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Brazilian National Congress

The National Congress of Brazil is the bicameral federal legislature responsible for enacting laws, overseeing the executive branch, and approving the national budget in the . It comprises the , representing the population through proportional allocation, and the Federal Senate, ensuring equal representation for the 26 states and the . Established in its current form under the 1988 Constitution, which ended the and restored democratic institutions, the meets annually from February 2 to December 22 in the iconic National Congress Palace in , designed by and completed in 1960 as part of the new capital's modernist ensemble. The consists of 513 members elected every four years by , with seats distributed based on state population but capped between a minimum of eight and a maximum of seventy per federative unit to balance regional disparities. Deputies initiate most , including bills on taxation and civil , reflecting the diverse and often fragmented that necessitates broad coalitions for governance. The Federal Senate features 81 members—three per state and the —elected for eight-year terms, with elections staggered every four years for one-third and two-thirds of seats to provide continuity and federal equilibrium. Senators hold powers over Chamber bills and exclusive authority on treaties, state boundaries, and constitutional amendments, underscoring the upper house's role in protecting minority regional interests against majority populism. As the primary arena for political contestation in Brazil's , the National Congress has been pivotal in landmark reforms, such as and measures, though its operations are marked by high legislative productivity alongside chronic challenges like pork-barrel amendments and influence peddling scandals that erode public trust. The body's effectiveness hinges on amid multiparty fragmentation, where over 30 parties vie for seats, often leading to unstable alliances and executive reliance on provisional measures to bypass .

History

Origins under the Empire and Early Republic

The General Assembly of the was instituted by the promulgated on March 25, 1824, forming a bicameral comprising the and the . Deputies were elected for four-year terms by indirect vote among literate male property owners, numbering around 42 to 84 members depending on provincial quotas, while senators—initially 50 in number—held lifetime appointments selected by the from triple lists generated by provincial electoral colleges. This structure centralized authority under the emperor's moderating power, which permitted vetoes of legislation, dissolution of the Chamber, and reconvening of assemblies, thereby constraining parliamentary autonomy despite the Assembly's nominal role in approving taxes, loans, and treaties. The Assembly convened annually, usually from early May to late December, producing limited legislative output focused on civil and commercial codification, such as the 1830 Criminal Code and 1850 Commercial Code, which reinforced elite property rights amid scant reforms addressing slavery or broader . Voter eligibility, restricted to about 1% of the , underscored oligarchic control, with provincial notables dominating elections and debates often deferring to imperial prerogatives. The monarchy's overthrow via military coup on November 15, 1889, transitioned to a , prompting the adoption of a federal constitution on February 24, 1891, which preserved in the National Congress while decentralizing power to states. The retained proportional representation based on population, but the shifted to elected terms of nine years, granting each of the 20 states equal allocation of three seats to foster federal equilibrium and counterbalance larger provinces like and . This equal representation reflected compromises among republican positivists and regional caudillos, embedding malapportionment that amplified smaller states' influence in a system marked by "coffee-with-milk" oligarchic pacts between and elites. Early republican Congresses met in annual ordinary sessions from May to December, supplemented by extraordinary calls, yet legislative productivity remained modest, averaging fewer than 50 federal laws per year before 1910, prioritizing tariff protections for exports and over social legislation. Electoral manipulations, including vote-buying and barriers excluding over 90% of adults, perpetuated dominance, with congressional debates often serving as arenas for rather than national policy innovation until the 1930 Revolution.

Developments during the Vargas Era and Mid-20th Century

The 1934 Constitution, promulgated on July 16, 1934, by a following Getúlio Vargas's provisional presidency after the 1930 Revolution, introduced reforms that mitigated traditional in Brazil's . While retaining the and Federal Senate, it strengthened executive influence over legislative processes, including provisions for presidential decree-laws that bypassed full congressional deliberation, reflecting Vargas's push for centralized authority amid economic instability from the . This shift subordinated to executive priorities, such as state-led industrialization and labor regulations, which prioritized national economic consolidation over robust checks and balances. On November 10, 1937, Vargas orchestrated a , proclaiming the and enacting a new that explicitly dissolved the National Congress, abolished , and eliminated legislative bodies entirely. This interruption of democratic functioning lasted until 1945, during which Vargas ruled by decree, consolidating power through corporatist structures that controlled labor unions and suppressed opposition, justified by fabricated threats like the forged "Cohen Plan" alleging communist plots. The dissolution exemplified authoritarian centralization, where legislative institutions were viewed as obstacles to rapid executive decision-making in foreign policy alignment and domestic stabilization, particularly as Brazil navigated neutrality before joining the Allies in 1942. The end of Estado Novo in October 1945, prompted by military and societal pressure, led to elections and the promulgation of the 1946 Constitution on September 18, 1946, which restored full bicameral powers to the National Congress, reinstating and checks like veto overrides requiring simple majorities in joint sessions. It expanded to literate women—building on 1932 electoral reforms—and maintained literacy requirements that preserved dominance, as rural and lower-class illiterates (over 50% of the ) remained disenfranchised, ensuring congressional favored and landowning interests. Despite these restorations, economic under presidents like Vargas in his 1951–1954 term fostered legislative deference to the executive; Congress approved state interventions in industry and wages but rarely challenged decree-laws or , as evidenced by minimal overrides amid policies promoting import-substitution industrialization that ballooned public debt from 10% of GDP in 1947 to over 20% by 1960. This deference stemmed causally from populist appeals that aligned congressional majorities with executive-led growth strategies, prioritizing short-term redistribution and over fiscal restraint, which entrenched statist frameworks resistant to reforms. Right-leaning analysts, such as those critiquing Vargas's , argue these periods solidified interventionist precedents— including monopolies like in 1953—that stifled private enterprise and long-term competitiveness, contrasting with liberal emphases on and property rights. Such critiques highlight how and executive dominance during mid-century transitions perpetuated inefficiencies, as legislative inertia deferred structural changes until the 1964 military intervention.

Military Dictatorship and Legislative Suppression

The 1964 military , executed between March 31 and April 1, overthrew President and prompted the National to elect Marshal as president on April 11, following the cassation—permanent removal from office—of dozens of opposition legislators to ensure regime loyalty. Over the regime's course, approximately 100 to 200 federal congressmen were purged through cassations and suspensions of political rights, often under Institutional Act No. 1 issued shortly after the coup, which authorized such measures without to eliminate perceived subversives. These purges, combined with the shift to indirect presidential elections by itself via Institutional Act No. 2 in October 1965, subordinated legislative functions to executive preferences, as opposition figures were systematically replaced by alternates aligned with the regime's party. The 1967 Constitution, promulgated under President Artur da Costa e Silva, further entrenched executive dominance by granting the president decree powers in security, financial, and budgetary matters, effectively bypassing congressional deliberation and reducing the legislature to a rubber-stamp body for regime policies. Institutional Acts, as extra-constitutional edicts, exemplified this erosion: Act No. 5, enacted December 13, 1968, amid student protests, suspended habeas corpus, enabled indefinite congressional closures, and empowered the executive to intervene in state assemblies, leading to direct shutdowns of the National Congress for months and a marked decline in autonomous legislative output as executive decrees supplanted bills. Pre-coup legislative activity, characterized by robust debate under the 1946 Constitution, yielded to post-1964 patterns where bill initiations from deputies dropped due to fear of reprisal and procedural overrides, with the regime maintaining Congress as a facade of legality rather than dissolving it outright, unlike contemporaneous dictatorships in Argentina or Chile. From the mid-1970s, President Ernesto Geisel's distensão policy initiated controlled liberalization, permitting direct elections for Congress in November 1974 that yielded significant gains for the opposition , including control of over half of seats contested, signaling public discontent with repression. Yet this thaw was uneven; executive dominance persisted through package votes and cassations, as evidenced by Congress's in April 1977 after opposition challenges to electoral reforms, underscoring how distensão prioritized regime survival over full legislative restoration. Pro-regime analyses credit the era with macroeconomic stability and growth during the 1968–1973 "," attributing it to centralized executive control that curbed congressional gridlock amid perceived leftist threats, though critics, drawing on documentation, highlight causal links between suppressed dissent—via and legalized under acts like AI-5—and delayed institutional accountability, with over 400 deaths tied to state repression. This duality reflects the dictatorship's instrumental use of Congress: a tool for legitimation and stability, but weakened to prevent vetoes on authoritarian measures.

Transition to Democracy and the 1988 Constitution

The Diretas Já campaign, launched in 1983 and peaking with mass rallies in 1984 attended by millions across major cities, demanded direct popular elections for the presidency to accelerate the end of military rule, but Congress rejected the enabling constitutional amendment on April 25, 1984, preserving indirect voting via an electoral college. This pressure nonetheless facilitated the 1985 indirect election of Tancredo Neves as the first civilian president in 21 years, with 480 of 686 electoral college votes on January 15, 1985; Neves died before inauguration on March 15, leading Vice President José Sarney to assume office and initiate redemocratization. Under Sarney, a National Constituent Assembly, elected in November 1986 with 559 members (72% incumbents from the prior Congress), drafted and promulgated the 1988 Constitution on October 5, 1988, restoring full bicameral legislative autonomy suppressed during the dictatorship by reinstating the National Congress as comprising 513 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, elected by proportional representation for four-year terms, and 81 senators (three per state and the Federal District) elected by majority vote for eight-year staggered terms, with one-third or two-thirds renewed every four years. The framework emphasized federalism through equal senatorial representation for states regardless of population, aiming to balance regional interests against the populous states' dominance in the lower house. Post-1988 implementation saw initial spikes in legislative productivity, with the executive introducing 85% of enacted bills but Congress approving over 66% of constitutional amendments, reflecting heightened activity amid ; however, federalism's structure facilitated pork-barrel allocations, as deputies secured individual budget amendments for local projects, often favoring birthplaces or constituencies, which empirical studies link to electoral incentives under open-list rather than policy coherence. The Constitution earned praise for expanding civil rights, social protections, and democratic checks, fostering through 100+ amendments and adaptation to crises, yet critics highlight how provisions enabling expansion allowed interventions in policy domains like fiscal rules and executive acts, arguably fostering over-centralization via judicial overrides of legislative or federal-state balances, while pork mechanisms exacerbated fragmentation and fiscal indiscipline without proportional gains.

Composition and Organization

Chamber of Deputies

The , the of Brazil's National Congress, consists of 513 deputies elected to four-year terms by within each state's multi-member constituency. Seats are apportioned according to state population, with a minimum of eight deputies for the least populous states and a maximum of seventy for the most populous, such as . This system emphasizes population-based proportionality, contrasting with the Federal Senate's equal allocation of three seats per state to ensure federal balance. Deputies are selected through an open-list system, where voters cast ballots for individual candidates rather than parties alone, and seats within party lists are awarded to those receiving the highest personal votes after proportional allocation to parties or coalitions. The Chamber operates through a network of standing committees, which conduct permanent legislative scrutiny of bills by subject area, alongside temporary and joint committees for specific inquiries or bicameral coordination. In overriding presidential vetoes, the Chamber requires an absolute majority vote—257 of 513 deputies—jointly with the to enact bills into law. Representation trends reflect demographic disparities: as of 2022, women held approximately 18 percent of seats, marking gradual increases from prior decades amid quota policies, while self-identified Black or mixed-race () deputies comprised about 26 percent, underscoring underrepresentation relative to the national population where over 56 percent identify as Black or . These patterns arise from electoral dynamics favoring incumbents and resource-intensive campaigns, limiting broader inclusion without structural reforms.

Federal Senate

The Federal Senate comprises 81 members, known as senators, with three elected from each of 's 26 states and one from the , providing equal representation to all federative units irrespective of population disparities. This structure promotes regional balance and federal equilibrium, differing from the population-proportional allocation in the . Senators are elected by majority vote in two-round elections held concurrently with those for the Chamber, serving eight-year terms to foster legislative stability. Elections occur every four years in staggered cycles, renewing one-third (27 seats) in one and two-thirds (54 seats) in the subsequent one, as stipulated in the 1988 Constitution. This mechanism ensures partial continuity, with approximately two-thirds of senators retaining experience across cycles, which supports consistent oversight of federal-state relations. For instance, the 2022 election renewed 27 seats, while the 2026 election will contest 54, heightening strategic maneuvering among parties for state-level influence. The holds exclusive competences vital to , including approving presidential nominations for positions such as justices, the Attorney General, ambassadors, and ministers of the Superior Courts. It also authorizes federal interventions in states or the —requiring and prior opinion—and processes impeachments of the , Vice-President, and certain officials for crimes of responsibility. These powers position the Senate as a guardian of state autonomy and a check on executive overreach, arbitrating disputes that could undermine the federation's unity.

Leadership and Joint Mechanisms

The of the National Congress alternates between the president of the Federal and the president of the every four-year term, ensuring balanced bicameral leadership. This rotation, established under the 1988 Constitution and congressional rules, positions the president as the ex officio head during their house's designated period, as seen in the 2023–2027 where Senator holds the role following his to on February 1, 2023, with re-election considerations extending into 2025. The president directs joint administrative functions, represents the in interbranch relations, and convenes bicameral sessions for high-stakes actions like overriding presidential vetoes by absolute majority or conducting trials after initiation. The Board of the National Congress (Mesa do Congresso Nacional) comprises the president, up to four vice-presidents, four secretaries, and additional alternates, selected alternately from senators and deputies to reflect across chambers. Elected or appointed at the legislature's outset through negotiations among party leaders, board members serve two-year terms within the four-year cycle, with eligibility for re-election subject to house-specific statutes limiting consecutive mandates to prevent entrenchment—such as the Chamber's rule capping presidencies at two terms. This oversees like document distribution, session , and , fostering operational unity while mitigating unilateral house dominance. Joint mechanisms include mixed commissions (comissões mistas), permanent or temporary bicameral panels formed by equal numbers of deputies and senators for targeted review. The Joint Budget Committee (Comissão Mista de Orçamento, CMO), for instance, analyzes the annual federal budget law, fiscal targets, and credit operations, submitting reports for plenary approval by December 22 each year; in 2024, it processed over 1,200 emendations amid debates on expenditure ceilings. Other examples encompass mixed parliamentary inquiries (CPIs mistas), like the 2025 CPI on undue INSS discounts involving 18 members probing irregularities, and groups for provisional measures (medidas provisórias), which must be evaluated within 60 days to avert caducity—handling 38 pending MPs as of March 2025 through dedicated installations. These bodies streamline cross-house coordination on executive-initiated bills, reducing , though their effectiveness hinges on maintenance and majority consensus, often shaped by pacts that align with the .

Powers and Functions

Legislative Authority

The Brazilian National Congress exercises primary legislative authority through a bicameral process outlined in Articles 59–69 of the 1988 Constitution, where ordinary bills may be initiated in either the or the , except for revenue-raising measures, which originate exclusively in the , and international treaties, which begin in the . Bills undergo review in the originating house, followed by and voting; upon passage, they proceed to the second house for examination, where amendments may necessitate return to the origin for reconciliation, potentially involving a joint to produce identical texts required for final approval. This sequential shuttle system ensures mutual revision, fostering deliberation but occasionally contributing to delays in a fragmented multiparty environment. Approved bills are forwarded to the , who has 15 working days to them into or issue a total or partial , justified on grounds of unconstitutionality or . Vetoed portions return to for review during its next session; override requires an absolute majority (257 votes in the and 41 in the ) in separate votes by each house, after which the must promulgate the within or it takes effect automatically. This mechanism balances executive input against legislative supremacy, with overrides occurring sporadically, as seen in December 2023 when reinstated anti-Indigenous provisions by overturning Lula's vetoes on 14.701. Constitutional amendments, proposed as Proposals to Amend the Constitution (PECs), demand a of three-fifths of members in each house across two distinct voting rounds, with no amendments permitted in the second round to prevent dilution. This elevated threshold, per Article 60, enforces policy stability by insulating the from transient majorities but can induce amid Brazil's system, which generates dependencies. A prominent example is PEC 241/2016, which established a 20-year cap on public expenditure growth tied to inflation; it passed the in October 2016 by 366–111 votes in the second round and the in December 2016 by 53–16, becoming Emenda Constitucional 95 without presidential veto, as it originated from the under Temer.

Oversight and Accountability

The Brazilian National Congress asserts oversight over the executive branch through Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry (CPIs), which are authorized under Article 58, paragraph 3, of the 1988 Constitution to investigate events of public concern that warrant elucidation. These commissions, formed by either chamber or jointly, operate with judicial-like powers, including subpoenaing witnesses, accessing documents, and conducting hearings, typically lasting up to 180 days with possible extensions. CPIs have produced investigative reports recommending legislative or prosecutorial actions, though empirical outcomes show low rates of follow-through convictions, often attributed to political negotiations and jurisdictional overlaps with the . Impeachment represents a core tool against the for crimes of responsibility, with the voting to authorize proceedings and the Federal Senate serving as court, requiring a two-thirds for conviction and removal. This process was invoked in the 2016 of , where the Chamber approved the articles by a 367-137 margin on April 17, 2016, following allegations of fiscal manipulations to mask budget deficits, and the Senate convicted her 61-20 on August 31, 2016, upholding the charges as constitutional violations. Such mechanisms enable reactive checks on executive overreach, distinct from proactive lawmaking, by focusing on post-hoc for misconduct. The further enforces accountability via hearings for presidential nominees to key judicial and advisory roles, including ministers of the (STF), the General, and directors, ensuring scrutiny of qualifications and potential partisanship. For example, in December 2023, the Senate confirmed Justice Minister to the STF by a 47-31 vote after public hearings probing his judicial record and political ties. These approvals, grounded in Article 52 of the Constitution, have historically balanced executive appointments against congressional review, though durations vary from weeks to months based on controversy. Oversight lapses, such as infrequent or inconclusive CPIs prior to major probes, causally contributed to entrenched networks in public contracts and state firms, as exposed by Operation Lava Jato's revelations of bid-rigging schemes spanning decades. Conservative analysts contend this reflects systemic selectivity in enforcement, with intensified scrutiny under left-leaning administrations like Rousseff's contrasted against muted responses to analogous issues in others, potentially eroding impartial accountability. Empirical patterns from Lava Jato-era CPIs indicate shorter investigative durations (averaging 12-18 months) but persistent challenges in securing prosecutions, highlighting causal links between delayed congressional intervention and prolonged malfeasance.

Budgetary and Fiscal Responsibilities

The National Congress holds exclusive authority under Article 48 of the 1988 Constitution to deliberate on the pluriannual plan (PPA), the law of budgetary guidelines (LDO), and the annual budget law (LOA), all proposed by the executive branch. It also authorizes domestic and foreign debt operations by the Union and supervises their execution, ensuring that borrowings align with fiscal sustainability. Tax policy initiation falls to Congress via ordinary laws, though the executive submits foundational proposals, with amendments subject to maintaining revenue neutrality to avoid deficits. The annual budget process requires the executive to submit the LOA by August 31, projecting revenues and expenditures for the following year, which reviews and amends before approval, ideally by December 22. Amendments are constrained by constitutional rules prohibiting increases in expenditures without corresponding revenue sources or compensatory cuts elsewhere, though historical has allowed expansive emendations—often pork-barrel allocations—that strain fiscal , as evidenced by the post-1988 of legislative budgetary rights leading to fragmented and clientelistic spending. For instance, the 2025 LOA included R$62 billion in congressional earmarks, approved three months late in March 2025, highlighting delays and additive pressures. further shapes through the LDO, which sets expenditure ceilings, debt targets, and adjustment mechanisms for revenue shortfalls, emphasizing proactive multi-year planning over reactive oversight. In response to chronic deficits, approved a new fiscal framework in August 2023, replacing the 2016 spending cap and targeting primary surpluses starting at 0% of GDP in 2024, rising to 1% by 2026, with spending growth limited to 70% of net revenue increases to curb expansions. Empirical trends reveal limited efficacy: primary deficits averaged around 1-2% of GDP in the , ballooning to 14% in amid pandemic spending before partial recovery, yet the nominal deficit reached 8.45% of GDP in 2024 with gross debt at 76.1%. Subsequent exceptions—such as expanded court-ordered debt payments exceeding R$120 billion projected for 2027 and repeated rule dilutions by both executive and legislative actions—have eroded anchors, fostering skepticism about sustained consolidation amid politically driven spending hikes. Congress legislates mandatory federal transfers to states and municipalities, constitutionally fixed at minimum shares like 25% of certain taxes for subnational entities, via laws such as the Fund for State Equalization (FPE), which redistribute revenues to mitigate regional disparities. Discretionary transfers, embedded in the LOA, often favor politically aligned states, with data showing allocations correlating to congressional bargaining rather than need-based equity, though aggregate transfers have correlated with modest declines from 0.54 in 2010 to 0.52 in 2022. This framework underscores Congress's role in federal revenue-sharing, distinct from investigative accountability, by enforcing revenue floors and authorizing adjustments that influence subnational fiscal health without direct expenditure control.

Electoral System

Representation and Apportionment

The Chamber of Deputies consists of 513 members apportioned among Brazil's 26 states, the , and territories based on population figures from the latest decennial conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), using a quota of four deputies per 100,000 inhabitants, with a constitutional minimum of eight seats and a maximum of 70 per state to ensure proportional yet bounded representation. This fixed total reflects adjustments after each to maintain balance, though proposals in 2025 sought to expand it to 531 seats amid population growth debates, pending full enactment as of late 2025. Larger states like (70 deputies, representing over 44 million residents) and (53 deputies) thus hold substantial weight, while smaller northern states such as , , and each receive the minimum eight seats despite populations under 1 million, illustrating the system's federal safeguards. In contrast, the Federal Senate provides equal representation with three senators per state and the , totaling 81 members, elected in staggered cycles to prioritize territorial equality over . This structure, rooted in federal principles, grants smaller states veto-like influence in bicameral processes, ensuring peripheral regions can counterbalance urban-dominated majorities and preserve national cohesion against centrifugal forces. Such design embodies a trade-off in : while promoting regional equity and preventing dominance by populous centers like the Southeast, it amplifies the voice of low-density areas, where one senator from (population ~636,000) represents roughly 212,000 people compared to over 5 million per senator in . Critiques of this highlight significant malapportionment, particularly in the Chamber, where the floor quota creates disparities exceeding 10:1 in representational ratios, overempowering less populous states and potentially skewing policy toward rural or extractive interests at the expense of economic priorities. Empirical studies document how this persists due to entrenched electoral incentives, with overrepresented jurisdictions securing disproportionate fiscal transfers, though it arguably sustains democratic by accommodating Brazil's vast geographic and socioeconomic divides. No explicit constitutional quotas mandate ethnic or ideological minority beyond proportional allocation within states, leaving such outcomes to electoral dynamics rather than engineered safeguards.

Election Processes and Timing

Elections for both chambers of the Brazilian National Congress occur concurrently with presidential and elections every four years, typically on the first Sunday of , with congressional seats decided in the initial round regardless of any presidential runoff. The cycle aligns with the four-year term for the , while Senate terms last eight years, resulting in staggered renewals of either one-third (27 seats) or two-thirds (54 seats) of the alternately; the 2026 elections will renew two-thirds of Senate seats, with two senators elected per and the . The Chamber of Deputies employs an open-list system for its 513 seats, apportioned among 's 26 states and the based on population; voters select an individual candidate by number on electronic ballots, aggregating votes for both the candidate and their party or , after which parties receive seats via the electoral quotient (valid votes divided by seats available) plus largest remainders for surplus allocation, and intra-party seats go to the highest-voting candidates without closed lists or preference averaging. Senate elections use a majoritarian system, where the top vote-getter(s)—one or two per depending on the renewal cycle—secure the seat(s) outright, with no second round required even if no absolute majority is achieved. Post-2015 rulings banning corporate contributions, the 2017 electoral reforms imposed strict spending limits scaled by office sought and jurisdiction size—capping deputy campaigns at around 1.5 million reais per in larger states—while introducing public campaign funds distributed proportionally by prior vote shares to curb self-financing excesses and enhance competition, though enforcement relies on Tribunal Superior Eleitoral oversight. for those aged 18-70, enforced via fines and service restrictions, yielded a 79.05% turnout in the 2022 first-round congressional vote, down slightly from prior cycles amid growing abstention fines' inefficacy. Vote-buying persists as a systemic issue, particularly in lower-income regions, where clientelistic exchanges of cash, goods, or favors for ballots undermine free choice, with empirical analyses linking it to weaker monitoring and despite legal prohibitions under Article 299 of the Electoral Code and rising prosecutions since reforms. Such practices favor incumbents with resource access, distorting representation away from policy merit toward transactional networks, as evidenced by localized studies showing reduced public goods provision in high-clientelism areas.

Outcomes of Recent Elections

In the 2018 general elections held on October 7, the saw significant gains by parties aligned with anti-corruption sentiments fueled by Operation Lava Jato, with the Social Liberal Party (PSL), supporting President-elect , securing 52 seats and the (PT) holding 56 seats amid 30 parties represented in the 513-seat body. The Federal Senate, renewing 54 of 81 seats, resulted in a fragmented outcome with 20 parties winning seats, including the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) taking 7 and the Progressive Party (PP) 5, reflecting a rightward shift as conservative and centrist forces capitalized on public backlash against prior administrations. The 2022 elections on October 2 marked a consolidation of conservative strength in the legislature despite Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidential victory, with the Chamber's composition showing the (PL), Bolsonaro's party, surging to 99 seats—the largest share at 19.3%—while gained modestly to 68 seats across 23 represented parties, underscoring persistent fragmentation but reduced from 2018 levels. Centrist parties associated with the pragmatic Centrão bloc, including (47 seats), MDB (42), and (42), collectively held substantial influence, enabling cross-ideological deal-making in the 513-seat chamber. In the Senate, renewing 27 seats, captured 8 to bolster its position as the upper house's leading party, with centrists like União Brasil (5) and (3) also advancing, yielding a balanced yet right-leaning total of 81 seats where no single ideology dominated outright. The 57th Legislature (2023–2027), convened on February 1, 2023, retained this fragmented, centrist-heavy profile into 2025, with commanding the plurality in both chambers amid ongoing party switches and judicial rulings that annulled some Lava Jato convictions, potentially eroding the mandate that propelled gains but not altering core seat distributions from 2022 results. Empirical seat swings highlighted conservative resilience: 's expansion from PSL's base reflected voter persistence with right-leaning options, while Centrão's pivotal role—often exceeding 200 seats through alliances—ensured legislative bargaining power transcending presidential politics.
Chamber Party2018 Seats2022 Seats
PL/PSL5299
5668
3747
MDB3442
This table illustrates key swings favoring Bolsonaro-aligned forces, with stable, contributing to a less aligned with Lula's left-wing agenda than electoral maps might suggest.

Facilities and Operations

Architectural Design and Location

The National Congress building, known as the Palácio do Congresso Nacional, is situated in in , the capital of Brazil's . This plaza symbolizes the , housing the legislative branch alongside the executive () and judicial () branches. The location at the eastern end of the aligns with Lúcio Costa's bird-shaped urban plan for , positioning the Congress as a focal point of the modernist capital inaugurated in 1960 to centralize federal authority inland from former coastal hubs like . Designed by architect , the structure was completed in 1960 as a hallmark of Brazilian modernism, featuring forms that emphasize curves and . The building comprises two 28-story towers—one for the and one for the Federal Senate—flanking a raised platform with administrative spaces, while two inverted hemispherical domes house the respective plenary chambers. These elements symbolize the bicameral legislature, with the distinct towers and domes representing the separation between the popularly elected and the state-representing . The Chamber of Deputies' hemicycle accommodates 513 members, reflecting Brazil's system with seats allocated by state population (minimum 8, maximum 70 per state). The Senate's chamber seats 81 senators, three per state regardless of population, underscoring federal equality among Brazil's 26 states and the . Engineering highlights include the towers' elevator systems and the domes' acoustic designs for legislative debates, though the original construction faced logistical challenges typical of Brasília's rapid build under President . The design's open plaza integration and elevated plinth facilitate public access while projecting institutional monumentality.

Security Incidents and Responses

On January 8, 2023, thousands of supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro invaded the National Congress building in Brasília, along with the adjacent Supreme Court and Planalto Palace, in protests against the 2022 presidential election results. The demonstrators, alleging electoral fraud rejected by courts including the Supreme Federal Court (STF), broke through barriers, smashed windows, and vandalized interiors, occupying legislative chambers and causing material damage estimated in official probes as part of broader public property destruction charges. Security lapses, including delayed police response and lax perimeter controls, enabled the breach despite prior intelligence warnings of potential unrest. Immediate responses involved federal police and military regaining control after hours of occupation, with initial arrests exceeding 1,500 individuals across the sites. President responded by decreeing a 30-day in the , replacing local authorities to prevent recurrence, and federal prosecutors filed charges against over 2,000 investigated participants for offenses including attempted , criminal association, and vandalism. By January 2025, the STF had convicted 371 defendants in trials emphasizing the events as an on democratic institutions, with sentences including prison terms for leaders; acquittals remained limited amid ongoing proceedings. Post-incident measures included a congressional inquiry commission examining security failures, such as inadequate coordination between legislative and forces, leading to recommendations for reinforced physical barriers, expanded , and joint oversight protocols at the congressional complex. Authorities framed the invasion as a coordinated anti-democratic act akin to a coup attempt, while Bolsonaro condemned the destruction but portrayed participants' actions as stemming from legitimate grievances over unproven election irregularities, highlighting tensions in STF handling of related disputes. Prior to 2023, the Congress experienced protests like the 2016 anti-government rallies outside the building but no successful invasions or occupations of interiors.

Controversies and Reforms

Major Corruption Scandals

The , uncovered in 2005, involved a systematic vote-buying scheme orchestrated by the (PT) government under President to secure congressional support through monthly payments to allied lawmakers. Brazil's (STF) convicted 25 individuals, including senior PT officials and advertisers who funneled public funds via fraudulent contracts, with sentences totaling over 100 years in prison before reductions and some later overturns on procedural grounds. The scheme, estimated to involve bribes of around 55 million reais (approximately $30 million at the time), exemplified where executive influence over legislative votes undermined democratic accountability, though PT defenders attributed prosecutions to selective judicial overreach rather than systemic graft. Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), launched in 2014, revealed a vast bribery network at state-owned , implicating over 100 federal lawmakers, including senators and deputies from multiple parties, in kickback schemes totaling billions of dollars in exchange for inflated contracts. The probe led to nearly 280 convictions across Brazil and internationally, with authorities recovering approximately $800 million in embezzled funds, though total bribes exceeded $2 billion. PT leaders, including former House Speaker Eduardo Cunha and numerous caucus members, faced charges for diverting revenues to campaign slush funds, highlighting how expansive state enterprises under leftist administrations enabled cartel-like corruption; critics of subsequent STF annulments, including those voiding evidence from leniency deals and Lula's convictions on claims of judicial bias, argue these decisions prioritized institutional comity over accountability, effectively shielding elites from empirical evidence of malfeasance. In September 2025, widespread protests erupted against proposed constitutional amendments in , dubbed the "PEC da Blindagem" (Shielding Amendment), which sought to expand from prosecution and grant for certain crimes, potentially benefiting lawmakers across parties amid ongoing probes. The Senate's Constitution and Justice Committee unanimously rejected the bill on September 24, shelving it after tens of thousands demonstrated in major cities, decrying it as an entrenchment of that would hinder enforcement. Proponents framed the measures as protections against judicial overreach, echoing Lava Jato annulment rationales, but empirical patterns of legislative self-preservation—evident in repeated failed reforms post-scandals—underscore causal links between concentrated power in and resistance to external oversight.

Political Violence and Institutional Challenges

On January 8, 2023, thousands of supporters of former President breached security barriers and invaded the building in , along with the adjacent (STF) and , in protests against the results of the October 2022 presidential election. The demonstrators, who had gathered in following Lula da Silva's inauguration on January 1, demanded military intervention to overturn the election outcome, citing widespread mistrust fueled by Bolsonaro's repeated unsubstantiated claims of and vulnerabilities in systems. No deaths or serious injuries were reported during the incursion itself, though the events caused extensive , including broken windows, vandalized furniture, and scattered documents across the chambers. Security forces took over five hours to regain control, highlighting lapses in federal and local policing despite prior intelligence warnings of potential unrest. The incident, often compared to the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol breach due to similarities in populist election denialism and institutional targeting, resulted in approximately 1,500 detentions, with around 527 formal arrests initially; many were later released on humanitarian grounds, such as age or health considerations. Federal authorities, led by the STF, pursued charges of coup plotting, armed association, and democratic subversion against participants, leading to expedited trials and convictions for dozens, including military officers accused of aiding the rioters. Critics from conservative perspectives argue that the STF's preemptive censorship of content questioning the election—under disinformation combat mandates—exacerbated perceptions of institutional bias and suppressed legitimate conservative grievances, contributing to rather than resolving mistrust. Empirical data shows no proven widespread in the vote, as affirmed by electoral audits, yet persistent belief in irregularities correlates with low trust in bodies like the (TSE), which had banned Bolsonaro from office until 2030 for abuse of power. Institutional challenges persist amid heightened , with facing criticism for delayed reforms to bolster legislative and electoral , potentially enabling future disruptions. By September 2025, the advanced Bill PL 2162/23, proposing amnesty for participants in "political demonstrations" from October 30, 2022, onward, which could encompass actors and related Bolsonaro allies, sparking nationwide protests by tens of thousands opposing perceived impunity for anti-democratic acts. Pro-amnesty advocates, primarily from the right, contend it addresses prosecutorial overreach and uneven application of justice, given releases of leftist militants in prior unrest, while opponents highlight risks to democratic norms. Broader remains acute, with documenting 338 threats or attacks on political figures—including 33 killings—ahead of the 2022 elections, underscoring 's vulnerability to ideological clashes that hinder legislative functionality.

Policy Gridlock and External Influences

The Brazilian National Congress frequently experiences policy stemming from its fragmented , where over 20 parties hold seats, necessitating broad coalitions and negotiations with the Centrão—a loose of centrist parties that trades legislative support for budgetary amendments and -barrel spending allocations. This dynamic, rooted in and lack of , results in prolonged bargaining, as evidenced by the Centrão's role in securing individual parliamentary amendments (emendas impositivas) exceeding R$40 billion annually, which often delay or dilute major bills to accommodate regional interests. Rather than ideological polarization alone, this inefficiency arises from causal incentives in the , where deputies prioritize local over national policy coherence, contrasting narratives that attribute primarily to conservative opposition. In , gridlock manifested in 2024 through impasses over the primary surplus target, with watering down a fiscal package by exempting key expenditures, leading to a R$70 billion shortfall in projected savings and repeated delays in implementation. By 2025, similar delays plagued the 2026 Budget Guidelines Law (LDO), postponed indefinitely amid disputes over revenue offsets and fiscal calibration, as lawmakers resisted government-proposed tax hikes in favor of spending protections. These episodes highlight how Centrão demands for emendas exacerbated passage delays, with the 2024 fiscal framework amendments taking over six months of haggling before partial approval. A notable 2025 development was the passage of the General Environmental Licensing Law (Bill 2159/2021) on July 17, approved 267-115 in the Chamber, which streamlined approvals by allowing for low-risk projects and reducing IBAMA oversight, framed by proponents as bureaucratic relief for development but criticized for weakening environmental safeguards against . President Lula enacted the law on August 8 with 63 vetoes, yet core provisions persisted, reflecting pro-agribusiness pressures amid ongoing advances, where complementary bills like 68/24 were approved in December 2024 to implement the 2023 constitutional overhaul, unifying consumption taxes despite implementation hurdles. External influences, particularly from agribusiness lobbies like the bancada ruralista, amplify by shaping land and environmental legislation; this bloc, representing rural constituencies, secured wins in restricting land demarcations and easing licensing, with disclosures showing funding over 25% of ruralist campaigns in recent cycles. In October 2025, resistance stalled climate plan components demanding curbs, prioritizing export-driven land laws over sustainability mandates, underscoring how sectoral capture—via informal absent robust laws—prolongs debates and favors incremental, interest-aligned reforms over comprehensive policy.

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