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Forced conversion

Forced conversion is the coercive imposition of a new religion or irreligion on individuals or groups through threats of violence, economic penalty, enslavement, or state-mandated penalties, often suppressing or eradicating prior beliefs under duress rather than through persuasion or conviction.^[1]^[2] This practice has recurred across civilizations, particularly during conquests and empire-building, where religious uniformity served political consolidation, as seen in Charlemagne's Saxon Wars (772–804 CE), which prescribed death for refusing baptism,^[3] the mass coerced baptisms of Jews amid the 1391 Iberian pogroms,^[4]^[1] and episodes under Almohad rule in North Africa and al-Andalus (12th century), where non-Muslims faced ultimatums of conversion, exile, or execution.^[5]^[6] In colonial contexts, such as Portuguese Goa (16th–17th centuries) and Spanish America, inquisitorial mechanisms and military dominance enforced Catholic adherence, frequently blending overt force with incentives like land grants.^[7]^[8] While doctrinal texts in faiths like Islam and Christianity nominally reject compulsion—Qur'an 2:256 states "no compulsion in religion," and early Christian evangelism emphasized voluntary faith—historical implementation often prioritized expansion over these ideals, yielding superficial or relapsed conversions amid resistance, syncretism, or underground persistence of original practices.^[9]^[10] Empirical assessments of efficacy remain contested, with coerced adherents frequently reverting or maintaining dual allegiances upon eased enforcement, underscoring causal limits of force in altering deeply held convictions.^[10]^[11]

Conceptual Framework

Definition and Distinctions

Forced conversion denotes the adoption of a religion or irreligion under duress, typically involving threats of physical violence, economic penalties, legal prosecution, or social ostracism, rather than arising from personal conviction or rational persuasion. This compulsion overrides individual autonomy, compelling outward compliance irrespective of internal assent, as evidenced in historical and contemporary analyses of coercive religious practices.^[12]^[13] Such conversions differ fundamentally from proselytism, which relies on voluntary engagement through discourse, testimony, or exemplary living without penalties for dissent, and from gradual cultural assimilation, where shifts occur via societal influence absent direct enforcement. Coerced adoptions often produce nominal adherence or crypto-practices, wherein individuals feign conformity while preserving original beliefs in secret, as anthropological studies of dissimulation under pressure demonstrate; this reveals coercion's limited capacity to effect genuine transformation, frequently resulting in superficial or hypocritical professions.^[14]^[15]^[16] Causal realism underscores that authentic belief emerges solely from uncoerced conviction, as external threats cannot engender voluntary assent essential to faith's cognitive and volitional components; compelled submission thus equates to behavioral mimicry, not internalized commitment, a principle echoed in philosophical inquiries into belief formation.^[17] Doctrinal variances highlight this: Islamic legal traditions have prescribed death for apostasy, creating a unidirectional coercive structure that deters renunciation and incentivizes entry under penalty,^[18]^[19] while Christian doctrine stresses inner regeneration over enforced ritual, viewing coercion as incompatible with faith's relational essence.^[20]^[21]

Methods of Coercion

Direct physical coercion in forced conversions has encompassed threats of execution, torture, or enslavement to compel adherence to the dominant faith. Historical instances include ultimatums demanding conversion or death, as issued by the Islamic State to Christians in northern Iraq on July 18, 2014, where refusal led to execution or expulsion.^[22] Enslavement similarly functioned as a punitive measure, with non-converts captured and bound in servitude under the new religious order to erode resistance and enforce compliance.^[23] Indirect economic pressures operated through discriminatory taxation systems, creating material incentives for conversion. Under Islamic governance, the jizya poll tax imposed on non-Muslims exempted converts, thereby alleviating financial burdens and prompting shifts in allegiance; during the Umayyad era, this policy spurred large-scale conversions among Sogdians upon waiving the tax for new Muslims.^[24] Economic modeling of such poll taxes in medieval Egypt further demonstrates their role in widening socioeconomic gaps between non-Muslims and Muslims, accelerating conversion rates as a rational response to fiscal disparity.^[25] Social and familial mechanisms leveraged personal vulnerabilities, including abductions of children and forced marriages to integrate targets into the coercing community. In Pakistan, minority Hindu and Christian girls endure frequent kidnappings followed by coerced conversion to Islam and matrimony, with UK government assessments documenting at least 100 Christian cases annually as of April 2024.^[26] These acts, often enabled by local power imbalances and inadequate legal recourse, exploit family ties to perpetuate demographic assimilation.^[27] Institutional frameworks amplified coercion via state or ecclesiastical authority, such as inquisitorial tribunals employing isolation, threats, and torture to extract professions of faith from suspected deviants.^[28] Residential boarding schools for indigenous populations institutionalized separation from kin and cultural suppression, embedding religious indoctrination to supplant ancestral beliefs; Canada's system, active from the 1880s to the late 20th century, systematically disrupted native spiritual practices through prolonged isolation and punitive assimilation.^[29] These methods, backed by legal mandates, yielded measurable declines in traditional adherence without overt violence in every instance.^[30]

Theological and Legal Justifications

In Islamic theology, Quran 9:5, known as the Sword Verse, instructs believers to slay polytheists after the sacred months have passed unless they repent, perform prayer, and give zakat, providing a doctrinal basis for lethal confrontation tied to conversion demands in contexts of broken treaties. Complementary hadiths reinforce this, such as Sahih al-Bukhari 1:2:25, where Muhammad states he was ordered to fight people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and he is His messenger, framing jihad as a mechanism to compel verbal submission or face combat. Quran 9:29 extends subjugation to People of the Book, mandating war against those who do not believe until they pay jizya in humbled submission, establishing dhimmi status as a tolerated but inferior condition that doctrinally incentivizes eventual conversion through systemic disadvantage rather than immediate force. Classical sharia jurisprudence codifies apostasy (riddah) as a capital offense, drawing from hadiths like Sahih al-Bukhari 9:84:57—"Whoever changes his religion, kill him"—to legally enforce retention within Islam, treating departure as treason against the divine order and justifying execution to prevent communal erosion. Christian doctrine presents inherent tensions, with New Testament passages emphasizing voluntary faith, such as John 6:44 stating no one can come to Jesus unless drawn by the Father, rejecting inherent coercion. Yet, justifications for force emerged through interpretive lenses, notably Augustine of Hippo's exegesis of Luke 14:23's parable of the great banquet—"compel people to come in"—in his Letter 185 (also referenced in Letter 93), arguing that external compulsion could aid internal conversion, as seen in Paul's blinding on the Damascus road (Acts 9), thus rationalizing coercion against heretics like Donatists to preserve ecclesiastical unity.^[31] Old Testament models of conquest, including Deuteronomy 7:1-5's commands to destroy Canaanite nations and their altars to eliminate idolatry, supplied precedents for total war against false worship, analogized in later theology to justify aggressive expansion or crusading as divine mandates to eradicate paganism and secure promised lands. Secular ideologies, particularly Marxist-Leninist materialism, frame religion as a delusional barrier to rational progress, with Karl Marx's 1843 description of it as "the opium of the people"—a sigh of the oppressed that consoles but perpetuates alienation—positing its abolition as essential for true emancipation by dismantling ideological chains that sustain class exploitation.^[32] Vladimir Lenin echoed this in "Socialism and Religion" (1905), declaring atheism integral to Marxism and urging combat against faith through materialist education, viewing religion as a bourgeois tool that must yield to proletarian science for societal reconstruction, thereby doctrinally endorsing state-driven suppression to enforce ideological conformity.^[33] Legally, this contrasts sharia's apostasy penalties with Western frameworks like the U.S. First Amendment's free exercise clause, which prohibits compelled belief, though secular regimes historically inverted this to mandate atheism, treating religious adherence as counterrevolutionary sabotage warranting eradication for causal advancement toward classless society.

Under Christianity

Late Antiquity and Early Medieval Period

In 380 CE, Emperor Theodosius I, along with Gratian and Valentinian II, issued the Edict of Thessalonica, which declared Nicene Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire and branded all other Christian sects as heretics subject to divine and imperial punishment.^[34] This edict initiated a policy of religious exclusivity, prohibiting public worship by non-Nicene groups and setting the stage for broader suppression.^[35] Subsequent Theodosian decrees between 391 and 392 CE escalated enforcement by banning pagan sacrifices, closing temples, and imposing civil penalties such as fines, confiscation of property, and exile on pagans and heretics who persisted in their practices.^[35] These measures, codified in the Theodosian Code, reflected the fusion of imperial authority with ecclesiastical doctrine to consolidate power amid the empire's fragmentation, prioritizing state stability over voluntary adherence.^[36] Empirical records indicate widespread compliance through coercion rather than conviction, as temple destructions and legal proscriptions dismantled public pagan institutions without eliminating private holdouts.^[37] In the early medieval Visigothic kingdom of Hispania, following the realm's conversion to Nicene Catholicism at the Third Council of Toledo in 589 CE, rulers pursued similar unification to bind diverse subjects under a single faith.^[38] King Sisebut, reigning from 612 to 621 CE, promulgated an edict around 613–614 CE mandating the baptism of all Jews or their expulsion, with non-compliance punishable by enslavement or death; this affected an estimated Jewish population integral to urban economies but viewed as a threat to religious homogeneity.^[39]^[40] Forced baptisms under Sisebut produced widespread crypto-Judaism, where nominal converts secretly observed Jewish rites, as evidenced by later Visigothic legislation targeting relapsed practitioners and records of underground communities persisting into the seventh century.^[38] Limited long-term adherence is corroborated by recurrent Jewish revolts and the need for repeated edicts under successors like Chindasuinth (642–653 CE), indicating that coercion yielded superficial compliance rather than doctrinal shift, driven by the monarchy's reliance on church councils for legitimacy in a precarious post-Roman order.^[41] This state-church alliance contrasted with later traditions emphasizing personal faith, underscoring how political imperatives, not theological purity alone, propelled enforcement.^[39]

High Middle Ages and Inquisitions

The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, convened by Pope Innocent III, mandated measures against heresy, including the identification of Jews and Muslims through distinctive clothing and the suppression of groups like the Cathars in southern France, whose dualist beliefs rejected Catholic sacraments and material creation.^[42] This council's decrees facilitated the Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229), launched against Cathar strongholds in Languedoc, where crusaders under Simon de Montfort employed massacres and coerced baptisms, culminating in events like the 1210 burning of over 200 Cathars at Minerve and the 1244 siege of Montségur, where 200–400 were executed after refusing recantation.^[43] Despite these efforts, conversions often proved superficial, as underground Cathar practices persisted, requiring subsequent inquisitorial interventions to root out relapsed heretics, evidencing the limits of coercion in fostering authentic adherence.^[44] In the 13th century, the Baltic Crusades, authorized by papal bulls from 1147 onward and intensified under the Teutonic Order, targeted pagan Prussians, Livonians, and Lithuanians, involving forced baptisms following military conquests, such as the 1236 Battle of Saule and the subjugation of Samogitia by 1290.^[45] Canon law initially prohibited compelling non-Christians to convert, yet crusaders rationalized mass baptisms as preparatory for Christian rule, often nominal due to revolts like the Great Prussian Uprising (1260–1274), where thousands rejected Christianity, destroying churches and indicating coerced faith's instability.^[46] Similarly, during the Reconquista's advances, such as the 1212 Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Christian forces imposed baptisms on captured Muslims in frontier zones, but resistance manifested in crypto-Islamic practices and periodic rebellions, underscoring institutional coercion's failure to eradicate prior allegiances.^[47] The Spanish Inquisition, established in 1478 by Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile with papal approval from Sixtus IV, systematized scrutiny of conversos—Jews baptized en masse after 1391 pogroms—and later Moriscos, Muslims compelled to convert following Granada's 1492 fall and edicts like Valencia's 1525 ultimatum of baptism or exile.^[48] Inquisitors employed torture and auto-da-fé executions to detect Judaizing or Islamic recidivism, with over 2,000 conversos tried for relapse by 1530, yet persistent secret observances, such as Morisco retention of Arabic texts, revealed coerced uniformity's superficiality, breeding resentment rather than conviction.^[49] Medieval Christian theology, drawing from Augustine's allowance for heretic coercion to prevent societal harm but emphasizing voluntary interior assent for salvation, clashed with these mechanisms, as forced rites produced external compliance without transformative belief, fueling later upheavals like the 1525 German Peasants' War, where agrarian grievances intertwined with demands for gospel-based liberty against imposed doctrines.^[2]^[50]

Early Modern Europe and Colonial Expansion

The Wars of Religion in 16th- and 17th-century Europe intensified intra-Christian coercion, as Catholic and Protestant rulers vied for dominance and demanded religious uniformity to consolidate power. In France, the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of August 24-25, 1572, resulted in the deaths of 5,000 to 30,000 Huguenots in Paris alone, with subsequent killings across provinces totaling up to 70,000 victims; while primarily exterminatory, the violence pressured survivors into coerced conformity and abjurations of Protestantism to evade further persecution.^[51]^[52] Similar dynamics unfolded in the Schmalkaldic War (1546-1547) and the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648), where territorial control often hinged on enforcing confessional allegiance, though outright mass conversions were rarer than expulsions or warfare.^[53] The revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV on October 18, 1685, exemplified state-orchestrated pressure on Protestants. Preceding the edict, dragonnades—military billeting of troops in Huguenot homes from 1681—terrorized families into conversions, with estimates of 200,000 to 400,000 Huguenots abjuring Calvinism under duress by 1685; the revocation then banned Protestant worship, closed schools, and mandated Catholic baptism for children, prompting a diaspora of 200,000-300,000 refugees while pressuring others to feign adherence.^[54]^[55] These measures reflected absolutist aims to eradicate religious pluralism, yielding nominal compliance but fostering underground resistance and emigration to Protestant strongholds like Prussia and England.^[56] Iberian colonial expansion amplified coercion through imperial structures blending evangelization with exploitation. In Spanish America, the encomienda system, formalized in the 1500s, granted conquistadors labor rights over indigenous groups in exchange for their Christian instruction, resulting in mass baptisms—often immediate and without catechesis—to legitimize subjugation and access royal protections; by 1550, millions of natives had been nominally converted, though enforcement varied by region and friars like Bartolomé de las Casas decried abuses as antithetical to true faith.^[57] In Portuguese India, the Goa Inquisition, active from 1560 to 1812, targeted crypto-Hindus, Jews, and relapsed converts with trials, torture, and auto-da-fé executions, compelling thousands to renounce non-Christian practices; edicts like the 1736 inquisitorial decree mandated public renunciation rituals, eradicating visible Hindu temples and customs while driving underground adherence.^[58]^[59] Empirical outcomes revealed limits to coerced assimilation, with high nominal conversion rates—near-total in core Spanish viceroyalties by the late 16th century—belied by syncretic survivals. Indigenous and African populations blended Catholic rites with pre-existing beliefs, as in Haitian Vodou, which emerged under French colonialism (analogous to Iberian patterns) by fusing Yoruba loa with saints, allowing slaves to maintain ancestral spirits covertly beneath baptismal veneers; this hybridity persisted despite inquisitorial scrutiny, underscoring that coercion yielded superficial adherence rather than doctrinal erasure.^[60]^[61] Such persistence challenged claims of wholesale cultural extirpation, as colonial records document recurring relapses and mestizo folk practices integrating native cosmologies.^[62]

19th-20th Century Imperialism and Conflicts

In the Russian Empire of the 19th century, state and Orthodox Church policies systematically encouraged the conversion of non-Orthodox populations, including Jews and Muslims, through a combination of legal restrictions, missionary efforts, and social incentives that imposed practical disadvantages on nonconformists.^[63] An estimated 69,400 Jews underwent baptism into the Russian Orthodox Church during this period, often motivated by escape from discriminatory laws confining them to the Pale of Settlement or barring them from certain professions and education.^[64] While overt mass baptisms were rare after the mid-century abolition of the Cantonist system—which had conscripted Jewish boys for military service and conversion from 1827 to 1856—covert pressures persisted via administrative favoritism toward converts and sporadic pogroms that heightened vulnerability.^[65] Among Muslim subjects, particularly in newly conquered Caucasian territories, assimilationist policies during the Russo-Circassian War (1763–1864) complemented expulsions with selective conversions, as Russian authorities viewed Islam as incompatible with imperial loyalty and promoted Orthodox Christianity to integrate survivors.^[66] European colonial powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries backed Christian missions in Africa and Asia, where state authority enabled indirect coercion through monopolized education, healthcare, and land access tied to religious instruction. In sub-Saharan Africa, Protestant and Catholic missions established over 10,000 schools by 1914, enrolling millions and prioritizing Bible-based curricula that supplanted indigenous beliefs, with colonial governors enforcing attendance in regions like British Nigeria and German Kamerun.^[67] Empirical studies indicate these efforts accelerated cultural shifts, as mission proximity correlated with higher conversion rates and reduced traditional practices, though outright physical force waned after abolitionist reforms.^[68] A stark example unfolded in Canada's Indian residential school system, launched under the 1876 Indian Act and expanded from the 1880s to the 1960s, where federal policy compelled over 150,000 Indigenous children into church-operated institutions for assimilation, banning native languages, ceremonies, and spirituality while mandating Christian worship and doctrine.^[69]^[70] The program's architect, Duncan Campbell Scott, articulated its goal in 1920 as "to continue the process of civilization" by eradicating Indigenous identity, resulting in documented abuses including physical punishments for religious noncompliance; the last school closed in 1996.^[71] By the 20th century, overt forced conversions linked to Christian imperialism declined amid secularization in Western metropoles and rising nationalist resistances in colonies, though conflicts retained religious dimensions. In the Belgian Congo (1908–1960), state-leased missions wielded authority to enforce Christian observance among forced laborers, contributing to over 50% Christianization by independence, but local revolts and ethical scandals curbed extremes.^[72] Post-World War II decolonization and human rights instruments, notably Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibiting coercion in religious belief, further eroded state-backed proselytism in former empires.^[73] In Europe and North America, theological justifications for compulsion faded with Enlightenment-derived liberalism, yielding to voluntary evangelism; data from the era show Christian expansion in Africa and Asia—reaching 500 million adherents by 2000—driven primarily by indigenous agency rather than imperial fiat.^[74] This shift marked a causal pivot from coercion to persuasion, as global norms prioritized individual conscience over confessional uniformity.

Under Islam

Prophetic Era and Rashidun Caliphate

During Muhammad's Prophetic era, military engagements such as the Battle of Badr on March 13, 624 CE, where 313 Muslims defeated a larger Meccan force, and the Battle of Uhud on March 23, 625 CE, which resulted in significant Muslim casualties but reinforced calls for tribal allegiance, framed conflicts as imperatives for submission to Islam, leading to coerced conversions among some defeated groups.^[75] The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, signed in March 628 CE, provided a ten-year truce with the Quraysh of Mecca, allowing limited pilgrimage access but including provisions for returning Muslim converts who fled Mecca, which underscored ongoing pressures on religious affiliation and set the stage for the 630 CE conquest of Mecca, where mass submissions to Islam occurred under the threat of subjugation.^[76] A pivotal example of enforcement arose with the Banu Qurayza Jewish tribe in Medina following the Battle of the Trench in April 627 CE; after a 25-day siege for alleged treason in aiding besieging forces, the tribe surrendered, and an arbitrator ruled for the execution of 600 to 900 adult males, with women and children enslaved, reflecting the severe repercussions for non-Muslim tribes refusing alignment with the emerging Islamic polity, though framed as punishment for breach of pact rather than direct conversion refusal.^[77]^[75] Such incidents, rooted in doctrinal views of loyalty to the ummah, contributed to the consolidation of Medina as an Islamic center, with empirical growth tied to conquest rather than voluntary propagation alone. Under the Rashidun Caliphate, Abu Bakr's Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) from June 632 to 633 CE targeted Arabian tribes that, after Muhammad's death on June 8, 632 CE, either renounced Islam, withheld zakat, or rebelled against central authority, involving eleven major campaigns that reimposed submission through military means, resulting in thousands of deaths and the restoration of unified Islamic governance across the peninsula, causally accelerating Arabization and doctrinal adherence. This enforcement differed from apologist interpretations emphasizing Quranic verse 2:256 ("no compulsion in religion"), as primary accounts indicate subjugation as the operational default for maintaining caliphal expansion, with conversions often following defeat rather than preceding it.^[78] Subsequent Rashidun conquests under Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE), including victories over Byzantine and Sasanian forces by 651 CE, established pacts offering conquered populations—such as in Persia and the Levant—conversion to Islam, payment of jizya poll tax for dhimmi status with restricted rights, or war, as per Quranic directive in Surah At-Tawbah 9:29 to fight non-believers until they submit through tribute, fostering empirical growth via systemic incentives for Islamization amid discriminatory protections that pressured long-term assimilation.^[79] These early dynamics prioritized conquest-driven expansion over later caliphal periods' relative laxity, with historical records showing rapid territorial gains from 632 to 661 CE correlating directly with enforced religious-political unity.

Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates

Under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE), the imposition of jizya—a poll tax levied exclusively on non-Muslim adult males in conquered regions such as Syria and Persia—established a systemic economic disparity that incentivized gradual conversion to Islam. Following the rapid conquests of the Sasanian Empire (633–651 CE), Zoroastrians and other non-Muslims were required to pay jizya in exchange for protection and exemption from military service, while Muslims faced only the lighter zakat or land-based kharaj in some cases; failure to pay could result in enslavement, imprisonment, or execution.^[80]^[81] Fiscal records from the period, including papyri and administrative documents, reveal that this burden disproportionately affected lower-income groups, accelerating conversion rates as households sought relief from the tax's compounding effects, with Islamization in Syria remaining limited to urban elites until the 8th century but expanding under sustained pressure.^[82]^[83] In North Africa, Umayyad expansion from 647 CE onward involved similar policies, where Berber tribes, initially resisting conquest, underwent mass conversions amid military subjugation; however, post-conversion discrimination—such as continued subjection to jizya and preferential treatment of Arab settlers—sparked the Great Berber Revolt of 740 CE under Maysara al-Matghari. This uprising, centered in Tangier and spreading across the Maghreb, highlighted coercive elements, as Berber forces, including recent Muslim converts influenced by Kharijite egalitarianism, rebelled against fiscal exploitation and second-class status, leading to brutal suppressions that reinforced Islam's dominance through violence and renewed incentives.^[84]^[85] Unlike Byzantine or Sassanid poll taxes applied uniformly within religious majorities, the jizya's tie to non-Muslim identity created a causal mechanism for demographic shift, evidenced by evolving tax rolls showing declining dhimmi populations over generations.^[86] The Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE), shifting the capital to Baghdad in 762 CE, perpetuated the dhimmi framework but introduced juristic debates on non-Muslim obligations, with caliphs like al-Mahdi (r. 775–785 CE) and al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861 CE) enforcing stricter dress codes (ghiyar), church demolitions, and jizya collections to curb perceived encroachments. These measures, applied to Christians and Jews in urban centers like Baghdad, imposed veiled coercion through social humiliation and economic strain, prompting conversions among artisans and merchants to access guild privileges and tax exemptions; occasional violence, including riots against dhimmis, underscored the system's instability, though massacres were rarer than under prior conquests.^[87] Empirical data from Egyptian and Iraqi fiscal archives indicate conversion acceleration among the poor due to the tax's regressive nature, contrasting with non-mandatory Christian levies that lacked faith-based exemptions, thus highlighting fiscal policy as a primary driver of Islamization rather than doctrinal compulsion alone.^[83]^[88]

Medieval Islamic Dynasties and Invasions

In the 12th century, the Almohad Caliphate, founded by Ibn Tumart and expanded under Abd al-Mu'min (r. 1130–1163), pursued a doctrinal revivalism centered on strict tawhid (monotheism) that rejected accommodations for non-Muslims, leading to the revocation of dhimmi protections in North Africa and al-Andalus.^[5] Following conquests such as Cordoba in 1148, Jews and Christians faced ultimatums of conversion to Islam, exile, or execution, with estimates of thousands affected across Morocco, Algeria, and Iberia; many outwardly converted while practicing Judaism or Christianity in secret (crypto-Judaism or crypto-Christianity).^[89]^[90] This policy marked a departure from earlier pragmatic tolerance under Umayyad and Abbasid rule, driven by Almohad ideology's intolerance for scriptural "anthropomorphism" attributed to Jewish and Christian texts, resulting in mass flights—including that of philosopher Maimonides (1138–1204), who escaped Cordoba with his family and penned the Iggeret ha-Shemad (Epistle on Forced Conversion) advising strategic compliance to preserve life and faith.^[91]^[5] In Anatolia and the Balkans during the 11th–13th centuries, Seljuk Turks and their vassals, including the Danishmendids, advanced through ghazi (raider-warrior) campaigns following the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, which eroded Byzantine control and facilitated demographic shifts via warfare, enslavement, and border pressures rather than centralized decrees.^[92] Seljuk sultans like Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072) and Malik Shah (r. 1072–1092) prioritized territorial expansion over systematic coercion, with Islamization proceeding gradually through Sufi missionary efforts, intermarriage, and economic incentives amid Turkish migrations numbering in the hundreds of thousands; however, Danishmendid emirs in eastern Anatolia enforced conversions in captured areas, including through abduction of rural Christians and forced assimilation of slaves, contributing to the region's transition from majority Christian to Muslim by the 13th century.^[92]^[93] These dynamics reflected revivalist zeal among frontier ghazis, contrasting with core Seljuk pragmatism that retained dhimmi taxes for revenue. In Yemen, Zaydi imams from the 11th century onward periodically invoked Shi'i-derived edicts compelling the conversion of Jewish orphans to Islam, as per interpretations of dhimmi custody laws requiring state guardianship to prevent non-Muslim upbringing; this practice, rooted in medieval Zaydi fiqh, affected communities in Sana'a and highlands, prompting Jewish strategies like early marriages to avert orphan status, though enforcement varied and often prioritized fiscal exploitation over total eradication of Judaism.^[94] Such episodic coercions stemmed from doctrinal assertions of Islam's supremacy, exacerbating expulsions and migrations, yet differed from Almohad absolutism by allowing dhimmi persistence under jizya payments when politically expedient.^[95] Overall, these dynasties' stricter phases arose from puritanical reinterpretations of shari'a amid expansionist fervor, favoring expulsions and selective force over the Umayyad-era balance of protection-for-tribute, though pragmatic lulls occurred under weaker rulers.^[5]

Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires

The Ottoman Empire employed the devshirme system from the late 14th century through the 17th century, forcibly recruiting Christian boys aged 8 to 18 primarily from Balkan regions such as Greece, Serbia, and Albania, converting them to Islam, and training them as elite Janissary infantry or administrators.^[96] This levy, occurring every few years and affecting thousands—up to 3,000 per cycle in peak periods—ensured a loyal, slave-soldier class unbound by tribal or familial ties, bolstering military effectiveness during expansions under sultans like Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566).^[97] While the system enhanced state control by severing recruits' original religious and ethnic identities, it generated enduring resentment among Christian communities, contributing to periodic revolts and contributing to the Janissaries' later corruption and resistance to reform by the 17th century.^[98] In the Safavid Empire, founded in 1501 by Shah Ismail I, policies of forced conversion transformed Iran from a Sunni-majority region to a Twelver Shia stronghold through mass executions of Sunni scholars, ulama, and resistors, alongside mandatory Shia rituals and propaganda disseminated by imported Lebanese Shia clerics.^[99] By the mid-16th century under Shah Tahmasp I (r. 1524–1576), coercion included public cursing of Sunni caliphs and destruction of Sunni shrines, affecting an estimated 90% of the population through intimidation and violence, though superficial conversions persisted in rural areas.^[100] These measures consolidated dynastic legitimacy against Sunni Ottoman rivals but provoked Sunni tribal uprisings, such as those by the Qizilbash and Uzbeks, fostering sectarian resentment that undermined internal stability and fueled cross-border conflicts.^[101] The Mughal Empire under Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) revived the jizya poll tax on non-Muslims in April 1679, applying it discriminatorily to Hindus with escalating rates based on wealth—12 to 48 rupees annually—while exempting converts, thereby incentivizing conversions amid economic hardship.^[102] Concurrently, imperial orders led to the documented destruction of over 200 Hindu temples between 1669 and 1680, including the Vishwanath Temple in Varanasi in 1669 and the Kesava Deo Temple in Mathura in 1670, often as reprisals for rebellion or to repurpose sites for mosques, pressuring Hindu elites and communities toward submission or Islam.^[103] Unlike the Ottoman devshirme, Mughals lacked a systematic child-levy for conversion, relying instead on fiscal and punitive coercion; these policies strengthened orthodox Islamic governance temporarily but ignited widespread Hindu revolts, such as the Jat uprising in 1669 and Maratha resistance, eroding Mughal authority and accelerating territorial fragmentation.^[104]

19th-20th Century Reforms and Nationalism

The Tanzimat era (1839–1876) marked a pivotal shift in Ottoman policy toward non-Muslims, with reforms promulgating legal equality across religious lines and abolishing the jizya poll tax on dhimmis in 1856, thereby undermining the institutional incentives for coerced conversions under classical Islamic law.^[105] These measures, driven by the empire's need to counter European pressures and internal decay, modernized the legal framework by curtailing sharia's discriminatory elements, though enforcement varied regionally and provoked backlash from ulema who viewed equality as a dilution of Islamic supremacy.^[106] Despite these liberalizations, sporadic forced conversions persisted in rural areas resistant to central edicts, as local authorities and mobs exploited transitional chaos to enforce religious conformity. In Qajar Iran (1789–1925), Shi'a clerical influence intensified persecutions of religious dissenters, particularly Baha'is—who originated from the Babi movement in the 1840s—through mass executions, property seizures, and demands for recantation to Islam. Historical records indicate that following uprisings like the 1850 Battle of Fort Tabarsi, Iranian authorities executed over 20,000 Babis and coerced survivors into public apostasy rituals, framing refusal as treason against the faith.^[107] Such episodes, often instigated by mujtahids in cities like Isfahan and Yazd, blended theological rejection of Baha'i claims to prophethood with political suppression, perpetuating a pattern of forced assimilation amid modernization efforts under Naser al-Din Shah. The Balkan Wars (1912–1913) accelerated Ottoman territorial losses, displacing over 400,000 Muslims from newly independent states like Bulgaria and Serbia, where Christian majorities imposed expulsions and, in cases such as Pomak communities, coerced reconversions from Islam to Orthodox Christianity, resulting in 27% mortality among affected Muslim civilians from violence and privation.^[108] Ottoman responses, amid pan-Islamic rallying cries, included localized efforts to reclaim apostate Muslims through reconversion campaigns in Anatolia, though these were overshadowed by the empire's military collapse and the rise of Young Turk secularism. Post-World War I conflicts saw heightened Islamization during the Ottoman collapse, as in the 1915 Armenian deportations where authorities systematically forced conversions—especially of women and orphans—into Muslim families to erase Christian identity, with tens of thousands absorbed via adoption and marriage as part of demographic homogenization.^[109] Paralleling this, the Assyrian Genocide (Sayfo) involved massacres in southeastern Anatolia and Hakkari, where Kurdish and Ottoman irregulars compelled survivors to convert to Islam under threat of death, integrating them into tribal structures while destroying Syriac Christian communities numbering around 250,000 pre-war.^[110] These acts, rationalized as wartime security measures against perceived disloyalty, reflected a fusion of nationalist homogenization with religious erasure. Twentieth-century Arab nationalism, from the Mandate era through Ba'athist regimes in Iraq and Syria, nominally prioritized secular unity over religious hierarchy, diminishing state-enforced conversions compared to prior caliphal models. Yet, its emphasis on Arabo-Islamic cultural synthesis exerted subtler pressures on minorities like Copts and Assyrians, with state policies favoring Muslim-majority narratives in education and administration, as noted in contemporary analyses of assimilation dynamics. In practice, reduced overt coercion coexisted with social incentives for conversion, such as access to power, amid the movement's evolution from anti-colonial ideology to authoritarian state-building.

Contemporary Islamist Enforcement

In Pakistan, hundreds of Hindu and Christian girls, often minors, are abducted annually and subjected to forced conversions to Islam followed by marriages to Muslim men, with perpetrators leveraging social pressures, threats, and falsified consent documents to evade legal recourse.^[111] Civil society reports from 2020 to 2025 document patterns in Sindh province, where weak enforcement of minimum marriage age laws and police complicity enable over 1,000 such incidents yearly among Hindus alone, though official underreporting persists due to minority communities' fear of reprisal.^[112] Blasphemy laws under Sections 295-B and 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code exacerbate this by inciting mob violence; accusations, frequently baseless and spread via social media, lead to extrajudicial killings or coerced public recantations and conversions to appease crowds, as authorities often prioritize de-escalation over protection.^[113] ^[114] The self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) during its 2014–2019 caliphate in Iraq and Syria imposed explicit forced conversion policies on non-Sunni populations, including Yazidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims, offering enslavement, taxation, or death as alternatives to adopting its interpretation of Islam.^[115] In Sinjar and Mosul, ISIS fighters systematically separated families, sexually enslaved women and girls after nominal conversions under duress, and executed resisters, with UN-documented cases exceeding thousands among Yazidis alone by 2017.^[116] Survivor testimonies and forensic evidence from mass graves confirm that refusals triggered immediate executions, contrasting ISIS propaganda claims of voluntary adherence with empirical records of coercion.^[117] In Indonesia, blasphemy laws under Article 156(a) of the Criminal Code have compelled apostasy reversals, as convictions for "insulting" Islam—often tied to perceived deviations—result in imprisonment and societal ostracism pressuring defendants to reaffirm Muslim identity.^[118] The 2023 Criminal Code revisions expanded these provisions to explicitly criminalize apostasy, with at least 50 prosecutions since 2010 involving coercion to recant, per monitoring by religious freedom advocates.^[119] In Iran, Baha'is endure state-orchestrated discrimination, including property seizures and educational bans, creating indirect pressures to convert to Islam or conceal faith; while overt forced baptisms are rare, arrests of over 200 Baha'is since 2020 for "propaganda" often involve interrogations demanding renunciation.^[120] ^[121] Yemen's penal code treats blasphemy as evidence of apostasy, punishable by death or flogging, enforcing conformity amid Houthi control, though data scarcity limits precise case counts.^[122] Islamist apologists and state media in these contexts frequently portray conversions as genuine spiritual shifts, dismissing coercion allegations as Western fabrications; however, cross-verified victim accounts, satellite imagery of destroyed minority sites, and quantitative analyses from organizations like USCIRF and Human Rights Watch substantiate systemic enforcement, underscoring discrepancies between official narratives and ground-level realities.^[114] ^[123]

Under Other Religions

Judaism

In the 2nd century BCE, during the Hasmonean dynasty's expansion, High Priest and ruler John Hyrcanus conquered Idumea (Edom) around 125 BCE and compelled its inhabitants to undergo circumcision and adopt Jewish practices as an alternative to exile or death, marking one of the few documented instances of forced conversion perpetrated by Jewish authorities.^[124]^[125] This policy integrated the Idumeans into Judean society but was exceptional, driven by territorial consolidation rather than doctrinal universalism, and later Hasmonean kings like Alexander Jannaeus extended similar coercive measures against other groups such as the Itureans.^[125] In contrast, the conversion of the Khazar elite to Judaism in the 8th or 9th century CE is regarded by historians as voluntary, stemming from geopolitical neutrality between Christian Byzantium and Muslim caliphates rather than imposition.^[126] Judaism's theological framework, rooted in the Torah's depiction of the Israelites as a particular "chosen people" bound by covenant (Deuteronomy 7:6-8), eschews aggressive proselytism, emphasizing instead the Noahide laws for non-Jews as sufficient for righteousness without requiring full conversion.^[127] This particularism—prioritizing ethnic and covenantal identity over universal salvation—has historically constrained the scale of any coercive efforts, rendering forced conversions rare and non-systematic compared to expansionist faiths.^[128] Post-Hasmonean rabbinic tradition further discouraged insincere or coerced entrants, viewing them as potential sources of instability, as evidenced by Talmudic reservations about converts bringing "hardship."^[129] In modern times, instances of Jews enforcing conversions remain negligible, with Israel's Law of Return facilitating immigration for those with Jewish ancestry but not mandating religious change for others.^[130] Jewish communities have instead predominantly experienced the reverse, serving as targets of forced assimilation under Christian and Islamic regimes, though such victimhood underscores the asymmetry rather than perpetration.^[125] This dynamic aligns with Judaism's non-missionary ethos, limiting causal incentives for widespread coercion.

Hinduism

Hinduism, characterized as a non-missionary tradition, lacks historical records of systematic forced conversions to the faith under indigenous rule. Unlike proselytizing religions that expanded through conquest, Hindu kingdoms in ancient and medieval India did not institutionalize coercion for religious adherence, with empirical evidence showing conversions occurred primarily through cultural assimilation, intermarriage, or voluntary adoption rather than state-enforced mandates.^[131] Scholarly analysis confirms no strong evidence of Hindu rulers compelling mass conversions as policy, distinguishing it from patterns observed in external invasions.^[132] During the medieval period under Mughal dominance, Hindu resistance to Islamic conversion pressures manifested through the Bhakti movement, which emphasized personal devotion and vernacular expression to preserve cultural identity amid temple destructions and fiscal incentives like jizya that encouraged shifts away from Hinduism. Bhakti saints, such as Kabir and Tulsidas, promoted egalitarian worship that countered Sufi outreach and coercive tactics, enabling Hindu continuity despite documented violence and enslavement in invasions that claimed millions of lives and led to demographic changes.^[133] This devotional resurgence, peaking from the 15th to 17th centuries, functioned as a non-violent bulwark, with low conversion rates to Hinduism reflecting defensive rather than aggressive strategies.^[134] In the modern era, "ghar wapsi" (homecoming) initiatives, prominent since 2014 under organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, involve reconversions of individuals claiming ancestral Hindu roots after prior shifts to Christianity or Islam, often facilitated by missionaries or economic incentives. Participants in documented cases, such as families in Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, have affirmed voluntariness, citing disillusionment with proselytizing faiths and a return to heritage without reported coercion.^[135] ^[136] These efforts, numbering in the thousands annually but dwarfed by historical scales elsewhere, counter narratives of Hindu aggression, as allegations of force often stem from biased reporting in minority advocacy sources lacking participant testimony. Empirical prevalence remains low, with no state policy mirroring the institutionalized conversions under prior Islamic empires, where primary records detail widespread temple razings and enslavements driving adherence.^[137] ^[138] Claims of systematic Hindu coercion thus appear inflated, unsubstantiated by comparative historical data.^[139]

Buddhism and Other Eastern Traditions

In the history of Buddhism, instances of forced conversion have been rare and limited compared to proselytizing Abrahamic traditions, attributable to its non-theistic framework emphasizing personal enlightenment over exclusive salvation or damnation, which reduces incentives for coercive expansion.^[140] Following the Kalinga War around 261 BCE, Emperor Ashoka (r. 268–232 BCE) of the Maurya Empire converted to Buddhism out of remorse for the estimated 100,000 deaths and 150,000 deportations, subsequently inscribing rock and pillar edicts across his realm to promote dhamma—a policy of ethical conduct, non-violence, and tolerance—influenced by Buddhist principles but extended to all religious communities without mandating adherence to Buddhism itself.^[141] These edicts, such as Major Rock Edict 7, explicitly urged respect for other sects' doctrines and rituals, reflecting a voluntary dissemination model rather than enforcement, as Ashoka subsidized mendicants from multiple traditions and avoided doctrinal exclusivity.^[142] In Tibetan Buddhism, widespread monasticism emerged as a cultural institution rather than a mechanism for forced conversion; by the early 20th century, monks comprised up to 20% of the male population in some regions, often through familial or societal expectations rather than coercion of non-Buddhists, with historical records showing no systematic campaigns to convert conquered populations, as in Tibetan or Mongolian expansions. Similarly, other Eastern traditions like Taoism and Confucianism, lacking missionary imperatives, exhibited minimal coercive elements; Taoism integrated with folk practices through syncretism, while Confucianism functioned as a state ethic in imperial China without demanding religious conversion, prioritizing hierarchical harmony over doctrinal uniformity. During Japan's Meiji era (1868–1912), assimilation policies targeted the indigenous Ainu, banning traditional animist practices and compelling adoption of Japanese customs, including state-promoted Shinto rites after the 1868 separation of Shinto from Buddhism, but these measures emphasized cultural erasure over explicit conversion to Buddhism, which had been syncretized with Shinto prior to disestablishment.^[143] In contemporary Myanmar, Buddhist nationalist groups like the 969 Movement have fueled violence against the Muslim Rohingya since 2012, resulting in over 700,000 displacements by 2017, yet empirical accounts indicate exclusionary and expulsionary motives rooted in ethnic nationalism rather than efforts to compel Buddhist conversion, with perpetrators framing actions as defensive preservation rather than evangelistic.^[144] This pattern underscores Buddhism's empirically pacifist profile in conversion dynamics, diverging from conquest models in theistic faiths where eternal stakes incentivize compulsion.

Under Atheist and Secular Ideologies

Enlightenment and Revolutionary Periods

The Enlightenment's emphasis on reason over faith portrayed organized religion as a repository of superstition that hindered human progress and perpetuated irrational authority. Thinkers such as Voltaire critiqued religious dogma as fostering fanaticism and intolerance, arguing that superstition, rather than genuine piety, underlay much of ecclesiastical power, while Denis Diderot asserted that "superstition is more injurious to God than atheism," prioritizing skeptical inquiry to dismantle faith-based claims.^[145]^[146] This rationalist framework justified coercive secularization by positing the state as the arbiter of truth, enabling policies to eradicate religious influence in favor of a monopoly on civic ideology grounded in empirical observation and causal explanation.^[147] During the French Revolution's dechristianization campaign of 1793–1794, amid the Reign of Terror, revolutionary authorities intensified efforts to suppress Catholicism through forced secular oaths and executions. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy, enacted on July 12, 1790, mandated priests swear loyalty to the state over the Pope, dividing clergy into "jurors" who complied and "non-jurors" who faced deportation, imprisonment, or death; by 1793, public worship was banned in October, churches were desecrated or repurposed for the Cult of Reason—a civic religion venerating rationalism—and non-compliant priests were executed en masse, with estimates of hundreds killed and around 30,000 exiled.^[148]^[149] The Law of 17 September 1793 formalized this by compelling clerical renunciation of faith, framing refusal as counter-revolutionary treason and substituting festivals honoring reason for Christian rituals to inculcate secular devotion.^[150]^[151] In the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), anticlerical provisions of the 1917 Constitution enforced secularization by prohibiting religious education in schools, nationalizing Church properties, and restricting clergy numbers and activities, effectively compelling adherence to state-mandated rationalism over Catholic doctrine. Article 3 required exclusively secular public instruction, indoctrinating youth with antireligious curricula to supplant faith-based worldviews, while Article 130 mandated priest registration and barred them from political rights or wearing habits publicly, aiming to dismantle ecclesiastical influence.^[152]^[153] These measures, rooted in revolutionary ideology viewing the Church as an obstacle to modernization, forced nominal compliance through legal penalties, prioritizing causal state control over individual belief.^[154]

Communist Regimes

In the Soviet Union, the League of Militant Atheists, founded in 1925 and dissolved in 1947, coordinated aggressive anti-religious propaganda, museum exhibits mocking faith, and pressure campaigns that facilitated the closure of thousands of churches, mosques, and synagogues. By 1939, only about 500 Orthodox churches remained operational out of over 50,000 before the revolution, with the regime employing forced renunciations through workplace and union coercion to boost nominal apostasy rates. Stalin's 1930s Great Purge targeted religious leaders as "counter-revolutionaries," resulting in the execution of an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 clergy and the imprisonment of tens of thousands more, while famines like the Holodomor (1932–1933) exacerbated mortality among rural believers resistant to atheistic collectivization.^[155] These measures produced official statistics claiming near-universal secularization, yet archival data post-1991 reveal persistent underground networks, with church attendance rebounding to 40–50% of the population by the 1990s. Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) mobilized Red Guards—youth militias numbering up to 10 million—to demolish religious sites under the "Smash the Four Olds" directive, destroying or damaging an estimated 80–90% of China's cultural heritage, including temples, monasteries, and mosques.^[156] Coercion involved public struggle sessions where believers were humiliated, beaten, or forced to desecrate sacred objects and declare atheism, affecting millions; in Tibet alone, all but a handful of 6,000 monasteries were razed, with thousands of monks imprisoned or killed.^[156] State propaganda and education systems reinforced this, claiming over 90% atheistic adherence by 1976, though clandestine practices endured, as evidenced by the rapid resurgence of religious identification after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, with hundreds of millions reporting faith by the 1980s. Albania under Enver Hoxha declared itself the world's first atheist state in 1967, enacting laws that prohibited all religious observance, demolished over 2,000 churches and mosques, and imprisoned or executed clergy. The 1976 constitution formalized religion's eradication, with forced secular oaths required for employment and education, yielding near-total nominal apostasy; Hoxha's regime documented the destruction of religious artifacts and burial of leaders in unmarked graves to sever cultural ties.^[157] Despite this, empirical surveys post-1991 showed 70–80% of Albanians identifying with pre-communist faiths, indicating superficial compliance and covert transmission of beliefs. In Eastern Bloc states like the German Democratic Republic (GDR), communist policies mandated atheistic indoctrination in schools and youth organizations, such as the Jugendweihe rite replacing Christian confirmation, which by the 1980s enrolled over 90% of adolescents and correlated with declining church membership to under 10% officially. These efforts drove mass nominal apostasies—state records claimed 75% non-belief by 1989—but relied on surveillance and career penalties for dissent, while underground Bible smuggling and secret seminaries sustained religious cores, as confirmed by the swift post-unification church growth to 25% attendance.

Modern Secular Assimilation Policies

In the late 19th and 20th centuries, the United States operated a network of federal Indian boarding schools designed to assimilate Native American children into mainstream American society by suppressing indigenous languages, customs, and tribal affiliations in favor of English-language education, vocational training, and Western cultural norms. From 1819 to 1969, this system encompassed 408 schools across 37 states or territories, enrolling tens of thousands of children who were often forcibly removed from families, with policies emphasizing "civilizing" metrics such as literacy rates and economic self-sufficiency while prohibiting native practices.^[158] Government officials, including founder Richard Henry Pratt of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School (established 1879), advocated this as a secular path to integration, encapsulated in Pratt's 1892 statement to "kill the Indian in him, and save the man," prioritizing national unity over ethnic preservation despite church involvement in operations.^[159] Assimilation outcomes included high rates of cultural disconnection, with empirical data from federal records showing widespread language loss—over 90% of students barred from speaking native tongues—and elevated mortality from disease and neglect, though proponents cited increased employment in non-tribal economies as success.^[160] Similarly, in Australia, assimilation policies from the early 20th century targeted Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children through forced removals known as the Stolen Generations, aiming to integrate them into white settler society via institutional upbringing focused on domestic skills, wage labor, and adoption into non-indigenous families. Between approximately 1910 and 1970, state legislation such as New South Wales' Aborigines Protection Act (1909, amended 1915) empowered authorities to remove children deemed "neglected," affecting up to one in three indigenous children in some regions, with estimates of 100,000 total removals based on archival inquiries.^[161]^[162] These efforts, framed by policymakers as benevolent modernization to break cycles of "tribal" dependency, measured success through metrics like school attendance and assimilation into urban economies, but survivor testimonies and government reports document causal links to intergenerational trauma, including identity erasure evidenced by suppressed kinship ties and cultural knowledge transmission.^[163]^[164] In contemporary China, since 2017, the government has expanded "vocational education and training centers" in Xinjiang targeting Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, compelling participation in programs that promote Han Chinese language, history, and secular nationalist ideology while curtailing Islamic practices to foster "ethnic fusion" into the dominant culture. Estimates from satellite imagery, leaked documents, and defector accounts indicate over 1 million detainees across hundreds of facilities, subjected to mandatory sessions on Xi Jinping Thought, Mandarin proficiency, and loyalty oaths, with policies justified as deradicalization and poverty alleviation to achieve measurable assimilation indicators like employment in state industries.^[165]^[166] Official narratives portray this as secular modernization countering separatism, yet empirical evidence from detainee interviews reveals enforced renunciation of religious customs—such as fasting or prayer—correlating with reported identity dilution, including family separations and cultural reprogramming that prioritize Han-centric metrics over minority autonomy.^[166]^[167] Chinese state media attributes reduced "extremist" incidents to these interventions, though independent analyses highlight biases in self-reported data, underscoring causal pressures toward cultural homogenization.^[165]

Societal Impacts and Responses

Demographic and Cultural Consequences

Forced conversions under Islamic rule in the Middle East contributed to a profound demographic shift among Christian populations, reducing their share from a historical majority in regions like the Levant and Egypt prior to the 7th-century conquests to approximately 4.2% by 2020, down from 12.7% in 1900.^[168] This decline, continuing from 13.6% in 1910, reflects sustained pressures including dhimmi taxation, social discrimination, sporadic forced conversions, and violence, which incentivized assimilation over generations rather than isolated events.^[169] In areas under recent Islamist control, such as Gaza and Bethlehem, Christian populations have plummeted by up to 90% due to coercion and insecurity, underscoring causal links between enforcement and exodus or conversion.^[170] In contrast, forced Christianization in Latin America during the colonial era resulted in widespread syncretism rather than demographic erasure of indigenous elements, fostering hybrid practices like the veneration of saints overlaid on pre-Columbian deities, which preserved cultural continuity within a dominant Christian framework.^[171] By the 21st century, Latin America hosts over 40% of global Catholics, with syncretic expressions enduring without reducing Christianity to minority status, as initial coercion blended with voluntary adoption and lacked perpetual second-class penalties.^[172] Under atheist regimes like the Soviet Union, coercive suppression of religion yielded nominal compliance but shallow adherence, evidenced by a rapid post-1991 revival where Christian identification surged in former republics, with religious belief increasing by 22% in Russia alone.^[173]^[174] This reversal highlights how forced secularization disrupts but does not eradicate underlying cultural affinities, leading to resurgence upon policy relaxation, unlike more permanent shifts under enduring discriminatory systems. The Ottoman devshirme system exemplifies broader genetic and cultural dilution from forced conversion, as Christian boys from Balkan families were systematically extracted, Islamized, and integrated into elite Muslim roles, accelerating the transition of regions like Albania and Bosnia to Muslim majorities through severed lineages and incentivized emulation.^[175] Such mechanisms debunk narratives of purely voluntary Islamization, as empirical demographic trajectories link coercion to lasting population reconfiguration, with Balkan Christian percentages dropping below 20% in affected areas by the empire's end.^[176] Overall, data indicate that coercion fosters superficial or reversible changes in open contexts but entrenches dilution where paired with institutional privileges for converts.

Resistance, Reconversion, and Legal Challenges

Historical instances of resistance to forced conversion often involved clandestine adherence to original beliefs, known as crypto-practices. In 16th-century Spain, Moriscos—Muslims nominally converted to Christianity under duress—maintained secret Islamic rituals and cultural elements as a form of passive resistance against assimilation pressures, despite inquisitorial scrutiny and eventual mass expulsion between 1609 and 1614.^[177] This crypto-Islam persisted as a survival mechanism, underscoring the limited long-term efficacy of coerced baptisms without genuine enforcement of prohibitions on reversion.^[178] In contemporary contexts, reconversion movements have emerged alongside legal frameworks aimed at reversing or preventing coerced shifts. India's Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, promulgated in 2020 and enacted as law in 2021, targets conversions induced by fraud, force, or allurement, particularly in interfaith marriages, with penalties up to 10 years imprisonment.^[179] Amendments in 2024 stiffened penalties for mass conversions and introduced survey mechanisms for oversight, leading to over 400 reported cases prosecuted by mid-2025, often tied to marriage-related coercion.^[180] Proponents argue these statutes facilitate reconversions—termed "ghar wapsi" by Hindu organizations—by enabling legal challenges to dubious conversions, with empirical patterns indicating reduced incidence in rigorously enforced districts through deterrence of fraudulent inducements.^[181] Conversely, in Pakistan, anti-forced conversion efforts have faltered due to enforcement gaps, as documented in 2025 reports from the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) and allied bodies like the National Commission on the Status of Women, which highlight persistent abductions and coerced marriages of Hindu and Christian girls, numbering in the hundreds annually despite nominal prohibitions.^[182] The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has repeatedly designated Pakistan a Country of Particular Concern, citing systemic failures in addressing these cases and urging international sanctions, though domestic courts often validate conversions post-facto, exacerbating minority vulnerabilities.^[183]^[113] Legal challenges to forced conversions invoke competing principles: human rights advocates, including USCIRF, frame coercion as a violation of religious freedom and bodily autonomy under international norms like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while defenders of preservationist laws in India contend they safeguard cultural continuity against demographic erosion via deceitful means, with data from enforced jurisdictions showing measurable declines in contested conversions compared to lax areas.^[114] Enforcement rigor causally correlates with lower reported incidences, as weak implementation in Pakistan perpetuates cycles of impunity, whereas India's model demonstrates partial success in curbing fraudulently induced shifts through prosecutorial action and reconversion provisions.^[184]

Human Rights Frameworks and Ongoing Debates

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948, affirms the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, explicitly including the freedom to change one's religion or belief, thereby prohibiting coercive practices that impair this liberty.^[73] Similarly, Article 18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by over 170 states, states that no one shall be subject to coercion that would impair their freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of choice. These provisions establish a global norm against forced conversion, yet enforcement remains inconsistent, particularly in jurisdictions where domestic laws conflict with treaty obligations. In states applying Sharia-based legal systems, apostasy—often equated with renunciation of Islam—is frequently criminalized, leading to penalties ranging from loss of inheritance and employment to imprisonment or execution, despite ICCPR commitments. For instance, several Muslim-majority countries maintain apostasy laws that override international protections, with non-enforcement of ICCPR stemming from reservations or prioritization of religious jurisprudence over secular human rights standards.^[185] This creates enforcement gaps, as evidenced by ongoing prosecutions or social vigilantism against converts, contrasting with the treaty's intent to safeguard individual autonomy from communal or state pressure. Contemporary debates surrounding forced conversion often pit accusations of Islamophobia against documentation of empirical risks, such as fatwas and mob violence targeting apostates in Pakistan during the 2020s, where ex-Muslims face extrajudicial threats despite no formal apostasy statute.^[186] Critics arguing equivalence across ideologies overlook data indicating apostasy punishable by death in at least 13 Muslim-majority nations, a pattern absent in other religious or secular frameworks today. In atheist regimes like China's, legacies of communist-era suppression persist through "Sinicization" policies forcing religious alignment with state ideology, including mass detentions of over one million Uyghurs since 2017 to eradicate Islamic practices.^[165]^[187] Realist analyses emphasize causal disparities over moral equivalence, noting that while historical forced secularization occurred under communist rule, current global incidence of coercion ties more directly to theocratic enforcement of apostasy than to comparable mechanisms elsewhere, as per annual religious freedom reports. This selective application undermines universal frameworks, with calls for prioritizing verifiable threats—such as documented apostasy cases in Sharia contexts—over narratives dismissing scrutiny as bias.^[9]

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Christian use of coercion against Donatists forced conversion. Is it legitimate to force people to convert to Christianity? Luke 14.23. Migne LatinMissing: 14:23 | Show results with:14:23
[32]
Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right ...
Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.Missing: suppression | Show results with:suppression
[33]
Lenin: Socialism and Religion - Marxists Internet Archive
Everyone must be absolutely free to profess any religion he pleases, or no religion whatever, i.e., to be an atheist, which every socialist is, as a rule.
[34]
The Edict of Thessalonica | History Today
Feb 2, 2021 · On 27 February 380, divine punishment and imperial retribution were threatened for those who rejected the Nicene creed.
[35]
Theodosius's Edicts Promote Christian Orthodoxy | Research Starters
In general, he supported the Nicene faith and began to place both heretics and pagans under civil penalties. ... Although Theodosius took a rigid attitude toward ...Missing: suppression | Show results with:suppression
[36]
The Systematic Destruction of Paganism - Eric Claussen
Sep 1, 2025 · All other Christian groups (Arians, Eunomians, etc.) are deemed heretics and madmen, punished by God and the emperor. Marks the turning point: ...
[37]
380: Christianity becomes the state religion of Rome
The emperor Theodosius I (r. 379-95) makes Christianity the official state religion of the Roman Empire in 380. More pagans and heretics are persecuted.
[38]
Spain. Visigoths and Jews.
The Jewish community had been subject to exile or forced conversion before, but thanks to half-hearted enforcement, bribery, or protection by kings or powerful ...
[39]
Toward a Social History of Jews in the Visigothic Kingdom
Nov 24, 2022 · kingdom of the Visigoths. As a primary proposition, it is clear that the forced baptism of Jews decreed by King Sisebut (probably in 614) ...
[40]
[PDF] Jews, Visigoths, and the Muslim Conquest of - eScholarship
cites King Sisebut who, in 613, did "not even call a council before ordering the Jews either to leave the country or join the Church. "^^. Next, Grayzel ...
[41]
A Reassessment of Visigothic Jewish Policy, 589-711 - jstor
THE SUFFERING OF THE JEWS in Visigothic Spain during the seventh century has traditionally occupied an important place in the history of the persecu-.
[42]
Cathars and Cathar Beliefs in the Languedoc Fourth Lateran ...
The Church condemned all heresies, assuming guilt and placing the burden of proof on the accused. The intention was to "exterminate" Cathars, not reform them.Missing: conversion | Show results with:conversion
[43]
[PDF] The Albigensian Crusade: The Intersection of Religious and Political ...
Dec 8, 2017 · The Albigensian Crusade, called in 1209 by Innocent III, aimed to eradicate heresy in Languedoc, where the Church lacked secular support.
[44]
The Albigensian Crusade: A Comparative Military Study, 1209-1218
Apr 12, 2018 · The Albigensian Crusade began as a genuine attempt by the Catholic Church to subdue Cathars. Along the way, the military efforts of those ...
[45]
Holy War – Holy Wrath: Baltic Wars between regulated Warfare and ...
Sep 26, 2016 · The Baltic crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were in principle aimed at converting infidels and establishing a new Christian plantation in the ...
[46]
The Debate on the Baltic Crusades and the Making of Europe - Bombi
Sep 4, 2013 · And how could this holy war be squared with canon law that explicitly prohibited forced conversions of non-Christians until the mid-13th century ...
[47]
[PDF] Muslim and Jewish Minorities in the Medieval Iberian Peninsula ...
The common destiny of Muslims and Jews after the end of Reconquista by 1492 can be seen in the persecution with forced conversions, suspicions of new Christians ...<|separator|>
[48]
VI The Moriscos - UC Press E-Books Collection
This was followed on October 20, 1525, by an edict ordering all the remaining Moors of Valencia to accept baptism or leave Spain before December 8, 1525.
[49]
https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004416826/BP000014.xml?language=en
[50]
[PDF] The religious allegiances of sixteenth-century peasant rebels
In sum, peasant rebellions always had some religious dimension that reflected the choices of the peasants themselves. These choices are evident in peasant ...
[51]
Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day - Britannica
Bartholomew's Day, massacre of French Huguenots (Protestants) in Paris on August 24/25, 1572, plotted by Catherine de' Medici and carried out by Roman Catholic ...Missing: forced conversions
[52]
St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre's Lessons for Today - Providence
Aug 24, 2022 · The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre should remind us of the dangers of absolutism and demands for coerced religious and political conformity.
[53]
Religious Wars in Early Modern Europe
Aug 31, 2018 · These conflicts ranged from international wars – including the Schmalkaldic War (1546-47), the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648), the French Wars of ...Missing: conversions | Show results with:conversions
[54]
[PDF] University of Groningen The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes van ...
But it followed upon a campaign of forced conversions, the dragonnades, in which soldiers were billeted in Huguenot households. The edict outlawed Huguenot ...
[55]
The period of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1661-1700)
The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685 led to the suppression of the Reformed Church in France and forced Protestants into exile or hiding.
[56]
Coexisting in Intolerance under the Edict of Pacification
Aug 1, 2023 · Forced conversions of Huguenots and repressive measures against domestic devotion therefore caused a problematic situation in the 1680s, and ...
[57]
Labor, slavery, and caste in Spanish America (article) | Khan Academy
The colonization of Spanish America was marked by stark contradictions: claims of protection and salvation clashed with brutal systems of forced labor and ...Missing: baptisms | Show results with:baptisms
[58]
https://brill.com/display/book/9789047400868/back-4.pdf
[59]
Taboo or Veiled Consent? Goan Inquisitorial Edict of 1736 - jstor
Religious converters have found that when people convert, they must be seen to have converted. This requires insistence on certain rituals, dress, language, ...<|separator|>
[60]
Syncretic Beliefs - OER Project
Syncretism was also a form of resistance in the face of slavery and colonialism. By blending traditions into new, hybrid religions like Santería, Vodun, and ...Missing: conversions | Show results with:conversions
[61]
Haitian Vodou | Open Encyclopedia of Anthropology
Apr 5, 2022 · Haitian Vodou worships spiritual entities representing nature and human activities, with divinities called Vodoun, and is practiced in temples ...
[62]
[PDF] Creole Religions - of the Caribbean - University of Michigan
Creole religions include Vodou, Santería, Obeah, and Espiritismo. These systems developed in secrecy and allowed oppressed people to manifest their ...
[63]
Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia on JSTOR
Moreover, a number of overt and covert efforts were made throughout the nineteenth century to promote conversion.
[64]
Confessions of the Shtetl: Introduction | Stanford University Press
Over the course of the nineteenth century, an estimated 69,400 Jews were baptized in the Russian Orthodox Church, and at least 15,000 converted to the tolerated ...
[65]
Full article: (Un)welcome guests? Converted Jews and the state in ...
Oct 16, 2025 · On 2 December 1742, Russian Empress Elizabeth issued a decree expelling all Jews from the Russian Empire, regardless of their status or ...
[66]
The Circassian exile: 9 facts about the tragedy - TRT World
May 22, 2019 · Circassians, a Muslim people indigenous to Caucasia, had long been persecuted by the Russian Empire. Their last remnants of resistance ...
[67]
[PDF] Missions, Education and Conversion in Colonial Africa
Specifically, it addresses the unique role of Christian missions in prompting a genuine schooling revolution and explores the comparative educational expansion.
[68]
[PDF] Religious Conversion in Colonial Africa - Harvard University
May 2, 2010 · The empirical results show that descendants of ethnic groups that experienced greater missionary contact are today more likely to self-identify ...
[69]
History of Residential Schools | Indigenous Peoples Atlas of Canada
Residential schools operated in Canada for more than 160 years, with upwards of 150000 children passing through their doors. Every province and territory, ...
[70]
The History and Impact of Residential Schools | PBS
Dec 19, 2023 · Learn about the complicated, dark history of residential schools and how Indigenous communities are reckoning with their legacies today.
[71]
Residential School History - NCTR
The History of Residential Schools For a period of more than 150 years (see the Residential School Timeline) , First Nations, Inuit and Métis Nation ...Missing: Christian | Show results with:Christian
[72]
https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-56
[73]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights | United Nations
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, ...
[74]
Christianization without economic development: Evidence from ...
The most significant religious transformation of the 19th and 20th centuries has been the dramatic expansion of Christianity outside of Europe, facilitated by ...
[75]
Muhammad's atrocity against the Qurayza Jews - Answering Islam
The larger background of this atrocity against the Jews reveals that Muhammad had already expelled two tribes of Jews: the Qaynuqa in AD 624 and the Nadir in AD ...
[76]
The Treaty of Hudaybiyya | A Restatement of the History of Islam and ...
The Treaty of Hudaybiyya, the most important political document in Islam, included a 10-year peace, and Muslims would return without Umra, and only bring ...
[77]
Legacy of a Prophet . Muhammad and Jews of Medina | PBS
In his view, the Banu Qurayza had attacked the new social order and failed to honor their agreement to protect the town. He ruled that all the men should be ...Missing: early era
[78]
Principal Events of the Caliphate of Abu Bakr - Al-Islam.org
Abu Bakr spent full one year in fighting against the Ahl-er-Ridda and the false Prophets. At year's end all of them had been reduced to submission, and his ...
[79]
Political Development - II | History of Islam
The Rashidun Caliphate guarantees non-interference in their personal lives, particularly regarding their religion, allowing them the freedom to practice any ...
[80]
https://historyguild.org/the-umayyad-and-abbasid-empire/
[81]
[PDF] Taxing Unwanted Populations: Fiscal Policy and Conversions in ...
Nov 26, 2017 · Furthermore, certain local governors attempted to deter conversions to Islam by imposing the poll and kharaj land taxes on converts, although ...
[82]
Conversion and the poll tax in early Islam 9780674331594
... burden as a study of the Aphrodito tax records will show, By 76. Becker ... tax, he did not free himself from the other fiscal burdens. If he continued ...
[83]
[PDF] Poll tax, Religion, and Human Capital in Medieval and Modern Egypt
The tax burden is quite high at lower income levels but falls as income increases, thus suggesting that the financial incentive to convert to Islam was stronger ...
[84]
https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa/From-the-Arab-conquest-to-1830
[85]
How North African Muslims Defied Arab Rule: The 740 Berber ...
Sep 23, 2025 · That was reality under the Umayyads in North Africa: Berbers converted, paid prophets' dues, yet suffered jizya and special levies, treated as ...
[86]
FISCAL SYSTEM iii. ISLAMIC PERIOD - Encyclopaedia Iranica
At the beginning of the 4th/10th century, tax burdens increased largely due to a change in the conversion rate from silver to gold (up to two hundred dinars ...
[87]
[PDF] The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam
Sep 14, 1982 · century of persecution and massacres (Greece, Lebanon-Syria, Serbia, ... cution and massacre struck the dhimmis indiscriminately, wherever they.
[88]
The Geography of Islamization in Syria, 600–1500 - jstor
Many medieval Muslim jurists seem to have regarded widespread conversion to Islam as irrelevant to Islamic society, while increased enforcement of regulations ...
[89]
the case of the Almohads in the Islamic West (sixth/twelfth–seventh ...
The forced conversion of Jews and Christians stands out among the most puzzling policies implemented at the beginning of the Almohad revolutionary movement.
[90]
Maimonides' Life - Oxford Academic
Oct 31, 2023 · Muslim sources similarly speak of forced conversions of Jews and Christians. ... And no Almohad document decreeing the conversion of Jews and ...
[91]
The Guide to the Perplexed: Chapter 2 | Stanford University Press
It is during this period that Maimonides wrote his “Epistle on Forced Conversion” (Hebrew, Iggeret ha-Shemad), a pastoral circular composed in the guise of a ...
[92]
Siege of Brusa 1317–1326 - War History
Dec 13, 2024 · In spite of their desire to reestablish the Sunni sect of Islam, the Seljuks did not undertake the practice of forced conversions, which the ...
[93]
[PDF] Again on Forced Conversion in the Almohad Period - Digital CSIC
The forced conversion of Jews and Christians that took place in the early Almo- had period has been a subject of debate, with positions ranging from the ...
[94]
THE FORCED CONVERSION OF JEWISH ORPHANS IN YEMEN
Apr 28, 2003 · This law obligated the Yemeni (Zaydi) state to take custody of dhimmi children who had been orphaned, usually of both parents, and to raise them as Muslims.<|separator|>
[95]
Zaydi <i>fiqh</i> and the Jews of Yemen
Jun 2, 2023 · One such legal debate concerns the forced conversion of Jewish minor orphans (Eraqi Klorman 2001 and 1995, Tobi 1990), a practice that was not ...Missing: medieval | Show results with:medieval
[96]
Devshirme System - World History Commons
The devshirme was a system of forced labor, probably begun in the late 14th century, in which Christian boys, mostly from the Balkans, were taken from their ...
[97]
Religions - Islam: Ottoman Empire (1301-1922) - BBC
Sep 4, 2009 · Non-Muslims in parts of the empire had to hand over some of their children as a tax under the devshirme ('gathering') system introduced in the ...
[98]
Waning of the Devshirme System | Research Starters - EBSCO
Originating in the 14th century, the devshirme system was designed to provide the elite Janissary troops, as well as various state officials, by converting ...
[99]
SAFAVIDS (1501-1722) - Facts and Details
The Safavids declared Shiite Islam the state religion and used proselytizing and force to convert the large majority of Muslims in Iran to the Shiite sect.
[100]
From Sunni to Shi'i: Iran's Sectarian Legacy - Islamic History
Jun 22, 2024 · For most of its Islamic history, the land of Iran was majority Sunni. The Shi'i Safavids, who took control of Iran in 1501, changed this forever.
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SAFAVID DYNASTY - Encyclopaedia Iranica
Jul 28, 2008 · In 1548, the Safavids managed to penetrate deeply into Anatolia, where the Qezelbāš created much local resentment by their cruel conduct. The ...
[102]
2008 - Aurangzeb, as he was according to Mughal Records
In obedience to the Quranic injunction, Aurangzeb reimposed Jizyah on the Hindus on 2nd April 1679 (Exhibit No. 27), which had been abolished by Emperor ...
[103]
Hindu Temples Destruction by the Aurangazeb in India – a Study
Jun 13, 2024 · The Mughal rulers did the religious persecution of the non-Muslims. They demolished thousands of Hindu temples and some masjids are constructed ...
[104]
[PDF] Reevaluating the Religio-Political Policies of Aurangzeb Alamgir
Dec 6, 2023 · These changes included re- imposing jizya, temple destruction, and the exclusion of Hindus from state services. Apart from this, he banned ...Missing: revival | Show results with:revival
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(PDF) From Dhimmitude to Democracy: Islamic Law, Non-Muslims ...
The Ottomans enacted radical reforms to bring about civic equality, irrespective of race or religion. In particular, they abolished jizya and dhimma in 1856.
[106]
the origin and development of the dhimma in islamic law
... Ottoman Empire equal status under the law. The Tanzimat reforms (1839-1871) modernized the empire's legal system, further reducing the influence of Islamic Law.
[107]
[PDF] A Minority Rights Group Report
This has been a recurring theme in Iranian history, with the forced conversion or persecution of the defeated common events. Manichees,. Mazdakites ...
[108]
1912-1913 Balkan Wars: Death and Forced Exile of Ottoman Muslims
27% of the Muslims of the conquered areas of Ottoman Europe, mostly Turks, died as a result of these wars-the worst civilian mortality witnessed in any modern ...Missing: displacements religious reconversions conversions
[109]
The Absorption and Forced Conversion of Armenian Women and ...
Kévorkian Raymond, Le génocide des Arméniens, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2006, p. 51. DOI : 10.3917/arco.ecker.2015.02. Kuper Leo, Genocide: Its Political Use in ...
[110]
The Assyrian Genocide of 1915 - seyfo center
Apr 18, 2009 · By David Gaunt. Of all modern genocides, that perpetrated on the Assyrian peoples of Kurdistan during World War I is one of the most obscure ...
[111]
Abduction, forced conversion and marriage in Pakistan
May 27, 2025 · How many abductions? Statistics for abduction and forced marriage and conversion are difficult to arrive at and inconclusive, since many ...
[112]
[PDF] nchr-las-forced conversion
Sep 12, 2025 · Marriage presents a bleak picture of religious freedom in Pakistan. The ... abduction, kidnapping, or wrongful confinement, rather than ...Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
[113]
[PDF] Country Update: Pakistan
mere accusations or rumors of blasphemy are often enough to incite mob violence. Offenders increasingly levy such accusations on social media or WhatsApp ...
[114]
Religious Freedom Conditions in Pakistan | USCIRF
Authorities' failure to address mob violence associated with blasphemy accusations, as well as forced conversions of religious minorities—including Hindus, ...
[115]
Mass Violence and Genocide by the Islamic State/Daesh in Iraq and ...
In the wake of the 2003 US invasion, ISIS was primarily operating in Iraq, and then reemerged in fuller force and expanded into Syria following the Syrian ...
[116]
[PDF] A demographic documenation of ISIS's attack on the Yazidi village of ...
In the early hours of 3 August 2014, ISIS fighters left their bases in Iraq and Syria and converged on the Sinjar region in northwest Iraq, close to the Iraqi- ...Missing: conversions | Show results with:conversions
[117]
In the Shadow of the Caliphate: A Decade of Islamic State Gendered ...
[47] “Iraq: Sunni Women Tell of ISIS Detention, Torture,” Human Rights Watch, February 20, 2017. [48] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Archive of Islamic State ...
[118]
[PDF] Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN Member Countries
Blasphemy cases continue to be a persistent issue throughout Indonesia. Most ... Blasphemy and apostasy laws insulate this restriction on conversion.
[119]
Half-hearted progress: religious freedom after the new Criminal Code
Jan 17, 2023 · The new KUHP actually expands the blasphemy provisions in the old criminal code, and even includes a new provision making apostasy an offence.
[120]
“The Boot on My Neck”: Iranian Authorities' Crime of Persecution ...
Apr 1, 2024 · After the 1979 revolution, Iranian authorities executed or forcibly disappeared hundreds of Baha'is, including their community leaders.
[121]
[PDF] Country Update: Iran
Iranian authorities continue to systematically target members of minority faith communities, including Baha'is, Jews, Christians, Sufis, Sunni Muslims, and ...
[122]
Yemen - End Blasphemy Laws
In Yemen 'blasphemy' can be punished by a term in prison ... “denouncing Islam” or any 'blasphemy' conviction may constitute evidence of 'apostasy'.Missing: forced conversion
[123]
https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/pakistan/
[124]
HYRCANUS, JOHN (JOHANAN) I. - JewishEncyclopedia.com
Forcibly Converts the Edomites. Opposes the Sanhedrin. High priest; prince of the Hasmonean family; born about 175; died 104 (Schürer). He was a ...
[125]
Forced Conversions - Rabbi Jeremy Rosen
Dec 2, 2021 · It was John Hyrcanus, of the next generation who it was claimed initiated forced conversion on the Idumean enemy as an alternative to ...
[126]
https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/edcoll/9789047421450/Bej.9789004160422.i-460_010.pdf
[127]
Jewish Proselytizing? - Aish.com
Judaism does not actively proselytize, as the Torah is for all humanity, and observing the "Seven Laws of Noah" is sufficient for a relationship with God. ...Missing: particularism | Show results with:particularism
[128]
Ask the Expert: Proselytism - My Jewish Learning
Jews don't proselytize because righteous non-Jews have a place in the World to Come, and rabbis discouraged it after Paul's arrival.Missing: particularism | Show results with:particularism
[129]
Why Jews Don't Proselytize - TORCH: Torah Weekly
Jews don't actively proselytize due to historical dangers, a Talmudic statement about misfortune for converts, and concerns about insincere converts.Missing: particularism | Show results with:particularism
[130]
Why Don't Jews Proselytize? - Reform Judaism
Proselytizing was one of these restrictions. Jews were not permitted to seek converts, and in some cases, were forced to grant access by the majority faith ...Missing: particularism | Show results with:particularism
[131]
Hinduism and Conversion - Oxford Academic
Hinduism is classified as a non-missionary religion, and this provides a clear indication of its attitude toward religious conversion.
[132]
Dr Arvind Virmani (Phd) on X: "Q: Is there any evidence of any Hindu ...
Jul 1, 2025 · Conclusion There is no strong historical evidence of Hindu rulers forcibly converting people of other faiths to Hinduism as a matter of state ...<|separator|>
[133]
How the Bhakti Movement Gave Hindus a Breather and the New ...
Oct 23, 2018 · The Bhakti movement arose precisely due to Islam's record of cultural homicide marked by an industrial scale destruction of Hindu temples.
[134]
Didn't mediaeval India have perfect conditions for mass religious ...
Jun 1, 2025 · Also, • The Bhakti movement resisted Sufism. Islamic rulers lacked direct control over North India, relying on local rulers who resisted ...
[135]
50 cases of Ghar Wapsi in 2023 where people embraced Hinduism
Dec 29, 2023 · However, several expressed a voluntary desire to revert to Sanatan Dharma and did the Ghar Wapsi.
[136]
'Ghar wapsi': Dressed in saffron scarves, Muslim family converts to ...
May 2, 2025 · 'Ghar wapsi': Dressed in saffron scarves, Muslim family converts to Hinduism in Mathura; says decision voluntary. Article Image ANI.Missing: nature | Show results with:nature<|separator|>
[137]
Ghar Wapsi: Reversing Conversion, Reclaiming Identity
Jul 9, 2025 · In truth, Ghar Wapsi is a voluntary and conscious return to one's ancestral faith, not forced conversion. Let's check out a few toxic headlines ...
[138]
Whitewashing the Forced Conversions of Hindus to Islam in ...
Feb 13, 2020 · Two major variants of the same theme of pre-medieval and medieval Islamic invasions into India have stood out, and continue to remain an ...
[139]
'Forced conversions a myth; an attempt at falsification of history'
Dec 1, 2019 · Even the Supreme Court has said that there is no evidence of this having happened. Interestingly, in the Mughal period, there is evidence of ...
[140]
Religious Conversion in Shambhala - Study Buddhism
It is also true that neither Tibetan nor Mongolian history has seen forced mass conversions of conquered populations to Buddhism or to one of its sects.
[141]
Ashoka's Conversion | World Civilization - Lumen Learning
According to a contemporary text, the Edicts of Ashoka, Ashoka converted to Buddhism because he “felt remorse on account of the conquest of Kalinga because, ...
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https://www.countercurrents.org/2016/07/did-ashokas-embracing-buddhism-promoting-ahimsa-weaken-india/
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Origins of the Ainu Religious Conversion at Hokkaido in Japan
Sep 14, 2023 · Throughout the assimilation process, the Ainu people were forced to accept the Japanese culture including an indispensable part, religion.
[144]
What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?
Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority group, have fled persecution in Myanmar's Rakhine State, fueling a historic migration crisis.
[145]
Voltaire and the French Enlightenment
Nov 9, 2018 · How does he relate superstition to contemporary religious practices? How does Voltaire argue for toleration? What is his goal in this entry ...
[146]
Denis Diderot - Humanists UK
In the former, a set of aphorisms including: 'Superstition is more injurious to God than atheism' and 'Scepticism is the first step towards truth', Diderot ...
[147]
Enlightenment - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 20, 2010 · The Enlightenment begins by unleashing skepticism in attacking limited, circumscribed targets, but once the skeptical genie is out of the bottle ...
[148]
The French Revolution and the Catholic Church | History Today
In October 1793, public worship was forbidden and over the next few months all visible signs of Christianity were removed, a policy pursued with particular ...
[149]
The Dechristianization of France during the French Revolution
Jan 12, 2018 · The program of dechristianization waged against the Christian people of France increased in intensity with the enactment of the Law of 17 September 1793.
[150]
The French Revolution and religion, 1795–1815 (Chapter 28)
By 1794, the radical revolutionaries had literally attempted to 'de-Christianize' France by closing down churches, forcing priests to resign or emigrate.
[151]
Dechristianisation during the Reign of Terror (1793-1794)
The campaign was two-fold. First, all institutionalised religions had to be eradicated and then a new civil Religion of Reason was established (Celebration of ...Missing: sources | Show results with:sources
[152]
Mexico: Confrontation Between Church and State
The Constitution of 1917. One major consequence of the Mexican Revolution was the Constitution of 1917 and its strong anti-church and anti-religious provisions.
[153]
Religion and Revolution, Mexico: 1910–1940 - Oxford Academic
Governors passed laws rigorously enforcing article 130 of the Constitution of 1917. This second wave of anticlericalism (1926–1928), like the first, was not ...
[154]
[PDF] THE ANTICLERICAL ARTICLES OF THE FEDERAL ...
Therefore, in a certain sense, the Constitution of 1917 led to a rebirth in the Church in Mexico. The process of eliminating the anticlerical articles took many.
[155]
“Religion was the Enemy” | Angela K Couch
Dec 3, 2014 · Of these, over 100,000 were shot. Lower estimates claim that at least 25,000–30,000 clergy were killed in the 1930s and 1940s.
[156]
Government policy toward religion in the People's Republic of China
Aug 30, 2023 · 1966-1976: Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution Paramilitary Red Guards attacked or destroyed many temples, shrines, churches and mosques, and some ...
[157]
[PDF] Albania: An Atheistic State?
In 1967, Albania officially proclaimed itself to be "the first atheistic state in the world." All religious institutions were closed and religious officials ...
[158]
Department of the Interior Releases Investigative Report, Outlines ...
May 11, 2022 · The investigation found that from 1819 to 1969, the federal Indian boarding school system consisted of 408 federal schools across 37 states or ...
[159]
History & Culture - Carlisle Federal Indian Boarding School National ...
Dec 9, 2024 · Carlisle Federal Indian Boarding School (Carlisle School) was one the first of the Federal boarding schools to be set up outside of a reservation.Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
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US Indian Boarding School History – NABS
There were more than 526 government-funded, and often church-run, Indian Boarding schools across the U.S. in the 19th and 20th centuries. Indian children were ...
[161]
Aborigines Protection Act | National Museum of Australia
Sep 19, 2022 · 1915: NSW Government gains power to remove Aboriginal children from their families.<|separator|>
[162]
Who are the Stolen Generations and what has happened to them?
Sep 6, 2023 · Under Australia's assimilation laws, as many as one in three Indigenous children were removed from their families in the 60 years between ...
[163]
The Stolen Generations | AIATSIS corporate website
Since colonisation, numerous government laws, policies and practices resulted in the forced removal of generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander ...
[164]
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Stolen Generations - Australian ...
Jun 2, 2021 · Stolen Generations survivors face poorer health and wellbeing outcomes than other Indigenous Australians. More than 27,000 Aboriginal and Torres ...
[165]
China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang
More than a million Muslims have been arbitrarily detained in China's Xinjiang region. The reeducation camps are just one part of the government's crackdown ...Missing: secular assimilation
[166]
“Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots”: China's Crimes against ...
Apr 19, 2021 · The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in China's northwest, is the only region in China with a majority Muslim population. The Uyghurs, ...Missing: secular | Show results with:secular
[167]
“Like we were enemies in a war”: China's Mass Internment, Torture ...
According to a trusted source still in Xinjiang, Muherrem was taken away by the Chinese authorities. Muherrem's sister interviewed by Amnesty International and ...
[168]
Christianity in the Middle East - Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary
Feb 26, 2020 · Christians were 12.7% of the region's population in 1900 but only 4.2% in 2020, and it is likely that they will only represent 3.7% of the population by 2050.
[169]
[PDF] Ongoing Exodus: Tracking the Emigration of Christians from
The proportional decline of historic Christian communities in the Middle East is continuing. Christians were 13.6 percent of the region's population in 1910 ...
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Christian population declined under Palestinian Authority and Hamas
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