Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

BM-21 Grad

The is a truck-mounted 122 mm system developed by the in the early 1960s. It features a 40-tube launcher capable of firing unguided M-21OF high-explosive rockets with a maximum range of up to 20 kilometers. The system entered service with the in 1963 as a replacement for the older launcher, mounted initially on the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis for enhanced mobility. Designed for rapid saturation bombardment, the BM-21 Grad can unleash a full salvo of 40 rockets in under 20 seconds, providing area against troop concentrations, equipment, and fortifications. Its simplicity, low cost, and ease of maintenance have contributed to its status as one of the most prolifically produced and exported systems of the era. The launcher has been upgraded over time, including adoption of the chassis in the 1970s, and licensed variants have been manufactured in countries such as , , and . Remaining in active service with dozens of nations more than six decades after its introduction, the BM-21 Grad exemplifies enduring Soviet principles emphasizing massed and logistical robustness. It has been employed in numerous conflicts worldwide, demonstrating effectiveness in both conventional and despite limitations in precision compared to modern guided systems.

Development and Introduction

Design Origins and Early Prototyping

The development of the BM-21 Grad originated in the late 1950s as part of Soviet efforts to modernize beyond the improvised II-era systems, such as the BM-13, which had demonstrated the effectiveness of massed unguided rocket salvos for area suppression but suffered from inconsistent mounting, limited mobility, and logistical challenges. In , the State Committee for Defense Technology tasked the Scientific Research Institute No. 147 (NII-147) in , under chief designer Alexander N. Ganichev, with creating a standardized 122 mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) mounted on a production truck chassis to enable rapid saturation fire against troop concentrations and fortifications, prioritizing volume over precision in line with Soviet artillery doctrine. The project drew tactical lessons from Katyusha's WWII employment, where salvoes provided psychological and suppressive impact despite inaccuracy, but aimed to address Katyusha's vulnerabilities like rail-mounted immobility and exposure during reloading. Early prototyping began around 1960 at SKB-203 (later JSC NPP Start), focusing on integrating a fixed 40-tube launcher pod capable of firing up to 40 rockets in approximately 20 seconds with the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis for enhanced cross-country mobility and quick repositioning to avoid counter-battery fire. Factory tests of initial prototypes occurred in late 1961, followed by field trials in 1961–1962 at sites like the Sofrino artillery range and Rzhevka, where engineers refined stabilization, rocket stabilization, and pod reloading mechanisms based on performance data from prototype batches, including two combat vehicles and associated munitions. These efforts incorporated warhead development input from the State Research and Production Enterprise Splav (NPO Splav), emphasizing reliable fragmentation and incendiary effects for the M-21OF rockets. The prototypes successfully validated the system's core concept of high-volume, short-duration barrages, leading to its formal adoption by the Soviet Army on March 28, 1963, via USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 372-130ss, marking a shift to purpose-built, wheeled MLRS platforms in Soviet inventory.

Production and Initial Deployment

Serial production of the BM-21 Grad commenced in 1963 at the Motovilikha Plants in Perm, Soviet Union, transitioning from earlier prototypes mounted on ZIL-157 trucks to the standardized Ural-375D 6x6 chassis for enhanced mobility and logistics compatibility. This shift emphasized cost-effective manufacturing by leveraging existing automotive production lines, enabling rapid scalability without requiring bespoke vehicle development. The system entered service with artillery units in 1964, replacing older rocket launchers and integrating into divisional structures. Initial deployment focused on equipping motorized rifle and tank divisions, with batteries organized into regiments capable of delivering high-volume . The first documented combat use occurred in March 1969 during the at Damansky Island, where Soviet forces employed the BM-21 to counter Chinese infantry assaults, marking its operational debut. By the 1970s, production had scaled to thousands of units, supporting widespread adoption across forces through exports to allies such as , , and , which licensed local assembly to bolster collective defense capabilities. Doctrinally, the BM-21 formed a core element of Soviet "firepower strikes," designed to saturate enemy fortifications and troop concentrations over areas up to 40 hectares per salvo, facilitating breakthroughs by formations while supported by counter-battery radars like the AN/MPQ-37 for targeting. This integration prioritized massed, short-duration barrages to disrupt defenses prior to maneuver elements advancing.

System Design and Specifications

Launcher Vehicle and Chassis

The BM-21 Grad utilizes the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis as its primary mounting platform in the standard configuration, providing a robust, all-wheel-drive base engineered for cross-country mobility in diverse terrains. This chassis features an unarmored forward cab for the driver and crew, with the rear area dedicated to the launcher assembly, prioritizing simplicity and rapid deployment over protected operations. The vehicle's overall dimensions are 7.35 meters in length, 2.40 meters in width, and 3.09 meters in height, contributing to a combat weight of 13.7 metric tons when fully loaded with rockets. Propulsion is provided by a ZIL-375 V-8 gasoline engine delivering 180 horsepower, enabling a maximum road speed of 75-80 km/h and an operational range of 750-800 km on prepared surfaces. The 6x6 configuration, supplemented by features like optional central tire inflation systems, enhances reliability in rugged conditions, allowing fording depths up to 1.5 meters. The launcher consists of a reusable pod with 40 launch tubes arranged in a rectangular , which is hydraulically elevated from 0 to 55 degrees for firing and rotated forward over the cab for transit to minimize silhouette and facilitate transport. For stability during launch, particularly off-road, two hydraulic jacks at the rear are extended to brace the vehicle against recoil forces. Reloading the pod is performed manually or with auxiliary equipment from a separate ammunition carrier truck, typically requiring 5-10 minutes for a trained to achieve combat readiness. This design emphasizes quick setup and teardown, integral to the system's role in massed, high-volume .

Rocket Pods and Firing System

The rocket pods of the BM-21 Grad consist of a single launcher unit with 40 launch tubes arranged in four rows of ten, each tube accommodating one 122 mm unguided rocket. The tubes feature internal grooves to impart stabilizing spin to the rockets during launch, enabling a maximum range of 20 km with standard ammunition. Reloading is performed manually by the crew, who insert individual rockets into the tubes, a process requiring approximately 10 minutes for a full pod. The firing system employs electrical ignition powered by an onboard , allowing for single-round or full-salvo discharge. A complete salvo of 40 rockets can be launched in about 20 seconds, saturating a area with high volume of fire. At maximum range, this salvo produces a lethal covering roughly 600 m × 600 m, optimized for suppression of exposed or area denial rather than precision strikes. Aiming relies on the PG-1M panoramic telescope for manual alignment in and , with no integrated ballistic computer in the original design; operators use precomputed firing tables adjusted for meteorological conditions and surveyed positions. The system supports firing directly from the cab for crew protection or remotely via cable up to 60 meters, minimizing exposure during engagement. Launch tubes are elevated hydraulically to the firing angle, with the pod's open-bottom design directing exhaust gases downward to mitigate backblast hazards to the vehicle.

Mobility, Crew Requirements, and Logistics

The BM-21 Grad utilizes the Ural-375D 6×6 truck chassis, which features all-wheel drive and high ground clearance suited for rough roads and off-road conditions, though specific clearance figures are approximately 400 mm based on the base truck's design. This configuration allows traversal of secondary roads and unprepared terrain but limits maximum speeds to 75 km/h on highways due to the 180 V8 and 5×2 gearbox. The vehicle's operational range extends to around 750 km, yet its truck-like profile and moderate acceleration increase exposure to and precision strikes during transit or repositioning after firing. Crew requirements consist of three personnel for emplacement and firing—typically a , commander, and gunner—with additional loaders bringing the total to four or five for efficient reloading. The system's manual controls and cab-fired operation enable quick setup in under three minutes, accommodating operators with basic training rather than extensive expertise. Logistics involve manual rocket reloading by crew, achievable in about eight minutes with five personnel, or faster pod swaps on supported variants. rockets are transported in wooden crates on supply trucks, with a standard organization providing 2–3 reloads per launcher to support initial salvos before resupply, making prolonged field use sensitive to disruptions in convoys.

Ammunition and Warheads

Standard 122 mm Rockets

The primary munition for the BM-21 Grad is the unguided M-21OF 122 mm , a solid-fuel designed for high-explosive fragmentation effects against area targets. Total rocket weight measures 66 kg, incorporating an 18.4 kg charged with TNT-based such as TGAF-5. Launched from the system's pods, it attains a of 690 m/s, enabling a maximum range of 20,127 to 20,380 meters. The M-21OF warhead features internal scoring to generate approximately 3,950 fragments weighing 0.5 grams or more upon detonation, dispersing over a lethal radius of roughly 28 to 40 meters. This configuration prioritizes saturation fire for area denial, particularly effective against exposed infantry concentrations and light vehicles lacking armor protection. Development of the M-21OF coincided with the BM-21's in , with scaling up in the through state enterprises like Splav for widespread distribution to Warsaw Pact forces and allies. These rockets load directly into the launcher's 40-tube pods without requiring alterations, facilitating rapid replenishment in field conditions. Subsequent manufacturing by licensed producers in , Asia, and the has sustained stockpiles globally.

Specialized Payloads and Extensions

Specialized warheads for the BM-21 Grad include incendiary types such as the 9M22S rocket, which carries 180 ML-5 elements filled with thermite-based incendiary mixture, each burning for at least two minutes to create sustained fire foci over an area of up to 1,000 square meters. munitions enable mine dispersal, with variants like the 9M22K deploying three PTM-3 anti-tank mines and the 9M18 releasing five anti-personnel mines, while scatterable POM-2 fragmentation mines can be delivered via compatible dispensers for remote emplacement and self-destruct after 10–96 hours. payloads, such as those in 9M218 rockets, disperse submunitions including bomblets for anti-personnel or anti-armor effects, enhancing area saturation beyond standard fragmentation. Range extensions incorporate upgraded solid-fuel rockets like the 9M521, achieving maximum distances of 40 km—nearly double the original 20 km—through improved efficiency while maintaining compatibility with BM-21 . Limited post-2000 modifications add guidance kits, such as inertial navigation with GPS for precision strikes, though these are not standard and deployment remains restricted primarily to upgraded systems. Theoretically, Grad rockets accommodate chemical warheads from historical Soviet stockpiles, allowing dispersal of agents over 20 km, but no verified combat applications exist; authorities reported alleged use of irritant-loaded 122 mm rounds in BM-21 systems as of January 2025, prompting OPCW notifications, though independent confirmation is lacking amid conflicting claims.

Performance Characteristics

The standard M-21OF rocket for the BM-21 Grad achieves a maximum range of 20,380 meters and a minimum range of 5,000 meters. These unguided, spin-stabilized projectiles follow a ballistic trajectory influenced by factors such as wind and launch angle, resulting in substantial dispersion that increases with distance. At maximum range, the probable error in deflection is approximately 160 meters, contributing to an overall circular error probable (CEP) of around 200 meters. The launcher's firing mechanism enables a full salvo of 40 rockets in 20 seconds, with individual rockets intervaled at 0.5 seconds. This capability supports area saturation, where the combined impact footprint of a single vehicle's salvo spans roughly 0.36 km² (600 m × 600 m) when accounting for dispersion and effects. In massed fire involving 10 or more launchers, the overlapping patterns can empirically cover 1–2 km², enhancing probability of effect against dispersed area targets despite inherent inaccuracies. Terminal effects derive primarily from the high-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) , which weighs 18.4 kg and contains about 4 kg of filler. Upon , it generates a and disperses approximately 3,950 pre-formed fragments greater than 0.5 g, producing lethal effects against exposed personnel within a radius of 25–30 meters per . The 's design emphasizes blast and fragmentation over penetration, yielding a high of in open terrain but reduced efficacy against hardened structures or armored vehicles.

Variants and Modernizations

Soviet and Russian Upgrades

The BM-21PD "Damba" variant, developed in the Soviet era during the as part of the DP-62 anti-sabotage system, features a 40-tube launcher mounted on a Ural-375D or for defending naval bases against combat divers and underwater threats. It incorporates electrically ignited rockets with a reduced range of approximately 1-2 km optimized for close-in coastal engagements, along with a power allowing operation from shipboard electricity for enhanced deployability in environments. Post-Soviet Russian modernization efforts centered on the 9K51M Tornado-G system, introduced in the as a direct upgrade to the BM-21 Grad, featuring an automated with satellite navigation for precise targeting and reduced dispersion that reportedly increases strike effectiveness by 2.5 times compared to legacy systems. The Tornado-G employs a KamAZ-63501 6x6 for improved cross-country mobility and reliability over the original Ural-375D, with a 40-tube pod capable of ripple-firing in 20 seconds and reloading in about 8 minutes. Tornado-G ammunition includes extended-range 122 mm rockets such as the 9M521 (up to 40 km) and 9M522 variants, extending operational reach beyond the standard BM-21's 20-30 km while maintaining compatibility with existing munitions for logistical flexibility. forces continue production of Tornado-G units as a lower-cost complement to heavier systems like the , emphasizing massed with precision enhancements for divisional-level operations.

Eastern European Copies

The RM-70, developed by in the late 1960s and entering service in 1972, adapted the BM-21 Grad's 40-tube 122 mm launcher to a 8x8 wheeled chassis, incorporating an armored crew cab for improved protection against small arms and shell fragments. This design retained full compatibility with standard Grad rockets for interoperability while adding two auxiliary reload pods, each holding 40 rockets, to reduce replenishment time from 10-15 minutes to under 5 minutes under optimal conditions. Production emphasized rugged mobility over the original Ural-375D truck, with over 100 units built primarily for export to allied forces. Romania's APR-40, manufactured by starting in the 1970s and formally adopted in 1978, replicated the BM-21's firing module on a lighter domestic , such as the DAC-443, to enhance logistical compatibility within forces. The system maintained the 40-round configuration and 122 mm caliber, enabling seamless use of Soviet or locally produced with ranges up to 20 km for unguided rockets, though it featured minor refinements to the elevation mechanism for slightly improved accuracy in static positions. Approximately 100 units were produced, reflecting fidelity to the original design amid resource constraints in non-Soviet production. Poland's , introduced in the as a modernization of imported BM-21s, substituted the launcher onto a P662D 6x6 with updated fire control , yet preserved the core 122 mm compatibility to leverage existing stockpiles. This variant supported both original munitions and Polish-developed guided rockets for ranges extending to 35 km, with about 70 systems delivered by 2012, underscoring limited deviations focused on chassis durability rather than radical redesign. Belarusian efforts produced the BM-21A BelGrad around 2001, mounting the launcher on an with enhanced digital fire control for automated aiming and reduced crew exposure. Retaining the 40-tube array and 122 mm standard, it improved off-road performance and integrated GPS for positioning, with upgrades addressing wear from Soviet-era units while avoiding changes to ensure ammunition interchangeability across . Serbian BM-21 copies involved primarily chassis adaptations, such as integrating pods onto local FAMOS or Tatra-derived trucks, maintaining the original launcher's simplicity and 122 mm for cost-effective sustainment. These modifications, seen in systems like the Oganj configurations capable of firing up to 50 Grad-compatible rockets, prioritized modular pod swaps over comprehensive overhauls. Across these copies, the 122 mm was universally retained for logistical alignment with Soviet doctrine, enabling shared supply chains in former armies. However, post-1991 NATO accessions in countries like and constrained further indigenous upgrades, shifting focus to Western integrations and donations rather than deepening fidelity to the Grad lineage.

Asian and Middle Eastern Adaptations

China produced the Type 81 self-propelled multiple rocket launcher in the early 1980s as a licensed derivative of the BM-21, featuring 40 launch tubes for 122 mm rockets mounted on a modified Dongfeng EQ140 6x6 truck chassis with a standard range of approximately 20 km. This system marked China's initial effort to localize production of Soviet-era rocket artillery for the People's Liberation Army, incorporating domestic rocket variants compatible with BM-21 munitions. Subsequent developments included the Type 90, an upgraded 40-tube 122 mm launcher on an improved XC2030 6x6 chassis developed by Norinco, emphasizing enhanced mobility and fire control over the original design. Export variants of these systems, such as the WS-22, have been supplied to regional allies including Bangladesh, where they retain the core 122 mm pod configuration but integrate Chinese guidance upgrades for limited precision in some configurations. North Korea developed the M-1985 and M-1991 multiple rocket launchers in the 1980s, direct copies of the BM-21 and its towed Type 63 counterpart, with approximately 200 units estimated in service for saturation fire roles. These adaptations prioritize mass production using local chassis, though without verified solid-fuel rocket enhancements beyond standard liquid propellants. In , the produced Fajr-series launchers derived from North Korean M-1985 designs, which trace lineage to the BM-21; the employs 12 tubes for 240 mm rockets achieving 43 km range, doubling the original Grad's effective reach through extended warheads and propellants. incorporated similar Fajr-derived systems during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, adapting captured and imported BM-21 chassis with Iranian rockets for extended-range barrages exceeding 40 km. fields BM-21 systems augmented by indigenous Yarmuk high-explosive fragmentation rockets, produced by since the 2000s, which extend operational range to over 40 km while maintaining compatibility with standard 40-tube pods. Middle Eastern non-state actors like have localized BM-21 adaptations by mounting standard 40-tube pods on 6x6 trucks such as the HM-20 variant, facilitating rapid deployment in while preserving the system's area-denial capabilities. These truck-based modifications emphasize concealment and mobility over chassis redesign, drawing from Iranian technical assistance.

Improvised and Recent Field Modifications

In the , Ukrainian forces have fielded improvised "mini-Grad" multiple rocket launchers by adapting shortened launch tubes from BM-21 systems onto civilian pickup trucks, enabling lighter, more agile platforms for saturation fire since at least August 2023. These modifications prioritize tactics amid and counter-battery risks, with tubes firing standard 122 mm rockets in salvos of 10-20 for area suppression. To compensate for ammunition shortages and extend engagement ranges, BM-21 operators have incorporated Serbian-manufactured 122 mm rockets, which reportedly achieve up to 50 km compared to the baseline Soviet M-21OF's 20-40 km, with integrations noted by February 2024. Such ad-hoc swaps leverage third-party imports for compatibility with existing pods, though precision remains unguided and reliant on volume fire. Following the in , insurgents mounted BM-21-derived 122 mm rocket tubes on captured U.S.-origin trucks, repurposing abandoned logistics vehicles for mobile launchers to support territorial advances. These field assemblies, observed in operations through 2025, substitute for unavailable Soviet , emphasizing rapid assembly from stockpiles over standardized engineering. In , amid 2024 modernization efforts tied to anti-narcotics operations, the army transferred BM-21 launchers (designated 2B5) to KamAZ-43118 6x6 chassis, replacing obsolescent Ural-375D trucks to boost off-road mobility and payload capacity in rugged terrain. This retrofit, leveraging commercially available Russian heavy trucks, enhances deployment speed without full-system overhauls. Across these conflicts, operators have jury-rigged basic GPS units and mesh screens onto BM-21 variants for improved execution against FPV drones, with and attempts documented in 2025 strikes where unmodified systems were neutralized post-firing within 30 minutes. Such low-tech additions aim to shorten exposure times but face limitations from the platform's inherent reload delays and acoustic signatures.

Operational History

Early Combat Deployments (1960s–1980s)

The BM-21 Grad received its baptism of fire in March 1969 during the , specifically in clashes over Damansky Island () along the River, where Soviet border guards and motorized rifle units deployed the system to repel Chinese incursions involving infantry and light armor. Following approval amid escalating tensions, the launchers provided suppressive rocket barrages that marked the system's debut in operational combat, demonstrating its capacity for rapid area denial against massed assaults in a defensive border scenario. In the , Arab states equipped with Soviet-supplied BM-21 Grads employed the launcher extensively during the 1973 , with Egyptian and Syrian forces firing salvos to saturate Israeli armored columns advancing across the and . These deployments highlighted the system's role in high-intensity conventional warfare, where batteries delivered high-volume unguided rocket fire over ranges of up to 20 kilometers to disrupt mechanized breakthroughs, though exact casualty figures from Grad strikes remain undocumented in declassified accounts. Syrian units continued using the BM-21 in subsequent engagements, including defensive operations during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, where it supported Syrian and Palestinian positions against advancing formations in the Bekaa Valley and . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 introduced the BM-21 to prolonged operations, with motorized rifle divisions and regiments deploying the launchers from bases in the northern provinces to target strongholds in rugged terrain. Over the decade-long conflict, Grads were fired in salvos to blanket fortified caves and mountain redoubts, such as those near , expending thousands of 122 mm rockets annually to support ground advances by the 40th Army. These missions, often conducted from mobile Ural-375D trucks traversing limited road networks, underscored logistical demands in austere environments, including ammunition resupply over extended supply lines vulnerable to ambush.

Post-Cold War Conflicts

In the of the 1990s, BM-21 Grad systems saw employment by Croatian forces during on August 4–7, 1995, when multiple rocket barrages targeted the Serb-held town of , facilitating the rapid advance and capture of the region with minimal Croatian casualties but contributing to civilian displacement and infrastructure damage. Bosnian government army units also integrated captured or supplied BM-21 launchers into their artillery for and urban defense, though limited quantities restricted widespread use compared to heavier field guns. These applications highlighted the system's role in area suppression during sieges and breakthroughs, where its 40-rocket salvoes covered up to 600 meters in width but offered little precision against mobile or entrenched opponents. Russian forces extensively deployed BM-21 Grad launchers during the (1994–1996), particularly in the Battle of Grozny from December 1994 to March 1995, unleashing saturation fire to dismantle Chechen strongpoints amid dense urban terrain. The unguided rockets, fired in volleys from truck-mounted platforms, demolished buildings and suppressed guerrilla positions but proved ineffective for pinpoint targeting, allowing Chechen fighters to exploit the system's 20–30 km range limitations and inaccuracy in . Chechen rebels captured several launchers and over 1,000 rockets, repurposing them for ambushes on federal convoys, which underscored vulnerabilities in unsecured supply lines and the weapon's ease of operation by minimally trained personnel. In the 1991 , Iraqi army and divisions fielded approximately 200–300 BM-21 Grad systems as part of their doctrine, launching rockets against coalition troop concentrations and forward operating bases during the ground campaign from February 24–28, 1991, to disrupt advances in and southern . While capable of delivering high-volume fire—up to 40 rockets per launcher in 20 seconds—the platforms' static reloading process and lack of camouflage exposed them to devastating counterstrikes from U.S.-led air assets, resulting in near-total attrition rates exceeding 80% of deployed units. Residual Grads remained in Iraqi service through the 2003 invasion, where they were sporadically fired at invading coalition columns near and but similarly succumbed to rapid neutralization by helicopters and raids, affirming their doctrinal emphasis on massed firepower over survivability against technologically superior foes.

Syrian Civil War and Middle East Uses

The Syrian Arab Army deployed BM-21 Grad systems in massed barrages against rebel-held districts during the civil war from 2011 onward, targeting urban centers like Homs to dislodge opposition fighters entrenched in densely populated areas. In mid-December 2012, government forces fired 122 mm Grad rockets carrying cluster munitions from BM-21 launchers at locations near Homs, contributing to siege tactics that combined rocket saturation with ground assaults. Similar volleys supported offensives in Aleppo by 2016, where the system's rapid-fire capability—up to 40 rockets in 20 seconds—enabled suppression of rebel positions amid prolonged urban combat. Hezbollah, supporting Assad's regime, facilitated smuggling of rockets through Syrian territory for its arsenal, with consignments seized by Syrian as recently as September 2025 in Al-Qusayr, intended for cross-border operations against positions. The group employed 122 mm -type Katyushas in skirmishes along the Syria-Lebanon-Israel , leveraging the system's mobility for hit-and-run launches amid Hezbollah's interventions in Syrian battles like Qusayr in 2013. The seized BM-21 launchers from captured Syrian and Iraqi military depots, reversing them for offensive use including a July 2018 barrage of rockets fired from toward the in . These captures enabled to conduct syndicated strikes in eastern and northern , though operational constraints limited sustained employment compared to state forces. Iranian-aligned proxies integrated systems into ; in , Houthi fighters inherited BM-21 launchers from pre-war Yemeni army stocks, deploying them in attacks on coalition advances toward in 2021, often alongside improvised adaptations for drone-integrated targeting. In Iraq, militias launched Grad rocket salvos at U.S.-hosted bases, such as the March 2021 attack on airbase using multiple BM-21 systems from nearby positions. Across these theaters, rockets exerted high psychological pressure through sheer volume and noise of incoming salvos, demoralizing in urban fights, but empirical assessments noted diminished precision and reliability from aged stockpiles, with unguided trajectories favoring area suppression over pinpoint strikes.

(2014–Present)

In the initial phase of the conflict in 2014, Russian-backed separatists in employed BM-21 systems, with early instances reported as early as May 9, 2014, when insurgents allegedly seized units and used them for salvos against government positions. forces responded with BM-21 , integrating the systems into operations near the border to target separatist and positions. Both sides relied on the for area suppression in the theater, contributing to intensified exchanges around key sites like Airport. Following the full-scale on February 24, 2022, BM-21 saw sustained bilateral deployment, with Russian forces using them for preparatory barrages and Ukrainian units, such as the , firing 122 mm salvos against advancing positions in areas like as late as July 2024. modernized portions of its inventory, including mini-Grad variants like the Verba MLRS on chassis, while receiving transfers of APR-40 systems—a derivative—in early 2025 to bolster stocks. deployed upgraded Tornado-G variants, entering combat in by November 2022, featuring improved guidance for ranges up to 40 km via integrated UAV support. From 2023 to 2025, systems faced heightened vulnerabilities to FPV and bomber drones, which destroyed numerous BM-21 launchers mid-movement or in firing positions, with at least 265 confirmed losses by OSINT tracking through early 2025. Usage persisted due to scaled production: increased 122 mm output from approximately 33,000 rounds in 2023 to over 500,000 in 2024, sustaining frontline salvos amid broader demands. forces reported destroying at least one BM-21 in June 2025 allegedly loaded with chemical munitions in , based on intercepted communications urging use post-strike, though independent verification of the payload remains pending.

Tactical Employment and Effectiveness

Doctrinal Role in Soviet and Successor Forces

In Soviet military doctrine, the BM-21 Grad served as a divisional-level multiple rocket launcher system designed primarily for artillery preparation within the framework of deep battle operations, entering service around 1963. Organized into battalions typically comprising 18 launchers mounted on Ural-375D trucks, these units executed concentrated, high-volume fire raids to suppress enemy defenses, disrupt command and control, and soften targets immediately preceding infantry and armored assaults. A single battalion volley—delivering up to 720 122 mm rockets—equated to the explosive effect of approximately 18 howitzer batteries, emphasizing saturation over precision to achieve temporary dominance in the close operational depth. Doctrinal employment stressed massed fires from multiple battalions, often exceeding 100 launchers in breakthrough scenarios, to overwhelm fortified positions and enable successive echelons of forces to exploit gaps in enemy lines. This aligned with the Soviet emphasis on operational art, where complemented tube systems in phased fire preparations, transitioning from destructive barrages to accompanying fires during advances. Post-firing, units prioritized rapid displacement—achievable within 2 minutes—to mitigate counter-battery risks, embodying the "fire and " principle central to Soviet tactical flexibility. Post-Soviet successor forces, notably in the , retained the BM-21's core role in general-purpose while adapting it to contemporary doctrines favoring reconnaissance-fire complexes against hybrid threats. Integration with longer-range assets like the system enables layered engagements, where Grad batteries provide area suppression to fix dispersed or mobile adversaries, facilitating precision strikes on high-value targets. This evolution reflects a doctrinal shift toward fires in non-linear warfare, preserving the system's utility for massed, responsive barrages despite the proliferation of guided munitions.

Strengths in Saturation Fire and Suppression

The BM-21 Grad's primary strength lies in its capacity for high-volume saturation fire, enabling rapid delivery of 122mm rockets over large areas to overwhelm enemy defenses and positions. A single launcher can discharge its full load of 40 rockets in as little as 20 seconds, achieving an effective firing rate of approximately 120 rockets per minute per vehicle. In standard battery configurations, often involving multiple coordinated launchers, this scales to deliver hundreds or thousands of projectiles in coordinated salvos, saturating target zones up to 20 km away and covering areas exceeding 400 meters in diameter per launcher salvo. This volume-based approach prioritizes quantity over precision, proving effective against dispersed , unarmored vehicles, and soft targets in open terrain. The system's saturation barrages induce significant psychological disruption and area denial, compelling enemy forces to seek cover and halting maneuvers for extended periods. The incoming rockets produce a characteristic screeching that heightens and disorientation, amplifying non-lethal effects on troop morale and . Combined with the wide dispersal of high-explosive fragmentation warheads, a typical salvo can suppress enemy or batteries for 10 to 20 minutes by denying safe movement and forcing dispersal, as evidenced in doctrinal employment for during advances or retreats. In the from 2022 onward, Grad systems have demonstrated sustained utility in these roles despite the rise of drones and counter-battery radars, forming the backbone of for due to their to provide immediate, high-density in attritional frontline conditions. Cost-effectiveness further enhances the Grad's viability for prolonged operations, with individual 122mm rockets estimated at $1,000 to $2,000 per unit—orders of magnitude cheaper than comparable precision-guided munitions, which often exceed $100,000 each. This affordability, coupled with simple and , allows batteries to sustain repetitive salvos in high-consumption environments without straining resources, achieving equivalent area coverage against non-point targets at roughly one-tenth the expense of guided alternatives like GMLRS rockets. Such economics have underpinned its persistence in modern conflicts, including through 2025, where massed unguided fire remains a practical counter to resource constraints.

Limitations, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures

The BM-21 Grad's 122 mm rockets demonstrate limited accuracy, with a typical (CEP) ranging from 200 to 500 meters at maximum ranges of 20-40 , depending on rocket and environmental factors; this dispersion arises from ballistic inconsistencies and wind effects, confining effective employment to area suppression of troop concentrations or unarmored assets rather than precision engagements. A full 40-rocket salvo at 20 can blanket a roughly 600 by 600 meter zone, but individual rockets often deviate significantly, reducing hit probability on smaller targets below 10% without advanced guidance retrofits unavailable in standard configurations. Mechanically, the system's truck-mounted design lacks armor plating, rendering the launcher and crew vulnerable to small-arms fire, , drones, and loitering munitions; in the since 2022, numerous BM-21 units have been destroyed by Ukrainian FPV drones and Western-supplied systems exploiting this exposure during reloading or repositioning. Age-related breakdowns are common, with Soviet-era prone to failures and hydraulic issues under sustained operations, earning derisive nicknames like "grandma" among Ukrainian forces due to frequent demands and limited off-road reliability in contested environments. Reloading the pod requires 5-10 minutes manually, exposing crews to detection and attack in forward areas without dedicated armored resupply vehicles. The prominent launch signature—characterized by dense smoke trails and audible barrages—combined with short rocket flight times of 20-40 seconds to targets facilitates rapid counter-battery response; opposing forces can triangulate origins via radar or acoustic sensors within 1-2 minutes, as evidenced by High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes neutralizing Russian BM-21 batteries in shortly after salvos. The doctrinal "" tactic, involving displacement within 2 minutes post-firing, partially mitigates this by leveraging the chassis's mobility, though logistical dependence on vulnerable ammunition convoys and limited onboard spares hampers sustained evasion against persistent surveillance. Successor upgrades like the Russian Tornado-G incorporate automated aiming and improved to shorten setup times and enhance scoot speed, partially addressing dispersion via better stabilization but retaining core unguided vulnerabilities without full precision munitions.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Indiscriminate Attacks

The unguided 122 mm rockets fired by the BM-21 Grad system exhibit significant dispersion, with individual rockets having a (CEP) of approximately 200-400 meters at maximum range of 20 km, and a full 40-rocket salvo effectively saturating an area of roughly 400 m × 400 m with high-explosive fragmentation effects. This inherent inaccuracy renders the system prone to when employed against targets in or near populated areas, as fragments and radii extend beyond precise objectives, a characteristic shared with other unguided multiple launch rocket systems but amplified in urban environments. In the starting in 2011, Syrian government forces deployed BM-21 Grad launchers during offensives in rebel-held urban zones like , where barrages of unguided rockets struck residential districts, contributing to documented civilian casualties amid broader patterns of reported by international observers. and inquiries have cited such rocket attacks as part of systematic strikes causing high numbers of deaths, though precise attribution to Grad systems versus other varies across incidents. During the from 2014 onward, both belligerents faced allegations of Grad misuse in , including and regions. Pro-Russian forces fired at least 88 volleys of BM-21 Grad rockets at a civilian checkpoint near on January 18, 2015, resulting in 31 deaths, as detailed in proceedings. documented indiscriminate shelling by both and separatist forces in 2014-2015, with unguided rocket attacks from populated areas or into them causing civilian bloodshed on either side of the frontline. Non-state actors have similarly employed Grad-type rockets in cross-border strikes, exacerbating civilian risks due to the weapons' poor guidance. , utilizing BM-21 systems and compatible 122 mm / rockets, launched barrages into northern Israeli communities during escalations, including a July 2024 attack killing 12 civilians at a soccer field in . In , and allied groups fired thousands of imported or locally produced Grad-equivalent rockets toward Israeli population centers since 2001, with verifying instances where inaccurate trajectories led to deaths among Israeli civilians and misfires harming Gazans. These launches, often from improvised platforms, underscore the system's challenges in distinguishing targets amid dense settlement patterns.

Legal and Ethical Debates Under International Law

The employment of the BM-21 Grad, which launches unguided 122 mm rockets with inherent dispersion patterns, is governed by core principles of (IHL) enshrined in the of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, particularly Articles 48 (basic rule of distinction), 51(4) (prohibition of indiscriminate attacks), and 51(5)(b) ( rule). These require attacks to distinguish between military objectives and civilians, while ensuring anticipated civilian harm does not exceed the concrete military advantage. Unguided rockets are not classified as inherently indiscriminate weapons under customary IHL, as they may be lawfully directed at verifiable military targets in open terrain, but their wide-area effects—typically covering 40,000 square meters per salvo—frequently precipitate violations when fired into populated areas, where risks escalate due to inaccuracy and blast radii. No explicitly prohibits multiple launch rocket systems like the BM-21, distinguishing them from cluster munitions restricted under the 2008 or blinding lasers under Protocol IV to the 1980 (CCW). Efforts within the CCW framework to address explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including discussions on their use in populated areas since 2016, have not yielded binding restrictions on unguided MLRS, stalling amid disagreements over scope and feasibility. The 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, endorsed by over 70 states, urges restraint in such environments but remains politically non-binding and omits outright bans on systems like the . In ongoing conflicts, BM-21 use has fueled IHL compliance scrutiny, as seen in the International Criminal Court's () investigation into the Ukraine situation since November 21, 2013, encompassing alleged war crimes from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on civilians, potentially including barrages documented in urban strikes. Similar patterns emerged in Syria's , where UN commissions of inquiry highlighted rockets' role in attacks causing excessive civilian casualties, prompting referrals to the UN Security Council though not advancing to ICC jurisdiction absent state party status. Left-leaning NGOs, such as and the International Network on Explosive Weapons, contend that the system's inaccuracy renders urban employment presumptively unlawful, prioritizing civilian risk mitigation. Military legal analysts, however, equate rockets to unguided barrel —widely used without —arguing legality hinges on contextual targeting rather than weapon type, provided precautions mitigate foreseeable harm.

Defenses Based on Military Utility and Context

The BM-21 has demonstrated empirical military utility in countering massed and exposed troop concentrations, as evidenced by its captured use during the 1973 , where Israeli forces reported it among the most effective systems for disrupting Arab advances across open terrain through rapid, high-volume barrages. This effectiveness stems from the launcher's capacity to deliver 40 unguided 122 mm s in under 20 seconds, saturating an area of approximately 600 by 400 meters and suppressing maneuvers where precision targeting is secondary to denying space to large formations. Such applications align with causal demands of warfare against numerically superior or advancing forces, where alternatives like guided munitions remain cost-prohibitive for many state militaries, with each Grad costing under $1,000 compared to tens of thousands for precision equivalents. In defensive contexts, such as Ukraine's repulsion of Russian incursions since 2014, the Grad provides essential fire support to halt armored and pushes, with massed salvos from multiple launchers mitigating inherent inaccuracies through sheer volume, akin to historical massed tactics that prioritize coverage over individual precision. modernizations, including digital fire control and extended-range rockets introduced by May 2025, further enhance targeting efficiency while preserving the system's rapid reload and mobility for counter-battery roles against advancing threats. These upgrades, such as the series with automated aiming, reduce dispersion errors to under 100 meters at maximum range, allowing defensive employment without undue collateral risks in fluid battlespaces. Claims of inherent indiscriminacy overlook comparable area-effect capabilities in Western systems like the M270 MLRS, which can fire unguided M26 rockets dispersing submunitions over large zones for suppression, producing effects analogous to volleys despite optional guided munitions. In peer conflicts, where enemies employ and to evade single strikes, the 's utility lies in enabling defenders—often outmatched in precision assets—to impose attrition through affordable saturation, a necessity unaddressed by selective prohibitions that prioritize technical sophistication over operational realism. Tornado-G variants, modernizing the platform since 2010, exemplify how incremental guidance improvements sustain this role without negating the value of volume fire against massed assaults.

Current Status and Proliferation

Ongoing Production and Upgrades

Russia continues serial production of the Tornado-G multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), a modernized successor to the BM-21 Grad featuring automated fire control, integration, and compatibility with precision-guided 122 mm rockets that extend range beyond 30 km and improve strike accuracy by up to 2.5 times compared to legacy unguided munitions. Deliveries to n forces included over 30 units in 2020, with additional contracts for rockets and systems fulfilled in 2022 and 2023, alongside development of extended-range variants exceeding 90 km. New 122 mm rocket projectiles with enhanced guidance were certified for Tornado-G in 2023, emphasizing hybrid unguided/guided options to balance cost and precision in sustained operations. Ukraine has ramped up domestic production of 122 mm Grad-compatible rockets, enabling self-sufficiency amid high consumption rates in frontline use as of March 2025. Modernization efforts include upgrading over 100 systems with electric vertical/horizontal aiming drives, , and automated targeting to reduce reaction times and enhance precision, with deliveries to the reported in May 2025. Innovations encompass portable "mini-Grad" launchers improvised from BM-21 tubes mounted on light vehicles for rapid, decentralized , alongside the Bastion-01 variant integrating satellite communications and automatic fire control for improved responsiveness. Export adaptations persist, such as Ecuador's integration of BM-21 Grad launchers onto modernized 6x6 KamAZ-43118 chassis in 2024, replacing outdated Soviet-era trucks to boost mobility and reliability in counter-narcotics operations. Proliferation through licensed copies continues, notably Iran's Heidar-44, an upgraded BM-21 variant with drone-assisted fire control and rockets compatible with original Grad tubes, sustaining local production for regional allies. Recent upgrades prioritize guidance—combining low-cost unguided salvos with selective GPS/INS-equipped rockets—to maintain affordability while addressing threats through accelerated reload cycles and automated sequencing, as seen in Tornado-G's reduced firing time to under 30 seconds. These adaptations enable saturation fire to overwhelm and loitering munitions, preserving the system's doctrinal emphasis on area suppression despite precision proliferation.

Active Operators and Exports

The BM-21 Grad remains in active service across more than 50 countries, with proliferation sustained by its low cost, ease of maintenance, and availability of munitions, despite the adoption of precision-guided alternatives by advanced militaries. No verified large-scale phase-outs have occurred, as the system continues to meet doctrinal needs for area suppression in resource-constrained forces. In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, both Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have employed the BM-21 extensively from 2022 to 2025, comprising the majority of their capabilities due to high-volume fire requirements in attritional combat. has augmented its stocks through allied transfers, including APR-40 launchers—a local BM-21 variant—delivered in early 2025, and has pursued domestic upgrades such as remounting systems on modern MAN 6x6 chassis for improved mobility. Middle Eastern operators, including Syrian government forces and Iranian-backed proxies, sustain BM-21 operations via routes that bypass sanctions, enabling continued use in asymmetric conflicts. In , and maintain modernized Grad-derived stockpiles for territorial defense and export, while recent border tensions saw deploy BM-21 systems against in July 2025. African nations such as retain significant inventories, with over 70 BM-21 and RM-70 variants reported active, alongside usage by non-state actors like affiliates in regional insurgencies. Exports persist into 2025, exemplified by Ecuador's integration of BM-21 launchers onto upgraded 6x6 vehicles to modernize formations. In , operates the system alongside indigenous developments, and the in evaluates captured units for potential adaptation in roles.

References

  1. [1]
    BM-21 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher - GlobalSecurity.org
    May 25, 2022 · The 122mm 40-tube multiple launch rocket system Grad (Hail), with a firing range of up to 20 km, was introduced into operational service with ...Missing: history | Show results with:history
  2. [2]
    BM-21 Grad Russian 122mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL)
    Dec 19, 2024 · The BM-21 Grad is a Soviet truck-mounted 122 mm multiple rocket launcher. The weapons system and the M-21OF rocket that it fires evolved in the early 1960s.
  3. [3]
    BM-21 GRAD 9K51 - Army Recognition
    Sep 17, 2025 · The BM-21 Grad is a Soviet truck-mounted 122-mm multiple rocket launcher, developed in the early 1960s. The development of the 122 mm BM-21 ...Missing: history | Show results with:history
  4. [4]
    BM-21 Grad | Weaponsystems.net
    The BM-21 Grad is an early Cold War era multiple rocket launcher of Soviet origin. It is an iconic Soviet weapon system that remains in widespread use today.Missing: history | Show results with:history
  5. [5]
    BM-21 (Grad) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
    The initial BM-21 Grad was based on the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis but has since been upgraded to the Ural-4320 6x6 truck chassis, this in 1976. In either form ...
  6. [6]
    BM-21 Grad (1963) - Truck Encyclopedia
    The BM-21 Grad was a weapons system consisting in a M-21 122mm multiple rocket launcher generally based on an Ural 375 truck chassis.Missing: history | Show results with:history
  7. [7]
    BM-21 "Grad": the heir of two opponents - Military Review
    Mar 29, 2017 · 28 March 1963, the Soviet Army adopted a new multiple rocket launcher system, which has become the most widespread in the world.
  8. [8]
    From the history of the M-21 field jet system | Missilery.info
    In 1961, it was necessary to carry out factory tests of the Grad system and to manufacture a prototype batch of projectiles and two combat vehicles for range ...
  9. [9]
    [PDF] The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict:
    108 The Soviets employed the top-secret T-62 tanks in the battle and, after a Politburo debate and Brezhnev's approval, used for the first time the BM-21. “Grad ...
  10. [10]
    Lessons Learned From Ukraine: Rocket Artillery On The Modern ...
    Mar 17, 2023 · By 1963 the new system had entered service with the Soviet Army as the BM-21 Grad. The BM-21 supposedly first saw combat service in March ...
  11. [11]
    BM-21 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher
    Jun 19, 1999 · The 122mm 40-tube multiple launch rocket system Grad (Hail), with a firing range of up to 20 km, was introduced into operational service with the Russian Army ...Missing: dimensions | Show results with:dimensions<|separator|>
  12. [12]
    BM-21 GRAD 122MM Multiple Rocket Launcher - Ultra Defense Corp
    It has a road range of up to 750 kilometers (470 miles) and can ford depths of up to 1.5 meters (4 ft. 11 in). The BM-21 may be operated and ...Missing: dimensions | Show results with:dimensions
  13. [13]
    BM-21 GRAD - Armatec
    The weapons system and the M-21OF rocket were first developed in the early 1960s, and saw their first combat use in March 1969 during the Sino-Soviet border ...
  14. [14]
    BM-21 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher - GlobalSecurity.org
    Feb 14, 2018 · 9K51 BM-21 Grad (Hail) 9A51 Prima Sakr-18 [Egyptian] 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher ; Maximum Range, 20,380 ; Warhead Weight (kg), 18.4 (M21OF).Missing: dimensions | Show results with:dimensions
  15. [15]
    [PDF] 122 mm ROCKET PROJECTILE M-21OF FOR BM-21 “GRAD” AND ...
    TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS. Weight of the projectile, kg. 66. Explosive charge. TGAF-5. Weight of warhead, kg. 18, 4. Muzzle velocity, m/s. 690. Maximum range, m.
  16. [16]
    122 mm M-21OF-M ROCKET - Atlas Internazionale Ltd
    122 mm M-21OF-M ROCKET ; Weight of rocket, kg, 66, 180 ; Maximum range, m, 20127 ; Maximum velocity, m/s, 690 ; Spoiler rings, Small and big one.Missing: warhead | Show results with:warhead
  17. [17]
    122mm 9M22 Grad Rocket - CAT-UXO
    When detonated the internal scoring of the M-21-OF warhead creates approximately 3,150 fragments which are scattered over a Lethal-Radius (LR) of about 28m.Missing: time | Show results with:time
  18. [18]
    122 ROCKET PROJECTILES (“GRAD”) FOR BM-21 MULTIPLE ...
    Weight of rocket projectile, kg, 65, 66 ; Range, m, 20127, 20000 ; Max. velocity, m/s, 660, 660 ; Total number of fragments, 0.5 g and more in weight, pc. 3950 ...Missing: warhead | Show results with:warhead
  19. [19]
    122mm 9M22S Grad Rocket - CAT-UXO
    The INC elements are ML-5 Magnesium cups filled with a Thermite type mixture and packed in a matrix, each element having a burning time of at least 2 minutes.Missing: POM- mines
  20. [20]
    Unguided rocket projectile MZ-21 (9M22S) | Missilery.info
    The MZ-21 (9M22S) is an unguided rocket projectile designed to create mass fire foci, with a 122mm caliber, 2970mm length, and 180 ignition elements.Missing: 9M22K | Show results with:9M22K
  21. [21]
    122mm 9m22k grad rocket - CAT-UXO
    The 122mm 9M22K is a Russian rocket with 3 PTM-3 landmines, which are high-explosive, magnetic, anti-vehicle landmines with a self-destruct feature.Missing: cluster | Show results with:cluster
  22. [22]
    122mm 9M18 Grad Rocket - CAT-UXO
    This is the Russian 122mm 9M18, a submunition carrier, Anti-Personnel (AP) landmine (x5) dispensing, base-ejection, electrically-initiated, ...Missing: mine | Show results with:mine
  23. [23]
    Pom 2 landmine - CAT-UXO
    The carrier munition KPOM-2 is a tubular metal canister containing 4 x landmines and a Pyrotechnic-Delay (P-DLY), which is ignited to begin the landmine arming ...Missing: 9N27 | Show results with:9N27
  24. [24]
    [PDF] Cluster Munitions & Submunitions in Syria:
    Nov 1, 2023 · Sources indicate this submunition can be loaded into both 9M218 122 mm rockets, fired from the BM-21 Grad (Град; 'Hail') MBRL, and 9M55K5 300 mm ...<|separator|>
  25. [25]
    122mm 9m521 grad rocket - CAT-UXO
    The 122mm 9M521 is a Russian HE-Frag, electrically-initiated, fin and spin-stabilized, ground-to-ground rocket with a 40km range, designed to engage personnel ...Missing: GPS- guided
  26. [26]
    Israeli-Made Bolt-On Kit Turns 122mm 'Grad' Artillery Rockets Into ...
    May 22, 2018 · It has infrared and laser sensors and an inertial navigation system (INS) with embedded GPS, which allows the round to engage a wide variety of ...Missing: GRL- | Show results with:GRL-
  27. [27]
    [PDF] Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the OPCW
    Jan 21, 2025 · shells (RS) for BM-21 "Grad" multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS), loaded with chemical irritant substances. (the exact substance is ...Missing: warheads | Show results with:warheads<|separator|>
  28. [28]
    [PDF] EXPLOSIVE WEAPON EFFECTS - GICHD
    Jul 20, 2006 · When firing a 122 mm BM-21 rocket at a range of 20 km, for example, a sample probable error in deflection is 160 m, and a sample probable error ...
  29. [29]
    122 mm M-21OF-M Rocket for BM-21- (GRAD) - Kintex.bg
    Weight of rocket projectile ( kg ), 65 ; Range ( m ), 20127 ; Max.. velocity ( m/s ), 660 ; Total number of fragments, 0.5 gand more in weight ( pc.) 3950 ; Pellets ...Missing: warhead | Show results with:warhead<|separator|>
  30. [30]
    Rare Russian Variant Of BM-21 Grad Appears To Be Guarding ...
    May 30, 2023 · The BM-21PD rocket launcher is specifically designed to help defend against combat divers and other close-in underwater threats.
  31. [31]
    Russian Navy counters Ukrainian naval drone attacks with rare BM ...
    May 31, 2023 · A unique feature of the BM-21PD is that it is equipped with a power rectifier, enabling it to operate not only from its power station but also ...Missing: variant | Show results with:variant
  32. [32]
    Tornado-G Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) - Army Technology
    Sep 24, 2018 · It is an upgraded variant of the BM-21 Grad MLRS. The new rocket system is intended for use by the armed forces of Russia and foreign countries.Missing: specifications | Show results with:specifications
  33. [33]
    Analysis: Russian Tornado-G rocket launcher modernized BM-21 ...
    Dec 17, 2024 · Depending on the specific munition variant, the Tornado-G can now engage targets at ranges between 30 to 40 kilometers. This represents a marked ...Missing: specifications | Show results with:specifications
  34. [34]
    9A52-4 / 9K51M Tornado-G - GlobalSecurity.org
    Sep 13, 2021 · The 9A52-4 "Tornado-G" was the first of the MLRS to receive an automatic guidance and fire control system, which allows continuously determining ...
  35. [35]
    RM-70 - Weaponsystems.net
    The RM-70 is a Czechoslovak multiple rocket launcher, developed in the late 1960s, using 122mm rockets, and based on a Tatra T-813 truck with an armored cab.Missing: copy | Show results with:copy
  36. [36]
    RM-70 – Czechoslovak multiple launch rocket system - Новости ВПК
    Dec 6, 2024 · Czechoslovakian self-propelled multiple launch rocket system on a wheeled chassis. It is designed to destroy a variety of targets dispersed over a large area.
  37. [37]
    APRA-40 122mm multiple rocket launcher - Weapons Parade
    The APRA-40 122mm multiple rocket launcher is a Romanian version of the omnipresent Soviet BM-21 Grad. This model have some modifications that improves some of ...
  38. [38]
    Ukrainian Gunners Discuss Operational Experience on Romanian ...
    Apr 25, 2024 · APR-40 is a licensed Romanian copy of the BM-21 Grad MRL, which was produced by Aerostar in the 1970s and 1980s. It has the same artillery unit, ...
  39. [39]
    Langusta WR-40 Rocket Launcher - Army Technology
    Nov 22, 2012 · "The WR-40 MLRS is a heavily modified variant of the BM-21 Grad artillery rocket system." The Langusta WR-40 can be used to target enemy firing ...
  40. [40]
    The Belarusian BM-21A BelGrad MLRS - TankNutDave.com
    The Belarusian BM-21A BelGrad MLRS (Belorussian Grad) is an upgraded Russian BM-21 Multiple Launch Rocket System. It entered Belarusian service in 2001.
  41. [41]
    LRSVM Multiple Launch Rocket System - Army Technology
    Mar 26, 2013 · The Oganj rockets can be fired for a maximum range of 22.5km and Grad rocket can be launched to a maximum range of up to 35km. The Grad rocket ...
  42. [42]
    PZH-10 - GlobalSecurity.org
    Jan 8, 2021 · It fires 122 mm artillery rockets. These rockets were originally developed for the Soviet BM-21 Grad and are widely used around the world. In ...
  43. [43]
    Type90 (Self-propelled rocket launcher) - Army Guide
    The Type 90 is the second-generation truck-mounted 122mm 40-tube multiple launch rocket system developed by China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO)Missing: variants | Show results with:variants
  44. [44]
    M1985/M1991 - Missile Threat - CSIS
    These systems include of the Russian BM-21 'Grad' and Chinese Type 63 MLRS. Military analysts estimate that North Korea possesses roughly 200 M1985 and M1991 ...
  45. [45]
    SBI Fajr-3 (Dawn-3) 6x6 Wheeled Multiple-Launch Rocket System ...
    Sep 24, 2018 · "The Iranian-produced Fajr-3 MLRS is based in the North Korean M1985, itself based in the Soviet-era BM-21 Grad design." · Armament & Ammunition
  46. [46]
    ​Pakistani Artillery Rockets for BM-21 Grad MLRS are in Use of ...
    Mar 26, 2023 · Defense Forces of Ukraine received 122mm Yarmuk HE-Frag rockets. These Pakistani-made ammunition are already used by Ukrainian artillerymen.
  47. [47]
    Alongside modern Western arms, Ukraine uses custom-built 'mini ...
    Aug 22, 2023 · The "mini-Grad" uses pipes from Soviet-designed BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers developed in the 1960s, and can be mounted on pickup trucks.Missing: improvised 2024 Serbian
  48. [48]
    Ukraine weaponized pickups - tiny Grad on the go - Technology Org
    Apr 17, 2023 · Both Grad and these armed pickups are considered to be rocket artillery and are designed to destroy everything in a certain area.Missing: Serbian | Show results with:Serbian
  49. [49]
    Ukraine Is Arming Its Grad Systems With Serbian Rockets
    Feb 28, 2024 · The BM-21 Grad is a ubiquitous multiple rocket launcher, which entered service in 1963, but technically could trace its roots all the way to the Second World ...Missing: improvised mini- pickups
  50. [50]
    Unusual Grad rocket launcher spotted in Afghanistan - ВПК.name
    Dec 28, 2021 · The militants of the Taliban movement (recognized as terrorist and banned in the Russian Federation) armed themselves with an unusual version of the BM-21 Grad.Missing: mounts | Show results with:mounts
  51. [51]
    https://x.com/DoungaJohn/status/1980767928070074482
  52. [52]
    Ecuador Modernizes Its Artillery Capabilities with BM-21 Grad ...
    Jun 27, 2024 · The launcher is mounted on a mobile and elevatable platform, allowing firing angles from 0 to +55 degrees in elevation, with a rotation of 60 ...
  53. [53]
    Ukrainian FPV Drones Wipe Out Russian Grad Launcher Before It ...
    Jul 2, 2025 · A Russian BM-21 Grad system was identified and destroyed by Ukrainian forces, highlighting advanced drone tactics in protecting national ...
  54. [54]
    Ukraine Unleashes a Next-Gen BM-21 Grad - YouTube
    May 17, 2025 · Ukraine has radically upgraded the iconic BM-21 Grad, transforming it into a high-tech, precision strike system.Missing: improvised modifications 2023 2024 mini- pickups HMMWVs Serbian
  55. [55]
    SOVIET MLRS 1950–1960 - War History
    Dec 13, 2024 · The BM-21 first saw action in the 1969 Sino–Soviet border ... The BM-21's predecessor, the 240mm BM-24, entered service in the early 1950s.<|separator|>
  56. [56]
    [PDF] Unacceptable Risk
    BM-21 Grad MBRLs and other heavy artillery weapons ... According to a US field manual, 'precision capabilities have a circular error probable (CEP) of less than ...
  57. [57]
    [PDF] Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat
    Russian successor to the Soviet. KGB. Grad (BM-21). 40-tube 122mm truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher system. NATO designation: M1964.
  58. [58]
    BM-21 Grad Rocket Launcher | Legends Live On
    Aug 3, 2025 · The system was again used during the Gulf War in 1991 and remained in service through the 2003 Iraq War. After the fall of Saddam Hussein's ...
  59. [59]
    Weapons of the Syrian War: Artillery - Defense One
    Jul 19, 2016 · Syrian artillery attacked Homs, the hub of the so-called Free Syrian Army and “capital of the revolution. ... BM-21 122mm multiple rocket ...
  60. [60]
    Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition
    Jan 14, 2013 · Evidence indicates that Syrian forces used BM-21 Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers to deliver cluster munitions in attacks near the city of ...Missing: 1982 | Show results with:1982
  61. [61]
    Syrian army seizes Aleppo, takes aim at ISIL in Raqqa - Al Jazeera
    Feb 21, 2016 · Monitoring group says Syrian forces advance as unrest continues elsewhere with twin bombings killing 25 in Homs.Missing: BM- barrages
  62. [62]
    The Quiet Return of Hezbollah's Smuggling Network in Syria - FDD
    Oct 1, 2025 · On September 29, Syria's Interior Ministry claimed that authorities had “seized 200 Grad rockets in a warehouse in Al-Qusayr, in Homs' western ...
  63. [63]
    Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah
    The 122 mm 9M22 Grad-type is one of the more popular Katyusha variants today. It was originally fitted for the Soviet BM-21 MRL, and has a range of ...Missing: 1982 | Show results with:1982
  64. [64]
    Syrian rebels target Hezbollah militia, fire rockets into Lebanon - CNN
    May 21, 2013 · The Free Syrian Army claimed it fired Grad rockets from the city of Qusayr into northeastern Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah areas in Hermel. The ...
  65. [65]
    Suspected ISIS rockets hit Sea of Galilee; IDF destroys launcher in ...
    Jul 26, 2018 · Suspected ISIS rockets hit Sea of Galilee; IDF destroys launcher in Syria ... IDF officials believe the projectiles were BM-21 Grad rockets ...
  66. [66]
    Russia praises Israel for attacking ISIS in Syria - Ynetnews
    Jul 26, 2018 · Israeli defense officials believe ISIS launched the grad rockets at Israel as a provocation, in an effort to make Israel attack the Syrian army ...
  67. [67]
    Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook - Oryx
    Sep 4, 2022 · 122mm BM-21 Grad (Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks) ... Houthis (Yemen) (6); Israel (6); Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (6); Belarus (5) ...
  68. [68]
    Rocket attack, caused civilian casualties in Al-Rawda neighborhood ...
    Nov 19, 2021 · However, a report by Al-Araby TV, quoting a military source, stated that the rockets were Katyusha - Grad BM-21 - often used in the Yemeni war.
  69. [69]
    Rockets Hit Iraqi Base Where U.S. Troops Are Stationed
    Jun 28, 2021 · The attackers who targeted the base on Wednesday used BM-21 “Grad” rockets, fired from about five miles from the base, officials said. A ...
  70. [70]
    Grad as the Russian Weapon of Terror - ICDS
    Jan 27, 2015 · One of the first mentions of pro-Russian separatists possessing Grad BM 21 was on 9 May 2014 – the insurgents allegedly seized two Ukrainian ...
  71. [71]
    Russo-Ukraine War - 2014 - GlobalSecurity.org
    Among the heavy weapons the Ukrainian army used were BM-21 Grad and BM-27 Uragan multiple-rocket launchers. The Ukraine conflict increased in speed and ...
  72. [72]
    [PDF] “Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad”: A Brief History of the Battles of ... - AUSA
    They regularly employed indirect fire—mortar, artillery and BM-21 Grad MLRS—from the city into the airport to both draw counterbattery fire and to desensitize ...
  73. [73]
    BM-21 Grad 122mm rocket launcher crew firing against Russian ...
    Jul 21, 2024 · BM-21 Grad 122mm rocket launcher crew firing against Russian positions in the Kharkiv direction, 36th Marine Brigade. Published on July 18, 2024.
  74. [74]
    Verba (MRLS) - Wikipedia
    Verba is a Ukrainian multiple rocket launcher 122 mm caliber based on the truck KrAZ-6322 and combat unit BM-21 Grad.
  75. [75]
    Romania Provided the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a BM-21 Grad ...
    Jan 16, 2025 · Available information confirms the transfer of APR-40 multiple rocket launchers, which are essentially Romanian copies of the BM-21 Grad MLRS.
  76. [76]
    Tornado-G - Army Recognition
    Sep 28, 2025 · Like the BM-21, the BM-21V has stabilizing jacks on the rear of the vehicle for support when firing. The launch vehicle has the industrial name ...
  77. [77]
    Ukrainian Bomber Drone Strikes Russian BM-21 Grad on the Move
    According to the ORYX OSINT resource, in the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia has lost at least 265 BM-21 MLRS, including 207 destroyed. On January 12, ...Missing: vulnerabilities 2023-2025
  78. [78]
    Russian estimate production numbers for artillery shells, rockets ...
    Jun 30, 2024 · In 2023, Russian 122 mm Grad production was just 33,000 rounds, but in 2024, production is on track to exceed 500,000 rounds. Similarly, 220 mm ...After 2.5 Years, Russian rocket artillery in storage is now virtually ...Ukraine will fully meet its artillery needs with domestic production by ...More results from www.reddit.com
  79. [79]
    Russian Troops Caught Off Guard as Ukraine Blows Up Chemical ...
    Jun 17, 2025 · Ukrainian troops have destroyed a Russian BM-21 Grad multiple-launch rocket system that was reportedly loaded with chemical munitions.
  80. [80]
    Marine Corps Artillery Rockets: Back Through The Future
    With this new stage of Russian rocket modernization, the BM- 21 would become the standard multiple rocket launcher system for Soviet forces. ... deep battle" and ...
  81. [81]
    Reactive Systems of Salvo Fire Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems ...
    Feb 14, 2018 · One volley from a BM-21 battalion is 720 rounds. Because these weapons have a large circular error probable (CEP),they are not suited for ...
  82. [82]
    [PDF] RECCE-Strike Complexes in Soviet Theory and Practice - DTIC
    An integral part of fire preparation is artillery and aviation preparation of the attack. Fire preparation can consist of one or several fire raids by artillery ...
  83. [83]
    Russia's Way of War on Land: 4 Deadly Weapons NATO Won't Want ...
    Dec 8, 2018 · Russian military doctrine emphasizes larger-scale, centrally-directed ... BM-21 Grad multiple-rocket launcher systems. Russia's “Next ...
  84. [84]
    The Iskander-M and Iskander-K: A Technical Profile - RUSI
    Aug 8, 2022 · Russian forces have also practised the integration of Iskander and the Tornado-S multiple rocket launcher into a single reconnaissance ...
  85. [85]
    How effective was BM-21 Grad or similar Multiple rocket launcher to ...
    Mar 24, 2016 · It's tracked, rather than wheeled. It's got a built-in fire direction computer, and a GPS system. It always “knows” where it is. Tell it where ...Artillery: How accurate is the BM-21 Grad? Can it hit a square box ...How many mortar rounds does it take to hit a building from 400 ...More results from www.quora.com
  86. [86]
    How Bm21-Grad actually meant to be used? : r/WarCollege - Reddit
    Oct 31, 2023 · The grad (using a general term for unguided rocketry) is primarily used for rapid saturation fire, typically covering a units advance or retreat in the offense.Missing: Splav 1950s prototypes 1960-1962<|separator|>
  87. [87]
    Is there a way to turn the ubiquitous BM-21 Grad 122mm rocket into ...
    May 18, 2024 · Mounted on technicals and up to 5 ton trucks? How could Ukraine use this to provide tactical medium range precision fires at the BN level?
  88. [88]
    Assuming that guided rockets could be mass produced, what pros ...
    Jan 4, 2022 · Guided munitions cost more than artillery rounds. According to this document a single GMLRS round costs 127 051 $ in 2014. https://www.google.conventional artillery vs MLRS? comparing the two, what ... - RedditWhy are missiles so prolific in use despite their ... - RedditMore results from www.reddit.com
  89. [89]
    CEP of a 122 mm rocket - NavWeaps Forums - Tapatalk
    Aug 7, 2006 · If the range error is 2.0% then it will work out to 400 meters as well. So your rocket is landing somewhere in a 400 x 400 meter area.Missing: Grad | Show results with:Grad
  90. [90]
    What is a grad? - AOAV
    Jun 9, 2021 · Developed in the 1960s, the BM-21 Grad has become the most numerous and widely-deployed multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in the world.Missing: prototyping | Show results with:prototyping
  91. [91]
    Syria: Dozens of Government Attacks in Aleppo | Human Rights Watch
    Dec 21, 2013 · Dozens of government airstrikes that have killed hundreds of civilians, including children, in Aleppo governorate in the last month were ...Missing: BM- Grad
  92. [92]
    Attacks on Syrian civilians and aid workers in Aleppo were war crimes
    Mar 3, 2017 · The scale of what happened in Aleppo is unprecedented,” the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria said, issuing its new report.Missing: BM- 21 Grad HRW
  93. [93]
    Memorial of Ukraine | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
    multiple-launch rocket systems (“BM-21 Grad” or “Grad”) to shell the civilian checkpoint. The DPR unleashed a hailstorm of at least 88 rocket volleys that ...
  94. [94]
    Ukraine: Horror of civilian bloodshed in indiscriminate attacks
    Feb 2, 2015 · An Amnesty International researcher on the ground in eastern Ukraine has gathered gruesome evidence of civilian deaths and casualties inflicted by both sides ...Missing: BM- 21 Grad
  95. [95]
    Analysis: Hezbollah rocket fire kills 12 civilians in northern Israel
    Jul 27, 2024 · The victims, aged 10 to 20, were at a soccer field when a rocket struck the area, killing them and wounding at least 29 others.
  96. [96]
    Hezbollah's Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War
    According to Lebanese security sources quoted by the press, the weapons included 122mm Grad rockets of the type that Hezbollah had fired into Israel during the ...
  97. [97]
    Palestinian Rockets in May Killed Civilians in Israel, Gaza
    Aug 12, 2021 · Israeli authorities reported that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups launched more than 4,360 unguided rockets and mortars toward Israeli ...
  98. [98]
    [PDF] EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS - ICRC
    Discussions focused on the humanitarian, legal, technical, and military policy issues raised by the use of explosive weapons against legitimate targets located ...
  99. [99]
    Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas — UNODA
    When explosive weapons are used in populated areas, 90% of the casualties are civilians resulting in lasting trauma endured by millions of girls, boys, women ...The Political Declaration · Endorsement · Calendar · ResourcesMissing: MLRS | Show results with:MLRS
  100. [100]
    Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation ...
    Feb 28, 2022 · Ukraine is not a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or the "Court"), so cannot itself refer the ...Missing: BM- Grad Syria
  101. [101]
    BM-21 Grad vs M270 MLRS – Cost to Fire Compared #shorts s
    Aug 30, 2025 · BM-21 Grad vs M270 MLRS – which rocket artillery is more cost-effective to fire? Grad follows the “fire many, maybe hit” logic.
  102. [102]
    The Grad 2.0 MLRS: How Ukraine's National Guard Gave the BM-21 ...
    May 12, 2025 · A new suite of onboard computers and software allows crews to detect targets, calculate firing solutions and slew the launcher to precise ...Missing: tables | Show results with:tables
  103. [103]
    Ukraine's National Guard receives upgrades BM-21 rocket launchers
    May 12, 2025 · “The machine features a redesigned cabin and optimized internal space, improving comfort and safety for personnel,” the National Guard noted.<|separator|>
  104. [104]
    M270 MLRS - From Grid Exterminator to Precision Blaster | Medium
    Sep 21, 2024 · The M270 theoretically had an inferior barrage rate and onboard capacity to the contemporary Soviet made BM-21 Grad (56.4 seconds for 12 rockets ...
  105. [105]
    Beyond Artillery's Reach - Armada International
    Sep 4, 2020 · The MLRS and HIMARS (shown) have become the primary platforms for the US military's tactical missiles. Equipped with onboard navigation and ...
  106. [106]
    Russian army to receive more Tornado-S and Tornado-G MLRS ...
    May 5, 2020 · The Russian Armed Forces will get more than 30 new Tornado-S Tornado-G multiple launch rocket systems MLRS in 2020.
  107. [107]
    More and more precise. New ammunition for MLRS "Tornado-G"
    Feb 16, 2023 · The Russian defense industry has completed work on a new line of 122-mm rocket projectiles for the Tornado-G multiple launch rocket system.Missing: 2020s | Show results with:2020s<|separator|>
  108. [108]
    Ukraine Is Making And Refurbishing Its Own Grad Rockets
    Mar 19, 2025 · Ukraine is producing 122 mm rockets for the Grad system itself. This is very important, because a lot of such rockets are being used all the time.
  109. [109]
    Ukrainian Armed Forces show rare footage of modernised Bastion ...
    Jun 18, 2023 · One of the key innovations is the ability to target and fire automatically. In addition, the system is equipped with satellite communications.<|control11|><|separator|>
  110. [110]
    List of military equipment manufactured in Iran - Wikipedia
    – Iranian version of the BM-21; Heidar 44 – Upgraded BM-21 Grad equipped with a fire control system. It utilizes surveillance drones for more precise fire ...IAIO Qaher-313 · HESA Shafaq · Meshkat (missile) · Qaem 100
  111. [111]
    Pictures Show Russia Using Ammo from Iran in Ukraine War
    Aug 30, 2023 · Iran's Arash is a series of unguided artillery rockets developed as a copy of the Soviet-designed BM-21 “Grad.” #Ukraine ...
  112. [112]
    Ukraine buys Soviet rounds and BM-21 GRAD rockets from US
    Apr 27, 2022 · Ukraine is ready to pay up to $165M to US government for the purchase of various artillery cartridges and non-standard ammunition produced ...<|separator|>
  113. [113]
    The National Guard of Ukraine modernizes its BM-21 rocket ...
    May 13, 2025 · The National Guard of Ukraine has revealed new images showing its BM-21 Grad rocket launchers mounted on new MAN 6×6 trucks.Missing: improvised modifications 2023 2024 mini- pickups HMMWVs Serbian
  114. [114]
    Chapter Six: Middle East and North Africa - Taylor & Francis Online
    Feb 11, 2025 · The 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas, and the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) combined-arms response, largely shaped the Middle East in 2024.
  115. [115]
    Thailand accuses Cambodia of using BM-21 rocket systems - Mint
    Jul 25, 2025 · Thailand's military accused rival Cambodia of using Russian-made BM-21 rocket systems as tensions between the neighbouring countries ...Missing: operators | Show results with:operators
  116. [116]
    MENA Middle East and North Africa | Start Insight
    Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner's battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and ...Wagner Rebooted · The Islamic State In... · Gaza: Attack On Kamal Adwan...