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Operation Ring

Operation Ring was the codename for a military operation conducted by Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops in coordination with Azerbaijani special police units from late April to mid-May 1991, targeting ethnic villages in the Shaumyan district of the SSR bordering the to disarm irregular armed groups and restore order amid rising interethnic violence. The operation involved the encirclement of villages such as Getashen, Chaykent, and Martunashen, leading to the temporary of thousands of civilians, the and of hundreds of men, and the emptying of several settlements. At least 22 civilians were killed during the clearances in Chaykent and Martunashen alone, with broader estimates of civilian deaths ranging from dozens to over 30 amid reports of summary executions, beatings, and looting by participating forces. Intended as a measure against amid the Soviet Union's unraveling, Operation Ring escalated the , fueling accusations of from communities while Soviet and Azerbaijani authorities portrayed it as necessary pacification, marking a pivotal shift toward open warfare as central authority collapsed.

Historical Context

Nagorno-Karabakh Territorial Dispute

The (NKAO) was incorporated into the in 1921 as part of the Soviet Union's nationalities policy, which drew internal borders often disregarding ethnic majorities to foster loyalty to and balance regional influences. This decision followed the Red Army's conquest of the , overriding initial claims and Azerbaijani hesitations, with the formalized on July 7, 1923, granting limited amid a population that was approximately 94% ethnic per early Soviet counts. Soviet leaders, including , prioritized geopolitical stability, including accommodations toward , over demographic realities, embedding the region within while suppressing irredentist sentiments through cultural and economic integration. By the late Soviet period, the NKAO's population stood at 189,000 according to the 1989 USSR census, with ethnic comprising 76.9% (145,500 individuals) and 21.5% (40,600), reflecting gradual Azeri influx encouraged by Baku's policies but maintaining an Armenian plurality rooted in historical settlement patterns predating Soviet rule. Economic disparities exacerbated grievances, as the region's resources, including copper-molybdenum mines, disproportionately benefited proper, fueling Armenian perceptions of exploitation and cultural erosion under Azerbaijani administration. The dispute intensified in the era of Mikhail Gorbachev's , when on February 20, 1988, the NKAO's regional Soviet voted unanimously to petition the USSR , the Armenian SSR, and Azerbaijan SSR for transfer to , citing ethnic and historical ties. This resolution, backed by petitions from about 75,000 Armenians in the NKAO and Armenia proper, invoked Leninist principles of national but clashed with Gorbachev's emphasis on , leading to its rejection by on July 18, 1988. Azerbaijani authorities viewed the move as secessionist aggression, triggering reciprocal mobilizations and intercommunal violence, while Soviet inertia in redrawing borders—contrary to earlier precedents like Crimean Tatar deportations—exposed the fragility of artificially imposed ethnic divisions.

Ethnic Tensions and Pogroms (1988-1990)

The ethnic tensions in the escalated following the February 20, 1988, resolution by the Autonomous Oblast's local soviet petitioning to transfer the enclave from the SSR to the Armenian SSR, amid growing Armenian nationalist demonstrations in both and . This move provoked counter-protests in Azerbaijani cities like and , fueled by rumors of violence against and mutual fears exacerbated by historical grievances, including the 1915 and Soviet-era demographic policies favoring Azerbaijanis in . By mid-1988, sporadic clashes had displaced thousands on both sides, with Azerbaijanis fleeing rural Armenian areas amid reports of beatings and property seizures, while Armenians in Azerbaijan faced harassment and boycotts. The first major outbreak of organized anti-Armenian violence occurred in on February 27-29, 1988, triggered by inflated reports of an Azerbaijani death toll from clashes in , , where Soviet records noted four killed earlier that month. Mobs, including local and reportedly instigated by nationalist agitators, targeted Armenian neighborhoods, apartments, and individuals, committing murders, rapes, and ; official Soviet investigations documented 26 Armenian and six Azerbaijani deaths, though eyewitness accounts and later reports suggested undercounting of Armenian casualties, possibly exceeding 30, with many bodies mutilated or disposed of to conceal evidence. Soviet forces delayed intervention for over 36 hours despite pleas from victims, allowing the to spread unchecked until troops restored order on February 29, an inaction attributed to local authorities' sympathies or incompetence. Subsequent incidents amplified the cycle of retaliation. In November 1988, anti-Armenian riots in Kirovabad (now ) resulted in at least three Armenian deaths and further deportations from mixed areas. By 1989, over 100,000 had fled amid ongoing intimidation, reducing the non-enclave Armenian population from around 200,000 to under 50,000, while parallel expulsions saw approximately 185,000-200,000 Azerbaijanis leave due to mob attacks, forced evictions, and killings in villages like Chardakhly and Bashgyugh. These mutual displacements, documented in Soviet censuses and refugee flows, deepened communal paranoia, with invoking genocide fears and Azerbaijanis citing territorial revisionism as . The Baku pogrom from January 13-19, 1990, marked the peak of this phase, erupting after anti-Armenian rallies organized by the of Azerbaijan, which blockaded Armenian districts and incited crowds with slogans demanding expulsion. Attackers, often unchecked by local police who sympathized with perpetrators, killed an estimated 90 Armenians through beatings, stabbings, and arson, while thousands more were injured or displaced; the violence halved Baku's Armenian population overnight, from roughly 250,000 to near zero, as survivors fled by train or hid until evacuation. Soviet forces, commanded by General , finally quelled the riots on January 20 after days of restraint, amid reports of complicity and failure to protect civilians, as corroborated by investigations highlighting state tolerance of tactics.

Rise of Armenian Self-Defense Groups

In the aftermath of the from February 27 to 29, 1988, during which Azerbaijani mobs killed at least 26 and injured dozens more amid unchecked violence against the ethnic population, residents of began organizing informal units to safeguard villages from similar attacks. These early groups, comprising local men armed primarily with hunting rifles and farm tools, formed spontaneously in response to heightened ethnic tensions and the perceived failure of Soviet authorities to protect communities, marking the initial militarization of the beyond political demonstrations. The pogroms escalated with the Baku violence from January 13 to 19, , where systematic killings and assaults displaced over 200,000 from , prompting a surge in formations across and bordering Armenian-majority areas like the Shahumyan district. By mid-, an influx of small arms—facilitated by lax Soviet controls and cross-border supplies—enabled these units to evolve into coordinated detachments, numbering in the hundreds per region, focused on perimeter patrols and rapid response to incursions by Azerbaijani irregulars. In Shahumyan, villages such as Getashen and Martunashen established dedicated armed squads by late , training volunteers in basic tactics to counter threats from Azerbaijani units that had begun probing Armenian settlements. These groups operated independently at first, without formal ties to or Stepanakert's political leadership, but their proliferation reflected a broader shift toward armed resistance as diplomatic efforts for Nagorno-Karabakh's unification with stalled amid rising casualties from clashes, which claimed over 100 lives in intermittent fighting by early 1991. While Soviet officials labeled them illegal militias, proponents viewed them as essential for survival, given documented instances of Azerbaijani forces seizing Armenian villages without reprisal. By spring 1991, these networks had fortified key positions, setting the stage for direct confrontations that prompted Moscow's .

Planning and Objectives

Soviet Leadership Directives

The Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), under Minister , directed Operation Ring as a series of cordon-and-search operations targeting Armenian-populated villages in the and adjacent Shahumyan District of the SSR. The primary directive, issued in late April 1991, authorized and combined units to encircle settlements, conduct house-to-house inspections for illegal weapons caches, and detain individuals affiliated with unauthorized groups formed amid ethnic clashes since 1988. These measures were officially justified as necessary to enforce Soviet constitutional order, neutralize armed insurgencies threatening regional stability, and prevent further pogroms or escalations following incidents like the 1990 Getashen attacks. Initial implementation began on the night of April 29–30, 1991, with MVD forces mobilizing the 23rd Division of the 4th Army and specialized to seal borders and initiate clearances, prioritizing villages suspected of harboring detachments estimated at 200–300 fighters equipped with smuggled arms. Directives emphasized minimal civilian disruption, mandatory registration of residents, and coordination with Azerbaijani republican authorities, including the police, though Pugo publicly denied systematic OMON involvement in excesses despite eyewitness accounts of joint patrols. Higher-level oversight from Mikhail Gorbachev's administration implicitly endorsed the operation as part of broader efforts to quell separatist unrest in the dissolving USSR, with no recorded despite monitoring by groups like . By mid-May 1991, follow-up orders extended the scope to dismantle over 40 villages, mandating of non-compliant populations to SSR internment sites if persisted, resulting in the documented of approximately 10,000–15,000 and seizure of small arms stockpiles. Soviet leadership framed these actions in internal communiqués as apolitical , distinct from ethnic targeting, though declassified MVD logs later revealed quotas for apprehensions (targeting 100+ per sector) that correlated with demographic shifts favoring Azerbaijani control. Pugo's July 8, 1991, address to MVD commanders reaffirmed the operation's success in "neutralizing banditry," attributing any casualties—estimated at 50–100—to armed holdouts rather than procedural flaws.

Azerbaijani Collaboration and OMON Role

Azerbaijani authorities under Chairman Ayaz Mutalibov of the Azerbaijan SSR collaborated closely with Soviet central leadership, including Minister of Internal Affairs , to plan and execute Operation Ring as a means to neutralize self-defense formations in and adjacent border regions. This partnership involved sharing intelligence on alleged militant activities and authorizing the deployment of Azerbaijani personnel to augment Soviet forces, with the operation officially commencing on April 30, 1991, and extending through summer into early autumn. Mutalibov's government viewed the initiative as aligned with Azerbaijan's claims, providing logistical coordination and endorsing village encirclements to facilitate . The OMON (Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya), a special-purpose under the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, formed the primary Azerbaijani contingent, consisting of ethnically Azerbaijani officers trained for and counter-insurgency. OMON detachments, numbering in the hundreds across operations, accompanied Soviet and Army units during ground-level enforcement, entering villages after Soviet-led blockades to perform inspections, house-to-house seizures, and detentions of suspected fighters. reported that these joint actions targeted over two dozen Armenian-populated settlements, such as those in Shahumyan district, where OMON conducted searches yielding arms caches but also leading to documented cases of beatings, arbitrary arrests, and coerced departures. OMON's role extended to intimidation tactics, including nighttime raids and public interrogations, which exacerbated ethnic animosities rooted in earlier pogroms like those in and . While Soviet directives emphasized legal , OMON personnel, motivated by Azerbaijani nationalist sentiments, were implicated in excesses such as summary executions and property destruction, as noted in eyewitness accounts compiled by monitors. This collaboration marked an early instance of SSR forces integrating with Soviet military operations against communities, setting precedents for post-Soviet escalations.

Stated Counter-Insurgency Goals

The Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and military leadership framed Operation Ring as a targeted counter-insurgency effort to identify, disarm, and neutralize illegal armed formations among populations in the Shahumyan district of and bordering regions of , where militias had formed in response to ethnic pogroms and territorial disputes. Official directives emphasized enforcement of the passport regime—verifying residency documents and expelling undocumented individuals—to curb insurgent logistics and prevent the sheltering of armed groups accused of weapons and conducting raids into proper. This was positioned as a restoration of Soviet constitutional authority amid reports of detachments stockpiling arms and disrupting Azerbaijani control, with Soviet President publicly stating the troops' role was limited to disarming militants responsible for cross-border firing. Joint operations involving Soviet Internal Troops, the Azerbaijani OMON special police, and regular army units aimed to encircle villages, conduct house-to-house searches for caches of weapons (including automatic rifles, grenades, and anti-tank systems reportedly seized from Soviet depots), and detain individuals linked to these formations, with the explicit objective of preventing the conflict's spillover into full-scale guerrilla warfare. Azerbaijani authorities collaborated closely, viewing the operation as essential to reclaiming sovereignty over areas where Armenian committees had declared autonomy and mobilized fighters, estimated at several thousand by MVD intelligence, who were deemed a direct threat to state stability. The stated endpoint was the pacification of these zones through voluntary surrender of arms or forced removal of non-compliant elements, thereby isolating potential insurgent bases and facilitating centralized control ahead of the USSR's dissolution. These goals were codified in operational orders from the Soviet 4th Army and MVD, which prioritized minimal civilian disruption while prioritizing the elimination of command structures within the militias, though critics from monitors noted discrepancies between the rhetoric of precision targeting and on-ground outcomes involving mass detentions. Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov endorsed the initiative as a defensive measure against "banditry," aligning it with broader efforts to suppress without acknowledging the underlying ethnic grievances fueling the armed resistance.

Execution

Initial Phase: April-May 1991 Shelling and Encirclements

Operation Ring initiated in late April 1991, targeting Armenian-populated areas north of , particularly in the Shahumyan district and Getashen subdistrict of SSR. On April 30, 1991, Soviet forces commenced with artillery shelling of the villages of Getashen and Martunashen, marking the beginning of operations aimed at disarming alleged Armenian militants. Units from the Soviet 4th Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) , and Azerbaijani special police surrounded these villages using tanks and armored personnel carriers, restricting movement and facilitating searches for weapons. In early May 1991, the operations intensified in Martunashen and Getashen, where shelling and ground assaults led to significant destruction; Martunashen was largely razed, and at least 18 villagers were killed in these two locations alone. Soviet and Azerbaijani forces conducted house-to-house searches, detaining hundreds of Armenian men for interrogation, often under coercive conditions involving beatings and threats. The encirclements forced the temporary evacuation of thousands of residents, with reports of looting by accompanying Azerbaijani civilians. These actions displaced over 10,000 Armenians in the initial phase, contributing to the broader depopulation of border villages. The stated objective was to neutralize illegal armed groups amid rising ethnic tensions, but the tactics employed, including indiscriminate shelling, resulted in civilian casualties exceeding half of the approximately 40 deaths recorded during the operation's early stages. Azerbaijani units played a role in roundups and deportations, exacerbating fears among populations. While Soviet command denied ethnic targeting, eyewitness accounts documented ethnic-based violence, including killings motivated by hatred.

Village Clearances and Disarmament Operations

Village clearances and disarmament operations under Operation Ring involved Soviet and Azerbaijani units systematically targeting Armenian-populated settlements in the Shahumyan district and Getashen , beginning with barrages on Getashen and Martunashen on April 30, 1991. These actions were officially described by Soviet authorities as passport verification checks aimed at identifying and disarming illegal armed formations responsible for cross-border attacks. Forces would encircle villages with checkpoints to prevent movement, followed by entry into communities for house-to-house searches where residents' documents were inspected, homes ransacked for hidden weapons, and suspected militants detained. In Getashen, for instance, troops seized control after shelling, conducting roundups that included separating men for and confiscating arms caches accumulated by local groups. Similar procedures were applied in other Shahumyan villages, where non-resident or those lacking proper registration faced orders. The process often extended beyond mere weapon seizures, involving the temporary of villages and the of civilians to reveal hideouts or under of further action. Reports indicate that these operations led to the evacuation or flight of residents from at least a dozen settlements in May 1991 alone, with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's administration maintaining that the measures were limited to neutralizing armed s without intent to displace populations.

Key Incidents in Shahumyan and Getashen Regions

Operation Ring's initial phase targeted the Getashen subdistrict with heavy artillery shelling of Getashen and Martunashen villages on the night of April 29-30, 1991, involving Soviet forces and Azerbaijani units. This bombardment, which preceded ground assaults, destroyed homes and infrastructure, prompting residents to flee or submit to searches. In early May 1991, troops advanced into Getashen and Martunashen, encircling the settlements, conducting passport checks, and confiscating weapons from self-defense groups. documented these actions as especially violent, based on interviews with deported who reported beatings, arbitrary detentions, and killings during clearances. Approximately 2,500 residents from these villages were displaced, with some deaths attributed to or direct violence. Parallel operations in the Shahumyan district from May to June 1991 focused on neutralizing units in border villages such as Chaykand, Karkar, and Manashid. Soviet , supported by armored vehicles and , blockaded roads, searched households, and deported populations unwilling to disarm. Over 17,000 were reportedly expelled from some 24 villages in Shahumyan, leaving the region largely depopulated. Azerbaijani sources described the efforts as counter-insurgency against illegal militias, while testimonies highlighted torture and summary executions amid the operations. Casualty figures vary, with estimates of dozens killed in clashes and abuses, though independent verification remains limited due to restricted access.

Military Tactics and Forces

Composition of Involved Units

The operation primarily involved units from the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) (Vnutrennye Voyska, or VV), which were responsible for maintaining and counter-insurgency efforts within the USSR. These forces encircled Armenian-populated villages in the Shahumyan district and adjacent areas, conducting searches, disarmament, and deportations under the pretext of passport verification and neutralizing armed groups. Specific deployments included elements of the of , relocated from to the operational zone, providing the bulk of the and logistical support for village clearances. Azerbaijani participation centered on detachments of the (Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya), the special-purpose police units of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs, who operated in coordination with Soviet troops to conduct interrogations, detentions, and enforcement actions following initial encirclements by . OMON forces, numbering in the hundreds per operation phase, were predominantly ethnic and focused on identifying and removing alleged , often employing harsher tactics during village sweeps. This collaboration reflected directives from Soviet leadership to integrate local republican security assets, though OMON's role amplified ethnic tensions due to its composition and reported conduct. Overall command fell under Soviet MVD officers, with operational oversight from the Transcaucasian Military District's internal security apparatus, ensuring Soviet troops formed the core combat and containment elements while Azerbaijani provided auxiliary and intelligence functions. No regular (Ministerstvo Oborony) divisions were formally tasked, distinguishing Operation Ring from frontline warfare and framing it as an internal policing action, though armored vehicles and helicopter support from MVD assets were utilized for mobility and intimidation.

Use of Checkpoints, Searches, and Detentions

Soviet and Azerbaijani units implemented cordons and checkpoints around targeted Armenian villages in the Shahumyan and Getashen regions to isolate areas, restrict , and prevent the of suspected militants during May-June 1991 operations. These measures facilitated controlled entry for conducting systematic searches, as villages were encircled prior to troop advances, effectively blocking roads and paths to enforce compliance with demands. House-to-house searches followed , with forces entering dwellings to confiscate weapons, , and documents, often separating adult males from families for on-site interrogations about insurgent affiliations or arms caches. Forcible checks targeted potential members, involving physical inspections and demands for surrender of illegal holdings, amid reports of and to extract information. Detentions were widespread, resulting in the arrest of hundreds of men suspected of possessing arms or supporting groups; many were transported to nearby military barracks or temporary holding sites for further questioning. sources reported beatings and ill-treatment of detainees, particularly in villages like Martunashen and Getashen, where operations were noted for heightened violence. While some were released after checks confirmed no militant ties, others faced prolonged holding, contributing to fears of .

Logistical and Intelligence Aspects

The logistical execution of Operation Ring depended on coordinated deployments of Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) , including elements of the 4th Army, alongside Azerbaijani special police units, to remote villages in the Shahumyan and Getashen regions. Ground convoys facilitated initial advances and encirclements, while the mountainous terrain necessitated helicopter support for rapid troop movements and resupply. Mi-24 attack helicopters were prominently utilized, providing aerial , , and during village raids conducted between April and July 1991. Intelligence efforts preceded and informed tactical operations, focusing on identifying self-defense groups and weapon stockpiles through combined Soviet and Azerbaijani sources. Preliminary , including aerial by helicopters, enabled the cordoning of targeted settlements and systematic searches for arms. Operations often involved passport checks and interrogations to gather on-site about militant activities, though reports indicate reliance on local informants amid contested claims of selective targeting. This approach aimed to minimize surprises in disarmament sweeps but faced challenges from limited real-time coordination in decentralized rural engagements.

Controversies and Perspectives

Allegations of Human Rights Violations

During Operation Ring, from May to July 1991, Soviet and Azerbaijani forces conducted house-to-house searches in Armenian-populated villages in the Shahumyan district and northern , leading to widespread allegations of arbitrary arrests, , and extrajudicial killings. (HRW) reported that hundreds of Armenian men were detained without warrants or legal justification, often held in makeshift facilities where they endured beatings with rifle butts, electric shocks, and forced confessions regarding hidden arms; these detentions frequently lasted weeks, with many detainees released only after intervention by local authorities or family payments. Eyewitness testimonies compiled by HRW detailed specific instances of summary executions, including the shooting of unarmed villagers in Getashen on June 29, 1991, where at least five civilians were killed during clearance operations ostensibly aimed at disarming militants; survivors described soldiers firing indiscriminately into homes and rounding up men for immediate execution if weapons were not produced. Forced deportations displaced over 10,000 from villages such as Kirovagan and Manashid, with families given hours to evacuate under armed escort or face destruction of their property; HRW noted that these actions emptied at least 24 settlements, rendering them uninhabitable through systematic , , and of infrastructure. Women and children were not exempt from reported abuses, including and intimidation; accounts from displaced persons described units separating families, subjecting women to assaults, and using threats of to coerce during passport checks that devolved into punitive raids. These violations were facilitated by the operation's structure, which combined Soviet military oversight with Azerbaijani paramilitary involvement, often bypassing international humanitarian standards; while Soviet commanders claimed the actions targeted only armed groups, HRW investigations, based on interviews with over 100 witnesses, found patterns indicative of rather than precise counter-insurgency.

Armenian Claims of Ethnic Cleansing

officials and authorities have described Operation Ring as a coordinated operation aimed at depopulating -majority areas in the Shahumyan district of and nearby villages in , such as Getashen and Martunashen, to secure Azerbaijani control over border territories. They contend that the Soviet military's involvement, alongside Azerbaijani units, facilitated mass deportations, extrajudicial killings, and destruction of property under the pretext of disarming armed groups, with the true intent being the forcible removal of ethnic to alter the demographic composition of the region. Eyewitness accounts and Armenian reports allege specific atrocities, including the encirclement of villages starting in late April 1991, followed by raids involving beatings, rapes, and executions of civilians, particularly in Getashen on May 7–8 and Martunashen in early May, where residents were herded into basements before being expelled. (now ) interviewed Armenian deportees who reported at least 22 civilian deaths in Chaikent and Martunashen alone during these clearances, with broader claims citing dozens of killings across operations. Armenian sources estimate that the operation displaced approximately 24,000 to 30,000 Armenians from over 20 villages in Shahumyan and surrounding areas between May and July 1991, rendering these settlements largely uninhabitable through shelling, looting, and arson, with many structures subsequently destroyed or repopulated by Azerbaijanis. These claims frame the events as part of a pattern of anti-Armenian pogroms and deportations, drawing parallels to earlier incidents like Sumgait in 1988, and argue that the lack of genuine disarmament efforts—coupled with the failure to protect civilians—evidences genocidal intent rather than mere counterinsurgency.

Azerbaijani and Soviet Counter-Narratives

Soviet officials justified Operation Ring as a limited "passport checking operation" conducted from May to July 1991 to identify and disarm illegal armed formations in villages around Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly those accused of launching attacks into Azerbaijani territory. The operation, involving joint units of the Soviet Army, Internal Troops, and Azerbaijani OMON, was framed as enforcement of central authority amid rising separatist violence following the Armenian Supreme Soviet's February 1991 decision to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia's electoral process, which violated Soviet constitutional norms. Azerbaijani authorities echoed this rationale, portraying the measures as essential to neutralize guerrilla groups that had stockpiled weapons and initiated hostilities, including pogroms against Azerbaijanis in Armenia and Karabakh. They emphasized that the operation's codename in Azerbaijan, "Chaykand" (suggesting a ring of fire or containment), reflected a defensive strategy to contain armed insurgency rather than target civilians. Relocations of villagers were described as temporary evacuations to enable thorough searches for arms caches, with claims that significant quantities of illegal weapons were seized, preventing further escalation. Countering Armenian allegations of , Soviet and Azerbaijani narratives asserted that no systematic policy of population expulsion or existed; instead, any displacements stemmed from operational necessities and voluntary departures amid , with many residents reportedly returning post-searches. Casualties, estimated by Azerbaijani sources at under 100 and attributed primarily to clashes with resisting militants, were presented as regrettable but incidental to lawful , not deliberate atrocities. These accounts, drawn from official statements and Azerbaijani , prioritize the restoration of in SSR territory over ethnic motivations, though independent reports like those from documented instances of excessive force and arbitrary detentions that challenge the sanitized portrayal. (HRW), through its division, conducted investigations into Operation Ring, documenting it as a joint Soviet-Azerbaijani effort that resulted in arbitrary arrests of hundreds of men, forced deportations of thousands of civilians, and the depopulation of at least 24 villages in the Shahumyan and Geranboy districts between April and July 1991. HRW's 1992 report "Bloodshed in the " specifically recorded at least 22 deaths in Chaikent and Martunashen villages during the operation's execution, attributing these to indiscriminate violence by Soviet motorized rifle units and Azerbaijani , while noting the operation's stated aim of disarming armed groups but highlighting its disproportionate impact on civilians. These findings were based on eyewitness interviews primarily from displaced , as access to Soviet and Azerbaijani officials was restricted, limiting corroboration from perpetrator perspectives. The operation has been referenced in subsequent international legal proceedings as evidence of systemic ethnic targeting. In Armenia's 2021 application to the (ICJ) against under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial , Operation Ring was described as a deliberate campaign aimed at ethnic in Nagorno-Karabakh's northern regions and adjacent areas, forming part of a historical pattern of . Similarly, the (ECHR) in Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (2015) acknowledged the forced displacement of populations from 24 villages during the operation, conducted by combined Azerbaijani and Soviet forces, in assessing property rights violations under the . reports on missing persons in the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict have also cited hostage-taking of civilians as widespread during Operation Ring, linking it to broader patterns of enforced disappearances predating the full-scale . Despite this documentation, no formal prosecutions or accountability mechanisms directly targeted Operation Ring's perpetrators, attributable to its timing amid the Soviet Union's collapse in December 1991, which dissolved central command structures and precluded unified investigations. International response at the time was muted, with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) only establishing the Minsk Group mediation framework in 1992, post-operation, focusing on rather than retrospective justice. Azerbaijani narratives, as reflected in official accounts, framed the operation as lawful internal security measures without addressing HRW-documented abuses, while Armenian submissions in ICJ and ECHR proceedings emphasized intent, underscoring ongoing interpretive disputes in legal forums.

Outcomes and Immediate Effects

Casualties and Displacement Figures

documented at least 22 Armenian civilian deaths during the implementation of Operation Ring, primarily from documented incidents in targeted villages such as those in the Getashen subdistrict. Armenian government and advocacy sources, including the Republic of Artsakh's foreign ministry, report higher figures of over 100 Armenians killed, attributing many deaths to executions, shelling, and mistreatment by Soviet and Azerbaijani units during village encirclements and searches. These claims encompass fatalities in specific actions starting April 30, 1991, such as the initial assaults on Getashen and Martunashen, where helicopter gunships and were deployed. Soviet and Azerbaijani official reports provided no detailed casualty breakdowns for their forces, suggesting minimal losses given the operation's focus on disarmament rather than pitched battles, though independent verification remains limited due to restricted access and ongoing hostilities. Displacement affected primarily ethnic Armenian populations in the Shahumyan district and adjacent areas outside proper, with estimating thousands temporarily deported and several villages fully depopulated through coordinated checkpoints, house-to-house searches, and forced relocations to central collection points. The operation, spanning May to July 1991, emptied at least 24 Armenian villages, including Getashen (pre-operation population approximately 3,000), leading to the flight or expulsion of residents amid reports of , , and hostage-taking of hundreds of men for interrogation. Armenian accounts cite up to 10,000 displaced from Shahumyan alone, with many unable to return due to subsequent of the areas by Azerbaijani forces, contributing to broader refugee flows into and . While Soviet authorities framed deportations as temporary for "passport checks" and weapons seizures, the scale and permanence of —exacerbated by destruction of homes and —aligned with patterns of ethnic homogenization in the region, though exact totals vary due to incomplete Soviet records and partisan reporting. No significant Azerbaijani displacement from these specific operations was recorded.

Achievement of Disarmament Objectives

Operation Ring aimed to neutralize illegal armed formations, termed , by confiscating their weapons and detaining participants in the and districts of . and units implemented passport checks, house-to-house searches, and blockades, resulting in the seizure of , , and other from targeted villages such as Getashen and Martunashen between April 30 and May 1991. These actions temporarily disrupted local networks, with reports indicating that villagers surrendered caches under duress or during cordon-and-search tactics. Hundreds of males were arrested on suspicions of militant affiliation, contributing to the partial fulfillment of in depopulated areas, as entire communities were evacuated or fled, leaving behind unsecured positions. documented the emptying of multiple villages, which effectively removed armed presence from those sites and aligned with Soviet claims of neutralizing immediate threats from cross-border raids. Azerbaijani accounts assert comprehensive resolution of planned tasks, including weapon recovery and prevention of further insurgent activity in the northern flanks. Despite these tactical gains, the operation failed to achieve enduring disarmament, as significant numbers of escaped with portions of their arsenals to or , sustaining broader resistance capabilities. Armenian forces promptly reoccupied several vacated villages post-operation, underscoring the provisional nature of control and the stimulus to escalated arming rather than pacification. The influx of weapons into Armenian-held territories continued unabated, per contemporaneous observations, rendering the initiative counterproductive to stabilizing the region's ethnic tensions.

Escalation of Broader Conflict Dynamics

Operation Ring, conducted from late April to mid-May 1991, marked a pivotal shift in the by transforming sporadic intercommunal violence into sustained military confrontation. The operation's forcible disarmament raids and village clearances in the Shaumyan District displaced approximately 24,000 , creating a influx into and that galvanized communities against perceived Soviet-Azerbaijani . This not only strained local resources but also intensified recruitment into irregular forces, with reports indicating accelerated acquisition from abandoned Soviet depots amid the USSR's weakening central authority. The visible involvement of Soviet Interior Ministry troops alongside Azerbaijani units eroded any remaining trust in as a neutral arbiter, prompting Armenian leaders to reject ongoing negotiations like the ill-fated Jirairian Plan for joint administration. In the operation's aftermath, cross-border incursions and ambushes escalated, with Armenian groups launching retaliatory strikes on Azerbaijani positions, while Azerbaijani forces responded with pogrom-like reprisals in mixed areas. By June 1991, these dynamics had evolved into coordinated offensives, foreshadowing the full-scale that erupted following the Soviet Union's in December 1991. Broader geopolitical ripple effects included heightened international scrutiny, though limited by endgame priorities, and a of ethnic narratives on both sides. Azerbaijani authorities framed the operation as necessary stabilization, yet its failure to fully disarm militants—coupled with documented civilian casualties exceeding 20—fueled secessionist resolve, culminating in Nagorno-Karabakh's unilateral on September 2, 1991. This sequence underscored how Operation Ring's coercive tactics, intended to contain unrest, instead accelerated the conflict's militarization, displacing Soviet-era restraint mechanisms and paving the way for the First Nagorno-Karabakh War's attritional phase.

Long-Term Impact

Role in First Nagorno-Karabakh War

Operation Ring, conducted from late April to early July 1991, represented a pivotal Soviet military intervention amid the escalating of the (1988–1994), which had begun with Armenian demands for unification with and Azerbaijani countermeasures. Officially ordered by Soviet President to disarm illegal Armenian armed groups accused of attacks on Azerbaijani targets, the operation involved joint Soviet Interior Ministry troops (MVD) and Azerbaijani forces targeting villages in and adjacent Armenian-populated districts like Shahumyan. It aimed to restore order in the autonomous oblast amid rising insurgency, but empirical accounts from on-site reporting document widespread village raids, detentions, and forced deportations of over 20,000 , exacerbating mutual distrust and hardening combatant resolve on both sides. Militarily, the operation partially achieved short-term disarmament in targeted areas, seizing weapons caches and neutralizing some Armenian fedayeen units, yet it failed to eradicate underground networks, as surviving militants regrouped and acquired arms from sympathetic Soviet military elements. Clashes during the operation, including artillery shelling of villages like Getashen on April 30, 1991, resulted in dozens of Armenian civilian and fighter deaths, prompting retaliatory Armenian ambushes on Soviet convoys and Azerbaijani positions. This cycle of violence intensified intercommunal warfare, with Human Rights Watch documenting how the operations' coercive tactics—such as house-to-house searches and summary expulsions—fueled Armenian perceptions of existential threat, accelerating the formation of disciplined self-defense forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani forces, emboldened by Soviet support, viewed it as a successful suppression of separatism, but the operation's reliance on local Azerbaijani auxiliaries eroded Soviet neutrality and sowed seeds for post-Soviet escalations. In the broader war trajectory, Operation Ring catalyzed a shift from sporadic pogroms and skirmishes to sustained , as the USSR's weakening grip post-operation—coupled with the failed August 1991 coup—enabled to launch independent offensives while consolidated control over Nagorno-Karabakh's interior. By late 1991, the operation's displacements had created influxes that strained Armenian logistics but also unified disparate militias under emerging command structures, contributing to Armenian counteroffensives that captured strategic heights by 1992. Soviet archival evidence and neutral analyses indicate that the intervention's partial successes masked underlying failures in , as it neither secured lasting nor prevented the war's expansion into full-scale battles involving tanks and by 1992–1993, ultimately leading to a Minsk Group ceasefire in after Azerbaijani territorial losses. The operation's legacy underscores how Soviet coercive measures, intended to contain the war, instead accelerated its militarization amid the federation's dissolution.

Legacy in Post-Soviet Ethnic Relations

The events of Operation Ring, conducted from April to July 1991, entrenched a cycle of mutual suspicion and retaliation that profoundly shaped Armenian-Azerbaijani interactions following the Soviet collapse. The of approximately 24,000 ethnic from villages in the Shahumyan and Geranboy districts, accompanied by documented instances of violence and destruction, generated enduring communities and narratives of targeted among , which intensified for self-defense and unification with . Azerbaijani accounts, emphasizing the operation's role in neutralizing armed militias amid rising cross-border attacks, portrayed it as essential for restoring order, yet this framing failed to mitigate Armenian perceptions of ethnic targeting, thereby eroding any residual interethnic cooperation inherited from Soviet-era administrative structures. In the post-Soviet era, the operation's legacy manifested in the rapid escalation to full-scale war in autumn 1991, as displaced and forces rejected and pursued territorial gains, leading to reciprocal expulsions totaling over 800,000 and 300,000 by 1994. Political analyst Michael Croissant argued that Operation Ring "reinforced the ethnic divide between and , virtually precluding the possibility of further coexistence," a dynamic that persisted through failed ceasefires and the OSCE Group's efforts from 1992 onward, where invocations of 1991 atrocities stalled concessions on or . This bifurcation of historical memory— citing it as a precursor to systematic cleansing akin to earlier pogroms in (1988) and (1990), versus Azerbaijani emphasis on —has impeded civic initiatives, such as joint cultural projects or border , fostering instead polarized diasporas that amplify grievances through and . Broader implications for ethnic relations include heightened reliance on external patrons, with deepening ties to for security guarantees against perceived Azerbaijani revanchism, while leveraged hydrocarbon revenues to modernize its military, culminating in the 2020 . The operation exemplified how late-Soviet interventions, ostensibly neutral, inadvertently primed post-independence polities for zero-sum conflicts by prioritizing force over dialogue, a pattern echoed in unresolved tensions involving other groups like the or Talysh along the - border. Archival disclosures from declassified Soviet documents since the have substantiated claims of coordinated Azerbaijani-Soviet actions, yet without mechanisms, these revelations have reinforced rather than resolved animosities, underscoring the causal link between unresolved 1991 displacements and the region's stalled integration into Euro-Atlantic frameworks.

Archival Evidence and Ongoing Debates

Declassified Soviet-era documents on Operation Ring remain scarce, with state archives providing limited access to primary orders from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and , which authorized the operation on April 30, 1991, under the pretext of passport verification and disarmament of unauthorized armed groups in -populated villages around . Eyewitness testimonies compiled in investigations, including those from villagers in Getashen and Martunashen, describe systematic house-to-house searches, beatings, and executions by joint Soviet (Azerbaijani special police) and regular army units, resulting in at least 22 confirmed deaths in those two villages alone during May-June 1991 raids. These accounts, cross-verified by on-site journalists and local records, indicate that while official orders emphasized non-lethal compliance checks, field implementation frequently escalated to forced extractions without , leading to the depopulation of approximately 24 villages and of over 20,000 residents. Secondary analyses drawing from partially accessible MVD logs and defector interviews suggest the operation's causal chain stemmed from Gorbachev's central authority seeking to reassert control amid USSR dissolution, coordinating with Azerbaijani SSR leadership to neutralize Armenian self-defense militias that had formed in response to prior pogroms in (1988) and (1990). However, the credibility of these sources varies: Armenian-compiled archives, such as those in the Karabakh Records project, emphasize premeditated demographic engineering but rely heavily on partisan oral histories without independent forensic validation, potentially inflating intent over reactive violence. In contrast, limited Russian military memoirs portray the actions as pragmatic enforcement against illegal arms caches documented in pre-operation , though without public release of raw intercept data, attributions of systematic bias toward —evident in OMON's disproportionate involvement—remain inferential rather than evidentiary. Ongoing scholarly and legal debates hinge on whether Operation Ring constituted under international definitions (forced removal on ethnic grounds with violence), with Armenian advocates citing village burnings and livestock seizures as evidence of intent to prevent return, corroborated by rulings like Sargsyan v. (2015), which acknowledged property deprivations tied to the operation's execution. Azerbaijani counter-narratives, echoed in state historiography, reframe it as a defensive "Chaykand" operation against separatist aggression, arguing displacements were voluntary evacuations amid combat and that Armenian casualty figures overlook Soviet losses to militia ambushes, though lacking granular archival rebuttals to HRW-documented abuses. Neutral observers, including analyses by specialists, note the operation's hybrid nature—neither purely genocidal nor benign policing—but a causal product of collapsing Soviet favoring the titular () to contain irredentist spillovers, with debates persisting due to restricted access to full operational files and mutual incentives for both sides to instrumentalize narratives in post-2020 conflict revivals.

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