Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Geomagnetically induced current

Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are quasi-direct currents of low frequency (typically below 1 Hz) that flow through long, conductive structures on Earth's surface, such as lines, pipelines, and communication cables, as a result of rapidly varying geomagnetic fields generated during events. These fields induce geoelectric fields in the , which drive the GICs through grounded electrical systems, with magnitudes that can reach tens to hundreds of amperes depending on the intensity of the disturbance and the conductivity of the subsurface. Primarily triggered by geomagnetic storms—major disturbances of Earth's caused by the interaction of solar coronal mass ejections (CMEs) or high-speed solar wind streams with the planet's —GICs represent a key ground-level manifestation of that can propagate thousands of kilometers along extended conductors. The physical mechanism behind GICs stems from Faraday's law of electromagnetic induction, where time-varying magnetic fields from ionospheric and magnetospheric currents (such as auroral electrojets) penetrate the and induce horizontal , particularly in regions of high ground or during storms with rapid changes exceeding 100 nT/min. High-latitude areas near the auroral oval and mid-latitude regions with long east-west oriented transmission lines are especially vulnerable, as the induced fields align with these infrastructures to maximize current flow. In power systems, GICs enter via transmission lines and exit through neutrals connected to the ground, bypassing conventional protections designed for alternating currents. The impacts of GICs on electrical are profound, primarily affecting transformers by driving them into half-cycle , which generates excessive harmonics, increases reactive power demand, causes overheating, and can lead to permanent damage or failure. This disrupts , potentially triggering protective relays, cascading outages, and widespread blackouts; for instance, during severe events, multiple transformers may fail simultaneously, overwhelming grid reserves and repair capabilities. Beyond power grids, GICs can induce in pipelines and interfere with railway signaling, though the electric sector remains the most critical concern due to its societal dependence. Historical events underscore the real-world threats posed by GICs, most notably the March 13, 1989, geomagnetic storm that caused a nine-hour blackout in Quebec, Canada, affecting six million people through tripped static var compensators and line faults, with peak GICs exceeding 100 A in some transformers. Other incidents include transformer damage in New Jersey during the same storm and a 2003 outage in Malmö, Sweden, highlighting vulnerabilities even in mid-latitudes. More recently, the May 2024 geomagnetic storm induced significant GICs, causing transformer disturbances in Sweden and other regions, underscoring persistent vulnerabilities. The 1859 Carrington Event, the most intense recorded solar storm, is estimated to have produced geoelectric fields strong enough to induce GICs far exceeding modern thresholds, prompting ongoing assessments of "once-in-a-century" risks. Mitigation strategies for GICs focus on both blocking and monitoring, including the installation of neutral blocking devices like resistors (typically 5–10 ohms) or series capacitors in transmission lines to impede flow, which can reduce GIC levels by 60–90% without significantly affecting operations. Operational measures, such as increasing system reserves, shedding load during forecasted storms, and real-time monitoring using magnetometers, are also employed, guided by predictions from agencies like NOAA. Research continues to refine 3-D models of subsurface and improve forecasting lead times to enhance against these inevitable solar-terrestrial interactions.

Fundamentals

Definition and Overview

Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are low-frequency (typically 0–0.1 Hz) quasi-direct currents that flow through conductive networks on or near the Earth's surface, such as lines, pipelines, and railways, in response to rapid variations in the geomagnetic field. These currents arise from the of geoelectric fields driven by geomagnetic disturbances, primarily during periods of enhanced activity. GICs are a key manifestation of effects on technological infrastructure, occurring globally but with greater intensity at higher latitudes. In terms of scale, GICs typically range from 1 to 100 amperes per phase in power systems during severe geomagnetic events, though magnitudes can exceed this in extreme cases. Their occurrence is closely tied to the 11-year solar activity cycle, with peaks during when coronal mass ejections and solar flares more frequently trigger geomagnetic storms. Unlike , which involves charge separation and is confined to surface effects, GICs originate from processes linked to magnetohydrodynamic interactions in the and , allowing the associated geoelectric fields to penetrate deeply into the Earth's conductive crust due to their . The geoelectric field \mathbf{E} that drives GICs can be expressed conceptually as \mathbf{E} = -\frac{\partial \mathbf{A}}{\partial t} - \nabla \phi, where \mathbf{A} is the magnetic vector potential and \phi is the scalar electric potential; this formulation highlights the inductive component from time-varying magnetic fields. While primarily a natural phenomenon, GICs pose risks to electrical grids by superimposing on normal alternating currents, potentially leading to transformer overheating and system instability.

Physical Principles

Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) arise from the interaction between time-varying geomagnetic fields and the conductive , fundamentally governed by Faraday's law of . This law states that a changing through a surface induces an (EMF) along a closed path bounding that surface, expressed as \oint \mathbf{E} \cdot d\mathbf{l} = -\frac{d\Phi_B}{dt}, where \mathbf{E} is the , \Phi_B = \iint \mathbf{B} \cdot d\mathbf{A} is the , and \mathbf{B} is the . In the context of GICs, rapid variations in the geomagnetic field, particularly the vertical component dB_z/dt, generate horizontal geoelectric fields E_h that drive currents through conductive pathways in the and extended infrastructure. More generally, the differential form \nabla \times \mathbf{E} = -\frac{\partial \mathbf{B}}{\partial t} describes how spatial gradients in the induced relate directly to the temporal rate of change of the , enabling the computation of E_h from observed data across networks. The magnitude and distribution of GICs are strongly influenced by the Earth's subsurface structure, which determines how induced geoelectric fields propagate and amplify within the ground. models, ranging from simple one-dimensional (1D) layered profiles to complex representations, account for lateral and vertical variations in resistivity; for instance, 1D models assume horizontal homogeneity and are often sufficient for preliminary estimates, while models capture enhancements due to geological features like sedimentary basins or coastlines. In regions with higher , such as auroral zones where ionospheric activity is , geoelectric fields can be amplified significantly, leading to larger GICs compared to resistive continental interiors; this amplification arises from conductivity contrasts that focus induced currents, with models often showing substantially higher values than 1D approximations in such areas. GICs exhibit quasi-direct current (quasi-DC) characteristics, with frequencies typically in the range of 0.0001–0.1 Hz, corresponding to periods from tens of seconds to several hours, allowing them to penetrate deeply into the Earth without significant attenuation. The direction of GIC flow aligns with the induced geoelectric field lines, which in mid-latitudes often orient north-south during geomagnetic disturbances due to the prevailing east-west ionospheric currents producing north-south magnetic perturbations. A key aspect of the induction process involves ionospheric Hall currents, which generate asymmetric magnetic field variations; these asymmetries, such as bipolar structures in the vertical component, lead to non-uniform ground responses, though GIC modeling often simplifies to the primary ground-level electric field for practical assessments.

Causes and Mechanisms

Space Weather Drivers

The primary drivers of geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are solar phenomena that disturb Earth's magnetosphere, leading to rapid variations in the geomagnetic field. Coronal mass ejections (CMEs), which are large expulsions of plasma and magnetic fields from the Sun's corona, interact with Earth's magnetosphere upon arrival, often triggering intense geomagnetic storms when the embedded interplanetary magnetic field has a strong southward component. High-speed solar wind streams, originating from coronal holes, also contribute significantly by compressing the magnetosphere and enhancing magnetopause reconnection, resulting in prolonged periods of geomagnetic activity. These disturbances are quantified using indices such as the planetary Kp index, which measures global geomagnetic activity on a scale from 0 to 9 (with values ≥5 indicating storms), or the Dst index, which tracks the equatorial ring current intensity; severe storms typically feature Dst values below -100 nT, reflecting substantial magnetic field depressions. Ionospheric currents play a crucial role in generating localized geomagnetic variations that induce GICs, particularly during periods of enhanced auroral activity. Auroral electrojets, consisting of intense eastward and westward ionospheric currents at auroral latitudes (around 60–70° magnetic latitude), are driven by region 1 and region 2 field-aligned currents (FACs) that connect the to the . Region 1 FACs flow into the at higher latitudes and out at lower latitudes, while region 2 FACs reverse this pattern, facilitating the closure of magnetospheric currents through Pedersen and Hall conductivities in the . During substorms, these systems produce sudden ionospheric currents (SICs), which can reach peak intensities of up to 1 million amperes, causing sharp, localized enhancements in ground-level magnetic fields. The frequency and intensity of these space weather drivers follow the approximately 11-year , with geomagnetic storms and associated GICs peaking during when activity is highest. , which began in December 2019, reached its smoothed maximum number of 160.9 in October 2024—higher and earlier than the predicted 115 in July 2025, exhibiting a double-peaked structure with peaks in 2023 (125.3) and August 2024 (216.0 provisional)—leading to increased occurrences of CMEs and high-speed streams that heightened GIC risks during its peak. This cyclical pattern results in recurrent elevations in geomagnetic activity every decade, with historical data showing storm frequencies up to several times higher at maximum compared to minimum phases. Substorm dynamics further amplify these effects through impulsive magnetospheric processes. Rapid in the magnetotail, where stretched field lines suddenly release stored energy, initiates substorm expansion phases, injecting into the inner and enhancing auroral electrojet intensities. This reconnection produces abrupt changes in the geomagnetic field (dB/dt) on timescales of minutes, with peak rates exceeding 100 / during intense events, directly contributing to GIC . The energy input from these substorms is quantified by the auroral electrojet () index, derived from ground data, which measures high-latitude westward current strength and can exceed 1000 during major events, serving as a proxy for dissipated magnetospheric power.

Induction Processes

The time-varying magnetic field generated by ionospheric currents propagates downward through the non-conductive atmosphere and into the conductive , inducing horizontal at the surface that drive geomagnetically induced currents (GICs). This propagation follows in the quasi-static approximation, where the is negligible (σ ≫ ωε₀), leading to diffusive governed by the skin effect. The skin depth δ, which determines the distance of the magnetic field variations, is given by \delta = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\omega \mu \sigma}}, where ω is the angular frequency of the variation, μ is the magnetic permeability (typically μ₀ = 4π × 10⁻⁷ H/m for non-magnetic Earth materials), and σ is the Earth's electrical conductivity. For typical geomagnetic storm frequencies (e.g., ω ≈ 10⁻⁴ to 10⁻² rad/s) and continental crust conductivities (σ ≈ 10⁻³ to 10⁻² S/m), skin depths range from tens to hundreds of kilometers, allowing significant induction in surface conductors. The induced surface electric field E relates to the magnetic field B variation approximately as E ≈ K B, with transfer function K ≈ √(ω / (2 μ₀ σ)). These geoelectric fields couple to extended conductive infrastructure, such as lines longer than 100 km, which act as antennas collecting the induced (emf). The emf along a line segment is V = E_h × L, where E_h is the horizontal component of the geoelectric field and L is the line length; this drives quasi-DC currents that flow through the network via grounded neutrals. For a , the GIC magnitude I is approximated as I = \frac{E_h \cdot L}{R}, where R is the effective of the path, highlighting how longer lines and lower resistances amplify —transmission lines with R ≈ 0.01–0.1 Ω/km can experience I > 100 A during intense storms for E_h ≈ 1 V/km. Network-scale modeling treats these as voltage sources in series with line impedances to compute across interconnected systems. intensity varies regionally due to differences in ionospheric current proximity and geomagnetic geometry. In polar and auroral zones (typically 60°–80° magnetic latitude), higher GICs occur from closer coupling to intense auroral electrojet at ~100–150 km altitude, yielding E_h up to 10 V/km during substorms. At equatorial latitudes, enhancements arise from the symmetric ring encircling at ~3–5 Earth radii, which intensifies during storms and induces eastward E_h fields of 0.1–1 V/km, affecting mid-to-low latitude grids. Mid-latitudes experience moderate from substorm and storm-time , modulated by local Earth conductivity structures like coastlines that deflect E_h. In three-phase power systems, GICs manifest as zero-sequence currents because they flow equally and in-phase through all three phases, entering and exiting via grounded wye-connected transformer neutrals. Neutral grounding provides the low-impedance path to Earth, allowing the DC-like GIC (with periods >10 s) to split symmetrically across phases without significant positive- or negative-sequence components, though it can generate even harmonics upon transformer saturation. This zero-sequence nature concentrates the full current (up to three times the per-phase value) at the neutral, necessitating blocking devices there for mitigation.

Impacts on Infrastructure

Power Grids

Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) pose significant risks to electrical and systems by entering through long transmission lines and flowing into the neutrals of grounded wye-connected . These quasi-direct currents, typically lasting from seconds to minutes, superimpose a DC offset on the normal excitation current in the transformer windings, leading to asymmetric or half-cycle where the core saturates on one half of the AC cycle while remaining unsaturated on the other. This offset can reach up to 100% of the normal flux level, fundamentally altering the transformer's magnetic behavior and operational characteristics. The primary effects of this saturation include a substantial increase in reactive power demand, often rising by up to 50% or more in affected transformers, which strains and can lead to system-wide instability. Saturated transformers generate significant harmonic currents, predominantly odd harmonics such as the 3rd and 5th, along with even harmonics, distorting voltages and currents across the grid and potentially causing misoperation of protective relays or capacitor banks. Overheating is another critical consequence, with losses elevating transformer hot-spot temperatures above 140°C, risking degradation and structural damage if sustained. These disruptions are exacerbated in high-latitude regions with extensive transmission networks, such as and , where geomagnetic field variations induce stronger geoelectric fields. A notable example is the March 13, 1989, that caused a complete of Hydro-Québec's grid, affecting 6 million people for up to 9 hours and resulting in an estimated $6 billion economic loss to the economy due to power interruptions and equipment damage. GICs above a threshold of approximately 10 A per are generally considered a concern for initiating and related effects, with modeling of grid impacts often employing network admittance matrices to simulate current flows and predict vulnerabilities.

Pipelines and Railways

Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) pose significant risks to buried , particularly those transporting oil and gas, by inducing stray currents that interfere with systems designed to prevent . These systems apply a protective electrical potential to the to counteract natural processes, but GICs can override this protection during geomagnetic storms, leading to accelerated at grounding points or insulation defects. For instance, during periods of high geomagnetic activity (Kp index > 5), pipe-to-soil potentials fluctuate, causing rates to exceed the NACE benchmark of 0.025 mm/year, with observed rates reaching up to 0.038 mm/year in affected locations, resulting in pitting and potential pipe wall penetration over decades. Monitoring of GIC effects on pipelines has been ongoing since the 1970s, particularly for the , where early studies identified telluric currents distorting corrosion control measurements and accelerating degradation in northern latitudes. These efforts, initiated by researchers like in 1971 and expanded by Campbell in 1978 and 1980, involve continuous assessment of pipe-to-soil potentials to adjust amid geomagnetic disturbances. Steel pipelines, with a typical resistivity of approximately $1.8 \times 10^{-7} \, \Omega \mathrm{m}, act as efficient conductors for GICs, allowing currents to flow over thousands of kilometers along linear networks, exacerbating localized where coatings fail. Mitigation strategies for pipelines include the installation of insulating flanges, which electrically isolate sections of the to limit GIC flow and prevent phase reversals that could intensify at junctions. These flanges interrupt current paths, reducing the overall impact on , though their effectiveness depends on proper to avoid conductive bridging. Globally, GIC-induced in pipelines contributes to substantial economic losses, estimated within the broader $1-2 billion annual costs for in oil and gas , driven by repair, inspection, and replacement needs. In railway networks, GICs induce voltages along extensive tracks, posing hazards to signaling and systems as well as personnel . During geomagnetic storms, these induced voltages can reach 4-6 V/km in mid-to-high latitudes, sufficient to cause "wrong-side" failures in track circuits, where signals incorrectly indicate occupancy and halt train movements. Such disruptions have been statistically linked to increased anomaly durations—up to three times higher during intense storms—potentially delaying traffic and compromising operational . Direct current (DC) electrified rail systems are particularly vulnerable, as GICs superimpose on traction currents, amplifying voltage imbalances that can lead to false signaling or equipment malfunctions over long track sections. Personnel risks arise from shocks at track interfaces or switches during , especially when voltages exceed safe thresholds, though incidents remain rare due to grounding practices. Railways mitigate these effects through enhanced monitoring of geomagnetic activity and insulated rail joints, similar to approaches, to segment conductive paths and reduce induced current propagation.

Other Systems

Telecommunication systems, particularly those involving buried cables, are vulnerable to geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) that form closed loops in conductive elements such as metallic power feeds for fiber-optic , leading to induced voltages, signal noise, and bit errors that degrade data transmission quality. These effects arise because long terrestrial cable runs act as antennas for the low-frequency geoelectric fields generated during , potentially causing intermittent disruptions or equipment stress in repeater stations. A notable historical example occurred during the August 4, 1972 , when an L4 in failed due to GIC exposure in a region experiencing geoelectric fields of at least 7 V/km, contributing to broader outages amid widespread anomalies. Submarine telecommunication cables, which span oceanic distances to connect continents, generally experience minimal GIC induction in their underwater segments owing to the high electrical conductivity of , which effectively shields and attenuates the geoelectric fields penetrating from above. However, vulnerabilities emerge at the coastal landing points, where the abrupt transition from conductive to less conductive landmasses amplifies electric potentials through the geoelectric coast effect, potentially driving currents into onshore power-feeding equipment and . For instance, analysis of the transatlantic during the March 1989 storm revealed peak induced electromotive forces of approximately 700 V across its 6,300 km length, with shallow sections contributing disproportionately to the total due to stronger local fields, though the overall oceanic shielding limited widespread damage. Navigation systems face challenges from geomagnetic storms through direct alterations to and indirect ionospheric effects. Magnetic compasses, which rely on the geomagnetic field for , can exhibit deviations of up to 10 degrees or more during intense storms, as field fluctuations—driven by auroral electrojets—temporarily distort local magnetic bearings and hinder accurate heading determination in , , or applications. Concurrently, though not a direct GIC consequence, storm-induced ionospheric scatters GPS and other global system (GNSS) signals, resulting in positioning errors, increased range inaccuracies, and potential signal loss-of-lock that can degrade reliability, particularly in polar or equatorial regions during severe events. Emerging infrastructure, such as data centers and (EV) charging networks, introduces additional conductive pathways that could facilitate GIC flow, similar to extended linear conductors, though their localized nature may mitigate some risks compared to transmission lines. Data centers, with extensive grounding grids and backup power systems, are primarily indirectly affected through grid instabilities but could experience localized heating or voltage anomalies in transformers if GICs exceed typical thresholds during extreme storms. EV charging networks, expanding rapidly with interconnected stations and cabling, pose concerns as potential new entry points for GICs into distribution systems, potentially accelerating in metallic components or disrupting charging operations, warranting further modeling to assess scale in high-latitude deployments.

Historical and Recent Events

Major Historical Incidents

The most significant historical incident involving geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) was the of September 1-2, 1859, triggered by a massive (CME) from that arrived at in just 17.6 hours. This solar superstorm produced the strongest geomagnetic disturbance on record, with auroras visible as far south as the and northern telegraph systems worldwide experiencing severe disruptions, including electric shocks to operators, spontaneous fires in equipment, and the ability to operate lines without batteries due to induced voltages. Although no modern power grids existed, contemporary analyses estimate that a similar event today could induce GICs causing widespread transformer failures and blackouts across , with economic damages ranging from $0.6 to $2.6 trillion due to the scale of interconnected . This event marked the first documented recognition of solar-terrestrial interactions affecting technology, prompting early scientific investigations into geomagnetic variations. Another major event occurred on May 13-15, 1921, known as the Railroad Storm, resulting from a series of intense solar flares and CMEs that generated a geomagnetic disturbance approximately ten times stronger than the 1989 event. The storm caused widespread failures in telegraph and telephone systems across , with particular impacts on railroad signaling and switching in the , including shutdowns of the below 125th Street and a fire in a signal tower. GICs induced in long conductors like railway lines led to operational halts and equipment damage, highlighting vulnerabilities in transportation during geomagnetic storms. This incident underscored the need for resilient signaling systems, influencing subsequent engineering practices in rail networks. The March 13, 1989, geomagnetic storm, driven by a fast CME from a , stands as the most impactful on modern power systems, causing a complete blackout of the grid in , , affecting 6 million people for up to 9 hours. Intense GICs, reaching levels that saturated transformers and tripped protective relays across 21 substations, led to voltage instability and the collapse of the 735 kV transmission network, with some transformers suffering permanent damage from overheating. The event demonstrated the susceptibility of high-latitude grids to rapid geomagnetic field changes, prompting to implement immediate operational changes like load shedding protocols. Earlier mid-20th-century incidents further illustrated GIC risks to European grids. During the intense of October 1960, the power system experienced multiple trips, with 30 lines affected due to induced currents causing misoperations and voltage fluctuations. In 1982, another severe storm caused voltage instability in the UK power network, leading to power outages in parts of and operational adjustments at several stations. These events, occurring amid growing electrification, spurred initial research into GIC modeling, including the development of basic predictive tools by utilities in the 1980s to anticipate storm impacts.

Developments Since 2000

Since 2000, several major geomagnetic storms have highlighted the ongoing risks posed by geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to global infrastructure. The Halloween storms of October-November 2003, triggered by multiple coronal mass ejections, produced intense GICs that led to overheating and a one-hour blackout affecting 50,000 customers in , with ripple effects including voltage instability across and disruptions worldwide. The storm on March 17, 2015, the strongest of , generated peak geoelectric fields exceeding 1 V/km in northern observatories like , resulting in calculated GICs up to approximately 50 A in regional power networks based on substation measurements and modeling. More recently, the May 10-12, 2024, G5-level "Gannon" superstorm, the most intense since 2003, induced GICs peaking at 50-62 A in northwest Russia's power substations, prompting detailed post-event studies on auroral electrojet influences. In response, activated pre-planned mitigations, including targeted power line disconnections to reconfigure the grid and limit stress during the event. Advancements in monitoring and modeling have significantly enhanced GIC risk assessment since 2000. The INTERMAGNET global network of digital magnetic observatories expanded from around 90 sites in 2000 to over 120 by 2025, improving real-time data coverage for geomagnetic variations critical to GIC detection. A new 2025 ground model for , developed using magnetotelluric data from 53 sites, provides more accurate predictions of geoelectric fields up to 12 V/km during extreme storms, accounting for local to refine GIC maps. The 2025 (WMM2025), updated with satellite and observatory data through 2024, incorporates higher-resolution crustal field variations (up to degree/order 133 in its high-resolution variant), offering a refined baseline for subtracting main-field changes from disturbance signals relevant to GIC calculations. The 2020s have seen heightened focus on GIC vulnerabilities amid 's peak in 2024-2025, which has driven updates to regulatory standards. This cycle's intense activity, including multiple X-class flares, prompted the (NERC) to prioritize GIC model validation through workshops analyzing the May 2024 storm, informing revisions to standards like TPL-007-4 for vulnerability assessments. In the , similar pressures have accelerated compliance with network codes addressing risks, emphasizing harmonic distortion monitoring. The (EPRI) has deployed advanced GIC monitoring hardware, including low-cost sensors for DC and AC current detection up to the 7th harmonic, across North American utilities to enable real-time transformer health tracking during storms. Globally, the May 2024 storm caused minor voltage fluctuations and a disturbance in southern Sweden's power grid, underscoring persistent vulnerabilities in high-latitude regions despite mitigations. Economic analyses estimate the annual risk cost of GIC-related disruptions to power grids at tens of billions of euros globally, driven by potential outages and effects from recurrent minor-to-moderate events.

Monitoring and Prediction

Detection Methods

Direct measurement of geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) primarily involves installing sensors at the neutral points of power transformers in substations, where quasi-DC currents flow to ground during geomagnetic disturbances. Hall-effect sensors and current transformers (CTs) are the most common devices for this purpose, as they can accurately detect low-frequency DC components superimposed on AC currents without interrupting operations. These sensors typically offer high precision, with accuracy levels sufficient to resolve currents as low as 1 A, enabling reliable quantification of GIC magnitudes during events. By 2025, such monitoring systems have been deployed in hundreds of substations worldwide, including networks like the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI) SUNBURST program, which operates dozens of sites across North America to capture real-time data. Indirect proxies for GIC detection rely on geophysical instruments that infer current flows from variations in Earth's magnetic and electric fields, providing broader spatial coverage where direct sensors are absent. Magnetometers, deployed at observatories such as those operated by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), measure rapid changes in the magnetic field (dB/dt), which correlate with induced geoelectric fields driving GICs in conductive infrastructure. These devices record vector components of the magnetic field at high sampling rates, allowing estimation of disturbance intensity over large areas. Complementing magnetometers, geoelectric field sensors—often consisting of pairs of buried electrodes connected to voltmeters—directly measure telluric electric fields at shallow depths of 0.5 to 3 meters to minimize environmental noise. Such installations, like those at the USGS Boulder observatory, help validate models of GIC risk by capturing ground-level electric field strengths during storms. Integration of GIC detection into power system networks enhances operational awareness through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition () systems, which aggregate for centralized monitoring and automated responses. GIC sensors feed low-frequency readings into platforms via analog or interfaces, enabling utilities to log DC neutral currents alongside traditional AC parameters like voltage and power flow. Alert thresholds are typically set at levels such as 20 A, triggering notifications or protective actions like blocking to prevent overheating. This real-time logging supports across interconnected grids, with often shared through utility consortia for regional storm response. Despite these advances, GIC detection faces significant challenges, including sparse sensor coverage in developing regions where infrastructure monitoring is limited, leading to gaps in global risk assessment. Additionally, man-made electromagnetic noise from power lines, pipelines, and urban activities can interfere with measurements, particularly for geoelectric sensors, requiring sophisticated filtering techniques to isolate geomagnetic signals. These issues underscore the need for expanded international networks and improved signal processing to ensure robust, real-time GIC observation.

Forecasting and Modeling

Empirical models form the foundation for forecasting geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) by estimating the geoelectric field that drives these currents in ground-based conductors. A key approach is the plane-wave approximation, which relates the horizontal electric field \mathbf{E} to the time rate of change of the magnetic field \frac{d\mathbf{B}}{dt} through the Earth's surface impedance \mathbf{Z}, expressed as \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{Z} \frac{d\mathbf{B}}{dt}. This method assumes a vertically propagating plane electromagnetic wave and simplifies calculations for low-frequency geomagnetic variations, enabling rapid assessment of induced fields during storms. To capture regional variations in Earth's conductivity, three-dimensional (3D) geomagnetic modeling incorporates data from magnetotelluric (MT) surveys, such as the empirical magnetotelluric transfer function (EMTF) approach, which derives 3D conductivity structures to refine geoelectric field estimates across heterogeneous terrains. Operational forecasting tools at the NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) provide real-time geoelectric field models for GIC risk assessment over the and , utilizing the 1-minute empirical EMTF-3D model that interpolates MT-derived transfer functions on a 0.5-degree to account for local effects. These models draw on observed geomagnetic to compute induced fields, supporting operators in monitoring hazards from ongoing disturbances. For proactive warnings, SWPC issues 3-day geomagnetic forecasts that predict levels (G-scale) driven by coronal mass ejections (CMEs), offering lead times of 1-3 days to anticipate GIC risks from enhanced solar activity. Recent advancements as of 2025 integrate physics-based simulations with empirical data for more accurate ground modeling. A notable development combines the Lyon-Fedder-Mobarry (LFM) magnetohydrodynamic model, which simulates magnetospheric dynamics, with MT conductivity profiles to predict ionospheric currents and their ground-level induction effects, improving spatial resolution of E-field forecasts during complex storms. Additionally, techniques, such as algorithms trained on and geomagnetic data, enable substorm predictions with approximately 80-83% accuracy up to three hours in advance, enhancing short-term GIC risk alerts by identifying rapid field variations. Model validation against real events confirms their reliability, with back-testing on the severe May 2024 geomagnetic storm (G5 level) showing correlation coefficients exceeding 0.8 and prediction efficiencies of 0.4–0.7 compared to direct measurements at transformers and substations across the , including data from utilities like the . Similar performance was observed for the October 2024 geomagnetic storm. These comparisons highlight the models' ability to capture storm-induced currents while identifying needs for finer-scale conductivity inputs in coastal regions.

Mitigation Strategies

Engineering Solutions

Engineering solutions for mitigating geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) primarily involve hardware modifications and design changes to grids, pipelines, and related infrastructure to interrupt or limit the flow of these quasi-DC currents. In systems, series capacitors installed in transmission lines present a to low-frequency GIC, effectively blocking their flow and preventing saturation in downstream transformers. These devices, commonly used to enhance on long lines, can eliminate GIC entirely in the protected segments. For example, in the 400 kV grid, widespread deployment of series capacitors since the early has significantly reduced GIC exposure by eliminating flow paths in major transmission corridors. Neutral blocking devices (NBDs), consisting of inductor-resistor combinations installed in the grounding leads of wye-connected transformers, provide another key mitigation approach by diverting GIC away from transformer windings. These passive devices increase impedance to currents while allowing normal fault currents to pass, typically achieving an average reduction of about 50% in GIC magnitude across affected transformers. High-resistance grounding resistors in connections further limit GIC by partially blocking flow, though they permit some residual compared to full inductors. In practice, NBDs have been installed at critical substations in North American grids to protect high-value transformers during geomagnetic disturbances. Grounding strategies also play a vital role in minimizing GIC impacts through winding configurations and substation earthing practices. -wye connected , where the high-voltage side is and the low-voltage side is wye-grounded, allow induced GIC to circulate within the closed loop rather than flowing through the grounded wye, thereby reducing effective zero-sequence exposure to the core. This configuration inherently limits half-cycle by containing the offset in the ungrounded winding. Additionally, strategic earthing at substations, such as using isolated ing or resistors in paths, reduces the overall GIC entry points by increasing path without compromising system stability. For pipelines, where GIC can exacerbate corrosion by altering electrochemical potentials at the pipe-soil , protections on cathodic systems and electrical . Sacrificial anodes and adjustments to impressed-current rectifiers maintain protective potentials during GIC events, countering the stray interference that shifts corrosion rates. Insulating joints segment pipelines into isolated sections, preventing continuous GIC flow along extended lengths and localizing corrosion risks to manageable zones. These measures ensure that GIC-induced voltage fluctuations do not overwhelm corrosion control systems, preserving pipeline integrity over thousands of kilometers. Regulatory standards guide the implementation of these solutions, with the (NERC) Reliability Standard TPL-007-4 mandating GIC vulnerability assessments for transmission owners and operators of facilities connected to the bulk power system, including those with long high-voltage lines susceptible to induced fields. These assessments evaluate GIC flows under benchmark geomagnetic events and require plans, such as installing blocking devices, for elements showing thermal or risks, particularly in grids spanning extensive geographic areas. Compliance ensures that fixes are prioritized based on modeled impacts, enhancing overall system resilience.

Policy and Preparedness

In the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 830 in 2016, which approved the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, mandating that transmission operators assess vulnerabilities to geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) and develop mitigation plans for geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) in their systems. This order requires entities to conduct initial and periodic vulnerability assessments, focusing on transformer heating and reactive power absorption risks, with compliance deadlines phased through 2017 and beyond. In the European Union, the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive (EU) 2022/2557, adopted on 14 December 2022 and requiring transposition by member states by 17 October 2024, with application from 18 October 2024, establishes an all-hazards framework for critical infrastructure resilience, encompassing natural events such as space weather disruptions that could induce GIC in power networks. This directive obliges operators of essential services to perform risk assessments, implement resilience measures, and report annually on preparedness against physical threats, including geomagnetic storms. Preparedness plans for GIC emphasize operator training and predefined response protocols to alerts. Utilities conduct regular training programs to equip grid operators with skills for interpreting warnings from agencies like NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center, enabling timely activation of steps such as GIC flows in real-time. For instance, during severe events, protocols may involve load shedding or equivalent measures like circuit de-energization to prevent damage; in New Zealand's response to the May 2024 Gannon G5 , Transpower declared grid emergencies to remove vulnerable transmission circuits, reducing peak neutral currents from potential highs of over 200 A to around 113 A at key substations without resorting to load shedding. These procedures align with NERC templates for GMD operating guides, which outline escalation from watches to emergencies based on storm intensity forecasts. International cooperation enhances global GIC resilience through coordinated data and policy efforts. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of (COPUOS) facilitates initiatives via the International Space Weather Initiative (ISWI), promoting collaborative research, model sharing, and capacity-building among nations to address GMD impacts on . Complementing this, the INTERMAGNET operates a worldwide network of geomagnetic observatories, providing near-real-time that supports global alerts and GIC modeling; this has been instrumental in validating storm predictions and informing cross-border grid protections. Such efforts underscore a unified approach, with frameworks like the 2018-2030 International Services plan emphasizing integrated forecasting to mitigate widespread disruptions. Despite progress, challenges persist in policy implementation, particularly underfunding and resource gaps in low-latitude regions where GIC risks are often underestimated due to weaker . These areas, including parts of and , face limited investment in monitoring and training compared to high-latitude grids, exacerbating vulnerabilities during intense storms. Cost-benefit analyses of GIC mitigations, such as strategic grounding and blocking devices, generally demonstrate favorable returns by averting blackout costs that can exceed billions per event, though comprehensive studies highlight the need for tailored economic evaluations to prioritize investments.

References

  1. [1]
    Review of Geomagnetically Induced Current Proxies in Mid-Latitude ...
    Nov 2, 2023 · GICs are defined as intense, low-frequency (0.0001 Hz–0.1 Hz) quasi-DC currents flowing in ground conductor systems, oil and gas pipelines ...
  2. [2]
    Geomagnetic Pulsations Driving Geomagnetically Induced Currents
    Nov 4, 2020 · Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are naturally occurring currents induced in conductive media, such as the Earth, by fluctuations of the ...
  3. [3]
    Analysis of geomagnetically induced currents at a low-latitude ...
    This analysis provides an overview of the long-term GIC monitoring at low latitudes and suggests new insight into critical phenomena involved in the GIC ...
  4. [4]
    Geomagnetically induced current during magnetic storms
    Aug 5, 2025 · GICs have magnitudes that can range on the order of 1-100's of Amperes with the largest GIC recorded in Sweden during a magnetic storm on ...
  5. [5]
    Geomagnetic Storm Occurrence and Their Relation With Solar Cycle ...
    Aug 18, 2021 · The occurrence of geomagnetic storms depends on the strength of the 11 yr solar cycle (SC), and the different phases in it.
  6. [6]
    [PDF] Frequency Components of Geomagnetically Induced Currents for ...
    Dec 19, 2019 · In the frequency domain, the conductivity of the Earth relates the B-field to the E-field via the surface impedance Z(f). The E-field in turn ...
  7. [7]
    Estimation of the 3-D geoelectric field at the Earth's surface ... - ANGEO
    May 27, 2025 · The geoelectric field drives geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) ... vector potential of the DF 2-D SECS from Amm and Viljanen (1999) ...
  8. [8]
    Geomagnetically induced currents: Science, engineering, and ...
    Jan 30, 2017 · Geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) cause geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) to flow in long engineered conductor systems such as power grids, ...
  9. [9]
  10. [10]
    Geomagnetic Storms | NOAA / NWS Space Weather Prediction Center
    These storms result from variations in the solar wind that produces major changes in the currents, plasmas, and fields in Earth's magnetosphere. The solar wind ...
  11. [11]
    Geomagnetic response to solar and interplanetary disturbances
    Jul 29, 2013 · High-speed streams of solar wind from coronal holes are the main cause of geomagnetic disturbances in the period around solar minimum, although ...
  12. [12]
    Magnetic Storms During the Space Age: Occurrence and Relation to ...
    Nov 25, 2022 · We find 2,526/2,743 magnetic storms in the Dxt/Dst index, out of which 45% are weak, 40% moderate, 12% intense and 3% major storms. Occurrence ...
  13. [13]
    Electrojets - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
    The auroral electrojets are the most prominent currents at auroral latitudes. They carry a total current of some million amperes.
  14. [14]
    Power grid disturbances and polar cap index during geomagnetic ...
    The field-aligned currents close in the ionosphere through conduction (Pedersen) currents while strong transverse. (Hall) currents are generated by the ...
  15. [15]
    Initial Response of Nightside Auroral Currents to a Sudden ...
    Mar 31, 2022 · These values show that intense westward currents of order 1 million Ampere are switched on by the SC only minutes after a quiet period. In a ...
  16. [16]
    Solar Cycle Progression - Space Weather Prediction Center - NOAA
    The Prediction Panel predicted Cycle 25 to reach a maximum of 115 occurring in July, 2025. ... Geomagnetic Storms · Ionosphere · Ionospheric Scintillation ...
  17. [17]
    Implementing Geomagnetically Induced Currents Mitigation During ...
    Jun 1, 2025 · Since the Halloween storm of 2003, the past 20 years has seen largely mild geomagnetic conditions, but solar cycle 25 has produced frequent ...
  18. [18]
    Near-Earth Magnetotail Reconnection Powers Space Storms - PMC
    The solar wind flow imparts energy to Earth's magnetosphere that is dissipated as heat during substorms and storms. ... (B) AE index (black, left axis scale) ...
  19. [19]
    Global Observations of the Short‐Term Disturbances ... - AGU Journals
    Apr 25, 2023 · The GIC threat represented by the dB/dt peaks during the supersubstorms shows the highest magnitude (∼900 nT/min) in the latitude band of ...
  20. [20]
    Auroral-oval activity during the intense magnetic storm of May 2024
    Mar 25, 2025 · It is known that the AE index can serve as an energy proxy function to quantify the energy fluxes in the auroral electrojets and due to ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  21. [21]
  22. [22]
    [PDF] Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC) and E3 HEMP Mitigation John
    This report deals with techniques for protecting the high voltage portion of the U.S. power grid against the effects of geomagnetically induced currents ...
  23. [23]
    Electric Power Transmission - Space Weather Prediction Center
    These geomagnetically induced currents cause the 'exciting current' in power transformers to operate out of their designed range, resulting in saturation of ...
  24. [24]
    [PDF] Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper
    This geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) results in an offset of the ac sinusoidal flux resulting in asymmetric or half-cycle saturation (see Figure 1). Half- ...
  25. [25]
    [PDF] Impact of transformer saturation from GIC on power system voltage ...
    GICs cause transformer saturation, increasing harmonic current and var losses, leading to voltage depression and potentially system voltage collapse.
  26. [26]
    Geomagnetically Induced Currents, Transformer Harmonics, and ...
    Apr 17, 2025 · GIC potentially leads to damaging levels of internal heating, voltage dips, power flow variations, and distortion of the AC supply waveform.
  27. [27]
    [PDF] Effect of GIC on Power Transformers & Power Systems
    May 14, 2014 · 2/3rd of transformers were determined, based on their designs, to have a high level of susceptibility to possible damaging overheating, ...
  28. [28]
    Sun-Earth Day 2009 - NASA
    The March 13, 1989 Quebec blackout, the result of a major geomagnetic storm, caused a $6 billion loss to the Canadian economy. During intense solar flares ...
  29. [29]
    GIC effects on pipeline corrosion and corrosion control systems
    Aug 7, 2025 · The impact of telluric current activity on the corrosion control systems for pipelines in northern regions is examined.
  30. [30]
    Impacts of GIC on the New Zealand Gas Pipeline Network
    Dec 7, 2022 · The aim of CP is to prevent corrosion of a steel pipe which may occur when the pipe is exposed in an aerated but neutral electrolyte. In ...
  31. [31]
    Gas Pipelines - SolarStorms.org
    ... Pipelines that have insulating flanges can be more vulnerable to damaging electric currents. The flanges are meant to interrupt current flow; however, it ...
  32. [32]
    Modeling the Impact of Geomagnetically Induced Currents on ...
    Mar 16, 2023 · It was later estimated that a geoelectric field of 4–5 V/km was induced as a result of the storm, with the GICs driven through the railway ...
  33. [33]
    Geomagnetic Storms' Influence on Intercity Railway Track Circuit
    Jul 8, 2016 · However, at high-latitude area, induced voltage can reach to 6 V each kilometer when strong storms happen [18]. Asymmetric GIC at this time is ...
  34. [34]
  35. [35]
    Modeling “Wrong Side” Failures Caused by Geomagnetically ...
    Dec 11, 2023 · This study shows that a relay is most susceptible to “wrong side” failure when a train is at the end of a track circuit block.
  36. [36]
    Space weather climate impacts on railway infrastructure
    Jun 17, 2020 · From a safety criticality standpoint, the most significant systems that may be affected by GIC are signalling and traffic control systems. This ...
  37. [37]
    [PDF] Electric Utility Industry Experience with Geomagnetic Disturbances
    For example, geomagnetic disturbances induce voltages on the metallic conductors used to power fiber optic repeaters on long circuits such as submarine cables.
  38. [38]
    [PDF] Space Weather Effects on Communications Systems
    May 6, 2021 · • Fiber Optic Cables on land do not conduct electricity (mitigation) ... GIC and Undersea Cables. Risk currently unknown. 25. Page 26. Mark ...<|separator|>
  39. [39]
    [PDF] Geomagnetic Storms and Their Impacts on the US Power Grid
    This report describes the threat of geomagnetic storms on the Earth caused by solar activity and further discusses their impacts (past and future) on the ...
  40. [40]
    An Examination of Geomagnetic Induction in Submarine Cables
    Feb 1, 2024 · Geomagnetic disturbances induce electric fields in both the sea and in submarine cables Earth potentials are produced by the geoelectric ...
  41. [41]
    [PDF] 6RODU#6WRUPV#DQG#<RX$ - Space Math @ NASA
    Navigation by compass is especially difficult during either of these magnetic storms because compass bearings can change by 10 degrees or more during the course ...
  42. [42]
    Space weather effects on technology
    Because of their low frequency compared to the AC frequency, the geomagnetically induced currents appear to a transformer as a slowly-varying DC current.Missing: deep | Show results with:deep
  43. [43]
    Data centers weather solar storms - DCD
    Oct 6, 2022 · Due to its low frequency, geomagnetic EMP acts most strongly on electrical conductors running miles in length, such as high-voltage transmission ...
  44. [44]
    What Was the Carrington Event? | NESDIS - NOAA
    Spikes of electricity surge into the world's telegraph systems, and no one can send a message. What Is Going On? In 1859, even scientists didn't understand ...
  45. [45]
    5 Geomagnetic Storms That Reshaped Society - USGS.gov
    Jul 9, 2024 · The “Carrington storm” as it was later dubbed, disrupted telegraph systems and caused them to overload, igniting fires at numerous telegraph ...
  46. [46]
    [PDF] Duration and Extent of the Great Auroral Storm of 1859
    As discussed earlier, for the great storm of 1859, these ionospheric currents were so strong that magnetometers frequently went off scale and telegraph systems ...
  47. [47]
    [PDF] The Carrington Event or How the Sun Can Make Civilized Life ...
    The total economic cost for such a scenario is estimated at $0.6-2.6 trillion USD. Atlantic coast is significant. The total number of damaged transformers is ...Missing: modern | Show results with:modern
  48. [48]
    When Solar Storms Attack: Space Weather and our Infrastructure
    Oct 19, 2015 · The 1859 Carrington Event, the largest geomagnetic storm in recorded history, crippled a large portion of the telegraph system at the time, ...
  49. [49]
    [PDF] dr. peter vincent pry - House Oversight Committee
    May 13, 2015 · In 1921 a geomagnetic storm ten times more powerful, the Railroad Storm, afflicted the whole of. North America. It did not have catastrophic ...
  50. [50]
    [PDF] Multifractal Analysis of Geomagnetically Induced Currents
    Feb 21, 2020 · recorded in 1921 when the effects of a space storm shut down New York Central Railroad below. 125th street and provoking a fire in the ...
  51. [51]
    [PDF] Geomagnetic Disturbance Monitoring Approach and Implementation ...
    Executive Summary. Geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) occur when Earth is subjected to changes in the energized particle streams emitted by the Sun.
  52. [52]
    Lights Out - Electrical and Computer Engineering
    Apr 15, 2016 · A 1921 event had similar effects, disrupting telephone service and railroad ... geomagnetic storm and mitigate its effects on the network. While ...
  53. [53]
    Space Weather and Safety
    During this storm, excess currents were produced on telegraph lines, shocking technicians and in some cases, setting their telegraph equipment on fire.
  54. [54]
    [PDF] Geomagnetic Storms and Long- Term Impacts on Power Systems
    It is widely accepted that the sun can create geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) on the Earth that are potentially damaging to electric power equipment ...Missing: explanation | Show results with:explanation
  55. [55]
    [PDF] Did geomagnetic activity challenge electric power reliability during ...
    [1] During solar cycle 22, a very intense geomagnetic storm on 13 March 1989 contributed to the collapse of the Hydro-Quebec power system in Canada.
  56. [56]
    [PDF] Electric Utility Experience Industry with Geomagnetic Disturbances
    The geomagnetically induced (quasi-dc) currents that flow through the grounded neutral of a transformer during a geomagnetic disturbance cause the core of the ...
  57. [57]
    Chronology of effects - Space Weather Canada
    The geomagnetic storm caused problems in the Swedish telegraph system. ... The power system in Sweden experienced tripping of 30 line circuit breakers ...
  58. [58]
    RAL Space “Cobra” – space weather becomes a political issue
    Feb 5, 2020 · Transformer damage is rare but can happen (two UK transformers suffered minor damage during the great geomagnetic storm of March 1989) and, of ...
  59. [59]
    Power grid disturbances and polar cap index during geomagnetic ...
    Jun 25, 2013 · These high-voltage power grid disturbances were related to impulsive magnetic variations accompanying extraordinarily intense substorm events.
  60. [60]
    The effects of geomagnetic disturbances on electrical systems at the ...
    Geomagnetic disturbances have affected electrical systems on the ground for over 150 years. The first effects were noted on the early telegraph in the 1840s.
  61. [61]
    Geomagnetic storm of 29–31 October 2003 ... - AGU Journals
    The blackout lasted for an hour and left about 50,000 customers without electricity. The incident was probably the most severe geomagnetically induced current ( ...
  62. [62]
    Geolectric field measurement, modelling and validation during ...
    Jun 18, 2021 · We examine the geoelectric field modelled for three of the larger storms experienced in the UK between 2013 and 2018: 17–18 March 2015, 7–8 ...
  63. [63]
  64. [64]
    Evolution in time of the number of INTERMAGNET observatories...
    The new method is used to study secular trends for the period 1991–2015 and relies on observations of three components of the magnetic field at five geomagnetic ...
  65. [65]
    Developing a New Ground Electric Field Model for Geomagnetically ...
    Aug 9, 2025 · Longer period/lower frequency signals penetrate deeper into the crust, whereas higher frequencies (short periods) probe the shallower subsurface ...
  66. [66]
    [PDF] The US/UK World Magnetic Model for 2025-2030
    Jan 14, 2021 · The WDCs for geomagnetism benefit greatly from the efforts of INTERMAGNET, an organization whose objectives are to establish a global network ...
  67. [67]
    [PDF] Agenda Geomagnetic Disturbance Workshop - NERC
    Oct 1, 2024 · Validation of GIC models and vulnerability assessments using GIC and magnetic field measurements are a key priority to advance mitigation of the ...
  68. [68]
    EPRI GIC Monitor
    The Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC) RF Monitor is a specialized device designed to measure both alternating current (a.c.) and direct current (d.c.) ...Missing: 2020s | Show results with:2020s
  69. [69]
    Characterizing the distribution of extreme geoelectric field events in ...
    Aug 21, 2024 · The purpose of this study is to perform an extreme value (EV) analysis of the E magnitude at six different latitudes in Sweden and to express the maximum |E|
  70. [70]
    Quantifying the Economic Value of Space Weather Forecasting for ...
    2004). Estimates of economic impact of space weather on European power grids alone range from €10s-100s billion (e.g., Eastwood et al. 2018) ...
  71. [71]
    Monitoring GIC (Geomagnetically Induced Currents), Hall Effect ...
    Nov 12, 2019 · The Hall Effect transducer operates over a wide dynamic range and maintains low-level accuracy even after a large over-range. The GIC's ...
  72. [72]
  73. [73]
    Measurement of geomagnetically induced current (GIC) around ...
    May 7, 2021 · We need a typical method of directly measuring geomagnetically induced current (GIC) to compare data for estimating a potential risk of power grids caused by ...
  74. [74]
    Monitoring and Mitigation of Geomagnetically Induced Currents - EPRI
    These solar magnetic disturbances induce slowly varying electric fields at the earth's surface that cause geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to flow in ...
  75. [75]
    [PDF] Occurrence of Large Geomagnetically Induced Currents
    76% of top GIC events occur during main geomagnetic storm phases, 24% at sudden commencements. Mid-latitude positive bays can cause large GICs. 17 locations ...
  76. [76]
    Observatories | U.S. Geological Survey - USGS.gov
    The USGS Geomagnetism Program currently operates 14 magnetic observatories. Magnetometer data are collected at these facilities, and the data are then ...Missing: induced indirect detection dB/
  77. [77]
    [PDF] On the Feasibility of Real-time Mapping of the Geoelectric Field ...
    Jun 7, 2018 · A review is given of the present feasibility for accurately mapping geoelectric fields across North America in near-realtime.Missing: detection | Show results with:detection<|separator|>
  78. [78]
    (PDF) Geoelectric monitoring at the Boulder magnetic observatory
    Nov 2, 2017 · The installation of a new geoelectric monitoring system at the Boulder magnetic observatory of the US Geological Survey is summarized. Data from ...
  79. [79]
    Geoelectric Field Monitoring | BGS Geomagnetism research
    The electrodes are spaced approximately 100m apart and are located as far as possible from sources of cultural noise and non-natural conductive structures (e.g. ...Missing: sensors GIC 200m
  80. [80]
    Review and Development of Improved Techniques for GIC ... - EPRI
    This approach would allow utilities to monitor GICs using existing digital relay equipment, thereby lowering hardware and installation costs, and potentially ...Missing: 2020s | Show results with:2020s
  81. [81]
  82. [82]
    Analysis of Long‐Term GIC Measurements in Transformers in Austria
    Dec 29, 2021 · A further increase in temperature causes a loss of insulation and internal transformer failures.
  83. [83]
    Geoelectric Field 1-Minute (Empirical EMTF - 3D Model)
    The empirical EMTF - 3D model uses transfer functions from MT surveys to specify the contribution of the Earth conductivity to the calculation.Missing: AEM | Show results with:AEM
  84. [84]
    3-Day Geomagnetic Forecast - Space Weather Prediction Center
    A daily deterministic and probabilistic forecast, for next three days, of geomagnetic activity. · Three-day forecast of Ap, Kp, and Geomagnetic Storm levels · The ...Missing: GIC | Show results with:GIC
  85. [85]
    Early Prediction of Geomagnetic Storms by Machine Learning ...
    Jan 17, 2024 · This paper uses machine learning to predict geomagnetic storms, achieving 82.55% accuracy three hours in advance, using Random Forests ...
  86. [86]
    Intercomparison of Model Determinations of Auroral Electrodynamic ...
    Mar 1, 2025 · These models simulate the complex physical behaviors that take place due to interactions between the solar wind and Interplanetary Magnetic ...
  87. [87]
    GIC--Related Observations During the May 2024 Geomagnetic ...
    Jul 9, 2025 · We have assembled and synthesized a large and unique set of GMD-related data, compared model predictions with measurements, and identified ...
  88. [88]
    [PDF] Protecting the Electric Grid from Geomagnetic Disturbances - GAO
    Dec 19, 2018 · When GMDs occur, they can cause geomagnetically induced current (GIC) in the electric transmission grid, which can cause service disruption or.
  89. [89]
    [PDF] Geomagnetically induced currents in Finnish transmission grid
    Nov 12, 2024 · Full transformers. • GIC has no path between voltage levels. • Series capacitors. • GIC can not flow in 400 kV power lines between.
  90. [90]
    [PDF] Mitigation of Geomagnetically Induced Currents in Transformers
    Kappenman provided an overview of the grid's increasing vulnerability to GICs: a) 97% of transformers are single phase at 500 kV and 765 kV; b) megavolt amperes ...
  91. [91]
    Protecting the grid from solar storms
    Apr 7, 2023 · Upper Great Plains Maintenance experts installed the NBD in the neutral of a large power transformer to block geomagnetically induced currents, ...Missing: solutions | Show results with:solutions
  92. [92]
    [PDF] GIC Flow Characteristics and Mitigation - cigre usnc
    The concept of effective GIC is used to measure GIC impact level to power transformers. For wye ground-delta connected transformers, effective GIC is.
  93. [93]
    [PDF] Geomagnetically induced currents on long pipelines
    “Back-up” corrosion mitigation. Effective over reasonable distances (~100km) ... What concerns are there? Destruction of monolithic insulating joints.Missing: sacrificial anodes
  94. [94]
    [PDF] Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for
    NERC states that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 applies to planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners and generation owners who own ...
  95. [95]
    Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard - Federal Register
    May 23, 2018 · 2. Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2016), ...
  96. [96]
    Guidelines for Operations During a Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD ...
    Aug 26, 2025 · It contains sections on the role of GIC monitoring equipment, measures to be taken based on space weather warnings and alerts, real-time ...
  97. [97]
    None
    ### Summary of Response to Gannon Geomagnetic Storm (May 2024)
  98. [98]
    [PDF] Geomagnetic Disturbance Operating Procedure Template
    Operating procedures are the quickest way to put in place actions that can mitigate the adverse effects of geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) on system ...
  99. [99]
    International Real-time Magnetic Observatory Network
    The INTERMAGNET programme exists to establish a global network of cooperating digital magnetic observatories, adopting modern standard specifications.INTERMAGNET Metadata · Intermagnet faq · Data Downloads and Plots · SoftwareMissing: expansions 2000-2025
  100. [100]
    Framework for International Space Weather Services (2018-2030)
    Expanded international coordination has been proposed within COPUOS under the UNISPACE+50 process, where priorities for 2018-2030 are to be defined under ...
  101. [101]
    [PDF] Mitigating disastrous electricity system failures initiated by GICs ...
    Oct 25, 2016 · need to determine the cost-benefit relationship of the best approaches to mitigation of risk for their ... costs (CICs) for composite power system.<|separator|>