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Security force assistance

Security force assistance (SFA) is the organized effort by a state or coalition to train, advise, equip, and otherwise support the security forces of a partner nation, aiming to build their capabilities for internal security, counterinsurgency, or broader strategic goals.^[1]^[2] Primarily associated with U.S. military doctrine since the post-9/11 era, SFA emphasizes enabling partners to operate independently rather than direct combat involvement by the assisting force, as formalized in Department of Defense directives and Joint Publication 3-22.^[3]^[4] Historically rooted in Cold War-era advisory missions, such as U.S. support to South Vietnam in the 1960s and Soviet assistance to allies like Angola, SFA has evolved into a core component of great-power competition, with the U.S. establishing specialized units like Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) in 2017 to professionalize these efforts.^[4]^[5] Notable examples include U.S. training of Philippine forces against terrorism since 2002 and multi-billion-dollar programs in Iraq and Afghanistan to develop national armies capable of sustaining operations post-withdrawal.^[3]^[6] Despite doctrinal refinements and investments exceeding tens of billions of dollars, empirical assessments reveal SFA's mixed record, with frequent failures in fragile states due to host-nation political instability, corruption, insufficient local ownership, and external interference undermining built capacities.^[7]^[8]^[9] High-profile collapses, such as the rapid disintegration of Afghan forces in 2021 after two decades of assistance, highlight causal factors like dependency on foreign support and lack of will to fight, prompting critiques that SFA often prioritizes short-term tactical gains over sustainable institutional reforms.^[6]^[10] Proponents argue it remains essential for strategic denial and partner influence, but evidence underscores the need for rigorous vetting of recipient commitment and integration with broader political strategies to avoid enabling repression or prolonged instability.^[11]^[4]

Definitions and Core Concepts

Primary Definition

Security force assistance (SFA) is defined as the unified action by U.S. military forces to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority, typically involving advising, training, equipping, and institutional capacity-building to enable partners to address internal and external threats independently.^[12] This doctrine, formalized in U.S. joint publications such as Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, emphasizes partner-led security operations where U.S. personnel provide enablement rather than assuming primary combat roles, aiming to foster self-reliance in host nation forces.^[13] SFA activities are executed across phases, from assessment and planning to sustainment, often integrating logistics, intelligence sharing, and doctrine alignment to build enduring capabilities.^[14] Core to SFA is its focus on institutional development, including reforming partner military education, command structures, and sustainment systems to align with operational needs, as evidenced by U.S. Army programs that have trained over 1,400 Iraqi soldiers in six-week cycles during post-2014 stabilization efforts.^[15] Unlike direct intervention, SFA prioritizes measurable outcomes such as improved host nation force readiness metrics—e.g., graduation rates from advisory-led training and independent operation thresholds—to mitigate dependency and enhance strategic stability.^[16] Specialized units like the six Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) fielded by the U.S. Army since 2018 embody this approach, deploying teams of 50-800 personnel tailored for advisory missions in permissive environments.^[15] SFA's objectives extend beyond tactical proficiency to strategic goals, such as countering malign influence from adversaries like Russia or China by strengthening allied defenses, as outlined in National Defense Strategy guidance linking SFA to great power competition.^[3] Empirical assessments, including post-mission evaluations from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, highlight challenges like cultural mismatches and corruption in partner forces, underscoring the need for vetted personnel and phased transitions to avoid over-reliance on U.S. support.^[1] Despite these hurdles, SFA remains a vital tool for indirect U.S. influence, with doctrine stressing adaptability to host nation contexts over templated solutions.^[13] Security force assistance (SFA) differs from foreign internal defense (FID) primarily in scope and focus; FID doctrine emphasizes U.S. support to a host nation's efforts against internal threats such as insurgencies or lawless groups, integrating development activities to foster internal security and governance, whereas SFA prioritizes building partner security forces' capabilities across a broader spectrum of threats, including conventional external defense, without mandating the internal threat emphasis central to FID.^[17] ^[18] For instance, U.S. Army doctrine in ATP 3-96.1 outlines SFA as applicable to organizing, training, equipping, and advising foreign security forces in peacetime or conflict environments, extending beyond FID's host-nation-led internal defense model to include institutional reforms for sustained self-reliance.^[14] In contrast to standalone military advising, which centers on providing expert guidance to foreign commanders on tactics, operations, or leadership without broader logistical or material support, SFA integrates advising as one element within a comprehensive framework that also encompasses equipping forces with materiel, conducting joint training exercises, and reforming doctrines and structures to enhance long-term operational effectiveness.^[12] This holistic approach, as detailed in the Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance, distinguishes SFA by requiring advisors to address systemic deficiencies, such as logistics chains or personnel systems, rather than limiting roles to observational counsel, as seen in earlier advisory groups like Military Assistance Advisory Groups that focused primarily on doctrinal transfer.^[19] SFA is a subset of building partner capacity (BPC) efforts but narrower in application; BPC encompasses interagency activities to improve a partner's overall military or stability functions, including non-security sectors like governance or economics, while SFA specifically targets security force development through Department of Defense-led programs, excluding direct U.S. combat engagements and emphasizing partner-nation ownership to avoid dependency.^[20] Unlike counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, where U.S. forces often conduct partnered kinetic missions alongside host forces—as in Iraq post-2003—SFA doctrine mandates minimal U.S. direct action, focusing instead on enabling the partner to assume lead roles, with metrics tied to the partner's independent execution rather than joint outcomes.^[21] This separation ensures SFA avoids escalating U.S. involvement into de facto combat support, a risk highlighted in evaluations of Afghanistan advisory teams where blurred lines undermined partner autonomy.^[22] Security cooperation programs, such as those under Title 10 authorities for arms transfers or exchanges, differ from SFA by prioritizing diplomatic and materiel exchanges without embedded operational advising; for example, security assistance funding mobile training teams contrasts with SFA's sustained brigade-level embeds, like those of Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) activated since 2017, which conduct persistent assessments and reforms tailored to theater plans.^[23] ^[15] Overall, these distinctions underscore SFA's emphasis on scalable, low-footprint capacity enhancement to align with strategic deterrence, avoiding the mission creep associated with more intrusive practices.^[3]

Theoretical Foundations

Security force assistance (SFA) draws from political realism in international relations theory, viewing it as a mechanism for states to bolster allies' military capacities to deter aggression, maintain regional balances of power, and secure national interests without direct intervention. This approach recognizes that SFA shapes recipient states' power dynamics and elite incentives, prioritizing political outcomes over isolated tactical gains. For instance, U.S. efforts in the Philippines since 2002 exemplify how SFA curbs transnational threats like al Qaeda affiliates by building partner self-sufficiency, aligning with realist imperatives to avoid overextension.^[3]^[24] A Clausewitzian framework further grounds SFA, conceptualizing it as an instrument of policy where military assistance must integrate with political strategy, rather than devolving into apolitical training metrics. Carl von Clausewitz's emphasis on war as a continuation of politics underscores that SFA failures, such as in Afghanistan where over $80 billion yielded fragile forces collapsing in 2021, stem from prioritizing quantifiable outputs like trainees over strategic coherence and recipient political will. Successful cases, like Ukraine's adaptation of Western aid since 2014, demonstrate "reverse SFA" where recipients drive reforms amid existential threats, highlighting the need for advisors to navigate local political terrains rather than impose external models.^[24] Contemporary analyses incorporate principal-agent theory and systems thinking to address SFA in fragile or fragmented contexts. Principal-agent dynamics reveal risks of misaligned interests, where recipients exploit assistance for regime preservation amid divided loyalties, distinct from security sector reform's governance focus or peacekeeping's neutral monitoring. In complex adaptive systems, advisor-partner interactions produce emergent, non-linear outcomes influenced by feedback loops and cultural intersubjectivity, as seen in Colombia's effective Plan Colombia absorption versus Iraq and Afghanistan's mismatches from U.S.-centric templates. These frameworks stress assessing institutional absorptive capacity and unintended consequences to foster sustainable partner forces.^[1]^[25]

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Colonial Precedents

In ancient empires, practices akin to security force assistance emerged through the integration and training of allied or provincial forces. The Roman Empire systematically recruited auxiliaries from non-citizen provincials across its territories, subjecting them to rigorous training in Roman drill, tactics, and equipment standards to operate alongside legions. These units, organized into cohorts of approximately 500 infantrymen or alae of 500 cavalrymen, provided essential specialized roles such as archery and scouting, eventually comprising roughly half of the Roman army's manpower by the 2nd century AD. This approach enhanced imperial control by building capable local contingents loyal through service, with auxiliaries earning Roman citizenship after 25 years, fostering long-term alignment with Roman interests.^[26]^[27] During the colonial era, European powers expanded this model by raising and advising native armies in Asia and Africa to extend control with minimal metropolitan troops. The British East India Company formalized the sepoy system in the mid-18th century, beginning with the Bengal Native Infantry in 1748 and expanding after the 1757 Battle of Plassey, where 2,100 sepoys supported Robert Clive's victory over a larger Nawab force. By 1857, the Indian Army included over 232,000 sepoys trained in European-style infantry tactics, artillery, and discipline under British officers, enabling conquests across the subcontinent and deployments to imperial wars in China and Burma. This reliance on advised local forces reduced costs but exposed vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the 1857 Indian Rebellion, where cultural insensitivities like greased cartridges triggered widespread mutiny among 139,000 sepoys, killing thousands of British personnel before suppression. Parallel efforts occurred in Africa, where France organized the Tirailleurs Sénégalais in 1857 from West African recruits, training them in French military doctrine for colonial pacification and expeditions, numbering about 15,000 by World War I. Similarly, the Belgian Force Publique in the Congo Free State, established in 1885, employed European officers to drill local askaris in marksmanship and patrols, enforcing Leopold II's rubber quotas through brutal enforcement that claimed millions of lives amid documented atrocities. These colonial precedents demonstrated how advising indigenous forces amplified European reach but often sowed seeds of instability due to mismatched loyalties and exploitative oversight, contrasting with modern SFA's emphasis on partner sovereignty.^[28]

Cold War Era Applications

During the Cold War, security force assistance emerged as a key mechanism for the United States and Soviet Union to extend influence through proxy conflicts, training and advising allied militaries to counter ideological rivals without risking direct confrontation. The U.S. established Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in multiple nations to professionalize host forces against communist insurgencies and expansions, such as in Greece, the Philippines, Korea, and Thailand, where advisors focused on logistics, training, and doctrinal reforms.^[29]^[30] These efforts were driven by containment doctrine, with MAAG personnel embedding at unit levels to enhance operational capabilities, though outcomes varied due to host nation political fragilities and advisor limitations in addressing internal governance issues.^[31] The Vietnam War represented the pinnacle of U.S. advisory operations, with MAAG Vietnam formed on November 1, 1950, initially capped at 342 advisors under Geneva Accords limits, expanding to 685 by 1955 amid rising Viet Cong threats. President Kennedy authorized surges, reaching approximately 16,000 military advisors by late 1963, who trained the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in counterinsurgency tactics, equipment use, and staff functions through the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) after 1962.^[32]^[33] Despite providing over $1 billion in annual aid by the early 1960s, effectiveness was hampered by ARVN corruption, desertions exceeding 100,000 annually in some years, and mismatched U.S. conventional focus against guerrilla warfare, contributing to reliance on direct U.S. combat intervention by 1965.^[31] The Soviet Union mirrored these efforts, dispatching military advisors to support Marxist regimes in Africa and Asia, emphasizing ideological alignment and rapid force modernization. In Angola, following the 1975 MPLA victory, the USSR provided over $4 billion in arms by the mid-1980s alongside 1,500 to 1,700 advisors who trained the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) in armored warfare and operations against UNITA rebels and South African incursions.^[34] Advisors, numbering around 1,000 by the late 1970s, embedded in command structures but struggled with cultural adaptation and overreliance on Cuban surrogates, leading to tactical setbacks like failed offensives in 1987-1988 due to poor intelligence integration.^[35] In Afghanistan, Soviet advisory presence predated the 1979 invasion, with hundreds assisting Afghan forces from the 1950s under aid agreements, escalating to 4,500 advisors by April 1979 to bolster the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan amid rebellions.^[36] These specialists reorganized units, supplied MiG fighters and T-62 tanks, and conducted joint training, yet failed to stem mujahedin gains due to ethnic fractures and advisor vulnerabilities to ambushes, foreshadowing the full intervention's 15,000 Soviet casualties over a decade.^[36] Overall, Cold War SFA highlighted causal challenges: while materially bolstering partners short-term, success hinged on host political will and local buy-in, often absent in ideologically imposed alliances, resulting in unsustainable dependencies evident in both superpowers' post-withdrawal partner collapses.^[31]

Post-Cold War and 9/11 Transformations

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. security force assistance evolved from Cold War-era proxy support to addressing post-bipolar instability, including humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping. Operations in Somalia under Operation Restore Hope (December 1992–March 1994) involved limited training of local militias amid famine relief efforts, while NATO-led missions in the Balkans from 1995 onward, such as Implementation Force in Bosnia, incorporated advising nascent local security units to foster stability amid ethnic conflicts.^[37]^[38] These engagements underscored a doctrinal shift toward "operations other than war," with assistance remaining episodic and largely confined to special operations forces rather than a core conventional mission.^[39] The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks prompted a profound transformation, integrating SFA into counterinsurgency (COIN) frameworks within the Global War on Terror. In Afghanistan's Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Special Forces provided critical advising to Northern Alliance fighters, enabling the Taliban's rapid ouster by December 2001 and highlighting SFA's potential in unconventional warfare.^[40] This success spurred formalized structures, including the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) by 2006, which coordinated training, equipping, and ministerial capacity-building for the Afghan National Security Forces amid escalating insurgency.^[41] In Iraq following the 2003 invasion, SFA scaled dramatically to rebuild security institutions post-regime collapse. The Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), activated on June 28, 2004, led efforts to train, equip, and organize Iraqi military and police units, establishing centralized academies and distributing equipment to counter insurgency.^[42] By emphasizing transition to host-nation lead, these initiatives reflected a broader doctrinal pivot formalized in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 (December 2006), which positioned SFA as essential to COIN by prioritizing sustainable partner capabilities over direct combat.^[43] Yet, assessments revealed systemic issues, including corruption and dependency, limiting long-term effectiveness despite billions invested.^[40]^[44]

Institutionalization in the 2010s

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review directed the U.S. military to strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance, marking a shift toward embedding SFA as a core competency across conventional units rather than relying primarily on special operations forces.^[45] This emphasis responded to lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, where ad hoc advising strained operational tempo and highlighted the need for dedicated structures to build partner capacity without diverting combat brigades.^[46] On October 27, 2010, the Department of Defense issued Instruction 5000.68, which formalized SFA policy by defining it as activities to develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions to deter or defeat threats to stability.^[47] The instruction mandated integration of SFA into joint planning and training, requiring combatant commands to incorporate it into theater security cooperation plans and emphasizing measurable outcomes in partner self-sufficiency.^[47] Concurrently, the U.S. Army articulated SFA as a combination of tasks to enhance foreign security forces' capabilities, advocating for its doctrinal incorporation to support broader national objectives.^[48] Building on these foundations, the Army established the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) in 2017 as specialized, brigade-sized units composed of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers dedicated exclusively to advising, assisting, and enabling partner forces.^[14] The first SFAB activated on February 16, 2018, at Fort Benning, Georgia, followed by announcements for five active-component and one National Guard SFABs to professionalize advisory roles and alleviate burdens on conventional brigade combat teams.^[49] By May 2020, all six SFABs were operational, each tailored with enablers like intelligence, logistics, and fires support to conduct SFA in permissive, semi-permissive, and contested environments.^[50] Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1, published May 2, 2018, provided doctrinal guidance for SFAB operations, underscoring their role in fostering partner autonomy through embedded advising and institutional capacity building.^[14] The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, operationalized in the early 2010s under U.S. Central Command and later joint auspices, further institutionalized SFA by developing standards, tactics, techniques, and procedures for cross-service application, ensuring interoperability among U.S. forces and allies.^[2] These developments reflected a doctrinal evolution prioritizing SFA as a strategic tool for competition below armed conflict thresholds, with empirical focus on sustainability metrics like partner force readiness and reduced U.S. footprint requirements.^[4]

Operational Frameworks and Doctrine

Key Doctrinal Elements

Security force assistance (SFA) is defined in U.S. joint doctrine as Department of Defense activities that develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions to achieve security objectives aligned with U.S. national interests.^[51] This encompasses organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding or building institutions, and advising host nation (HN) forces across the competition continuum, from cooperation below armed conflict to active hostilities.^[52] SFA emphasizes unified action integrating military, diplomatic, and other U.S. government efforts, with the Department of Defense leading military aspects under combatant commander theater campaign plans.^[51] Central to SFA doctrine are imperatives that guide effective implementation, including understanding the operational environment through assessments of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time factors (PMESII-PT); ensuring unity of effort among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; fostering HN ownership to promote self-reliance; and prioritizing sustainability by linking security to governance, rule of law, and economic viability.^[51] Additional imperatives stress building legitimacy via transparent processes and human rights adherence, synchronizing information efforts to counter narratives, providing effective leadership tailored to HN contexts, and avoiding harm through vetting and insider threat mitigation.^[51] These principles underscore causal linkages between institutional capacity-building and long-term stability, rejecting short-term tactical fixes in favor of enduring HN capabilities.^[14] Operationally, SFA employs an "OTERA" framework—organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise—to address capability gaps, with assessments using measures of performance and effectiveness to track progress quantitatively and qualitatively.^[51] Advising follows a teach-coach-advise progression, often via embedded teams at tactical levels (e.g., 12-person units for battalion advising) and higher echelons, emphasizing mission command, cultural proficiency, and parallel planning where HN forces lead with U.S. support.^[14] Doctrine mandates persistent engagement, such as daily proximity advising (Level 1), to build trust and cohesion, while transitions occur incrementally based on HN readiness, ensuring equipment interoperability and maintenance feasibility.^[14] In multinational contexts, NATO doctrine aligns with these by prioritizing political primacy, comprehensive approaches integrating civilian-military efforts, and sustainability through "train-the-trainer" models.^[53]

Training and Advisory Methods

Training and advisory methods in security force assistance (SFA) encompass structured techniques to develop foreign security forces (FSF) capabilities, primarily through the organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) framework. This approach integrates tactical advising with institutional capacity building, emphasizing host nation (HN) ownership and sustainability rather than direct U.S. command. U.S. doctrine, as outlined in Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, prioritizes assessments using measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) to tailor methods to FSF gaps across executive, generating, and operating functions.^[51]^[51] Training methods follow a progressive "crawl-walk-run" model, beginning with individual skills such as marksmanship and first aid, advancing to small unit leader training via tactical exercises without troops, and culminating in collective tasks like squad-level battle drills and situational training exercises. Advisors employ hands-on instruction, leveraging indigenous instructors where possible, and incorporate after-action reviews (AARs) to reinforce lessons and adapt to FSF proficiency levels. Collective training integrates military decisionmaking processes (MDMP) adapted for HN contexts, parallel planning where FSF leads with U.S. support, and train-the-trainer programs to foster self-reliance. Equipping efforts focus on sustainable, maintainable systems with accompanying new equipment training to avoid dependency on unavailable logistics.^[14]^[14]^[14] Advisory techniques emphasize embedded teams that collocate with FSF units to build trust through daily interaction, subtle coaching, and shared missions such as patrols or operations planning. Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) deploy 12-person maneuver advisor teams (MATs), led by captains, at platoon to battalion levels, scaling to company teams under majors for brigade advising. Advising occurs in phased progression: teaching basic concepts interactively, coaching during practice with guidance, and mentoring for independent decision-making, always influencing via relationships rather than authority. Specialized roles, including communications advisors for network security training and maintenance advisors for standard operating procedures (SOPs), address warfighting functions like logistics and intelligence.^[14]^[12]^[14] Best practices stress cultural awareness, cross-cultural communication, and unity of effort through combined cells for functions like intelligence and logistics, while advisors act as honest brokers assessing HN limitations transparently. Methods incorporate joint combined exchange training (JCET) for interoperability and Section 333 authorities for targeted training in areas like counterterrorism, ensuring alignment with combatant command objectives. Advisors maintain moral courage in ambiguous environments, prioritizing HN achievement of security goals over U.S.-directed outcomes, with sustainment coordinated externally to support long-term FSF viability.^[12]^[14]^[52]

Metrics of Effectiveness and Sustainability

Assessing the effectiveness of security force assistance (SFA) relies on measures of performance (MOPs), which quantify immediate outputs such as the number of trainees completing courses or equipment transfers completed, and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), which evaluate broader outcomes like enhanced partner operational independence or territorial control gains.^[54] MOPs are often tracked via systems like the Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS), providing data on activity completion rates, but they risk overstating success by ignoring qualitative factors such as training quality or application in combat.^[54] MOEs incorporate SMART (specific, measurable, attributable, realistic, time-bound) indicators aligned with doctrinal frameworks like DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy), aiming to link SFA inputs to intermediate military objectives such as reduced reliance on external support.^[54] Empirical evaluations, including those from U.S. Army security cooperation assessments, emphasize causal chains via theories of change, where effectiveness is scored on scales (e.g., 0-1, with a minimum threshold of 0.5 for continuation), but attribution remains challenging due to confounding variables like host-nation political instability.^[54] Sustainability metrics prioritize long-term viability, assessing absorptive capacity (partner ability to integrate and maintain capabilities), ownership (internal leadership and resource allocation), and handover success, such as gradual logistics transitions to avoid dependency.^[55] Key components include viability (attainable goals and enduring practices), legitimacy (professionalism reducing corruption and enhancing public trust), and political subordination (effective civil-military relations ensuring non-interventionist forces).^[55] In practice, these are gauged via five-point assessment scales adapted from NATO models, with sustainability faltering when metrics overlook host-nation will to fight or elite capture, as evidenced by high attrition rates (e.g., Afghan National Security Forces exceeding 3% monthly in 2010) despite extensive training.^[55]^[56] Critiques from oversight bodies highlight systemic flaws in U.S. metrics, which often prioritize quantifiable inputs over verifiable outcomes, leading to misleading portrayals of progress in cases like Afghanistan, where $88 billion in assistance yielded forces unable to sustain control post-2021 withdrawal due to corruption, poor leadership, and insufficient internal cohesion rather than training deficits alone.^[56] DoD reports acknowledge that without rigorous impact evaluations using comparison groups, effectiveness claims suffer from optimism bias, as short-term MOP gains rarely predict enduring stability absent host-nation reforms.^[54] Sustainable SFA thus demands integrated monitoring, such as after-action reviews and scenario-based data analysis, to validate causal impacts beyond surface-level indicators.^[54]

National and Institutional Implementations

United States Security Force Assistance Brigades

![Activation ceremony of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade]float-right The United States Army established Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) between August 2017 and May 2020 to institutionalize security force assistance as a core competency, creating six specialized units—five active component and one Army National Guard—that focus exclusively on advising, assisting, and enabling partner nation security forces.^[50] These brigades emerged from lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, where ad hoc advising by combat units diluted warfighting readiness and produced inconsistent outcomes in partner capacity building.^[15] SFABs enable persistent engagement with allies and partners by deploying advisor teams trained in language, cultural awareness, and military doctrine tailored to foreign contexts, thereby freeing conventional brigade combat teams for decisive action roles.^[57] Each SFAB comprises approximately 800 personnel, predominantly experienced officers and non-commissioned officers selected for operational expertise, organized into headquarters, maneuver advisor teams (typically 10-12 soldiers), and support elements including military intelligence, sustainment, and fires capabilities.^[14] Advisor teams operate at tactical levels, conducting assessments, training, and liaison to enhance partner forces' ability to plan, execute, and sustain operations independently.^[57] The 1st SFAB, activated on February 8, 2018, at Fort Moore (formerly Fort Benning), Georgia, exemplifies this structure, with subsequent activations including the 2nd SFAB at Fort Liberty, North Carolina; 3rd at Fort Cavazos, Texas; 4th at Fort Carson, Colorado; 5th at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and 54th (National Guard) headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana.^[58] SFABs have conducted deployments across multiple theaters, with the 1st and 2nd SFABs rotating to Afghanistan starting in 2018 to advise Afghan National Defense and Security Forces amid U.S. drawdown efforts, though the rapid collapse of those forces in August 2021 highlighted limitations in achieving self-sustaining partner capabilities without indefinite U.S. overwatch.^[58] In Iraq, SFAB elements supported Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve by training Iraqi Security Forces against ISIS remnants, contributing to territorial reconquest by 2017 but facing persistent challenges from corruption and sectarian divisions within partner units.^[59] Post-2021, SFABs shifted to great power competition theaters: the 4th SFAB in U.S. European Command enhanced NATO allies' readiness against Russian threats; the 5th SFAB deployed to the Indo-Pacific for partner exercises; and the 54th SFAB supported operations in Latin America, including counter-narcotics training in Honduras and Colombia as of 2025.^[60] These efforts emphasize deterrence and interoperability over direct combat.^[61] Evaluations of SFAB effectiveness reveal strengths in professionalizing advising—such as specialized training pipelines yielding more consistent partner feedback—but persistent gaps in resourcing, authorities for operations under Title 10 or 22 U.S. Code, and integration with special operations forces, which can limit impact in high-threat environments.^[62] A 2024 U.S. Institute of Peace assessment recommended structural reforms, including enhanced funding mechanisms and advisor retention incentives, to better align SFABs with national security objectives amid peer competitor threats.^[62] Despite these critiques, SFABs have demonstrated utility in low-intensity engagements, fostering long-term relationships that deter aggression, as seen in European rotations bolstering Ukraine's indirect support networks pre-2022 invasion.^[16] Under Security Force Assistance Command oversight since 2021, SFABs continue evolving doctrine for multi-domain operations, prioritizing empirical metrics like partner force readiness scores over anecdotal success.^[63]

United Kingdom Formations and Approaches

The United Kingdom's dedicated security force assistance (SFA) formation, the 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade, was established in November 2021 as part of the British Army's Future Soldier reforms to institutionalize capacity-building for partner militaries.^[64] This brigade integrates expertise from across the Army, including infantry battalions specialized in advisory roles, to deliver training, mentoring, and operational support aligned with UK strategic interests.^[65] By June 2024, units from the brigade, such as the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland, were actively conducting rehearsal drills and field training with partner forces, demonstrating its operational focus on enhancing tactical proficiency.^[66] In parallel, the brigade underwent a reorientation in 2024 toward a more combat-oriented role within the Land Special Operations Force, retaining SFA functions but prioritizing capabilities to intercept and engage adversaries while advising partners.^[67] It comprises four regular infantry battalions (1st Battalion, The Irish Guards; 1st Battalion, Royal Anglian Regiment; 3rd Battalion, The Rifles; 3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland), a reserve battalion (4th Battalion, Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment), and a specialist outreach group for tailored engagement.^[65] This structure enables persistent deployments, such as joint urban warfare training with U.S. partners in Kenya in February 2025, emphasizing interoperability and partner force readiness.^[68] Complementing the 11th Brigade, the British Army Ranger Regiment—formed on 1 December 2021—provides elite, special operations-capable infantry for high-risk SFA missions, including advising in "grey zone" conflicts below the threshold of war.^[69] Operating under the Army Special Operations Brigade, the regiment's four battalions focus on reconnaissance, direct action, and capacity enhancement in contested environments, as evidenced by its November 2022 deployment alongside U.S. Special Operations Forces to test equipment and tactics.^[69] This formation addresses gaps in traditional SFA by enabling advisers to accompany partners during operations, thereby sustaining assistance amid threats.^[70] UK SFA approaches are embedded in the International Defence Engagement Strategy, which prioritizes building partner security institutions to deter adversaries, counter hybrid threats, and secure influence without large-scale combat commitments.^[71] Activities span pre-conflict capacity development—such as leadership training and equipment familiarization—to post-conflict stabilization, often integrated with NATO frameworks like Allied Joint Publication 3.16 for standardized advising and metrics.^[53] Emphasis is placed on sustainable outcomes through persistent presence, with evaluations drawing on empirical indicators like partner force retention rates and operational independence, though challenges persist in measuring long-term geopolitical impact.^[72] Prior to these formations, UK SFA relied on ad hoc military advisory teams in operations like those in Somalia and Nigeria from 2014–2019, focusing on tactical skills to support counter-terrorism efforts.^[73]

NATO and Allied Contributions

The NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence (SFA COE), established in Vicenza, Italy, in 2016 and sponsored by Italy, Albania, and Slovenia with Austria as a contributing participant, serves as the Alliance's primary hub for advancing SFA capabilities. It focuses on doctrine development, specialized training for NATO and partner personnel, lessons learned analysis, and interoperability enhancement to support stability in conflict and post-conflict environments. The center conducts courses, simulations, and research to refine SFA practices, emphasizing the generation and sustainment of partner security forces capable of addressing regional threats independently.^[74]^[75] NATO's SFA doctrine, outlined in Allied Joint Publication-3.16 (AJP-3.16, Edition B, Version 1), defines SFA as encompassing all Alliance activities that develop, improve, or directly support the development of capable, accountable, and sustainable partner security forces, applicable across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This framework prioritizes tailored assistance, including advising, mentoring, training, and institutional capacity-building, while integrating civil-military coordination to ensure long-term partner self-reliance. The doctrine evolved from lessons in operations like Afghanistan and Iraq, stressing measurable outcomes in force readiness and governance over indefinite external dependency.^[53] In Afghanistan, NATO transitioned from combat operations under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2001-2014) to a dedicated SFA role via the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A, 2009-2014) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2015-2021), which provided training, advising, and institutional support to Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. These efforts emphasized leadership development, logistics sustainment, and counterinsurgency tactics, enabling Afghan forces to assume primary security responsibilities by 2014, though sustainment challenges persisted post-withdrawal in August 2021.^[76]^[77] NATO's SFA in Iraq includes the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I, 2004-2011), which assisted in rebuilding Iraqi armed forces through officer professionalization, police training, and institutional reforms at the Iraqi Military Academy and elsewhere, followed by the non-combat NATO Mission Iraq (NMI, launched 2018). NMI focuses on advising Iraqi ministries and training instructors in specialized areas such as counter-improvised explosive devices, military medicine, and equipment maintenance, with contributions from all Allies via personnel deployments, in-country or external training programs, financial support, and equipment donations to enhance Iraqi self-sufficiency against ISIS remnants.^[78]^[79] More recently, NATO established the Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) command in 2024 to coordinate Allied military equipment provision and training for Ukrainian forces amid Russia's invasion, building on pre-existing SFA partnerships. This includes logistics integration, tactical advising, and capacity enhancement through NATO frameworks, with Allies committing over EUR 35 billion in security assistance by mid-2025, reflecting a collective Allied effort to bolster Ukraine's defense sustainability without direct combat involvement. NSATU draws on SFA COE expertise for doctrine alignment and interoperability.^[80]^[81] Allied contributions to NATO SFA extend through Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs) and individualized programs like Individual Partnership Action Plans, enabling non-member partners in the Western Balkans, Mediterranean, and beyond to access joint exercises and pre-deployment training for missions such as Kosovo Force (KFOR). European Allies, including Germany and France, have provided specialized trainers and funding to these initiatives, complementing U.S. leadership while adhering to NATO's burden-sharing principles.^[82]^[83]

Case Studies and Empirical Examples

Notable Successes

One prominent example of successful security force assistance occurred during the British-led counterinsurgency in the [Malayan Emergency](/page/Malayan Emergency) from 1948 to 1960, where advisors trained and expanded indigenous forces to isolate and defeat communist guerrillas. British military personnel, including Special Air Service units, focused on building the Malayan police and home guard, which grew to over 40,000 personnel by 1952, integrating them into "New Villages" resettlement programs that denied insurgents rural support and provided intelligence. This effort, combined with targeted operations, reduced insurgent strength from an estimated 8,000 fighters in 1951 to fewer than 500 active combatants by 1955, culminating in the emergency's declaration of success on July 31, 1960, with minimal British troop casualties relative to the scale—fewer than 2,000 total security force deaths against over 6,700 insurgents killed.^[84]^[85] In El Salvador during the 1980s civil war, U.S. advisory teams, capped at 55 military personnel under congressional limits, professionalized the Salvadoran armed forces through the Operational Planning and Assistance Training Team (OPATT) program from 1981 onward, emphasizing mobile infantry tactics, human rights training, and logistics to counter FMLN guerrillas. Advisors restructured units into ranger battalions and regional commands, improving operational effectiveness; for instance, the Atlacatl Battalion, trained by U.S. personnel, conducted successful offensives like the 1981 counterattack at El Paraiso that halted insurgent advances. By 1984, government forces controlled 70% of territory and inflicted heavy losses on insurgents, contributing to the FMLN's shift to negotiations and the 1992 peace accords, with U.S. assistance totaling about $6 billion in military aid enabling the government's survival without direct U.S. combat involvement.^[86]^[87] U.S. security force assistance under Plan Colombia, initiated in 2000, bolstered Colombian military capabilities against FARC insurgents and narcotraffickers, training over 10,000 troops in counternarcotics battalions and providing helicopters and intelligence support that enhanced interdiction and mobility. From 2000 to 2015, U.S. aid exceeding $8 billion facilitated the demobilization of over 50,000 paramilitary and guerrilla fighters, including FARC's 2016 peace deal, while homicide rates dropped 50% from 2002 peaks and coca cultivation stabilized after initial surges due to eradication efforts. Security improvements allowed economic growth and reduced FARC territorial control from 40% of Colombia in the 1990s to negligible post-2016, marking a rare case of sustained partner force autonomy in a protracted internal conflict.^[88]^[89]

Prominent Failures

The rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in August 2021 exemplified a major failure of U.S. security force assistance, despite over $88 billion invested in training and equipping since 2002. The ANDSF, numbering approximately 300,000 personnel on paper, disintegrated within weeks of the U.S. withdrawal, with units abandoning positions, equipment, and territory to Taliban advances, culminating in the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021. Contributing factors included systemic corruption that eroded unit cohesion and logistics, such as ghost soldiers inflating payrolls by up to 40% in some units, and a heavy reliance on U.S. air support and contractors, which fostered dependency rather than self-sufficiency.^[90] Ethnic factionalism, particularly Pashtun dominance under President Ashraf Ghani, alienated non-Pashtun troops, while morale plummeted due to the 2020 U.S.-Taliban Doha Agreement, perceived as a betrayal that signaled abandonment.^[90] The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), a congressionally mandated watchdog, attributed the failure partly to the Afghan government's inability to formulate a coherent national security strategy post-U.S. troop drawdown, compounded by leadership deficits at senior levels. In Iraq, U.S. security force assistance efforts faltered dramatically with the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) collapse during the Islamic State's (ISIS) capture of Mosul on June 10, 2014, where roughly 30,000 ISF troops fled before a force of about 1,500 militants, abandoning vast quantities of U.S.-provided equipment.^[91] Despite $25 billion spent on training and arming the ISF since 2003, underlying issues included Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's sectarian policies, which marginalized Sunni units and fostered desertions, with some divisions losing up to 70% of personnel due to low motivation and corruption.^[92] ^[93] Politicization of the military, including favoritism toward Shia militias and inadequate intelligence on ISIS movements, exacerbated the rout, as units prioritized self-preservation over defense.^[93] U.S. assessments prior to the fall had noted declining ISF readiness, with logistical breakdowns and poor leadership preventing effective SFA outcomes, echoing critiques of mismatched training that emphasized conventional tactics over counterinsurgency resilience.^[94] The Soviet Union's security force assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 represented another high-profile failure, as the Soviet-backed Afghan regime under Najibullah collapsed in 1992 after Moscow's withdrawal, despite deploying over 100,000 advisors and troops to train and bolster local forces.^[95] Key shortcomings involved underestimating tribal and ethnic resistances, leading to ineffective integration of Soviet doctrinal training into Afghan social structures, with regime forces suffering high desertion rates—estimated at 20-30% annually—and reliance on brutal repression rather than genuine capacity-building.^[96] The failure stemmed from misaligned strategic objectives, where Soviet advisors prioritized urban control over rural pacification, allowing mujahideen to erode government control, ultimately requiring $4-5 billion in annual subsidies that ceased post-1989, triggering the regime's fall.^[95] This case highlighted how external assistance without addressing internal political legitimacy often yields unsustainable forces, a pattern corroborated in declassified Soviet analyses.^[96]

Hybrid Outcomes in Ongoing Engagements

In the Russo-Ukrainian War, initiated by Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, U.S.-led security force assistance has delivered hybrid outcomes characterized by enhanced defensive capabilities alongside persistent strategic limitations. Multinational training programs, including those under NATO and the EU Military Assistance Mission, have equipped over 51,000 Ukrainian personnel with skills in Western weaponry and tactics as of early 2025, enabling effective integration of provided systems like HIMARS and Javelin missiles.^[97] This support facilitated Ukraine's repulsion of initial Russian offensives, including the recapture of significant territory around Kharkiv in September 2022 and stabilization of fronts in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive stalled against entrenched Russian positions, minefields, and drone warfare adaptations, resulting in a protracted stalemate with estimated Ukrainian casualties exceeding 500,000 by mid-2025 and no decisive territorial breakthroughs.^[98] Analyses from defense think tanks note that while SFA improved unit cohesion and interoperability, challenges such as corruption in procurement—evidenced by documented diversions of aid—and acute manpower deficits have constrained offensive momentum and long-term self-reliance, fostering dependency on over $66.9 billion in U.S. military aid disbursed by January 2025.^[99]^[100] In the Sahel, ongoing counterinsurgency efforts against jihadist groups like JNIM and ISGS have yielded similarly mixed results from U.S. and EU security force assistance since 2014. Western programs, totaling more than $5.5 billion from the U.S. and €8 billion from the EU, have trained thousands of troops from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in special operations and intelligence-sharing, yielding tactical successes such as localized clearances of insurgent strongholds in northern Mali in 2022–2023.^[101] Yet, regional violence escalated dramatically, with militant Islamist activity comprising over half of Africa's total in 2024 and fatalities nearly tripling since 2020 to exceed 25,000 conflict deaths.^[102] Political disruptions, including coups in all three countries between 2020 and 2023, coupled with the influx of Russian Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) mercenaries offering transactional support without governance reforms, have eroded SFA impacts; U.S. force posture reductions in 2024 followed host-nation expulsions, leaving partner forces fragmented and violence unchecked. RAND evaluations conclude that such assistance has produced minimal net reductions in political violence, highlighting causal factors like weak state legitimacy and external proxy competition over internal capacity deficits alone.^[103] In Iraq, post-2017 SFA against ISIS remnants has maintained hybrid equilibria, with U.S. advisors embedded in Iraqi Security Forces enabling sustained operations that prevented major urban re-conquests by 2024. Over 2,500 U.S. personnel continue advisory roles under Operation Inherent Resolve, contributing to the degradation of ISIS to under 10,000 fighters regionally.^[104] However, the parallel empowerment of Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), integrated into state structures yet operating with de facto autonomy, has fostered "vicarious impunity" where abuses by PMF units—documented in over 100 civilian incidents since 2020—undermine unified command and fuel sectarian tensions, complicating full territorial stabilization amid ongoing low-level insurgencies.^[105] This duality reflects SFA's tactical bolstering of conventional forces against hybrid threats, tempered by unresolved political factionalism that perpetuates vulnerability to external influences.

Achievements and Strategic Impacts

Capacity-Building Victories

In Plan Colombia, initiated in 2000, the United States provided over $10 billion in security assistance, including training for more than 200,000 Colombian military and police personnel, which contributed to the professionalization of the Colombian National Army and a significant decline in violence from insurgent groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).^[106] This effort enabled Colombian forces to regain territorial control, with homicide rates dropping from 70 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002 to 25 per 100,000 by 2016, facilitating the FARC's demobilization under a peace accord signed on September 26, 2016.^[89] Although drug cultivation persisted, the enhanced operational capacity of partner forces demonstrated sustainable improvements in counterinsurgency capabilities, as Colombian units increasingly conducted independent operations by the mid-2010s.^[107] The British military intervention in Sierra Leone, beginning with Operation Palliser in May 2000, involved training and restructuring the Sierra Leone Army (later Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, RSLAF), transforming a disorganized force of approximately 14,000 personnel into a professional entity capable of securing the country post-civil war.^[108] British advisors, numbering around 300-400 in initial phases, focused on basic infantry skills, logistics, and command structures, leading to the RSLAF's successful repulsion of Revolutionary United Front advances and the war's end via the Lomé Peace Accord implementation by 2002.^[109] Long-term programs, such as the International Military Advisory and Training Team established in 2001, sustained these gains, enabling the RSLAF to handle internal security independently by 2011 and contribute to regional stability without ongoing foreign combat presence.^[110] U.S. Special Operations Forces assistance to the Philippines from 2002 onward, under Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines, built the capacity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group through joint training exercises and intelligence sharing, resulting in the group's operational defeat by 2019.^[111] This included equipping and advising Philippine units, which improved small-unit tactics and maritime interdiction, reducing Abu Sayyaf's strength from thousands to under 100 fighters and enabling Philippine forces to conduct autonomous operations in the southern islands.^[112] By 2014, U.S. advisors had transitioned to advisory roles only, with Philippine military effectiveness evidenced by a 90% decline in Abu Sayyaf-initiated attacks in key areas, underscoring the transfer of sustainable counterterrorism skills.^[3]

Contributions to Regional Stability

Security force assistance (SFA) bolsters regional stability by enabling partner nations to independently counter internal insurgencies and external threats, thereby mitigating conflict diffusion and decreasing reliance on foreign combat deployments. This capacity-building fosters self-sustaining security architectures that deter aggression and promote cooperative regional security frameworks, as evidenced by U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) tailored to specific areas of responsibility, enhancing partner capabilities against localized challenges.^[16]^[113] In sub-Saharan Africa, U.S. security sector assistance from the post-Cold War era onward has yielded small but statistically significant gains in stability indicators, such as reduced incidence of civil conflict and improved governance metrics in recipient states, according to quantitative evaluations controlling for confounding factors like aid volume and partner commitment. These effects, though modest, demonstrate SFA's potential to incrementally strengthen fragile states against transnational threats like jihadist insurgencies, preventing broader destabilization across porous borders.^[114]^[115] The U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, launched in 2000 with over $10 billion in assistance through 2015, exemplifies SFA's stabilizing impact by professionalizing Colombian security forces, which reclaimed over 90% of FARC-controlled territory and facilitated the group's 2016 peace accord, demobilizing approximately 13,000 combatants and halving national homicide rates from 2002 peaks. This reduced insurgent safe havens curbed narcotics trafficking and spillover violence into neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela, enhancing Andean regional security. Similarly, post-2014 SFA to Iraqi forces enabled the territorial defeat of ISIS by 2019, dismantling its caliphate and averting refugee crises and terror exports to Jordan and beyond.^[116]^[117]^[118]

Broader Geopolitical Benefits

Security force assistance (SFA) enables donor states to extend influence in contested regions without committing large expeditionary forces, thereby preserving resources for core defense priorities while shaping favorable security environments. By equipping and training partner militaries, SFA denies adversaries like Russia and China opportunities to expand footholds through their own assistance programs, as seen in U.S. efforts to counter Beijing's military diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific and Africa's Sahel region.^[4]^[119] This indirect approach has historically amplified geopolitical leverage, such as during the Cold War when U.S. advising in Southeast Asia and Latin America helped contain Soviet expansion by fostering aligned security partners capable of independent action.^[4] A core benefit lies in building interoperability and trust among regional allies, which facilitates collective defense mechanisms and burden-sharing in multinational operations. For instance, U.S. SFA programs have enhanced NATO partners' capacities along eastern flanks, contributing to deterrence against Russian aggression post-2014 Crimea annexation by enabling rapid partner-led responses integrated with alliance structures.^[3]^[4] This fosters long-term diplomatic alignment, as strengthened partners are more likely to support donor objectives in forums like the United Nations or bilateral trade pacts, reducing isolation risks in multipolar rivalries. Empirical data from U.S. Department of Defense assessments indicate that SFA investments, totaling over $10 billion annually across global programs as of 2023, yield multipliers in partner autonomy that offset direct U.S. deployments.^[120] In great power competition, SFA serves as a spoiling mechanism against rivals' strategic gains, allowing donors to invest cost-effectively in partners who address localized threats—such as insurgencies or hybrid incursions—that could otherwise draw in major powers. U.S. advising in the Philippines since 2016, for example, has bolstered maritime domain awareness against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, enhancing regional coalitions without escalating to confrontation.^[4]^[119] Such outcomes extend to economic dimensions, as stable partners secured through SFA open avenues for resource access and infrastructure projects, countering initiatives like China's Belt and Road by tying security ties to developmental aid.^[121] Overall, these benefits accrue from SFA's emphasis on sustainable capacity over transient interventions, promoting a network of resilient allies that amplifies donor strategic depth.^[4]

Criticisms and Analytical Challenges

Structural and Bureaucratic Shortcomings

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State lack a defined joint planning process for security cooperation activities under Section 333 authority, resulting in fragmented efforts to build partner capacity through train-and-equip projects.^[122] This structural gap has led to inconsistent State Department involvement, as roles and timelines remain undefined, pressuring officials to approve proposals without adequate review time for alignment with U.S. priorities or partner absorption capabilities.^[122] From fiscal years 2018 to 2021, 42 of 46 DOD project proposals omitted essential elements such as sustainment plans, absorptive capacity assessments, or measurable objectives, undermining long-term effectiveness.^[122] Bureaucratic hurdles exacerbate these issues, including insufficient training for State Department personnel on security cooperation, which limits overseas officials' ability to contribute meaningfully to planning.^[122] Delayed State inputs during detailed proposal development further risk misaligned initiatives, while congressional notifications often exclude critical details on sustainment and capacity, complicating oversight.^[122] In parallel, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, essential for equipping partner forces, suffers from outdated regulations and excessive bureaucracy, causing multi-year delays in deliveries that hinder operational readiness.^[123]^[124] These delays persisted despite $5.6 billion allocated for Section 333 projects from fiscal years 2018 to 2022, highlighting systemic inefficiencies in resource allocation.^[122] Advisor deployments face structural discontinuities from high rotation rates, typically 6-12 months, which prevent sustained relationships and institutional knowledge transfer critical for SFA success.^[125] Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), established to professionalize advising, encountered manning shortages and recruiting difficulties, depriving units of experienced noncommissioned officers and limiting specialized training beyond basic courses. DoD doctrine's emphasis on rapport-building persuasion, while de-emphasizing incentives or conditionality, reflects a bureaucratic aversion to perceived coercion, fostering ineffective metrics focused on minor concessions rather than verifiable capability gains—as evidenced by the Afghan National Army's collapse despite $83 billion in assistance from 2001 to 2021.^[125]

Cultural and Political Mismatches

Cultural differences between assisting nations and partner forces often undermine security force assistance efforts by creating barriers to effective training and integration. Foreign cultural attributes, such as divergent views on hierarchy, loyalty, and operational ethics, can impede the adoption of Western-style military doctrines, leading to persistent gaps in performance.^[126]^[127] In Afghanistan, for instance, tribal affiliations and local power dynamics frequently superseded national military cohesion, resulting in unreliable partner units prone to desertion or internal fractures despite years of advising.^[128] This cultural incompatibility contributed to over 26 documented green-on-blue attacks by Afghan forces against coalition members between 2007 and 2011, eroding trust and operational effectiveness.^[129] Political mismatches exacerbate these issues when U.S. strategic objectives clash with the recipient state's governance structures or incentives. Assistance programs tend to concentrate on states with the weakest political institutions, an adverse selection dynamic that amplifies risks of failure as partners prioritize short-term survival over long-term capacity building.^[8] In Iraq, despite extensive training, the army's 2014 collapse against ISIS stemmed from underlying political fragility, including sectarian divisions and corruption, which advising could not resolve without aligned domestic reforms.^[8]^[130] Similarly, in Vietnam, cultural and political disconnects—such as mismatched motivations between U.S.-backed centralized command and indigenous guerrilla-oriented resistance—deepened mistrust and contributed to advising shortfalls.^[131] Without congruence between donor aims and host-nation politics, SFA risks bolstering forces that either fracture under pressure or pursue agendas antithetical to the provider's interests.^[24]^[132]

Resource Allocation Inefficiencies

Security force assistance (SFA) programs frequently exhibit resource allocation inefficiencies stemming from fragmented oversight, mismatched equipment provisioning, and insufficient accountability mechanisms, resulting in substantial financial waste without commensurate improvements in partner capabilities. In Afghanistan, the United States allocated approximately $83 billion from 2002 to 2021 toward training and equipping the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), yet these investments yielded limited sustainability, as evidenced by the ANDSF's rapid disintegration following the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.^[133] A notable instance involved an additional $28 million expenditure on camouflage uniforms ill-suited to Afghanistan's terrain, driven by the aesthetic preferences of a single Afghan general rather than operational efficacy, highlighting ad hoc decision-making detached from strategic needs.^[134] Further inefficiencies arose from corruption and poor sustainment planning, with the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) identifying $19 billion in waste, fraud, and abuse across $63 billion of reviewed reconstruction funds, including SFA-related expenditures where equipment often went unused or was diverted.^[135] In Iraq, SFA efforts post-2003 faced similar issues, with the Coalition Provisional Authority's mixed outcomes in rebuilding security institutions attributed to uncoordinated resource distribution and inadequate integration of U.S. aid into Iraqi budgetary processes, leading to over-reliance on external funding without building endogenous capacity.^[136] Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessments have underscored broader challenges in U.S. security assistance, including fragmented implementation across agencies that duplicates efforts and hampers cost-effective allocation, as seen in evaluations from fiscal years 2018 to 2024 where monitoring gaps allowed resources to be misdirected. These patterns reflect systemic flaws, such as prioritizing short-term metrics like unit training numbers over long-term viability, exacerbated by limited congressional oversight of supplemental appropriations that bypassed standard budgeting scrutiny.^[137] In both theaters, resources were often funneled through contractors with inadequate performance tracking, contributing to inflated costs—for instance, $3.74 billion on Afghan aviation fuel alone amid broader sustainment failures.^[133] Such misallocations not only diminished strategic returns but also strained U.S. defense budgets, prompting calls for reformed doctrines emphasizing vetted, outcome-based funding tied to verifiable partner reforms.^[138]

Controversies and Debates

Ethical Dilemmas in Advisory Roles

Military advisors in security force assistance (SFA) roles frequently navigate tensions between operational imperatives and adherence to human rights standards, particularly when partner forces exhibit practices incompatible with international norms. The U.S. Leahy Law, codified in Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and paralleled in Department of Defense provisions, bars assistance to foreign security units credibly implicated in gross violations such as extrajudicial killings or torture, requiring vetting of over 160,000 candidates annually.^[139]^[140] Implementation, however, presents dilemmas: advisors must assess credible evidence amid incomplete intelligence, balancing the risk of complicity against mission disruption, with remediation contingent on host-nation investigations that often falter due to weak accountability mechanisms.^[141] This framework underscores causal challenges, as training intended to instill rule-of-law principles can inadvertently legitimize abusive units if vetting gaps persist, prioritizing short-term capacity over long-term ethical alignment.^[142] In Afghanistan, U.S. advisors confronted acute ethical conflicts over partner forces' endemic abuses, including "bacha bazi"—the sexual exploitation of boys by Afghan security personnel—which persisted despite explicit U.S. policy prohibitions under the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act barring support for perpetrators.^[143] Advisors often deferred confrontation to preserve rapport and operational effectiveness against the Taliban, fostering moral injury among U.S. personnel who witnessed unchecked predation yet prioritized counterinsurgency gains; reports indicate such tolerance alienated local populations and fueled insurgent recruitment.^[144] Similarly, divergent moral codes exacerbated dilemmas, as enforcing U.S. standards on issues like civilian targeting required navigating cultural relativism without undermining cohesion, with surveys of U.S.-trained forces showing reduced human rights adherence under conflicting orders.^[145]^[142] Iraq provides another case, where U.S.-trained Iraqi Security Forces committed documented sectarian abuses post-2003, including torture in detention facilities, prompting advisors to grapple with whether to suspend training amid strategic pressures to combat ISIS.^[146] Despite human rights instruction, structural issues like corruption and impunity led to persistent violations, raising questions of advisor accountability: continued engagement risked enabling harm, while withdrawal could cede ground to adversaries, as evidenced by the 2014 Mosul collapse partly attributed to eroded trust from abuses.^[147] These scenarios highlight a recurring causal realism: SFA's emphasis on partner autonomy often dilutes oversight, amplifying ethical hazards when liberal norm promotion clashes with host-nation agency, as non-state surrogates in conflicts like Syria further complicate complicity risks through abandonment post-partnership.^[148]^[149]

Accountability for Partner Force Abuses

The Leahy Laws, enacted in the 1990s and codified in annual appropriations acts, prohibit U.S. assistance to foreign security force units credibly implicated in gross human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings, torture, or rape, unless the partner government investigates and remediates the issue.^[141] These provisions, named after Senator Patrick Leahy, apply separately to the Department of State (for foreign military financing and International Military Education and Training) and the Department of Defense (for programs like security force assistance), requiring pre-assistance vetting based on official records, intelligence, and credible NGO reports.^[139] Vetting aims to prevent U.S. complicity in abuses but faces enforcement gaps, as determinations often rely on incomplete data from conflict zones where monitoring is limited.^[150] Implementation challenges include difficulties in attributing abuses to specific units amid decentralized command structures, partner governments' reluctance to prosecute their own forces, and the scale of assistance programs involving thousands of personnel.^[151] For instance, a 2025 Government Accountability Office report highlighted delays in State Department responses to civilian harm allegations from partner forces, noting that while some units are suspended, remediation rarely leads to accountability due to weak foreign judicial systems.^[152] Critics, including human rights organizations, argue that strategic imperatives often override strict enforcement, allowing tainted units to retain aid if abuses are deemed unconfirmed or isolated.^[153] In Iraq, U.S.-trained elements of the 16th Division of the Iraqi Army were implicated in the extrajudicial execution of at least 72 prisoners, including ISIS suspects, during the 2017 Mosul offensive, with bodies found in mass graves bearing execution-style wounds.^[154] Despite Leahy vetting, the incidents underscored vetting limitations, as the division had received U.S. training and equipment shortly before; no immediate U.S. aid cutoff was reported, though investigations were urged.^[155] Similarly, in Afghanistan, a 2018 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction audit found the Pentagon continued funding Afghan National Defense and Security Forces units despite credible evidence of child sexual abuse by members, violating Leahy standards; of 5,753 vetted individuals, only a fraction were flagged, with remediation often inadequate due to cultural tolerance of "bacha bazi" practices among commanders.^[156] The Defense Department withheld details from Congress, citing operational sensitivities, leading to accusations of impunity for U.S.-backed warlords.^[157] These cases illustrate broader tensions: while Leahy sanctions have disqualified units—such as Afghan commandos in 2017 for night raid abuses—effectiveness is hampered by non-transparent processes and the risk that withholding aid undermines counterterrorism goals without deterring abuses rooted in partner forces' internal dynamics.^[158] U.S. officials maintain that engagement enables influence for reform, but empirical outcomes show persistent violations, as documented in State Department human rights reports, prompting calls for enhanced transparency and third-party monitoring.^[147]

Deterrence and Strategic Miscalculations

Security force assistance (SFA) is frequently employed to bolster partner nations' military capabilities as a means of deterrence, aiming to raise the costs of aggression for adversaries by creating resilient allied forces capable of independent defense. However, this approach has repeatedly led to strategic miscalculations, where assisting states overestimate the durability and motivation of partner forces, fostering illusions of stability that collapse under pressure. Empirical evidence from post-conflict environments reveals that SFA often fails to instill the institutional cohesion or political will necessary for sustained deterrence, as partners may prioritize short-term resource extraction over long-term operational readiness, leading donors to misjudge escalation thresholds and adversary resolve.^[24]^[159] In Afghanistan, two decades of U.S.-led SFA, totaling over $88 billion in training, equipping, and advising the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), culminated in a rapid collapse in August 2021 following the U.S. withdrawal. U.S. planners miscalculated the ANDSF's dependence on external enablers like air support and logistics, assuming that numerical superiority—peaking at 352,000 personnel—and SFA investments would deter Taliban advances; instead, widespread corruption, including "ghost soldiers" inflating payrolls by up to 40%, eroded unit cohesion, resulting in provinces falling in days without significant combat. This strategic error not only negated deterrence against the Taliban but also signaled vulnerability to regional actors, as the ANDSF abandoned $7 billion in U.S.-provided equipment, enabling rapid insurgent consolidation.^[159]^[160]^[161] Similarly, in Iraq, SFA efforts post-2003, involving billions in training and $25 billion in equipment by 2014, failed to deter the Islamic State's (ISIS) 2014 offensive, exemplified by the collapse of Iraqi forces in Mosul on June 10, 2014, where 30,000 troops fled against 800-2,500 ISIS fighters. Miscalculations stemmed from overlooking endemic issues like sectarian divisions, poor leadership, and motivational deficits—exacerbated by corruption siphoning funds—despite U.S. intelligence warnings of declining morale; this led to the abandonment of vast stockpiles, including 2,300 Humvees and 40 M1 Abrams tanks, necessitating renewed U.S. intervention via Operation Inherent Resolve starting in 2014. Such breakdowns undermined deterrence signaling, as ISIS exploited perceived Iraqi fragility to seize one-third of the country by mid-2014.^[94]^[92]^[162] These cases illustrate a recurring causal pattern in SFA-driven deterrence: donors' focus on quantifiable metrics like troop numbers and equipment obscures qualitative failures in partner governance and warfighting culture, inviting adversary opportunism and eroding credibility. Analyses from government oversight bodies highlight that without addressing root causes like elite capture of resources, SFA reinforces brittle structures prone to rapid dissolution, prompting strategic reassessments toward more conditional assistance tied to verifiable reforms.^[159]^[163]

Recent Developments and Future Prospects

Post-Afghanistan Reforms

Following the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in August 2021, which occurred despite approximately $88 billion in U.S. security sector assistance from 2002 to 2021, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress undertook reviews to rectify deficiencies in security force assistance (SFA), including fragmented responsibility, inadequate planning, and unsustainable equipping practices.^[56] These efforts emphasized professionalizing advisors through mandatory certification training, extended deployment durations beyond the prior 6-12 month norms to build sustained relationships, and predeployment preparation tailored to host-nation contexts.^[56] ^[164] Organizational adaptations included the expansion of the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program, integrating civilian specialists with military personnel for holistic ministry-level advising, and refinements to Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)—initially stood up in 2017—to enable persistent, non-combat engagements focused on partner self-reliance rather than dependency-creating logistics support.^[56] ^[119] The U.S. Army addressed prior SFA shortcomings, such as ad hoc advisor assignments during the War on Terror, by institutionalizing permanent SFA formations and prioritizing units with doctrinal expertise in training and enabling host forces.^[130] Doctrinal shifts post-2021 stressed aligning SFA with host-nation political incentives and governance capacity, rejecting open-ended financing that eroded Afghan forces' motivation for self-sustainment, and incorporating rigorous monitoring and evaluation to track outcomes beyond inputs like equipment delivery.^[11] ^[164] Proposals emerged for a dedicated advising career track across the joint force, rewarding linguistic, cultural, and operational proficiency to elevate SFA as a strategic competency, alongside calls for a functional combatant command to unify interagency efforts and reduce turnover in long-term missions.^[165] In the context of great power competition, reformed SFA prioritizes selective partnerships with aligned actors to enhance deterrence and access, drawing on Afghanistan's failures to avoid over-investment in unmotivated forces while leveraging advisors for influence in proxy dynamics and alliance-building.^[119] These changes reflect a broader pivot from large-scale counterinsurgency reconstruction to targeted capacity-building, informed by oversight reports highlighting the need for enduring strategies over tactical expediency.^[56]

Applications in Contemporary Conflicts

In Somalia, the United States has applied security force assistance to enhance the capabilities of Somali National Army units combating al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate active since the mid-2000s. Under a 2017 agreement, the US committed to recruiting, training, equipping, and mentoring approximately 3,000 personnel for the elite Danab Brigade, focusing on counterterrorism operations and building sustainable special operations forces.^[166] Between 2010 and 2020, this effort included over $500 million in direct assistance, encompassing advisory support from US special operations forces to improve tactical proficiency and operational coordination against the group's attacks, which have killed thousands and displaced millions.^[167] US Africa Command has supplemented these ground efforts with airstrikes in collective self-defense of Somali forces, such as the August 2025 strike targeting al-Shabaab militants.^[168] In the Philippines, security force assistance has targeted ISIS-affiliated groups, including during the 2017 Siege of Marawi, where Islamist militants seized the city and held it for five months, resulting in over 1,200 deaths. US special operations forces provided non-combat advisory support, including intelligence sharing and training, to Philippine troops, enabling the eventual recapture of the city on October 23, 2017.^[169] Post-siege, ongoing US-Philippine cooperation has emphasized capacity building for Philippine special forces to counter remnants of groups like Abu Sayyaf and the Maute organization, which pledged allegiance to ISIS and continue low-level attacks in the southern regions.^[170] This assistance aligns with broader Indo-Pacific counterterrorism objectives, leveraging joint exercises and equipment transfers to address transnational threats without large-scale US troop commitments. Amid the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, security force assistance has manifested primarily through external training programs rather than in-country advising, due to the high-risk combat environment. As of February 2024, over 30 countries, led by the US, trained approximately 116,000 Ukrainian personnel outside the country, with the US accounting for about 16% or roughly 18,560 trainees focused on weapons handling, combined arms tactics, and sustainment.^[171] The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, authorized by Congress, funds these efforts to build long-term defensive capacity, including integration of Western systems like HIMARS and Patriot missiles, though effectiveness depends on Ukraine's internal absorption and corruption challenges.^[172] Security Force Assistance Brigades have supported related European deployments, such as the 4th SFAB's 2021 rotation to advise allies amid heightened tensions.^[173]

Evolving Doctrines Amid Great Power Competition

U.S. military doctrines for security force assistance (SFA) have shifted significantly since the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which prioritized great power competition with China and Russia over counterinsurgency operations.^[174] This evolution emphasizes building partner militaries' capabilities to deter aggression, counter adversarial influence, and operate in multi-domain environments, rather than solely focusing on internal stability.^[16] The U.S. Army's Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), first activated in 2017 with the 1st SFAB standing up on December 7, 2017, represent a dedicated structure for this purpose, deploying specialized advisor teams to enhance partners' interoperability and resilience against peer competitors.^[61] In response to Chinese and Russian military assistance programs—such as China's People's Liberation Army support in Africa and the South China Sea, and Russia's Wagner Group deployments—U.S. SFA now integrates with broader campaigns of integrated deterrence.^[16] SFABs perform core functions including assessment, advising, liaison, and support across the competition continuum, from peacetime engagements to crisis response, enabling partners to disrupt adversary logistics and hybrid threats.^[175] For instance, in the Indo-Pacific, SFAB rotations have focused on training Philippine and Vietnamese forces for high-end maritime operations to counter Chinese expansionism.^[4] Doctrinal updates, informed by post-Afghanistan lessons, prioritize scalable advising models that align with joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) concepts, allowing partners to contribute to U.S.-led coalitions against great powers. The Army's SFA triad—comprising SFABs, special operations forces, and security cooperation activities—provides combatant commanders flexible options to build influence and spoil adversarial gains, as evidenced by expanded SFAB deployments in Europe following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.^[16] Evaluations indicate SFABs have adapted by incorporating language skills, cultural expertise, and advanced warfighting tactics, though challenges persist in measuring long-term partner autonomy amid resource constraints.^[62] This doctrinal pivot underscores SFA's role in strategic competition, aiming to multiply U.S. force projection without direct combat commitments.^[4]

References

[1]
Security Force Assistance to Fragile States: A Framework of Analysis
Dec 7, 2021 · Security Force Assistance (SFA) – the training and equipping of a foreign security force – represent a common form of intervention into ...
[2]
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JCISFA serves as the Joint Force integrator for the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of SFA doctrine, standards, tactics, techniques and ...
[3]
[PDF] SecuriTy Force ASSiSTAnce - NDU Press
Prepare U.S. forces to execute civilian-to-military operations and military-to-military training in sup- port of security cooperation and security assistance.
[4]
Security Force Assistance as a Tool of Strategic Competition
Security force assistance (SFA) is an indirect tool of competition that has often been used during periods of heightened strategic rivalry. When Athens launched ...
[5]
[PDF] ROLE OF THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE ...
One of the notable examples of SFA occurred in the early 1960s, when the US Army sent approximately 11,000 advisors to assist the pro-western government of ...
[6]
[PDF] A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance ...
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) ...
[7]
Why military assistance programs disappoint - Brookings Institution
In other cases, improving an assistance program may be unworkable because the United States is unwilling to crack down on external actors, whose support it ...
[8]
The Cult of the Persuasive: Why U.S. Security Assistance Fails
Jan 1, 2023 · The literature demonstrates that U.S. influence in security assistance tends to be more effective when the United States makes elements of its ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
[9]
Does Security Assistance Work? Why It May Not Be the Answer for ...
Nov 15, 2021 · Our study provides strong empirical evidence that supplying weapons and military aid to post-conflict governments can increase government repression.Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
[10]
Understanding security force assistance: a matter of control?
Jan 8, 2024 · This article seeks to explain the historically poor performance of the US Department of Defence's security force assistance (SFA) to state ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
[11]
Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context ...
Jan 23, 2019 · There are several sides to the SFA debate. First, there are critics who view SFA as enabling host-nation militaries to engage in more violence ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies<|control11|><|separator|>
[12]
[PDF] Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance
Planners should clearly define and delineate the supported and supporting relationships/roles between the military and police. Balance Security & ...
[13]
[PDF] Security Force Assistance: What Right Looks Like - DTIC
In an effort to ensure a minimal level of standardization and interoperability with the forces being trained the U.S. provided security force assistance to ...
[14]
[PDF] ATP 3-96.1 Security Force Assistance Brigade - Army University
May 2, 2018 · SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE. 1-1. Security force assistance has always played a vital role in the U.S. Army's history.
[15]
Security Force Assistance Primer | Article | The United States Army
Nov 23, 2022 · This primer explores current SFA literature to determine if the doctrine is accurate, understandable, and consistent with other doctrine.
[16]
The U.S Army's Security Force Assistance Triad - AUSA
Oct 3, 2022 · SFABs train and advise foreign security forces to improve partner capabilities and facilitate achievement of U.S. strategic objectives (U.S. ...
[17]
[PDF] JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense
Jul 12, 2010 · HN commander on missions will afford the advisor visibility ... Legal Authority for Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense.
[18]
[PDF] FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE - Air Force Doctrine
Feb 1, 2020 · CAA units are tasked with FID, security force assistance, and unconventional warfare (UW). CAAs maintain advisor certifications from both the ...
[19]
[PDF] Security Force Assistance - dtic.mil
Some differences that advisors experience between ... the advisor to overlook very real differences. ... security force assistance and foreign internal defense ...
[20]
[PDF] Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts ...
Feb 14, 2013 · its building partner capacity efforts. The key practices are: (1) ... be security force assistance. Another command considered only.
[21]
[PDF] Security Force Assistance: Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Nation ...
nature of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions generally makes it desirable to ... Counterinsurgency, Security Force Assistance, Stability Operations Website.
[22]
[PDF] GAO-14-482, Security Force Assistance: The Army and Marine ...
Jul 11, 2014 · Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan.
[23]
Section 333 - Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity
U.S. government security requirements cannot be imposed upon the Benefitting Partner by the Building Partner Capacity ... Security Force Assistance Brigade ...
[24]
Security Force Assistance without Strategy: A Clausewitzian ...
A true strategic theory of SFA begins with political realism. This realism was also central to U.S. experience in the Philippines and South Vietnam—where, ...
[25]
Systems Thinking: Explaining Security Force Assistance in Complex Adaptive Systems | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University
### Application of Systems Thinking to Security Force Assistance (SFA)
[26]
The Versatile Roman Auxiliary Soldiers | Short History - Medium
Jan 2, 2021 · The auxiliary soldiers were non-Roman citizens from provinces who volunteered in the military. For these men, serving in the Roman army meant ...
[27]
Daily life in the multicultural Roman auxiliary – Lucius'€™ Romans
Mar 15, 2017 · Some units would have continued to recruit from the provinces of their creation, but for units further from home replacements would have been ...
[28]
[PDF] The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their ...
German colonies were defended by 'Schutztruppen'. British and French used colonial troops in Europe, with French deploying large numbers of African troops. ...Missing: assistance | Show results with:assistance<|control11|><|separator|>
[29]
[PDF] U.S. Military Advisors in Greece, Korea, The Philippines, and Vietnam
An analysis of the U.S. advisory missions in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines shows a pattern of perceived success that overshadowed the operational and ...
[30]
[PDF] united states military advisory assistance groups during the cold war ...
In some of the missions, advisors also trained foreign troops, reformed their military education centers, and even helped reorganize the host nation's armed ...
[31]
[PDF] Lessons from American Military Assistance Efforts Since World War II
Nov 18, 2001 · Confrontation with perceived Soviet Union expansionist policies during the Cold War prompted the dispatch of advisory missions around the globe.
[32]
[PDF] Military Advisors in Vietnam: 1963 - JFK Library
In May 1961, JFK authorized sending an additional 500 Special Forces troops and military advisors to assist the pro-Western government of South Vietnam. By the ...
[33]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I
The presence of US advisors of MAAG in Vietnam has long been the target of vitriolic propaganda blasts by Hanoi and regular [Page 468] complaints to ICC about ...
[34]
[PDF] SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT TO ANGOLA - CIA
Since Angolan independence in 1975, the Soviet Bloc has supplied Angola with over $4 billion in military aid, along with about 1,500 to 1,700 advisers and 35, ...
[35]
Soviet Military Mission - War In Angola
With the growth of numbers of instructors and advisors from the USSR, Major-General Ilya Ponomarenko; was appointed in the head of the newly created Soviet ...
[36]
[PDF] Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime - RAND
By April 1979, there were 4,500 Soviet advisors in Afghanistan. Soviet advisors worked closely with the Afghan military, provid- ing guidance for training ...
[37]
[PDF] United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report
The national impulse to intervene— to help—is a powerful one, and the U.S. military forces are uniquely suited to bringing to bear their skill, manpower, and ...
[38]
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE and STABILITY INTEGRATION ...
Apr 11, 2019 · Established in 1993, on the heels of the Cold War, spurred on by the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and the Balkans, the Peacekeeping ...
[39]
U.S. Military Capabilities in the Post-Cold War Era
Dec 4, 1998 · The US military has taken on an unprecedented number of overseas commitments -- including humanitarian, peacekeeping, and contingency operations -- that have ...
[40]
[PDF] Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan - RAND
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsur- gency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghani- stan. The outcome ...
[41]
The continuing mission in Afghanistan | Article - Army.mil
Apr 13, 2016 · The CSTC-A CJ-8 director, who is our comptroller, controls the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and oversees the execution of the NATO ...
[42]
Building Iraqi Security Forces Through Partnership | Article - Army.mil
Nov 29, 2009 · MNSTC-I was established June 28, 2004, to help Iraq organize, train and equip its military and police forces. What has it done'. Working ...
[43]
TRADOC and the Release of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency - Army.mil
Jul 7, 2023 · This shift led the American military to formulate counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine to guide its ground forces primarily. COIN required ...Missing: SFA evolution
[44]
[PDF] Muddling Through: An Analysis of Security Force Assistance in Iraq
May 25, 2017 · ”91 MNSTC-I raced to expand training sites, build new police stations and army bases around the country, and equip the Iraqi Security Forces ...
[45]
[PDF] Quadrennial Defense Review Report February 2010
Nov 15, 2009 · • Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force ... contribute to U.S. capacity for security force ...
[46]
[PDF] Marine Advisor Advantage: Institutionalizing Security Force Assistance
Apr 16, 2013 · The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review further identifies “institutionalizing” the capabilities of general purpose forces (GPF) to conduct SFA as a ...
[47]
[PDF] DoD Instruction 5000.68, October 27, 2010
Oct 27, 2010 · However, the Department of Defense may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to ...
[48]
[PDF] The U.S. Army Approach to Security Force Assistance
Security force assistance is the combination of activities to build the capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. SFA is a task ...Missing: framework | Show results with:framework
[49]
SFABs Adjust Unique Role for Large-Scale Combat - AUSA
Mar 10, 2023 · First established in 2018, the scaled-down, specialized brigades were created to advise and assist foreign security forces while freeing up Army ...<|separator|>
[50]
Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) - Congress.gov
May 13, 2025 · Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). CRS PRODUCT ... advising foreign security forces (FSF). Title 10, Chapter 16, of the ...<|separator|>
[51]
[PDF] JDN 1-13, Security Force Assistance - NPS Publications
Apr 29, 2013 · Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational force should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United ...
[52]
[PDF] 23-02-703-security-force-assistance-primer-nov-22-public.pdf
Nov 23, 2022 · The DASA (DE&C) leads, manages, resources, and directs policy and strategy for the conduct of select elements of the Army's global security.
[53]
[PDF] AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance - GOV.UK
Aug 1, 2025 · This doctrine outlines the fundamental principles on how NATO provides security force assistance (SFA). SFA activities are applicable at all ...
[54]
[PDF] Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation
It focuses on understanding the factors that are associated with security cooperation effectiveness and examines the extent to which recent Army security ...
[55]
[PDF] Measures of Effectiveness in Security Force Assistance
The United States define Security Force Assistance as “the unified action to ... 74 United States of America, Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 ...
[56]
[PDF] Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts In Afghanistan
and deploying advisor units like the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). ... Current metrics of effectiveness are misleading, as they are often ...
[57]
Security Force Assistance Brigades - Army.mil
The Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) are specialized US Army units with the core mission to conduct assess, support, liaise and advise operations.
[58]
Security Force Assistance Brigades: Ways to Support Advisor Teams ...
Feb 1, 2024 · Between 2017 and 2020, the Army set up six security force assistance brigades (SFABs) designed to advise, assist, and accompany Afghan, ...
[59]
Combat Multiplier: Examining the Security Force Assistance ... - AUSA
Oct 1, 2021 · It further seeks to offer solutions to current controversies involving SFAB force structure and to create an extensive dialogue for further ...
[60]
[PDF] SFAC Factbook - Army.mil
Feb 13, 2025 · PRIOR US SFAB DEPLOYMENTS. CURRENT US SFAB DEPLOYMENTS. 54TH SFAB. GLOBAL FOCUS. INDIANAPOLIS, IN. 27. 4TH SFAB. EUCOM. FORT CARSON, CO. SFAC HC.
[61]
Security Force Assistance Brigades - Army University Press
Jun 6, 2024 · Established direct liaison to a force with intimate knowledge of the area of operations (AO); Able to observe and direct fires in the deep area ...
[62]
[PDF] An Evaluation of Security Force Assistance Brigades' Role and ...
Sep 30, 2024 · SFABs deploy under multiple authorities. Questions about SFAB funding authorities are a constant concern across the Security Cooperation ...
[63]
SFABs in Army 2030: Experimenting with a unified approach
May 30, 2024 · Security Force Assistance Command conducted a Tabletop Experiment at the Maneuver Battle Lab to prepare for future conflicts and warfighting needs.
[64]
[PDF] Future Soldier Guide - The British Army
Dec 1, 2021 · The 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade draws on personnel and expertise from across the Army, to build the capacity of allied and partner ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[65]
11th Brigade | The British Army
11th Brigade are the Land Special Operations Force's fighting formation: designed as a covering force to intercept, engage, and deceive the enemy. By ...
[66]
British soldiers from the 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade lead ...
Jun 3, 2024 · British Army Corporal Steven Dunnett, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland, 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade, conducts a rehearsal drill.
[67]
In-Flight Fight: Manoeuvre in the Near Surface - RUSI
Oct 1, 2025 · Twelve months ago, the British Army's 11th Brigade was still labelled as a Security Force Assistance Brigade. Over the intervening period, ...
[68]
https://www.instagram.com/p/DGTWBK4Rh5u/
[69]
Ranger Regiment: What we know about the British Army's elite ...
Mar 20, 2024 · The elite regiment deployed alongside US Special Operations Forces in November 2022, putting new battlefield equipment to the test.
[70]
In-Depth Briefing #68: Ranger Regiment - CHACR
Nov 28, 2023 · A British Special Operations Force capability which is increasingly trained, equipped and commanded to meaningfully engage in the grey space of systemic ...
[71]
[PDF] International Defence Engagement Strategy - GOV.UK
HMG's guidance on Overseas Security and Justice Assistance provides a framework for assisting us to comply with applicable obligations. 16. Our ability to ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[72]
Security Force Assistance: practised but not substantiated
The purpose of this article is to distinguish the organisational and doctrinal differences between the US, the UK and the Dutch armed forces.
[73]
British Army Military Capacity Building in support of the UK's ...
Dec 1, 2021 · This thesis examines British Army capacity building and Defence Engagement activities in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Somalia between 2014 and 2019.
[74]
NATO Centres of Excellence – Security Force Assistance (SFA COE)
Aug 15, 2023 · Security Force Assistance aims to prevent regional crises and conflict by providing military assistance to local security forces to generate and ...
[75]
Who we are_old - NATO SFA COE ®
The NATO SFA COE is a multinational entity with Italy, Albania and Slovenia as Sponsoring Nations, and Austria as Contributing Participant.Missing: contributions | Show results with:contributions
[76]
ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) - NATO
May 30, 2022 · This meant that ISAF's mission evolved from one focused primarily on combat to an enabling Security Force Assistance (SFA) role, centred on ...
[77]
Topic: Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015-2021) - NATO
May 30, 2022 · Its aim was to provide further training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions.Missing: achievements SFA
[78]
NATO's assistance to Iraq (2004-2011)
Sep 1, 2022 · The NATO Training Mission-Iraq or NTM-I was established in 2004 to help Iraq create effective armed forces. It was set up at the request of the ...
[79]
NATO Mission Iraq
Jun 3, 2025 · All NATO Allies contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment.
[80]
NATO Security Assistance Ukraine | Home - nato shape
NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) is a NATO command that coordinates the provision of military equipment and training to Ukraine by NATO
[81]
NATO's support for Ukraine
Oct 14, 2025 · In 2025, Allies have so far committed an additional EUR 35 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, and this support is expected to continue.
[82]
Topic: Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs) - NATO
Aug 4, 2025 · PTECs also provide pre-deployment training to troops for NATO operations and missions such as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Operation Sea Guardian ...
[83]
Topic: NATO's partnerships - NATO
May 12, 2025 · Partners contribute to NATO-led operations and missions, whether through supporting peace by training security forces in the Western Balkans or ...
[84]
Malayan Emergency | National Army Museum
The Malayan Emergency (1948-60) was one of the few successful counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Western powers during the Cold War.
[85]
[PDF] The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect - RAND
British and Malayans were able to achieve success at remarkably low cost ... Chinese had entered government service or the security forces; for example ...
[86]
Operational Planning and Assistance Training Team (OPATT) to ...
27 The eight-year-long OPATT program in El Salvador is considered a classic example of a successful Foreign Internal Defense mission.
[87]
[PDF] El Salvador (1980 1992) - DTIC
Nov 16, 2007 · The mission of the American military advisors was to provide and concentrate on training Salvadorian units, provide material and equipment, and ...
[88]
GAO-09-71, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully ...
GAO-09-71, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance.
[89]
[PDF] U.S. Security Assistance and the Bid to Stabilize Colombia and Mexico
Jul 31, 2024 · Using this information, he argues that Plan Colombia should be considered a security-sector reform success because it enabled the increased ...
[90]
Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces
... force would either fail or a new stalemate would be established. How did ... failure that occurred in Afghanistan. Citations [1] Susannah George ...
[91]
Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army's 2nd Division - War on the Rocks
Jul 1, 2014 · Although the collapse of forces in Mosul shocked many in the region, many causes of their collapse can be attributed to systemic internal ...
[92]
The Collapse of the Iraqi Army's Will to Fight: A Lack of Motivation ...
Feb 19, 2016 · Much of the commentary on the Iraqi Army collapse of 2014-2015 centers on the motivations of individual soldiers and the general concept of a “will to fight.”
[93]
Why the Iraqi army collapsed (and what can be done about it)
Jun 13, 2014 · History highlights two key causes: poor intelligence, and the politicization and corruption of security forces.
[94]
The Iraqi Army Was Crumbling Long Before Its Collapse, U.S. ...
Jun 12, 2014 · Even before the fall of Mosul, the Iraqi forces had had logistical difficulties and been battered in their clash with Islamic extremists. From ...
[95]
[PDF] The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War, 1979-1989
Soviet failure was brought about by American support for the Afghan resistance is ... President's security guards immediately tried but failed to kill the ...
[96]
Afghanistan: Anatomy of a Soviet Failure - jstor
failure in Afghanistan. How was Moscow brought to this point ... forces. Both the Soviet forces and those of the. Kabul regime failed to live up to Moscow's.
[97]
Military assistance to Ukraine (February 2022 to January 2025)
Jul 17, 2025 · In response, in May 2024, Russia accused NATO and the US of ... Over 51,000 Ukrainian personnel have been trained so far. NATO ...
[98]
Can Ukraine Fight Without U.S. Aid? Seven Questions to Ask - CSIS
May 19, 2025 · This paper argues that a complete US military and intelligence aid cutoff would significantly harm Ukraine's ability to fight Russia but would not necessarily ...
[99]
U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine - State Department
To date, we have provided $66.9 billion in military assistance since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
[100]
The Surprising Success of U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine - CNAS
After all, the United States provides security assistance to many countries with mixed results. Billions of dollars in aid and decades of training, advising ...
[101]
Chapter 5 – Sahel: Partnerships Deserted - Munich Security ...
Since 2014, the EU has spent 8 billion euros on security and humanitarian assistance to Sahel states, while the US has allocated more than 5.5 billion US ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[102]
Africa's 2024 Security Trends in 10 Graphics
Dec 17, 2024 · The Sahel accounted for over half of all militant Islamist activity on the continent in 2024, with fatalities nearly tripling since 2020 to ...
[103]
What RAND Research Says About Counterinsurgency, Stabilization ...
A RAND review of security assistance in Africa found that these programs have had little net impact on political violence there, but significant positive ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[104]
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/why-washingtons-anti-pmf-moves-are-testing-the-iraq-partnership/
[105]
Vicarious Impunity: Othering in Security Force Assistance in Iraq - DIIS
Sep 3, 2025 · This article introduces the concept of 'vicarious impunity' to describe how Western interveners, particularly through Security Force Assistance ...Missing: mixed ongoing Ukraine Sahel
[106]
[PDF] Plan Colombia:
Following the signing of Plan Colombia, U.S. military assistance helped the Colombian government fight the. FARC and other drug lords, while also providing ...
[107]
Plan Colombia: Major Successes and New Challenges - state.gov
May 11, 2005 · All of these success stories create a powerful argument for continued assistance to Colombia, so that this hard earned momentum is not lost.
[108]
Sierra Leonean army comes of age under British direction - GOV.UK
Apr 6, 2011 · The long-term plan, which is already bringing success, is to build a skilled RSLAF capable of carrying out its country's defence missions and ...<|separator|>
[109]
British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone 2000-2002
Mar 4, 2019 · The British intervention in Sierra Leone, considered a success, involved four operations, with 300-400 personnel, and helped end the war, ...
[110]
When Intervention Works: The Instructive Case of Sierra Leone
Aug 31, 2016 · The British success in Sierra Leone yields five related lessons. First, the use of force achieved lasting strategic effect because it was ...
[111]
The People Are the Key: Irregular Warfare Success Story in the ...
Apr 15, 2025 · After decades of conflict and instability, the US government helped the government of the Republic of the Philippines defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group.
[112]
U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 - RAND
Apr 6, 2016 · This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014.
[113]
Enhancing Global Security Through Security Force Assistance
Jul 11, 2018 · Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) are the Army's way of using existing force structure in a more effective and efficient way to contribute.
[114]
Effects of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa - RAND
Sep 13, 2018 · Most security sector assistance in most countries in the post–Cold War era appears to have had little net impact. Whatever "success stories" ...
[115]
[PDF] An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the ...
This report documents the results of a RAND Corporation project, “The Effectiveness of Security Cooperation in Advancing Counter terrorism and ...Missing: metrics | Show results with:metrics<|control11|><|separator|>
[116]
U.S. Security Cooperation with Colombia - State Department
Jan 20, 2025 · The United States provides security assistance to Colombia to promote Colombia's long-term stability, strengthen its security capabilities, and boost regional ...
[117]
Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations - Congress.gov
May 30, 2025 · U.S. assistance helped the Colombian government train and equip its security forces, regain control of territory from illegal armed groups, ...
[118]
New CFR Book Assesses Multi-Billion Dollar U.S. Security ...
Mar 8, 2024 · For the United States, Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative were each a means to an end: a reduction in drug trafficking, ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[119]
The Future of US Security Force Assistance - Modern War Institute
Nov 23, 2021 · SFA offers the putative promise of bolstering deterrence in great power competition, improving access to and influence over foreign partners.Missing: geopolitical | Show results with:geopolitical
[120]
Are We Really Helping? U.S. Security Assistance to Partner Nations ...
Sep 25, 2023 · Today's WatchBlog post looks at our two recent reports about the effectiveness of one of the Department of Defense's largest programs that ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
[121]
The Role of Special Operations Forces in Great Power Competition
Feb 8, 2023 · SOF are an essential part of foreign internal defense. These activities can also include broader efforts to conduct security force assistance.
[122]
Building Partner Capacity: DOD and State Should Strengthen ...
Aug 29, 2023 · GAO is making four recommendations to DOD—to define a joint planning process, establish associated guidance, and improve proposals and ...
[123]
Arsenal of Bureaucracy: How to Fix the U.S. Arms Sales Bottleneck
Mar 7, 2025 · Designed for a different era, FMS is paralyzed by outdated regulations and bloated bureaucracy, leaving trusted allies waiting years for ...Missing: SFA | Show results with:SFA
[124]
JUST IN: Foreign Military Sales too Slow To Meet Global Demand
Sep 25, 2024 · Foreign military sales have grown dramatically over the past 20 years, and the “slow” process is no longer fast enough to keep up with the demands global ...
[125]
All Rapport, No Results: What Afghanistan's Collapse Reveals ...
All Rapport, No Results: What Afghanistan's Collapse Reveals About the Flaws in US Security Force Assistance ... The second strand argues that the ...Missing: shortcomings | Show results with:shortcomings
[126]
[PDF] Effects of Culture on Training Foreign Security Forces - DTIC
Foreign culture presents barriers to the success of capacity building efforts; these barriers must be accounted for prior to engagement. Just because a nation's ...
[127]
[PDF] Cultural Awareness: An Essential Element in the Security Assistance ...
In short, the specific attributes that define a people's culture may present impediments to the implementation of our programs over and above the normal ...
[128]
Revisiting Military Cultural Intelligence: Lessons from Afghanistan ...
Apr 16, 2022 · This paper studied three shortcomings with the application of military cultural intelligence in Afghanistan and Iraq ... [11] Jeffrey Record, ...
[129]
[PDF] A CRISIS OF TRUST AND CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY:
May 12, 2011 · Since May, 2007 there have been at least 26 murder/attempted murder incidents by ANSF or ASG members against ISAF/UNAMA members, ...
[130]
A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance ...
Nov 14, 2024 · The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force ...
[131]
Military, Geographical, and Cultural Differences Between the ...
May 2, 2025 · Culturally, Vietnam's disconnects deepened mistrust, while Iraq's complex dynamics demanded nuanced engagement, with missteps amplifying ...
[132]
[PDF] Why Security Force Assistance Fails - DTIC
Failure to align US strategic aims and objectives with the partnered nation could result in ineffective security cooperation results. In order to determine the ...
[133]
The US Spent $83 Billion Training Afghan Forces. Why Did They ...
Aug 14, 2021 · In July, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found the Defense Department has spent $3.74 billion on fuel for Afghan ...
[134]
'A Dumb Decision': U.S. Said to Waste $28 Million on Afghan Army ...
Jun 21, 2017 · The United States spent up to $28 million more than it had to on camouflage uniforms for the Afghan National Army because of the sartorial tastes of a single ...
[135]
[PDF] SIGAR 21-05-SP Update on the Amount of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse ...
Oct 15, 2020 · Of that amount, SIGAR reviewed approximately $63 billion and concluded that a total of approximately $19 billion or 30 percent of the amount ...<|separator|>
[136]
Rebuilding Security Forces and Institutions in Iraq | RAND
Dec 20, 2005 · The Coalition Provisional Authority's record at rebuilding Iraqi security forces and building security sector institutions was mixed.
[137]
The Ghost Budget: How U.S. war spending went rogue, wasted ...
Apr 1, 2024 · The United States funded the $5 trillion Iraq and Afghanistan wars with an unaccountable and unprecedented scheme utilizing debt, accounting tricks, and ...
[138]
Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication ...
May 13, 2025 · This report discusses new opportunities for achieving billions of dollars in potential financial benefits and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a ...
[139]
Leahy Law Fact Sheet - United States Department of State
Jan 20, 2025 · The term “Leahy law” refers to two statutory provisions prohibiting the U.S. Government from using funds for assistance to units of foreign ...Missing: ethical dilemmas
[140]
[PDF] Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law
Second, U.S. military forces are forbidden by law to provide training or education to foreign military units or individuals with a history of human rights ...
[141]
Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”)
Jan 6, 2025 · The Leahy Laws prohibit US assistance to foreign security force units when there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human ...Missing: ethical advisors
[142]
Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict
Apr 1, 2022 · The U.S. military, for example, fears that human rights abuses perpetrated by its proxies can create backlash for U.S. interests. See U.S. ...
[143]
The United States' Unwavering Commitment To Afghanistan Is ...
Dec 11, 2017 · Sexual abuse, among other moral lapses, seem part and parcel of the Afghan security forces. Not all units are dens of iniquity, and there are ...Missing: challenges | Show results with:challenges
[144]
How US-Funded Abuses Led to Failure in Afghanistan
Jul 6, 2021 · These rampant abuses have in turn fueled the cycle of conflict in numerous ways, including by inspiring recruitment to the insurgency, rendering ...Missing: ethical advisors
[145]
Divergent Ethics: Facing a Foreign Partner Who Has a Different ...
Jul 17, 2017 · Enforcing US ethical standards on foreign soldiers can be exceptionally difficult and complex. It requires moral courage, cultural competence and interpersonal ...Missing: abuses | Show results with:abuses
[146]
Rethinking “Advising and Training” in Iraq
Jul 14, 2009 · The United States should address human rights abuses and corruption in Iraq's security forces, write Brian Katulis and Emily Hogin.Missing: ethical | Show results with:ethical
[147]
2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq
The human rights situation worsened during the year due to increased federal and Kurdistan Regional Government restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic ...
[148]
The Common Good: Ethical Strategy Between States and Partner ...
Oct 15, 2020 · Unlike these formal state-to-state alliances, partnerships with non-state actors present strategists with ethical problems. The American ...Missing: training abuses<|separator|>
[149]
Is Human Rights Training Working with Foreign Militaries? No One ...
May 12, 2020 · For example, military advisers consistently misdiagnose poor human rights compliance as a problem that stems from a lack of basic training.Missing: advisors | Show results with:advisors
[150]
The "Leahy Law" Prohibiting US Assistance to Human Rights Abusers
Jun 27, 2017 · When a unit or individual is vetted and then trained by the US and goes on to commit abuses, it might call into question the value of the ...
[151]
Transparency in the Leahy Laws: Who is Banned?
May 30, 2025 · Doubts about the rigor of Leahy implementation are not unique to these partners. In other cases, too, credible allegations of abuse have ...
[152]
State Can Improve Response to Allegations of Civilians Harmed by ...
Apr 24, 2025 · ... security assistance to foreign partners or specific units of foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses. Following the ...
[153]
What Is the Leahy Law? — ProPublica
Dec 15, 2022 · The Leahy Law prohibits the US military from providing training and equipment to foreign security forces that commit human rights abuses.Missing: ethical | Show results with:ethical<|separator|>
[154]
Iraq: US-Trained Forces Linked to Mosul War Crimes
Jul 27, 2017 · An Iraqi army division trained by the United States government allegedly executed several dozen prisoners in Mosul's Old City, Human Rights Watch said today.
[155]
Human Rights Violations: U.S. Foreign Aid for Accountability and ...
Mar 29, 2015 · For two decades, ensuring the U.S. isn't complicit in gross human rights abuses by foreign police and military forces has rested in ...
[156]
Pentagon provided funds to Afghan units accused of child sexual ...
Jan 23, 2018 · The report specifically examines how the U.S. has implemented the Leahy law, which withholds funds from Afghan units if there is credible ...
[157]
Impunity for U.S.-Funded Warlords in Afghanistan
Feb 16, 2018 · The Defense Department has continued to fund Afghan security forces that violate human rights, without informing Congress.
[158]
The Leahy Law and Human Rights Accountability in Afghanistan
Mar 5, 2017 · The standard interpretation of the Leahy law is that once an individual is rejected under the law, the entire unit is “tainted” by that abuse.
[159]
[PDF] SIGAR 23-05-IP Why the Afghan Government Collapsed
Nov 1, 2022 · SIGAR identified six factors that contributed to the collapse of the. Afghan government in August 2021. First, the Afghan government failed to ...
[160]
The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned
Jan 8, 2025 · The Miscalculations. A significant miscalculation stemmed from overestimating the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Over ...
[161]
How not to disengage from a conflict: Evidence from NATO's war in ...
Jul 11, 2021 · Our work shows how strategic miscalculation during Afghanistan's first security transition may have contributed to its current resurgence of ...
[162]
America's Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf
Jan 2, 2020 · The United States ultimately failed to ensure that most Iraqis saw the critical role that U.S. advisors and airpower played in defeating ISIS, ...Missing: SFA | Show results with:SFA
[163]
The Causes and the Consequences of Strategic Failure in ...
Aug 15, 2021 · This short paper attempts to survey key assessments of the causes and consequences of strategic failure.
[164]
[PDF] June 1, 2021 Protecting U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Following ...
Jun 1, 2021 · Those reforms included mandatory certification training for all security cooperation professionals, and the implementation of a monitoring and ...
[165]
Lessons from the Afghan Military Collapse - Irregular Warfare Initiative
Oct 28, 2021 · Discover the lessons from the Afghan military collapse and how the US can reform its security assistance programs to avoid future failures.
[166]
U.S. to Construct Bases for the SNA Danab Brigade
Feb 16, 2024 · In 2017, the United States and Somalia reached an agreement to recruit, train, equip, and mentor 3,000 men and women from across Somalia to ...
[167]
US Security Assistance to Somalia - Stimson Center
Mar 20, 2023 · Between 2010 and 2020, the United States provided more than $500 million in direct security assistance to Somali Forces.
[168]
U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Targeting al Shabaab in southern Somalia
Aug 26, 2025 · In coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike against al Shabaab on Aug. 23, 2025.
[169]
US forces helping Philippines battle ISIS-linked fighters | CNN
Jun 10, 2017 · US Special Operations Forces are assisting the Philippine military in its battle against ISIS-affiliated fighters, the US Embassy in Manila said Saturday.Missing: SFA | Show results with:SFA
[170]
Terrorism in the Philippines and U.S.-Philippine security cooperation
Aug 15, 2017 · ... Philippines, which have sworn loyalty to the Islamic State (ISIS) and received recognition from ISIS, and on the threat posed by ISIS ...Missing: SFA | Show results with:SFA
[171]
Ukraine: DOD Could Strengthen International Military Training ...
Sep 26, 2024 · We found that over 30 countries helped train about 116,000 Ukrainians outside Ukraine as of Feb. 2024. The U.S. trained about 16% of them. As of ...
[172]
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) is intended to build Ukraine's capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.Missing: assessment | Show results with:assessment
[173]
4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade Deployment to Europe
Oct 15, 2021 · The 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade will deploy to Europe in support of US Army Europe and Africa in fall 2021 to support and assist US allied and ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[174]
[PDF] Military Advisors, Service Strategies, and Great Power Competition
Abstract. United States professional military advisors play a critical role across the spectrum of conflict within the various services' strategies in ...
[175]
Security Force Assistance Brigades: In Competition, Crisis, and ...
Nov 27, 2023 · SFABs create interoperability between the U.S. and its security partners while enabling multi-national cooperation across continents.<|separator|>