Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Working-class culture

Working-class culture denotes the collective norms, values, social practices, and expressive traditions emergent from the socioeconomic conditions of individuals and households dependent on manual labor, skilled trades, or low-wage service employment, generally featuring limited formal education, occupational instability, and incomes below prevailing medians. This culture prioritizes parochial community bonds and present-focused pragmatism over cosmopolitan abstraction or deferred gratification, fostering resilience amid economic precarity through kin-based support networks and informal mutual aid. Core values include a robust work ethic rooted in tangible output, modesty eschewing ostentatious display, straightforward communication, and loyalty to immediate circles, which frequently conflict with the credentialed, individualistic ethos of professional classes and institutional elites. Defining expressions span vernacular arts like folk music and pub-based camaraderie, labor organizing traditions, and recreations emphasizing physicality such as team sports or DIY crafts, though these have waned under industrialization, deunionization, and media-driven homogenization that often marginalizes or stereotypes proletarian authenticity. Controversies arise from empirical divergences in worldview—working-class orientations toward contextual threat perception and interdependence yield lower uptake of elite-prescribed mobility paths like higher education, interpreted variably as adaptive realism or deficit—exacerbated by institutional analyses prone to pathologizing rather than elucidating causal socioeconomic constraints.

Definition and Characteristics

Defining the Working Class

The working class is fundamentally defined in economic terms as the socioeconomic stratum consisting of individuals and households whose primary means of livelihood derives from selling their labor power for wages, without ownership or significant control over the . This classical formulation, rooted in 19th-century analysis, distinguishes it from capitalists who derive income from and investments, emphasizing a structural dependency on employment rather than passive wealth accumulation. Historically, this class coalesced during the (circa 1760–1840 in ), when rural artisans and agricultural laborers migrated to factories, performing manual tasks in textiles, , and under wage systems that replaced independent craftsmanship. Sociological and economic definitions vary but commonly converge on occupational, educational, and criteria, though no single exists across disciplines. Occupationally, it encompasses blue-collar roles involving physical labor—such as , , , and transportation—as well as certain low-skill jobs requiring minimal formal training. Educationally, in modern contexts like the , the working class is often operationalized as the labor force participants lacking a four-year , comprising approximately two-thirds of the workforce as of and including high school graduates, dropouts, and those with some postsecondary vocational training. thresholds reinforce this, typically aligning with household earnings below national averages, adjusted for regional costs, though boundaries blur with rising service-sector employment. These definitions highlight causal realities of class formation: technological shifts, such as during industrialization, eroded and generated a proletarianized reliant on employers for survival, a dynamic persisting amid where non-degree holders face stagnant wages and job . Empirical data from labor statistics underscore this, with U.S. Bureau of Labor data showing working-class occupations averaging 20–30% lower median wages than professional roles in 2022, tied to limited absent ownership. While some scholars critique overly rigid Marxist binaries for overlooking intra-class gradients (e.g., skilled vs. unskilled laborers), the core attribute remains wage dependency as a barrier to economic , informing cultural adaptations like communal forged in shared labor conditions.

Key Cultural Traits

Working-class culture emphasizes a present-time orientation, prioritizing immediate experiences and over deferred future rewards, as opposed to the future-oriented planning prevalent in middle-class norms. This trait stems from economic instability, where job insecurity and low savings rates—evident in U.S. data showing working-class households holding median wealth of $24,100 in 2019 compared to $188,200 for middle-class—foster a focus on current survival rather than speculative investment. A core value is collectivism, manifesting in strong loyalty to family, peers, and local communities, often prioritizing group solidarity over individual ambition. Anthropological studies highlight this through extended family networks providing mutual aid, such as shared childcare or financial support during unemployment, contrasting with middle-class individualism. In working-class settings, bravery and physical toughness are esteemed, reflecting the demands of manual labor; for instance, mining communities in 20th-century Britain valued "mateship" in hazardous environments, where collective risk-sharing built enduring bonds. Fatalism permeates attitudes, viewing life outcomes as largely predetermined by external forces like economic cycles or chance, rather than personal agency alone. This derives from repeated exposure to uncontrollable events, such as factory closures; U.K. sociological data from the 1960s onward linked it to lower educational aspirations, with working-class youth showing 20-30% less emphasis on upward mobility planning than peers. Yet, this coexists with resilience, evident in cultural expressions like gallows humor and stoicism during hardships, as documented in oral histories from U.S. Rust Belt workers post-1980s deindustrialization. Parochialism defines spatial and social focus, favoring local ties and skepticism toward distant institutions or elites, rooted in geographic near workplaces. Surveys indicate working-class individuals report higher trust in immediate neighbors (65% in U.S. polls from ) but lower confidence in national or (under 40%), reflecting lived experiences of policy detachment. These traits, while adaptive to constraints, can hinder in credential-driven economies, per longitudinal studies tracking intergenerational rates of 40-50% in working-class status.

Historical Development

Industrial Origins

The First Industrial Revolution in , from roughly 1760 to 1830, catalyzed the emergence of working-class culture by restructuring labor from agrarian and artisanal forms to mechanized production. Innovations such as ' (1764) and James Watt's improvements (1769) enabled mass textile manufacturing, concentrating workers in urban mills and mines where output surged—cotton consumption, for instance, rose from 5 million pounds in 1790 to 52 million by 1810. This displaced rural laborers via enclosures and deskilled craftsmen, compelling adaptation to rigid routines often exceeding 12 hours daily under poor ventilation and high injury risks, as documented in parliamentary reports from the era. accelerated accordingly, with England's urban dwellers surpassing 50% of the population by 1851, up from under 20% in 1750, concentrating proletarians in slums like Manchester's where density fostered interpersonal bonds amid squalor. Early working-class cultural practices arose from necessity and continuity with pre-industrial traditions, manifesting in mutual aid institutions and collective defiance. Friendly societies, self-organized groups for insurance against illness and death, proliferated with 925,000 members by 1815, representing about 9% of adult males and embodying values of reciprocity inherited from guild systems but scaled to industrial instability. Resistance movements like the Luddites (1811–1816), involving thousands of skilled knitters smashing automated frames in Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire, highlighted not blanket opposition to machinery but defense against wage cuts—down 25–50% in some cases—and unemployment, organized through oaths and nocturnal raids that built clandestine solidarity networks. These actions, repressed by military force including 17 executions, cultivated a narrative of agency against elite-imposed changes, distinct from passive victimhood. Historians such as , in his 1963 analysis drawing on correspondence, ballads, and court records, contend the English self-consciously coalesced between 1780 and 1832 through shared experiences of taxation, riots, and demands, defining as a dynamic process of relational antagonism rather than mere economic strata. Thompson's evidence, including over 400 plebeian autobiographies, reveals cultural artifacts like radical chapels and alehouse debates that instilled principles—fair pricing and community welfare—resisting market absolutism. While Thompson's framework privileges conflict over accommodation, verifiable patterns of union formation, such as the 1818 cotton spinners' strikes involving 10,000 participants, affirm how industrial pressures forged enduring traits of self-reliance and communal ethics, unmediated by later ideological overlays.

Mid-20th Century Peak

The mid-20th century, particularly the post-World War II era from the late 1940s to the 1970s, marked the zenith of working-class culture in the United States, characterized by economic security, social cohesion, and a robust sense of class identity rooted in industrial labor. This period saw manufacturing employment expand significantly, reaching a postwar peak of approximately 19.6 million jobs by 1979, providing stable, union-protected positions that afforded blue-collar workers unprecedented bargaining power and wage gains. Union membership rates climbed to one-third of the workforce in the 1950s, enabling collective agreements that secured benefits like pensions, health insurance, and overtime pay, which reinforced a culture of mutual aid and pride in manual craftsmanship. These gains stemmed from wartime industrial mobilization transitioning to peacetime production, fueled by pent-up consumer demand and government policies such as the GI Bill, which extended home loans and education to veterans, many from working-class backgrounds. Social structures exemplified stability, with nuclear families forming the core of working-class life amid low divorce rates—averaging 2.3 to 2.5 per 1,000 population in the , far below later peaks exceeding 5 per 1,000 in the . Homeownership surged among this demographic, contributing to a national rate increase of 20 percentage points from 1940 to 1960, as affordable suburban housing developments like enabled blue-collar families to achieve property ownership at median prices around $7,500–$10,000, symbolizing upward mobility without eroding class ties. networks thrived in ethnic enclaves and union halls, fostering rituals such as church suppers, local sports leagues, and fraternal organizations that emphasized self-reliance, thrift, and intergenerational continuity, distinct from emerging consumerist individualism. Culturally, this peak manifested in media portrayals of working-class heroes—think factory workers in films like (1954)—and leisure pursuits tied to labor's rhythms, including bowling leagues, amateur athletics, and radio serials that celebrated stoic resilience over elite sophistication. Yet, this era's cohesion was not without tensions; racial exclusions persisted, with union benefits often limited to white males until civil rights pressures in the , though data show broad wage compression that benefited the working majority. The period's prosperity, driven by domestic dominance rather than dependencies, sustained a causal link between productive labor and cultural vitality, peaking before and eroded these foundations by the late 1970s.

Post-Industrial Transition

The post-industrial transition, accelerating from the onward in Western economies, marked a profound shift from -dominated production to service- and knowledge-based sectors, fundamentally altering working-class cultural foundations built around stable industrial . , peaked at approximately 19.5 million jobs in 1979 before declining to about 12.8 million by 2011, driven primarily by and gains rather than alone, though contributed to localized losses. Similarly, in the , 's share of GDP fell from 30% in 1970 to 12% by 2010, with the sector's contracting sharply due to technological displacement and global competition. This transition eroded the that underpinned working-class communities, fostering precarious service jobs with lower wages, fewer benefits, and diminished through unions, which saw membership plummet from over 20 million in the U.S. in 1983 to around 14 million by 2020. Culturally, deindustrialization inflicted social ruination on former industrial heartlands, dismantling communal networks forged in factories and mills, where shared labor rituals reinforced solidarity, mutual aid, and pride in tangible production. Communities in places like the U.S. Rust Belt or UK's northern industrial towns experienced physical decay—abandoned plants symbolizing lost purpose—and psychological trauma, including heightened stigma against manual labor and a retreat into privatized leisure amid rising isolation. Traditional working-class values of self-reliance through skilled craftsmanship gave way to adaptation challenges, with many displaced workers facing underemployment in gig or retail roles that lacked the camaraderie and moral economy of industrial work, contributing to family instability and intergenerational disconnection from vocational pride. While automation boosted overall productivity and created net job gains in services, these often required different skills, exacerbating a cultural rift where working-class identity shifted from collective resilience to fragmented individualism, with empirical studies noting persistent wage stagnation for non-college-educated males. Globalization amplified these effects by enabling to low-wage regions, hollowing out domestic clusters and severing ties to place-based , such as regional dialects, festivals, and networks sustained by proximity to . In response, some working-class subcultures adapted through or retraining, but data indicate uneven recovery, with deindustrialized areas showing higher rates of social dysfunction, including epidemics linked to economic despair rather than inherent cultural deficits. This era thus transitioned working-class culture from a of industrial camaraderie to one navigating , where underscores causal links between job displacement and eroded communal vitality, challenging narratives that downplay structural losses in favor of aggregate .

Social and Familial Elements

Family Structures and Values

In historical contexts, particularly during the industrial era in the United States and from the late 19th to early 20th centuries, working-class families frequently relied on extended networks for survival, with relatives providing mutual economic support, childcare, and amid wage instability and frequent crises like illness or . These structures emphasized interdependence, with co-residence or close proximity among generations common—up to 23% of households in mid-19th-century , UK, classified as extended—contrasting with more nuclear arrangements in higher classes. Core values in these families included , , and the transmission of practical skills like hard work and , often reinforced through intergenerational living and shared labor contributions, such as children aiding household income. Family unity was framed as a for , with cultural norms prioritizing , straightforwardness, and familial over individual achievement. In contemporary Western societies, working-class family structures—defined by metrics like high school education or some without a and incomes in the 20th-50th percentiles—show elevated fragility relative to middle- and upper-class counterparts, attributable to economic pressures like job precariousness that heighten marital discord per the Family Stress Model. Marriage rates among working-class adults aged 18-55 stood at 39% in 2015 U.S. data, compared to 56% for college-educated or higher-income groups, reflecting a widening class gap from a near-parity of 72-76% in 1960.
Metric (U.S., )Working-ClassMiddle/Upper Class
Share Currently Married (Ages 18-55)39%56%
Divorce Rate Among Ever-Married41%30%
Nonmarital Childbearing (Infants <1 Year)36%13%
Single-parent households predominate among working-class children, with only 55% living with both biological parents by age 14 (2013-2015 data), versus 77% in higher classes, correlating with reduced child outcomes due to lower and heightened . Despite these strains, enduring values stress familial and work ethic inculcation, with non-college-educated parents often viewing as bolstering rather than supplanting self-sufficiency. Fertility averages 1.8 children per working-class woman, slightly above higher-class rates but increasingly outside , underscoring tensions between traditional ideals and material constraints.

Community and Social Networks

Working-class communities have historically featured dense, localized social networks centered on neighborhoods, workplaces, and mutual aid organizations, which provided essential support in the absence of extensive state welfare systems. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, mutual aid societies proliferated among industrial workers, offering benefits like sickness pay, funeral expenses, and job assistance through member contributions and reciprocity, with thousands of such groups documented in the U.S. by the 1910s, particularly among miners and laborers in regions like Colorado and the Southwest. Labor unions further reinforced these networks by combining economic bargaining with social functions, such as fraternal activities and community advocacy, enabling workers to share grievances and coordinate responses to hardships. Empirical studies indicate that working-class often manifests in place-based, homogeneous ties, with lower-income individuals relying more heavily on and proximate contacts for resource access compared to higher classes, who benefit from broader, cross-status connections. For instance, research on U.S. communities shows that working-class networks emphasize mutual support in daily challenges, such as childcare or job leads, but exhibit internal hierarchies based on tie strength, limiting upward mobility without . These structures foster in economically precarious environments, as evidenced by initiatives in working-class areas addressing and , though they can reinforce insularity. Deindustrialization since the 1970s has eroded these networks, correlating with declines in community cohesion and in manufacturing-dependent regions. In the U.S., areas experiencing sharp factory job losses saw reduced associational participation and , with one linking a 10% manufacturing employment drop to measurable decreases in and rates. Working-class , in particular, report lower participation in extracurriculars and parental interactions, exacerbating amid geographic mobility and economic disruption. Despite this, informal ties persist in residual industrial pockets, aiding coping in urban shrinkage through localized reciprocity.

Values and Lifestyle

Work Ethic and Self-Reliance

Working-class culture historically prioritized a adapted to the demands of manual labor and economic survival, where individuals engaged in extended shifts—often 10 to 12 hours daily in 19th-century factories—to secure wages without institutional support. This diligence was not uniform adherence to but reflected amid harsh conditions, as seen in immigrant steelworkers' high tolerance (25% annual rate at plants, 1907-1910) and artisans' maintenance of preindustrial work rhythms like "" to preserve autonomy. Such practices stemmed from causal necessities of sustenance in resource-scarce environments, prioritizing output tied to immediate needs over abstract ideals. Self-reliance complemented this ethic through emphasis on personal resourcefulness and community-based solutions, evident in workers' formation of cooperatives and unions to counter dependence on employers—such as 68.7% foreign-born organization rates in Illinois by 1886—and savings goals for land ownership among immigrants viewing factory work as temporary. Qualitative accounts from working-class families highlight instilled values of perseverance and skill acquisition without formal aid, as parents transmitted habits of self-provision to overcome barriers like limited resources. Attitudinal surveys reinforce this, with working-class identifiers rating self-reliance (51%) above obedience (43%) and associating moral worth with hard work and family provision. Empirical analyses link these traits to socioeconomic context, where fosters stronger endorsement of effort-based and accountability, contrasting with perceptions of middle-class reliance on networks. Post-industrial data shows persistence, as working-class respondents in studies uphold norms of reliability amid cultural mismatches in white-collar settings, though broader trends indicate generational erosion across classes. sources, often shaped by institutional biases favoring structural explanations over personal , may underemphasize these strengths, yet the data consistently affirm their role in sustaining labor contributions despite policy-induced disruptions like expansions.

Religion and Moral Frameworks

In historical working-class communities of 19th-century England, religion, particularly nonconformist Protestantism, served as a central moral anchor despite irregular formal church attendance; the 1851 Religious Census revealed that only about 40-50% of the urban working population were regular churchgoers, yet informal practices like hymn-singing and folk prayers embedded Christian ethics of personal responsibility and communal solidarity into daily life. These frameworks emphasized virtues such as thrift, temperance, and diligence, often reinforced through chapel-based mutual aid societies that provided welfare absent from state systems, fostering a causal link between faith-derived self-reliance and economic survival in industrial towns. In the United States, 20th-century working-class culture integrated with labor movements, where Catholic and Protestant congregations offered moral guidance on and honest toil; by the , unions affiliated with churches represented over 35% of organized labor, promoting ethical norms against while upholding traditional prohibitions on like and . This religious influence cultivated a prioritizing immediate obligations and reciprocal community support over abstract , with empirical studies showing working-class adherents deriving from church networks amid socioeconomic deprivation. Post-industrial shifts have accelerated among working-class populations, with religious attendance declining relative to higher-educated groups; U.S. data from 1972-2010 indicate moderately educated whites () experienced steeper drops in churchgoing, correlating with reduced reliance on faith-based due to expanding provisions. Nonetheless, contemporary surveys reveal persistent : in 2023, lower-income Americans showed higher Christian identification rates, with 66% overall affiliating as Christian versus disproportionate unaffiliation among those earning over $100,000 annually. These residual frameworks continue to stress causal —evident in higher endorsement of traditional bindings like and sanctity among conservative working-class demographics—contrasting with .

Leisure and Entertainment

Working-class leisure in the industrial era centered on affordable, communal activities that provided respite from long shifts, often lasting 12-14 hours daily in the early . Pubs emerged as primary social hubs in , where laborers gathered for ale, conversation, and games like or after work, fostering community bonds amid urban isolation. By the mid-, over 100,000 pubs operated in , serving as venues for working men to unwind from grueling labor, with patterns rooted in pre-industrial traditions but intensified by schedules. Music halls and variety theaters became staples of British working-class entertainment from the 1850s onward, offering low-cost admission—often a few pence—for acts including comedians, singers, and acrobats that satirized daily hardships and upper-class pretensions. These venues, numbering over 300 in by 1875, drew predominantly male audiences initially, evolving to include women by the as a form of and for performers from humble origins. In the United States, analogous shows and early nickelodeons from the 1890s provided similar accessible spectacles, with motion pictures capturing leisure scenes like games and dances, reflecting growing free time as weekly hours dropped from 60+ to around 50 by 1915. Sports participation emphasized team-based, participatory pursuits over elite spectatorship, with soccer and in British mill towns or in industrial cities serving as outlets for physical exertion and local pride. and blood sports like persisted into the despite regulatory efforts, while seaside excursions and fairs offered seasonal collective enjoyment, peaking in popularity by the 1880s with railway access. Commercialized options expanded in the , including cinemas—where working-class audiences flocked to films by the —and amusement parks, though these often prioritized profit over communal ties. Post-World War II shifts toward and radio democratized home-based , yet pubs retained cultural significance until economic pressures like rising costs and community fragmentation led to closures, with over 1,000 pubs shutting annually by the . Modern data reveal socioeconomic disparities, as youth from households earning under $75,000 show declining involvement since 2011, dropping 7-10% in team activities compared to higher-income peers, attributed to costs and access barriers rather than preference. This evolution underscores leisure's transition from integrated, low-cost communal rituals to individualized, market-driven pursuits, influenced by wage gains and but constrained by persistent economic realities.

Political Orientations

Conservative Alignments

Working-class culture has historically exhibited alignments with conservative principles, particularly in , national sovereignty, and skepticism toward elite-driven progressive agendas. In the United States, this manifested prominently during the 1980s with the emergence of "Reagan Democrats," a bloc of white working-class voters who shifted from the to support Reagan's 1980 and 1984 presidential campaigns, drawn by appeals to , traditional values, and economic self-reliance amid perceptions of Democratic overreach on cultural issues. These voters prioritized cultural preservation over class-based economic redistribution, viewing as protective of community norms against rapid and internationalism. Core values underpinning these alignments include strong adherence to traditional family structures, religious observance, and a preference for law-and-order policies. Surveys indicate that working-class individuals, particularly those without college degrees, report higher rates of religiosity and moral traditionalism compared to upper classes, fostering support for conservative stances on issues like abortion restrictions and marriage definitions. In Britain, similar patterns emerged, with working-class voters in deindustrialized regions aligning with the Conservative Party on sovereignty and immigration controls, as evidenced by the 2016 Brexit referendum where lower-income groups favored Leave by margins exceeding 60% in many constituencies. This reflects a causal link between lived experiences of community erosion and resistance to policies perceived as diluting national identity. In contemporary politics, these alignments persist through electoral realignments favoring conservative parties. American National Election Studies data from 2024 reveal that white working-class voters (non-college-educated whites) supported candidates at rates above 60%, driven by ideological commitments to rather than solely economic grievances. In the UK, the 2019 general election saw Conservatives secure a of C2DE (working-class) votes, particularly in former heartlands, on platforms emphasizing border security and traditional values, though subsequent shifts highlight volatility tied to policy delivery. analyses underscore that such voters often prioritize tangible protections for their way of life over abstract egalitarian ideals propagated by academic and elites, whose biases toward narratives may understate these preferences.

Socialist Influences and Critiques

Socialist ideologies gained traction among working-class communities in the mid-19th century, emphasizing collective action against capitalist exploitation and fostering cultural elements like mutual aid societies and class-based solidarity. The First International, founded in 1864 as the International Workingmen's Association, united workers across Europe to advocate for shorter workdays and better conditions, drawing on Marxist principles of proletarian revolution outlined in The Communist Manifesto (1848). In the United States, socialist thought influenced early labor organizations such as the Knights of Labor, established in 1869, which by 1886 boasted over 700,000 members and promoted cooperative production models alongside strikes for wage increases. These movements embedded socialist rhetoric into working-class folklore, songs, and educational cooperatives, portraying labor as a moral force against bourgeois oppression. By the early , socialist parties channeled working-class grievances into political platforms, contributing to legislative reforms that reshaped cultural norms around work and community. In , the (SPD), formed in 1875, integrated Marxist analysis into union strategies, helping secure unemployment insurance in 1911 and influencing a cultural shift toward viewing the state as a protector of proletarian interests. Similarly, in the U.S., the reached its peak membership of about 118,000 in 1912, backing strikes like the 1919 Steel Strike involving 350,000 workers, which advanced demands for and the eight-hour day. These efforts normalized socialist-infused values such as internationalism and anti-militarism in working-class enclaves, evident in cultural outputs like and celebrations originating from the 1886 . Critiques of socialist influences highlight their tendency to erode self-reliance and incentivize dependency, diverging from traditional working-class emphases on personal thrift and industriousness. Economists argue that expansive welfare states modeled on social democratic principles, such as those in post-1945 Scandinavia, reduced labor participation; for instance, Sweden's youth unemployment reached 25% in the early 1990s amid high marginal tax rates exceeding 60%, prompting market-oriented reforms that halved it by 2000. Empirical analyses show socialist policy adoption correlates with a 2 percentage point annual GDP growth decline in the first decade, constraining wage gains for low-skilled workers through diminished productivity incentives. From working-class viewpoints, as captured in Pew surveys, socialism is seen to weaken work ethic by decoupling effort from reward, with 36% of negative respondents citing reduced motivation and examples like Venezuela's hyperinflation (over 1 million percent in 2018) as evidence of policy failure. Further critiques point to socialism's cultural homogenization, suppressing individualistic traditions in favor of state-directed collectivism, which alienated segments of the prioritizing family and . In , Soviet-era policies suppressed independent unions, leading to worker resistance like Poland's movement, which grew to 10 million members by 1981 and rejected Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy for democratic self-governance. Observers note that while initial socialist reforms curbed child labor and established safety nets—such as the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 influenced by union pressures—long-term reliance on state intervention fostered bureaucratic inefficiencies, with union density in heavily socialized economies like dropping from 25% in 1970 to under 8% by 2020 amid rigid labor laws deterring hiring. These dynamics underscore a causal wherein socialist promises of often yielded paternalistic structures, prompting working-class realignments toward market-oriented in recent decades.

Responses to Welfare and Dependency

Working-class culture, rooted in traditions of labor and mutual aid, has historically exhibited skepticism toward expansive welfare systems, viewing them as potential threats to self-reliance and industriousness. This perspective posits that unconditional or generous benefits can foster a "dependency culture," where reliance on state aid supplants personal initiative, eroding the motivational structures that sustain employment and family stability. Empirical analyses, such as Charles Murray's 1984 examination of U.S. social policy from 1950 to 1980, argue that welfare expansions inadvertently incentivized behaviors detrimental to upward mobility, including increased out-of-wedlock births (rising from 5% to 18% among whites and higher among blacks) and labor force withdrawal, as benefits often exceeded low-wage earnings. Such concerns are echoed in working-class attitudes, where surveys indicate widespread belief that can undermine ; for instance, 68% of Republicans—who often draw from working-class demographics—perceive it as promoting rather than self-sufficiency. Intergenerational of welfare use provides supporting , with studies showing parental reliance increasing children's participation by up to 2.6 percentage points, perpetuating cycles that conflict with cultural emphases on . Critics within this worldview highlight "welfare cliffs," where benefit phase-outs create effective marginal tax rates exceeding 100%, discouraging part-time work or skill-building among those on the margins of the labor market. Responses have manifested in political advocacy for reforms prioritizing work requirements and time limits, as exemplified by the U.S. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which replaced open-ended Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with (TANF). This legislation, influenced by dependency critiques, led to a 60% decline in welfare caseloads by 2000 and boosted labor force participation among low-income single mothers by approximately 10 percentage points, demonstrating that structured aid aligns with working-class values of reciprocity over perpetual support. Post-reform data further substantiates reduced dependency, with poverty rates among affected groups falling amid rising employment, countering academic narratives that often minimize incentive effects due to ideological preferences for expansive redistribution. In , similar sentiments underpin resistance to unchecked social assistance, where working-class voters have supported policies like the UK's 2010s reforms, which integrated benefits with work mandates to mitigate "benefit traps" that trap recipients in idleness. These cultural responses underscore a preference for safety nets as bridges to rather than hammocks of indolence, informed by firsthand observations of how correlates with breakdown, such as elevated rates of family fragmentation in high-welfare locales. While some econometric studies contest strong causal links, the tangible successes of work-conditioned reforms validate working-class insistence on policies that reinforce, rather than supplant, the ethic of productive labor.

Economic Realities and Contributions

Labor and Trade Skills

Labor and trade skills form a cornerstone of working-class culture, encompassing specialized manual proficiencies in areas such as , , , and utilities maintenance, which demand practical expertise over theoretical . These skills enable the tangible of goods and , from building homes and bridges to repairing machinery, reflecting a historical emphasis on apprenticeship-based learning that traces back to pre-industrial guilds and evolved through the Industrial Revolution's demand for reliable craftsmanship. Acquisition of these skills typically occurs via registered apprenticeship programs, which combine paid with classroom instruction, allowing workers to earn while mastering competencies like , , or . In 2021, the U.S. hosted nearly 27,000 such programs, with apprentices seeing progressive wage increases as they gain proficiency, culminating in an average starting salary of $80,000 upon completion and 90% employment retention rates. Outcomes from these programs demonstrate higher long-term earnings compared to non-apprenticeship vocational paths, as hands-on fosters durable in sectors resistant to . Prominent trade occupations include electricians, plumbers, carpenters, and machinists, with median annual wages exceeding $60,000 for many as of May 2022 data, often surpassing entry-level white-collar roles without requiring four-year degrees. The U.S. projects steady demand, with construction and extraction occupations expected to add jobs through 2033 due to needs. These skills underpin , as tradespeople maintain essential systems like power grids and water supplies, contributing to national productivity without reliance on advanced credentials. Within working-class culture, trade skills embody a ethic of craftsmanship, where and durability signify personal and communal reliability, countering mass-produced uniformity with quality. This heritage fosters , as workers troubleshoot and innovate on-site, a trait undervalued in knowledge-economy narratives but empirically vital for societal function.

Economic Achievements

The working class played a pivotal role in the economic expansion of the by providing the labor force essential for mechanized production and development. In , between 1760 and 1860, workers in factories, textiles, and sectors adapted to new technologies, contributing to an increase in capital stock and output that positioned the country as the "workshop of the world." This era's gains, though initially gradual at around 0.2-0.5% annually before accelerating post-1800, were driven by the scale of working-class , which expanded the industrial base despite challenging conditions. Real wage improvements for working-class laborers underscored these efforts, with blue-collar earnings in rising slowly from 1781 to 1819 before accelerating rapidly thereafter, reflecting productivity spillovers from labor-intensive innovations in steam power and machinery. In the United States, similar dynamics emerged, as factory workers and urban laborers fueled growth, enabling greater crop production through mechanized and supporting the rise of a consumer economy. By the early , organized working-class actions further amplified these gains; during , near-full employment conditions led to significant real wage increases and enhanced political leverage for laborers. Notable individual achievements from working-class origins highlight entrepreneurial ingenuity within this cultural framework. , raised in poverty and supporting himself through manual jobs like , secured over 1,000 patents, including the practical in 1879, which powered industrial scalability and urban electrification. Similarly, figures like , who immigrated from and labored as a on , founded in 2009, building it into a platform serving billions and achieving a $19 billion acquisition by in 2014, demonstrating how working-class resilience can yield transformative economic value. These examples, rooted in self-taught skills and persistent labor, contributed to broader technological and market advancements beyond collective industrial output.

Impacts of Globalization and Policy

has accelerated in Western working-class communities by enabling of to lower-wage countries, resulting in substantial job displacement for non-college-educated workers. , declined from 17.3 million in 2000 to 11.5 million by 2010, with import competition from —intensified after its 2001 accession—accounting for approximately 2 million job losses, or about one-quarter of the sector's contraction during that period. This "" disproportionately hit regions like the Midwest and , where working-class culture historically centered on factory labor, skills, and stability tied to industrial output. Trade policies such as the (), implemented in 1994, contributed modestly to net U.S. job losses—estimated at around 15,000 annually—while facilitating the relocation of higher-wage manufacturing to , though some analyses argue it preserved jobs by integrating North American supply chains against Asian competition. However, these policies often lacked robust adjustment mechanisms, such as retraining or wage insurance, leaving displaced workers in protracted or low-skill service roles, which eroded traditional working-class values of and craftsmanship. Empirical studies indicate that widened , with less-skilled workers experiencing stagnant or declining —reduced by up to 5.5% or $1,800 annually by 2011 due to trade with developing nations—while overall consumer prices for goods fell, benefiting higher-income households more diffusely. The cultural ramifications include heightened social disintegration, as severed community ties forged in union halls and , fostering economic insecurity and "deaths of despair" like overdoses, which surged in affected U.S. counties post-2000. Policy shortcomings, including insufficient trade-adjustment assistance and reliance on expanded programs, have been critiqued for promoting dependency over reintegration into productive labor, contrasting with working-class norms of and . This vacuum has fueled populist political responses, with voters in deindustrialized areas supporting protectionist platforms to restore over and . While proponents of highlight aggregate GDP gains, the concentrated costs on working-class locales underscore a causal disconnect between elite-driven and localized cultural resilience.

Modern Decline and Challenges

Demographic and Participation Shifts

The working-class population, often defined by lack of a four-year degree, constitutes approximately 60.7% of the U.S. labor force, totaling 93.6 million individuals as of , though this share has diminished relative to prior decades due to rising overall . Between 1993 and , the proportion of adults aged 25 and older with a or higher increased by 74.9%, reducing the relative size of the non-college-educated cohort that anchors traditional working-class demographics. This shift reflects broader socioeconomic mobility patterns, where correlates with access to occupations, leaving manual and roles increasingly concentrated among those without postsecondary credentials. Mortality trends have exacerbated demographic contraction within the , particularly among non-Hispanic white adults lacking college education, through elevated rates of "deaths of despair"—suicides, drug overdoses, and alcohol-related fatalities. These deaths rose sharply from the mid-1990s onward, reversing prior gains in and contributing to stagnant or declining midlife mortality for this group, as documented by economists and . By the 2010s, such mortality accounted for much of the increase in overall U.S. death rates among working-age individuals without college degrees, disproportionately affecting men in deindustrialized regions and undermining community stability integral to working-class cultural continuity. Labor force participation among working-class men has undergone pronounced decline, signaling reduced engagement in the economic and structures that historically defined . For U.S.-born men aged 16 to 64 without a , the share not in the labor force rose by nearly 15 percentage points on average across states from 1960 to 2024, with prime-age (25-54) non--educated men exhibiting participation rates that fell from over 97% in earlier generations to around 86% by 2023. This trend, accelerating post-2000, stems from factors including job losses and barriers to re-entry for less-educated workers, resulting in higher workforce exit rates compared to college graduates. Among millennial men at age 25, approximately 14% were outside the labor force in recent cohorts, compared to negligible shares in prior generations, fostering generational disengagement from work-centric norms. These shifts have cultural ramifications, as declining participation correlates with weakened ties to institutions like unions and community organizations that sustained working-class , while demographic losses diminish the transmission of intergenerational traditions such as apprenticeships and local festivals. Native-born working-class cohorts face replacement pressures from in low-skill sectors, further diluting participation in authentic class-specific practices, though empirical data underscore that U.S.-born non-participation drives the core trend independent of inflows. Overall fertility declines to 1.60 births per woman by projected 2035 amplify these dynamics, constraining future working-class recruitment amid persistent economic disincentives for formation in this stratum.

Cultural Erosion Factors

Deindustrialization, beginning in the 1970s and accelerating through the , eroded working-class by dismantling the base that sustained community cohesion and occupational pride. In regions like the U.S. and , factory closures displaced millions, leading to rates exceeding 20% in affected areas by the early and fostering a pervasive sense of loss that undermined traditional values of and craftsmanship. This shift replaced skilled labor with precarious service-sector roles, diminishing intergenerational transmission of trade knowledge and weakening local institutions like unions and churches that once reinforced communal bonds. Family structure breakdown represents a core cultural erosion, with nonmarital births among white working-class Americans rising from under 5% in 1960 to approximately 40% by 2010, compared to stable low rates in upper-class cohorts. rates surged post-1965 no-fault laws, contributing to single-parent households that correlated with reduced child outcomes in and ; empirical data from analyses show this divergence widened class-based cultural gaps, as upper classes maintained norms fostering stability. Accompanying this, male labor force participation among non-college-educated workers plummeted from over 90% in 1960 to around 70% by 2010, linked to declining industriousness and increased idleness, patterns substantiated by longitudinal labor statistics rather than solely . Civic and religious disengagement further attenuated working-class culture, with dropping from majority levels in the to below 30% by the 2000s in working-class enclaves, eroding that historically buffered economic hardship. Mass media's pervasive influence exacerbated this by underrepresenting working-class realities and amplifying elite-driven narratives of and , which empirical studies link to shifted social norms away from communal obligations; heavy correlates with acceptance of as inherent to working-class failings, per analyses. These factors, compounded by policy expansions in welfare that some data associate with reduced work incentives, illustrate a self-reinforcing cycle where cultural norms decoupled from first-generation immigrant or post-WWII working-class .

Pathways to Renewal

Renewal of working-class culture requires addressing root causes of decline through evidence-based strategies emphasizing skill acquisition, family formation, and reduced on state support. Empirical analyses indicate that adherence to the "success sequence"—completing beyond high school, securing full-time prior to , and delaying childbearing until —enables 97 percent of adherents to avoid , a pattern holding across racial groups based on data from 1978 to 2015. This sequence fosters and community stability, countering cultural erosion by prioritizing causal links between personal choices and economic outcomes. Policy interventions must incentivize such behaviors without supplanting individual agency, as studies show that external incentives alone yield limited long-term gains absent internal motivation. Vocational education and apprenticeships offer a primary pathway by restoring practical skills and economic agency lost to deindustrialization and academic elitism. Upper secondary vocational training correlates with 10-20 percent higher hourly earnings and improved employability compared to general education tracks, per OECD longitudinal data across multiple countries. In the U.S., sector-focused job training programs have boosted participant earnings by up to 69.6 percent over basic services, with sustained employment gains five years post-completion, as evidenced by randomized evaluations of Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act initiatives. Expanding registered apprenticeships—combining on-the-job training with classroom instruction—could fill middle-skill job gaps (projected at 35 percent of U.S. employment), with federal tax credits covering 20 percent of employer costs for trainees earning under $60,000 annually proposed to accelerate adoption. These approaches rebuild cultural pride in labor by aligning education with tangible contributions, evidenced by higher job satisfaction and lower turnover in apprenticeship graduates versus college-only paths. Strengthening family structures constitutes another critical avenue, as stable two-parent households buffer against economic volatility and transmit across generations. States with higher rates exhibit 2-3 percentage points stronger and growth, per multivariate regressions controlling for and demographics in a 50-state analysis from 1970-2010. Working-class men married with children at home are 33.5 percentage points more likely to achieve than unmarried peers, correlating with reduced reliance on public assistance and improved child outcomes like . Policies promoting this include refundable tax credits capped at $80,000 income and public campaigns reinforcing the success sequence, which have shown efficacy in pilot programs reducing out-of-wedlock births by emphasizing causal realism over permissive norms. Such measures counteract family fragmentation, a factor explaining up to 40 percent of class-based mobility gaps in longitudinal studies. Reducing regulatory and welfare barriers enables self-sustaining communities by prioritizing work over dependency. Occupational licensing, affecting 29 percent of workers versus 5 percent in the 1950s, inflates entry costs into trades; interstate reciprocity compacts could lower barriers, boosting employment by 5-10 percent in licensed fields per White House economic modeling. Strengthening work requirements in programs like SNAP, paired with job placement, has increased labor force participation by 10-15 percent in experimental trials, while reforming unemployment insurance to offer lump-sum options incentivizes rapid reemployment. These reforms, grounded in causal evidence that unconditional aid erodes motivation, foster cultural renewal by reinstating reciprocity norms—evident in communities where phased welfare-to-work transitions halved long-term dependency rates. Cultural revitalization demands countering institutional biases that devalue manual labor and traditional values, often amplified in and . Empirical tracking of narrative shifts reveals that portrayals emphasizing victimhood over correlate with declining perceptions among youth, per surveys of attitudes. efforts, such as employer-led civic programs in Opportunity Zones, have enhanced local engagement and economic metrics by 15-20 percent in targeted areas, blending skills training with pride-building. Sustained hinges on broad adoption of these pathways, as isolated policies falter without cultural buy-in, underscoring the primacy of first-principles incentives over top-down mandates.

Controversies and Debates

Stereotypes and Media Misrepresentations

Media portrayals of the frequently rely on stereotypes depicting them as uneducated, lazy, culturally backward, or prone to behavior, such as criminality or . In television and film, characters embodying these traits—exemplified by Homer Simpson's indolence in or Doug Heffernan's unambitious demeanor in —reinforce a of working-class life as inherently dysfunctional and lacking . Such depictions contribute to a broader pattern where the is either rendered invisible or framed negatively, with empirical analyses showing they comprise only about 9% of speaking roles or on-screen presence in U.S. television despite representing roughly 30-40% of the population by occupational and metrics. This underrepresentation stems partly from production demographics, where over 80% of journalists and a majority of creatives hail from middle- or upper-class backgrounds, limiting authentic perspectives. News coverage exacerbates these misrepresentations, particularly in political contexts, by attributing working-class electoral choices—such as support for in 2016 or in 2016 and 2020—to irrational prejudice or ignorance rather than material concerns like job displacement from . For example, analyses of U.S. during the 2016 election highlight how outlets portrayed rural and industrial working-class voters as "dangerous idiots" driven by cultural resentment, overlooking data on manufacturing employment declines from 19.5 million jobs in 1979 to 12.4 million by 2020, which fueled legitimate economic alienation. Studies confirm this class-biased framing, where economic reporting prioritizes indicators favoring affluent consumers (e.g., gains) over stagnation affecting hourly workers, perpetuating a view of the working class as economically irrational or morally deficient. These diverge from empirical realities of working-class culture, which surveys and ethnographic describe as emphasizing hard work, , , and —values transmitted intergenerationally through parental modeling of labor discipline. 's failure to capture this complexity, often substituting reductive caricatures for nuanced representation, arises from institutional biases in newsrooms and studios, where producers undervalue or misunderstand proletarian experiences, leading to distorted perceptions that hinder on issues like trade impacts. Correcting such misrepresentations requires greater inclusion of working-class voices in production, as evidenced by calls for diversified staffing to align portrayals with demographic realities.

Class Mobility and the American Dream

The , as articulated in working-class culture, embodies the aspiration that diligent labor and enable individuals from modest origins to achieve economic and , often exemplified by homeownership, stable , and intergenerational advancement. This gained prominence post-World War II, when robust sectors and unionized trades facilitated widespread upward mobility for blue-collar families, with absolute income mobility—defined as children out-earning their parents—reaching approximately 90% for those born in 1940. However, empirical analyses indicate this trajectory has reversed, with absolute mobility plummeting to around 50% for cohorts born in the , reflecting a structural shift where rising outpaces wage growth for lower- and middle-income groups. Intergenerational relative , measuring transitions between quintiles, remains low compared to peer nations, with only about 8% of children from the bottom quintile reaching the top quintile as adults—a figure stagnant or declining since the late . For working-class households, typically defined by non-college-educated occupations and median household incomes below $75,000 as of 2023 data, this manifests in persistent "stickiness" at the lower end, where 40-50% of offspring remain in or fall to the bottom two quintiles. Recent updates from large-scale datasets, including tax records for over 57 million children, confirm that while racial gaps in have narrowed slightly since 2000, class-based disparities have widened, particularly among white working-class children born after 1980, who face reduced odds of exceeding parental earnings due to geographic and social segregation. Causal factors include the erosion of high-wage manual jobs from and , which reduced from 19 million in 1979 to 13 million by 2023, alongside surging tuition costs—up 180% since 1980 adjusted for —that disadvantage non-degree holders comprising 60% of the . structure plays a role, as single-parent households, now over 25% of working-class families versus 5% in 1960, correlate with 20-30% lower mobility rates in econometric models controlling for income. Policy-induced disincentives, such as expansive systems that can trap recipients in low-marginal-return cycles, further impede transitions, though cross-state variations highlight that areas with lower residential and stronger ties exhibit 10-15% higher mobility. Among working-class respondents, surveys reveal growing skepticism toward the American Dream's attainability, with only 42% of those earning under $50,000 believing hard work guarantees success as of 2024, down from 60% in the , fueling cultural disillusionment and political realignments. Counterarguments emphasize residual opportunities in and service sectors, where 39% of bottom-quintile children ascend at least one quintile, yet aggregate data underscores that without addressing inequality's drag— rising from 0.40 in 1980 to 0.41 in 2022—these paths insufficiently restore pre-1970s mobility levels for the .

References

  1. [1]
    9.3E: The Working Class - Social Sci LibreTexts
    Dec 15, 2020 · The working class consists of individuals and households with low educational attainment, low status occupations, and below average incomes.
  2. [2]
    Working Class Culture - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
    Working class culture is a discriminated cultural entity, shaped by class-specific socialization, and everyday ways of being shared by those in social and ...
  3. [3]
    How Class Cultures Work | Working-Class Perspectives
    Nov 15, 2021 · Working-class culture is more parochial and present-oriented, whereas middle-class culture is more cosmopolitan and future-oriented.
  4. [4]
    How the American Working Class Views the “Working Class” - MDPI
    Mar 12, 2019 · The working class values modesty, a strong work ethic, and loyalty, and has a humility-based ethos that clashes with academic expectations.
  5. [5]
    The psychology of social class: How socioeconomic status impacts ...
    Social class differences in identity, cognition, feelings, and behaviour make it less likely that working‐class individuals can benefit from educational and ...
  6. [6]
    Working class - Oxford Reference
    The working class is classically defined as that class which must sell its labour-power in order to survive. This was essentially what Karl Marx meant by ...
  7. [7]
    [PDF] Understanding the Working Class - Demos
    Defining The Working Class. Social scientists use 3 common methods to define class—by occupation, income, or education—and there is really no consensus ...
  8. [8]
    Creating the Working Class – HIS114 – United States to 1870
    The rise of industry created a new working class. This new working class included men, women and children. The new working class faced long hours, low wages, ...
  9. [9]
    Working Class: Definition, Compensation, and Job Examples
    The working class is a socioeconomic group characterized by low-paying jobs that typically require limited skills and education and are often found in the ...Defining the Working Class · Types of Working Class Jobs
  10. [10]
    What Policymakers Need To Know About Today's Working Class
    Apr 6, 2023 · This analysis defines the working class as comprising labor force participants who do not have a four-year college degree. It refers to non- ...
  11. [11]
    Understanding the Working Class | Demos
    Apr 16, 2018 · “Working class” is defined as individuals in the labor force who do not have bachelor's degrees. This includes high school dropouts, high school graduates, ...
  12. [12]
    Sugarman identified four key features of the working class ... - MyTutor
    Sugarman's four features are: Fatalism (no change possible), Collectivism (group over individual), Immediate Gratification (demanding pleasure now), and ...
  13. [13]
    Understanding Social Class as Culture - Behavioral Scientist
    Aug 12, 2016 · Unlike their middle- and upper-class counterparts, working-class individuals tend to live in a more uncertain world. They are more likely to be ...
  14. [14]
    Does the Working Class Have a Culture in the Anthropological Sense?
    This class culture values rough phys- ical labor, bravery, loyalty to mates ... Studies of working-class families also suggest that they retain more ...
  15. [15]
    Industrial Revolution | Definition, History, Dates, Summary, & Facts
    Oct 18, 2025 · Industrial Revolution, in modern history, the process of change from an agrarian and handicraft economy to one dominated by industry and machine manufacturing.
  16. [16]
    The first urban society
    Oct 31, 2024 · Britain was the first society to become predominantly urban, with over half the population living in towns or cities by 1851.
  17. [17]
    Friendly Societies | Encyclopedia.com
    May 18, 2018 · From an estimated 925,000 members in 1815 they grew to about 4 million in 1872—more than any social organization except the churches. By ...
  18. [18]
    Luddite | Industrial Revolution, Machine-Breaking, Protest Movement
    Oct 15, 2025 · Luddite, member of the organized bands of 19th-century English handicraftsmen who rioted for the destruction of the textile machinery that was displacing them.
  19. [19]
    E. P. Thompson, Politics and History: Writing Social History Fifty ...
    Apr 20, 2015 · Thompson aimed to rescue early working-class protest movements “from the enormous condescension of posterity,” to show how workers' struggles ...Missing: key arguments
  20. [20]
    [PDF] The Making of the English Working Class
    ENGLISH WORKING CLASS by. E. P. THOMPSON. PA TREON BOOKS. OF RA DOM HOUSE. EW YORK. Page 3. CO TE TS. Preface. Part One: THE LIB ER TY TREE. I Members Unlimited.
  21. [21]
    Forty years of falling manufacturing employment
    Nov 20, 2020 · In June 1979, manufacturing employment reached an all-time peak of 19.6 million. In June 2019, employment was at 12.8 million, down 6.7 million or 35 percent ...
  22. [22]
    Labor Unions and the U.S. Economy | U.S. Department of the Treasury
    Aug 28, 2023 · Union membership peaked in the 1950s at one-third of the workforce. At that time, despite pervasive racial and gender discrimination, overall ...
  23. [23]
    The Post World War II Boom: How America Got Into Gear - History.com
    May 14, 2020 · After years of wartime rationing, American consumers were ready to spend money—and factories made the switch from war to peacetime production.
  24. [24]
    How Marriage & Divorce Have Changed Since the 1950s
    Rating 4.1 (175) Jan 9, 2023 · The 1950 divorce rate (the number of divorces per 1,000 people) was 2.5. The 1955 divorce rate was 2.3. The 1958 divorce rate was 2.1.Missing: later | Show results with:later
  25. [25]
    Homeownership and Housing Equity in the Mid-Twentieth Century
    Sep 24, 2025 · The aggregate US homeownership rate increased by 20 percentage points from 1940 to 1960, the largest change in American homeownership in the ...
  26. [26]
    About Those 1950s Home Prices - Mid-Century Mondays
    Jan 29, 2024 · The 1950s were a decade marked by economic growth, rising wages, high birth rates, and a surge in homeownership. The median home price in the ...
  27. [27]
    The Rise of American Consumerism | American Experience - PBS
    Jobs were plentiful, wages were higher, and because of the lack of consumer goods during the war, Americans were eager to spend. During the same years, young ...
  28. [28]
    Cultural Pluralism and Social Structure in World War II - jstor
    Second, it examines the way in which wartime economic changes made the working class more socially homogeneous. Finally, it analyzes the character of the more ...
  29. [29]
    Unions help reduce disparities and strengthen our democracy
    Apr 23, 2021 · Unions lower inequality​​ Not coincidentally, union membership was at its highest rate in 1945, just as the war was ending. But as union strength ...Missing: peak | Show results with:peak
  30. [30]
    The evolution of US manufacturing | CEPR
    Aug 18, 2020 · US manufacturing employment has been falling since 1979, with particularly sharp declines in 2001 and 2007. There is considerable debate as to ...
  31. [31]
    Do Not Blame Trade for the Decline in Manufacturing Jobs - CSIS
    Oct 4, 2021 · ... in the twentieth century, reaching a peak of 38 percent during World War II. It was still at 32 percent in 1955 but steadily declined to 8 ...
  32. [32]
    Relative decline in UK manufacturing - Economics Help
    Feb 22, 2025 · UK manufacturing has been in relative decline since the 1960s. Manufacturing as a share of real GDP has fallen from 30% in 1970 to 12% in 2010.Missing: 1970-2020 | Show results with:1970-2020
  33. [33]
    The Social Costs Of Deindustrialization - Youngstown State University
    To put this differently, one of the social costs of deindustrialization is the declining economic security of the entire American middle and working class.
  34. [34]
    Deindustrialization & Its Aftermath: Class, Culture & Resistance
    Jul 5, 2013 · In the bitter aftermath of deindustrialization, working-class communities are often enveloped in silence and contend with stigmatization.Missing: impact post-
  35. [35]
    A New Era in Deindustrialization Studies?
    Sep 30, 2019 · Fundamentally, deindustrialization is a process of physical and social ruination as well as part of a wider political project that leaves ...
  36. [36]
    Deindustrialization and the American City - The Consilience Project
    Feb 22, 2021 · Deindustrialization has made it impossible for America to economically support a stable urbanized working class, resulting in the social and physical decay of ...
  37. [37]
    Deindustrialization in historical culture
    Nov 15, 2017 · Arguably the social consequences and the cultural trauma working-class communities have experienced under conditions of deindustrialization have ...
  38. [38]
    Full article: Deindustrialisation and 'Thatcherism': moral economy ...
    Aug 30, 2021 · This article examines the diverse understandings of this trend as they developed from the mid-1970s, and how this related to the politics of the time.<|separator|>
  39. [39]
    Understanding the impact of automation on workers, jobs, and wages
    Jan 19, 2022 · Automation often creates as many jobs as it destroys over time. Workers who can work with machines are more productive than those without them.
  40. [40]
    The Working Class and Globalization | George W. Bush Presidential ...
    Economic gains from globalization are an abstraction to many in the working class, fueling a push back against the global economy.
  41. [41]
    Globalization Has Undermined America's Working Class
    In the United States, jobs are disappearing. From construction zones to clerical offices to coal mines, the American working class is losing ground.
  42. [42]
    Op-Ed: Deindustrialization Isn't (Just) a White Working-Class Problem
    Feb 28, 2020 · Deindustrialization has negatively impacted black and white workers alike, but white Americans have historically recovered more easily from displacement.
  43. [43]
    “The Wounds of Class”: A Historiographical Reflection on the Study ...
    Nov 11, 2013 · This article examines 40 years of multi-disciplinary scholarship on deindustrialization in North America and the United Kingdom.
  44. [44]
    A Bond of Necessity? The Working-Class Family, 1880–1930
    Family unity rested on a sense of mutual dependence, enforced by recurrent crises. This chapter examines the standard of living attained by working class ...
  45. [45]
    [PDF] The Rise of the Extended Family in Nineteenth-Century England ...
    "Sociological History and the Working Class Family: Smelser Revis- ited." Social History 1.317-43. 1977. "The Impact on Family Relationships of the Elderly ...
  46. [46]
    [PDF] Household and family structure in England and Wales, 1851-1911
    This is consistent with the increased likelihood of extended households being working-class as the period progressed. These significant temporal shifts in ...<|separator|>
  47. [47]
    Socioeconomic Status, Family Processes, and Individual Development
    We evaluate the empirical research on social class and children during the last decade within the context of these two theoretical frameworks, beginning with ...
  48. [48]
    [PDF] The Marriage Divide - American Enterprise Institute
    Among working-class and poor men and women who have ever married, more than 40 percent have ever been divorced. High rates of nonmarital childbearing and ...
  49. [49]
    Family Structure: The Growing Importance of Class | Brookings
    Jan 16, 2013 · Because the breakdown of the traditional family is overwhelmingly occurring among working-class Americans of all races, these trends ...
  50. [50]
    [PDF] Working-Class Americans' Views on Family Policy
    In the American Compass survey, parents without a four-year degree were more likely to say the best way for the federal government to support families would be ...
  51. [51]
    The United States Has a Long History of Mutual Aid Organizing
    Jun 14, 2020 · By 1913, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona all had documented mutual aid networks among Hispanic miners. And across the Southwest, “sociedades ...
  52. [52]
    Mutual Aid Societies
    Mutual aid societies were an important way to share workplace grievances and brainstorm collective solutions to the problems they faced.
  53. [53]
    Benevolent and Mutual Aid Societies, Fraternal Orders, and Labor ...
    Labor Unions also functioned to serve Utah's working class. Union representatives worked to secure employment and later, by following the model of mutual aid ...
  54. [54]
    Local Network Interaction as a Mechanism for Wealth Inequality - PMC
    Jun 22, 2024 · Given limited institutional resources, low-income populations often rely on social networks to improve their socioeconomic outcomes.
  55. [55]
    Who you know: The classed structure of social capital - PMC
    This indicates that social capital creates an internal hierarchy within the Norwegian working class. ... empirical investigation of whether and how social ties ...
  56. [56]
    Who you know: The classed structure of social capital - Alecu - 2022
    Jun 1, 2022 · By means of Ascending Hierarchical Cluster analysis, five clusters are identified within the space of social ties: a homogenous working-class ...<|separator|>
  57. [57]
    A systematic review of the relationships between social capital and ...
    Jul 19, 2013 · Other studies provide examples of solidarity among working class communities being manifest in health initiatives, for example around chronic ...
  58. [58]
    [PDF] Divided we fall? The effect of manufacturing decline on the social ...
    Jul 28, 2023 · The aim of this research is to examine changes in social capital across the. US territory, with a focus on testing whether the decline of ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  59. [59]
    [PDF] Growing Class Gaps in Social Connectedness among American ...
    Jul 12, 2012 · Working class children spend less time with their par- ents and are much less likely to participate in sports, take music lessons, join student ...Missing: networks | Show results with:networks
  60. [60]
    Coping with urban shrinkage: the role of informal social capital in ...
    Jun 7, 2023 · ... working-class residents' social ties are strongly place-based – locally anchored and place-dependent – and that this rootedness in place is ...
  61. [61]
    [PDF] Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919
    and to study this subject afresh means to re-examine much that has been assumed as given in the writing of American working-class and social history.
  62. [62]
    [PDF] Qualitative Research on Barriers to Workplace Inclusion for First ...
    May 1, 2019 · They talked about the work ethic instilled in them from their working class parents and how the lack of resources that could have stalled ...
  63. [63]
    Understanding the Complexities of the White Working Class in ...
    Sep 20, 2012 · A plurality (46%) of white working-class Americans believe that capitalism and the free market system are at odds with Christian values, while ...
  64. [64]
    Research looks at white working-class views on identity, race and ...
    Oct 10, 2017 · Research looks at white working-class views on identity, race and immigration ... work ethic, providing for family, helping others in need, being ...Missing: survey | Show results with:survey
  65. [65]
    [PDF] Social Class and Workplace Norms - FIU Digital Commons
    Mar 30, 2022 · We chose this study criteria because most people who started their careers as low-status workers have been part of the working-class culture.
  66. [66]
    [PDF] An Empirical Study of Contemporary Beliefs About Work in American ...
    The underlying concepts or beliefs people hold about work were studied ... The data show that young people are more work ethic oriented than older people.
  67. [67]
    [PDF] Work Ethic and Work Incentives: Values and Income Maintenance ...
    This paper discusses the relationship between the work ethic philosophy, job creation programming and welfare reform. It reviews relevant theoretical and ...
  68. [68]
    Religion and the working classes in mid-nineteenth century England
    Jan 31, 2017 · Broadly speaking its findings were that a considerable proportion of the population could not be classed as regular church-goers and that those ...
  69. [69]
    Nineteenth century urbanisation and the Church of England, an ...
    Oct 19, 2022 · It would be wrong to suggest however, that the working class were not religious. Sarah Williams has shown that hymns and prayers were an ...
  70. [70]
    Has the Church forgotten the working class? | Psephizo
    Dec 2, 2024 · The Church of England's most enduring 'problem of the city' has been its relationship with the urban working class. Forty years on the challenge remains.
  71. [71]
  72. [72]
    Religiosity and wellbeing in areas of socio-economic deprivation
    Oct 9, 2023 · This paper explores how resources for subjective wellbeing are enabled in deprived areas via religious participation.Wellbeing, Religion And... · Swb, Social Capital And... · Theme 1: Church Community<|separator|>
  73. [73]
    No Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of ...
    We find that religious attendance among moderately educated whites has declined relative to attendance among college-educated whites.
  74. [74]
    [PDF] Secularization and the Tribulations of the American Working-Class1
    Aug 23, 2021 · As such, I examine the effects of declining religiosity on these aforementioned variables, motivated by the fact that substantial secularization ...
  75. [75]
    2023 PRRI Census of American Religion: County-Level Data on ...
    Aug 29, 2024 · Two-thirds of Americans (66%) identify as Christian, including 41% who identify as white Christians and 25% who identify as Christians of color.
  76. [76]
    Age, race, education and other demographic traits of U.S. religious ...
    Feb 26, 2025 · Among religiously unaffiliated Americans, 48% of atheists and 43% of agnostics have a household income of $100,000 or more.
  77. [77]
    Moral Foundations Theory | moralfoundations.org
    Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was developed by a team of social and cultural psychologists, primarily Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham.Questionnaires · Publications · Other Materials · Videos and Press
  78. [78]
    The History of the British Pub - Historic UK
    Jun 1, 2015 · The Great British Pub · Taverns and alehouses provided food and drink to their guests, whilst inns offered accommodation for weary travellers.
  79. [79]
    Neither Carnival nor Lent: Everyday Working Class Drinking - NCBI
    Jun 19, 2018 · This chapter explores the drinking cultures of the working classes through analysis of oral history interviews conducted in the 1970s on surviving Victorians ...
  80. [80]
    Music hall and variety | History, Performers & Audience - Britannica
    Oct 8, 2025 · Music hall and variety, popular entertainment that features successive acts starring singers, comedians, dancers, and actors and sometimes jugglers, acrobats, ...
  81. [81]
    The British Music Hall - Musicals 101
    In time, intellectuals and the upper classes took a liking to these unpretentious variety shows. By 1875 there were over three hundred music halls in London ...
  82. [82]
    America at Work, America at Leisure: Motion Pictures from 1894-1915
    The period from 1894 to 1915 was one in which workers in the United States began to have more leisure time than their predecessors.
  83. [83]
    Leisure and entertainment in the 19th century - History File - BBC
    Jul 18, 2012 · 19th-century leisure included blood sports, fairs, festivals, travelling acts, village cricket, May Fair, and pubs.
  84. [84]
    Leisure and Entertainment in the Early Twentieth Century
    Jan 27, 2021 · Amusement parks, circuses, and zoos are just three of the many casual leisure options that offered collective experiences to a greater public in ...
  85. [85]
    10 Commercialized Leisure in the Early 1900s - Oxford Academic
    Commercialized leisure in the early 1900s included amusement parks, vaudeville, cabarets, affordable pianos, and the phonograph for repeatable performances.
  86. [86]
    The decline of the pub: what can we learn from history? | HistoryExtra
    Jun 21, 2014 · Historically, too, the pub was rooted in working class communities. Those communities have been disappearing, whether one is looking at big ...
  87. [87]
    Game over: Middle-class and poor kids are ditching youth sports
    Aug 15, 2019 · Participation in sports among families earning less than $75,000 has dropped since 2011, according to The Aspen Institute's Project Play. By ...Missing: demographics | Show results with:demographics
  88. [88]
    The Income Gap Is Becoming a Physical-Activity Divide
    Mar 25, 2023 · Nationwide, poor children and adolescents are participating far less in sports and fitness activities than their more affluent peers.Missing: demographics | Show results with:demographics
  89. [89]
    The Ideological Foundations of White Working Class Republicanism
    Apr 3, 2025 · Data from American National Election Studies surveys show clear evidence of this ideological realignment among white working class voters.
  90. [90]
    Ronald Reagan's Northern Strategy and a new American Partisan ...
    So the switch of millions of Democrats to Reagan in 1980 was more than the mere expression of the embourgeoisement of the working class. It was a switch born ...
  91. [91]
    The Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of ...
    Reagan is seen as the crusader for conservatism dedicated to small government and free markets. But Henry Olsen argues that this assumption is wrong. In The ...<|separator|>
  92. [92]
    [PDF] Liberal and Conservative Trends in the United States - GSS
    First, we examined many works on politics and political ideology for the prime attributes of contemporary liberalism (variously referred to as collectivist, ...
  93. [93]
    Working-class conservative voters in 2019: voices from a valley in ...
    May 20, 2021 · This paper highlights the findings from qualitative research into the electoral decision-making processes of working-class Conservative ...Missing: modern | Show results with:modern
  94. [94]
    How the Conservative Party won the working-class vote in 2019
    Apr 17, 2024 · The ideological cleavage of British politics began to narrow during Tony Blair's New Labour era, with the party seeing a surge of support among ...
  95. [95]
    How Britain voted in the 2024 general election - YouGov
    Jul 8, 2024 · Using a sample of over 35000 voters, YouGov looks at how voters voted at the 2024 election across factors like age, gender, class, education ...
  96. [96]
    The Emerging Working-Class Republican Majority - Politico
    Nov 4, 2023 · A historic realignment of working-class voters helped Trump defy the odds and win in 2016, and brought him to within a hair of reelection in 2020.
  97. [97]
    Working-Class Realignment | American Enterprise Institute - AEI
    Today, we examine the 2024 presidential election as working-class voters shift right and the marriage gap persists.<|separator|>
  98. [98]
    Remembering and Rebuilding Socialist Culture: A talk given at The ...
    Oct 11, 2019 · How collectivism, mutual aid and political education formed a fundamental part of working-class community and culture.
  99. [99]
    Socialism: A short primer - Brookings Institution
    May 13, 2019 · The proletariat was no longer the sole engine of progress; the SPD had changed from being a “party of the working class” to a “party of the ...
  100. [100]
    The Socialist Party's Legacy In The U.S. Labor Movement
    Sep 27, 2016 · Although the U.S. labor movement was traditionally dominated by men, socialist women broke through to the middle levels of power, particularly ...
  101. [101]
    How Socialism Discourages Work and Creates Poverty - FEE.org
    Mar 30, 2022 · Socialist policies severely restrict individuals' ability to improve their conditions, so productivity suffers and living conditions plummet.Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
  102. [102]
    The growth consequences of socialism - ScienceDirect.com
    Our results robustly point towards a decrease in annual growth rates of approximately two percentage points during the first decade after implementing ...Missing: class wages
  103. [103]
    Americans' Views of 'Socialism' and 'Capitalism' In Their Own Words
    Oct 7, 2019 · Socialism's critics say it weakens work ethic; some point to Venezuela; Many with positive views of socialism say it fosters equality ...
  104. [104]
    Socialism, Capitalism, And Income - Hoover Institution
    May 27, 2020 · Higher taxes imply lower take-home wages and Rosen finds that labor hours are diminished as a result. More recent work includes Steven Davis and ...Missing: employment | Show results with:employment
  105. [105]
    What are some historical examples of working class resistance to ...
    Jun 21, 2020 · 1. By far the most important is ''SOLIDARNOSC''union - Solidarity (Polish trade union) - Wikipedia ; They started in 1970 and they are the ...
  106. [106]
    Chapter 4: Workers of a New Century By Philip Taft
    The depression of the 1890s had softened the public attitude towards organized labor. Between 1897 and 1904, union membership climbed from 447,000 to 2,072,700.<|separator|>
  107. [107]
    Losing Ground - Manhattan Institute
    Charles Murray startled readers by recommending that we abolish welfare reform, but his position launched a debate culminating in President Clinton's proposal ...
  108. [108]
    [PDF] From Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950—1980
    A deficiency is observed—too little money, too little food, too little academic achievement—and a social transfer program tries to fill the gap—with a welfare ...<|separator|>
  109. [109]
    What Americans Think about Poverty, Wealth, and Work | Cato Institute
    Sep 24, 2019 · 68% of Republicans believe welfare creates dependency; 71% of Democrats think welfare helps people get back on their feet; 70% say government ...
  110. [110]
    Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Dependency
    The results show that parental DI participation increases children's DI participation by at most 2.6 percentage points, on average among the children that grew ...
  111. [111]
    Welfare Reform - Cato Institute
    Dec 15, 2022 · The U.S. welfare system makes it hard to move from welfare to work and to become self-sufficient. The bulk of government efforts to fight ...Missing: class reliance
  112. [112]
    Welfare Reform, Success or Failure? It Worked - Brookings Institution
    Experience with welfare reform since 1996 shows conclusively that most low-income families are capable of finding and holding jobs.<|control11|><|separator|>
  113. [113]
    Family Economic Well-Being Following the 1996 Welfare Reform - NIH
    The host of policy changes enacted in the late 1990s as well as a robust economy succeeded in increasing the labor force participation of many low-income women.
  114. [114]
    Labor Market Effects of Welfare Reform - San Francisco Fed
    Aug 29, 1997 · As Figure 2 illustrates, the number of women maintaining families entering the labor force increased dramatically following welfare reform.Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
  115. [115]
    [PDF] Social Assistance and the 'Dependency Syndrome'
    The 'dependency syndrome' is the concern that social assistance creates permanent dependence, undermining self-sufficiency and motivation to improve ...<|separator|>
  116. [116]
    Parents' reliance on welfare leads to more welfare use by their ...
    Jan 21, 2015 · They have found strong empirical evidence that reliance on welfare in one generation is likely to cause greater welfare use in the next generation.
  117. [117]
    Skilled Labor: A Comeback Story | NAIOP
    The cultural shift toward favoring four-year college degrees over skilled trades began in the 1960s, resulting in the perception that office or management roles ...
  118. [118]
    Industrialization, Labor and Life - National Geographic Education
    May 30, 2025 · Industrialization ushered much of the world into the modern era, revamping patterns of human settlement, labor, and family life.
  119. [119]
    Explore Apprenticeship - Apprenticeship.gov
    Did You Know? · $80K* Average Starting Salary. Average starting salary after an apprentice completes an apprenticeship program · 90%* Employment Retention.Registered Apprenticeship · Express Interest · Create a ProgramMissing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes<|separator|>
  120. [120]
    FY 2021 Data and Statistics | U.S. Department of Labor
    There were nearly 27,000 registered apprenticeship programs active across the nation. 2,879 new apprenticeship programs were established nationwide in FY 2021.Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
  121. [121]
    Time-Based, Competency-Based, or Hybrid Programs?
    Aug 2, 2023 · Registered apprenticeship programs result in positive outcomes for employers and apprentices. Apprenticeship is an “earn-and-learn” model ...
  122. [122]
    Highest Paying Trade Jobs: Fastest Growing and Salary Breakdowns
    Here's a few of the highest paying trade jobs based on BLS data for median annual wages as of May 2022: Electricians: $60,240; Plumbers, Pipefitters and ...
  123. [123]
    OES Home : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
    The Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) program produces employment and wage estimates annually for approximately 830 occupations.Occupational Employment and... · Browse oews respondents · Overview
  124. [124]
    Industry and occupational employment projections overview and ...
    Total employment is projected to grow by 4.0 percent and add 6.7 million jobs from 2023 to 2033, increasing from 167.8 million to 174.6 million.
  125. [125]
    The Wisdom of the Hands, and Craftsmanship as Heritage
    Craftsmanship is the visible face/identity/embodiment/proof of hand skills. The word attaches itself to the concrete result of one's having purposefully applied ...
  126. [126]
    Industrial Revolution and the Standard of Living - Econlib
    Of all the disagreements, the oldest one is over how the industrial revolution affected ordinary people, often called the working classes. One group, the ...
  127. [127]
    [PDF] PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION:
    Productivity growth during the Industrial Revolution was slow, with steam having a small, delayed impact. Technological change, including embodiment, was key. ...
  128. [128]
    [PDF] WRAP-Understanding-productivity-growth-industrial-revolution ...
    Recent research relating to productivity growth during the British industrial revolution is reviewed. This confirms that there was a gradual acceleration ...
  129. [129]
    Life in Working Class America | United States History II
    A significant number of these urban and suburban dwellers earned their wages in factories. Advances in farm machinery allowed for greater crop production with ...
  130. [130]
  131. [131]
    From Rags to Riches: Inventors Who Overcame Poverty to Change ...
    Mar 12, 2025 · From Rags to Riches: Inventors Who Overcame Poverty to Change the World · 1. Thomas Edison – The Boy Who Sold Newspapers to Light the World · 2.
  132. [132]
    7 Billionaire Entrepreneurs Who Started Off Dirt-Poor
    May 14, 2018 · WhatsApp founder Jan Koum went from living on welfare and working as a janitor to creating one of the most globally popular messaging apps.
  133. [133]
    [PDF] GLOBALIZATION, TRADE IMBALANCES AND LABOR MARKET ...
    Apr 6, 2022 · We find that the “China shock” accounted for 25% of the decline in US manufacturing between 2000 and 2014—twice the magnitude predicted from a ...
  134. [134]
    NAFTA and the USMCA: Weighing the Impact of North American Trade
    Jul 1, 2020 · Their 2014 PIIE study of NAFTA's effects found a net loss of about fifteen thousand jobs per year due to the pact—but gains of roughly $450,000 ...
  135. [135]
    Botched policy responses to globalization have decimated ...
    Jan 31, 2022 · This chartbook shows that the loss of manufacturing jobs has been particularly devastating for Black and Hispanic workers and other workers of color.
  136. [136]
    Does Globalization Lower Wages and Export Jobs?
    There is no doubt that globalization has coincided with higher unemployment among the less skilled and with widening income inequality.
  137. [137]
    Four Ways Globalization Affects American Workers - WorkingNation
    Oct 12, 2016 · The Economic Policy Institute estimates that in 2011, rising trade with less-developed countries reduced wages by 5.5 percent, or $1,800, for ...
  138. [138]
    Deindustrialization, social disintegration, and health: a neoclassical ...
    Mar 14, 2022 · Deindustrialization is a major burden on workers' health in many countries, calling for theoretically informed sociological analysis.
  139. [139]
    Deindustrialization's Global Story | American Enterprise Institute - AEI
    Jun 14, 2022 · In all three nations, sudden workforce dislocation is associated with substance abuse (opioids in the U.S., alcohol consumption in Russia), ...
  140. [140]
    How can policymakers help communities left behind by globalization ...
    Jun 18, 2025 · And the primary government policy response in terms of safety net programs to elevated joblessness was increased uptake of social security ...
  141. [141]
    Gone For Good: Deindustrialization, White Voter Backlash, and US ...
    Mar 16, 2021 · We argue that deindustrialization threatens dominant group status, leading some white voters in affected localities to favor candidates they believe will ...
  142. [142]
    [PDF] Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization ...
    Abstract. A populist backlash to globalization has ushered in nationalist governments and challenged core features of the liberal international order.
  143. [143]
    Understanding the Working Class and the Challenges It Faces
    Mar 24, 2025 · The working class—defined as workers without a four-year college degree—makes up almost two-thirds of the workforce and is more racially and ...Missing: sociology | Show results with:sociology
  144. [144]
    Educational Attainment Statistics [2025]: Levels by Demographic
    Jan 14, 2025 · Between 1993 and 2023, educational attainment skyrocketed among adults aged 25 and older, with a 74.9% increase in college graduates; high ...
  145. [145]
  146. [146]
    Mortality and morbidity in the 21st century - Brookings Institution
    Case and Deaton find that deaths of despair are rising in parallel for both men and women without a high school degree, and these deaths of despair have ...
  147. [147]
    Labor Force Participation Deterioration Among the U.S.-Born at the ...
    Dec 19, 2024 · The percentage of U.S.-born men (16 to 64) without a bachelor's not in the labor force increased by nearly 15 percentage points on average ...
  148. [148]
    1. Labor market and economic trends for young adults
    May 23, 2024 · Today, that share is 87%. Chart shows Labor force participation has declined among young men without a college degree. Similarly, 96% of young ...
  149. [149]
    Why more men are dropping out of the workforce - CNBC
    Sep 21, 2024 · A study by the Pew Research Center found that men who are not college-educated leave the workforce at higher rates than men who are. At the ...
  150. [150]
    Men's Falling Labor Force Participation across Generations
    Oct 10, 2023 · The labor force participation rate for prime-age men has been declining for decades. About 14% of millennial males at age 25 are not in the labor force.Trends in prime-age male... · Explaining changes in prime... · The role of education
  151. [151]
    The Declining Labor Market Prospects of Less-Educated Men - PMC
    At the same time, the labor-force participation rates of men without a college education have steadily declined. While wage and participation trends are ...
  152. [152]
    The Demographic Outlook: 2025 to 2055
    Jan 13, 2025 · Since last year, CBO has lowered its projection of the total fertility rate over the long run from 1.70 births per woman to 1.60 and ...
  153. [153]
    Geographies of deindustrialization and the working‐class: Industrial ...
    Nov 19, 2018 · The first major studies tracking the effects of deindustrialization reacted to the economic restructuring of North America and the UK from the ...
  154. [154]
    Introduction to Crumbling Cultures: - Deindustrialization, Class, and
    examining the long-term social and cultural legacies of deindustrialization. How do people remember both industrial work and its loss, and how do they remember ...
  155. [155]
    Charles Murray Examines the White Working Class in 'Coming Apart'
    Feb 10, 2012 · Churchgoing among the white working class has declined, eroding the social capital that organized religion once provided. Illegitimacy ...
  156. [156]
    Is White, Working Class America 'Coming Apart'? - NPR
    Feb 6, 2012 · By Murray's calculations, the upper class is 20 percent of the white population. The working class is 30 percent. Over the past 50 years the two ...
  157. [157]
    Murray's Coming Apart Offers Explanations for Social Decline
    Jul 1, 2012 · Murray also shows declines in industriousness and honesty. He traces a significant decline in work ethic among men in Fishtown. In the 1960 ...
  158. [158]
    Television's Misrepresentation of the Working-Class as Cultivation ...
    Apr 21, 2024 · While some results are inconsistent, heavy television viewers seem more prone to view social inequalities as the result of working-class people ...
  159. [159]
    The "Coming Apart" Case for Less Entitlements
    May 28, 2023 · Murray does see two problems with the cognitive elite, unrelated to their divergence from the lower classes—an immediate problem and a long-term ...<|separator|>
  160. [160]
    [PDF] Restoring opportunity for the working class
    We can bring people together and provide incentives. But in the end, there will be no renewal unless more working-class Amer- icans begin to make different ...
  161. [161]
    [PDF] The effects of vocational education on adult skills and wages (EN)
    Our empirical evidence shows that upper secondary VET is associated to substantially higher hourly earnings, employability and skills with respect to lower ...
  162. [162]
    A longitudinal evaluation of government-sponsored job skills ...
    Jun 26, 2020 · Job skills training also increased earnings by up to 69.6 % compared to basic services only. Despite the long-term gains in employment and ...
  163. [163]
  164. [164]
    Vocational and skills training programs to improve labor market ...
    Mar 14, 2023 · Vocational and skills training programs aim to build a strong labor force with in-demand skills by preparing people for jobs in a specific occupation or sector.
  165. [165]
    Strong Families, Prosperous States: Do Healthy Families Affect the ...
    Oct 19, 2015 · This report shows, shifts in marriage and family structure are important factors in states' economic performance, including their economic growth, economic ...
  166. [166]
    Good Jobs, Strong Families | Institute for Family Studies
    Apr 30, 2025 · We found that working-class men (33.50%) were much less likely to be married with children living in their homes compared to college-educated ...
  167. [167]
  168. [168]
  169. [169]
    Class attitudes and the American work ethic - ScienceDirect.com
    This research contributes to an empirical understanding of the relationship between class-related attitudes and perceived work ethic.
  170. [170]
  171. [171]
    How Hollywood Misrepresents the Working Class
    Jul 18, 2019 · Characters like Homer on The Simpsons or Doug on The King of Queens reinforce stereotypes that the working class is lazy, uninterested in ...
  172. [172]
    Does it Make a Difference?: Television's Misrepresentation of the ...
    Apr 21, 2024 · ... working-class members account for only 9% of people talking on television. The study showed that the underrepresentation of working-class ...
  173. [173]
    80 per cent of journalists now come from higher class backgrounds
    May 6, 2022 · According to the data, 84 per cent of reporters and 73 per cent of editors come from a higher class background. The survey determined social ...
  174. [174]
    Working class creatives at 'lowest level in a decade' - Equity
    May 16, 2024 · The research revealed that only 8% of creatives in TV and film are from working class backgrounds, whereas 60% are from middle- and upper-class backgrounds.
  175. [175]
    Dangerous idiots: how the liberal media elite failed working-class ...
    Oct 13, 2016 · Trump supporters are not the caricatures journalists depict – and native Kansan Sarah Smarsh sets out to correct what newsrooms get wrong.
  176. [176]
    Whose News? Class-Biased Economic Reporting in the United States
    Apr 12, 2021 · Class-biased news arises here from media actors placing a positive value on features of the economy that are systematically correlated with ...
  177. [177]
    Media representations of social class - ReviseSociology
    Oct 9, 2019 · Jones (2011) suggests the working classes are represented as feckless racists who hate immigration and multiculturalism – coverage of Brexit ...
  178. [178]
    [PDF] Work Ethic and Family Background - Employment Policies Institute
    do children learn to work hard from their parents? Does the example of ...
  179. [179]
    (PDF) The media's failure to represent the working class
    Apr 14, 2023 · The media have contributed to the immiseration and marginalisation of working-class people by failing to adequately represent the complexity, diversity, and ...
  180. [180]
    News for the powerful and privileged: how misrepresentation and ...
    Apr 18, 2023 · The problems of misrepresentation include: 1) emphasising negative news; 2) treating groups unfairly; 3) perpetuating stereotypes; 4) failing ...
  181. [181]
    Why We Need a Working-Class Media - Dissent Magazine
    Why We Need a Working-Class Media. What could the political effects be of a media that actually served working-class Americans?
  182. [182]
    The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility ...
    Absolute income mobility, the fraction of children earning more than parents, fell from 90% in 1940 to 50% in the 1980s, mainly due to increased inequality.
  183. [183]
    The Decline of Upward Mobility in One Chart - Visual Capitalist
    Aug 26, 2020 · One factor behind America's deteriorating upward mobility is the sluggish pace at which wages have grown. For example, the average hourly wage ...
  184. [184]
    The 'American Dream' of upward mobility is broken. Look at the ...
    Mar 13, 2021 · In the US, 8% of children raised in the bottom 20% of the income distribution are able to climb to the top 20% as adults, while the figure in ...
  185. [185]
    Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United States
    The US has relatively low rates of intergenerational income mobility, especially when compared with other advanced economies, and mobility appears to have ...Missing: 2000-2025 | Show results with:2000-2025
  186. [186]
    Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying ...
    Using data on 57 million children, we show that intergenerational mobility changed rapidly by race and class in recent decades.
  187. [187]
    Tracking the decline of social mobility in the U.S. - Yale News
    Feb 20, 2025 · Harvard economist Raj Chetty used a series of maps and charts to reveal the dramatic decline in upward mobility in the US and how data findings can be used to ...Missing: 2000-2025 | Show results with:2000-2025
  188. [188]
    Stuck on the ladder: Wealth mobility is low and decreases with age
    Jun 29, 2022 · As we show in a new paper, Americans are quite unlikely to move far up (or down) the wealth ranks early in life, and their chances decrease with age.
  189. [189]
    Intergenerational mobility in the US: One size doesn't fit all | CEPR
    Jan 3, 2019 · This column examines the influence of parents' income on the income of their children in the US for the period 1980-2010.
  190. [190]
    Seven key takeaways from Chetty's new research on friendship and ...
    Aug 2, 2022 · The headline finding is that at the community level, cross-class connections boost social mobility more than anything else.
  191. [191]
    Economic Opportunity and Social Mobility - AEI
    Jun 18, 2024 · A survey covering opportunity, mobility, and the American Dream. One revealing question we asked was the following:
  192. [192]
    Upward Mobility Is Alive and Well in America - Cato Institute
    Jan 6, 2023 · On average, 39% of those children as adults rose to a higher quintile and 37% fell to a lower one. The harshest critics of mobility in America ...
  193. [193]
    Trends in U.S. income and wealth inequality - Pew Research Center
    Jan 9, 2020 · The share of American adults who live in middle-income households has decreased from 61% in 1971 to 51% in 2019. This downsizing has proceeded ...