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Palestinian self-determination

Palestinian self-determination refers to the nationalist aspiration of the Arab population in the former British Mandate of Palestine to establish sovereign control over defined territories, primarily the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, as a means of achieving political independence separate from Israeli governance.^[1] This claim emerged prominently after the 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, which proposed partitioning the Mandate into Jewish and Arab states to enable self-determination for both peoples, a plan accepted by Jewish leaders but rejected outright by Arab representatives and the Arab League, who launched the 1948 war in opposition.^[2] The resulting conflict led to Israel's independence, the flight or expulsion of approximately 700,000 Palestinian Arabs as refugees, and Jordanian and Egyptian control over the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, without establishing an independent Palestinian state.^[2] The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, formalized the drive for self-determination through its National Charter, affirming belief in sovereignty and self-determination while rejecting Israel's existence and calling for armed struggle to liberate all of Mandatory Palestine.^[3] Subsequent amendments in the 1990s, amid international pressure, shifted toward accepting a two-state solution, though the original charter's irredentist framework persisted in practice.^[3] The 1993 Oslo Accords marked a partial achievement, creating the Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer limited autonomy in specified areas of the West Bank and Gaza, with the PA elected in 1996 and intended as an interim step toward final-status negotiations on borders, refugees, and Jerusalem.^[4] However, implementation faltered due to Palestinian violence, including the Second Intifada (2000–2005) that killed over 1,000 Israelis, the PA's failure to curb incitement and terrorism, and internal divisions culminating in Hamas's 2007 military takeover of Gaza, severing unified governance.^[4] Negotiated offers of statehood, such as at Camp David in 2000 and by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008, were rejected by Palestinian leaders, perpetuating stalemate and highlighting causal factors like maximalist demands and governance deficits over external barriers alone. The movement's defining controversies include the prioritization of rejectionism over compromise, as evidenced by historical patterns from 1947 onward, and the PA's chronic corruption and authoritarianism, with no elections held since 2006 despite Oslo's democratic provisions.^[4] Despite UN General Assembly affirmations of the right since 1974, including Resolution 3236, these non-binding measures have not translated to statehood, underscoring self-determination's dependence on mutual recognition rather than unilateral claims.

Historical Development

Ottoman and Early Modern Period

During the Ottoman Empire's conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1516, the region known as Palestine came under imperial control, remaining so until 1917, administered primarily as part of the larger Eyalet of Damascus rather than as a distinct political entity with sovereign Arab governance.^[5] The area lacked a unified Palestinian polity; instead, it was divided into sanjaks such as Jerusalem, Nablus, and Gaza, governed by appointed Ottoman officials and local notables who prioritized loyalty to the sultan over any regional self-rule.^[5] Society consisted predominantly of Muslim Arab fellahin (peasant farmers) tied to clan-based villages, semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes controlling peripheral areas, Christian communities in urban centers, and longstanding Jewish populations in cities like Jerusalem, Hebron, and Safed, numbering around 5,000 Jews amid approximately 295,000 non-Jews as of 1517.^[6] By the mid-19th century, following population recovery from earlier declines, estimates indicated roughly 300,000 Muslims, 27,000 Christians, and 13,000 Jews, with social organization revolving around tribal affiliations, religious communities (millets), and absentee landownership rather than collective national aspirations.^[7] No evidence exists of organized movements for Palestinian self-determination during this era, as inhabitants identified primarily with religious, tribal, or Ottoman imperial frameworks, absent a cohesive "Palestinian" national consciousness distinct from broader Arab or Islamic ties.^[8] Ottoman administrative reforms under the Tanzimat (1839–1876) introduced centralized land registration (tapyu system) and taxation, which empowered local Arab elites but also highlighted fragmented loyalties, with power often contested among clans and Bedouin groups rather than unified regional governance.^[9] Jewish communities maintained continuous presence, engaging in trade and scholarship, while from the 1880s onward, the First Aliyah saw increased Jewish immigration and legal land purchases from absentee Arab landlords and Ottoman officials, totaling small but growing holdings despite imperial restrictions aimed at curbing foreign settlement.^[10] These acquisitions, often of uncultivated or marshy tracts, provoked local resistance framed in terms of economic competition and Ottoman loyalty, not yet a proto-national Palestinian claim. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nascent Arab nationalism emerged among educated elites in Ottoman provinces, influenced by exposure to European ideas and resentment of Istanbul's centralization, but it manifested as pan-Arab sentiment aspiring to autonomy within or revival of a decentralized empire, rather than a Palestine-specific identity.^[8] Figures like Khalil al-Sakakini and newspapers such as Filastin (founded 1911) critiqued Ottoman policies and Jewish immigration, portraying the latter as disruptive to Arab societal order, yet opposition aligned with wider Syrian-Arab unity under leaders envisioning a "Greater Syria" encompassing Palestine, without delineating it as a separate national homeland.^[9] This pan-Arab orientation, rooted in linguistic and cultural revival during the Nahda, prioritized anti-colonial rhetoric against perceived European-backed Zionism but stemmed causally from defending existing tribal and notable privileges against demographic and economic shifts, not from pre-existing self-determination doctrines.^[11] By 1914, Palestine's population hovered around 700,000, with Jews comprising under 8%, underscoring the region's integration into Ottoman Arab provincial life absent modern nationalist self-rule imperatives.^[6]

British Mandate and UN Partition Plan

The British Mandate for Palestine, established by the League of Nations in 1920 following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I, incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which expressed support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" while stipulating that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." This policy aimed to balance Zionist aspirations for Jewish self-determination with safeguards for the Arab majority, but it fueled tensions as Jewish immigration increased from about 85,000 in 1922 to over 400,000 by 1939, driven by persecution in Europe.^[12] Arab opposition manifested in violent riots throughout the 1920s and 1930s, targeting Jewish communities and development amid disputes over land sales and holy sites, such as the 1920 Jerusalem riots killing five Jews and injuring over 200, the 1921 Jaffa riots claiming 47 Jewish lives, and the 1929 Hebron massacre where 67 Jews were killed.^[2] The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, involving widespread strikes, bombings, and attacks on British forces and Jewish settlements, resulted in over 5,000 Arab, 400 Jewish, and 200 British deaths, primarily as a reaction to accelerated Jewish immigration and perceived threats to Arab political dominance. These events underscored Arab rejection of partition or coexistence frameworks that would enable Jewish self-governing institutions, prioritizing instead demands for an end to Jewish immigration and exclusive Arab control over the territory.^[13] In response to the revolt, the 1937 Peel Commission recommended partitioning Palestine into a small Jewish state (about 20% of the land), an Arab state to unite with Transjordan, and a British corridor including Jerusalem, with compulsory population transfers to resolve demographic conflicts.^[14] Arab leaders, including the Arab Higher Committee, rejected the proposal outright, viewing any Jewish state as illegitimate and insisting on a unitary Arab-governed Palestine, while some Zionist factions accepted it in principle despite its limited scope.^[15] The British government abandoned partition amid escalating violence, issuing the 1939 MacDonald White Paper on May 17, which capped Jewish immigration at 75,000 over five years—despite the intensifying Holocaust—and envisioned a single independent Palestine with an Arab majority after a decade, effectively prioritizing Arab acquiescence over Jewish refuge needs.^[16]^[17] As British withdrawal loomed post-World War II, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) proposed dividing the Mandate into independent Jewish and Arab states linked economically, with Jerusalem under international administration; the UN General Assembly adopted this as Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, allocating roughly 56% of the land to the Jewish state (including desert areas) and 43% to the Arab state, reflecting Jewish acceptance of compromise despite comprising only one-third of the population.^[18] Jewish Agency leaders endorsed the plan as a pathway to self-determination, but Arab states and Palestinian representatives rejected it unanimously, with the Arab Higher Committee declaring it "unjust and destructive" and vowing armed resistance, arguing it violated Arab rights to the entirety of Palestine and ignoring prior rejections of similar offers.^[19] This refusal precluded the establishment of an Arab Palestinian state under the partition framework, leading instead to the 1948 war in which the proposed Arab state's territories came under Jordanian and Egyptian control without granting local Arab self-determination.^[20]

Arab-Israeli Wars and Territorial Changes (1948-1967)

Following Israel's declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, armies from Egypt, Jordan (then Transjordan), Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon invaded the former British Mandate territory the next day, aiming to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state and asserting claims over the entire area.^[21] The ensuing war, which lasted until early 1949, concluded with a series of armistice agreements that delineated temporary boundaries known as the Green Line.^[21] Under these lines, Jordan occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and formally annexed it on April 24, 1950, integrating the territory into the Hashemite Kingdom and extending citizenship to its Palestinian residents while suppressing movements for separate Palestinian governance.^[22] Egypt established military administration over the Gaza Strip, housing over 200,000 Palestinian refugees there under direct control from Cairo, but refrained from annexation or permitting autonomous Palestinian institutions.^[21] Neither Jordan nor Egypt facilitated Palestinian self-determination in these areas, prioritizing their own territorial and strategic interests over the creation of an independent Arab state in the Mandate's Arab-allotted portion.^[22] Throughout the 1950s, Palestinian fedayeen—irregular fighters operating from bases in Gaza and the West Bank—launched hundreds of cross-border raids into Israel, resulting in civilian and military casualties on both sides and prompting Israeli reprisal operations.^[23] These activities, often supported logistically by Egyptian and Syrian authorities, reflected persistent Arab rejection of Israel's existence rather than organized efforts toward Palestinian state-building.^[23] The Arab League, while coordinating anti-Israel policies, imposed protocols on member states that effectively barred initiatives for Palestinian independence, as such moves could undermine inter-Arab territorial claims and unity against Israel; the League's focus remained on "liberating" all of Palestine through collective military action, not partitioning it for a discrete Palestinian entity.^[22] Despite controlling over 5 million square kilometers of Arab territory collectively, League members made no substantive diplomatic or institutional provisions for Palestinian autonomy during this period, absorbing refugee populations into their domains without granting political self-rule.^[22] Escalating tensions in 1967, including Egyptian troop mobilizations in Sinai, expulsion of UN peacekeepers, and closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, led Israel to launch a preemptive airstrike on Egyptian airfields on June 5. Over the next six days, Israeli forces decisively defeated Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armies, capturing the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria—territories totaling approximately 70,000 square kilometers.^[24] In the war's aftermath, Arab leaders convened at the Khartoum Summit from August 29 to September 1, 1967, issuing a resolution encapsulating the "three no's": no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiation with Israel.^[25] This unified stance, endorsed by representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and other League members, explicitly rejected diplomatic engagement that might have addressed territorial dispositions or Palestinian claims, thereby postponing any framework for self-determination in favor of sustained belligerency and the goal of reversing Israeli gains through force.^[25] The resolution's emphasis on armed struggle and non-compromise effectively nullified opportunities for Arab-initiated Palestinian statehood discussions prior to the onset of direct Israeli administration over the captured areas.^[22]

Post-1967 Occupation and PLO Emergence

Following Israel's victory in the Six-Day War of June 5–10, 1967, the Israel Defense Forces captured the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria, resulting in military occupation of territories inhabited by approximately 1 million Palestinians.^[26]^[27] This outcome discredited Arab states' ability to confront Israel militarily on behalf of Palestinians, prompting a shift from reliance on pan-Arab nationalism toward independent Palestinian political and militant organization.^[28] United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, 1967, called for Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied" in exchange for peace, secure borders, and recognition of states in the region, but made no explicit reference to Palestinian self-determination or statehood.^[29] The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), initially established in 1964 under Egyptian auspices as a symbolic entity, underwent a radical reorientation after 1967, with Fatah—led by Yasser Arafat—seizing control by 1969 and emphasizing armed struggle for "liberation" of all Palestine.^[30] The PLO's revised Palestinian National Charter of 1968 explicitly rejected the legitimacy of the State of Israel, asserting that Zionism was a colonial enterprise and denying any historical or legal Jewish claim to the land, while calling for the elimination of Israel through jihad.^[31] This document framed Palestinian self-determination not as coexistence but as the exclusive sovereignty of Arabs over the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine, viewing partition as null and void. Tensions escalated in September 1970 when PLO factions, basing operations in Jordan, challenged King Hussein's authority through hijackings and assassination attempts, leading to "Black September"—a Jordanian military offensive that expelled PLO forces to Lebanon by July 1971, resulting in thousands of deaths.^[32] At the Arab League summit in Rabat on October 28, 1974, member states recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," endorsing its leadership over Jordan's claims to the West Bank.^[33] That year, UN General Assembly Resolution 3236 affirmed the Palestinians' "inalienable rights" to self-determination, national independence, and return, granting the PLO observer status.^[34] The PLO pursued these aims through "armed struggle," exemplified by the Black September Organization's attack on the 1972 Munich Olympics, where eight militants killed 11 Israeli athletes and coaches to publicize the cause internationally.^[35]

Legal and Conceptual Foundations

Self-Determination Principle in International Law

The principle of self-determination is articulated in Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter (1945), which identifies it as a foundational purpose for developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. This provision, alongside Article 55 promoting respect for human rights and self-determination, established the norm within the post-World War II international order, though its precise content remained underdeveloped at the Charter's inception. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has since clarified that self-determination encompasses internal dimensions—such as the right to genuine participation in governance—and external dimensions, primarily the achievement of independence by peoples under colonial or alien subjugation, but it does not imply an unqualified entitlement to statehood or territorial reconfiguration. In practice, the principle gained normative force during the decolonization wave of the 1960s and 1970s, as codified in UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960), which affirmed the right of colonial peoples to freely determine their political status and pursue development, leading to independence for over 80 former territories by 1990.^[36] Applications were confined largely to overseas colonies detached from metropolitan territories, excluding claims by groups within sovereign states or integral provinces, to safeguard territorial integrity under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.^[37] The uti possidetis juris doctrine reinforced this by mandating that emerging states inherit administrative boundaries from the colonial era, as applied in Latin American independences (1810–1830), African decolonizations (1960s), and the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1990s), prioritizing stability over ethnic or remedial redrawings.^[38] Beyond decolonization, self-determination claims in disputed or non-colonial territories face stringent limitations, with international law favoring internal self-governance over external secession absent egregious, systematic violations of fundamental rights.^[39] The concept of "remedial secession"—positing secession as a last resort for peoples enduring extreme oppression, such as genocide—remains doctrinally contested and unsupported by state practice or ICJ jurisprudence as a peremptory norm, as evidenced by the absence of recognized secessions in cases like Biafra (1967–1970) or Catalonia (2017).^[39] Thus, while self-determination promotes equitable political arrangements, it operates within constraints that preserve existing borders and state sovereignty, except in paradigmatic colonial contexts.^[37]

UN Resolutions and Palestinian Claims

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX), adopted on 22 November 1974, reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, explicitly including the right to self-determination without external interference, as well as national independence, sovereignty, and return to their homes and property.^[34] On the same date, Resolution 3237 (XXIX) granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the General Assembly, enabling its participation in UN proceedings on Palestinian matters.^[40] These measures marked an initial formal endorsement by the Assembly of Palestinian claims to self-determination, though General Assembly resolutions lack binding legal force under the UN Charter, serving primarily as recommendations. Subsequent General Assembly actions built on this framework, with Resolution 67/19 on 29 November 2012 upgrading Palestine's status to non-member observer state, thereby implicitly recognizing its self-governing aspirations while stopping short of full membership, which requires Security Council approval.^[41] The Assembly has issued annual resolutions reaffirming the Palestinian right to self-determination, such as A/RES/79/163 adopted on 17 December 2024, which restates this as an inalienable entitlement alongside demands for an end to occupation.^[42] Similarly, in April 2025, the Human Rights Council via A/HRC/RES/58/27 reaffirmed the unqualified right to self-determination, including living free from foreign intervention.^[43] These recurring endorsements reflect consistent majority support in the Assembly but occur amid broader recognitions of Palestine by states, without altering the non-binding character of the resolutions. In contrast, United Nations Security Council resolutions pertinent to the post-1967 territorial disputes, such as Resolution 242 adopted unanimously on 22 November 1967, called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the Six-Day War in exchange for secure and recognized boundaries, emphasizing negotiation to achieve a just settlement rather than unilateral assertions of self-determination or statehood.^[44] Resolution 338, adopted on 22 October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, demanded an immediate ceasefire and explicit implementation of Resolution 242, reinforcing a framework centered on bilateral talks under international auspices over independent Palestinian claims.^[45] These Security Council measures, potentially binding when invoking Chapter VI or VII principles, prioritize negotiated outcomes and have not endorsed unilateral Palestinian statehood. The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 declared Israel's prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory unlawful, obligating withdrawal without specifying modalities for self-determination, though advisory opinions carry no enforcement authority and depend on voluntary state compliance or further UN action.^[46] This opinion, requested by the General Assembly, aligns with its resolutions on occupation illegality but highlights the absence of compulsory mechanisms, as evidenced by ongoing non-implementation and the lack of Security Council follow-through.^[47]

Disputes Over Applicability to Palestinians

Israeli perspectives contend that the principle of self-determination was extended to Palestinian Arabs through the United Nations Partition Plan adopted on November 29, 1947, which proposed independent Jewish and Arab states comprising 56% and 43% of Mandatory Palestine, respectively, with Jerusalem under international administration; Arab leaders, including the Arab Higher Committee, rejected the plan outright, launching a civil war that forfeited their immediate claim to statehood alongside Israel's.^[48] This rejection, Israeli legal arguments maintain, undermines subsequent Palestinian invocations of self-determination, as it prioritized maximalist demands over partition despite Arabs constituting two-thirds of the population but receiving viable contiguous territory.^[49] Complementing this view, Jewish rights to self-determination in Palestine were affirmed internationally at the San Remo Conference of April 1920, where Allied powers endorsed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 by assigning Britain the Mandate for Palestine with explicit provisions for establishing a Jewish national home, rooted in the Jewish people's continuous historical and indigenous ties to the land, including sovereign kingdoms under David and Solomon around 1000 BCE and the Hasmonean dynasty in the 2nd century BCE.^[49]^[50] These ancient polities, evidenced by archaeological records and biblical texts corroborated by extra-biblical sources like the Merneptah Stele (circa 1208 BCE), distinguish Jewish claims from Palestinian ones, which lack evidence of prior sovereign statehood; the region was administered as part of successive empires—Ottoman, Byzantine, Arab Caliphates—without an independent Palestinian entity until modern nationalist assertions.^[51] Palestinian counterarguments emphasize their indigeneity as Arabs with deep-rooted presence in the land, framing the 1948 displacement of approximately 700,000-750,000 persons during the Nakba—the Arabic term for "catastrophe"—as a foundational injustice warranting remedial self-determination, irrespective of the absence of antecedent sovereignty.^[52] Proponents assert that prolonged habitation under Ottoman rule (1516-1918) and earlier Islamic governance establishes equivalent indigenous status, with displacement resulting from Zionist settlement and war outcomes rather than inherent entitlement deficits.^[53] International legal discourse underscores limits to self-determination's applicability, holding that it operates as a collective right but cannot authorize secession or statehood that impairs the territorial integrity or self-determination of established sovereign entities like Israel, which achieved independence in 1948 with UN recognition.^[54] This principle, reflected in UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibiting threats to political independence, implies that Palestinian claims must accommodate Israel's existence, precluding zero-sum interpretations; where two-state viability falters due to mutual distrust or demographic shifts, binational or confederative models have been proposed as pragmatic alternatives balancing rights without nullifying prior realizations of self-determination.^[55]

Arguments Supporting Palestinian Self-Determination

Nationalist and Identity-Based Claims

Palestinian nationalist claims frame self-determination as the fulfillment of an ethnic Arab identity distinct from broader pan-Arabism, crystallized amid the displacements of 1948 and 1967. Prior to the 1960s, aspirations were often subsumed under pan-Arab frameworks, with the 1964 founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) initially emphasizing collective Arab duty for Palestine's liberation as articulated in its charter.^[3] By the late 1960s, following the Six-Day War, Palestinian discourse shifted toward independent national agency, prioritizing a unique identity tied to territorial roots over unified Arab statehood.^[56] Central to these claims are historical and cultural bonds to the land, including religious reverence for sites like the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and narratives of continuous Arab inhabitation predating modern conflicts.^[57] The 1964 and 1968 PLO Charters codified aspirations for sovereignty over the entirety of Mandatory Palestine, portraying it as an indivisible Arab homeland requiring liberation to restore collective dignity and freedom.^[58] The 1988 Declaration of Independence proclaimed the State of Palestine as an embodiment of this identity, asserting historical continuity and the right to develop national culture on Palestinian soil.^[59] Refugee experiences form a core narrative, emphasizing the 1948 Nakba (catastrophe) and subsequent exoduses as ruptures in identity that self-determination must rectify through return. Over 5.9 million descendants of these refugees are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), sustaining claims of inherited ties that demand territorial realization.^[60] While 1996 PLO Charter amendments revoked explicit rejections of Israel's existence to align with Oslo commitments, residual ambiguities in territorial interpretation persist in nationalist rhetoric, linking identity to comprehensive homeland reclamation.^[61]

International Consensus and Resolutions

As of September 2025, 157 United Nations member states, comprising 81 percent of the body's membership, have recognized the State of Palestine, reflecting widespread diplomatic endorsement of Palestinian self-determination within a two-state framework alongside Israel.^[62] ^[63] These recognitions, primarily from non-Western and developing nations, underscore a global consensus favoring Palestinian statehood based on the 1967 borders, though they have yielded limited practical advancements in state-building or territorial control.^[64] The European Union maintains a collective commitment to a negotiated two-state solution as the path to resolving the conflict, providing substantial financial aid to Palestinian institutions while deferring full recognition to bilateral negotiations; by late 2025, ten EU members had individually recognized Palestine, with recent actions by France, Belgium, and others signaling heightened diplomatic momentum.^[65] ^[66] United Nations General Assembly resolutions have repeatedly affirmed support for the two-state solution, including the September 2025 endorsement of the New York Declaration, which calls for reviving negotiations toward Palestinian statehood and an end to the occupation.^[67] ^[68] However, efforts to elevate Palestine to full UN membership have been stymied by repeated United States vetoes in the Security Council, such as the April 2024 rejection of a resolution recommending admission, highlighting the gap between symbolic General Assembly backing and enforceable action.^[69] ^[70] In July 2025, France and Saudi Arabia co-chaired a UN high-level conference advancing a phased recognition plan tied to two-state implementation, culminating in joint statements urging broader state acknowledgments and reforms in Palestinian governance, though these initiatives prioritize diplomatic gestures over immediate sovereignty enforcement.^[71] ^[72] The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by the Arab League at the Beirut Summit, proposed comprehensive normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 lines, establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a "just solution" to the refugee issue based on UN Resolution 194.^[73] ^[74] Critics have noted the initiative's ambiguity on refugee repatriation, which lacks specificity on numbers or mechanisms, potentially complicating implementation amid demographic concerns.^[75] Complementary pressures include the International Court of Justice's July 2024 advisory opinion declaring Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful and obligating states to abstain from aiding it, alongside grassroots boycotts under the BDS framework targeting entities complicit in settlement activities.^[76] ^[47] These measures, while amplifying international scrutiny, remain largely symbolic, as evidenced by the absence of binding sanctions or shifts in territorial realities.^[77]

Equity and Demographic Realities

The Palestinian population in the West Bank stood at approximately 3 million as of 2023, while Gaza's population was around 2.23 million prior to the October 2023 conflict.^[78] Combined with Israel's approximately 2.1 million Arab citizens—who constitute 21% of the total population—these figures total roughly 7.33 million Arabs under Israeli control or adjacent territories.^[79] In contrast, Israel's Jewish population numbered about 7.4 million in 2023.^[79] Demographic projections indicate that annexation of the West Bank and Gaza without territorial separation would result in near-parity between Jewish and Arab populations initially, followed by an Arab majority due to higher Palestinian fertility rates—historically around 3.5-4 children per woman versus 3 for Jewish Israelis—potentially within decades absent policy interventions.^[80]^[81] Advocates for Palestinian self-determination invoke these realities to argue that a separate Palestinian state is essential for equity, as indefinite Israeli control over the territories risks eroding the Jewish majority necessary to sustain Israel as a Jewish-majority democracy, thereby threatening Jewish self-determination.^[80] Without partition, Israel faces a trilemma: continued occupation without citizenship (denying Palestinians full rights), annexation with enfranchisement (ending the Jewish majority), or a binational state (diluting Israel's foundational character as the nation-state of the Jewish people). This demographic pressure is cited as a pragmatic basis for mutual recognition of self-determination rights, prioritizing territorial separation to preserve distinct national majorities for both peoples. Human rights organizations frame the occupation as a denial of Palestinian dignity and autonomy, asserting that demographic confinement under military rule perpetuates inequality and necessitates statehood for equitable resolution.^[82]^[83] Reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch describe systemic discrimination in the territories as akin to apartheid, depriving Palestinians of self-determination and basic dignities available to Israeli citizens, though these analyses have drawn criticism for selective emphasis on Israeli actions while downplaying Palestinian agency, security threats, and rejection of prior peace offers.^[82]^[84] Moral equity in this view entails balancing competing self-determination claims through viable partition, excluding maximalist elements like unrestricted refugee return—which could add 5-7 million descendants to Palestinian demographics and overwhelm Israel's Jewish majority— in favor of negotiated compromises preserving both nations' viability.^[85]

Arguments Opposing or Limiting Palestinian Self-Determination

Israeli Security and Self-Preservation Imperatives

Israel's establishment in 1948 was immediately met with invasion by five Arab armies, initiating a pattern of existential threats that has persisted, including the 1967 Six-Day War where Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian forces attacked or prepared to attack Israeli positions, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War launched by Egypt and Syria.^[21]^[86] Subsequent Palestinian-led violence, such as fedayeen raids from Gaza and the West Bank in the 1950s-1960s and the 1987-1993 First Intifada involving widespread stone-throwing, bombings, and stabbings, underscored the vulnerability of Israel's narrow coastal plain to attacks from elevated territories.^[87] These episodes demonstrated that relinquishing territorial control without robust security guarantees enables adversaries to launch cross-border assaults, threatening civilian concentrations where over 70% of Israel's population resides within 15 miles of potential launch points.^[88] The 2005 Gaza disengagement, in which Israel evacuated all settlements and military installations, serves as empirical evidence of the risks posed by Palestinian self-rule without stringent oversight. Following the withdrawal, Hamas seized control in 2007 after defeating Fatah forces, leading to a surge in rocket and mortar attacks; between 2000 and 2007 alone, Palestinian groups fired thousands of projectiles from Gaza, with the intensity escalating post-disengagement as Hamas enhanced rocket range, accuracy, and payload.^[89]^[90] Over 12,000 rockets and mortars targeted Israeli communities by 2014, displacing thousands and necessitating continuous military operations like Cast Lead (2008-2009) and Protective Edge (2014), rather than yielding peace or economic cooperation as some proponents anticipated.^[91] This outcome illustrates how autonomy in a confined territory facilitated militarization, funded partly by external actors, transforming Gaza into a launchpad for indiscriminate fire rather than a demilitarized zone. The October 7, 2023, Hamas assault amplified these concerns, with militants breaching Israel's border fence in over 100 locations, killing approximately 1,200 individuals—predominantly civilians, including 843 non-combatants—and taking 251 hostages, in coordinated attacks involving rockets, paragliders, and ground incursions.^[92] Hamas, governing Gaza since 2007 with Iranian financial and technical support for its arsenal—including smuggling of advanced weaponry—exploited the territory's sovereignty-like status to build an underground tunnel network spanning hundreds of kilometers and stockpile tens of thousands of rockets.^[93] This event, the deadliest single day for Jews since the Holocaust, exposed how a Palestinian entity, even partially autonomous, can harbor forces intent on Israel's destruction, bypassing prior ceasefires and intelligence warnings.^[94] In the West Bank, Israeli retention of strategic areas, including settlements, functions as a defensive buffer against similar threats, given the region's topographic dominance over Israel's population centers and its history as a conduit for infiltrations.^[95] Without such presence, high-ground positions could enable artillery or rocket deployments overlooking Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, as evidenced by pre-1967 Jordanian shelling from the same ridges. Proposals for a demilitarized Palestinian state, as floated in past negotiations, falter on enforcement; the Palestinian Authority's inability to disarm rivals like Hamas, coupled with ongoing Fatah-Hamas schisms—exacerbated by the 2007 Gaza coup and failed reconciliation attempts—renders verifiable non-militarization implausible.^[96]^[97] Israeli security doctrine thus prioritizes defensible borders over territorial concessions, with public opinion polls showing over 60% opposition to statehood absent ironclad guarantees, reflecting lessons from Gaza's transformation into a fortified enclave.^[98] Unrestricted self-determination risks amplifying these imperatives into existential peril, as a sovereign Palestine could import heavier armaments, ally with Iran-backed proxies, and contest borders through unified command structures absent in the current fragmented governance.^[99]

Historical Jewish Rights and Continuous Presence

The ancient Kingdoms of Israel and Judah, established around the 10th century BCE, represent the earliest documented Jewish sovereignty in the region, corroborated by archaeological findings such as the Tel Dan Stele referencing the "House of David" and inscriptions from sites like Khirbet Qeiyafa indicating centralized Judahite administration during the Iron Age IIA period (c. 1000–900 BCE).^[100]^[101] These kingdoms maintained political independence and cultural continuity centered on Jerusalem, with the First Temple constructed circa 950 BCE under King Solomon serving as a focal point of Jewish religious and national identity, evidenced by artifacts like bullae bearing Hezekiah's name from the 8th–7th centuries BCE.^[102] Despite conquests by Assyrians (722 BCE), Babylonians (586 BCE), Persians, Greeks, and Romans, Jewish communities persisted in the land, with Galilee synagogues from the Roman-Byzantine era (2nd–7th centuries CE) attesting to ongoing settlement and religious practice amid diaspora.^[51] Under early Islamic caliphates following the 7th-century conquest, Jewish populations in cities like Tiberias and Jerusalem contributed to scholarship, including the compilation of the Jerusalem Talmud (c. 400–500 CE), while Ottoman rule from 1517 to 1917 saw sustained Jewish communities in Safed, Hebron, and Jerusalem, numbering around 25,000 by the late 19th century despite periodic expulsions and taxes.^[103]^[51] This unbroken presence, predating the rise of modern Arab nationalism in the 19th–20th centuries, underscores Jewish indigeneity as a counter to claims of exclusive Arab historical entitlement. The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, approved on July 24, 1922, explicitly incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration's commitment to "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," tasking Britain with facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement while recognizing prior Jewish connections to the land.^[104] This legal framework affirmed Jewish rights to self-determination in the territory west of the Jordan River, distinct from Transjordan's provisional exclusion under Article 25. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in April 1950 received recognition from only Britain and Pakistan, lacking broader international validity and thus preserving Jewish legal claims to the area under the Mandate's unfulfilled provisions.^[105]^[106] Jewish self-determination was realized through acceptance of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, which proposed partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states; the Jewish Agency endorsed the plan, enabling Israel's declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, despite Arab states' rejection and subsequent invasion.^[107]^[108] Palestinian Arab leadership's refusal of this opportunity, prioritizing maximalist demands over a viable state alongside Israel, parallels the symmetry in self-determination rights: Jewish realization in 1948 despite opposition, while Palestinian claims overlook the forfeited 1947 pathway to sovereignty.^[107]^[108]

Practical Viability and Governance Failures

The Palestinian Authority (PA), established in 1994 under the Oslo Accords, has been led by Mahmoud Abbas as president since January 15, 2005, following Yasser Arafat's death; Abbas's four-year term expired in 2009, yet no presidential elections have been held since, consolidating power amid widespread perceptions of autocracy.^[109] Surveys indicate that 87% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza view the PA as corrupt, with Abbas's prolonged rule linked to nepotism, embezzlement scandals involving his inner circle, and interference in anti-corruption probes by bodies like the Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission.^[110] ^[111] A prominent example of flawed incentives is the PA's "pay-for-slay" policy, through which it allocates approximately $350 million annually to imprisoned militants and families of deceased attackers, with payments scaled by sentence length and family size, effectively rewarding participation in violence against Israelis.^[112] This system, administered via the Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs and the Palestine Liberation Organization's Martyr's Fund, has persisted despite international criticism and U.S. legislation like the Taylor Force Act of 2018, which conditions aid on cessation of such stipends, as it diverts resources from development and perpetuates a culture of martyrdom over state-building.^[113] In Gaza, Hamas's governance exemplifies rejectionist ideology incompatible with viable statehood; its 1988 charter explicitly rejects Israel's existence, framing the conflict as a religious duty to reclaim all of historic Palestine "from the river to the sea" through jihad.^[114] Although a 2017 document pragmatically accepted a provisional state on 1967 borders, it refrained from recognizing Israel, maintained armed resistance as legitimate, and distinguished the struggle against "Zionist occupation" from antisemitism without renouncing core Islamist aims, thus sustaining ideological barriers to compromise.^[115] Hamas's victory in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian Legislative Council elections—securing 74 of 132 seats—reflected voter frustration with Fatah corruption but led to the violent June 2007 coup in Gaza, where Hamas ousted PA forces in bloody clashes, resulting in over 100 deaths and a permanent territorial schism that fractured unified governance.^[116] This split persists, with Hamas controlling Gaza and Fatah the West Bank, precluding coherent institutions or elections, as evidenced by the absence of national polls since 2006. Economic viability remains undermined by heavy reliance on Israeli clearance revenues (about 60% of PA budget) and foreign aid (up to 25% of GDP historically), fostering dependency rather than self-sufficiency; the PA's budget deficits, exacerbated by corruption and dual administrations, have led to repeated fiscal crises, with donor fatigue evident in declining support post-2010s.^[117] ^[118] Parallel to this, PA and Hamas curricula and media promote narratives glorifying violence, delegitimizing Israel, and fostering antisemitic tropes, as documented in reviews finding textbooks that omit peace education, map Palestine without Israel, and praise "martyrs," hindering societal readiness for coexistence.^[119] ^[120] World Bank assessments, while noting technical progress in fiscal management by 2011, have consistently highlighted institutional fragility due to political divisions, lack of rule of law, and inability to control territory or deliver services independently, concluding that without resolving internal rifts and rejectionism, Palestinian readiness for sovereign statehood falters on governance benchmarks essential for sustainability.^[121] ^[122] This internal dysfunction—manifest in stalled reforms, ideological extremism, and economic parasitism—renders a unified, functional Palestinian state practically unviable under current leadership paradigms.

Major Pursuits and Outcomes

PLO Charter and Armed Struggle Era

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), established in 1964, adopted its foundational Palestinian National Charter in 1968 under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, who assumed chairmanship in 1969, emphasizing armed struggle as the primary means to achieve Palestinian self-determination by liberating all of historic Palestine, including areas constituting the State of Israel.^[58] The charter explicitly rejected the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 and the establishment of Israel as illegitimate, portraying Zionism as a colonial and racist movement, and called for the dismantling of Israel through revolutionary violence rather than negotiation or recognition of its existence.^[123] This document, reaffirmed annually by PLO bodies, positioned the organization as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians and framed self-determination in zero-sum terms, excluding any compromise with Jewish national claims.^[124] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, PLO-affiliated fedayeen groups, particularly Fatah, conducted cross-border raids from bases in Jordan targeting Israeli civilians and military personnel, escalating after the 1967 Six-Day War and culminating in the Battle of Karameh in March 1968, which boosted PLO recruitment despite heavy fedayeen losses.^[125] These operations strained relations with Jordan's Hashemite monarchy, leading to the Black September conflict in 1970, where Jordanian forces expelled PLO fighters following attempts by fedayeen to overthrow King Hussein, resulting in thousands of Palestinian casualties and the relocation of PLO headquarters to Lebanon.^[126] From Lebanese bases in the 1970s, fedayeen intensified attacks, including airplane hijackings by factions like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a PLO constituent, such as the Dawson's Field hijackings in September 1970, which involved diverting multiple planes to Jordan and destroying empty aircraft to publicize demands for prisoner releases.^[127] The 1976 Entebbe hijacking of an Air France flight by PFLP-External Operations and German militants, who diverted it to Uganda with Israeli hostages, exemplified this tactic, ending in an Israeli commando rescue that killed the hijackers and freed most captives, highlighting the international repercussions of PLO-linked terrorism.^[128] The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, signed following the Camp David Accords, further isolated the PLO by normalizing relations between the largest Arab state and Israel without addressing core Palestinian demands or including PLO participation, prompting Arab League expulsion of Egypt and reinforcing the PLO's rejectionist posture amid declining pan-Arab support for armed struggle.^[129] This diplomatic shift underscored the limitations of the PLO's strategy, as Egypt's withdrawal from confrontation left the organization reliant on asymmetric violence from Lebanon, where fedayeen activities contributed to Lebanon's civil war dynamics and Israeli retaliatory operations.^[130] The First Intifada, erupting in December 1987 after a Gaza traffic incident sparked widespread protests, represented a tactical evolution from fedayeen guerrilla actions to grassroots mobilization coordinated by the PLO's Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, involving strikes, boycotts, and stone-throwing against Israeli forces, but also escalating violence including stabbings, shootings, and Molotov cocktails that killed approximately 160 Israelis, many civilians. Lasting until 1993, the uprising inflicted over 1,000 Palestinian deaths from Israeli responses but entrenched rejectionist foundations by blending mass resistance with targeted attacks, with the first Palestinian suicide bombings emerging in 1993 under Hamas influence, signaling a hardening of tactics even as the PLO began exploring diplomatic channels.

Oslo Accords and Interim Agreements

The Oslo Accords began with the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed on September 13, 1993, between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), establishing a framework for Palestinian interim self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip while deferring final-status issues such as borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees to future negotiations.^[4] Accompanying letters of mutual recognition exchanged on September 9, 1993, saw the PLO acknowledge Israel's right to exist in peace and security and renounce terrorism, while Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.^[4] This process led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an interim body, granting limited autonomy over civil affairs in specified areas as a step toward potential self-determination, though without committing to statehood.^[131] The Oslo II Accord, formally the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed on September 28, 1995, expanded PA responsibilities by dividing the West Bank into three administrative zones: Area A (approximately 18% of the land, mainly urban centers, under full PA civil and security control); Area B (about 22% of the land, under PA civil control with joint Israeli-Palestinian security); and Area C (roughly 60%, under full Israeli control, including settlements and strategic areas).^[132] This arrangement provided the PA with administrative authority over around 40% of the West Bank (Areas A and B combined) plus full control of the Gaza Strip, constituting a significant concession toward Palestinian self-rule but preserving Israeli security oversight and leaving most land and resources in Area C unresolved.^[133] Gaza-Jericho redeployments had earlier transferred limited control in 1994, but Oslo II formalized phased Israeli withdrawals tied to PA commitments to combat terrorism and incitement, which were inconsistently fulfilled amid ongoing attacks.^[131] Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's pursuit of the accords faced domestic opposition, culminating in his assassination on November 4, 1995, by Yigal Amir, a Jewish extremist who viewed the concessions as endangering Israeli security by ceding territory without adequate safeguards against violence.^[134] The killing, occurring shortly after Oslo II's signing, shifted Israeli politics rightward, with Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu elected prime minister in May 1996 amid a wave of Palestinian suicide bombings that killed dozens and eroded public support for further withdrawals.^[135] Under Netanyahu, implementation continued selectively; the Hebron Protocol of January 17, 1997, redeployed Israeli forces from 80% of Hebron, transferring control to the PA despite heightened terrorism, including bombings that delayed the process and underscored security risks.^[135] These interim steps advanced PA autonomy as a mechanism for self-determination but stalled on permanent arrangements, as mutual distrust grew over PA failures to curb militant groups like Hamas, which rejected the accords and continued attacks.^[131] The process reached a critical impasse at the Camp David Summit in July 2000, where Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered approximately 91% of the West Bank, all of Gaza, territorial swaps for settlement blocs, and limited Palestinian sovereignty in parts of East Jerusalem, framed as a basis for statehood.^[136] PA Chairman Yasser Arafat rejected the proposal without presenting a counteroffer, citing insufficient concessions on refugees and Jerusalem, leading to the summit's collapse and the subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada; U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross later attributed the failure partly to Arafat's unwillingness to conclude a deal despite Barak's extensive territorial compromises.^[131]^[136] This rejection highlighted the accords' limitations in achieving full Palestinian self-determination, as interim autonomy did not translate into a viable final-status agreement amid unresolved core disputes and escalating violence.^[137]

Camp David, Annapolis, and Subsequent Talks

The Camp David Summit, held from July 11 to 25, 2000, and mediated by U.S. President Bill Clinton, featured Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak proposing a Palestinian state comprising about 91% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and limited Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, with land swaps to compensate for retained Israeli settlement blocs.^[138] Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat rejected the offer outright, providing no formal counterproposal despite extensive prior discussions on core issues like borders, security, Jerusalem, and refugees, which U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross later described as Arafat's refusal of every major concession while offering none in return.^[139] The summit's collapse contributed to the outbreak of the Second Intifada shortly thereafter, marked by widespread Palestinian violence that resulted in over 1,000 Israeli deaths in the following years.^[138] Follow-up negotiations at Taba, Egypt, from January 21 to 27, 2001, built on the Clinton Parameters issued in December 2000, with Israel tabling maps offering up to 97% of the West Bank alongside land swaps equivalent to the retained 3% for major settlement areas, secure borders, and joint administration of Jerusalem's holy sites.^[140]^[141] While participants reported progress— including Palestinian concessions on refugee returns limited to family unification for 10,000 annually and Israeli flexibility on early-warning sites—the talks ended without agreement, constrained by the impending Israeli elections on February 6, 2001, in which Ariel Sharon defeated Barak.^[141] Both sides' final communiqué acknowledged the potential for a deal had political timelines allowed, but Palestinian negotiators later emphasized unresolved gaps on refugees and Jerusalem as barriers.^[140] The Annapolis Conference on November 27, 2007, hosted by U.S. President George W. Bush, produced a joint understanding between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas committing to immediate bilateral talks on final-status issues, aiming for a peace treaty by the end of 2008 based on the two-state solution outlined in prior U.S. roadmaps.^[142] The framework emphasized parallel implementation of obligations like ending violence and settlement expansion, with U.S. monitoring, but Palestinian demands for a complete Israeli settlement freeze as a precondition escalated tensions, stalling momentum despite Olmert's willingness to negotiate core issues.^[142] In September 2008, Olmert presented Abbas with a detailed map-based proposal conceding 93.7% of the West Bank (with 6.3% annexation offset by 5.8% of Israeli territory in land swaps), full withdrawal from Gaza pending demilitarization, shared sovereignty in Jerusalem's Arab areas, international oversight of the Old City's holy basin, and absorption of 5,000 Palestinian refugees into Israel alongside compensation funds for others.^[143] Abbas, after reviewing the visuals during a series of meetings, offered no substantive response or counteroffer, later citing insufficient time to study the map and Olmert's domestic legal troubles as factors, though Olmert maintained the plan addressed maximal Palestinian territorial demands.^[143]^[144] This non-engagement effectively ended the Annapolis process, with Olmert resigning amid corruption charges in 2009. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's intensive negotiations, launched in July 2013 with nine months of secret and public sessions, sought a framework agreement on borders, security, refugees, and mutual recognition, including phased prisoner releases by Israel in exchange for Palestinian concessions on settlements and acknowledgment of Israel as a Jewish state.^[145] The talks collapsed in April 2014 after Palestinians signed 15 international conventions, pursued unity with Hamas, and refused to extend beyond the deadline without further Israeli releases of prisoners involved in attacks, while Israel halted concessions citing these unilateral moves and threats of Palestinian appeals to the International Criminal Court.^[145] U.S. envoy Martin Indyk attributed primary blame to Israeli settlement announcements, but Israeli officials countered that Palestinian insistence on maximalist positions—like unlimited refugee claims and rejection of Jewish state recognition—undermined viability, marking another instance where Palestinian leadership prioritized symbolic actions over compromise despite territorial offers nearing 97% with swaps.^[145]^[146]

Gaza Disengagement and Hamas Takeover

In August and September 2005, Israel unilaterally implemented the Gaza Disengagement Plan under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, evacuating approximately 8,000 Jewish settlers from 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and withdrawing all military forces from the territory's interior.^[147]^[148] The move aimed to reduce friction and improve Israel's security by ending direct involvement in Gaza's daily governance, but proceeded without a negotiated peace partner or Palestinian commitments to demilitarization, leaving the territory under Palestinian Authority (PA) control via the Oslo framework.^[149] Following the withdrawal, Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas, escalated rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli communities near Gaza, with over 400 projectiles fired in 2006 alone, compared to fewer than 100 annually prior to disengagement, demonstrating the absence of reciprocal de-escalation toward state-building.^[150] The Palestinian Legislative Council elections on January 25, 2006, resulted in a decisive victory for Hamas's Change and Reform List, which secured 74 of 132 seats, while Fatah obtained 45, reflecting widespread voter disillusionment with Fatah's corruption and ineffective governance rather than endorsement of Hamas's charter calling for Israel's destruction.^[151]^[152] Hamas formed a government under Ismail Haniyeh, but international donors, including the Quartet (United States, European Union, United Nations, Russia), withheld aid due to Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel, renounce violence, or accept prior agreements, exacerbating economic woes and internal power struggles with Fatah.^[153] A brief Mecca Accord in February 2007, brokered by Saudi Arabia, established a unity government, but it collapsed amid mutual accusations of coup plotting, leading to violent clashes.^[154] In June 2007, Hamas launched a rapid offensive in the Battle of Gaza, defeating Fatah forces in six days of street fighting, executing or expelling PA loyalists, and seizing full control of the Strip, thereby splitting Palestinian governance between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah-led PA in the West Bank.^[155]^[156] This Islamist takeover transformed Gaza into a base for military buildup, with Hamas diverting resources to smuggling weapons via tunnels from Egypt rather than civilian development, prompting Israel and Egypt to impose a blockade in June 2007 to interdict arms imports and prevent attacks.^[157]^[158] The blockade restricted non-essential goods and maritime access while allowing humanitarian aid, but Hamas's prioritization of rocket production—firing thousands toward Israel—and cross-border tunnels for infiltration underscored the failure to foster viable self-governing institutions conducive to peace.^[159] Subsequent Israeli military operations responded to persistent threats from Gaza-based rocket barrages and tunnel networks. Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008–January 18, 2009) followed over 571 rockets and 205 mortars launched in 2008, targeting Hamas infrastructure to degrade launch capabilities.^[150] Operation Pillar of Defense (November 14–21, 2012) countered a surge of over 900 rockets, with Israel's Iron Dome system intercepting hundreds to protect civilians.^[160] These conflicts, recurring through 2021, highlighted Hamas's rejection of compromise in favor of armed confrontation, entrenching Gaza under authoritarian Islamist rule and undermining prospects for Palestinian self-determination as a peaceful, democratic entity.^[154]^[161]

Recent Developments and Stalemate

2023 Hamas Attack and Gaza War

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and allied Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants launched a coordinated assault from Gaza into southern Israel, breaching border defenses with paragliders, motorcycles, and ground incursions, resulting in the deaths of approximately 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals, predominantly civilians, including at sites like the Nova music festival and kibbutzim.^[162]^[163] Militants took 251 hostages, with over 100 still held or presumed dead as of late 2025, using them as leverage for prisoner exchanges.^[164] Hamas framed the operation, dubbed "Al-Aqsa Flood," as resistance to Israeli occupation and blockade, with explicit aims of "liberation" aligned to its charter's rejection of Israel's existence and call for establishing Islamic rule over historic Palestine.^[165]^[166] Israel responded with airstrikes beginning October 7, followed by a ground invasion on October 27, 2023, aimed at dismantling Hamas's military capabilities, including over 500 kilometers of tunnels, rocket launchers, and command centers embedded in civilian areas.^[167] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeted Hamas leadership and infrastructure, eliminating key figures and destroying weapon stockpiles, though Hamas retained operational capacity in parts of Gaza into 2025.^[93] These operations severely degraded Hamas's governance facade, as no viable civilian administration or state-building efforts materialized amid the fighting, with resources redirected to military entrenchment rather than institutional development. The Gaza Health Ministry, controlled by Hamas, reported over 40,000 Palestinian deaths by mid-2024, rising to approximately 51,000 by April 2025, figures that include combatants and unverified claims without distinguishing between civilian and military casualties.^[168] Israeli assessments estimate around 17,000 Hamas fighters killed, disputing the ministry's totals as inflated and including natural deaths or indirect causes, with independent analyses suggesting undercounts of traumatic injuries but confirming high combatant proportions due to Hamas tactics.^[162]^[169] Hamas's strategy exacerbated civilian risks by embedding military assets in densely populated zones, schools, and hospitals—evidenced by IDF footage, Hamas propaganda admissions, and third-party reports—effectively using human shields to deter strikes and amplify international pressure on Israel.^[170]^[171] Aid inflows, intended for humanitarian relief, faced diversion, with Israeli intelligence and aid monitors documenting Hamas taxing or seizing up to 25% of supplies for fighters or black-market sales, undermining prospects for functional governance and perpetuating dependency over self-reliant state structures.^[172]^[173] This escalation underscored Hamas's prioritization of ideological confrontation over pragmatic statehood, as the attack and subsequent war devastated Gaza's infrastructure without advancing Palestinian self-determination, instead reinforcing cycles of violence and Israeli security measures that preclude territorial concessions.^[165]^[174]

International Recognition Efforts (2023-2025)

In May 2024, Spain, Ireland, and Norway formally recognized the State of Palestine on May 28, joining 143 prior recognitions and aiming to bolster diplomatic momentum for a two-state solution amid ongoing conflict.^[175]^[176]^[177] These moves drew condemnation from Israel, which viewed them as premature and rewarding violence, while the United States opposed unilateral recognitions, insisting they bypassed direct negotiations.^[176]^[178] On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories unlawful under international law, obligating Israel to withdraw its presence "as rapidly as possible" and cease settlement activities, though the opinion lacked direct enforcement mechanisms.^[46] The ruling, requested by the UN General Assembly, emphasized obligations on other states to refrain from aiding the occupation but did not alter existing bilateral recognitions or territorial control.^[76] Diplomatic initiatives accelerated in 2025, with the UN General Assembly endorsing the New York Declaration on September 12, reaffirming commitment to a two-state solution, Palestinian statehood, and Hamas's disarmament and handover of Gaza governance to the Palestinian Authority.^[67]^[179] France formalized recognition of Palestine on September 22, 2025, during a UN high-level conference co-hosted with Saudi Arabia, framing it as essential for regional stability despite U.S. veto power in the Security Council blocking membership bids.^[180]^[181] The United States continued to oppose such recognitions, citing the need for negotiated outcomes tied to security guarantees and rejection of terrorism, while the United Kingdom shifted to recognition on September 21, 2025, alongside Canada and Australia.^[178]^[182]^[183] Parallel to these recognitions, the Arab League advanced a reconstruction framework for Gaza adopted in June 2025, proposing $53 billion in funding over five years for rebuilding infrastructure, conditioned on Palestinian Authority reforms, technocratic governance, and Hamas's relinquishment of power to enable PA administration.^[184] Hamas rejected elements requiring its disarmament or exclusion, maintaining control over aid distribution and military assets, which stalled implementation and highlighted fractures in Palestinian unity.^[185]^[186] These efforts underscored persistent diplomatic divides, with recognitions expanding to 157 UN member states by September 2025 but yielding no immediate territorial or governance changes on the ground.^[187]

Post-War Proposals and Regional Dynamics

In September 2025, the United States under President Donald Trump proposed a 21-point plan to end the Gaza war, emphasizing hostage release by Hamas within 48 hours of agreement, full demilitarization of Gaza to prevent rearmament by militant groups, and transitional governance by a technocratic Palestinian committee focused on deradicalization and reconstruction.^[188]^[189] The plan conditioned pathways to Palestinian self-determination on verifiable steps against extremism, including restrictions on munitions inflows and international oversight of aid distribution to avoid Hamas resurgence, while envisioning eventual Palestinian Authority involvement in Gaza administration post-stabilization.^[190] This framework linked security guarantees for Israel to moderated Palestinian governance, critiqued by some as prioritizing Israeli interests but defended as essential for sustainable autonomy given Hamas's October 2023 attack.^[191] Regional dynamics further tied post-war proposals to broader normalization efforts, with Saudi Arabia signaling potential extension of the Abraham Accords contingent on tangible progress toward Palestinian statehood, including East Jerusalem as capital and deradicalized governance in Gaza and the West Bank.^[192]^[193] Iranian-backed proxies, such as remnants of Hamas and Hezbollah, complicated these initiatives by sustaining low-level threats and undermining ceasefire enforcement, necessitating U.S. strategies to counter Tehran's influence for any enduring plan.^[194]^[191] Proponents argued that normalization incentives from Gulf states could incentivize Palestinian leadership reforms, fostering self-determination through economic integration rather than unilateral militancy.^[195] Demographic pressures in the West Bank intensified scrutiny of self-determination proposals, with violence surging post-October 2023: an average of four settler incidents daily and over 1,800 attacks recorded by early 2025, displacing Palestinian communities amid Israeli military operations against militants.^[196]^[197] Concurrently, Israeli settlement expansion accelerated, with over 30,000 housing units advanced in 2023 and nearly 29,000 in 2024, plus 10,300 more in pipeline by mid-2025, fragmenting territory and eroding viability of contiguous Palestinian statehood without deradicalization preconditions.^[198]^[199] These shifts underscored proposals' emphasis on mutual security reforms to enable normalized regional ties, as unchecked violence and settlement growth risked foreclosing two-state outcomes absent moderated Palestinian institutions.^[200]

Controversies and Broader Implications

Links to Terrorism and Rejection of Compromise

The Palestine Liberation Organization's 1968 National Charter explicitly designated armed struggle as the sole means to liberate all of Mandatory Palestine, rejecting any territorial compromise and framing the conflict in zero-sum terms.^[58] Similarly, Hamas's 1988 Covenant described Israel as a "Zionist invasion" and "racist entity" to be eradicated through jihad, echoing genocidal rhetoric by invoking Islamic obliteration of the Jewish state. These foundational documents underscore a pattern where self-determination claims have been intertwined with calls for Israel's elimination rather than coexistence, prioritizing maximalist goals over pragmatic statehood. Palestinian Arab leadership has consistently rejected partition proposals offering territorial sovereignty. In 1937, the Arab Higher Committee dismissed the Peel Commission's recommendation for a small Jewish state alongside an Arab one, insisting on undivided Arab control over Palestine.^[15] This stance repeated in 1947, when the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine formally opposed the UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181), which allocated approximately 56% of the territory for an Arab state despite Arabs comprising about two-thirds of the population, leading to immediate violence rather than negotiation.^[201] Subsequent offers fared no better: Yasser Arafat rejected Ehud Barak's 2000 Camp David proposal, which included over 90% of the West Bank, all of Gaza, and shared control of Jerusalem, without presenting a counteroffer and instead launching the Second Intifada.^[143] Mahmoud Abbas likewise turned down Ehud Olmert's 2008 plan conceding 93-94% of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem as a capital, later admitting the rejection while citing unresolved maps but avoiding commitment.^[143] This rejectionism aligns with a "phased plan" strategy articulated in PLO doctrine following Arafat's 1974 UN address, where incremental gains were pursued not as ends to two-state resolution but as steps toward reclaiming the entire territory "from the river to the sea"—a slogan invoked by Palestinian leaders to denote liberation of the area between the Jordan River and Mediterranean, implicitly negating Israel's existence.^[202] Empirical records show no instance of Palestinian leadership endorsing a viable two-state framework on offered terms, with violence often following diplomatic overtures; the Second Intifada (2000-2005), erupting after Camp David, resulted in 1,083 Israeli deaths, predominantly civilians, via suicide bombings and shootings orchestrated by PLO-affiliated groups and Hamas.^[203] Such patterns suggest self-determination rhetoric has served as a veneer for uncompromising irredentism, where compromise is viewed as capitulation rather than progress toward statehood.

Incitement, Education, and Cultural Narratives

Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas-controlled educational materials frequently depict Israel as non-existent, with maps of "Palestine" encompassing all territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, thereby erasing Israel's legitimacy and fostering territorial maximalism incompatible with compromise for statehood.^[204] Textbooks glorify martyrdom and jihad as noble paths, praising suicide bombings and armed resistance while omitting recognition of Israel's right to exist or narratives of peaceful coexistence.^[205]^[206] These curricula, reviewed in studies as recent as 2025, promote antisemitism, celebrate terrorists as heroes, and reject reconciliation, conditioning generations against negotiation-based self-determination.^[207] Public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) indicate widespread endorsement of violence among Palestinian youth, with support for armed struggle exceeding 50% in Gaza and rising in the West Bank amid ongoing incitement.^[208]^[209] For instance, PCPSR's June 2024 survey found 56% of Gazans favoring violence as a means of resistance, reflecting a martyrdom cult that prioritizes confrontation over state-building.^[210] This socialization undermines prospects for peaceful self-determination by normalizing rejectionism, as evidenced by consistent majorities opposing two-state compromises in favor of "armed struggle" when queried.^[211] The PA's "pay-for-slay" policy allocates substantial funds—estimated at over 7% of its annual budget, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars—to salaries for imprisoned terrorists and stipends to families of "martyrs" killed during attacks on Israelis.^[113] These payments, which incentivize violence by rewarding severity of acts (e.g., higher for deaths caused), frame participation as a religious duty akin to jihad, perpetuating a cycle where economic support ties family welfare to aggression rather than productive state institutions.^[212]^[213] Despite international pressure and partial halts reported in 2025, the program persists, signaling prioritization of conflict over governance for self-determination.^[214] Palestinian media and television, including PA and Hamas outlets, routinely glorify suicide bombers through children's programming that portrays them as role models and paths to paradise.^[215] Shows like those on Al-Aqsa TV feature young children singing praises of jihad and martyrdom, directing viewers toward "Jihad Street" as an aspirational destination.^[216]^[217] The PA's Religious Affairs Ministry reinforces this by framing the conflict in sermons as defensive jihad for Islamic sites, embedding religious absolutism that rejects secular peace processes.^[218] In contrast, Israeli curricula, while acknowledging historical conflicts, incorporate elements promoting tolerance and recognition of Palestinian narratives in joint initiatives, though Palestinian materials lack equivalent efforts toward mutual legitimacy.^[204] This cultural narrative sustains hostility, eroding the pragmatic foundations needed for viable Palestinian statehood through negotiation.^[115]

Demographic Pressures and Alternatives to Two-State Model

Demographic analyses indicate that the combined population of Jews and Arabs between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea reached approximate parity around 2022, with over seven million Israelis residing in Israel proper and the West Bank alongside roughly seven million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.^[80]^[219] Projections suggest that without territorial separation, the Arab population—growing at higher rates due to higher fertility—could surpass the Jewish population by the 2040s, potentially eroding Israel's Jewish majority and democratic character in a single-state scenario.^[220]^[221] These trends amplify pressures for alternatives to the two-state model, as prolonged stalemate risks annexationist moves by Israel, such as extending sovereignty over parts or all of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), which some projections frame as responses to existential demographic shifts.^[222]^[223] Among Israel's right-wing factions, advocates for sovereignty over Judea and Samaria emphasize historical and legal claims rooted in pre-1948 international mandates and Israel's Declaration of Independence, arguing that full control is essential to maintain defensible borders and cultural continuity amid demographic momentum favoring Palestinians.^[224]^[225] In contrast, Israeli centrists and left-leaning figures, including former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, warn that annexation without granting equal rights would institutionalize a system of indefinite rule over millions of non-citizens, inviting comparisons to apartheid and international isolation, as demographic integration without separation heightens the risk of binational coercion rather than coexistence.^[226]^[227] Palestinian discourse occasionally invokes a binational state as an alternative, demanding equal rights within a single framework encompassing historic Palestine, though empirical polling reveals limited enthusiasm: surveys from 2023-2025 show that while support for a two-state solution has fluctuated—rising in some West Bank samples to around 40%—a majority often opposes one-state arrangements, with preferences leaning toward separation or armed resistance over shared sovereignty.^[228]^[229]^[230] This divergence underscores causal barriers to viability, as mutual distrust—evident in low cross-support for peaceful integration—renders binational models prone to instability, with Palestinians viewing them as perpetuations of inequality and Israelis as threats to self-determination.^[231] Confederation proposals emerge as hybrid alternatives, envisioning two sovereign states with open borders, shared institutions, and freedom of movement, akin to models in Europe, potentially mitigating demographic pressures by preserving national identities while addressing practical interdependencies.^[232]^[233] Yet, these face skepticism due to enforcement challenges in a low-trust environment, where risks include demographic spillover eroding Israel's Jewish character or Palestinian autonomy yielding to Israeli dominance, compounded by annexation threats that could preempt such frameworks.^[234] Overall, the stalemate elevates these options amid projections of sustained parity or Arab advantage, but entrenched rejectionism on both sides—polls indicating slim majorities for any compromise—highlights their precariousness without resolved security and identity conflicts.^[230]^[235]

References

[1]
History of the Question of Palestine - UN.org.
In 1974 the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence, sovereignty, and to ...
[2]
The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 - state.gov
The Palestinian Arabs refused to recognize this arrangement, which they regarded as favorable to the Jews and unfair to the Arab population that would remain ...
[3]
The Original Palestine National Charter (1964) - Jewish Virtual Library
Article 21. The Palestine people believes in the principle of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and the right of peoples to ...
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The Oslo Accords, 1993 - state.gov
The Palestinians made a significant advance toward self-government with the creation of the Palestinian National Authority, composed of a democratically elected ...
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May 18, 2018 · Under Ottoman rule, the Palestinian territory was organized into three states, Jerusalem, Gaza and Nablus, all linked to the Damascus Province.
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Jewish & Non-Jewish Population of Israel/Palestine (1517-Present)
Era. Year. Jews (core population). Non-Jews. Total Population. % Jewish. Ottoman Empire. 1517. 5,000. 295,000. ~300,000.
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A Primer: What were the demographics of Ottoman Palestine?
Sep 13, 2024 · In 1850, there were approximately 300,000 Muslims, 13,000 Jews, and 27,000 Christians in Ottoman Palestine. Waves of Jewish immigration to ...
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Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity - Martin Kramer on the Middle East
The Emergence of Arabism. Arabism first arose in the nineteenth century not as a direct reaction to Western rule, but as a critique of the state of the Ottoman ...
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Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism
In the past, analyses of the development of Palestinian nationalism have tended to overemphasize the role played by Zionism and underrate the internal Arab ...
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[PDF] Ottoman Policy and Restrictions on Jewish Settlement in Palestine
Ottoman policy was thus clear and constant. It was quickly backed up with restrictions on. Jewish entry into Palestine and land purchase there. And, for all ...
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https://martinkramer.org/reader/archives/arab-nationalism-mistaken-identity
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Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
As indicated in the despatch under reference, illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine at the rate of a few (probably not more than three) thousand a year had ...
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[PDF] The Intifadah and the 1936-1939 Uprising - The Carter Center
The 1936-1939 uprising was an admixture: a peasant revolt, driven by distinctively personal frustrations and motivations and overlaid by a nationalist veneer.
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Peel Commission Report, Excerpts From the Findings and ...
After outbreak of communal violence, the British investigatory committee suggests partition of Palestine, seeking to create two states for two peoples.<|separator|>
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The Arab Higher Committee have perused and studied the Report of the Royal Commission for Palestine issued on 7 th July 1937 and the Statement of British ...
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The Avalon Project : British White Paper of 1939
After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it. His Majesty's ...
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British White Paper of 1939 on Palestine (MacDonald White Paper)
The paper rejected the idea of partition and suggested the establishment within 10 years of an independent state in Palestine, with Arabs and Jews sharing the ...
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Arab reaction to the UNGA partition plan was prompt and violent. Strikes and demonstrations led to scattered riots within Palestine, and Arab League action was ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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The Arab states continued to use the Palestinians to their own ends, exploiting the newly created “refugee problem” to tarnish Israel's international standing.
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FIRST UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I)
Palestinian fedayeen, with the support of the Egyptian Government, had been launching frequent raids against Israel from their bases in Gaza, and these had ...
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Arab-Israeli War of 1967 - state.gov
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Consequences of the 1967 War | The Washington Institute
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The outcome ofthe Six Day War served to shake up the Palestinian reliance on their Arab neighbors and was a powerful catalyst in the awakening ofPalestinian ...
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Requests the Secretary-General to designate a. Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned ...
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Document 112 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian
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Requests the Secretary-General to report to the. General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the imple- mentation of the present resolution;. 9. Decides to ...
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Legal Aspects of Self-Determination
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self determination (international law) | Wex - Law.Cornell.Edu
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uti possidetis juris (UPJ) is a principle of customary international law that serves to preserve the boundaries of colonies emerging as States.
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Select a language for s/res/338(1973)
United Nations Logo. s/res/338(1973). العربية 中文 English Français Русский Español.
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Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ...
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Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024
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The Nakba, which means “catastrophe” in Arabic, refers to the mass displacement and dispossession of Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
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14 - Palestinian Nationalism, Religious (Un)claims, and the Struggle ...
This chapter examines religious claims and aspects within Palestinian nationalism from the time of the British Mandate to the present.
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Apr 18, 2024 · The Security Council rejected Palestine's request for UN membership on Thursday, with the United States casting a veto.
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Gaza has the same land area as Las Vegas but more than three times the population, with some 2.23 million residents of the small territory.
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Palestinians in Gaza continue to reel under Israel's genocide against them, despite the signing of a fragile ceasefire.
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Feb 6, 2024 · The majority of Israelis oppose the creation of a Palestinian state, even as part of a US-brokered deal that would forge formal relations with Saudi Arabia.
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His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to.
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The salary payments to terrorists from all Palestinian terror organizations ... pay-terrorist-families-admits-German-government-466980. 26 https://mfa ...
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militant before the June 1967 war, the PLO had done nothing to fight Israel actively except to create its c+wn guerrilla wing -- the Palestine Liberation Forces ...
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Black September - Jewish Virtual Library
Military confrontation between Jordan and the Palestinian guerrillas in September 1970, which lead to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan. ))))))))))<|separator|>
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Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist in peace. Both ...
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The 1995 Oslo agreement established an administrative division of the West Bank into areas A, B, and C as a transitional arrangement.
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Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank is divided into three non-contiguous areas, called Area A, Area B, and Area C. Approximately three million Palestinians ...
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This article will review the old and new evidence showing the tragedy of Arafat's “no” response to an attractive peace deal.
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Putting Gaza in 'Formaldehyde': Israel's 'Disengagement,' A Decade ...
In the summer of 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon withdrew Israel's army and approximately 8,000 Jewish settlers from the interior of the occupied Gaza ...
[150]
Israelis ask if their Gaza exit 2 decades led to Hamas attack - NPR
Sep 19, 2025 · Twenty years ago, Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Now, Israelis ask if it helped pave the way for the ...
[151]
Operation Cast Lead: Israel strikes back against Hamas terror in Gaza
During Operation Cast Lead (27 Dec 2008 - 18 Jan 2009), 571 rockets and 205 mortar shells landed in Israeli territory.Missing: 2008-2021 Pillar<|control11|><|separator|>
[152]
Hamas celebrates election victory | Palestine - The Guardian
Jan 26, 2006 · Figures from Palestinian officials tonight confirmed Hamas's shock win in the Palestinian parliamentary election over the once-dominant Fatah party.
[153]
Hamas Victory Reshapes Middle East Peace Process | Brookings
... Hamas' victory in the January 25, 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council election. The discussion was moderated by Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center ...
[154]
Legislative Elections (2006) | ECFR
Legislative elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council were held for a second time in January 2006, at the urging of President Bush, and won by the…
[155]
Battle for Gaza: Hamas Jumped, Provoked and Pushed | Brookings
Aug 16, 2007 · Hamas' swift victory in the June 2007 battle of Gaza was a stunning defeat for American interests in the Middle East.
[156]
Hamas takes control of Gaza | Palestine - The Guardian
Jun 15, 2007 · Last night, Hamas said it had executed the top Fatah militant in Gaza, Samih al-Madhoun. Witnesses said the conquest of the security ...
[157]
Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip (2007) - ECF
A short confrontation between Fatah and Hamas over control of the Gaza Strip, concluding with a complete victory for the latter, that took place in June 2007.
[158]
Israel's "Blockade" of Gaza - Jewish Virtual Library
To prevent smuggling and the infiltration of terrorists, Israel and Egypt tightened their respective border crossings and placed restrictions on shipping.<|separator|>
[159]
Tough Questions About Gaza Answered - American Jewish Committee
Feb 26, 2024 · Israel and Egypt maintain strict blockades over Gaza to block the smuggling of weapons and monitor the misuse of materials by terror groups.
[160]
The Gaza Blockade: An Explainer | HonestReporting
Feb 26, 2019 · The IDF has foiled a number of attempts to smuggle Iranian arms to Gaza. Egypt has also has also periodically moved against Gaza-Sinai smuggling ...
[161]
Operation Pillar of Defense | IDF
More than 900 rockets hit Israel and over 400 others were intercepted by the Iron Dome batteries, which saved the lives of a large number of Israeli civilians.Missing: 2008-2021 Cast Lead
[162]
Urban Warfare Project Case Study #14: Operation Cast Lead
Sep 11, 2025 · Hamas had three primary types of tunnels: smuggling tunnels beneath the Egypt-Gaza border, used to bring weapons into Gaza; offensive tunnels ...
[163]
Explainer: How many Palestinians has Israel's Gaza offensive killed?
Oct 7, 2025 · The war, triggered by the deadly October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel ... Israeli officials have said previously that the death toll figures ...
[164]
Swords of Iron: Civilian Casualties Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Gov.il
The names of over 800 civilians who were murdered in their homes, towns and communities confronting Hamas terrorists during the brutal attack on October 7, 2023Israeli civilian casualties · Nova Music Festival victims · Zikim Beach attack victims<|separator|>
[165]
Israel at War: What You Need To Know | AJC
Over 700 days after the deadliest attack on Jews since the Holocaust, there are still more than 45 hostages held in captivity by Hamas. At a moment when global ...
[166]
What Is Hamas? | Council on Foreign Relations
The Palestinian militant group struggled to govern the Gaza Strip before launching a surprise attack on Israel in 2023. Now facing Israel's military ...
[167]
Hamas's October 7 Attack: Analysis of an “Antagonistic” Crisis - Toth
Apr 9, 2025 · Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups gave the attack the name “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.” The attacks began at about 6:30 a.m. on Saturday, ...Introduction · The Largest Terrorist Attack in... · Lack of Sensemaking and...
[168]
IDF destroys Hamas infrastructure in Jabalya | The Jerusalem Post
Jul 20, 2025 · Combat engineers from the IDF's 401st Brigade have located and dismantled a network of tunnels under Jabalya amid the IDF's expanding operations ...
[169]
Gaza health ministry denies manipulating death toll figures - BBC
Apr 22, 2025 · At least 51,266 people have been killed in the 18 months since the Gaza war began, according to the Hamas-run Ministry of Health, with nearly a ...
[170]
Questionable Counting: Analysing the Death Toll from the Hamas ...
Dec 13, 2024 · For example, an April 2024 headline in The Observer stated: 'Gaza death toll passes 34,000 as Israel and Iran missile strikes grab global ...
[171]
[PDF] Hamas's Human Shield Strategy in Gaza | Henry Jackson Society
May 4, 2025 · Historical evidence, extensive third-party reporting, Hamas propaganda videos and. IDF-sourced evidence confirm Hamas's illegal exploitation of ...
[172]
[PDF] Hamas' use of human shields in Gaza
Hamas, an Islamist militant group and the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip, has been using human shields in conflicts with Israel since 2007.
[173]
USAID analysis found no evidence of massive Hamas theft of Gaza aid
Jul 25, 2025 · Those reports also show that Hamas has diverted up to 25% of aid supplies to its fighters or sold them to civilians, the Israeli military said, ...
[174]
The inside story of how Gaza aid is diverted from the people who ...
Aug 5, 2025 · During the initial stage of the war in October 2023, Hamas diverted 25 per cent of all incoming UN aid. By early 2024, this quota was ...
[175]
Hamas' October 7th Genocide: Legal Analysis and the ...
Aug 8, 2025 · This article analyses the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack on Israel ... Across the various locations of the 7 October attacks, the mission ...
[176]
Spain, Ireland and Norway formally recognise Palestinian state - BBC
May 28, 2024 · Spain, Ireland and Norway have formally recognised a Palestinian state, in what they say is an attempt to refocus attention on efforts to ...
[177]
Spain, Ireland and Norway recognise Palestinian statehood | Reuters
May 29, 2024 · Spain, Ireland and Norway officially recognised a Palestinian state on Tuesday, prompting an angry reaction from Israel, which has found ...
[178]
Government of Spain approves recognition of the State of Palestine
May 28, 2024 · Today's recognition of the State of Palestine by Spain, Norway and Ireland brings the number of countries that share this position to 146.
[179]
Can the World Make Recognition of Palestine's Statehood Matter?
Sep 26, 2025 · Israeli and U.S. officials have vehemently opposed the recognition initiative. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claims that a Palestinian ...
[180]
UN General Assembly Approves Palestinian Statehood Resolution
Sep 12, 2025 · The resolution calls on Hamas to “end its rule in Gaza and hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority, with international engagement and ...
[181]
France recognizes Palestinian statehood at UN meeting - AP News
Sep 22, 2025 · France and Saudi Arabia have advanced a phased plan in which a reformed Palestinian Authority would eventually govern the West Bank and Gaza ...
[182]
Israel / Palestinian Territories – Announcement of the recognition of ...
Jul 25, 2025 · In line with its historic commitment to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, France will recognize the State of Palestine this September ...
[183]
Explanation of Vote on the UNGA Resolution Endorsing the New ...
Sep 12, 2025 · ... Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution and the resolution that mandated it. General Assembly action on the New York ...
[184]
UK, Australia and Canada recognize a Palestinian state - AP News
Sep 21, 2025 · The U.K., Australia and Canada have formally recognized a Palestinian state, prompting an angry response from Israel.
[185]
Cairo Statement and Arab Plan Adopted at the League of ... - UN.org.
Jun 5, 2025 · The overarching Arab plan adopted at the League of Arab States summit for early recovery and reconstruction in Gaza, which was submitted by the Arab Republic ...
[186]
The Arab League Proposal for the Reconstruction of Gaza
Mar 20, 2025 · The plan calls for a group of “independent Palestinian technocrats” to manage affairs in Gaza, in effect replacing Hamas. The technocratic ...
[187]
An Arab Plan for Gaza: Obstacles and Possibilities
Mar 7, 2025 · The plan would invite the Palestinian Authority to return to the Strip to govern it instead of Hamas which had ruled the territory since 2007 ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[188]
Four major Western nations recognise Palestinian state, to fury of ...
Sep 22, 2025 · Britain, Canada, Australia and Portugal all recognised a Palestinian state.<|separator|>
[189]
Revealed: US 21-point plan for ending Gaza war, creating pathway ...
Sep 27, 2025 · Revealed: US 21-point plan for ending Gaza war, creating pathway to Palestinian state ... Gaza Strip on September 18, 2025. (Eyad BABA / AFP). 12.
[190]
Trump upbeat about ending Gaza war as 21-point peace plan takes ...
Sep 27, 2025 · The plan calls for all hostages held by Hamas to be released within 48 hours of an agreement and sets out a roadmap for Gaza once the war ...
[191]
Read Trump's 20-point proposal to end the war in Gaza | PBS News
Sep 29, 2025 · It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A ...
[192]
[PDF] Plan for Postwar Gaza - The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune
Sep 28, 2025 · Given the Islamic. Republic of Iran's stated aim to destroy the State of Israel and its extensive support for. Hamas (as well as Palestinian ...
[193]
Israel and the Abraham Accords in 2025: Five years on
Sep 30, 2025 · Saudi Arabia has said recognition of Israel is conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Past ...
[194]
Trump expects expansion of Abraham accords soon, hopes S ...
Oct 17, 2025 · United States President Donald Trump has said he expects an expansion of the Abraham Accords soon and hopes Saudi Arabia will join the pact ...
[195]
The US needs a new Iran strategy if Trump's Gaza plan is to endure
Oct 15, 2025 · The US needs a new Iran strategy if Trump's Gaza plan is to endure. The president's accomplishment in bringing about a ceasefire in Gaza is ...
[196]
The Abraham Accords at five - Atlantic Council
Sep 15, 2025 · Five years after the Abraham Accords, the promise of these agreements to help shape a far more peaceful, prosperous, and integrated Middle East ...Missing: extension | Show results with:extension
[197]
Mapping 1,800 Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank since October ...
Jan 22, 2025 · An average of four incidents of settler violence have taken place each day in the occupied West Bank since October 7.Missing: surge | Show results with:surge
[198]
Settler Violence Is Turning the West Bank Into a Tinderbox
Apr 18, 2025 · The early months of 2025 have seen a significant rise in extremist right-wing violence against Palestinians in the West Bank—an estimated 30 ...
[199]
How Israel's West Bank strategy aims to bury Palestinian statehood
Sep 22, 2025 · Home to 2.7 million Palestinians, the Israeli-occupied West Bank has long been at the heart of plans for a future nation existing alongside ...<|separator|>
[200]
[PDF] Report on Israeli Settlements in the occupied West Bank including ...
Aug 14, 2025 · The total number of settlement plans and tenders advanced by Israel in 2024 was 28,872, slightly lower than the 30,682 in 2023.Missing: growth | Show results with:growth
[201]
Israel ramps up settlement and annexation in West Bank with dire ...
Mar 18, 2025 · Over 10,300 units within existing Israeli settlements in the rest of the West Bank are in the pipeline and an unprecedented 49 new Israeli ...
[202]
Arab Committee Rejects U.N. Partition Plan | CIE
September 29, 1947. The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine formally rejects the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine's partition plan, which advocates for ...
[203]
Slogan: “From the River to the Sea Palestine Will be Free” | ADL
Oct 26, 2023 · “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” is an antisemitic slogan commonly featured in anti-Israel campaigns and chanted at demonstrations.<|control11|><|separator|>
[204]
10 years to the second Intifada – summary of data - B'Tselem
Sep 27, 2010 · Palestinians killed 1083 Israelis in Israel and the Occupied Territories. 741 of the fatalities were civilians, of whom 124 were minors, and 342 ...
[205]
Steps to a two state solution: End incitement in the Palestinian ...
Jul 11, 2022 · The curriculum promotes antisemitism and incitement to violence, celebrates terrorism and jihad, and rejects peacemaking and reconciliation with Israel.
[206]
As Gazans return to school, study finds their PA textbooks still rife ...
Mar 27, 2025 · As Gazans return to school, study finds their PA textbooks still rife with incitement. Despite pledge by Ramallah to revise curriculum, ...
[207]
The Palestinian Authority Continues to Teach Hate and to Reward ...
Mar 31, 2025 · Documented evidence from these classrooms confirms that incitement remains a core pillar of Palestinian education in Gaza, despite the ongoing ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[208]
[PDF] Educational Materials in the Palestinian Authority and their ...
Feb 27, 2025 · ... incitement and promote education for peace and coexistence. • In this document, we were asked to focus on Palestinian educational materials ...
[209]
https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/985
[210]
https://www.reddit.com/r/IsraelPalestine/comments/1deyuur/palestinian_center_for_policy_and_survey_research/
[211]
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research Poll (June 12th ...
Jun 13, 2024 · The previous poll in December found 56% support in Gaza for using violence, which is exactly what the current poll reported. I'm not sure ...
[212]
Index PSR Polls - PCPSR
Support for armed struggle rises, particularly in the West Bank and in response to settlers' violence, but support for the two-state solution rises somewhat.
[213]
[PDF] Palestinian Authority “Pay for Slay” Fact Sheet
The Palestinian Authority (PA) tells foreign audiences that they oppose terrorism, yet they pay generous rewards to Palestinians, and/or their families, who ...
[214]
End Palestinian Authority's “Pay-To-Slay” Program
Jul 21, 2025 · In February, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas decreed that he would end his government's “pay to slay” program in which ...
[215]
PA Reportedly Halts 'Pay-to-Slay' Payments to More Than ... - FDD
May 12, 2025 · ... pay-to-slay” payments to the families of at least 1,612 Palestinians serving jail sentences in Israel for terror-related offenses. The halt ...
[216]
In Hamas TV show, Gaza children sing praises of suicide bombing
Hamas recently broadcast a children's television program in which kids who appeared to be no older than 10 extolled the virtue of suicide attacks.Missing: glorifying | Show results with:glorifying
[217]
Palestinian TV Teaches Kids The Way to 'Jihad Street'
May 21, 2014 · ... suicide bombings. As the New York Times reported in 2009, when ... children's television shows produced by the Hamas. Every Monday ...
[218]
Hamas recently broadcast a children's TV show which specifically ...
Oct 7, 2009 · ... glorification of suicide bombing attacks: Al-Aqsa TV, July 13, 2007, pictures courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch Nahool asks the children ...
[219]
The Palestinian Authority is Islamic too | The Jerusalem Post
Aug 14, 2025 · The PA Religious Affairs Ministry appoints imams and oversees Friday sermons that frame the conflict as jihad to defend Islamic holy sites.
[220]
Israel: A Demographic Ticking Bomb in Today's One-State Reality
Jul 10, 2023 · As of late 2022, over seven million Israelis lived in Israel and the West Bank, and seven million Palestinians lived in the West Bank, Gaza ...
[221]
Changing Population Patterns Will Reshape the Middle East
Nov 22, 2022 · Israel's population will double from 9.2 million to 18.4 million · Palestine (i.e., Gaza and the West Bank) will grow from 5.2 million to 12.8 ...<|separator|>
[222]
Demography and the Palestine Question (II)
Only in Gaza is the Palestinian fertility rate still very high, but no higher than that of the Israeli settlers. The charts below provide projections for the ...
[223]
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/implications-application-israeli-sovereignty-judea-samaria/
[224]
Implications of the Application of Israeli Sovereignty over Judea and ...
Jan 8, 2018 · The proposals raised are generally based on ideological arguments about the Jewish people's right to Greater Israel, but other arguments ...
[225]
The State of Israel's Legal Right to Judea and Samaria
Sep 30, 2025 · As set out below, and based on its historic and legal rights, the government of Israel would be legally justified in extending Israeli law to ...Missing: arguments | Show results with:arguments
[226]
[PDF] The Myth That Israel's Presence in Judea and Samaria Is ...
Israel's continued presence in Judea and Samaria is justified by its historic ties to these territories, by the provisions of the League of Na- tions Mandate ...
[227]
Two States or One? Reappraising the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse
Sep 18, 2018 · ... one state and global isolation. Former prime minister Ehud Barak has warned of future apartheid if Israel moves toward a single state ...
[228]
Israel's One-State Reality | Foreign Affairs
Apr 14, 2023 · ... Israel and the Palestinian territories as a “one-state reality with inequality akin to apartheid.” The term may not be a perfect fit. Israel's ...
[229]
Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (93) - PCPSR
Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued. Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the head ...<|separator|>
[230]
What Can We Learn From the Public Opinion Polls in Palestinian ...
Nov 12, 2024 · For example, the Independent Opinion poll revealed that in July 2024, 40% of Palestinians supported a two-state solution, compared to 21% among ...
[231]
Peace Still a Distant Prospect for Israelis, Palestinians - Gallup News
Sep 29, 2025 · In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, one in three adults (33%) support a two-state solution in 2025, while 55% oppose it. Current support is ...
[232]
[PDF] How Gaza Sees the 2023-2025 War and the Future of the Israel
Jul 1, 2025 · compel Palestinians (or Israelis) to forsake their core values only backfire, increasing resistance to peace deals and support for violence.
[233]
Two States, Together: An Alternative Vision for Palestinians and ...
Jan 27, 2025 · The political concept of two states in a confederation arrangement is a fresh idea for Israel and Palestine, but, on the global scale, it isn't new or radical.1Two States in Confederation · 2The Only Remaining Solution
[234]
The 'state-plus' framework: A confederal solution for Israel-Palestine
Dec 23, 2020 · This paper presents an exploration of one such alternative: the hybrid model of confederation. The intention of this paper is to think beyond the classic two- ...Missing: binational | Show results with:binational
[235]
Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | RAND
Feb 10, 2021 · West Bank Palestinians' preferred alternative was the two-state solution, while Gazans ranked a one-state solution slightly above the two-state ...Missing: binational | Show results with:binational<|separator|>
[236]
Potential for Israeli-Palestinian peace - Pew Research Center
Jun 3, 2025 · About a fifth of Israelis (21%) say a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully, down from 26% last year.Missing: preference | Show results with:preference