Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Cluster munition

Cluster munitions are conventional explosive weapons consisting of a delivery container, such as a , , or , that disperses or releases multiple smaller submunitions, known as bomblets, over a wide area to inflict damage on personnel, vehicles, and . These submunitions typically contain high-explosive charges and are designed for area effects, providing forces with versatile options against dispersed, mobile, or concealed targets that unitary munitions may struggle to engage effectively. In controlled testing, cluster munitions have demonstrated significantly higher lethality against armored vehicles compared to precision-guided alternatives, with effectiveness multipliers reported up to 60 times in peacetime evaluations. Employed since and extensively in conflicts including , the Gulf Wars, and more recent operations in , cluster munitions offer in use and logistical simplicity for suppressing large enemy formations or nodes. Their tactical utility stems from first-principles of physics, where fragmenting submunitions maximize kill radii through probabilistic coverage rather than pinpoint accuracy, making them particularly suited to high-intensity against numerically superior or entrenched adversaries. However, submunitions exhibit failure-to-detonate rates varying from 1% in modern U.S. designs to 10-40% in older or combat-stressed systems, resulting in persistent that functions analogously to mines, contaminating battlefields and causing delayed civilian and combatant casualties. The primary controversy surrounding cluster munitions arises from these remnants, which advocacy groups and some international bodies highlight for humanitarian impacts, leading to the 2008 —a ratified by over 100 states that bans their production, stockpiling, transfer, and use, though non-signatories including the , , and continue to maintain and deploy them citing indispensable battlefield roles. U.S. , for instance, restricts exports to munitions with sub-1% dud rates but authorizes domestic use without such limits, reflecting empirical assessments of net value over remnant risks in active theaters. Recent transfers of U.S. cluster munitions to in 2023 underscore ongoing debates, where their deployment against Russian advances has been credited with disrupting advances despite parallel Russian use, illustrating causal trade-offs between immediate operational gains and protracted clearance challenges. Sources critiquing cluster munitions often emanate from NGOs with disarmament agendas, potentially underemphasizing verified combat efficacy data from analyses.

Technical Characteristics

Definition and Mechanism

A cluster munition consists of a non-reusable canister or delivery body containing multiple conventional submunitions, designed to disperse these submunitions over a targeted area to engage personnel and . These weapons are delivered by air-dropped bombs, shells, rockets, or missiles, with the submunitions typically each weighing less than 20 kilograms and functioning independently upon release. Submunitions include anti-personnel types that fragment to injure or kill , anti-armor variants with shaped charges to penetrate vehicles, or combined-effects models addressing both. The operational mechanism begins with to the vicinity of the target, after which a —timed, altitude-based, or impact-initiated—triggers a dispersal charge within the . This charge expels the submunitions, which then scatter ballistically over an area determined by factors such as release altitude, , , and atmospheric conditions, often covering hundreds of square meters. Upon descent, submunitions deploy stabilizing features like parachutes, fins, or vanes to orient for impact, with individual fuzes activating detonation via direct ground contact, proximity to targets, or delayed action to maximize area denial. Engineering designs vary, but common configurations use a cylindrical or spherical container that splits or bursts mid-flight, propelling submunitions outward via gas pressure from a small explosive charge, ensuring even distribution without requiring precision guidance for the parent munition itself. Submunition payloads incorporate high-explosive fillers with fragmentation casings or penetrators, engineered for kinetic and blast effects upon fuze initiation, though inherent duds from manufacturing tolerances or environmental factors can leave unexploded ordnance. This dispersal contrasts with unitary munitions by prioritizing wide-area coverage over pinpoint accuracy, leveraging probabilistic lethality across dispersed targets.

Delivery Systems and Submunitions

Cluster munitions employ diverse delivery systems, including air-dropped bombs, artillery projectiles, rocket artillery, and ballistic missiles, which release submunitions over targeted areas to achieve wide-area effects. Air-delivered variants, such as gravity bombs, are released from fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters and typically open mid-air via radar or barometric fuses to disperse payloads. Ground-launched systems include tube-fired artillery shells, like 155 mm projectiles, and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), which propel cluster warheads to ranges exceeding 30 kilometers before submunition ejection. Ballistic missiles, such as the Russian Iskander-M, can also carry cluster payloads for longer-range delivery, integrating inertial guidance for precision prior to dispersal. Submunitions, often numbering from dozens to hundreds per container, are smaller explosive devices designed for specific effects upon ground or self-activation. Common types include anti-personnel submunitions, which rely on fragmentation or blast to incapacitate over broad swaths; anti-vehicle variants employing shaped charges to penetrate armor; and dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) combining both mechanisms in a single bomblet. For instance, DPICM submunitions in 155 mm shells feature bodies that fragment for antipersonnel lethality while incorporating liners for armor-piercing jets. Most submunitions are unguided and free-falling, stabilized by fins, streamers, or to ensure even distribution across footprints spanning hundreds of meters; fuzes trigger , though failure rates can leave duds functioning as de facto mines. Advanced submunitions incorporate sensors or delayed fuzing for enhanced target discrimination, such as seekers in top-attack munitions that detect roofs before striking, though such "" types remain limited in compared to basic free-fall models. Delivery method influences submunition design; air-dropped bomblets prioritize aerodynamic stability for dispersal from high altitudes, while payloads endure higher g-forces, necessitating robust casings. Empirical assessments indicate that submunition density and failure rates—often 5-40% depending on type and conditions—directly affect operational reliability and post-strike hazards.

Reliability Factors and Modern Improvements

The reliability of cluster munitions primarily refers to the proportion of submunitions that fail to detonate upon impact, resulting in (UXO) that poses long-term hazards. Dud rates are influenced by multiple factors, including the type of ( versus ), submunition age, delivery altitude and speed, impact angle and surface (e.g., soft versus hard ), and environmental conditions such as and . fuzes generally exhibit higher initial detonation rates than ones due to reduced to deformation on impact, though they can be susceptible to electronic failures. Historical field observations indicate dud rates far exceeding manufacturer specifications, often ranging from 10% to 40% depending on the munition and conditions, compared to claimed rates of 1-5%. For instance, U.S. CBU-87 bomblets have been reported by the Department of Defense to have 4-6% failure rates in testing, while assessments in post- zones suggest higher figures due to incomplete arming sequences or environmental interference. In the 2006 , certain Israeli cluster submunitions exhibited failure rates exceeding 40%, attributed to suboptimal release parameters and variability. These discrepancies arise partly from controlled test environments versus real-world dispersal, where submunitions may tumble or bury partially, preventing activation; clearance organizations consistently report elevated rates, though military sources emphasize that aggregate effectiveness remains high despite individual failures. Modern improvements have focused on mitigating dud risks through enhanced fuze designs and mechanisms, particularly since the . Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) like the M85 incorporate self-destruct timers as a to impact fuzes, intended to detonate uninitiated submunitions after 3-120 seconds via electronic circuitry, theoretically reducing hazardous s to below 1%; however, independent tests by organizations such as Norwegian People's Aid have documented self-destruct failure rates up to 10% in simulated conditions, yielding armed but inert remnants. The U.S. Department of Defense revised its policy in November 2017 to require new cluster munitions to achieve less than 1% failure rates in testing or include self-neutralization within , leading to adoption of sensor-fuzed submunitions like those in the BLU-108/B, which use seekers to detect and strike targets post-dispersal, minimizing ground-lingering UXO. These advancements, including electronic time fuzes with deactivation sequences, have demonstrably lowered reported dud rates in controlled evaluations to under 2% for select systems, though operational data remains limited and contested by field reports emphasizing persistent variability.

Development History

Early Innovations and World War II

Early development of cluster munitions occurred in the , with German engineers pioneering designs for dispersing submunitions to cover wide areas against dispersed targets. In 1932, munitions experts began adapting fragmentation bombs into cluster configurations by repackaging them into dispensers for aerial delivery, aiming to enhance coverage against troop concentrations and airfields. Prior to full-scale , Soviet forces employed rudimentary cluster incendiary devices during the against in 1939–1940, consisting of cylindrical containers that released dozens of phosphorus-filled bomblets over urban areas, earning the derisive Finnish nickname "Molotov bread baskets" in response to Soviet claims of drops. The SD-2, or Sprengbombe Dickwandig 2 kg, emerged as the first significant operational cluster submunition, a 2-kilogram anti-personnel bomblet with a serrated cast-iron body designed to fragment upon detonation, encased in a thin magnesium alloy "butterfly" wing for stabilization and dispersal. These were released from AB-series containers carried by , scattering up to 28 bomblets over a football-field-sized area to target personnel and light vehicles with delayed or impact fuzes that often left duds posing long-term hazards. The SD-2 saw initial deployment in May 1943 against the , causing civilian and military casualties through fragmentation and anti-handling mechanisms that detonated upon disturbance. scaled to millions of units, though logistical constraints limited widespread Eastern Front impact despite intended use against Soviet . Soviet innovations paralleled German efforts with the PTAB-2.5 kg anti-tank bomblet, a shaped-charge submunition weighing 2.5 kilograms, dispersed from aircraft-mounted clusters to penetrate armored vehicles by concentrating explosive force on a small area. Introduced in , these were air-dropped against panzer formations, with each carrier bomb releasing multiple bomblets to saturate columns, demonstrating early adaptation for anti-materiel roles amid the Red Army's push to counter mechanized warfare. Allied forces, including the and , incorporated cluster-like fragmentation dispensers later in the war, notably in Pacific theater bombings of cities such as and , where submunitions enhanced area denial against entrenched positions and industrial sites. These WWII applications highlighted cluster munitions' tactical value in overwhelming dispersed or mobile targets, though high dud rates—often exceeding 10% for early designs—foreshadowed persistent issues.

Cold War Advancements

During the era, cluster munitions underwent significant advancements driven by the strategic imperative to counter massed armored formations anticipated in potential conflicts between and forces in . The prioritized development of these weapons to saturate enemy avenues of approach with submunitions capable of defeating tanks and , reflecting doctrines like that emphasized deep strikes against mechanized threats. Key innovations included aerodynamic dispensers that enabled efficient external carriage on fighter-bombers and improved submunition designs, such as shaped-charge warheads for armor penetration combined with fragmentation effects for personnel casualties. These enhancements marked a departure from World War II-era crude clusters, incorporating height-of-burst fuzes to optimize dispersal patterns over target areas spanning hundreds of meters. The Soviet Union paralleled these efforts, producing cluster bomb series like the RBK family (e.g., RBK-250, RBK-500), which dispersed anti-tank and anti-personnel bomblets from aerial platforms to achieve similar area-denial effects against NATO counteroffensives. Soviet designs emphasized integration with rocket artillery systems, foreshadowing later multiple-launch rocket systems, and were tested in proxy conflicts such as the 1979-1989 invasion of Afghanistan, where air-dropped and rocket-delivered variants demonstrated operational reliability against dispersed guerrilla forces. Both superpowers stockpiled vast quantities—hundreds of thousands of US artillery shells alone—optimized for high-volume delivery via artillery, rockets, and aircraft to exploit the numerical superiority in conventional forces expected in mutual deterrence scenarios. By the , advancements culminated in munitions like the , introduced in 1986, which featured BLU-97/B bomblets with copper liners for enhanced anti-armor lethality alongside incendiary and fragmentation capabilities, replacing less versatile Vietnam-era predecessors. These refinements improved reliability through better mechanisms, though failure rates remained a persistent challenge, often exceeding 5% in field conditions. Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), such as those in 155mm shells, further exemplified the era's focus on versatile submunitions that could engage both and personnel over wide footprints. Such developments underscored cluster munitions' role as force multipliers in high-intensity warfare, prioritizing explosive yield and coverage over precision amid the era's emphasis on overwhelming firepower.

Post-Cold War Refinements

Following the end of the in 1991, refinements to cluster munitions emphasized enhanced reliability, reduced (UXO) hazards, and improved target discrimination through sensor-fuzed submunitions, addressing empirical shortcomings of earlier designs that exhibited dud rates of 5-30% in conflicts like . These advancements incorporated mechanisms, multi-mode sensors ( and ), and integration with precision guidance systems, enabling submunitions to autonomously detect and engage armored vehicles from above while minimizing persistent battlefield remnants. Such developments were driven by military requirements for effectiveness against mechanized forces, with failure rates targeted below 1% to comply with evolving doctrinal standards, though international humanitarian campaigns influenced design concessions without eliminating the weapons' area-effect utility. A primary innovation was the sensor-fuzed submunition (SFM), which deploys parachute-retarded or spinning warheads equipped with seekers to identify heat signatures or metallic targets, detonating only upon valid engagement or via timed self-destruction. In the United States, the CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon, operational by 1997, evolved into the CBU-105 variant in the early 2000s by incorporating a wind-corrected munitions dispenser (WCMD) for GPS/INS-guided accuracy from altitudes up to 20,000 feet. The CBU-105 dispenses 10 "skeets"—cylindrical submunitions with infrared and dual-mode radar sensors—that hover and strike top armor, achieving over 99% reliability and demonstrated efficacy in neutralizing up to 40 vehicles per salvo in simulations. U.S. policy retained SFWs post-2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions due to their low UXO footprint, contrasting with broader stockpiles facing phase-out mandates. European refinements paralleled this trajectory, with the 155mm round, jointly developed by Sweden's (now ) and France's Nexter from the mid-1990s and qualified around 2000, deploying two SFMs with and sensors for top-attack on armor over a 30x150 meter footprint. The II, initiated in 2001, upgraded to laser (LADAR) and electronics for GPS-denied environments, enabling operations from standard howitzers with near-total submunition functionality. Similarly, Germany's , refined from late-1980s prototypes by and Diehl into production by the early 2000s, uses dual-sensor submunitions (active and ) in a 155mm carrier shell, effective against armored advances at ranges up to 40 km and recently employed in for precise area denial. These systems, costing $80,000 per SMArt round, prioritize high-value targets but retain cluster dispersion for saturation, underscoring causal trade-offs between discriminate strikes and legacy area coverage. Non-Western states pursued analogous upgrades, such as Russia's integration of cluster warheads into Iskander-M ballistic missiles by the 2010s, though details on sensor enhancements remain less transparent and focused more on volume than reliability. Overall, post-Cold War iterations shifted from mass-dispersal paradigms toward hybrid precision, empirically boosting lethality against transient armored threats—10-fold over Vietnam-era equivalents—while curtailing but not eliminating UXO risks through rather than outright .

Military Applications

Tactical and Strategic Advantages

Cluster munitions provide tactical advantages through their ability to disperse numerous submunitions over a wide area, enabling effective engagement of dispersed or moving targets such as formations, armored columns, or positions that unitary munitions cannot cover efficiently. This area saturation increases the probability of hits against elusive or concealed threats, delivering that disrupts enemy maneuvers and prevents counteractions during assaults or retreats. Historical data from the indicates cluster munitions were eight times more effective at producing casualties than standard high-explosive bombs when targeting personnel in open terrain. On the battlefield, these weapons serve as an economy-of-force option, requiring fewer delivery platforms—such as sorties or tubes—to achieve equivalent or superior effects compared to precision-guided unitary against massed or area targets. Their versatility allows simultaneous anti-personnel and anti-materiel effects from a single munition, complicating enemy and reducing the volume of needed for sustained operations. Tactically, they excel in scenarios involving rapid area denial, where submunitions can impede enemy advances across fronts like narrow corridors or staging areas, buying time for friendly forces to reposition. Strategically, cluster munitions enhance by enabling commanders to neutralize broad threat concentrations with minimal resource expenditure, preserving high-value assets for other missions. In large-scale conflicts, their deployment can degrade enemy mobility and command structures over extended theaters, as seen in analyses of potential high-intensity warfare where dispersed mechanized forces predominate. This capability supports deeper operational goals, such as isolating battlefields or interdicting supply lines, by creating persistent hazards that force adversaries to divert resources for clearance. Overall, their utility stems from causal mechanics of fragmentation and dispersion, which outperform single-point impacts against probabilistic target distributions inherent in modern dispersed warfare.

Effectiveness Against Personnel and Materiel

Cluster munitions achieve effectiveness against personnel through wide-area dispersal of submunitions equipped with fragmentation or warheads, saturating zones to engage dispersed or troops in the open far more efficiently than unitary munitions of equivalent explosive yield. This area coverage exploits the of , where a single delivery can neutralize threats across hundreds of square meters, as submunitions like the BLU-26 or M77 produce overlapping lethal zones via high-velocity fragments penetrating soft and causing traumatic injuries. Empirical assessments from operations indicate cluster munitions generated casualties at a rate eight times higher than standard high-explosive bombs when normalized by explosive weight, underscoring their utility in suppressing troop concentrations and denying terrain to advancing forces. Against materiel, cluster munitions employ specialized submunitions such as shaped-charge bomblets (e.g., in Rockeye or CBU-87 dispensers) designed to defeat armored vehicles, aircraft on tarmacs, or radar installations by penetrating thin-skinned or even tracked targets with focused explosive force. These weapons excel in scenarios involving clustered equipment, such as airfields or convoys, where the probabilistic hit rate from multiple submunitions compensates for inaccuracies in delivery systems like artillery or unguided bombs, achieving higher overall destruction rates than precision strikes against spread-out assets. Military analyses affirm their role in neutralizing large populations of systems, including anti-aircraft batteries and logistics depots, by combining anti-armor penetration with incendiary effects to disable engines, optics, and electronics across an impacted footprint. The dual-capability design of many cluster variants, integrating anti-personnel fragmentation with anti-materiel shaped charges, enhances versatility in engagements, allowing a single munition to degrade both and elements simultaneously and disrupt enemy maneuverability. This efficiency stems from causal mechanics of explosive dispersion: submunitions activate post-release to maximize terminal effects, outperforming single-point detonations in probabilistic terms against non-point targets. from major militaries, including U.S. assessments, positions cluster munitions as indispensable for rapid area where alternative lacks comparable .

Comparative Analysis with Alternative Munitions

Cluster munitions differ from unitary high-explosive (HE) munitions primarily in their area-effect capability, dispersing multiple submunitions to engage dispersed or mobile targets over a wider , whereas unitary munitions deliver a single explosive payload concentrated at a point. Empirical assessments indicate that cluster munitions can achieve 2 to 5 times the effectiveness of unitary weapons against soft targets like personnel, based on modeling of blast and fragmentation patterns, though this multiplier varies with target density and . In historical data from the , cluster munitions produced casualties at a rate eight times higher than standard HE bombs per , attributed to broader coverage against troop concentrations in open areas. Unitary munitions, by contrast, excel against hardened or fixed structures but require multiple strikes—often 10 or more—to match the suppressive effect of a single cluster delivery against maneuvering forces, increasing logistical demands and exposure risks for delivery platforms. Compared to precision-guided munitions (PGMs), cluster munitions offer cost advantages for non-point targets, with unit prices typically under $1,000 versus $20,000–$100,000 for PGMs like JDAMs or guided rounds, enabling sustained fire against massed or vehicle convoys without depleting precision stockpiles. PGMs provide superior accuracy ( often under 5 meters) for minimizing unintended damage in or collateral-sensitive environments, but their point-focused effects limit utility against area threats, necessitating volleys that can exceed the coverage of one cluster munition equivalent to dozens of unguided projectiles. In scenarios like or anti-armor against dispersed formations, clusters maintain an edge in volume of fire per platform sortie, though modern sensor-fused PGMs (e.g., or rounds) attempt to replicate submunition lethality with self-guiding warheads, achieving comparable target kill rates at higher per-unit costs. Against standard artillery shells like the HE round, cluster variants such as dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) demonstrate 5 to 15 times greater lethality against personnel, dispersing 88 submunitions over 200–300 meters versus the single-fragmentation radius of 30–50 meters for HE, reducing required rounds for area suppression by factors of 10 or more in open terrain. This efficiency stems from probabilistic coverage of hidden or evading targets, where HE barrages demand saturation volumes prone to evasion; however, clusters' higher failure rates (5–30% ) contrast with near-100% detonation reliability of unitary shells, posing persistent hazards absent in alternatives. Overall, while alternatives like improved PGMs or unitary MLRS warheads mitigate some risks through guidance and reliability, clusters retain tactical primacy for resource-constrained forces facing numerically superior, dispersed adversaries, as evidenced by their deployment in conflicts like (2022–2025) to counter advances where precision assets were insufficient.
AspectCluster MunitionsUnitary HE MunitionsPrecision-Guided Munitions (PGMs)
Area CoverageWide (e.g., 200–500m footprint per delivery)Point-focused (30–50m radius)Variable, but typically point (5–10m CEP)
Lethality vs Personnel5–15x HE baseline; effective vs dispersedBaseline; requires volume fireHigh per hit, but fewer for area targets
Cost per Equivalent EffectLow ($<1,000/unit for area)Moderate; multiples neededHigh ($20k+); efficient for points
Reliability/Duds5–30% failure rateNear 100% detonationHigh, with guidance mitigating misses
Best Use CaseMassed troops, vehicles in openStructures, point targetsHigh-value, collateral-sensitive strikes

Historical Uses

Vietnam War and Southeast Asia

United States Air Force operations during the (1965–1973) marked one of the earliest and most extensive uses of cluster munitions in modern conflict, primarily to disrupt North Vietnamese logistics along the and target dispersed enemy forces in , , and . These weapons were dispensed from aircraft such as the F-105 Thunderchief and A-1 Skyraider, releasing submunitions over wide areas to deny terrain, destroy vehicles, and inflict casualties on troop concentrations. Key types included the CBU-2/A, which deployed 360 BLU-3 "" bomblets per unit—each containing 250 steel fragmentation pellets designed for anti-personnel effects—and the , releasing up to 665 BLU-24/B bomblets optimized for area saturation against unarmored targets like trucks and . Deployed in operations such as and Steel Tiger in , cluster munitions complemented high-explosive bombs in over 580,000 sorties, contributing to the 2.1 million tons of ordnance dropped on alone between 1964 and 1973. In , approximately 80,000 cluster munitions containing 26 million submunitions were used, mainly in eastern provinces bordering to interdict supply routes. Overall, U.S. forces expended around 800,000 cluster bombs across , prioritizing their scatter pattern to counter the enemy's use of cover and mobility. Military assessments noted cluster munitions' tactical value in suppressing anti-aircraft sites, such as SA-2 missile batteries, and halting convoys, with bomblets' fragmentation proving lethal against exposed personnel despite challenges from terrain and weather. However, failure rates of 20–30% left millions of unexploded submunitions, complicating clearance and contributing to ongoing hazards; in , these remnants have caused over 20,000 casualties since 1973. Use in targeted infrastructure, while in , they supported , though less prolifically than in neighboring countries due to denser population and terrain differences.

Middle East Conflicts (1970s-2000s)

employed air-dropped cluster munitions against non-state armed group training camps near during the 1973 . In the 1978 Operation Litani incursion into , i forces utilized cluster bombs supplied by the , prompting subsequent restrictions on their use near civilian areas. During the , extensively deployed U.S.-origin cluster munitions, including against Palestinian Liberation Organization positions and advancing forces, such as an strike using cluster ammunition on Battalion 931 in open armored personnel carriers. This usage, often in populated regions, led to and a U.S. decision in July 1982 to suspend further shipments of cluster bombs to . In the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, both belligerents employed cluster munitions, resulting in widespread contamination, particularly in Iran's where they were used extensively. Iraqi forces, equipped with Soviet-supplied systems, and Iranian air operations incorporating cluster bombs contributed to lingering hazards along border areas. The 1991 Gulf War saw coalition forces, led by the with support from and the , deploy approximately 61,000 cluster bombs containing around 20 million submunitions against Iraqi military targets in and during the aerial campaign. These included Vietnam-era munitions like the BLU-97/B bomblets, which were used in large numbers but left significant dud rates, exacerbating post-conflict clearance challenges. In Israel's 1996 against in , artillery barrages incorporated dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) shells, a type of cluster munition that disperses submunitions for anti-personnel and anti-armor effects, as evidenced in incidents like the shelling.

Soviet-Afghan War and Caucasus Wars

During the Soviet-Afghan War from December 1979 to February 1989, Soviet forces employed air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions against fighters, supply lines, and populated areas to deny terrain and disrupt guerrilla operations. These weapons, including scatterable PFM-1 "butterfly" mines dispersed from aircraft, helicopters, and mortars, were used extensively across rural and mountainous regions, contributing to high dud rates that left persistent hazards. As of 2019, such remnants continued to cause civilian casualties, with at least one documented child fatality from a Soviet-era cluster bomblet in eastern Afghanistan's hills. In the (1994–1996), Russian forces utilized cluster munitions in assaults on Chechen separatist positions, notably during the 1995 Shali cluster bomb attack and strikes on villages like Samashki, where such weapons killed at least 55 civilians on January 3, 1995, amid efforts to dislodge fighters embedded in civilian areas. These deployments targeted urban and rural strongholds but resulted in significant due to the munitions' wide dispersal patterns and failure to fully explode on impact. The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) saw intensified Russian use of cluster bombs, including Su-24 airstrikes on the village of Elistanzhi in October 1999, which dispersed submunitions and killed approximately 35 civilians while aiming to sever Chechen supply routes. In , the Chechen capital, Russian forces incorporated cluster munitions into bombardment campaigns that leveled much of the city, employing them alongside artillery and missiles to achieve area denial against fortified insurgent positions, though high rates exacerbated post-conflict hazards for reconstruction and civilian movement.

Gulf Wars and Iraq Conflicts

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, coalition forces led by the , along with the and , deployed cluster munitions on a large scale against Iraqi military targets in and . An estimated 61,000 cluster bombs were used, releasing approximately 20 million submunitions primarily for anti-armor effects and area suppression against Iraqi armored divisions, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. These munitions, including air-dropped CBU-87 and similar variants, were effective in rapidly degrading Iraq's units and command infrastructure during the air campaign from January to February 1991, contributing to the coalition's air superiority and ground advance. However, submunition failure rates of 2-5% resulted in widespread , causing at least 80 U.S. and allied casualties from duds during operations. Post-conflict remnants from these strikes contaminated vast areas, leading to long-term hazards. Estimates indicate 5,500 to 8,000 from cluster munition remnants in since 1991, predominantly civilians affected during reconstruction and civilian activities in former battle zones. Iraqi forces did not deploy cluster munitions against troops in significant numbers during this , with remnants primarily attributable to coalition use. Cleanup efforts by U.S. and teams focused on high-threat areas, but incomplete clearance left persistent risks, as submunitions' design for scatter and delayed detonation prioritized military utility over post-strike predictability. In the , U.S. and British forces again employed cluster munitions, firing nearly 13,000 units containing 1.8 to 2 million submunitions via aircraft, , and multiple-launch rocket systems like the M26 . Deployments targeted Iraqi air defenses, armored vehicles, and paramilitary concentrations, including in settings near during the April advance, where they suppressed resistance and disrupted command nodes effectively against dispersed irregular forces. Ground-launched variants, such as those from MLRS systems, were noted in strikes on positions, demonstrating utility in asymmetric engagements where precise targeting of fleeting targets was challenging. Yet, high failure rates—exacerbated by dispersal—created immediate post-strike dangers, with unexploded submunitions contributing to civilian injuries in contaminated zones amid the ensuing . No verified instances exist of Iraqi government forces using cluster munitions offensively against coalition troops in 2003, though post-invasion militias occasionally encountered or repurposed remnants. The U.S. ceased large-scale cluster use after the initial invasion phase, shifting to precision-guided alternatives, but legacy contamination from both 1991 and 2003 strikes persisted, complicating stabilization efforts and yielding ongoing clearance challenges reported by Iraqi authorities into the . Military assessments highlighted cluster munitions' role in minimizing coalition casualties through area coverage, though dud-induced friendly losses underscored reliability limitations inherent to the technology's mass-dispersion .

Recent Deployments (2010s-2025)

In 2011, during the Libyan Civil War, forces loyal to deployed cluster munitions, including bombs, against rebel-held areas such as , with attacks documented on April 14 targeting residential zones and causing civilian casualties. Later instances in included use by Libyan National Army-affiliated forces in in December 2019, striking residential areas with DPICM cluster munitions. From 2015 to 2017, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition intervening in Yemen's civil war employed cluster munitions, including U.S.-made CBU-105 and Brazilian-made BLG-109, in strikes near civilian areas such as and Hajjah, resulting in unexploded submunitions that injured children and others. In Syria's ongoing civil war, the Syrian government, supported by , repeatedly used cluster munitions from the 2010s onward, including bombs in attacks on province in September 2018 and November 2022 strikes on displaced persons camps using 9N210/9N235 submunitions, as well as October 2023 attacks on Termanin with PTAB-2.5KO submunitions. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, forces used Israeli-made cluster munitions with M095 DPICM submunitions in populated areas of , while forces employed Smerch rockets carrying 9N235 cluster submunitions against Azerbaijani positions, both contributing to risks despite the weapons' area-saturation effects on targets. In Russia's invasion of beginning February 2022, forces extensively deployed cluster munitions, including Iskander-M missiles with 9N235 submunitions in strikes on and other cities, causing over 1,200 documented civilian casualties by mid-2025; began using U.S.-supplied cluster munitions in summer 2023 and continued through 2024-2025, primarily against advancing troop concentrations in and oblasts, with both sides' employment highlighting the munitions' utility in denying large areas to and armor amid high-intensity .

Impacts and Risks

Unexploded Ordnance and Failure Rates

Cluster munitions generate (UXO) when submunitions fail to detonate upon impact, leaving hazardous remnants that function similarly to persistent landmines. These duds retain potential and can be triggered by later disturbance, contributing to long-term in affected areas. Failure occurs due to factors such as suboptimal impact angles, soil conditions, weather, and fuze reliability, which prevent arming or initiation sequences from completing. Empirical failure rates for cluster submunitions vary significantly by , era, and deployment , with manufacturer testing often reporting lower figures than observations. United States Department of Defense assessments from lot acceptance and stockpile reliability testing indicate dud rates of 2% to 6% for many submunitions in pre-2004 stockpiles. In contrast, demining organizations and conflict aftermath surveys frequently document higher rates, ranging from 10% to 40%, as submunitions age or encounter variable terrains. For instance, in from Vietnam War-era bombings, estimates suggest 10% to 30% failure rates among millions of dropped bomblets, resulting in 9 million to 27 million UXO remnants. Older cluster munitions, particularly Soviet and early Western models lacking mechanisms, exhibit elevated dud rates due to fuzes sensitive to environmental variables. In the 2006 Lebanon conflict, assessments of Israeli M85 submunitions reported field failure rates up to 10%, though manufacturer claims hovered around 2-5%; clearance teams observed higher incidences, attributing discrepancies to real-world dispersal dynamics. Russian systems used in recent Ukraine operations have been associated with 30-40% failure estimates by observers, exacerbating UXO density in populated zones. US policy since 2001 mandates submunitions produced after November 2004 achieve failure rates below 1%, with a goal to phase out older stocks by 2018, yet transfers of legacy systems persist, raising reliability concerns. These UXO pose causal risks through delayed detonation, with failure rates compounding over large-area strikes: a single cluster dispersing 100 submunitions at 10% failure leaves 10 duds per unit, scaling massively in saturation campaigns. While technological improvements like multi-mode fuzes reduce rates in controlled tests, empirical data from , , and indicate persistent challenges in achieving sub-1% reliability under combat conditions, underscoring inherent design trade-offs between wide-area coverage and precision. Independent analyses question low-end claims, noting that even "improved" munitions yield hazardous remnants when aggregated across thousands of deliveries.

Civilian Casualties: Data and Contextual Factors

Cluster munitions have inflicted substantial civilian casualties, both during attacks and through unexploded submunitions functioning as persistent hazards post-conflict. Data from monitoring organizations indicate that from 2010 to 2023, approximately 23,000 verified casualties occurred globally from cluster munitions, with estimates suggesting the true figure exceeds 56,000 when accounting for underreporting; of these, unexploded remnants caused over 18,000 casualties compared to about 4,600 from direct strikes. In recent years, civilian victims comprised nearly all recorded cases, with children accounting for 42% of remnant-related injuries in 2024. These figures, primarily drawn from advocacy-led monitoring, may emphasize long-term effects to support prohibition efforts, though empirical evidence from demining operations confirms ongoing risks in contaminated areas. In Southeast Asia, U.S. aerial campaigns during the Vietnam War era (1964–1973) dispersed over 270 million cluster submunitions across Laos alone, leaving an estimated 80 million unexploded items that have caused around 50,000 casualties since 1973, including over 20,000 deaths, mostly among civilian farmers and children foraging or working in fields. Similar legacies persist in Cambodia and Vietnam, where unexploded ordnance continues to kill or maim dozens annually, with children particularly vulnerable due to the bomblets' toy-like appearance and widespread scatter in rural, populated regions. These long-term impacts stem from submunition failure rates of 5–30%, turning strike zones into de facto minefields that hinder agriculture and development for decades. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict saw deploy cluster munitions containing up to 4 million submunitions in , resulting in 192 civilian casualties from by early 2008 (20 killed, 172 wounded), with most incidents occurring as civilians returned to clear or inhabit contaminated villages. By mid-2007, explosions of remnants had killed 24 civilians and injured 183, exacerbating displacement and economic disruption in affected areas. Contextual factors included late-war usage against entrenched positions in civilian zones, compounded by high dud rates and inadequate post-strike clearance, leading to indiscriminate post-ceasefire hazards. In Yemen's (2015–present), Saudi-led airstrikes using U.S.-supplied munitions wounded in multiple governorates, with documented cases of submunitions detonating near homes and markets, causing immediate injuries and leaving duds in residential areas. verified at least a dozen casualties from such attacks in 2016, highlighting risks from employment over populated Houthi-held territories where combatants embed among non-combatants. Since Russia's 2022 invasion of , cluster munitions have caused over 1,200 casualties, with strikes affecting urban and rural areas alike; both belligerents employed them, though attribution varies by source, often amid accusations of targeting infrastructure. In 2023–2024, such weapons contributed to hundreds of verified incidents, including in populated regions like and , where dispersed submunitions increased collateral risks compared to unitary explosives. Factors amplifying harm include urban combat environments, where military targets intermix with populations, and remnant duds (up to 40% failure in some types) that endanger reconstruction and movement long-term. Reports from UN-affiliated monitors note a rise in child victims, underscoring causal links between area-effect delivery and post-conflict persistence in contested zones.

Environmental and Long-Term Effects

Cluster munitions leave behind unexploded submunitions that contaminate soil and terrain, rendering large areas unusable for agriculture, habitation, or development for decades. In , where over 270 million submunitions were dropped during the era (1964–1973), approximately 80 million failed to detonate, contaminating about 25% of the country's land and causing ongoing denial of access to farmland and forests. This persistent contamination disrupts ecosystems by limiting vegetation regrowth and animal movement, while inhibiting soil recovery processes essential for . Unexploded cluster bomblets release toxins into the environment through corrosion and leakage, including heavy metals from casings (such as iron, copper, and aluminum) and explosive residues like derivatives that leach into and . Field analyses in explosive-contaminated regions show elevated levels of these pollutants, which accumulate in sediments and bioaccumulate in food chains, affecting and potentially human health via contaminated water sources. Submunition failure rates, reported by clearance experts as high as 30% despite manufacturer claims of 2–5%, exacerbate this by increasing the volume of deteriorating over time. In following the conflict, cluster munitions contaminated roughly 90% of farmland, leading to long-term and reduced crop yields due to restricted access and fear of . Similar patterns in and demonstrate how remnants pollute water tables and harm aquatic ecosystems, with hydrocarbons and metals from submunitions detected in post-conflict samples. These effects compound over generations, as natural of explosives is slow in varied climates, and clearance operations themselves risk further dispersion of contaminants if not precisely managed. Long-term ecological recovery remains hindered by the wide dispersal pattern of submunitions, which scatter over areas up to 30,000 square meters per strike, creating patchy but pervasive hazards that fragment habitats. In , over 50 years post-bombing, contamination continues to elevate risks of and dominance in uncleared zones, while persists from inhibited foraging and nesting. Economic analyses link this to sustained underutilization of , with clearance costs exceeding billions in affected nations, underscoring the causal chain from initial deployment to enduring environmental impairment.

Controversies and Debates

Indiscriminate Weapon Claims vs. Military Necessity

![Cluster bombs blanketing a SA-2 missile site during Vietnam War operations][float-right]
Critics, including organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross, argue that cluster munitions are inherently indiscriminate due to their wide-area dispersal of submunitions, which complicates adherence to the international humanitarian law principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. These groups highlight unexploded ordnance (UXO) rates, estimated at 5-40% depending on the system, that function as persistent anti-personnel hazards post-conflict, contributing to civilian casualties long after strikes. However, such assessments often emphasize humanitarian impacts while downplaying contextual military applications, reflecting advocacy priorities rather than balanced empirical evaluation of alternatives like sustained artillery barrages, which carry similar risks but lack equivalent efficiency against dispersed targets.
In contrast, military analysts contend that cluster munitions fulfill legitimate necessities in scenarios involving concentrated enemy forces, such as assaults, armored columns, or batteries, where single-precision strikes prove insufficient or uneconomical. For instance, during the Russia-Ukraine , U.S.-supplied cluster munitions enabled Ukrainian forces to deliver over large areas, neutralizing Russian troop movements and counter-battery targets with fewer munitions than conventional rounds, thereby conserving scarce resources amid shortages. This utility aligns with proportionality under , where anticipated civilian harm—minimal in active combat zones with evacuated or sparse populations—does not outweigh the concrete military advantage of denying enemy maneuverability. Dud rates for modern Western systems, improved via self-destruct mechanisms and electronic fuzing, fall below 6%, contrasting with older designs or Russian variants exceeding 20%, underscoring that indiscriminateness stems more from misuse or outdated technology than inherent design flaws. Empirical data from conflicts like the 1991 and recent Ukrainian operations demonstrate that targeted cluster strikes against verified military objectives, such as surface-to-air sites or trench lines, achieve high effectiveness without disproportionate civilian effects when delivery precision (e.g., via GPS-guided dispensers) minimizes scatter beyond intended zones. Proponents, including U.S. reviews, assert that banning such weapons would handicap forces facing numerically superior adversaries, as no equivalent single munition matches their cost-effectiveness for area denial—e.g., one round equating to dozens of unitary bombs in coverage. While NGO-driven narratives amplify post-strike UXO risks, often drawing from high-dud legacies in or , they overlook mitigation via improved submunition reliability and the causal reality that enemy positioning in civilian areas, not the weapon itself, drives incidental harm in asymmetric contexts. Thus, claims of blanket indiscriminateness fail under first-principles scrutiny, as the weapon's effects remain controllable and proportionate in lawful employment against valid military aims.

Ethical and Proportionality Arguments

Cluster munitions elicit ethical debates centered on their potential for indiscriminate harm versus their role in achieving decisive outcomes. Critics contend that the weapons' submunitions, which scatter over wide areas, inherently risk excessive civilian casualties and long-term hazards from (UXO), contravening principles of distinction and humanity in (IHL). Proponents counter that ethical assessments must weigh context-specific , arguing that blanket prohibitions overlook scenarios where cluster munitions provide proportionate advantages against massed enemy forces, such as armored columns or troop concentrations, without viable unitary alternatives offering equivalent coverage efficiency. Under IHL, particularly Additional Protocol I to the , proportionality requires that anticipated civilian harm not be excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. For cluster munitions, immediate strike effects can satisfy this if targeted at legitimate military objectives like dispersed or hubs, as their area-saturation capability neutralizes threats more efficiently than multiple precision-guided unitary bombs, which demand greater munitions expenditure and logistical strain. However, the persistent UXO risk—failure rates varying from 2-40% depending on munition age and type—complicates assessments, as post-conflict civilian encounters can render initial proportionality judgments retrospectively disproportionate, especially in populated or agricultural areas. Ethically, opponents, including organizations, frame cluster munitions as morally culpable due to documented impacts, such as in Lebanon's 2006 conflict where UXO from strikes killed or injured over 200 s in the year following cessation of hostilities, arguing this foreseeability demands categorical rejection akin to antipersonnel landmines. This view posits a deontological stance prioritizing over utilitarian wartime gains, influenced by advocacy-driven interpretations that emphasize long-term societal costs over tactical efficacy. In contrast, analysts assert a consequentialist ethic: in high-intensity conflicts like Ukraine's against Russian advances since 2022, cluster munitions' denial of terrain to invading forces—evident in halting mechanized assaults—preserves more lives overall by shortening wars, with modern variants (e.g., U.S. DPICM submunitions under 3% failure rate) mitigating UXO through self-destruct mechanisms, rendering them ethically defensible when alternatives like barrages would cause comparable or greater immediate . The debate underscores causal trade-offs: while UXO imposes asymmetric burdens on weaker parties post-victory, prohibiting cluster munitions cedes advantages to aggressors in peer conflicts, potentially prolonging engagements and escalating total casualties, as seen in analyses of and uses where area effects expedited enemy defeat without disproportionate peacetime legacies relative to scale. Empirical data from U.S. tests indicate that guided unitary replacements cover only 20-50% of equivalents' effective radius against fleeting s, supporting claims of necessity absent technological substitutes matching cost and volume. Thus, ethical hinges not on the weapon's form but on operational restraint, target validation, and failure-rate minimization, challenging absolutist bans that ignore these variables.

Effectiveness of Area-Denial in Asymmetric vs. Symmetric Warfare

In symmetric warfare, characterized by large-scale maneuvers between conventional forces with massed troop concentrations and mechanized units, cluster munitions have demonstrated high effectiveness for area denial by saturating broad zones with submunitions to disrupt advances, logistics, and assembly areas. During the 1991 , U.S. forces employed cluster bomb units (CBUs) such as the CBU-87, dispersing thousands of BLU-97 bomblets over Iraqi armored divisions and airfields, which neutralized soft-skinned vehicles, , and parked across footprints exceeding 1,000 meters by 400 meters per munition. This capability proved decisive in halting Iraqi counteroffensives and enabling coalition breakthroughs, with military assessments indicating clusters were up to 60 times more effective than unitary munitions against dispersed vehicle targets in testing scenarios akin to open-desert engagements. The weapons' design aligns with the causal dynamics of symmetric conflicts, where enemies rely on predictable concentrations vulnerable to probabilistic fragmentation effects over precision strikes alone. In contrast, asymmetric warfare—featuring dispersed, mobile non-state actors or insurgents who avoid massing to evade superior firepower—reduces the relative utility of cluster munitions for sustained area denial, as submunitions primarily affect fixed or transient concentrations that guerrillas can bypass using terrain, night movements, or civilian blending. In the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Soviet RBK-500 clusters targeted mujahideen supply routes and camps but failed to prevent guerrilla resurgence, with insurgents adapting by decentralizing operations and exploiting unexploded ordnance (UXO) failure rates of 5–30% that littered areas without reliably impeding hit-and-run tactics. Similarly, U.S. deployment of over 232 cluster strikes in Afghanistan from October 2001 to March 2002, including MK-118 tail kits on BLU-97s, aimed to deny Taliban positions but correlated with persistent insurgent mobility rather than territorial control, as fighters dispersed into villages and mountains where submunitions' static denial zones proved circumventable. Empirical data from such campaigns show clusters' area coverage becomes a liability when adversaries prioritize evasion over confrontation, amplifying UXO hazards to pursuing conventional forces and locals without proportionally degrading guerrilla logistics. The divergence stems from inherent mismatches: symmetric foes expose predictable densities exploitable by clusters' wide lethal radii (up to 50 meters per bomblet), yielding high kill probabilities against unarmored elements, whereas asymmetric actors' low-density, adaptive maneuvers favor precision-guided alternatives that minimize legacies and risks, which can alienate populations and sustain enemy recruitment. Military analyses, drawing from stockpiling rationales, affirm clusters' niche in peer competitions against massed threats but question their decisiveness in irregular contexts where long-term denial erodes due to 10–40% failure rates and the need for ground clearance operations.

International Regulation

Pre-Convention Efforts and Treaties

International efforts to address the humanitarian impacts of cluster munitions prior to the 2008 centered on the (CCW), established in 1980 to restrict weapons deemed excessively injurious or indiscriminate. Discussions within the CCW framework on explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded cluster submunitions, commenced in 2001 during meetings of states parties and experts, highlighting post-conflict clearance challenges from conflicts such as those in and the . These talks emphasized technical measures like improved reliability rather than outright prohibitions, reflecting divisions among major producers and users who prioritized military utility over comprehensive bans. On 28 November 2003, CCW states parties adopted Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, which entered into force on 29 November 2006 after by 20 states. Protocol V mandates generic preventive measures to minimize ERW risks, post-conflict obligations for clearance, marking, fencing, and monitoring of affected areas under a high contracting party's , assistance, and on . It explicitly includes submunitions as ERW but applies only to remnants after attacks, not to the , stockpiling, , or use of munitions themselves, thereby failing to prevent the initial deployment that generates such remnants. As of 2007, Protocol V had been ratified by 52 states, though adherence varied due to its non-binding preventive aspects and focus on aftermath mitigation rather than causation. From 2005 to 2007, the CCW convened a dedicated Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on cluster munitions, holding multiple sessions to explore restrictions such as dud rate limits below 1% and mechanisms. Proposals ranged from enhanced safety standards to area restrictions, but eluded negotiators; ban advocates, including NGOs, argued these were insufficient to address indiscriminate effects, while states like the advocated for targeted improvements compatible with operational needs. In June 2007, the CCW's Third Review Conference decided to pursue a new protocol on cluster munitions, but persistent disagreements—over scope, definitions, and verification—stalled progress, prompting parallel initiatives outside the CCW. Non-governmental organizations, including and the International Committee of the Red Cross, intensified advocacy in the early 2000s, documenting civilian casualties from legacy contamination in , , and to underscore failure rates often exceeding 10-30% in field conditions. The Cluster Munition Coalition, formed in October 2006, coordinated global campaigns for a categorical ban, citing of disproportionate post-attack harm. Nationally, a handful of states implemented unilateral prohibitions ahead of international consensus; for instance, countries participating in CCW talks began enacting domestic laws restricting production and transfer, though these were limited in scope and enforcement compared to later obligations. These pre-convention measures, while advancing awareness, did not yield binding multilateral restrictions on cluster munitions, leaving their use unregulated in most jurisdictions.

Convention on Cluster Munitions: Provisions and Ratifications

The was adopted on 30 May 2008 in , , following negotiations led by the Cluster Munition Coalition and opened for signature in , , on 3 December 2008. It entered into force on 1 August 2010, after receiving the required 30 instruments of ratification, accession, or succession. The defines cluster munitions as conventional munitions designed to disperse or release submunitions, each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and explicitly excludes certain munitions like directed energy weapons, mines, or those with self-destructing submunitions meeting specific reliability criteria (at least 98% reliability rate in tests). Under 1, states parties undertake never to use, develop, produce, acquire, , retain, or transfer cluster munitions to anyone, nor to encourage, induce, or assist others in any prohibited activities. 3 mandates the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years of the treaty's for that state party, with possible extensions granted by meetings of states parties; states may retain limited quantities solely for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques. 4 requires the clearance of all cluster munition-contaminated areas under a state party's jurisdiction or control within 10 years, subject to extensions, and promotes risk reduction education under 5, including marking, fencing, monitoring, and public awareness campaigns. Victim assistance provisions in 6 obligate states to provide medical care, , and psychological for cluster munition victims, enhanced by international cooperation and assistance outlined in 6 and national implementation measures. Transparency reporting under 7 requires annual submissions on destruction, retention, transfers, and assistance programs, while 21 allows for with non-states parties during joint operations, provided no assistance is given to prohibited activities. As of October 2025, 111 states are parties to the , having ratified or acceded to it, with 12 additional signatories that have not yet ratified. Regional adherence varies: 36 states are parties, 25 in the , 17 in , 29 in and , and 4 in the . Notable recent developments include Lithuania's withdrawal, effective 6 March 2025, citing security concerns amid regional threats, followed by Vanuatu's accession in late 2025, which restored the party count after the drop. Major non-parties include the , , , , , , and several , which together account for significant global production, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions but have not joined due to differing assessments of the weapons' military utility. The 's secretariat, hosted by the in , facilitates implementation, with annual meetings of states parties reviewing compliance and progress on deadlines.

Non-Signatory Policies and Rationales

The has not acceded to the , maintaining that such munitions provide a vital military capability for defeating massed armored formations, troop concentrations, and area targets where precision-guided unitary weapons would be less efficient or more costly. U.S. Department of Defense policy, revised in 2017, prohibits the acquisition, release, or transfer of cluster munitions with a exceeding 1% if alternatives exist, aiming to reduce post-conflict hazards through improved submunition reliability; however, presidential waivers under the 1992 Conventional Munitions Transfer Policy have enabled transfers of higher-failure-rate systems, including dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to in July 2023 amid shortages. This approach reflects a prioritization of operational effectiveness over obligations, with officials arguing that forgoing cluster munitions would unilaterally disarm U.S. and allied forces against adversaries like and that retain them. Russia, a non-signatory and active producer, regards cluster munitions as legitimate conventional arms integral to modern and systems, incompatible with restrictions due to their proven utility in suppressing enemy advances and . Russian forces have deployed cluster munitions extensively since the February 2022 invasion of , including Smerch and Uragan variants, to counter counteroffensives and deny terrain, with rejecting ban advocacy as it would constrain responses to numerically superior or dispersed threats. China, India, Pakistan, and Israel similarly abstain from the Convention, continuing production and stockpiling while emphasizing cluster munitions' role in asymmetric deterrence and high-intensity conflicts against potential peer adversaries. acknowledges humanitarian risks but prioritizes ongoing development of advanced variants for area saturation, viewing bans as impractical given regional tensions; and , as nuclear-armed neighbors with contested borders, retain them for rapid area denial against armored incursions; employs precision-guided cluster systems defensively, arguing their necessity for survival against mass assaults as demonstrated in conflicts with in 2006. These policies underscore a among non-signatories that cluster munitions' cost-effectiveness and coverage advantages—delivering hundreds of submunitions over wide areas—outweigh dud-related drawbacks when mitigated by self-destruct mechanisms or targeted employment, avoiding self-imposed limitations that could cede tactical edges.

Producers and Users

State Producers and Export Controls

As of 2025, 17 states produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so, none of which are parties to the ; these include , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , and the . Among these, the maintains one of the largest production capacities, manufacturing systems such as the CBU-105 sensor-fuzed weapon, while produces rocket and bomb-dispensed variants like the Smerch and Tornado-G systems, and develops and air-delivered types including Type 83 rockets. New production was documented in 2024 in , , , , and . Export controls on cluster munitions differ sharply by state party status to the , which entered into force on 1 August 2010 and prohibits transfers under Article 1(c). Of the 112 states parties as of September 2025, all enforce domestic bans on exports, with compliance verified through Article 7 transparency reports; for instance, former exporters like the destroyed stockpiles and ceased transfers upon ratification in 2010. Non-signatories among producers generally lack treaty-based prohibitions, though some impose unilateral restrictions. The , via a 2008 Department of Defense policy, committed to ceasing production and transfer of cluster munitions with submunition failure rates exceeding 1% after fiscal year 2018, prioritizing "technologically improved" variants; however, this policy was effectively waived in July 2023 when the U.S. transferred dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) with higher failure rates to under exceptions, bypassing standard export rules. Russia exercises no formal export controls aligned with international norms and has historically transferred cluster munitions to at least 20 countries, including , , , , , and , with systems like the RBK series and KMG-U documented in recipient inventories. China's export practices remain opaque due to state secrecy, but evidence of Chinese-origin submunitions—such as PTAB-2.5KO and Type 66 antitank bomblets—in unexploded remnants from conflicts in , , and indicates transfers to unspecified recipients, potentially including non-state actors, without publicly disclosed reliability or end-use restrictions. and , both major producers, have exported variants like the M85 and Rockeye to allies, subject only to bilateral agreements rather than multilateral controls. Among other producers, and continue limited manufacturing for domestic use with sporadic exports prior to enhanced EU-aligned scrutiny, while North Korea's production supports transfers to , as evidenced by DPRK-manufactured munitions used in in 2025. These policies reflect producers' prioritization of military utility over humanitarian concerns raised by failure rates averaging 5–40% in older systems.

Stockpiling Nations

The maintains one of the world's largest stockpiles of cluster munitions, with a 2004 Department of Defense report detailing approximately 5.5 million cluster munitions across 17 types, containing nearly 700 million submunitions. As a non-signatory to the , the U.S. has not committed to destruction, retaining them for potential defensive needs despite a 2008 policy limiting future use to munitions with less than 1% failure rates after 2018. Transfers to in 2023 and 2024, including via third countries like , have drawn scrutiny but align with U.S. policy permitting exports to non-parties. Russia, another non-signatory, possesses a substantial arsenal of cluster munitions, including air-dropped bombs, shells, and rockets, which it has employed extensively in since 2022, resulting in documented civilian casualties and area contamination. Exact sizes remain classified, but Russia's reliance on them in ongoing conflicts indicates retained production capacity and reserves, supplemented by imports such as North Korean systems reported in 2025. Official statements emphasize their military utility against massed forces, rejecting international bans as incompatible with national security. China acknowledges stockpiling cluster munitions as part of its military inventory, produced by state firms like North Industries Corporation, though quantities are not publicly disclosed. As a non-party to the convention, has cited ongoing research into "improved" variants to mitigate risks, while exporting to allies; its arsenal supports area-denial strategies in potential high-intensity conflicts. Other non-signatories with confirmed stockpiles include , , , , and , where cluster munitions form integral components of , , and aerial systems for countering armored or threats. , for instance, retains operational stocks despite domestic debates on reliability, while and maintain them amid regional tensions. These nations prioritize tactical advantages in asymmetric or border warfare over humanitarian concerns raised by treaty advocates. Limited transparency hinders precise quantification, but global estimates suggest non-signatories hold the majority of remaining stockpiles worldwide.

Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups have employed cluster munitions on limited occasions, constrained by the weapons' technical requirements for production, storage, and delivery systems such as artillery or rocket launchers. utilized Chinese-made Type-81 122mm cluster rockets during the against , marking the first confirmed global use of this variant. Each rocket dispersed 39 submunitions—either Type-90 or equivalent models—releasing hundreds of 3.5mm steel spheres over an area. launched 113 such rockets, totaling 4,407 submunitions, targeting northern locations including Mghar on July 25, 2006 (where one landed between homes, injuring three ), Safsufa on July 15, Karmiel, Kiryat Motzkin, and . These strikes caused one death and 12 injuries in , with unexploded submunitions persisting as hazards in zones due to the weapon's inaccuracy and dud rates. The () deployed cluster munitions in Syria's province, firing rockets adapted with cluster warheads on July 12 and August 14, 2014, toward Units (YPG) positions. Video evidence and remnant analysis confirmed the use, highlighting ISIS's adaptation of captured or improvised munitions for area saturation in contested urban and rural fronts. Such applications by non-state actors underscore the proliferation risks from state-supplied or battlefield-recovered stockpiles, though operational scale remains below state-level capabilities.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] CLUSTER MUNITIONS - ICRC
    ■ Cluster munitions are weapons. consisting of a container that opens in the air and scatters explosive submunitions or "bomblets" over a wide area. Depending ...
  2. [2]
    Cluster Munitions: What Are They, and Why Is the United States ...
    Jul 10, 2023 · A1: The international Convention on Cluster Munitions defines cluster munition as “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or ...
  3. [3]
    Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress
    Dec 16, 2024 · Cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility, as they provide distinct advantages against a range of threats in the ...
  4. [4]
    Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Land Mines: An Explainer
    Mar 28, 2025 · Cluster munitions would help neutralize the logistics support units, without which the Russian units could not move inland. In the face of such ...
  5. [5]
    Cluster Munitions No More: What This Means for the U.S. Military
    Cluster munitions are “munitions composed of a non-reusable canister or delivery body containing multiple, conventional, explosive sub-munitions” delivered by ...<|separator|>
  6. [6]
    The Convention on Cluster Munitions
    The Convention on Cluster Munitions is an international treaty of more than 100 states. The Convention prohibits all use, production, transfer and stockpiling ...Convention text · States Parties · Lausanne Action Plan · Action Plans
  7. [7]
    [PDF] Myths and Realities about Cluster Munitions - Human Rights Watch
    Military forces that use cluster munitions have not presented concrete evidence of the military effectiveness or decisive role of the weapon. Cluster munitions ...
  8. [8]
    The Suwalki Gap A Proving Ground for Cluster Munitions
    Cluster munitions are composed of a nonreusable canister or delivery body containing multiple conventional submunitions, or “bomblets.”3 They are delivered from ...
  9. [9]
    [PDF] Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress
    Nov 30, 2017 · Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel ...
  10. [10]
    What Makes Cluster Bombs Controversial? - Engineering.com
    Jul 18, 2023 · Cluster munitions may be airdropped from aircraft or drones, be integrated in the warhead of a guided missile or rocket or fired as artillery ...Missing: work explanation
  11. [11]
    Cluster Munition Monitor 2024
    The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but has not used them since 2003 in Iraq with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009.
  12. [12]
    [PDF] A GUIDE TO CLUSTER MUNITIONS
    financial and technical means available to or required by the State. Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of ...
  13. [13]
    [PDF] A Guide to Cluster Munitions - GICHD
    Jun 25, 2009 · Cluster munitions covered by this publication are conventional munitions each of which is designed to disperse or release multiple submunitions ...
  14. [14]
    [PDF] The Reliability of Cluster Munitions
    13 This is because electronic fuses have higher detonation rates than mechanical fuses, and the electronic fuse's self-deactivation, which renders the fuse ...
  15. [15]
    Why is the failure rate of cluster munitions so high? - Reddit
    Oct 16, 2024 · The rate is usually 3% to 5%, although EODs and mine clearance specialists claim higher numbers (10-30%).Cluster Bombs: Why no distinction between fail-safe and fail-deadly ...So what's up with cluster bomb (dud) failure rate being so ... - RedditMore results from www.reddit.com
  16. [16]
    Time to Take Stock - Human Rights Watch
    The Air Force still has CBU-87 cluster bombs containing more than 20 million submunitions; the DoD report cites a failure rate of 4 to 6 percent, while U.N. ...
  17. [17]
    [PDF] M85 – an analysis of reliability - Norwegian People's Aid
    M85 is a prominent example in this regard; while most references claim less than '1% failure rate', other sources talk about a '0.06% hazardous dud rate' for ...
  18. [18]
    Here's What You Need to Know About the US Military's New Cluster ...
    Nov 30, 2017 · It also says that weapons that do not meet this one percent threshold, but have a system to disarm or self-destruct within 15 minutes, will now ...
  19. [19]
    Cluster Bombs and Cluster Munitions: The Escalating Humanitarian ...
    Aug 30, 2024 · To address this issue, some nations are developing “smart” or sensor-fuzed weapons equipped with enhanced reliability and various self-destruct ...
  20. [20]
    America's Dark History of Killing Its Own Troops With Cluster Munitions
    Dec 4, 2019 · ... cluster-munition evolution, a process started by German arms designers before World War II. In 1932, Luftwaffe munitions handlers repackaged ...Missing: innovations | Show results with:innovations
  21. [21]
    Early Cluster Bomb: The Molotov Bread Basket - Vintage Everyday
    Jan 31, 2021 · It was used against the cities of Finland during the Winter War of 1939–1940. ... bombs on Finland, but merely airlifting food to starving Finns.
  22. [22]
    I think its very interesting that the Germans were the first to use ...
    Feb 20, 2024 · The Germans were the first to use cluster bombs units in WWII. Fortunately they did not produce enough of them to really effect the war on the Eastern Front.German use of Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) IN WWII : r/ww2 - RedditAllied bombardments during WW2 - did they ever use bombs ...More results from www.reddit.com
  23. [23]
    Original Soviet Union WWII PTAB-2.5 Aerial Cluster Bomb - INERT
    Totally inert, cannot be converted to an explosive devise, not available for export. This item is completely legal within the USA.Missing: AB | Show results with:AB
  24. [24]
    Russia - Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
    Sep 5, 2013 · The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German Armed Forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[6] Russian ...Missing: AB | Show results with:AB
  25. [25]
    [PDF] Arguments for restricting cluster weapons: Humanitarian protection ...
    Compared to the crude World War II bomb clusters, the new munitions embodied a number of advances. Most of the dispensers were streamlined for external carriage ...Missing: key | Show results with:key
  26. [26]
    List of cluster bombs | Military Wiki - Fandom
    A list of cluster bombs as of 2008. BLG-120 BLG-204 BLG-252 BAP 100 Belouga TAL 1 TAL 2 CB-470 Cluster Bomb Alpha Bomb[1] RBK-250 RBK-500 RBK-750 JP233 ...
  27. [27]
    Cluster Munitions and State Terrorism - Monthly Review
    A significant percentage of cluster munitions fails to explode in the air or upon ground impact, and thus, these bomblets become “unexploded ordnance.
  28. [28]
    [PDF] A Guide to Cluster Munitions - The Web site cannot be found
    The CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition (CEM) cluster bomb was introduced in. 1986 as a replacement for earlier, Vietnam War-era cluster bombs. The CBU-87 CEM.
  29. [29]
    Dual-purpose improved conventional munition - Wikipedia
    The submunitions use both shaped charges for the anti-armor role, and fragmentation for the antipersonnel role, hence the nomenclature "dual-purpose". Some ...
  30. [30]
    The terrible history behind cluster munitions - Popular Science
    Jul 11, 2023 · During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed cluster munitions, alongside the development of precision-guided ...Missing: early innovations
  31. [31]
    The Devastating Impact of Sensor Fuzed Weapons
    The SFW is considered 10 times more effective than Vietnam-era cluster munitions, which had only a small chance of hitting their targets. The SFW, in fact, has ...
  32. [32]
    Why Cluster Munitions Must Be Replaced - War on the Rocks
    Sep 2, 2014 · Advances in precision technology coupled with development of a new sensor-fuzed artillery munition will not only close the gap but arguably ...Missing: refinements reliability
  33. [33]
    [PDF] Munitions Employing Sensor-fuzed Submunitions:
    Oct 1, 2021 · Jenzen-Jones has also provided technical assessments of incendiary weapons, cluster munitions, indirect-fire artillery weapons, and conventional.
  34. [34]
    Can the cluster bomb be rehabilitated? - Army Technology
    Aug 20, 2013 · ... Sensor Fuzed Weapon" (SFW) cluster munition. India bought 512 of the ... The company website says the SFW delivers greater than 99% reliability.<|separator|>
  35. [35]
    CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon : USAF's Ultimate Tank-buster
    Jun 12, 2015 · The feature that separates the CBU-105 from other cluster bombs is its exceptional safety. The skeets are guaranteed to explode after ...
  36. [36]
    US CBU-97/CBU-105 'Sensor Fuzed Weapon' cluster munition
    Aug 5, 2017 · The Textron Systems Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW), best known by its US Air Force designation CBU- 97 or CBU-105 (see below), is an air-delivered cargo munition.
  37. [37]
    Bofors 155mm BONUS Munition - BAE Systems
    When launched from any 155mm artillery system, the BONUS carrier shell separates to deploy two sensor-fuzed munitions that then search for targets ...
  38. [38]
    155mm SMArt 155
    SMArt 155, a Sensor Fuzed Munition (SFM) for 155mm Cannon Artillery, is a fire and forget artillery round that is very effective in GPS denied environments ...
  39. [39]
    Ukraine is successfully using SMArt 155 artillery shells
    Sep 5, 2024 · The SMArt 155 is a German 155 mm shell specially designed to destroy enemy armoured vehicles. It is fired by a conventional howitzer, such as the German PzH ...
  40. [40]
    Why Biden Was Justified to Send Cluster Munitions to Ukraine | RAND
    Aug 14, 2023 · While they are effective against troops and artillery in the open, they also provide suppressive fires, preventing the enemy from employing its ...
  41. [41]
    [PDF] Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress - DTIC
    Mar 9, 2022 · Cluster bombs were first used in World War II, and inclusive of their debut, cluster munitions have been used in at least 21 states by at least ...Missing: innovations | Show results with:innovations
  42. [42]
    [PDF] Humanitarian, military, technical and legal challenges of cluster ...
    The effects of cluster munition use have been a persistent humanitarian problem for decades. History has shown that many models have problems of accuracy ...
  43. [43]
    [PDF] Cluster weapons n military utility and alternatives Ove Dullum
    There has been a general belief that cluster munitions have an advantage over unitary weapons by a factor of 2 to 5. The analyses on which this.
  44. [44]
    Cluster weapons - military utility and alternatives
    Compared with conventional high explosive munition, like the M107 artillery projectile, the effect of cluster munition is up to 50% better against soft targets.
  45. [45]
    [PDF] Munitions System Reliability - Defense Science Board
    Munitions considered in this study are unitary or cluster, guided or unguided. ... Approximately 9,000 bombs or 4 percent of the total were precision- guided.
  46. [46]
    Give Ukraine the “right artillery ammo:" DPICM - Small Wars Journal
    Sep 8, 2022 · DPICM is between 5-15 times more lethal than high explosive (HE) depending on terrain, weather and other variables. That means fewer Russian ...
  47. [47]
    [PDF] Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in Vietnam
    Again, it was the combined effects of lethal defense suppression and non-lethal electronic countermeasures which proved effective in reducing losses of friendly ...
  48. [48]
    BLU-3 anti-personnel ('Pineapple') Bomblet | Imperial War Museums
    This type of cluster bomb It was used extensively in the Vietnam War by the United States Air Force, when it was dropped in a CBU-2A cluster bomb, ...
  49. [49]
    The legacy effect of unexploded bombs on educational attainment in ...
    From 1964 to 1973 during the Vietnam War, the U.S. launched 541,344 bombing missions in Laos and dropped 2.1 million tons of ordnance, more than the amount ...
  50. [50]
    [PDF] An Analysis of Munitions Support to the U.S. Air Forces during the ...
    The Air Force employed a number of types of fragmentation bombs, missiles, cluster bombs, and fire bombs In the Vietnam War. Each individual bomb was made.
  51. [51]
    the 50-year fight to clear US bombs from Laos - The Guardian
    Apr 27, 2023 · Since the last bomb fell on this neutral country 50 years ago, unexploded ordnance has killed 20000 people. And it could take 100 years to ...
  52. [52]
  53. [53]
    III. Timeline of Cluster Munition Use - Human Rights Watch
    US forces make extensive use of cluster munitions in bombing campaigns. The ICRC estimates that in Laos alone, 9 to 27 million unexploded submunitions remain.Missing: II AB
  54. [54]
    Is Israel's Forbidden Cluster Bombs Affair Making Another Round in ...
    Oct 22, 2020 · Israel used cluster bombs in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and in its 1978 invasion of Lebanon up to the Litani River and during the first Lebanon ...
  55. [55]
    Israel's Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006
    Aug 30, 2006 · During the 1978 and 1982 Lebanon conflicts, the United States placed restrictions on the use of its cluster munitions by Israel, ...
  56. [56]
    Israel's Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon - jstor
    Israel's 1982 Invasion Of Lebanon. In early June 1982 Israel once again used cluster bombs and other Ameri- can-made weapons against civilian areas in Lebanon.
  57. [57]
    [PDF] U.S. AWARE OF ISRAELI CLUSTER BOMB WORK - CIA
    It was dated July 16,. 1982, the day President Reagan stopped the shipment of new cluster bombs to Israel because of the controversy surrounding their use in ...
  58. [58]
    1982 Lebanon War - Wikipedia
    An IAF F-4 Phantom attacked the Battalion 931, advancing in open APCs in south-eastern Lebanon with cluster ammunition.Lebanon (film) · PLO withdrawal from Lebanon · 1982 (2019 film) · Yekutiel Adam
  59. [59]
    [PDF] IRAN - Mine Action Review
    Some contamination is believed to remain from the Iran-Iraq war in 1980–88,2 when cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in ...
  60. [60]
  61. [61]
    Cluster Munitions in the Middle East and North Africa - Refworld
    1991. During the Gulf War in 1991, the US, France, and the United Kingdom dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions in Iraq and ...
  62. [62]
    A most painful lesson: The 1996 Shelling of Qana, why it matters today
    Apr 22, 2016 · ... Israel committed genocide at Qana, Lebanon in April of 1996. In military circles, the event is considered the 20th century's most...
  63. [63]
    Decades on, Soviet Bombs Still Killing People in Afghanistan - VOA
    Dec 15, 2019 · The cluster bombs were used extensively by Soviet forces, who dropped them like deadly rain across Afghanistan in the years following their ...
  64. [64]
    Afghanistan - Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
    Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989. A non-state armed ...
  65. [65]
    Did the USSR really drop toys filled with explosives on Afghanistan?
    Sep 9, 2017 · The Soviets used scatterable PFM-1 “butterfly” mines. The mines were deployed from mortars, helicopters and airplanes in large numbers; they ...
  66. [66]
    Timeline: Use of controversial cluster bombs in past conflicts
    Jul 10, 2023 · According to a monitor, the US dropped 413,130 tonnes of cluster munitions over Vietnam between 1965 and 1973. Citing authorities, the Red Cross ...Missing: invention date
  67. [67]
    Russia's atrocities in Ukraine, rehearsed in Chechnya | Conflict News
    Jan 20, 2023 · For many more weeks, Grozny was shelled with artillery, now-internationally banned cluster bombs, and cruise missiles that killed thousands and ...
  68. [68]
    Cluster Munitions and Thermobaric Weapons - PISM
    Russia used these weapons during the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and on a bigger scale during the Second Chechen War (1999-2000). Thermobaric bombs were also ...
  69. [69]
    II. Conduct of the air war - View - ICRC
    In Iraq, the Coalition used cluster bombs largely for their area effect and anti-armor capabilities. A CENTCOM official explained that common targets included ...
  70. [70]
    U.S. Using Cluster Munitions In Iraq | Human Rights Watch
    Apr 1, 2003 · At least eighty U.S. casualties during the 1991 Gulf War were attributed to cluster munition duds. More than 4,000 civilians were killed or ...
  71. [71]
    Iraq - Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
    Apr 11, 2025 · Iraq is massively contaminated by landmines from the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion of the country by a ...
  72. [72]
    United States Clearance of Unexploded Cluster Munitions
    Feb 23, 2007 · IRAQ: Immediately after the Second Gulf War in early 2003, clearance ... cluster munitions and landmines, was extended to all of Iraq.
  73. [73]
    Iraq puts a ban on cluster munitions - ReliefWeb
    May 17, 2013 · During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million ...
  74. [74]
    U.S. Use of Clusters in Baghdad Condemned (Human Rights Watch ...
    Human Rights Watch identified an unexploded cluster submunition in the photograph from either a ground-based Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) ...
  75. [75]
    Cluster Munition Use in Libya - Fact Sheet | Human Rights Watch
    Jun 24, 2011 · This fact sheet describes the use of MAT-120 cluster munitions by Libyan government forces during the current armed conflict in Libya ...
  76. [76]
    Libya: Gaddafi forces 'using cluster bombs in Misrata' - The Guardian
    Apr 15, 2011 · Forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi have fired cluster bombs into residential areas of the besieged city of Misrata, according to witnesses.<|separator|>
  77. [77]
    Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli | Human Rights Watch
    Feb 13, 2020 · Forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA) used cluster munitions in a residential area in Tripoli on December 2, 2019, Human Rights Watch said ...
  78. [78]
    Yemen: Saudis Using US Cluster Munitions | Human Rights Watch
    May 6, 2016 · Saudi Arabia has used US-made cluster munitions near civilian areas in Yemen, leaving behind unexploded submunitions, Human Rights Watch ...
  79. [79]
    Yemen: Saudi Arabia-led coalition uses banned Brazilian cluster ...
    Mar 9, 2017 · Amnesty International has been documenting the use of cluster munitions in Yemen since 2015. The most recent evidence shows that the Saudi ...
  80. [80]
    Syria: Cluster Munitions Used in November 6 Attacks
    Nov 23, 2022 · Attacks by the Syrian-Russian military alliance on November 6, 2022, used banned cluster munitions on four camps for internally displaced people.
  81. [81]
    Northwest Syria: Government Uses Cluster Munitions
    Nov 5, 2023 · Syrian government forces used widely banned cluster munitions in an attack on Termanin, a town in northern Idlib, on October 6, 2023, ...
  82. [82]
    Unlawful attacks using cluster munitions and unguided barrel bombs ...
    Sep 14, 2018 · As Idlib offensive looms, the Syrian government, backed by Russia, intensified unlawful attacks on civilians using internationally banned ...
  83. [83]
    Azerbaijan: Cluster Munitions Used in Nagorno-Karabakh
    Oct 23, 2020 · Azerbaijan has repeatedly used widely banned cluster munitions in residential areas in Nagorno-Karabakh, Human Rights Watch said today.
  84. [84]
    Armenia/Azerbaijan: First confirmed use of cluster munitions by ...
    Oct 29, 2020 · Amnesty International has verified the use of banned cluster bombs by Armenia for the first time in the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
  85. [85]
    World Report 2025: Ukraine - Human Rights Watch
    Repeated Russian cluster munition attacks have killed and injured hundreds of Ukrainian civilians since 2022. An April 29 attack on Odesa killed seven civilians ...Explosive Weapons in... · Landmines and Cluster... · Crimea · Prisoners of War
  86. [86]
    Ukraine records highest toll from cluster munitions for third year ...
    Sep 15, 2025 · According to the latest Cluster Munitions Monitor, more than 1,200 people are known to have been killed or maimed in Ukraine since Russia's full ...
  87. [87]
    Cluster munitions cause more than 1,200 civilian casualties in ...
    Sep 15, 2025 · Cluster munitions cause more than 1,200 civilian casualties in Ukraine war, global monitor says. By Olivia Le Poidevin. September 15, 20259:52 ...
  88. [88]
    Goodbye, Cluster Munitions: Will we Regret it? - RUSI
    Jun 6, 2008 · The recent international agreement achieved in Dublin to ban the use of cluster-munitions (CMs) is a clear victory for those who wish to rid the world of ...<|separator|>
  89. [89]
    The Current U.S. Cluster Munition Stockpile - Human Rights Watch
    The Air Force still has CBU-87 cluster bombs containing more than 20 million submunitions; the DoD report cites a failure rate of 4 to 6 percent, while U.N. ...
  90. [90]
    [PDF] CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION - ICRC
    Unexploded submunitions have also hindered reconstruction efforts,. e.g. by disrupting repairs to power lines. (Landmine Action, 2006). By December 2007, 217 ...
  91. [91]
    Cluster Munitions at a Glance | Arms Control Association
    Cluster munitions, also called cluster bombs or CBUs, are gravity bombs, artillery shells, and rockets that fragment into small bomblets or grenades.Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
  92. [92]
    United States - Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
    Congressional notifications show that the US had concluded agreements from 2008–2015 to sell the CBU-105 to India, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, ...
  93. [93]
    Cluster Munitions: New Use, Transfers Challenge Total Ban
    Sep 5, 2023 · Many submunitions fail to explode on initial impact, leaving duds ... unexploded ordnance (UXO) failure rate of between 6 and 14 percent.
  94. [94]
    The Impact of Cluster Munitions on Civilians and Conflict
    Oct 14, 2024 · Stockpiling CMs became a focal point for Russia in mid-2023 with the supply of cluster munitions to Ukraine from the US, stating they have been ...Missing: documented | Show results with:documented
  95. [95]
    Cluster Munitions Monitor 2025: All Recorded Victims in 2024 Were ...
    Sep 15, 2025 · The 2025 Cluster Munition Monitor reports a deeply troubling rise in civilian harm caused by cluster munitions, with 314 casualties recorded ...
  96. [96]
    The U.S. promised Ukraine cluster bombs. In Laos, they still kill ...
    Jul 11, 2023 · The U.S. dropped over 2 million tons of ordnance on Laos, including cluster bombs, in the 1960s and '70s. To this day, many people are ...
  97. [97]
    Israel's Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006
    Aug 17, 2006 · MACC SL reported, on January 15, 2008, 192 civilian casualties, including 20 killed and 172 wounded. Exploding duds were still injuring ...
  98. [98]
    Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War ...
    Sep 5, 2007 · [8]As of June 20, 2007, the explosion of cluster munition duds since the ceasefire had killed 24 civilians and injured 183. [9] They have ...
  99. [99]
    Yemen: Cluster Munitions Wounding Civilians | Human Rights Watch
    Feb 14, 2016 · The submunitions often fail to explode and pose a threat until cleared and destroyed. Yemen, the US, and Saudi Arabia and its coalition members ...
  100. [100]
    Record civilian cluster munitions victims as experts urge global ban
    Sep 5, 2023 · According to the UN-partnered report, 987 people were killed or wounded directly in cluster munition attacks in 2022. This is compared to the ...Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
  101. [101]
    New report on cluster munitions finds that 99% of victims are civilians
    Aug 30, 2025 · With 26 incidents Yemen suffered the second highest number of casualties from cluster munition attacks last year. As up to 40% of cluster ...
  102. [102]
    Laos: destroying explosives, creating jobs | The HALO Trust
    Laos is the most bombed country in the world, per capita, because of heavy aerial attacks in the 60s and 70s during the Vietnam War.
  103. [103]
    Laos | MAG
    Despite the war ending more than 30 years ago, cluster bomb contamination continues to kill, injure and hinder development in Laos.
  104. [104]
    Analysing soil in order to detect pollution from ageing explosives in…
    “This is due to the oxidation of metals from the shells of explosives, changes in soil substances, and pollution of heavy metals such as iron, copper, aluminum ...
  105. [105]
    Assessing pollution from explosive weapons in southern Ukraine
    Jan 16, 2025 · Soil and water samples collected during the study revealed a range of pollutants, including heavy metals and hydrocarbons. While some ...
  106. [106]
    Hot New Bombshells: Cluster Munitions' Humanitarian Legacy and ...
    Aug 22, 2025 · The unexploded ordnance (UXO) then becomes a landmine that could detonate years down the line if stumbled upon by an unsuspecting civilian— more ...<|separator|>
  107. [107]
    Cluster bombs cause decades of harm, says study - The Guardian
    May 16, 2007 · In southern Lebanon cluster munitions contaminate approximately 90% of the land used for farming. The contamination of essential land is ...<|separator|>
  108. [108]
    Environmental and Human Impacts of Cluster Bomb Use by the ...
    During the Vietnam War, the United States Air Force used cluster munitions in air strikes against targets in Cambodia and Laos. The United States later removed ...
  109. [109]
    Remnants of War: A Deadly Legacy and Looming Timed Death for ...
    Lastly, explosive remnants of war can harm the environment, pollute the soil and water sources with hazardous materials, and cause droughts due to the ...
  110. [110]
    US bombs continue to kill in Laos 50 years after Vietnam War
    Nov 21, 2018 · Now, some 80 million unexploded bombs and air-dropped cluster munitions left over continue to maim and kill Laotian men, women and children.
  111. [111]
    Mine Action Fellows Address the 13MSP of the Convention on ...
    Sep 19, 2025 · Unexploded ordnance leaks toxins into soil and water, damages ecosystems, and denies safe access to agricultural land for decades. Climate ...
  112. [112]
    [PDF] The Humanitarian Impact of Cluster Munitions
    These munitions can be air-delivered or surface-launched, and can be used against armour, materiel and personnel. However, for various reasons submunitions ...
  113. [113]
    Cluster Munitions and International Humanitarian Law
    ” Even if a cluster munition strike is not indiscriminate, its effects may be. The effects become more dangerous if the submunitions litter an area ...
  114. [114]
    Military needs can never justify using inhumane or indiscriminate ...
    Oct 18, 2019 · ... military necessity and humanitarian imperatives. The recognition ... Cluster Munitions in 2020, presided respectively by Norway and ...
  115. [115]
    Strengthening IHL - Human Rights Watch
    For example, there is lively debate on whether civilian harm outweighs military necessity, or vice versa, with respect to cluster munitions. Professor Thomas ...
  116. [116]
    Giving Ukraine Cluster Munitions is Necessary, Legal and Morally ...
    Jul 10, 2023 · Cluster munitions would be valuable in breaking through Russian trenches, while the threat to civilians is negligible amid Russia's mass ...<|separator|>
  117. [117]
    Cluster Munitions Have Changed the Course of the Ukraine War
    Dec 29, 2023 · Cluster munitions are much more effective as counter-battery fire. When a cluster round explodes precisely over the target and drops 88 ...
  118. [118]
    Cluster Munitions and Operational Considerations - Lawfare
    Jul 20, 2023 · Military necessity, humanity, and the complicated realities of ... or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;. (c) ...<|separator|>
  119. [119]
    U.S. to Arm Ukraine With Highly Controversial Cluster Bombs | TIME
    Jul 6, 2023 · The last publicly available estimates—more than 20 years ago—of dud rates for the weapons have them at 6%.Missing: old | Show results with:old
  120. [120]
    Why some countries are once again embracing cluster bombs
    Apr 24, 2025 · The second is that the dud rates of modern cluster bombs—the number of bomblets that remain unexploded—are thought to have fallen dramatically.
  121. [121]
    Cluster Munitions and Rearming for Great Power Competition
    May 9, 2018 · ... or transfer cluster munitions” and drove a clarifying U.S. policy. ... military necessity, prohibiting unnecessary suffering, taking ...
  122. [122]
    Cluster bombs: Ukraine using munitions 'effectively', says US - BBC
    Jul 20, 2023 · The weapons are effective when used against troops in trenches and fortified positions, as they render large areas too dangerous to move around ...
  123. [123]
    Convention on Cluster Munitions - Main Page
    “Cluster munitions” refers to any of a number of weapons systems which, as the name suggests, deliver clusters of smaller explosive submunitions onto a target.
  124. [124]
    [PDF] An Incomplete Solution to the Cluster Munition Problem
    92 As a result of high dud rates, thousands of unexploded bomblets disperse on battlefields. 93. Unexploded submunitions are even more harmful than other.
  125. [125]
    Cluster bombs too effective for military to do without: expert
    Apr 3, 2003 · However, often some bomblets do not explode on impact -- the usual failure rate is at least 10 percent, experts say -- and the half-buried ...
  126. [126]
    iv. cluster bomb use in afghanistan - Fatally Flawed:
    The U.S. military considered cluster bombs a valuable part of their Afghan arsenal. In 232 strikes during the first six months of the war, the United States ...
  127. [127]
    [PDF] CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
    Over the past several years, the Group of Governmental Experts has addressed cluster munitions as part of the ongoing discussions on explosive remnants of war.
  128. [128]
    IHL Treaties - CCW Protocol (V) on Explosive Remnants of War, 2003
    ... weapons and restrictions on the use of cluster munitions. After holding ... Date of adoption:28.11.2003. Depositary:United Nations. Number of articles:11.
  129. [129]
    Statement on the Outcome of the CCW Group of Government ...
    Jun 22, 2007 · We are prepared to join a decision by CCW States Parties when they meet in November to initiate a negotiation on cluster munitions. In this way, ...Missing: 2000s | Show results with:2000s
  130. [130]
    [PDF] Cluster Munitions - Harvard Law School Journals
    The Convention on Cluster Munitions advances stronger standards for the key IHL principles of discrimination and proportionality by elucidating the ways in ...
  131. [131]
    Convention on Cluster Munitions. Dublin, 30 May 2008 - UNTC
    STATUS AS AT : 23-10-2025 09:16:05 EDT. CHAPTER XXVI. DISARMAMENT. 6. Convention on Cluster Munitions. Dublin, 30 May 2008. Entry into force. : 1 August 2010, ...
  132. [132]
    Convention text - The Convention on Cluster Munitions
    The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention ...
  133. [133]
    [PDF] Convention on cluster munitions - ICRC
    The Convention on Cluster Munitions is an important treaty of international humanitarian law. It prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of ...
  134. [134]
    [PDF] Convention on Cluster Munitions: - Human Rights Watch
    It prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions, as well as assistance with any of these activities. The convention also.
  135. [135]
    States Parties - The Convention on Cluster Munitions
    To date, a total of 123 States have committed to the goals of the Convention – 111 States Parties and 12 Signatories.
  136. [136]
    Convention on Cluster Munitions
    The Convention provides a comprehensive international response to the suffering caused by the use of cluster munitions and their remnants, to prevent the ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  137. [137]
    Russia: Cluster Munition Ban Policy
    Summary: Non-signatory Russia says that it cannot join the Convention on Cluster Munitions as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons, despite the ...
  138. [138]
    Russia Denies Its Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions
    Sep 6, 2023 · Cluster munitions have been prohibited by 124 countries, but not Russia, Ukraine, or the United States, under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
  139. [139]
    China - Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
    Jul 3, 2025 · Summary: Non-signatory China acknowledges the humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions but has not taken any steps to join the ...
  140. [140]
    The United States Should Not Join the Convention on Cluster ...
    The Convention on Cluster Munitions is a misbegotten treaty that neither advances the laws of war nor enhances security.Missing: ethical | Show results with:ethical
  141. [141]
  142. [142]
    [PDF] cluster munition monitor 2025
    Sep 16, 2025 · Of these, new use of cluster munitions was recorded in 2024 and 2025 in states not party ... Ukraine did use cluster munitions in the conflict ...
  143. [143]
    Production of Cluster Munitions - Human Rights Watch
    Companies in Argentina (CITEFA), Germany (Rheinmetall), Romania (Romtechnica), and Switzerland (Armasuisse) have also assembled or produced these submunitions ...
  144. [144]
    [PDF] Press Briefing Geneva, 15 September 2025
    Sep 15, 2025 · New cluster munition production was recorded in Iran,. Myanmar, North Korea, and South Korea. • Cluster munitions produced by North Korea were ...
  145. [145]
    Cluster Munition Monitor 2025: Continued Progress Amidst New ...
    Sep 15, 2025 · Geneva, 15 September 2025 – The 2008 convention banning cluster munitions has led to significant humanitarian progress.
  146. [146]
    US Cluster Munition Transfers Raise Humanitarian Concerns
    Apr 4, 2024 · President Joe Biden has sidestepped US arms export rules in place since 2008 that until now prevented the US from exporting cluster munitions ...
  147. [147]
    Global Trade in Cluster Munitions - Human Rights Watch
    Examples of Known Exports of Cluster Munitions ; Russia. (including. ex-USSR). RBK Bomb. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Iraq, North ...
  148. [148]
    [PDF] Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 - ICBLCMC
    Sep 16, 2025 · Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster. Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International ...
  149. [149]
    [PDF] MAJOR FINDINGS - Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
    1 After Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 went to print, Vanuatu acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, bringing the number of States Parties back up to ...
  150. [150]
    US Sending Cluster Munitions to Ukraine via Germany
    Jul 30, 2024 · At least 35 countries party to the convention regard the transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions as prohibited by the convention.
  151. [151]
    Cluster Munition Use in Russia-Ukraine War | Human Rights Watch
    May 29, 2023 · Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian armed forces have used cluster munitions in attacks that have ...
  152. [152]
    North Korea supplying deadly cluster munitions to Russia for rare ...
    Jun 16, 2025 · North Korea has supplied Russia with deadly cluster munitions for weapons like the rare 107mm multiple-launch rocket system and the more widely used 122mm Grad ...<|separator|>
  153. [153]
  154. [154]
    Cluster Munitions: States Should Uphold Ban Treaty
    Sep 15, 2025 · Governments should reinforce the global ban on cluster munitions and call upon those still using or producing these indiscriminate weapons ...
  155. [155]
    Lebanon/Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel with Cluster Munitions During ...
    Oct 18, 2006 · Hezbollah fired cluster munitions into civilian areas in northern Israel during the recent conflict, Human Rights Watch reported today.
  156. [156]
    Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use
    Sep 1, 2014 · The use of cluster munitions by non-state actors such as the Islamic State ... (ISIS), used cluster munitions on July 12 and August 14 ...