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Secularization trends

Secularization trends encompass the observed reduction in religious affiliation, institutional influence, and personal religiosity across many societies, particularly in Western Europe and North America, where the proportion of individuals identifying as religiously unaffiliated—often termed "nones"—has risen substantially over recent decades.^[1]^[2] This shift, accelerating since the mid-20th century, correlates with modernization factors such as urbanization and higher education levels, though empirical patterns reveal variability rather than uniform inevitability.^[3] Key indicators include declining church attendance and self-reported importance of religion; in the United States, for instance, the share of adults attending religious services weekly dropped from 38% a decade ago to 30% currently, driven largely by disaffiliation among younger cohorts.^[4] In Western Europe, similar trajectories show Christian identification falling below 50% in countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, with nones comprising over 50% in several nations by the 2020s.^[5] Globally, between 2010 and 2020, religious affiliation declined by at least 5 percentage points in 35 countries, often following a predictable sequence: first erosion of public rituals, then diminished personal salience, and finally reduced formal affiliation, spanning roughly two centuries akin to demographic transitions.^[2]^[3] Controversies surround the secularization thesis's scope and durability, with some data indicating slowdowns or plateaus in the West—such as stabilized Christian shares in the U.S. post-2020—and counter-trends in non-Western regions like Latin America, where religiosity remains high and stable, or developing societies experiencing religiosity increases amid modernization.^[1]^[6]^[7] Recent studies affirm the theory's applicability in predicting decline sequences but challenge blanket generalizations, highlighting that while secularization prevails among historically wealthy societies, global patterns reflect contextual factors like economic security and cultural retention rather than a unidirectional master narrative.^[3]^[8]

Theoretical Foundations

Definition and Core Concepts

Secularization denotes the process whereby religious thinking, practices, and institutions progressively lose their social significance in both public and private spheres.^[9] This encompasses a diminution in religion's institutional authority over societal norms, reduced participation in religious rituals, and a waning salience of personal religious beliefs in shaping individual and collective behavior.^[10] Sociologists operationalize it as a multifaceted decline driven by broader societal transformations, rather than as an ideological stance or deliberate policy.^[8] Empirical indicators of secularization include measurable declines in church or temple attendance rates, proportions of populations self-identifying as religious, shares affiliated with organized faiths, and the extent of religion's integration—or lack thereof—in state functions and educational curricula.^[11] These metrics, drawn from surveys like the General Social Survey, capture shifts in overt behaviors and self-reports, providing quantifiable proxies for religion's reduced societal footprint without conflating them with underlying causal mechanisms. For instance, falling attendance frequencies signal disengagement from communal rites, while decreasing affiliation rates reflect erosion in nominal adherence.^[12] Secularization must be distinguished from secularism, which prescribes institutional neutrality of the state toward religions, ensuring no endorsement of any faith in governance.^[13] Whereas secularization describes an organic societal process of religion's marginalization, secularism constitutes a normative framework for political organization.^[13] It further contrasts with atheism, defined as the absence of belief in deities at the individual level, which does not inherently imply broader societal desacralization or institutional shifts.^[14] Thus, secularization emphasizes observable, aggregate patterns of diminished religious influence, amenable to causal analysis rooted in modernization dynamics, independent of personal irreligion or state policies.^[8]

Origins and Key Proponents of Secularization Theory

The concept of secularization traces its intellectual precursors to Enlightenment thinkers who emphasized reason over religious authority and advocated for the separation of ecclesiastical and civil spheres. Voltaire (1694–1778), a prominent French philosopher, critiqued organized religion, particularly the Catholic Church's influence on politics and society, arguing in works like his Philosophical Dictionary (1764) for tolerance and the curtailment of clerical power to foster rational governance.^[15] While not articulating a systematic theory of religious decline, Voltaire's advocacy for deism and institutional disengagement laid groundwork for later causal linkages between rational inquiry and diminished religious dominance.^[16] In the early 20th century, Max Weber advanced these ideas through his framework of rationalization and the "disenchantment of the world" (Entzauberung der Welt), first elaborated in his 1917 lecture "Science as a Vocation" and rooted in analyses like The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905). Weber posited that bureaucratic, scientific, and calculative processes inherent to modernity erode magical and theological explanations of causality, replacing them with instrumental rationality and thereby diminishing religion's explanatory monopoly in public life.^[17] ^[18] This disenchantment, Weber argued, accompanies structural shifts such as industrialization, implying a causal progression from traditional religious worldviews to secular alternatives without direct reliance on empirical metrics of belief decline.^[19] Mid-20th-century sociologists formalized secularization as a predictive model tied to modernization's correlates, including urbanization and rising education levels. Peter L. Berger, in The Sacred Canopy (1967), described secularization as the process by which societal sectors escape religious institutions' symbolic and institutional control, with pluralism fragmenting monolithic belief systems and fostering doubt through exposure to competing worldviews.^[20] ^[21] Similarly, Bryan R. Wilson, in Religion in Secular Society (1966), defined it as the declining social significance of religious practices, thoughts, and organizations, emphasizing institutional differentiation where spheres like economy, politics, and science operate autonomously from ecclesiastical oversight.^[22] ^[23] Both theorists anticipated religion's marginalization as an inexorable outcome of societal rationalization and functional specialization, measurable via indicators such as urban population growth (e.g., from 13% global in 1900 to over 50% by 2008) and literacy rates surpassing 80% in industrialized nations by the late 20th century.^[24]

Historical Development

Pre-Modern Religious Dominance

In pre-modern Europe, spanning the medieval period from approximately 500 to 1500 CE, the Catholic Church exerted pervasive control over governance, economy, and daily existence, with Christianity functioning as the compulsory state religion across kingdoms like England, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. The Church amassed substantial wealth through tithes—mandatory levies of one-tenth of agricultural produce, livestock, and other outputs—collected annually from virtually all households, as documented in ecclesiastical records from regions such as England and the Paris Basin, where compliance was enforced by local lords and clergy to sustain parish operations and monastic institutions. ^[25] ^[26] This system implied near-total participation, as non-payment risked excommunication or social ostracism, while baptism rates approached universality by the 12th century, with parish networks covering populations densely—England alone had about 9,000 parishes serving roughly 2-3 million people by the 14th century. ^[27] ^[28] Ritual observance further evidenced this dominance, with pilgrimage data serving as a proxy for religiosity; for instance, medieval accounts and later reconstructions estimate hundreds of thousands annually undertaking journeys to sites like Canterbury or Rome, involving communal processions, relic veneration, and feast-day attendance that structured seasonal calendars and reinforced communal bonds. ^[29] Church courts adjudicated disputes from marriage to inheritance, intertwining faith with legal authority, while monastic orders managed education and poor relief, leaving scant room for secular alternatives in a society where literacy and record-keeping were largely clerical prerogatives. ^[30] Globally, analogous integrations prevailed in non-European contexts, underscoring religion's foundational role prior to industrialization. In Islamic caliphates from the 7th to 13th centuries, Sharia-derived law codes regulated commerce, criminal justice, family structures, and taxation under Abbasid and Umayyad administrations, with qadi courts applying Quranic principles to maintain order across diverse empires stretching from Spain to Persia, as evidenced by legal compendia like those of al-Shaybani. ^[31] In imperial China, Confucian state rituals—codified since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and peaking under the Ming (1368–1644)—required imperial sacrifices at altars to heaven and earth, alongside bureaucratic exams emphasizing ritual propriety, fostering hierarchical stability and moral legitimacy for rulers, with temple networks and ancestral cults permeating agrarian villages. ^[32] ^[33] Pre-colonial African societies, such as those in West Africa before the 15th-century European arrivals, embedded animistic traditions into chiefly governance and kinship systems, where diviners and ancestor veneration dictated dispute resolution, agriculture, and warfare, with no institutionalized separation between spiritual authority and political economy. ^[34] These patterns, verifiable through archival tithe ledgers, legal fatwas, and ritual inscriptions, highlight religion's empirical centrality in pre-modern social organization, providing mechanisms for coordination absent modern state apparatuses.

Industrialization and Early Secularization (18th-19th Centuries)

The French Revolution of 1789 precipitated aggressive de-Christianization policies that targeted the Catholic Church's institutional dominance, including the nationalization of church property, the exile of approximately 30,000 priests, and the execution of hundreds during the Reign of Terror from 1793 to 1794.^[35] These measures, intensified by the Law of 17 September 1793, led to the closure of thousands of churches and the suppression of public worship, severely curtailing clerical influence and organized religious practice across much of France.^[36] ^[37] Although precise nationwide attendance statistics from the immediate post-revolutionary period are scarce due to institutional disruption, regional studies indicate a marked erosion in devotional practices, such as a pre-existing but accelerated decline in religious bequests in wills from over 80% in rural areas before 1789 to far lower levels amid urban and revolutionary pressures.^[38] This secularizing impulse stemmed partly from Enlightenment critiques of ecclesiastical authority, intertwined with economic upheavals that prioritized state control over traditional agrarian-religious structures. In Britain, the Industrial Revolution's rapid urbanization from the late 18th century onward correlated with uneven declines in church attendance, particularly among the emerging industrial working classes.^[39] The 1851 Census of Religious Worship, the first systematic national survey, recorded about 5.25 million attendances on census Sunday for a population of roughly 18 million in England and Wales, implying that more than half the populace did not participate, with rates dropping below 20% in some densely urbanized manufacturing districts like Lancashire and Yorkshire.^[40] ^[41] Cross-sectional analysis of the census data reveals a negative association between urbanization levels—fueled by factory-based industrialization—and Anglican attendance, as migrants from rural areas faced long work hours, overcrowded housing, and weakened community ties that had sustained prior religiosity.^[39] Bible societies' circulation records from the era further document rising intellectual skepticism in industrial hubs, where printed materials challenging orthodox doctrines proliferated amid literacy gains from economic expansion.^[42] Across the Atlantic, the United States exhibited a more paradoxical pattern during the same period, with industrialization's early phases coinciding with surges in popular religiosity via the Second Great Awakening (circa 1790s–1840s), which boosted Protestant church membership from about 1 in 15 Americans in 1800 to 1 in 7 by mid-century through camp meetings and revivalist preaching.^[43] Yet, among urban elites and nascent academic circles, secular tendencies emerged, as Enlightenment rationalism and proto-scientific inquiries distanced intellectual discourse from theology, evident in the establishment of nonsectarian colleges like the University of Virginia in 1819 and growing deistic influences in elite periodicals.^[44] This elite-level shift, while not yet dominant, reflected causal pressures from commercial expansion and technological innovation, which fostered a worldview prioritizing empirical utility over supernatural explanations, even as mass revivals temporarily offset broader declines.^[45] Overall, these 18th- and 19th-century developments illustrate secularization's gradual and regionally varied onset, driven by industrialization's disruption of traditional lifeways rather than uniform societal rejection of faith.^[46]

20th-Century Expansion and Institutional Differentiation

In the aftermath of World War II, Western European nations expanded welfare states that increasingly supplanted ecclesiastical roles in social provision, exemplifying institutional differentiation as governments centralized functions like poverty relief and healthcare previously dominated by churches. In the United Kingdom, the Attlee government's reforms, including the National Insurance Act of 1946 and the National Health Service Act of 1948, shifted charity from voluntary religious organizations to state mechanisms, diminishing the Church of England's traditional welfare influence. This transition coincided with observable declines in religious participation; surveys indicated that English church attendance entered a sustained downturn in the 1950s, with approximately one million individuals abandoning regular practice during the decade.^[47] Similar patterns emerged across Scandinavia and continental Europe, where post-war social democracies formalized secular administration of aid, further insulating public institutions from religious authority.^[48] In the United States, the 1960s marked accelerated judicial separation of religion from public education, reinforcing secular norms in key institutions. The Supreme Court's ruling in Engel v. Vitale (1962) invalidated state-composed prayers in public schools, deeming them violations of the Establishment Clause, followed by Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), which barred mandatory Bible readings and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer.^[49] These decisions differentiated schooling from devotional practices, aligning with broader mid-century trends toward neutral public spheres. Gallup polling reflected high but gradually softening religiosity; belief in God stood at 98% in the 1950s, persisting above 90% through the 1980s amid cultural shifts.^[50] Globally, the Soviet Union's state-enforced atheism from the 1920s to the 1980s provided a stark example of institutionalized secularization, with campaigns closing or destroying tens of thousands of churches and promoting scientific materialism through education and propaganda. By the 1930s, over 40,000 Orthodox churches had been shuttered, and anti-religious efforts intensified under Khrushchev in the late 1950s, targeting remaining clergy and believers to embed secular ideology in law, schools, and media.^[51]^[52] These measures exemplified aggressive differentiation, subordinating religious institutions to communist state control until the regime's waning years.^[53]

Empirical Patterns by Region

Western Europe

Western Europe has experienced advanced secularization, marked by sharp declines in religious affiliation, attendance, and deference to religious institutions since the postwar era. By 2020, religiously unaffiliated individuals ("nones") approached or exceeded 50% in countries like France and the United Kingdom, based on self-identification surveys, while overall Christian affiliation fell below majority levels in several nations.^[54] A 2025 analysis of global data, including European cohorts, identified a consistent sequence wherein public ritual participation—such as church attendance—declines before reductions in the personal importance of religion or explicit non-affiliation.^[3] Eurobarometer surveys from 2019 further document low religiosity, with belief in God below 50% in many Western European countries and church attendance averaging under 20% monthly. The Netherlands exemplifies rapid institutional decline, with regular church attendance dropping from roughly 50% in 1966 to negligible levels by 2015, and overall religious affiliation falling to about 40% by 2023 as nearly 60% report no religious belonging.^[55]^[56] In Sweden, weekly religious service attendance stands at approximately 8-10% in the 2020s, with only 13.9% participating at least once in the prior year per a 2023 population study, despite formal membership in the Church of Sweden remaining around 56% but with minimal active engagement.^[57]^[58] Data from the European Values Study (EVS) waves spanning 1981-2017 across Western Europe reveal eroding respect for religious authority, with respondents increasingly viewing religion as less essential for moral guidance and social norms; for instance, the proportion prioritizing religious values in family and ethics halved in several cohorts.^[59]^[60] This shift correlates with broader metrics, such as Pew's 2020 estimates showing unaffiliated populations at 25% continent-wide but higher in Western subregions, underscoring differentiated yet pervasive disengagement from organized religion.^[61]

North America

In the United States, the proportion of adults identifying as Christian declined from 78% in 2007 to 71% in 2014 and further to 62% in the 2023-24 period, according to Pew Research Center's Religious Landscape Study, though the rate of decline has slowed markedly since 2014 and appears to have stabilized since around 2019-2020 across multiple Pew surveys.^[62]^[1] This stabilization is evident in the consistency of Christian identification in Pew's half-dozen surveys conducted from 2020 onward, contrasting with steeper drops in earlier decades.^[63] Among Christian subgroups, evangelical Protestants have shown relative stability at 23% of the adult population in 2023-24, down only modestly from 25% in 2014, while mainline Protestants fell to 11% from higher shares and Catholics to 19% from 21%.^[1]^[64] Broader indicators of religious commitment reflect ongoing erosion but with signs of plateauing. Gallup polling in 2024 found that 45% of U.S. adults consider religion very important in their lives, a figure that has trended downward over decades yet held relatively steady in recent years amid broader cultural shifts.^[65] Church membership and attendance have similarly declined, but the religiously unaffiliated ("nones") share, at 29% in 2023-24, has not accelerated beyond levels observed since 2019, suggesting a non-monotonic trajectory rather than inexorable secularization.^[62] This pattern holds despite demographic pressures like aging mainline congregations, as younger cohorts show slightly higher retention of Christian identity than projected from prior trends.^[1] In Canada, secularization has proceeded more rapidly, with 34.6% of the population reporting no religious affiliation in the 2021 census, up from 23.9% in 2011 and 16.5% in 2001, driven by sharp drops in Christian identification to 53.3% overall.^[66] This acceleration contrasts with U.S. patterns, particularly among younger Canadians, where over 36% aged 15-34 declared no religion, reflecting weaker institutional ties and cultural detachment from historical Protestant and Catholic majorities.^[67] Unlike the U.S. stabilization, Canadian trends indicate continued momentum toward irreligion, with non-Christian faiths growing modestly via immigration but insufficient to offset the none's rise.^[67]

Asia-Pacific

In East Asia, secularization manifests through high rates of religious non-affiliation, often exceeding 60%, driven by state policies, urbanization, and cultural syncretism rather than outright rejection of spiritual practices. In China, approximately 90% of adults reported no formal religious identity in a 2023 Pew Research Center analysis of multiple surveys, with only 10% self-identifying as affiliated with an organized religion, reflecting the legacy of state atheism under the Chinese Communist Party, where 94% of members are unaffiliated.^[68]^[69] Similarly, Vietnam's 2020 population estimates indicate about 66% unaffiliated, per Pew data, amid official promotion of socialist secularism, though 38% identify as Buddhist in recent surveys, highlighting blurred lines between affiliation and folk rituals like ancestor veneration that persist despite low institutional adherence.^[70]^[71] Japan and South Korea exemplify low formal religiosity alongside enduring cultural traditions. Around 70% of Japanese adults expressed nonreligious sentiments in a 2023 Associated Press analysis of surveys, with formal affiliation rates hovering near 42% for "no religion" in government data, yet participation in Shinto festivals and Buddhist rites remains widespread as seasonal customs rather than doctrinal commitments.^[72] In South Korea, 60% identified as religiously unaffiliated in a 2021 Gallup Korea poll, up from 47% in 1984, with Protestants at about 20% and Buddhists at 17%, though rapid modernization correlates with declining church attendance and a shift toward personal spirituality over organized faith.^[73] Contrastingly, South Asia shows religious persistence that challenges uniform secularization narratives, particularly in India, where 79.8% of the population identified as Hindu in Pew's 2021 survey of nearly 30,000 adults, with overall affiliation exceeding 95% across groups and minimal growth in nones, sustained by deep cultural integration of religion into daily life and demographics.^[74] In Oceania, Australia reflects Western-influenced trends with 38.9% reporting no religion in the 2021 census, a rise from 30.1% in 2016, indicating ongoing secularization amid immigration-driven religious diversity.^[75] These variations underscore that Asia-Pacific secularization is regionally heterogeneous, with East Asian patterns tied to institutional disaffiliation amid ritual continuity, while South Asian stability resists modernization pressures.^[76]

Latin America and Africa

In Latin America, secularization has proceeded unevenly, with rises in religious nones accompanied by robust growth in Protestantism, particularly Pentecostalism, which has offset declines in Catholic affiliation. The region's Catholic share fell from over 90% to 69% between the late 20th century and 2014, driven partly by conversions to evangelical churches.^[6] Tens of millions shifted from Catholicism to Pentecostalism in recent decades, as these denominations offer experiential worship and community support appealing to urban migrants and the working class.^[77] In Brazil, the religiously unaffiliated ("nones") increased notably in the 2010s, contributing to a regional irreligious share quadrupling from 4% in 1996 to 16% by 2020, yet overall religiosity remains elevated, with majorities across surveys affirming religion's importance in daily life.^[78] World Values Survey data indicate persistent high levels of reported religious belief and practice in Latin American countries, contrasting with Western declines and underscoring demographic vitality in maintaining faith adherence.^[79] Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits trends counter to classical secularization, with Christianity expanding rapidly amid high fertility rates and conversions, rendering the region a demographic engine for global religious adherence. By 2020, sub-Saharan Africa hosted 697 million Christians, a 31% increase from 2010, surpassing Europe as the world's largest Christian population at 30.7% of global totals.^[80] Projections for 2025 affirm Africa's status as the continent with the most Christians, fueled by natural population growth and shifts from traditional religions or Islam in some areas.^[81] Metrics from recent global studies highlight sustained emphasis on religious rituals, with high participation in worship and moral frameworks tied to faith, as evidenced by World Values Survey responses showing near-universal religiosity in many nations.^[79] This growth, projected to concentrate 78% of global Christians in the Global South by 2050, challenges narratives of inevitable decline by demonstrating religion's resilience in high-birth, youthful populations.^[81]

Middle East and Muslim-Majority Regions

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Muslims constitute 94% of the population as of 2020, reflecting stable high affiliation rates with minimal evidence of widespread secularization.^[82] Surveys indicate that over 90% of individuals raised Muslim in these areas retain that identity into adulthood, underscoring low rates of religious disaffiliation.^[83] Public declarations of religiosity remain robust, with at least 70% of respondents in most surveyed MENA countries reporting religion as very important to them as of 2018, though self-reporting may understate irreligiosity due to social pressures and legal risks associated with apostasy in several nations.^[84] Arab Barometer data from multiple waves reveal a temporary increase in self-identified "not religious" respondents from 11% in 2013 to 18% in 2019 across the region, but this trend reversed by the 2021-2022 surveys, with fewer individuals—particularly youth—claiming non-religiosity, suggesting stabilization or mild resurgence in religious identification.^[85] By 2022, the share of "not religious" Arabs hovered around 10.6%, a slight growth from earlier but remaining a small minority amid dominant Islamic identity.^[86] Institutional factors, including constitutions in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran that enshrine Islam as the state religion and integrate sharia into legal systems, reinforce public religiosity and constrain secular alternatives.^[87] Turkey presents a partial exception, with urban and youth cohorts showing higher secular tendencies despite national policies under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promoting Islamic values since 2003. KONDA surveys indicate nonbelievers or atheists rose from 2% in 2008 to 8% in 2025, concentrated among educated urban populations and younger demographics resisting mandatory religious education.^[88] ^[89] Overall affiliation remains high at around 88-99% Muslim self-identification, but bottom-up secularization persists alongside top-down Islamization efforts, such as curriculum changes emphasizing national-Islamic values.^[87] Data limitations persist region-wide, as authoritarian contexts and cultural stigma likely suppress honest reporting of doubt, potentially masking understated private secularization.^[85]

Recent Trends (2000-2025)

Declines in Affiliation and Practice

Between 2010 and 2020, the share of the global population affiliated with any religion declined by approximately 1 percentage point, from 76.7% to 75.7%, while the number of religiously unaffiliated individuals increased by 270 million to 1.9 billion.^[80] This shift manifested in 35 countries where the proportion of religiously affiliated residents fell by at least 5 percentage points over the decade, driven primarily by generational changes rather than conversions or immigration.^[80] Empirical analysis across more than 100 countries reveals a consistent three-stage sequence in secularization: first, participation in public religious rituals, such as worship services, declines among younger generations; second, the subjective importance of religion in daily life diminishes; and third, formal religious affiliation erodes.^[3] This pattern holds across major religious traditions and regions, with ritual attendance dropping earliest in high-development contexts before cascading to belief and identity measures.^[2] The perceived importance of religion has declined dramatically worldwide since the early 2000s, correlating with socioeconomic factors like rising prosperity and democratization, though the unaffiliated population remains a global minority, comprising under 25% of adults.^[90] In the United States, for instance, the proportion of religiously unaffiliated adults—"nones"—reached 29% by 2024, up from lower levels at the century's start, reflecting accelerated disaffiliation among those under 55.^[78]

Evidence of Slowing or Regional Reversals

In the United States, the long-term decline in Christian affiliation appears to have stabilized, with Pew Research Center's 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study reporting that 62% of adults identify as Christian, a figure consistent with surveys conducted since 2020 and marking a halt to the sharper drops observed in prior decades.^[1] This plateau is attributed to reduced rates of disaffiliation rather than influxes from other faiths, as the religiously unaffiliated ("nones") share has also leveled off at around 29%.^[63] Among younger cohorts, indicators of stabilization include Generation Z's retention of childhood religious affiliations at higher rates than Millennials at similar ages, potentially driven by post-pandemic cultural shifts toward seeking meaning amid social fragmentation.^[91]^[92] Broader Western trends echo this slowdown, with data from multiple surveys showing Christianity holding steady or gaining traction among youth after years of erosion. In Western Europe and North America combined, secularization rates have decelerated since the early 2010s, evidenced by plateauing church attendance and affiliation metrics in countries like the United Kingdom and Canada, where post-2020 reversals in youth disaffiliation correlate with heightened cultural conflicts over identity and morality.^[5] Political expressions of religiosity have also intensified, as seen in Poland's sustained Catholic influence on policy despite youth practice declines, where conservative governance has reinforced institutional religion against secular pressures.^[93] In the Global South, demographic dynamics have fueled outright reversals, with Christianity projected to encompass nearly 3.3 billion adherents by 2050, driven by high fertility rates and conversions in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia.^[94] Africa's Christian population is expected to surpass Europe's by 2025 and represent the largest global share by mid-century, countering secularization narratives through organic growth rather than institutional revival.^[95] Political resurgences amplify this, such as India's Hindutva movement embedding Hindu identity in governance since 2014, which has mobilized religious participation and slowed liberalization in public life.^[96] These patterns underscore regional variability, where socioeconomic stability and cultural backlash have stalled or inverted secular trajectories absent in earlier Western models.^[97]

Causal Mechanisms

Socioeconomic and Modernization Factors

Modernization theory, rooted in sociological observations from the 19th and 20th centuries, argues that socioeconomic advancements diminish the societal role of religion by fulfilling existential and social needs through secular institutions and markets.^[98] Empirical cross-country analyses support a negative association between per capita GDP and religiosity, with higher income levels correlating to reduced religious participation and beliefs, as economic prosperity provides alternative explanations for causality and security previously attributed to divine intervention.^[98]^[99] This pattern holds in panel data from diverse regions, where a rise in GDP per capita from low to middle-income thresholds is linked to measurable declines in religious adherence, though the effect plateaus or varies in high-income contexts.^[100] Education emerges as a key driver within this framework, exerting a direct negative impact on religiosity independent of income effects. Studies using international datasets, such as those incorporating Barro-Lee educational attainment measures, find that each additional year of schooling reduces the intensity of religious beliefs and practices, with coefficients indicating statistically significant drops in affiliation and attendance.^[101]^[100] For instance, higher secondary and tertiary enrollment rates align with lower reported religiosity in longitudinal models controlling for confounders like age and family background, reflecting cognitive shifts toward empirical reasoning and skepticism of supernatural claims.^[102] This relationship underscores opportunity costs: educated individuals allocate time to skill-building and careers over ritual observance, amplifying secularization in knowledge-based economies. Urbanization accelerates these dynamics by eroding parochial religious communities and exposing individuals to pluralistic environments that dilute doctrinal adherence. Global migration patterns from rural to urban areas, particularly post-1950, coincide with declines in traditional practices, as city life imposes temporal and social opportunity costs on communal worship.^[7] In developing regions, urban dwellers exhibit 10-20% lower religiosity than rural counterparts in comparable surveys, attributable to weakened kinship ties and institutional religious influence.^[11] Industrial and service-sector jobs further prioritize efficiency, rendering time-intensive rituals less viable. Expansive welfare states, exemplified by Nordic models, further insulate populations from religious dependency by supplanting ecclesiastical roles in social support. In countries like Sweden and Denmark, comprehensive public provisions for health, education, and income security—covering over 80% of GDP in social expenditures by the 1990s—correlate with church attendance rates below 5% and nominal affiliations under 20%.^[103] This substitution effect reduces the perceived utility of religious institutions for risk mitigation, fostering existential autonomy; empirical comparisons show Nordic religiosity levels among the world's lowest, even accounting for cultural Lutheran heritage.^[104] Such systems, while not causally proving inevitability, empirically align with accelerated disaffiliation where state capacity supplants faith-based charity.^[105]

Cultural and Ideological Drivers

The ascendancy of expressive individualism, which posits the autonomous self as the locus of meaning and authenticity, has undermined the communal foundations of traditional religion by prioritizing personal fulfillment over inherited doctrines and obligations. This cultural shift, rooted in post-1960s therapeutic and humanistic ideologies, correlates with declining institutional religiosity, as individuals increasingly view faith as optional rather than obligatory. Data from the World Values Survey (WVS) illustrate this trend: in Western countries, self-expression values—emphasizing tolerance, environmentalism, and personal choice—have risen markedly since the 1980s, coinciding with a 20-30 percentage point increase in those prioritizing individual autonomy over survival-oriented conformity, which in turn aligns with drops in religious adherence.^[106]^[107] Exposure to scientific paradigms, beginning with Charles Darwin's 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species, has further eroded confidence in supernatural explanations by providing naturalistic accounts of biological complexity, challenging scriptural literalism and fostering doubt among educated populations. Longitudinal analyses indicate that acceptance of evolution correlates inversely with religiosity; for instance, in the United States, surveys from the 20th century onward show higher Darwinian acceptance among the non-religious, with this gap widening as scientific literacy spreads via education and media. The internet has amplified this effect in the 21st century, enabling rapid dissemination of skeptical content—such as critiques of miracles or historical biblical analysis—that correlates with self-reported disaffiliation; Pew Research Center data from the 2010s-2020s reveal that frequent online engagement with diverse viewpoints contributes to "nones" citing intellectual doubts as a primary reason for leaving faith, though causation remains debated due to self-selection biases in digital exposure.^[108]^[109] Peter Berger's sociological framework posits that religious pluralism, intensified by global migration and information flows, dilutes doctrinal exclusivity by subjecting believers to constant awareness of alternatives, transforming faith from a socially enforced default to a contested personal choice. Initially articulated in Berger's 1967 work The Sacred Canopy, this "heretical imperative" suggests pluralism erodes plausibility structures, prompting either privatization of belief or outright rejection; Berger later refined it to acknowledge desecularization in non-Western contexts but upheld its role in the West, where exposure to competing truth claims has halved exclusive adherence rates since the mid-20th century per cross-national surveys. This mechanism operates causally through cognitive dissonance: encountering viable rivals reduces the perceived certainty of any single creed, as evidenced by WVS data showing higher secularization in pluralistic urban settings versus homogeneous rural ones.^[110]^[111]

Demographic and Institutional Influences

Fertility rates differ markedly by religiosity, with the religiously unaffiliated exhibiting lower total fertility rates (TFRs) globally, estimated at 1.6 children per woman for the 2020-2025 period, compared to 1.9 for Christians and higher for other groups such as Muslims at 3.1 during 2010-2015.^[112]^[113] These disparities contribute to projections of slower growth or decline among secular populations, as low fertility among nones fails to replace aging cohorts, while religious groups sustain or expand through higher birth rates exceeding replacement levels (2.1).^[114] In religious strongholds like parts of Europe and North America, aging adherent populations—where median ages for Christians exceed those of unaffiliated by several years—exacerbate secularization, as younger generations disaffiliate at rates up to twice that of older ones, leading to demographic replacement.^[115]^[1] Immigration partially offsets secular trends in host nations by introducing more religious populations; migrants to Europe and the US from high-religiosity regions maintain higher practice levels than natives, with non-European immigrants showing elevated affiliation and fertility that sustains overall religiosity amid native declines.^[116]^[117] For instance, in Western Europe, immigrants average greater religiosity than the ethnic majority, buffering against host-country secularization through cultural retention and community networks.^[118] Institutional policies shape affiliation patterns; in the Soviet Union, state-enforced atheism from the 1920s to 1950s, including church closures and executions of clergy, suppressed overt practice but failed to eradicate underlying belief, resulting in temporary secularization followed by post-1991 resurgence.^[51] Conversely, subsidy mechanisms like Germany's Kirchensteuer—levied at 8-9% of income tax on registered members—have sustained nominal affiliation around 45-50% of the population as of 2023, despite actual practice being lower and ongoing exits driven by the financial burden.^[119]^[120] Such policies incentivize retention for fiscal reasons but mask deeper disengagement, as evidenced by annual membership drops exceeding 500,000 in recent years.^[120]

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Empirical Challenges to Inevitability

Projections from the Pew Research Center indicate that the global share of religiously unaffiliated individuals will decline from 16% in 2010 to approximately 13% by 2050, driven primarily by higher fertility rates among religious populations compared to the unaffiliated, resulting in religious adherents comprising the vast majority—around 87%—of the world's population.^[114] This demographic momentum counters narratives of inevitable global secularization, as religious groups, particularly Muslims and Christians, are expected to grow in absolute numbers through births exceeding deaths and conversions.^[114] In the United States, evangelical Protestants have maintained a substantial presence, comprising 23% of adults as of 2025, down modestly from 26% in 2007 but demonstrating resilience amid broader Christian declines that appear to have slowed or stabilized since 2020.^[1] Similarly, the Bible Belt region exhibits relative stability, with states like Tennessee reporting 72% Christian identification in 2024, higher than national averages and reflecting slower erosion in affiliation compared to coastal or urban areas.^[1] Survey metrics often emphasize affiliation and public practice, potentially understating persistent private religiosity; for instance, Pew data from 2025 reveal that while "nones" have increased, a significant portion retain beliefs in God or moral frameworks influenced by religion, with women and older cohorts showing higher private devotion uncorrelated with institutional ties.^[1] This discrepancy highlights how secularization indicators may conflate observable behaviors with underlying convictions, as evidenced by stable or lingering religious moral influences in surveys tracking personal ethics rather than attendance.^[121] Counterexamples abound in regions where religious structures endure against modernization pressures, such as Iran's theocratic system, where Shia Islam remains constitutionally enshrined and state-enforced since 1979, maintaining near-universal nominal adherence despite underground dissent or private skepticism.^[122] Such cases illustrate that political and institutional reinforcement can sustain religiosity, challenging unidirectional secularization models by demonstrating context-dependent persistence rather than universal decline.^[123]

Religious Adaptation and Resurgence

Religious movements have countered secularization pressures through adaptive forms emphasizing personal experience, communal vibrancy, and political engagement. Pentecostalism, originating in early 20th-century revivals but surging globally since mid-century, exemplifies this vitality, with the Pentecostal/Charismatic movement encompassing 644 million adherents by the mid-2020s—about 26% of all Christians and 8% of the world's population.^[124] ^[125] This expansion, fueled by practices like speaking in tongues, healing, and grassroots evangelism, has concentrated in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia, where annual growth rates have outpaced overall population increases.^[124] Political Islam similarly resurged post-1979, catalyzed by Iran's Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the monarchy and installed a Shiite theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini, inspiring Sunni and Shiite activists alike to pursue governance via religious law.^[126] The event popularized Islamism as a viable ideology, leading to electoral gains for groups like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in the 2010s and sustained influence in Pakistan and Turkey, where Islamist parties have alternated power amid public support for faith-based policies.^[126] ^[127] Adaptations to modern lifestyles include megachurches and digital outreach, which blend technology with worship to sustain engagement. In the U.S., megachurches—congregations averaging over 2,000 weekly attendees—totaled about 1,800 by 2020, with three-quarters reporting growth and an average 34% attendance rise from 2015 to 2020, often via multimedia sermons, cafes, and youth programs.^[128] ^[129] Online communities have proliferated since the 2000s, with early projections estimating 50 million individuals could depend entirely on web-based faith content by the 2020s, enabling virtual small groups and global connectivity.^[130] Regional resurgences underscore religion's resilience against suppression. In Eastern Europe, the 1989 fall of communism triggered an immediate religiosity rebound, with church attendance and self-identification spiking as populations rejected decades of state atheism—evident in Poland's Catholic revival and Orthodox renewals elsewhere.^[131] Among 2020s youth, Pew data reveal 70% of U.S. adults claim spirituality, with Gen Z showing revival signs, including rising male interest in faith exploration amid cultural shifts.^[132] These patterns illustrate religion's evolutionary capacity, prioritizing empirical vitality over uniform decline.

Methodological and Definitional Debates

Sociologists debate the precise meaning of secularization, distinguishing between a purported irreversible decline in religious belief and practice versus a reconfiguration of religion's institutional influence or privatization within pluralistic societies. Early formulations, such as those emphasizing modernization's erosion of religious authority, often conflate measurable drops in affiliation with broader existential disenchantment, yet critics contend this overlooks religion's adaptive persistence in personal or subcultural forms. Peter Berger, a key proponent of the thesis in works like The Sacred Canopy (1967), initially argued that societal pluralism undermines the plausibility of faith by exposing believers to competing worldviews, fostering secularization. However, by the 1990s, Berger reversed this stance, recognizing in The Desecularization of the World (1999) that pluralism can invigorate religious commitment through market-like competition and that global trends showed resurgent religiosity outside elite Western circles, challenging the universality of decline narratives.^[20] Methodological challenges compound these definitional issues, particularly in data reliability and cultural applicability. Self-reported surveys, the mainstay of religiosity metrics, suffer from inconsistencies, including social desirability bias where respondents overstate attendance or belief to align with perceived norms, as evidenced by comparisons with time-use diaries or observational counts revealing actual participation rates 20-50% lower than claimed. Such flaws inflate or deflate trends depending on question phrasing and respondent identity salience, undermining claims of uniform secular advance. Moreover, secularization studies exhibit Western-centric biases, privileging indicators like weekly church attendance suited to Protestant contexts while marginalizing non-Abrahamic traditions—such as Hinduism's emphasis on ritual purity over congregational worship or Islam's decentralized mosque practices—where religiosity manifests through lifecycle events or private devotion rather than formalized metrics. This Euro-Christian focus, rooted in 19th-century European data, distorts global assessments and reflects institutional preferences in sociology for narratives aligning with progressive secular ideals over empirical anomalies in Asia or Africa.^[133]^[134]^[135] Proponents of alternative frameworks, notably Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, dismiss secularization as empirically unsubstantiated mythology, advancing a supply-side "religious economies" model where faith flourishes under competitive deregulation akin to capitalist markets, rather than atrophying under monopoly or state control. In analyses of 19th- and 20th-century U.S. data, they demonstrate that denominational pluralism correlated with rising adherence rates, from 17% church membership in 1776 to 51% by 1980s peaks, attributing stagnation to over-regulation rather than inherent modernity effects. This rational choice perspective critiques demand-side explanations in traditional secularization theory for ignoring institutional incentives, positing instead that apparent declines stem from supply constraints, not societal maturation—a view bolstered by cross-national variations where lax religious regulations predict higher vitality. Academic resistance to such revisions, often embedded in departments favoring deterministic decline models, underscores source credibility issues, as peer-reviewed outlets historically underrepresented market-oriented empirics until accumulating counter-data necessitated reevaluation.^[136]^[137]

Societal Implications

Positive Outcomes and Achievements

Secularization has correlated with surges in scientific innovation and economic productivity in historical contexts, such as Europe's transition following the Reformation and Enlightenment. The Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, which emphasized empirical inquiry over doctrinal authority, contributed to foundational advancements in physics, astronomy, and mathematics, setting the stage for the Industrial Revolution and sustained GDP growth; for instance, European per capita income rose from approximately $1,000 in 1500 to over $2,000 by 1820 (in 1990 international dollars), accelerating further in Protestant-influenced regions where religious fragmentation encouraged literacy and rational inquiry.^[138]^[139] In contemporary settings, nations with advanced secularization exhibit higher rates of technological output, including patents, alongside robust GDP growth. Analysis of panel data from EU-15 countries between 1981 and 2019 demonstrates that patent stocks positively influence long-term economic expansion, with secular economies like those in Northern Europe and East Asia leading in per capita patent filings; for example, Sweden and Germany, both highly secular, consistently rank among top innovators, supporting reciprocal dynamics where innovation drives growth and vice versa.^[140]^[141] Secular governance has facilitated reductions in religiously motivated conflicts, enhancing stability and resource allocation to development. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) established principles of state sovereignty and religious tolerance, curtailing the scale of intra-European wars that had previously consumed up to 20-30% of populations in events like the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648); post-treaty, such doctrinal conflicts within Europe diminished sharply, allowing focus on interstate diplomacy and economic pursuits rather than theological disputes.^[142] Advances in human rights, particularly gender equality, align with secularization metrics in global indices. The World Economic Forum's 2024 Global Gender Gap Report ranks highly secular countries—Iceland (1st, 93.5% parity closed), Norway (2nd, 87.9%), and Finland (3rd, 87.4%)—at the top, where low religious influence correlates with policies promoting educational access, workforce participation, and political representation for women, contrasting with lower rankings in more religious societies.^[143]^[144] Social cohesion in secular societies has been bolstered by civic institutions supplanting ecclesiastical roles, yielding high interpersonal trust. In Nordic countries, where religiosity is minimal (e.g., church attendance below 10% in Sweden), social trust levels exceed 70% in surveys, sustained by voluntary associations, welfare systems, and public institutions that foster cooperation without reliance on faith-based networks; this model underpins low corruption and effective governance, as evidenced by consistent top rankings in global trust indices.^[145]^[146]

Criticisms and Negative Consequences

Secularization trends have been empirically linked to declines in family stability, with fertility rates in highly secular nations falling below replacement levels. Italy, a predominantly secular society despite its Catholic heritage, recorded a total fertility rate of 1.2 children per woman in 2023.^[147] In comparison, more religious populations maintain higher fertility; for example, in the United States, religious women averaged 1.8 to 1.9 children per woman in 2019, exceeding rates among secular women.^[148] Globally, countries with the highest religiosity in 2023 exhibited fertility rates approximately twice those of the least religious nations.^[149] Divorce rates also rise in tandem with secular shifts, as religious commitments correlate with marital durability; nonreligious married women in the US faced an annual divorce rate of about 5% in recent data, compared to lower rates among the religious.^[150] Secularization further normalizes divorce by framing marriage as a contractual arrangement rather than a sacred bond, contributing to post-1960s increases in dissolution rates across Western societies.^[151] Low religiosity has been associated with elevated risks of anomie and suicide, echoing Durkheim's observations on social integration. Multiple empirical studies demonstrate an inverse correlation: higher levels of religious belief and attendance predict lower suicide rates, with one analysis of over 28,000 participants confirming this pattern across genders.^[152] Systematic reviews affirm that religious service attendance reduces suicide attempts even after controlling for social support.^[153] In Europe, where nonreligious identification among youth aged 16-29 reaches 91% in the Czech Republic, 80% in Estonia, and 75% in Sweden as of 2023, mental health crises intensify.^[154] The World Health Organization reports that one in seven adolescents globally experiences a mental disorder, with Europe's youth facing sharp rises in anxiety, depression, and unmet care needs—nearly 50% in some EU data from the 2020s—amid weakening traditional community ties.^[155]^[156] Critics contend that secular voids foster political instability through the rise of identity politics, which mimics religious structures without transcendent anchors. Analyses describe identity politics as an "ersatz religion," inheriting Protestant emphases on innocence and transgression but omitting forgiveness and humility, leading to perpetual grievance cycles.^[157] This substitution fills the moral vacuum left by declining faith, per causal interpretations, exacerbating polarization as secular societies seek collective meaning in ideological tribes rather than shared ethical frameworks.^[158] Such dynamics contribute to instability, as evidenced by heightened factionalism in low-religiosity contexts where empirical data links weakened institutional religion to fragmented civic cohesion.

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Global Christian Population Projected to Reach 3.3 Billion by 2050
Feb 13, 2023 · There will be over 2.6 billion Christians worldwide by the middle of 2023 and around 3.3 billion by 2050, according to a report published in early January.
[97]
Christian Growth - Lausanne Movement
By 2050, Africa is projected to have the highest percentage of global Christians. Asia's share of the Christian population will also grow.
[98]
Religious revival: Why young people around the world are finding ...
Aug 13, 2025 · From digital spirituality to gendered divides, faith seems to offer meaning and identity where secular culture has fallen short.
[99]
[PDF] Status of Global Christianity, 2025, in the Context of 1900 –2050
Status of Global Christianity, 2025, in the Context of 1900 –2050. 1900 ... Percent of all Christians in the Global South. 17.6. 43.0. 58.9. 66.6. 0.66. 68.9.Missing: OMSC | Show results with:OMSC<|separator|>
[100]
[PDF] nber working paper series
In accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development——represented by per capita GDP——tends to reduce religiosity.
[101]
[PDF] The religious transition. A long-run perspective
Our measure of religiosity is negatively correlated with per capita income. Development apparently causes religiosity to fall to about half its pre-modern level ...
[102]
Religion and Economic Growth | NBER
We find that economic growth responds positively to the extent of religious beliefs, notably those in hell and heaven, but negatively to church attendance.Missing: correlation | Show results with:correlation
[103]
[PDF] religion paper ajs revised - Harvard University
In a previous study (Barro and McCleary [2003]), we used cross-country data to investigate the effects of religious participation and beliefs on economic growth ...
[104]
[PDF] Relations among education, religiosity and socioeconomic variables
Feb 28, 2019 · This study demonstrates the relations of the position of education in the correlation between religiosity, and socioeconomic.
[105]
[PDF] THE SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE STATES - unrisd
The Scandinavian welfare states have enjoyed an international reputation for combining generous welfare state entitlements with rapid economic growth, low ...
[106]
Approaching National Christianities in the Nordic Region
Jul 1, 2025 · Mette Buchardt, “The Nordic Model and the Educational Welfare State in a European Light: Social Problem Solving and Secular-Religious Ambitions ...Religion In The Study Of... · The Secular State Contested · An Interdisciplinary...<|separator|>
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How is the Nordic welfare state doing? Contemporary public ...
Dec 9, 2021 · This study produces descriptive cross-country snapshots of how the welfare state is construed in contemporary Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish mass media ...
[108]
Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Map - WVS Database
Findings from the WVS demonstrate that mass self-expression values are extremely important in the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions in a ...
[109]
Variations in cultural values across 105 countries in 2019
Aug 3, 2020 · Moving upwards on this map indicates increasing secular values and moving to the right increasing self-expression values. Inglehart-Welzel ...
[110]
Darwin's Influence on Modern Thought - Scientific American
Nov 24, 2009 · Darwin completely rejected typological thinking and introduced instead the entirely different concept now called population thinking. All ...
[111]
Darwin and Darwinism: The (Alleged) Social Implications of The ...
Darwinism, they claim, also had a number of social and cultural consequences: economic and political, medical, eugenic, educational, and religious.
[112]
Religious Pluralism for a Pluralist Age - Project Syndicate
Apr 28, 2005 · Pluralism means that established religions can no longer take for granted that a particular population will supinely submit to its authority.Missing: exposure dilutes
[113]
The Good of Religious Pluralism - First Things
Pluralism is often perceived as a threat to faith, associated with relativism and a loss of religious substance. I take a contrary position.Missing: exposure dilutes exclusivity
[114]
Methodology - Pew Research Center
Sep 13, 2022 · Total fertility rates used for the 2020-2025 period are 1.9 for Christian women, 1.6 for the religiously unaffiliated and 2.0 for women of other ...
[115]
1. Factors driving religious change, 2010-2020 - Pew Research Center
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[116]
The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010 ...
Apr 2, 2015 · Christians are projected to decline from 78% of the U.S. population in 2010 to 66% in 2050, while the unaffiliated are expected to rise from 16% ...Muslims · Factors Driving Population... · Christians · Hindus
[117]
The Age Gap in Religion Around the World | Pew Research Center
Jun 13, 2018 · Overall, adults ages 18 to 39 are less likely than those ages 40 and older to say religion is very important to them in 46 out of 106 countries surveyed by Pew ...
[118]
Religion and immigration in Europe
Dec 20, 2014 · Immigrants have a higher fertility rate and non-European immigrants tend to be more religious than the host population and more likely to retain ...
[119]
Religiosity of Migrants and Natives in Western Europe 2002–2018
Mar 23, 2023 · Even in an increasingly secular context, increasing migrant religiosity could stimulate revival or maintenance of religious engagement among ...
[120]
Full article: Immigrant generation and religiosity: a study of Christian ...
Mar 3, 2022 · Findings indicate that on average immigrants in Europe are more religious than the ethnic majority population (Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir ...
[121]
German Catholic Church Faces Significant Drop in Church Tax ...
Jul 11, 2024 · In 2023, they collected approximately €5.9 billion, down 5.3% from the €6.24 billion recorded in 2022, another record year for them.
[122]
Is Germany's church tax 'miracle' over? - by Luke Coppen - The Pillar
more than the Catholic decline of 4.9%. An annual decline of 5% is not unprecedented for the ...
[123]
The three stages of religious decline around the world - PMC
Aug 19, 2025 · Mapping religious change in latin America. ... In search of a comparable measure of generalized individual religiosity in the World Values Survey.
[124]
2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iran
The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic and specifies Twelver Ja'afari Shia Islam as the official state religion.
[125]
Faith as Power: Mapping the World's Theocratic Governments in 2025
Oct 4, 2025 · Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has institutionalized theocracy like no other nation. Its constitution enshrines Shia Islam as the ...Missing: adherence | Show results with:adherence<|separator|>
[126]
Global Pentecostalism - Center for the Study of Global Christianity
Globally, there are 644 million Christians in the Spirit-Empowered movement, representing 26% of all Christians worldwide. The map below depicts Pentecostal/ ...Missing: population | Show results with:population
[127]
Pentecostalism | Research Starters - EBSCO
Into the mid-2020s, there were approximately 644 million Pentecostal Christians worldwide, accounting for about 8 percent of the global population and nearly 26 ...
[128]
Political Islam After the Arab Spring | Foreign Affairs
Oct 16, 2017 · The term “Islamism” and its watered-down equivalent, “political Islam,” sprang into widespread use after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and ...Missing: post- statistics
[129]
Islamism at 50 in Politics, Power and War | Wilson Center
Nov 17, 2023 · After a half century, Islamism has become the single most disruptive force—both politically and militarily—in the Middle East.
[130]
Megachurch Research - Hartford Institute
This site's research focuses on very large Protestant Christian congregations in the United States, of which there are approximately 1800 at present.
[131]
Megachurches Continue to (Mostly) Grow and Not Just in Size
Dec 15, 2020 · While around 1 in 5 megachurches has experienced an attendance decline in the past five years, the average megachurch has grown 34% since 2015.
[132]
More Americans Are Seeking Net-Based Faith Experiences
The report projects that within this decade as many as 50 million individuals may rely solely upon the Internet to provide all of their faith-based experiences.
[133]
Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern ...
May 10, 2017 · Openness to religion briefly spiked after the fall of communism, though evidence suggests this may have been mostly a political statement ...
[134]
Spirituality Among Americans | Pew Research Center
Dec 7, 2023 · Overall, 70% of U.S. adults describe themselves as spiritual in some way, including 22% who are spiritual but not religious.
[135]
mode and social desirability bias in self-reported religious attendance
Reporting error may also be stimulated by misinterpretation at the comprehension stage. For example, "Did you attend church?" might be interpreted to mean "Are ...Missing: criticisms theory flaws
[136]
Lies, Damned Lies, and Survey Self-Reports? Identity as a Cause of ...
Nov 18, 2016 · We offer an alternative explanation rooted in identity theory that focuses on measurement directiveness as a cause of bias.
[137]
Can the Scope of Secularization Theory Be Expanded Beyond the ...
Aug 7, 2024 · This study asserts that the secularization theory has the potential to offer insights into the processes of social change experienced by faith groups outside ...
[138]
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X23000803
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[PDF] Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies
Nov 15, 2013 · Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities, 1906. Author(s): Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. Source ...
[140]
The scientific revolution and its implications for long-run economic ...
We analyze the role of the Scientific Revolution in the takeoff to sustained long-run economic development.Missing: Reformation boom
[141]
What drove economic growth in pre-industrial Europe, 1300–1800?
No advances in levels of GDP were made in southern and central Europe between 1500 and 1800—although income levels were high in Italy between 1300 and 1500, ...
[142]
The influence of standards and patents on long-term economic growth
Jun 10, 2021 · This study is the first to examine the long-term effects of formal standards and patents on economic growth in a panel of eleven EU-15 countries between 1981 ...
[143]
[PDF] Patenting Prosperity: - Brookings Institution
Research has established that patents are correlated with economic growth across and within the same country over time.<|separator|>
[144]
Europe: Between Religious War and Peace | EHNE
Jul 17, 2024 · Multi-denominational nations were shaken by religious clashes; they had to invent modes of coexistence and a new equilibrium between politics and religion.
[145]
Global Gender Gap Report 2024 - The World Economic Forum
Jun 11, 2024 · The Global Gender Gap Index annually benchmarks the current state and evolution of gender parity across four key dimensions.Sign in · Preface · Economy Profiles · ShareablesMissing: secular | Show results with:secular
[146]
Global Gender Gap Report 2024: It will take 134 years to reach ...
Sep 20, 2024 · The top nine countries (Iceland, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, Germany, Nicaragua, Namibia and Lithuania) have closed at least 80% of their gap.
[147]
The Nordic Exceptionalism - The World Happiness Report
Furthermore, Nordic citizens experience a high sense of autonomy and freedom, as well as high levels of social trust towards each other, which play an important ...Missing: secularism | Show results with:secularism
[148]
Religious Participation and Civic Engagement in a Secular Context
May 4, 2021 · The aim of the present study is to investigate the potential link between religious participation and civic engagement in Sweden.
[149]
Italy - Fertility Rate, Total (births Per Woman) - Trading Economics
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) in Italy was reported at 1.2 % in 2023, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators.
[150]
America's Growing Religious-Secular Fertility Divide
Aug 8, 2022 · ... religious women in 2019 had a fertility rate around 1.8 or 1.9 children each. With birth rates at just 1.8 or 1.9 children per woman vs. a ...
[151]
Religious Freedom is Supportive of Higher Fertility - More Births
Sep 8, 2024 · ' It turns out that the most religious countries in 2023 had a fertility rate that was on average twice as high as the least religious countries ...
[152]
The Religious Marriage Paradox: Younger Marriage, Less Divorce
Dec 15, 2021 · As shown4 in Figure 4, the annual divorce rate among married women with a nonreligious upbringing is around 5%. For religious women, it's around ...
[153]
The Rise and Fall of Divorce | Psychology Today
Jun 24, 2024 · Divorce is more socially acceptable. With the increasing secularization of society, marriage is seen more as a social contract than a sacrament.
[154]
[PDF] Religion and Suicide: New Findings
For example, in one study of over 28,000 males and females, higher suicide rates are associated with lower levels of religious belief and religious attendance ...
[155]
Religion and Suicide Risk: a systematic review - PMC
Several studies have found lower rates of suicide attempts among persons who attend religious services, after adjusting for social support. In the Canadian ...
[156]
Meet the 'nones': An ever increasing group across Europe with little ...
Oct 8, 2023 · Some 91% of 16 to 29 year olds say they have no religion, followed by Estonia's youths (80%), Sweden (75%) and the UK, where 70% have no ...
[157]
Mental health of adolescents - World Health Organization (WHO)
Sep 1, 2025 · Globally, one in seven 10-19-year-olds experiences a mental disorder, accounting for 15% of the global burden of disease in this age group.
[158]
Silent crisis: the mental health of Europe's youth
Feb 11, 2025 · Third, the 'Health at a Glance' report revealed, 50 % young Europeans reported unmet needs when it comes to their mental health. And, fourth, ...
[159]
Identity Politics as Ersatz Religion | The Russell Kirk Center
Dec 24, 2023 · His central thesis is that there exists a “deeply deformed relationship between identity politics and Protestant Christianity,” but, unlike ...
[160]
Identity politics is Christianity without redemption - UnHerd
Jan 20, 2020 · Identity politics is Christianity without redemption. Woke notions of white supremacy and the patriarchy bring back old ideas about predestination.