Prakash Singh
Prakash Singh (born 10 January 1936) is a retired Indian Police Service officer of the 1959 Uttar Pradesh cadre, who rose to the rank of Director General of Police and commanded key forces amid insurgency and terrorism in regions such as Nagaland, Assam, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, and Uttar Pradesh's Terai belt.[1][2] He served as Director General of the Border Security Force, as well as head of the police in Uttar Pradesh and Assam—two of India's largest states by population and area—earning the Padma Shri in 1991 for distinguished contributions to national security, alongside the President's Police Medal for Distinguished Service and the Police Medal for Meritorious Service.[1][2] Post-retirement in 1996, Singh became a pivotal advocate for structural police reforms by filing a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court, culminating in the 2006 judgment (Prakash Singh v. Union of India) that issued seven binding directives to curb political interference, establish state security commissions, ensure fixed tenures for officers, and separate investigative from law-and-order functions, though implementation has faced resistance from state governments.[2][3] A prolific author of six books and over 300 articles on security and governance, he has continued critiquing systemic failures in policing through roles like Chairman of the Police Foundation India and member of the National Security Advisory Board.[2][1]Early Life and Education
Personal Background and Formation
Prakash Singh was born on January 10, 1936, in Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, into a Rajput family, a community historically associated with martial traditions and valor in northern India.[1] His upbringing in this relatively modest, rural region of eastern Uttar Pradesh likely exposed him to the challenges of local governance and law enforcement from an early age, fostering a foundational respect for discipline and order.[1] Singh pursued his higher education in Allahabad, earning a Bachelor of Arts and a Master of Arts in History from the University of Allahabad, which equipped him with analytical skills essential for civil service examinations.[4] These academic pursuits, grounded in historical study, underscored the importance of institutional frameworks and rule of law, influencing his decision to enter public service through the competitive Indian Police Service selection process. His success in securing a place in the 1959 batch of the Indian Police Service, Uttar Pradesh cadre, at the age of 23, reflected the rigor of his early preparation and an innate commitment to addressing governance deficiencies observed in his formative environment.[4] This path from rural origins to elite civil service entry highlighted a character formed by self-reliance and empirical engagement with societal realities.Professional Career in IPS
Early Assignments and Postings
Prakash Singh, a member of the 1959 batch of the Indian Police Service allocated to the Uttar Pradesh cadre, began his professional career with an initial posting as Assistant Superintendent of Police in Kanpur.[4] This assignment immersed him in foundational operational policing, encompassing routine duties such as crime investigation, public order maintenance, and coordination with local administration in a key industrial hub of the state. Advancing through the ranks, Singh served as Senior Superintendent of Police in various Uttar Pradesh districts, followed by a tenure as Deputy Inspector General of Police in Meerut.[4] These mid-level district postings honed his expertise in managing law enforcement challenges, including crime control and resource allocation under state-level constraints, laying the groundwork for his subsequent elevations without documented specific quantifiable outcomes like crime rate reductions from these early phases.Leadership in Major Forces
Prakash Singh served two brief tenures as Director General of Police (DGP) for Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state with the largest state police force exceeding 100,000 personnel at the time, from 22 July 1991 to 30 September 1992 and again from 23 December 1992 to 8 June 1993.[4] During these periods, he navigated intense political pressures amid caste-based violence and the Ayodhya Ram Janmabhoomi dispute, which escalated communal tensions and led to demands for reduced police deployments at sensitive sites despite security risks.[5] In his second tenure, Singh prioritized anti-corruption measures by suspending implicated officers and launching operations against mafia elements, though these actions drew complaints from political figures and contributed to his removal.[4] He also addressed insurgency in the Terai region bordering Nepal, deploying forces to curb cross-border threats and maintain order during state elections marked by booth capturing and voter intimidation.[2] As DGP of Assam in 1991, Singh assumed command of a force strained by ongoing insurgency from groups like ULFA and ethnic conflicts in a state plagued by militancy and separatist violence.[2] His tenure focused on operational tactics to counter militant activities, but government interference in postings and investigations hampered effectiveness, prompting him to request relief from duties as he deemed independent functioning impossible.[4] Despite the brevity, his approach emphasized intelligence-driven raids and coordination with central forces, though quantifiable outcomes like militant neutralizations remain undocumented in available records, reflecting the era's broader challenges in Assam's counter-insurgency landscape.[2] Singh commanded the Border Security Force (BSF) as Director General from 9 June 1993 to 31 January 1994, overseeing a paramilitary of approximately 150,000 personnel responsible for India's land borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other neighbors.[4] He initiated modernization drives, including equipment upgrades and training enhancements to bolster operational readiness against infiltration, particularly along the Indo-Bangladesh border where smuggling and militant incursions were rampant.[4] In Jammu and Kashmir, Singh directed intensified patrols and counter-militancy operations, such as responses to provocative incidents like the display of foreign flags in Sopore, aiming to restore force discipline and deter cross-border threats amid rising Pakistan-backed terrorism.[6] These efforts contributed to improved border vigilance, earning recognition via his prior Padma Shri award in 1991 for national security contributions, though specific infiltration reduction metrics from his term are not publicly detailed.[2]Advocacy for Police Reforms
Key Committees and Reports
In 2003, following the Naxalite attempt to assassinate Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu via a roadside mine blast on October 1, Singh chaired a state-level inquiry committee to examine security lapses. The report pinpointed deficiencies in police arrangements, including inadequate intelligence coordination and protective protocols for VIPs, attributing these to bureaucratic inertia and fragmented command structures that exposed vulnerabilities in high-threat environments. It recommended immediate enhancements in surveillance and rapid response mechanisms, which the state government accepted, underscoring how resource silos and poor inter-agency communication causally undermined preventive efficacy.[7] Singh's most extensive committee work came in 2016, when he headed the Haryana government's inquiry into administrative and police handling of the Jat reservation agitation spanning February 7 to 22, across eight districts including Rohtak, Jhajjar, and Hisar. The resulting 450-page, two-volume report, compiled after reviewing 2,217 testimonies, over 100 video recordings, and on-site inspections, indicted five IAS officers, five IPS officers, and 80 subordinates for dereliction, including post desertions, failure to enforce Section 144 CrPC orders, and hesitancy in deploying force amid inflammatory speeches. It documented empirical shortfalls—such as a statewide police vacancy rate of 24.20% (13,784 unfilled posts out of 56,942), limited anti-riot stocks (e.g., only 656 tear gas shells expended in Rohtak despite massive unrest), and outdated equipment like insufficient water cannons and non-lethal options—as direct contributors to operational collapse, enabling mobs to raze infrastructure, torch 1,196 shops, and cause 30 deaths alongside property losses exceeding Rs. 20,000 crores.[8][9] Causal analysis in the report tied these inefficiencies to entrenched problems: politicized postings and ministerial interventions (e.g., uncoordinated visits by officials like Minister O.P. Dhankar on February 15 in Rohtak) eroded command autonomy and morale, while caste-based affinities among local forces—evident in 80% desertions from one community in Rohtak—fostered bias and selective enforcement. Training gaps, lacking regular anti-riot drills, manifested in cowardice during clashes (e.g., police retreats in Jhajjar's Dighal and Dujana), amplifying violence through delayed reinforcements and underutilized reserves like the 74 army columns, which arrived hours late in critical spots. The committee linked these root causes—unaddressed vacancies, equipment obsolescence, and interference—to recurrent breakdowns in crowd control, advocating data-backed fixes like doubling force strength in vulnerable districts and mandatory annual magistrate-police simulations to build resilience against politicized disruptions.[10][11]Supreme Court Litigation and Directives
In 1996, Prakash Singh, a retired Director General of Police, along with N.K. Singh, another retired DGP, filed a public interest litigation (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 310 of 1996, Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.) in the Supreme Court of India, seeking structural reforms to curb political interference in policing.[12][13] The petition cited empirical instances of arbitrary and frequent transfers of senior officers—often exceeding 20-30 per year in some states—executive misuse of police for electoral or personal gains, and subordination of professional judgment to political directives, which eroded accountability and enabled corruption.[14][15] On September 22, 2006, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, issuing seven mandatory directives to the Union, states, and union territories for immediate implementation to foster police independence and efficiency.[13][16] These were:- Establishment of State Security Commissions to formulate broad policy, oversee implementation, and evaluate performance, reducing direct executive micromanagement.[17]
- Selection of DGPs from a panel of the three most senior officers, with a minimum two-year tenure barring proven misconduct or incapacity, to prevent premature ousters.[16]
- Fixed minimum two-year tenures for officers in key operational posts to ensure continuity and expertise.[16]
- Separation of crime investigation from law-and-order duties at the police station level, with dedicated investigation wings to improve specialization and reduce overload.[17]
- Creation of independent Police Complaints Authorities at state and district levels to investigate custodial deaths, rapes, and grievous injuries, bypassing internal police control.[16]
- Formation of Police Establishment Boards, comprising senior officers, to regulate transfers, postings, and promotions, curbing arbitrary executive decisions.[16]
- Setup of Police Performance Review Boards to periodically assess officer performance for promotions, independent of political influence.[17]