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The Devil We Know

The Devil We Know is a 2018 American investigative documentary film directed by Stephanie Soechtig that examines the widespread contamination of drinking water in Parkersburg, West Virginia, by perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA or C8), a persistent chemical compound used by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) as a processing aid in Teflon production at its Washington Works facility. The film details how residents discovered clusters of severe health conditions, including testicular cancer, kidney cancer, and birth defects such as facial deformities in newborns, correlated with proximity to the plant, prompting investigations that revealed DuPont's internal knowledge of PFOA's toxicity and bioaccumulative properties dating back to animal studies in the 1960s, yet the company continued emissions into the Ohio River and local aquifers without adequate disclosure. Premiering at the 2018 Sundance Film Festival, The Devil We Know incorporates archival footage, public hearings, expert testimony from toxicologists, and accounts from affected individuals and whistleblowers to chronicle the ensuing class-action lawsuits, which culminated in DuPont agreeing to a $670 million settlement in 2017 for thousands of plaintiffs and an earlier $10.25 million EPA penalty in 2005 for withholding critical health and environmental risk data. Critically acclaimed for exposing mechanisms of corporate non-transparency in chemical safety regulation, the documentary underscores the challenges of regulating "forever chemicals" like PFAS, influencing public discourse on industrial accountability and prompting calls for stricter federal oversight amid evidence of similar contaminations nationwide.

Background on Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA)

Chemical Properties and Invention

(PFOA), chemically denoted as C₈HF₁₅O₂, is a synthetic perfluoroalkyl featuring a fully fluorinated eight-carbon chain attached to a group, conferring exceptional stability due to the strong carbon-fluorine bonds. This structure renders PFOA highly resistant to thermal, chemical, and biological degradation, with no known natural degradation pathways under environmental conditions, as the C-F bonds withstand , photolysis, and oxidation. PFOA exhibits properties, enabling it to reduce in aqueous solutions while repelling oils and , a trait stemming from its amphiphilic nature with a hydrophobic tail and hydrophilic head. Physically, PFOA appears as a white waxy solid at room temperature, with a melting point of approximately 40–50 °C and a boiling point of 189–192 °C; its density is about 1.8 g/cm³. It is sparingly soluble in water (around 9.5 g/L at 25 °C) but highly soluble in organic solvents, and in aqueous media, it dissociates into the perfluorooctanoate anion (PFO⁻), which persists due to its ionic stability. These attributes made PFOA valuable as a processing aid in fluoropolymer manufacturing, where its thermal stability—enduring temperatures up to 300 °C without decomposition—facilitated emulsion polymerization without contaminating the final product. PFOA was first synthesized in 1947 by chemists at (then Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company) through of octanoyl chloride in anhydrous , yielding the perfluorinated acid after . This method, developed to produce fluorochemicals for industrial applications, marked the commercial inception of PFOA, initially in small quantities for research into fluoropolymers like polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE, or Teflon), which had been discovered earlier in but required aids like PFOA for scalable production. By 1951, began purchasing PFOA from for large-scale Teflon manufacturing at its Washington Works facility, leveraging the compound's ability to stabilize polymer emulsions during synthesis, though residual traces remained in finished products. The synthesis process prioritized yield and purity for industrial efficacy, with early production focused on enabling the non-stick and heat-resistant properties of fluoropolymers without initial emphasis on long-term environmental persistence.

Industrial Applications and Economic Benefits

PFOA functioned as a key processing aid and emulsifying agent in the aqueous emulsion polymerization of fluoropolymers, notably polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), enabling the production of fine, stable polymer dispersions critical for high-quality end products. This role was central to DuPont's manufacturing of Teflon at facilities like the Washington Works plant in , where PFOA facilitated efficient , yielding materials with exceptional thermal stability ( above 327°C), chemical resistance, and low coefficients. These properties allowed PTFE to be applied in non-stick cookware coatings, reducing energy use in cooking by minimizing oil requirements and simplifying cleaning processes. Beyond consumer goods, PFOA-assisted fluoropolymers supported diverse industrial sectors, including for seals and bearings that withstand extreme temperatures and pressures, automotive components like and fuel hoses resistant to corrosive s, and for insulation in wiring and semiconductors. In semiconductors, trace PFOA residues in fluoropolymer dispersions aided wafer processing by providing anti-stick and release properties, enhancing yield rates in chip fabrication. Firefighting foams incorporating PFOA-derived improved fire suppression by forming stable aqueous films that spread rapidly over surfaces, reducing extinguishing times and water usage compared to earlier formulations. Economically, PFOA's contributions underpinned the growth of the industry, which by approached a global annual value of $10 billion, driven by demand for durable materials that lowered operational costs through extended equipment life and reduced downtime. In the U.S. alone, the fluoropolymer market reached $2.6 billion in , supporting innovations in energy-efficient applications such as low-friction coatings that cut machinery wear by up to 50% in industrial settings. These advancements fostered job creation in chemical and downstream industries, with fluoropolymers enabling reliable performance in , thereby contributing to broader economic productivity without immediate alternatives matching PFOA's emulsification efficiency prior to phase-out efforts.

Early Awareness of Potential Risks

In 1961, DuPont researchers conducted animal studies revealing that perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) caused enlarged livers in rats and rabbits, prompting internal concerns about its toxicity. DuPont's chief toxicologist, Dorothy Hood, documented these findings in an internal memorandum, noting the chemical's potential hazards based on observed organ effects. The company's Toxicology Section concluded that PFOA was toxic and recommended handling it "with extreme care," though these results were not disclosed publicly or to regulators at the time. Subsequent internal testing in replicated the liver enlargement in animals, confirming the earlier observations and raising further questions about and long-term exposure risks. By the mid-1960s, additional animal studies by and , a key supplier of PFOA-related compounds, demonstrated liver damage and other physiological changes, such as developmental abnormalities in offspring of exposed rats. These findings indicated PFOA's persistence in biological systems and potential for intergenerational effects, yet companies withheld the data from external and authorities, prioritizing for applications like Teflon . Public awareness of these risks remained negligible until the late 1990s, as early evidence was confined to proprietary research amid growing industrial use of PFOA since its in the . Internal documents later revealed that despite knowledge of thresholds—such as no-observed-adverse-effect levels in around 10-30 mg/kg—manufacturers continued scaling up without implementing precautionary measures like exposure limits for workers. This delay in dissemination contrasted with established protocols for other industrial chemicals, where animal data typically informed guidelines promptly.

DuPont's Washington Works Plant and Pollution

Plant Operations in Parkersburg, West Virginia

The Washington Works facility, situated on the banks of the approximately 5 miles south of , was established by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company () in 1948 as a major production site for fluorochemicals and polymers. The plant commenced operations with an initial focus on innovative materials like Teflon (, or PTFE), scaling to produce approximately 2 million pounds annually by the late 1940s through processes. At its peak under , the facility employed hundreds of workers and generated significant economic activity in the region, contributing to local employment and industrial output in chemical manufacturing. Central to the plant's operations was the use of (PFOA, also known as C8) starting in 1951 as a processing aid and in the aqueous of monomer to produce PTFE resins for Teflon-coated products, such as cookware and industrial coatings. This process involved dispersing the monomer in water with PFOA to stabilize polymer particles, followed by , washing, and drying stages, during which residual PFOA remained in , air emissions, and product streams. DuPont expanded production over decades, incorporating PFOA into multiple product lines, including fluoropolymers for semiconductors, fabrics, and foams, with annual PFOA usage reaching tons by the 1980s as documented in internal company records later revealed in litigation. Waste handling at the facility included direct discharges into the via permitted outfalls, aerial stack emissions, and on-site landfills, with operations from the 1950s through 2013 relying on unlined or minimally treated disposal methods that released PFOA-laden effluents. Brick-lined incinerators operated from 1959 to 1990 for thermal destruction of chemical wastes, though incomplete combustion contributed to atmospheric PFOA releases. By the 1980s, the U.S. Agency (EPA) initiated corrective actions under the , mandating investigations into soil, groundwater, and from these practices. phased out PFOA production by 2013 under EPA pressure and a voluntary stewardship program, transitioning to alternatives like hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (HFPO-DA, or ), before spinning off the performance chemicals division to in 2015, which continued modified operations at the site.

Detection of PFOA Contamination

In 1984, DuPont conducted internal testing that first detected perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA, also known as C8) in drinking water supplies near its Washington Works plant in Parkersburg, West Virginia. The company's analysis of tap water from the Little Hocking Water Association in Ohio—serving communities across the Ohio River from the facility—revealed PFOA concentrations as high as 3,460 parts per trillion (ppt) at the Ohio River intake point, with levels up to 2,890 ppt in finished drinking water distributed to customers. Similar testing confirmed elevated PFOA in the Parkersburg municipal water supply, linking the contamination to plant discharges into the Ohio River and local tributaries. These findings stemmed from 's monitoring of potential leaks and emissions during Teflon production, where PFOA served as a processing aid. Internal documents later revealed that the company measured PFOA in nearby private wells and surface waters, with some well samples exceeding 50,000 —far above levels later deemed hazardous by regulatory standards. Despite this, classified the results as and did not notify local authorities or affected residents, continuing operations without immediate remediation. Further internal detections occurred in the early , when tested creeks adjacent to the plant and identified extraordinarily high PFOA levels attributable to sludge and wastewater disposal practices, including unlined ponds that allowed leaching into groundwater. By the mid-, employee health surveys and animal studies prompted additional voluntary sampling, revealing PFOA persistence in the mid-Ohio River Valley , which supplied much of the region's from approximately 1984 onward. External emerged in 2000 when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), alerted by 3M's phase-out of PFOA, requested data from and initiated broader testing, verifying plume migration affecting over 70,000 residents. Detection extended to human exposure through serum blood testing in the early 2000s, as part of class-action litigation settlements. The C8 Health Project (2005–2006) analyzed blood from approximately 69,000 residents and found median PFOA levels of 15.7 to 1,750 nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) in a subset of exposed individuals—orders of magnitude higher than the U.S. general population average of under 5 ng/mL at the time. These measurements corroborated environmental findings, tracing bioaccumulation to contaminated water ingestion over decades.

Internal Knowledge and Response

DuPont's internal research beginning in the revealed early signs of PFOA , including liver enlargement in rats exposed to the chemical in 1961. By 1973, company studies indicated no safe exposure level for PFOA in , establishing its potential for harm at low doses. In 1981, following a study documenting birth defects in rat offspring exposed to PFOA in utero, DuPont identified similar issues among its employees at the Washington Works plant, where two of seven or eight pregnancies among female Teflon division workers resulted in children with defects, including eye abnormalities. By the mid-1980s, DuPont recognized PFOA's biopersistence and bioaccumulative properties, with internal monitoring detecting elevated levels in worker blood. In 1984, plant testing confirmed PFOA presence in nearby drinking water supplies, yet the company issued an internal memo advocating increased production despite these risks. Worker health data from 1992 showed excess mortality from cancer and leukemia linked to PFOA exposure. Throughout the 1990s, DuPont's studies confirmed PFOA-induced tumors in animal models, including testicular, pancreatic, and liver cancers, and one internal analysis projected a 40 percent likelihood of birth defects in children born to male plant workers. Internally, responded by restricting female workers from high-exposure areas in 1981 without disclosing the PFOA-related rationale, prioritizing operational continuity over transparency. The company installed granular filtration systems at the plant to treat its own water supply but did not extend similar measures to the surrounding or promptly notify water providers, delaying alerts until 2001 despite 1984 detections. Internal documents indicate withheld health and environmental data from regulators, violating Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) reporting requirements, which culminated in a $16.5 million EPA fine in 2005—the largest under environmental statutes at the time—for the . Rather than phasing out PFOA or fully mitigating off-site contamination, continued waste disposal practices, including dumping PFOA-laden sludge into unlined pits and waterways near the plant into the late 1980s. These actions reflected a pattern of internal without corresponding external disclosures, as evidenced by litigation-released memos asserting no confirmed birth defects despite contrary data.

Local Health Impacts and Activism

Residents in the area near DuPont's Washington Works plant exhibited significantly elevated PFOA levels due to contaminated , with concentrations ranging from 15.7 to 1020 ng/mL in a 2005 study of 10 exposed individuals, far exceeding levels in the general U.S. population. The C8 Health Project, involving over 69,000 participants from affected communities in and , confirmed widespread exposure, prompting the independent C8 Science Panel to investigate links between PFOA and outcomes. The C8 Science Panel, established under a 2005 class-action settlement, identified probable links between PFOA exposure and six human health conditions based on epidemiological data from the exposed population: , , , , pregnancy-induced hypertension (including ), and elevated levels. No probable link was found for other autoimmune diseases such as , , or . Additional analyses associated higher PFOA levels with increased risks of testicular, , , ovarian cancers, and in the community. Early indicators included deformities and deaths in on nearby farms, such as Wilbur Tennant's , where over half died after drinking from PFOA-polluted creeks starting in the late 1990s, with necropsies revealing organ abnormalities and tumors. Internal records from the documented birth defects, including eye abnormalities in offspring of female plant workers exposed to PFOA, and detection of the chemical in blood. Local activism emerged in response to these impacts, beginning with farmer Wilbur Tennant, who in 1998 videotaped dying livestock and contaminated waterways, alerting authorities and initiating legal action against in 1999. Community members, including affected residents and workers, organized protests against dumping at the plant's , with public demonstrations in 2005 highlighting toxic PFOA releases into local water supplies. Groups like Keep Your Promises DuPont, led by figures such as Harold Bock, advocated for accountability, water filtration, and transparency, pressuring to address ongoing pollution through voluntary sampling and efforts from the onward. These efforts raised awareness of PFOA's persistence and , contributing to broader demands for federal oversight on (PFAS).

Class-Action Lawsuits and Settlements

In August 2001, attorney filed a class-action lawsuit, Leach v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., in state court against , representing residents whose drinking water supplies in six districts near the Washington Works plant were contaminated with PFOA from the facility's emissions and waste disposal. The class encompassed over 70,000 individuals exposed through public water systems drawing from the and local aquifers polluted by the plant. The suit alleged that DuPont knowingly released PFOA into the environment, leading to widespread human exposure and potential health risks, despite internal awareness of its since the . Litigation revealed DuPont's failure to disclose PFOA's persistence, , and birth defects in to regulators and the public. The case settled on February 28, 2005, with DuPont agreeing to fund medical monitoring for class members up to $235 million and to install granular filtration systems at affected plants, with implementation costs exceeding $71 million including interest. As part of the settlement, an independent C8 Science Panel was established to evaluate associations between PFOA exposure and human disease using data from approximately 69,000 class members who participated in a health survey and blood testing between 2005 and 2006. The panel's reports, issued from 2011 to 2013, concluded probable links between PFOA and six conditions: , , , , , and elevated in adults. No probable links were found for 31 other examined diseases, including other cancers and autoimmune disorders. The settlement's provisions preserved rights for class members diagnosed with linked diseases to pursue individual claims against , resulting in multidistrict litigation in U.S. District Court in . In February 2017, and its spin-off settled approximately 3,550 such claims for $670.7 million without admitting liability or causation. Additional unresolved cases from this process were settled in 2021 for $83 million as part of broader liability resolutions totaling over $4 billion among , , and .

Regulatory Investigations

In July 2004, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed an administrative complaint against , alleging the company violated Section 8(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) by failing to report substantial risks associated with (PFOA), used in Teflon production at the Washington Works plant. The complaint cited evidence from internal DuPont documents, uncovered during contemporaneous class-action litigation, showing the company withheld data on PFOA's toxicity dating back to 1981, including animal studies demonstrating birth defects, liver damage, and testicular tumors in rats exposed at levels comparable to those at Washington Works. A second EPA complaint followed in December 2004, expanding allegations to include unreported human health observations, such as elevated PFOA levels in blood of pregnant employees' fetuses and birth defects in their offspring, as well as environmental releases exceeding reportable quantities under the (RCRA). The EPA's probe stemmed from DuPont's documented knowledge of PFOA contamination in local supplies near , where monitoring since 1984 had detected levels up to 22,000 parts per trillion in the , yet the company did not disclose risks to regulators or the public. Investigators determined DuPont's omissions spanned over two decades, involving eight specific counts of unreported information that could have prompted earlier regulatory intervention on emissions from the plant's wastewater and air stacks. Although the EPA considered a criminal referral in 2004 due to evidence of knowing concealment, the matter resolved civilly without charges. On December 14, 2005, settled with the EPA, agreeing to a record $10.25 million civil administrative penalty—the largest under any U.S. environmental statute at the time—and $6.25 million in supplemental environmental projects, including $5 million for PFOA transport and fate studies near Washington Works and $1.25 million for education in local schools. The agreement required to cease certain PFOA uses and commit to phasing out the chemical globally by 2015, while mandating ongoing monitoring of contamination at the site. Parallel state-level oversight by the Department of (DEP) focused on C8 (PFOA) monitoring, with conducting voluntary sampling around Washington Works since the early 2000s under DEP directives, revealing persistent groundwater and surface water contamination but resulting in no major independent fines during the primary era. The DEP's assessments, including a 2002 cattle toxicity report tied to plant discharges, informed federal actions but emphasized compliance through remediation plans rather than penalties. Subsequent regulatory pressure post-2015 targeted , 's spun-off entity, culminating in a 2025 federal court order halting PFAS discharges from the facility into the .

Production of the Documentary

Director Stephanie Soechtig and Development

Stephanie Soechtig, an American documentary filmmaker known for investigative works on corporate and , directed The Devil We Know, co-directed with Jeremy Seifert. Her prior films, including Tapped (2008), which examined the industry's environmental impacts and chemical concerns like plastics and , and Fed Up (2014), which critiqued the food industry's role in , established her focus on industry accountability. These successes led to an invitation to the Sundance Institute's Catalyst Forum, where she pitched The Devil We Know. Soechtig conceived the project upon learning of DuPont's alleged contamination of , with (PFOA), viewing it as a case of unchecked chemical risks mirroring themes in her earlier work on plastics. Development began in earnest with the 2016 Catalyst Forum pitch, securing $710,000 in initial funding: $310,000 in donations, $125,000 in recoupable grants, and $275,000 in equity investments. The total production budget reached $1,630,000, with $875,000 designated as recoupable. Producers included Kristin Lazure and Carly Palmour, with Soechtig and Mark Monroe contributing to the screenplay. Principal photography and research focused on firsthand accounts from affected residents and former employees, building on of lawsuits and internal documents. commenced in May 2017, followed by submission to the in August 2017, enabling a world premiere in the U.S. Documentary Competition on January 21, 2018. Soechtig emphasized the film's thriller-like narrative of citizen activism against corporate cover-ups, aiming to highlight broader regulatory failures in .

Key Interviews and Filming Locations

The features interviews with Wilbur Tennant, a Parkersburg-area who documented the deaths of over 280 of his cattle after they drank from a creek contaminated by waste from 's Washington Works plant, attributing the livestock losses to chemical exposure revealed through necropsies showing enlarged organs and tumors. Ken Wamsley, a former DuPont technician who worked with (PFOA) in the 1980s, provides testimony on smuggling out internal company documents that demonstrated DuPont's awareness of PFOA's to , including liver and birth defects, dating back to the . Bucky , born in 1996 with severe facial deformities including a missing and one eye, appears alongside his mother Sue , a former DuPont employee exposed to PFOA during , highlighting claims of reproductive harm linked to the chemical's persistence in the bloodstream. Additional interviews include , the attorney who represented affected residents and exposed DuPont's concealment through litigation uncovering thousands of internal studies, and local activists Joe Kiger and Darlene Kiger, who organized the class-action lawsuit involving over 70,000 plaintiffs after discovering elevated PFOA levels in exceeding 3 . These accounts draw on personal experiences, leaked memos, and epidemiological data suggesting correlations with cancers, , and high in the community, though causation remains contested in ongoing scientific debate. Filming occurred predominantly in Parkersburg, West Virginia, centering on the DuPont Washington Works facility along the , where aerial and ground shots depict waste lagoons, dry creek beds, and effluent discharge points implicated in groundwater infiltration. Sequences also capture Tennant's contaminated farm in nearby , residential areas with tested private wells showing PFOA concentrations up to 150 times EPA advisory levels, and community meetings in Wood County, emphasizing the local scale of the alleged spanning from the 1950s to the plant's 2017 phase-out of PFOA production. Limited exterior shots include scientific consultations, but the production avoids dramatization, relying on on-location verité to convey the environmental footprint without staged recreations.

Release Timeline

The documentary was submitted to the in August 2017, following the start of editing in May 2017. It world premiered at the on January 21, 2018. During the Sundance premiere, the finalized an sales deal with Roco Films for approximately $100,000 and secured subscription video on demand (SVOD) rights with in a low six-figure agreement, which included a 90-day theatrical holdback. Presales for transactional (TVOD) launched on September 4, 2018, with the digital release going live on October 16, 2018. An associated impact campaign, featuring nontheatrical screenings by organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, began in July 2018 and continued post-release. In April 2019, the film was accepted into the Sundance Institute's Creative Distribution Fellowship to support further outreach efforts. A limited international release followed in on May 23, 2019.

Content and Synopsis

Structure of the Film

The Devil We Know employs a primarily chronological structure to chronicle the environmental and caused by DuPont's use of (PFOA, also known as C8) at its Washington Works plant in , spanning from the through the mid-2010s. The narrative opens with archival footage shot by local Wilbur Tennant in the late and early , depicting the mass die-off of his after grazing on contaminated by DuPont's wastewater discharge into nearby creeks, which first raised suspicions of toxic pollution linked to the plant's operations. This sequence establishes the initial environmental red flags and introduces Tennant's collaboration with attorney , setting the stage for broader revelations. The film progresses to the human toll on plant workers and residents, interweaving personal testimonies—such as those from employees experiencing unexplained illnesses and families like that of Bucky Bailey, born with severe facial deformities attributed to maternal PFOA exposure—with of the chemical's persistence and . It details 's internal knowledge of PFOA's toxicity dating back to the , including animal studies showing birth defects and organ damage, contrasted against the company's public assurances of safety for products like Teflon. Community organizer Joe Kiger's role in mobilizing residents for blood testing is highlighted, leading into a pivotal seven-year epidemiological study of approximately 70,000 people that correlated elevated PFOA levels with cancers, , and other ailments. The latter sections build toward legal confrontation, documenting the 2001 class-action lawsuit filed by affected residents, DuPont's internal efforts revealed through discovery documents, and the 2017 settlement mandating $670 million in payments without admitting liability. Archival clips from public hearings, corporate advertisements, and reports are integrated throughout to underscore corporate denial and regulatory delays by the Agency. While thematic threads of corporate accountability and grassroots activism recur, the film's linear progression maintains focus on escalating evidence and consequences, culminating in broader implications for PFOA's global contamination.

Central Narratives and Evidence Presented

The documentary presents the primary narrative as DuPont's decades-long contamination of groundwater and surface water in , with (PFOA), a synthetic chemical integral to Teflon production at the company's Washington Works facility since the . It traces the story's origin to farmer Wilbur Tennant, whose cattle exhibited sudden deaths, organ failures, and deformities after near a creek receiving factory effluent starting in the late 1990s; autopsies revealed enlarged livers and tumors, prompting Tennant to collect water and soil samples showing elevated chemical concentrations. Central to the film's evidence are internal records, including from the demonstrating PFOA's accumulation in organs, causing liver and developmental abnormalities in offspring, with company scientists noting its persistence in the and by 1970. The film alleges suppressed this data, as evidenced by memos instructing employees not to disclose findings and continuing emissions despite awareness of ; for instance, a 1981 study cited in the documentary linked PFOA to birth defects in workers' children, including facial deformities in cases like Bucky , born in 1998 to a employee with documented high exposure. Human health impacts form another core thread, with the film showcasing blood tests from the early revealing PFOA levels in local residents up to 150 times federal advisory limits, alongside epidemiological data from a 2005 study commissioned by itself associating exposure with elevated risks of kidney and testicular cancers, , and . Personal accounts from affected individuals, such as Joe Kiger and plant workers, detail symptoms like and chronic illnesses, framed as direct consequences of unremedied affecting over 70,000 people via . The film further narrates corporate concealment through litigation evidence, including thousands of pages of documents obtained by attorney , which purportedly show DuPont's evasion of regulatory reporting under the Toxic Substances Control Act and destruction of records; this culminated in a 2001 class-action lawsuit settled for $343 million in 2007, with additional findings affirming PFOA's probable carcinogenicity by the EPA in 2005. Overall, these elements construct a case of systemic , emphasizing PFOA's "forever chemical" properties—its resistance to breakdown leading to indefinite environmental persistence—and calling for broader accountability in chemical manufacturing. Wilbur Tennant, a cattle farmer from Parkersburg, West Virginia, emerges as a pivotal figure in the documentary, documenting the mass deaths of his livestock in the 1990s after they consumed water from a creek adjacent to DuPont's Washington Works facility, which released PFOA-laden wastewater. His amateur videos of deformed animal organs and dying herds provided early visual evidence of environmental contamination, alerting attorney Robert Bilott and sparking broader scrutiny of DuPont's practices. Sue Bailey, a former DuPont employee at the Washington Works plant, and her son Bucky Bailey represent the human toll of occupational and community exposure. Sue worked in areas handling PFOA during her pregnancy in the late 1990s, resulting in Bucky's birth with severe facial deformities and lifelong health issues, which the film attributes to prenatal PFOA exposure based on internal studies withheld from workers. Bucky, shown undergoing multiple surgeries, symbolizes generational impacts, with blood tests confirming elevated PFOA levels in affected families. Ken Wamsley, a longtime chemist, provides insider testimony on the company's knowledge of PFOA's toxicity dating back to the 1980s, including animal studies showing birth defects and tumors that were not disclosed publicly. His interviews reveal DuPont's internal debates and document retention policies, contributing to evidence used in subsequent litigation. Joe Kiger, a local school administrator and activist, alongside his wife Darlene Kiger, catalyzed after noticing unusual cancer clusters and health anomalies in the . Joe initiated contact with lawyers, leading to the class-action lawsuit filed in representing over 70,000 residents, with the film highlighting his role in mobilizing public hearings and blood testing drives that confirmed widespread PFOA contamination in exceeding EPA guidelines by thousands of times.

Distribution and Accessibility

Premiere at Sundance and Theatrical Release

The Devil We Know premiered on January 21, 2018, in the U.S. Documentary Competition at the in . The screening drew attention for its investigation into (PFOA) contamination linked to DuPont's Teflon production, featuring interviews with affected residents and experts. Festival audiences and initial reviews highlighted the film's role in exposing corporate accountability issues, with director Stephanie Soechtig emphasizing community activism during post-screening discussions. Following the Sundance premiere, the , including Soechtig and Kristin Lazure, opted against a traditional theatrical release to prioritize impact over box-office metrics. This nontheatrical strategy aimed to facilitate broader educational screenings, reduce distribution costs, and align with an advocacy campaign targeting policy changes on (). Instead, the film launched on digital video-on-demand (VOD) platforms on October 16, , available through , Video, , and others, enabling immediate accessibility for home viewers and organizations. This approach supported over 78 nontheatrical screenings in 54 cities by late , reaching thousands via community events and partnerships with groups like Film Sprout. The decision reflected a calculated , forgoing wider exposure in favor of sustained public engagement and eventual streaming deals, including a agreement in January 2019.

Streaming Availability

As of October 2025, The Devil We Know is not available for free streaming on major subscription platforms such as , , or Disney+. Instead, it can be rented or purchased digitally on video-on-demand services including (rental from $3.99, purchase from $9.99), (rental from $3.99, purchase from $9.99), and Google Play Movies (rental from $4.99, purchase from $12.99). The film was previously available for subscription streaming on beginning in January 2019, following its limited theatrical release. This temporary availability aligned with heightened public interest in contamination issues, but it was removed from the platform by late 2020, shifting to a model. options include DVD purchases through retailers like , though digital rentals dominate accessibility due to the documentary's niche subject matter and independent distribution. No broadcast television airings or ad-supported free streaming (e.g., , ) are currently listed. Availability may vary by region and is subject to licensing changes; users outside the often face additional geo-restrictions.

International Reach

The documentary received screenings at several international film festivals following its world premiere at Sundance. Notable venues included the Hot Docs Canadian International Documentary Festival in in 2018, the in 2018, and the New Zealand International Film Festival in 2018. Limited theatrical releases occurred outside the United States, with dates recorded in on March 3, 2019; the on March 8, 2019; and on May 23, 2019. Global accessibility expanded through digital distribution platforms available in multiple countries, including Amazon Video and for purchase or rental. The film was also streamed on , which facilitated viewership in various international markets during its availability period. Additionally, Roco Films has offered licensing for institutional and broader international distribution.

Reception and Analysis

Critical Reviews

Critics praised The Devil We Know for its investigative depth into corporate accountability and environmental contamination, with the film holding a 100% approval rating on based on eight reviews as of its release. Reviewers highlighted the documentary's use of archival footage, interviews with affected residents, and scientific testimony to build a compelling case against and 3M's handling of (PFOA). In , called the film a "damning exposé of decades of intentional ," commending its mix of hearings, reports, corporate ads, and expert input for creating a "riveting" narrative that underscores the human cost of industrial secrecy. Similarly, 's Sundance review emphasized how director Soechtig illustrates the companies' billions in profits from chemicals linked to health issues, framing the documentary as a stark revelation of systemic environmental in . Audience-oriented critics echoed this sentiment; one review on aggregator noted the film's superiority to narrative counterparts like Dark Waters (2019) for its broader comparison of corporate practices beyond a single company, positioning it as essential viewing for understanding widespread () contamination. The limited volume of major-outlet critiques reflects the film's independent distribution, yet the consensus affirmed its effectiveness in mobilizing public awareness without descending into overt , though some observed its advocacy-driven structure prioritizes victim testimonies over balanced defenses.

Audience and Industry Responses

Audience members responded positively to The Devil We Know, praising its exposé of corporate practices surrounding (PFOA) contamination. On , the film holds a 7.8 out of 10 rating from 1,412 users, with reviews commonly describing it as "shocking" and "eye-opening," emphasizing the personal testimonies of affected residents and former employees. Similarly, users rated it 3.6 out of 5 based on 1,178 ratings, appreciating its role in raising awareness about risks. The documentary's availability on starting in January 2019 expanded its audience beyond limited theatrical runs, fostering online discussions and petitions linked to the film's companion site, thedevilweknow.com, which urged viewers to contact legislators on regulation. Industry figures and chemical professionals offered more reserved or critical feedback, often highlighting perceived imbalances in the film's narrative. , the primary target, did not release a direct public response to the documentary upon its 2018 Sundance premiere or subsequent release, though the company had previously settled related PFOA litigation, including a $343 million class-action payout in 2005 and ongoing claims totaling hundreds of millions by 2017. In scientific circles, a review in Chemistry World, published by the Royal Society of Chemistry, faulted the film for prioritizing emotional outrage over rigorous analysis, noting inaccuracies in chemical depictions, omission of dose-response principles in toxicity discussions, and a failure to contextualize PFOA's widespread benefits in products like non-stick coatings and firefighting foams. The reviewer described an "unpleasant aftertaste" from the film's chemophobic tone, which focused narrowly on one community's harms without addressing universal exposure levels or regulatory trade-offs. Broader chemical industry commentary echoed concerns about media portrayals amplifying risks without equivalent scrutiny of applications' societal value, such as in medical devices and water-resistant materials, though specific rebuttals to The Devil We Know remained limited in . This muted response contrasted with the film's activist framing, which aligned with groups pushing for stricter EPA oversight, but professionals argued it overlooked empirical debates on from low-level exposures, as evidenced in peer-reviewed studies predating .

Awards and Nominations

The Devil We Know was nominated for the Grand Jury Prize in the Documentary category at the . The documentary won the Special Jury Award for Documentary at the 2018 Philadelphia Film Festival. It received a nomination for the Call to Action Award at the 2018 Boulder International Film Festival. No major industry awards, such as Academy Awards or Emmy nominations, were bestowed upon the film.

Scientific and Health Context

Empirical Evidence on PFOA Health Effects

Empirical studies on perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) health effects primarily derive from occupational cohorts, community exposures near manufacturing sites, and general population biomonitoring, with the C8 Health Project—a cross-sectional survey of approximately 69,000 residents near a DuPont facility in West Virginia—providing the largest dataset. The associated C8 Science Panel, established in 2005 as part of a class-action settlement, analyzed serum PFOA levels and self-reported outcomes, identifying probable links (defined as greater than 50% probability of no chance association) with six conditions: high cholesterol (odds ratio [OR] 1.20 per log-unit increase in serum PFOA), thyroid disease (OR 1.15-2.03 depending on subtype), ulcerative colitis (OR 1.94), preeclampsia (OR 1.77), low birth weight (OR 1.34 per log-unit), and six specific cancers including kidney and testicular. These findings were based on logistic regression models adjusting for confounders like age, sex, and smoking, though the panel emphasized associations rather than causation due to the observational design and potential residual confounding. For cancer, human evidence remains limited to epidemiological associations, with cohort studies showing elevated standardized incidence ratios (SIRs) for (SIR 1.7-2.0 in high-exposure groups) and (SIR 2.5-3.0), particularly in the C8 cohort and Danish worker studies. Animal bioassays, however, demonstrate sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity, with PFOA inducing liver, testicular, pancreatic, and mammary tumors in rats at doses as low as 1-5 mg/kg/day, prompting the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) to classify PFOA as carcinogenic to humans () in 2023, citing strong mechanistic evidence (e.g., alpha activation and ) alongside limited human data. Critics, including reanalyses of pooled cohorts, argue that by detection bias (e.g., screening in exposed workers) and lack of dose-response in low-exposure settings undermine claims, with some meta-analyses finding no consistent excess risk after adjustments. Beyond cancer, consistent modest associations appear with metabolic effects, including increased total (pooled OR 1.11-1.27 per log-unit PFOA from meta-analyses of general populations) and levels, potentially linked to renal handling disruptions observed in toxicokinetic models. Reproductive and developmental outcomes show links to reduced fetal growth (e.g., -50 to -100g per log-unit maternal PFOA) in prospective cohorts like the Danish Birth , though effect sizes diminish after multivariable adjustment. Immune effects include diminished responses to (e.g., 20-30% reduction in titers for /), as evidenced in Faroese children with prenatal exposure. Liver enzyme elevations (ALT/AST) occur in occupational studies at high exposures (>100 ng/mL ), but hepatic thresholds exceed typical human levels. disruptions (e.g., reduced T4) persist in some meta-analyses, yet recent longitudinal data question , attributing patterns to reverse causation or artifacts.
Health OutcomeKey Evidence TypeAssociation Strength (Example Metric)Citation
Epidemiological (C8 cohort, meta-analyses)OR 1.20 per log-unit PFOA
Cohort (C8, occupational); Animal tumorsSIR 1.7-2.0; Sufficient in rats
Cohort (C8); Animal tumorsSIR 2.5-3.0; Sufficient in rats
Prospective cohortsOR 1.34 per log-unit maternal PFOA
Vaccine ResponseProspective (children)20-30% titer reduction
Limitations across studies include reliance on biomarker correlations without randomized exposure data, variable PFOA (2-4 years in s), and co-exposures to other , complicating attribution. The U.S. EPA's 2024 toxicity assessment integrates these, deriving reference doses (e.g., 0.000018 mg/kg/day for developmental effects) from benchmark modeling of and data, while noting uncertainties in low-dose . Emerging longitudinal analyses, such as those post-2020, increasingly highlight or attenuated risks at environmental levels (<5 ng/mL ), suggesting thresholds below which effects are negligible.

Epidemiological Studies and Causality Debates

The C8 Science Panel, established as part of a 2005 class-action settlement against , conducted epidemiological analyses on approximately 69,000 residents near a chemical plant with elevated (PFOA) exposure from manufacturing emissions. The panel's prospective cohort and cross-sectional studies identified statistically significant associations between PFOA levels and six health outcomes deemed to have a "probable link," including (odds ratio 1.76 for highest exposure quartile), (odds ratio 2.03), diagnosed (prevalence ratio 1.95), (odds ratio 1.47), high cholesterol (beta coefficient 4.7 mg/dL per log unit increase), and (odds ratio 1.77). These findings relied on biomarkers of exposure, self-reported diagnoses validated where possible, and adjustments for confounders like age, sex, and , but relied on historical exposure modeling due to the absence of pre-1990s measurements. Subsequent epidemiological research has expanded on these associations but highlighted inconsistencies. A of post-C8 evidence noted strengthened links for and immune effects in children, yet insufficient causal support for adult hormone changes across 20 studies, with many failing dose-response trends or consistency criteria. Meta-analyses have reported modest risk elevations for and testicular cancers ( ~1.1-1.7 per log unit PFOA increase), but these are based on small case numbers (e.g., fewer than 100 cases in key s) and heterogeneous populations. Occupational studies among and workers showed elevated liver enzyme levels and uric acid, but no clear cancer signals after latency adjustments. Broader PFAS studies, such as the Danish Birth , link prenatal PFOA to reduced (beta -50g per log unit), yet effects attenuate with covariate control. Causality debates center on epidemiological limitations under : while temporality is supported by biomarker precedence in some cohorts, biological plausibility draws from rodent carcinogenicity (e.g., liver tumors at doses 100-1000x levels), but specificity is lacking, with no established mechanism like . Critics argue associations may reflect by socioeconomic factors, reverse causation (e.g., disease-induced PFOA retention), or multiple testing inflating Type I errors across hundreds of endpoints tested in C8 data. For instance, null findings for common cancers like or undermine specificity, and risk estimates often hover near unity post-adjustment, suggesting minimal impact at ambient exposures below 5 ng/mL. Regulatory bodies like the EPA infer for cancer classification based on combined animal and data, yet independent reviews, including a analysis, emphasize inconsistent replication and absence of randomized evidence, cautioning against overinterpreting correlations as causation amid potential biases in environmentally focused academia toward precautionary conclusions. Multiple lines of evidence, including null genetic studies and declining U.S. PFOA levels correlating with stable disease rates, further question direct .

Benefits Versus Risks of PFAS Chemicals

PFAS chemicals, encompassing thousands of , have been utilized since the for their exceptional chemical stability, thermal resistance, and ability to repel , oil, grease, and stains, properties derived from strong carbon-fluorine bonds. These attributes enable critical applications, such as non-stick coatings in cookware and to prevent adhesion and contamination, stain-resistant treatments for textiles and carpets, and aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) for suppressing Class B fires where alone fails due to surface tension reduction. In industrial contexts, PFAS serve as in lubricants, greases, and herbicides, enhancing wetting, penetration, and rinse-off efficiency, while in , they provide flame retardancy and for cables and components. Such functionalities contribute to product and , with the PFAS sector estimating substantial economic value in consumer and industrial goods, though exact figures vary by application. Despite these advantages, exhibit environmental persistence due to their resistance to degradation, earning the moniker "forever chemicals," which complicates and leads to widespread in , , and . Human epidemiological studies, primarily focused on long-chain variants like PFOA and PFOS, report associations with elevated serum , uric acid levels, and thyroid hormone alterations, alongside potential links to liver changes, reduced response indicating immunotoxicity, and increased risks of kidney and testicular cancers based on occupational and community exposures. Animal corroborates some effects, such as and developmental toxicity at high doses, but human data remain inconsistent for endpoints like , , or broader carcinogenicity, with meta-analyses noting moderate for immunotoxicity yet insufficient causal support for many outcomes under criteria like and biological plausibility. Weighing benefits against risks involves causal scrutiny: while associations from cohort studies near contaminated sites (e.g., elevated PFOA in communities) suggest hazard at high exposures, low-level ubiquity complicates attribution, and no definitive thresholds exist for all effects, as ongoing research highlights confounders like diet and co-exposures. Replacement efforts face fluorine chemistry barriers, as non-fluorinated alternatives often underperform in heat resistance or repellency—e.g., short-chain PFAS substitutes retain some persistence issues, and fluorine-free options lag in efficacy or etching precision, potentially compromising safety in or medical devices. Thus, regulatory phase-outs must account for irreplaceable uses, such as in lithium-ion batteries or , where enable functionality absent in viable substitutes, underscoring a risk-benefit calculus favoring targeted restrictions over blanket bans.

Controversies Surrounding the Film and Topic

Allegations of Corporate Cover-Up Versus Defenses

Allegations against and other manufacturers, including , center on the failure to disclose internal findings on PFOA toxicity dating back to the 1960s. Internal documents, revealed through litigation, indicate that by 1961, studies on rats exposed to PFOA showed liver damage, and by the 1980s, evidence emerged of birth defects in offspring of exposed workers, including one case in 1981 where a child was born with facial deformities and multiple organ issues after maternal exposure at 's Washington Works plant. allegedly withheld this data from the EPA, including in a 1997 response to a toxicological information request where human blood monitoring results showing elevated PFOA levels in local communities were omitted, violating the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Further allegations stem from a 2023 analysis of over 100,000 internal DuPont and 3M documents, which documented strategies resembling those of the tobacco industry to suppress toxicity data, such as prioritizing product defense over public disclosure and influencing regulatory standards to downplay risks like carcinogenicity and developmental toxicity observed in animal models. The U.S. EPA fined DuPont $16.5 million in 2005—the largest environmental penalty at the time—for failing to report substantial risk information, including placental transfer of PFOA confirmed in 1996 bovine studies and elevated levels in a 1998 fetal cord blood sample. Ohio's 2018 lawsuit accused DuPont of intentional concealment to safeguard profits, citing unreported emissions from the Washington Works facility that contaminated drinking water supplies. In defense, has consistently denied concealing risks that met regulatory thresholds for reporting at the time, asserting that early animal data did not constitute definitive "substantial risk" under TSCA due to the absence of established human criteria for PFOA until later EPA assessments. The company maintains that trace environmental levels, such as those detected in the 1998 infant case, posed no demonstrated , and it complied with prevailing standards while voluntarily phasing out PFOA by 2015 in response to evolving science and stewardship commitments. Multiple settlements, including a 2023 with U.S. public water systems for $1.185 billion, explicitly state no admission of liability, with reserving all factual and legal defenses against claims of causation or concealment. DuPont's position emphasizes the chemical's historical safety profile in consumer applications like Teflon, where benefits in durability and performance outweighed unproven low-dose risks, and notes that post-phase-out alternatives have not eliminated broader exposure sources. Critics of the allegations, including perspectives, argue that hindsight application of modern standards ignores the precautionary context of mid-20th-century chemical regulation, where high-dose animal results often failed to translate to human without factors. These defenses highlight that while internal monitoring occurred, public disclosures aligned with legal obligations, and ongoing litigation has not universally established direct corporate malfeasance beyond settlement resolutions.

Criticisms of Alarmism in Media Portrayals

Critics have argued that media portrayals of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), including in documentaries like The Devil We Know, often amplify unsubstantiated fears by framing trace environmental exposures as equivalent to high-dose industrial incidents, thereby fostering public hysteria disproportionate to epidemiological evidence. Such depictions emphasize corporate nondisclosure of early animal studies on PFOA—a specific PFAS phased out in the U.S. by 2015—while understating human health data showing no clear causal links to diseases like cancer at ambient levels below 10-100 parts per trillion. For instance, sensational coverage of PFAS persistence in blood or water ignores toxicological axioms, such as Paracelsus's principle that "the dose makes the poison," where low exposures fail to elicit harm in controlled assessments. This alarmism extends to misrepresentations of regulatory actions, as seen in erroneous reports claiming the U.S. EPA withdrew its 2024 standards, which actually proceeded despite debates over their scientific stringency. reviews, including a 2022 analysis by 24 scientists convened by the Alliance for Risk Assessment, calculated safe intake thresholds orders of magnitude higher than EPA limits, attributing media-driven panic to selective emphasis on outlier correlations rather than dose-response gradients or factors like . Denmark's Agency similarly concluded no health risks from in under realistic use scenarios, countering blanket media narratives of ubiquity equating to . Furthermore, portrayals often omit PFAS-enabled innovations' net benefits, such as non-stick coatings reducing energy use in cooking or fluoropolymers in medical devices preventing infections without documented adverse effects. Critics like environmental toxicologist Susan Goldhaber contend that activist-influenced media distorts risk assessments, prioritizing persistence over and leading to policies—like state bans on in consumer goods—that yield negligible safety gains at the expense of functional alternatives. This pattern, evident in coverage of West Virginia's PFOA central to The Devil We Know, prioritizes narrative of inevitable doom over nuanced discussions of remediation successes and substitution progress since the early .

Disagreements on Regulatory Overreach

Critics of stringent regulations, including chemical manufacturers and officials, contend that federal and state measures impose undue economic burdens and overlook the indispensable roles of certain PFAS compounds in , such as semiconductors, batteries, and medical devices, where viable alternatives remain unavailable or inferior in performance. A 2024 U.S. study estimated that broad bans could disrupt seven key sectors, potentially leading to vulnerabilities and increased costs exceeding billions annually, without commensurate reductions in exposure risks at typical environmental levels. The has argued that the U.S. Agency's 2024 drinking water standards for six compounds—setting limits as low as 4 parts per trillion for PFOA and PFOS—disregard scientific uncertainties in low-dose and prioritize over more pressing contaminants like lead or , potentially diverting over $1 billion in annual compliance costs from higher-priority issues. Industry groups, citing a 2023 Department of Defense report, emphasize 's necessity in foams and coatings for equipment, warning that phase-outs could compromise without proven substitutes that maintain durability and safety standards. State-level initiatives, such as proposed comprehensive product bans in places like and , have drawn opposition from coalitions asserting regulatory fragmentation, with over 20 states enacting disparate rules by mid-2025 leading to compliance chaos and stifled innovation, as manufacturers struggle with patchwork exemptions for "essential" uses like non-stick cookware and waterproof apparel. Proponents of restraint, including lawmakers, opposed the 2021 PFAS Action Act (H.R. 2467) for mandating EPA listing of PFAS as hazardous without adequate , potentially triggering automatic reporting and cleanup liabilities disproportionate to demonstrated causal harms from ambient exposures. These disputes highlight a core tension: while epidemiological data link high occupational exposures to outcomes like elevated or immune effects, causal inference at trace environmental concentrations remains contested, with critics arguing that precautionary bans eschew cost-benefit favoring persistence over functionality, as evidenced by the absence of OECD-endorsed "low-concern" classifications being misrepresented in regulatory justifications. In response, some policymakers advocate tailored exemptions and phased transitions, as seen in deliberations where in 2025 urged against blanket prohibitions, prioritizing empirical validation of risks against societal dependencies on PFAS-enabled technologies.

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