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Tang ping

Tang ping (躺平), literally translated as "lying flat," is a term and attitudinal stance that emerged in 2021, encapsulating a deliberate rejection by young people of the high-intensity pursuit of career advancement, accumulation, and societal in favor of minimal labor, reduced , and self-preservation against perceived futile . The originated from a April 2021 post on the forum, where a user declared "Lying flat is my wise movement," framing it as a rational response to exploitative work norms like the "996" schedule—working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week—and broader structural barriers including elevated and housing inaccessibility. Unlike organized , tang ping manifests primarily as an individualistic posture of disengagement, prioritizing over metrics amid empirical realities such as youth joblessness rates surpassing 20% in recent years and stagnant real wage growth relative to escalating costs. authorities have denounced the trend as defeatist and antithetical to national rejuvenation goals, leading to on platforms and promotional countermeasures emphasizing diligence, though surveys indicate varied public evaluations influenced by expectations of reward for effort. This phenomenon underscores deeper causal dynamics in China's labor market, where diminishing marginal returns on personal exertion—driven by demographic shifts, overeducation, and policy-induced rigidities—prompt adaptive withdrawal rather than mere idleness.

Origins

Etymology and Initial Post

The term tǎng píng (躺平) derives from , where tǎng means "to lie down" or "to recline" and píng means "flat" or "level," literally denoting a posture of physical and metaphorical . In its cultural application, it evokes a rejection of upward mobility and competitive exertion, akin to one's trajectory in a emphasizing relentless ascent. The phrase entered widespread discourse via a April 2021 post on , a popular Chinese , by Luo Huazhong, a 31-year-old former factory worker from province using the username "Kind-Hearted Traveler." Titled "Lying Flat is Justice," the entry featured a of Luo reclining in bed with drawn curtains and outlined his post-burnout routine: sleeping nine to ten hours nightly, restricting expenses to about 500 yuan (roughly 70 USD at the time) monthly on essentials like , and abstaining from relationships, property purchases, or automotive ownership after years of overtime labor yielding scant financial security. The declaration explicitly framed this as a rational response to unattainable societal benchmarks, stating, "I don't buy a house, I don't save money, I'm happy as long as I have to eat." The post achieved rapid dissemination across Chinese social platforms, amassing thousands of views and replies within days, as it mirrored frustrations among urban youth over exhaustive routines like the "996" workweek—nine a.m. to nine p.m., six days weekly—and escalating barriers to homeownership amid stagnant wages. This foundational articulation crystallized tǎng píng as a encapsulating voluntary disengagement from high-stakes ambition.

Early Spread on Social Media

The concept of tang ping rapidly disseminated across Chinese online platforms following its introduction in an April 2021 post on by user Luo Huazhong, who detailed his minimalist of minimal expenditures and rejection of societal norms. Users on and subsequently amplified the idea through shared anecdotes and discussions framing tang ping as a deliberate opt-out from neijuan (), the hyper-competitive escalation in education and employment that yields diminishing returns for effort. By mid-2021, adaptations emerged as slogans and memes, such as endorsements of forgoing , , and consumerist milestones with phrases encapsulating "no house, no car, no wife—lying flat suffices," critiquing the intertwined pressures of familial expectations and material accumulation. These expressions proliferated organically via reposts and , including cat-themed memes symbolizing passive detachment, positioning tang ping as a decentralized lexicon rather than a coordinated campaign. Engagement metrics underscored its grassroots momentum, with related hashtags on accumulating hundreds of millions of views in the ensuing months, reflecting widespread resonance among urban youth disillusioned with the before platform-wide curtailed visibility later in 2021. This early phase highlighted tang ping as an informal, bottom-up articulation of fatigue with systemic overachievement demands, distinct from institutional narratives.

Underlying Causes

Economic Pressures and

China's youth unemployment rate, encompassing urban residents aged 16 to 24, surged to a record high of 21.3% in June 2023, prompting the National Bureau of Statistics to suspend data releases and revise methodologies to exclude students. This peak reflected structural mismatches between workforce entrants and available positions, with rates remaining elevated at around 18.9% in August 2025 amid persistent economic headwinds. Compounding the strain, 11.79 million graduates entered the labor market in 2024, a figure projected to rise to a record 12.22 million in 2025, overwhelming demand in a context of decelerating GDP growth from 5.2% in 2023 to 5.0% in 2024. The concept of , or , encapsulates this dynamic of intensified internal competition for scarce resources without corresponding systemic advancement or innovation. Originating in sociological discourse and gaining traction online around 2020, highlights how aggregate economic expansion—such as sustained GDP figures—masks individual-level , particularly in urban job markets and housing where positional goods remain finite. face hyper-competition for positions in sectors like and , where incremental efforts yield marginal gains amid overcapacity and deflationary pressures, fostering perceptions of futile escalation rather than productive growth. Exacerbating these pressures, the 996 work culture—entailing 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. shifts six days a week—prevalent in high-stakes industries has induced widespread , directly correlating with the appeal of tang ping as a withdrawal from exploitative labor norms. Declared illegal by China's in September 2021 for violating labor laws, this regimen nonetheless persists in practice, contributing to job insecurity and cost-of-living strains that surveys link to youth disillusionment with . Economic data underscores the causal link: high graduate inflows against tepid hiring in private sectors amplify involutionary traps, where prolonged effort fails to secure stable prospects, prompting passive disengagement over continued participation.

Social and Cultural Factors

The tang ping movement reflects a backlash against entrenched Confucian cultural norms that prioritize unyielding personal achievement (chenggong) and (xiao), which traditionally oblige individuals to pursue excellence in to secure family honor and provide intergenerational support. These values, deeply embedded in Chinese society, frame as a , rendering or morally suspect and akin to familial . Compounding this pressure is the legacy of China's (1979–2015), which produced a of sole —intensively resourced by parents yet lacking siblings—now confronting eldercare obligations in , as demographic shifts leave fewer to distribute responsibilities amid an aging . This structural intensifies the perceived futility of striving, as only children bear disproportionate emotional and material loads without reciprocal support networks, fostering resentment toward collectivist familial mandates. State-sponsored ideologies, including Xi Jinping's "" articulated since 2012 and the "" campaign launched in 2021, seek to channel individual aspirations toward national revival and equitable growth, yet youth disillusionment persists amid visible and unmet mobility promises, eroding faith in these grand narratives. This cultural disaffection manifests in demographic retreat: registrations fell to 6.1 million couples in 2024, a 20% decline from 2023, while births totaled 9.54 million, signaling a broader opt-out from procreation and formation as proxies for rejecting overbearing societal scripts. Parallel to these trends, a mental health crisis has escalated, with national surveys indicating around 25% of adolescents experiencing mild to severe by 2021, often linked to from performative expectations; proponents of tang ping view this inertia as a pragmatic recalibration to unsustainable demands, though detractors argue it sidesteps opportunities for adaptive agency within cultural constraints.

Characteristics of the Movement

Lifestyle Practices

Adherents to tang ping typically minimize to sustain basic subsistence, engaging in sporadic gig work or temporary jobs rather than pursuing full-time careers or promotions. This approach contrasts with China's prevalent "996" work schedule—nine hours a day, six days a week—and emphasizes performing only essential tasks to cover immediate needs like rent and food. Daily routines prioritize rest and personal fulfillment over productivity, with many allocating time to extended , unstructured leisure, or low-effort hobbies such as , reading, or casual . For example, the movement's symbolic originator, Luo Huazhong, described quitting a job in 2016 to cycle across to , embracing a nomadic without fixed obligations. Some extend this into "itinerary-free" , opting for relaxed, low-cost outings that avoid structured or consumption. Frugality forms a core tenet, with practitioners curtailing spending on non-essentials to evade traps associated with or vehicles. Reported examples include maintaining existence on minimal budgets, such as under 3,000 RMB monthly in low-cost regions, focusing expenditures on staples while shunning status symbols. This rejection of manifests in forgoing , parenthood, or property acquisition, favoring shared or rural accommodations to preserve autonomy. The practices remain a niche phenomenon rather than widespread adoption, with visibility peaking through 2021 posts before platform restrictions limited open discussion. Estimates of active participants hover in the thousands, based on early online engagement, though precise figures are elusive due to informal and censored dissemination.

Participant Demographics

Tang ping predominantly involves urban youth aged 18 to 35, encompassing and cohorts born primarily in the late 1990s and early 2000s, who have pursued but encounter amid intense job market competition. These participants, often recent graduates, represent a subset disillusioned with societal expectations of relentless advancement, the phenomenon from broader perceptions of indolence by emphasizing strategic withdrawal among those exposed to urban "involution"—hyper-competitive striving with . Adoption is concentrated in high-pressure sectors such as , , and , where participants report from extended work hours and unfulfilling prospects, rather than across all demographics. Rural populations and older age groups (above 35) exhibit negligible engagement, as the movement's ethos resonates less with agrarian lifestyles or established career trajectories less burdened by youth-specific credential inflation. Qualitative analyses of and self-identification indicate sparse participation from non-urban or less-educated individuals, underscoring tang ping's roots in metropolitan middle-class frustrations. While not characterized by total idleness, many adherents sustain minimal part-time employment or gig work sufficient for basic needs, explicitly eschewing overtime, entrepreneurship, or high-stakes ambition deemed futile under prevailing economic constraints. This pragmatic minimalism differentiates tang ping from outright unemployment, with participants framing it as a calibrated response to systemic overwork rather than passive disengagement. Gender distribution shows no pronounced skew in available accounts, though broader youth unemployment pressures affect both sexes, with males potentially facing amplified expectations in competitive fields. Empirical studies from 2021 onward, including post-graduation cohorts, reinforce that engagement correlates with urban education levels over rural or manual labor backgrounds, with limited quantitative surveys precluding precise prevalence rates but consistently highlighting educated youth as the core demographic.

Government and Media Responses

Official Condemnation and Censorship

In June 2021, state-run criticized tang ping culture through a video highlighting a scientist's 12-hour workday, framing the movement as antithetical to national progress. Similarly, China Science Daily denounced tang ping as "an extremely irresponsible attitude" that disappoints youth themselves and their parents while undermining societal expectations. These condemnations positioned the trend as nihilistic and harmful to "socialist core values," emphasizing its conflict with the state's push for diligence and collective advancement under Xi Jinping's leadership. Censorship followed swiftly, with the tang ping hashtag blocked on , China's primary platform, by late 2021 to curb its viral spread. Online groups promoting the lifestyle, such as those on with thousands of members, were shut down, reflecting broader platform-level enforcement on and other sites to suppress discussion. This aligned with Xi-era priorities for technological , as tang ping's rejection of threatened workforce mobilization essential for innovation drives, potentially derailing middle-class contributions to economic booms in semiconductors and other strategic sectors. Enforcement persisted into subsequent years, with terms routinely scrubbed from search results and social feeds amid ongoing youth disengagement. In August 2023, following a record 21.3% urban rate in June, authorities suspended publication of the 16-24 age group statistic, citing a need to revise methodology, which obscured data fueling narratives of economic disillusionment akin to tang ping. By 2024-2025, controls maintained low visibility for the term, prioritizing narrative alignment with productivity mandates over open discourse on labor market strains.

Promotion of Counter-Narratives

In response to the tang ping phenomenon, Chinese state media and official outlets promoted the "struggle spirit" (fèn dòu jīngshén), portraying it as essential for personal and national advancement, with 2021 editorials decrying passive withdrawal as antithetical to societal progress and goals under Xi Jinping's vision. These campaigns emphasized emulating historical and contemporary models of diligence to achieve economic , positioning fèn dòu as a voluntary of amid competitive pressures rather than enforced labor. Educational initiatives integrated counter-narratives by embedding patriotism and hard work into school and university programs, particularly targeting the 11.8 million university graduates entering the job market in 2024, amid efforts to sustain 5% GDP growth targets. The Patriotic Education Law, enacted and effective from January 1, 2024, mandated fostering a "strong national spirit" through curricula promoting dedication to collective goals and rejection of defeatist attitudes, extending to college students via socialist core values training. Policy measures included targeted youth employment subsidies from 2023 through 2025, offering employers one-time payments of up to 1,500 per hire for 16-24-year-olds under standard contracts with , explicitly designed to incentivize workforce entry and skill-building as rewards for initiative. These were framed in official announcements as support for "pro-employment" efforts aligning individual effort with economic revitalization, distinct from enabling disengagement.

Public and Intellectual Debates

Criticisms from Productivity and Societal Perspectives

Critics argue that the tang ping movement contributes to stagnant labor in by discouraging participation in high-intensity work essential for technological advancement and economic expansion. For instance, analyses from 2021 onward have highlighted how the rejection of and career ambition among young professionals impedes China's innovation drive, as middle-class workers—who are expected to fuel domestic consumption and R&D—opt for minimal effort instead. This aligns with observed slowdowns, such as China's GDP dipping to 4.8% in 2024 from 5.2% in 2023, with labor at 5.84% year-over-year by December 2024, trailing faster-growing peers like in per capita terms amid structural challenges. Reduced engagement exacerbates debt burdens and aging demographics, as fewer innovations mean diminished returns on capital-intensive investments, potentially deterring wary of a demotivated labor pool. From a perspective, tang ping is critiqued for fostering a sense of that erodes meritocratic incentives, akin to disincentives in expansive systems where minimal effort yields subsistence without proportional contribution. Surveys of respondents in characterized "lying flat" as morally questionable, viewing it as a shirking of responsibilities in favor of individual ease, which undermines societal trust in effort-reward linkages. Psychological research on more broadly links it to reduced adherence to norms and expectations of unearned gains, paralleling how tang ping adherents anticipate basic living standards without competitive striving, potentially perpetuating cycles of underachievement across generations. Societally, tang ping accelerates declines by reinforcing a low-desire that prioritizes personal repose over formation, intensifying pressures on systems amid China's shrinking workforce. Official concerns note that "lying flat" attitudes contribute to the plummeting to approximately 1 child per woman by 2023, down from 2.5 in 1990, as young adults forgo and in favor of unburdened lifestyles. This , evident in movements rejecting high-pressure careers, compounds demographic imbalances, with projections indicating unsustainable support ratios for retirees by the 2030s, as fewer births translate to a contracting base unable to fund escalating costs.

Defenses Based on Individual Autonomy and Critique of Overwork

Proponents of tang ping argue that individuals possess the to reject participation in hyper-competitive, zero-sum labor markets that prioritize economic output over personal health, viewing such an as a rational response to systemic rather than indolence. This perspective frames tang ping as an exercise of personal agency, allowing participants to allocate minimal effort toward basic sustenance while preserving mental and physical against societal demands for relentless achievement. Empirical data on underscore this claim, with estimates indicating approximately 600,000 annual deaths in attributable to excessive labor and related , surpassing global averages and highlighting the human cost of prolonged exertion. The critique of centers on practices like the "996" schedule—requiring 72 hours per week—which proponents decry as dehumanizing and violative of labor protections, treating workers as expendable resources akin to machinery rather than biological entities with finite capacities. In , where legal standards cap at 36 hours monthly, such regimens have persisted in and other sectors, contributing to documented cases of sudden deaths from exhaustion, including high-profile incidents in 2021 and 2022 involving software engineers. Advocates contend that subordinating individual to aggregate GDP growth ignores causal realities of fatigue-induced errors and chronic conditions, with longitudinal studies showing elevated all-cause mortality rates—4.15 per 1,000 person-years—for those exceeding 55 hours weekly compared to 1.67 for standard schedules. This stance prioritizes verifiable physiological limits, positing that sustained erodes productivity and without commensurate societal gains. While tang ping adherents report anecdotal reductions in and anxiety through disengagement, empirical validation remains constrained to small-scale or indirect assessments, with public surveys revealing mixed moral perceptions rather than widespread quantifiable improvements. Proponent claims of enhanced thus hinge on individual-level relief from documented stressors like , but lack robust, scalable evidence absent broader structural reforms to mitigate involutionary pressures. This defense, though grounded in autonomy, acknowledges that isolated opting-out does not resolve underlying labor imbalances, potentially limiting its efficacy to personal rather than systemic critique.

Evolution and Variants

Transition to Bai Lan

In 2022, the phrase bai lan (摆烂, literally "let it rot") emerged online among Chinese youth as a successor to tang ping, signifying a shift toward even greater passivity through deliberate underperformance in professional and academic settings. Originating from basketball slang for intentionally tanking games to secure better draft picks, bai lan adapted to describe minimal compliance—completing only the bare essentials at work or school to evade dismissal or failure, without investing effort in improvement or ambition. This evolution reflected suppressed overt resistance after official crackdowns on tang ping, channeling disillusionment into subtler, internalized sabotage rather than outright withdrawal. The rise of bai lan coincided with escalating economic pressures, including reaching a record 19.3% in June 2022 amid the prolonged lockdowns that disrupted job markets and heightened competition for limited opportunities. These policies, enforced through strict quarantines and business closures, exacerbated among graduates, fostering a sense of systemic futility where high effort yielded . Reports from that period noted bai lan gaining traction on social platforms as a response to these conditions, with young people expressing readiness to "let it rot" in the face of unattainable societal expectations for success. Unlike tang ping's emphasis on voluntary simplicity and opting out of the , bai lan embodies a more resigned, corrosive —participating in structures while undermining them through , signaling deeper from meritocratic ideals amid persistent structural barriers. This transition marked an adaptive phase in the , sustaining of overwork culture through covert means as explicit advocacy faced .

Persistence Amid Ongoing Crises

Despite intensified economic pressures, including a record 11.79 million university graduates entering the labor market in 2024 amid rates reaching 17.1% by July of that year, tang ping attitudes demonstrated continuity into 2025 through adaptive practices like minimalist RV living and psychological disengagement from high-stakes competition. Practitioners increasingly adopted lifestyles in recreational vehicles to minimize expenses and evade urban overwork, reflecting a broader rejection of sedentary in favor of nomadic , as observed among a emerging of RV dwellers since 2023. This endurance manifested in a psychological shift toward survival-oriented behaviors, where tang ping coexists with more defiant "throwing bombs" mentalities—symbolizing sporadic high-risk actions amid perceived systemic futility—rather than fading under duress. Analyses from 2025 highlight how such mindsets, including tang ping's low-effort ethos, influence broader economic psychology by fostering widespread Gen Z disaffection, evidenced in surveys linking the trend to voluntary "low-desire" living and rejection of rat-race ambitions. Tang ping's scale remained non-dominant yet culturally resonant, evading official through underground forums and evolving expressions that sustained its critique of on effort, even as youth joblessness hovered near 19% into late 2025. This adaptation underscores its role as an influential undercurrent in China's protracted demographic and crises, including persistently low birth rates exacerbating labor strains.

Global Comparisons and Influences

Parallels in Other Societies

In the , the "quiet quitting" phenomenon, which gained prominence in 2022, shares conceptual similarities with tang ping through its emphasis on performing only the minimum required job duties to avoid and . Gallup surveys indicate that approximately 50% of U.S. workers engaged in quiet quitting behaviors by 2023, often as a voluntary response to post-pandemic work-life imbalances rather than a wholesale rejection of ambition. Unlike tang ping's roots in systemic economic entrapment, quiet quitting in the U.S. context frequently stems from individual agency in more flexible labor markets, with participants maintaining while setting personal boundaries. South Korea's "sampo generation," a term emerging around 2010 and referring to youth who relinquish aspirations for , , and amid , parallels tang ping in its demographic-driven opt-out from traditional life milestones. This cohort, facing rates exceeding 7% in recent years and intense job competition, prioritizes basic financial security over societal expectations, echoing tang ping's minimalist ethos but extending to family formation due to housing costs and imbalances. The sampo trend has evolved into "N-po" (giving up N things), reflecting broader disillusionment in high-pressure East Asian economies. Cross-regional studies highlight elevated youth disengagement in competitive Asian markets, with the reporting East Asia's at a historic 14.5% in , correlating with opt-out behaviors tied to and stagnant wages. While parallels like quiet quitting allow for reversible participation, Asian variants exhibit greater intensity due to cultural emphases on collective achievement and limited social safety nets, fostering deeper withdrawal from productivity norms.

Cross-Cultural Resonances

The tang ping concept gained international attention through media coverage starting in , prompting discussions of "lying flat" as a response to in countries like the and . In the U.S., parallels were drawn to the 2022 "quiet quitting" trend, where workers minimized effort beyond contractual duties amid post-pandemic , with some analysts tracing inspirational links to tang ping's rejection of hustle culture. In , youth disillusioned by competitive job markets and economic inequality echoed tang ping's low-desire ethos, viewing it as a potential antidote to societal pressures akin to China's "996" work system, though often framed as a temporary respite rather than sustained . These adaptations faced criticism abroad as imported defeatism, potentially undermining productivity in economies reliant on ambition-driven growth, with commentators arguing it discourages innovation without addressing root causes like wage stagnation. Resonances appear in Japan's freeter (part-time workers avoiding full-time commitment) and (not in education, employment, or training) phenomena, both emerging in the amid and reflecting youth withdrawal from rigid norms. Unlike these, which stem from prolonged recessions and personal isolation—sometimes extending to hikikomori seclusion—tang ping explicitly antagonizes state-endorsed overachievement, such as China's pro-natalist and high-growth policies, positioning it as passive resistance rather than mere . This distinction highlights universal human aversion to unrelenting pressure but underscores tang ping's contextual tie to authoritarian incentives for , contrasting Japan's more decentralized corporate cultures. Empirical analyses through 2025 indicate limited direct migration of tang ping practices abroad, attributed to variance in social systems; stronger safety nets in and the mitigate the acute desperation fueling China's , reducing incentives for widespread adoption. youth surveys and labor data show sporadic sympathy but persistent engagement in part-time or gig economies rather than full disengagement, suggesting tang ping's resonance validates shared stressors like without replicating due to differing institutional buffers.

Empirical Impacts and Analysis

Effects on Economy and Demographics

The tang ping movement correlates with reduced labor force engagement in , exacerbating high rates among those aged 16-24, which reached 21% in mid-2023 before official metrics adjusted to 14.9-15.3% by late 2023 and early 2024. This detachment manifests in lower and structural inefficiencies, as participants opt for minimal effort over competitive "involution," contributing to broader . Such trends undermine initiatives like Jinping's strategy, which relies on domestic innovation and consumption but faces resistance from youth disillusionment with overwork. A 2025 Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis highlights how tang ping responses to have prompted government calls for industry self-discipline to counteract declining ambition. Demographically, tang ping amplifies China's crisis by fostering mindsets that delay or forgo and childbearing, with surveys indicating preferences for personal autonomy over family formation amid economic uncertainty. Births dropped to 9.02 million in 2023, yielding a rate of about 1.0 births per woman—well below replacement levels—and persisted into 2024, with no significant rebound despite incentives. This reluctance ties to tang ping's rejection of societal pressures, symbolically reinforcing low pro-natalist sentiment even as comprise a shrinking of just 7%. A 2023 Berkeley Economic Review assessment deems the movement's aggregate effects marginal in scale but indicative of deeper workforce and demographic erosion risks.

Causal Assessment and Future Trajectories

The phenomenon of tang ping arises from structural economic pressures in , including neijuan (involution), where intense competition for finite opportunities yields diminishing marginal returns on individual effort, as evidenced by persistent youth unemployment rates exceeding 18% in 2025 despite overall targets. This dynamic fosters and workplace anxiety, mediating the link between perceived over-competition and withdrawal behaviors, rather than being solely a rational response to absolute scarcity. However, causal realism highlights that while external incentives like high costs and limited upward contribute, the amplification occurs through individual agency loss—exacerbated by platforms that normalize disengagement via algorithmic reinforcement of pessimistic narratives, creating self-reinforcing cycles detached from broader potentials. Empirical models underscore this, showing how echo-like online communities sustain tang ping attitudes independent of verifiable economic reforms, prioritizing short-term psychological relief over long-term adaptation. Looking ahead, tang ping's sustainability hinges on the pace of structural reforms; with projected to remain elevated amid 12 million-plus annual graduates and mismatched skills in state-dominated sectors, the trend is likely to persist absent that restores alignment. responses, such as crackdowns on related online discourse, have yielded limited reversal, as evolving variants like bai lan ("let it rot") indicate deepening tied to unaddressed cultures. Potential catalysts for re-engagement include market liberalization to expand private-sector opportunities, though historical patterns suggest state interventions favor stability over innovation, prolonging zero-sum competition. In the long term, tang ping risks entrenching a demographic , as psychological frameworks link prolonged withdrawal to skill and reduced adaptability, undermining aggregate without countervailing efforts like entrepreneurial incentives. It cannot serve as a , since sustained economic output demands voluntary effort amid ; unmitigated persistence could exacerbate declines and fiscal strains, per demographic models correlating disengagement with lower labor force participation. Trajectories favor continuity over resurgence unless causal drivers—rooted in policy-induced —are dismantled through verifiable , a prospect tempered by entrenched institutional preferences for .

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