less adjustable than in private markets.[86] Efforts to mitigate shortfalls included injecting equity from 13 PFI projects in 2009 and subsequent deals that reduced the UK scheme's actuarial deficit from £150 million to £95 million by 2012 through £124.5 million in asset transfers.[87] By 2017, the total pension liability deficit stood at £48 million on an IAS 19 basis, down slightly from £52.4 million the prior year, though ongoing contributions—such as £23 million annually until 2011—highlighted the drag on liquidity in a high-leverage environment.[88][27] These intertwined liabilities underscored vulnerabilities in Interserve's model, where public-sector reliance locked in inflexible pension funding amid borrowing for growth, contrasting with private-sector peers' ability to renegotiate terms or shift to defined-contribution schemes for cost control. In administration proceedings from March 2019, the pension scheme's secured claims were released, insulating members from immediate impact while isolating the deficit from core creditor resolutions.[43][89]Annual Reporting Highlights
Interserve's 2017 annual report disclosed a pre-tax loss of £244.4 million, driven by significant non-underlying items including £76.7 million in goodwill and other asset impairments, primarily £60 million related to UK Support Services due to underperformance from competitive pricing and regulatory costs.[32] Contract review charges totaled £86.1 million, comprising £42.4 million in balance sheet write-downs and £43.7 million for onerous contracts, alongside £35.1 million additional provisions for Energy from Waste projects, reflecting cumulative losses of £216.6 million from 2015 onward.[32] Net debt stood at £502.6 million, exceeding internal targets and prompting refinancing efforts that extended committed facilities to £834 million maturing in September 2021.[32] The report's auditor, Grant Thornton, identified key audit matters including going concern assessments, revenue recognition, contract accounting, and impairment testing, with emphasis on significant judgments around loss-making contracts such as those with the Ministry of Justice and US Forces Prime.[32] Principal risks highlighted encompassed high debt levels, major contract mis-pricing, and potential covenant breaches under stress scenarios, alongside pension scheme deficits requiring ongoing contributions.[32] No dividends were recommended, signaling financial strain, though the viability statement affirmed resilience over a three-year horizon barring multiple adverse events.[32] In the 2018 annual report, disclosures intensified on liquidity pressures, with net debt rising to £631.2 million amid £128.6 million year-over-year increase and total borrowings at £827.9 million following April 2018 refinancing at elevated rates.[80] Impairment charges included £33.1 million in goodwill, notably £26.9 million for Support Services private-sector operations and £6.2 million for the Learning and Education cash-generating unit due to higher discount rates.[80] Provisions for loss-making contracts encompassed £11.4 million forward-loss for Ministry of Justice contracts and £5.1 million mainly for the US Forces Prime contract, with total provisions reduced to £22.5 million from prior-year levels after releases.[80] Going concern preparation hinged on shareholder approval of the Deleveraging Plan by 15 March 2019, with material uncertainty noted: failure could precipitate default on liabilities and inability to continue operations.[80] Auditors reiterated key matters such as going concern, contract provisions, and impairments, focusing on risks from Energy from Waste delays and high debt, including a £250 million pension guarantee.[80] Principal risks expanded to include Deleveraging Plan failure, Brexit effects, and contract terminations, underscoring trends toward greater transparency on covenant headroom and contingency planning amid regulatory compliance.[80]| Year | Net Debt (£M) | Key Impairment Charges (£M) | Notable Provisions (£M) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 502.6 | 76.7 (goodwill and assets) | 86.1 (contract reviews)[32] |
| 2018 | 631.2 | 33.1 (goodwill) | 22.5 (loss-making contracts)[80] |