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Post-democracy

Post-democracy refers to a stage in the development of advanced liberal democracies where formal democratic structures, including elections and representative bodies, remain operational, but genuine public control over political outcomes has weakened, with decision-making dominated by a nexus of corporate interests, media conglomerates, and insulated political elites who manage electoral spectacles and policy agendas behind closed doors.^[1] The concept, articulated by British sociologist Colin Crouch in his 2004 book Post-Democracy, describes a regression from the mid-20th-century "high point" of mass participation, driven by globalization's empowerment of multinational firms and the professionalization of politics, which prioritizes expert persuasion over broad deliberation.^[2]^[1] Central characteristics encompass tightly scripted public debates limited to elite-approved issues, apathetic voter passivity amid manipulated opinion polling and advertising, and the privatization of influence through business funding of parties and lobbying that bypasses citizen input.^[1] Notable examples include the emergence of firm-like political entities, such as Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia in Italy, built on corporate media assets without traditional membership bases, and the transition of Britain's New Labour to heavy reliance on private donations, elevating corruption risks while diluting grassroots ties.^[1] In the United States, patterns of escalating inequality and corporate sway over regulation exemplify the model's extremes, where policy favors entrenched interests over redistributive reforms.^[1] The framework highlights causal mechanisms like capital mobility constraining national sovereignty and the erosion of countervailing powers, such as unions, yielding observable outcomes in stagnant social mobility and elite capture of bureaucracies.^[2]^[1] Debates persist on its empirical scope, with some analyses favoring dynamic "de-democratization" processes—evidenced by institutional dependencies on finance—over a static post-democratic plateau, arguing the former better captures variances in responsiveness to mass pressures across cases like the UK and US.^[3]^[4] Critics question the concept's underemphasis on state agency amid neoliberal shifts, yet its emphasis on elite insulation aligns with data on policy divergence from median voter preferences in Western contexts.^[5]^[1]

Origins and Conceptual Foundations

Historical Precursors

The concept of post-democracy draws on earlier elite theories that posited inherent limits to mass rule in democratic systems. In 1896, Gaetano Mosca argued in Elementi di Scienza Politica that all societies are divided into a ruling class and a ruled class, with the former maintaining control through superior organization, even under democratic facades; formal equality masks this minority dominance, as the ruling elite manipulates political formulas to legitimize its power.^[6] Similarly, Vilfredo Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites, developed in works like Trattato di Sociologia Generale (1916), described how elites rise and fall but inevitably concentrate power, with democracies serving as arenas for elite competition rather than genuine popular sovereignty; non-circulating elites stagnate, leading to decay, while democratic rhetoric often conceals oligarchic realities.^[7] Building on these foundations, Robert Michels formalized the "iron law of oligarchy" in Political Parties (1911), observing that even avowedly egalitarian organizations, such as socialist parties, devolve into oligarchies due to the necessities of leadership specialization, bureaucratic inertia, and voter apathy; he concluded that "who says organization says oligarchy," as technical expertise and administrative needs empower a few at the expense of broad participation.^[8] This law underscored how democratic structures foster elite entrenchment, prefiguring post-democratic concerns over institutional hollowing. Michels' analysis, drawn from empirical study of European parties, highlighted causal mechanisms like the psychological inertia of masses and the self-perpetuating dynamics of hierarchies, which persist despite ideological commitments to equality.^[9] Joseph Schumpeter extended these insights in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), redefining democracy not as the classical expression of popular will but as an institutional arrangement for elite competition: politicians act as entrepreneurs vying for votes in a market, with citizens reduced to selecting leaders sporadically rather than shaping policy; this procedural view critiqued idealistic notions of sovereignty, arguing that leadership selection by elites better approximates realistic governance amid complex societies.^[10] Schumpeter's framework, influenced by economic realism, anticipated post-democracy by emphasizing how electoral mechanisms legitimize elite rule while sidelining substantive mass input, a dynamic exacerbated in later analyses by corporate influences.^[11] These precursors collectively established that democracies tend toward elite capture through organizational imperatives and competitive selection, providing theoretical groundwork for observing intensified power concentration in contemporary formal democracies.

Colin Crouch's Formulation (2004)

In his 2004 book Post-Democracy, British sociologist Colin Crouch introduced the concept to describe advanced Western societies where formal democratic mechanisms—such as elections, parliaments, and political parties—persist but function as increasingly empty rituals, with substantive decision-making power shifting to a restricted circle of political and economic elites.^[12] Crouch characterized this as a phase following the high point of 20th-century democracy, marked by expanded suffrage, welfare states, and mass mobilization, after which democratic vitality wanes without collapsing into overt authoritarianism.^[13] Crouch defined post-democracy explicitly as "a post-democratic society is one that continues to have and to use all the institutions of democracy, but in which they increasingly become a formal shell," with genuine political energy and innovation migrating to insulated elite networks often intertwined with corporate interests.^[14] He illustrated this trajectory using a parabolic metaphor: democracy ascends to a zenith around the mid-20th century, driven by industrial-era mass politics and state intervention, then descends as electoral competition devolves into managed spectacles dominated by public relations and lobbying, sidelining broader public input.^[13] Central to Crouch's formulation were causal drivers rooted in economic transformations, including the globalization of capital since the 1970s, which empowers transnational corporations to evade national democratic accountability by leveraging mobility and market leverage over governments. He highlighted how the privatization of public services and the professionalization of politics further erode citizen agency, as policy outcomes align more with corporate agendas than voter preferences, exemplified by the influence of business lobbies in shaping deregulation and trade policies during the late 20th century.^[14] Crouch emphasized that this hollowing occurs gradually, without deliberate conspiracy, but through structural incentives favoring elite coordination over mass deliberation, resulting in low voter turnout and apathetic publics by the early 2000s.^[12]

Evolution in Subsequent Works

In his 2020 work Post-Democracy After the Crises, Colin Crouch refined his original thesis by examining how the 2008 global financial crisis, subsequent austerity measures, and the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the shift of power toward unaccountable elites, including through deregulation that favored financial interests and the erosion of public trust in institutions.^[15] He argued that social media platforms, controlled by private conglomerates, amplified elite influence over public debate while fostering illusory participation, and that populist movements—while critiquing post-democratic complacency—often devolved into exclusionary nationalism rather than restoring genuine democracy.^[15] This update emphasized that crises exposed the fragility of formal democratic facades, with bailouts prioritizing corporations over citizens, thereby deepening the concentration of economic and political authority.^[15] Building on these foundations, Sheldon Wolin's Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (2008) elaborated a parallel framework for the United States, positing "managed democracy" as a system where periodic elections mask corporate dominance and fragmented power structures that evade accountability, akin to post-democracy's elite capture but with an emphasis on "inverted totalitarianism"—a soft, consumerist control rather than overt authoritarianism.^[16] Wolin attributed this to the fusion of state and corporate interests post-1970s, including lobbying expenditures exceeding $3 billion annually by 2007 and media consolidation reducing diverse viewpoints, which hollowed out citizen agency in policy formation.^[17] His analysis reinforced post-democratic critiques by highlighting how economic globalization and perpetual war mobilization subordinated electoral politics to oligarchic priorities.^[18] Peter Mair's Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (2013) extended the concept to European party systems, documenting a mutual withdrawal of elites and masses from partisan engagement, with voter turnout in national elections declining to below 60% in many EU states by the early 2010s and party memberships falling to 4-5% of electorates.^[19] Mair described this as creating a "cartel" of insulated parties reliant on state funding—totaling over €1 billion across Europe by 2010—while sidelining ideological competition, mirroring post-democracy's erosion of mass participation but focusing on the representational void filled by technocratic governance and anti-system challengers.^[20] He linked this to broader neoliberal reforms since the 1980s, which prioritized market efficiency over redistributive politics, resulting in diminished policy responsiveness to socioeconomic grievances.^[19] Subsequent scholarship integrated post-democracy into process-oriented models of de-democratization, viewing it not as a static endpoint but as a reversible stage amid financialization and institutional decay, with empirical indicators like rising income inequality (Gini coefficients averaging 0.30-0.35 in OECD countries post-2008) correlating with populist surges in 20% of Western elections between 2010 and 2020.^[21] Critiques, such as those framing trends as "authoritarian neoliberalism" rather than mere post-democracy, highlighted state coercion in enforcing market discipline, as seen in Greece's 2010-2015 austerity programs imposing 25% GDP cuts under EU-IMF oversight, challenging the original formulation's optimism about residual democratic potential.^[5] These evolutions underscore a consensus on elite insulation but diverge on causal primacy, with some emphasizing corporate hegemony over institutional inertia.^[22]

Defining Characteristics

Hollowing of Democratic Institutions

In post-democratic conditions, democratic institutions such as legislatures and electoral processes maintain their formal structures and rituals but are progressively emptied of substantive influence over policy outcomes. Colin Crouch, in his 2004 analysis, describes this as a "façade of strong institutions" masking the transfer of real authority to corporate interests, technocratic agencies, and supranational bodies that operate beyond direct public scrutiny.^[15] ^[23] Similarly, Peter Mair's 2013 examination identifies the "hollowing out" as a withdrawal of both elites and mass publics from participatory politics, leaving parties as cartel-like entities reliant on state funding rather than grassroots mobilization.^[20] ^[19] A primary mechanism involves the delegation of authority from elected bodies to unelected or quasi-autonomous entities, reducing parliamentary oversight. For example, the expansion of independent regulatory agencies and central banks—such as the European Central Bank's enhanced powers post-1999 euro adoption—allows technocratic decision-making on fiscal and monetary policy with minimal legislative input.^[24] ^[25] In national contexts, executives increasingly bypass legislatures through decrees and emergency measures; studies document a global trend since the 1980s where legislative powers have ceded ground to assertive executives, exemplified by the rise in ordinance-making in parliamentary systems like India and executive orders in the U.S.^[26] ^[27] This hollowing erodes the linkage between citizens and governance, as evidenced by plummeting party memberships and voter-party identification in Western Europe, dropping from peaks of 10-15% of electorates in the mid-20th century to below 5% by the 2010s.^[19] Political parties, once conduits for mass input, have transformed into professionalized machines focused on media-managed campaigns, further insulating elites from public pressure.^[28] The result is a ceremonial democracy where elections occur but fail to constrain elite-driven agendas, fostering public disengagement and declining trust in representative institutions, with surveys showing parliamentary approval rates below 30% in many established democracies by the 2020s.^[29] ^[30]

Concentration of Power in Elites

In post-democratic systems, as conceptualized by Colin Crouch, political power increasingly concentrates among a fusion of economic and political elites who prioritize their interests over broad electoral accountability, rendering formal democratic institutions largely performative.^[31] This elite dominance manifests through mechanisms that insulate decision-making from mass input, such as privileged access to policymakers and the erosion of competitive pluralism.^[32] Empirical indicators include the disproportionate influence of corporate actors in shaping policy, where lobbying expenditures in the United States reached $4.1 billion in 2023, with sectors like pharmaceuticals and technology dominating federal agenda-setting.^[33] A key driver of elite concentration is the revolving door between public office and private industry, facilitating bidirectional influence. In the European Union, former commissioners and senior officials frequently transition to corporate roles, with data from 2018 showing that 20 of 27 commissioners from the 2004-2014 period moved to private sector positions shortly after leaving office, often in regulated industries like finance and energy.^[34] Similarly, in the US, OpenSecrets data reveals that over 400 former members of Congress or senior staff lobbied after leaving office between 1998 and 2022, enabling firms to leverage insider knowledge for regulatory advantages.^[34] This practice correlates with policy outcomes favoring incumbents, as evidenced by OECD analyses of corporate sway in competition policy, where industry consultations outnumber public inputs by ratios exceeding 10:1 in antitrust decisions.^[35] Elite power solidification is further reinforced by economic disparities that amplify access to influence, with Crouch noting that post-1980s neoliberal shifts concentrated wealth among top deciles, enabling sustained funding of political networks. In advanced economies, the top 1% captured 27% of income growth from 1980 to 2016, correlating with heightened elite policy sway, such as tax reforms reducing effective rates for corporations from 35% to 21% in the US via the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.^[28] Such dynamics undermine causal links between voter preferences and outcomes, as elite capture diverts resources from public goods; for instance, EU lobbying by Big Tech firms, where 75% of Google's and Meta's Brussels representatives were former public officials as of 2022, has shaped digital regulation to preserve market dominance.^[36] While regulations exist to mitigate these flows, enforcement remains lax, with Transparency International reporting that only 10% of potential revolving door conflicts in EU institutions trigger formal investigations.^[37] This concentration erodes institutional checks, as elites co-opt regulatory bodies through funding and appointments, leading to self-perpetuating governance. Studies of power elite dynamics confirm that in societies with high economic inequality, policy responsiveness skews toward affluent interests, with US data showing a 0.78 correlation between elite preferences and legislative outcomes versus near-zero for median voters from 1981 to 2002.^[38] In post-democratic contexts, this manifests as oligarchic tendencies, where electoral competition persists but substantive power resides in unaccountable networks, challenging the causal realism of democracy as popular sovereignty.^[39]

Erosion of Mass Participation

In post-democratic conditions, the erosion of mass participation involves a shift toward citizen passivity, where the public responds only minimally to elite-initiated signals rather than actively shaping political outcomes. Colin Crouch identifies this as a defining trait, noting that "the mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part," with political parties transitioning from grassroots movements to professionally managed entities reliant on corporate funding and detached from broad membership bases.^[1] This disengagement extends beyond voting to reduced involvement in parties, unions, and civic organizations, fostering a ritualized democracy where formal mechanisms persist but substantive input diminishes.^[1] Empirical indicators include sustained declines in voter turnout across Western democracies. In established European nations, average turnout fell by about 10 percentage points from the late 1980s to the 2011–2015 period, reaching a regional average of 66% in national elections during that time.^[40] For instance, the United Kingdom recorded 66.1% turnout in its 2015 general election, while higher performers like Denmark and Sweden hovered around 85–86% but still reflected broader stagnation or dips from prior peaks.^[40] In the United States, turnout reached 66.8% of the voting-eligible population in the 2020 presidential election—a post-2000 high—but ranked 31st globally among 50 countries when measured against voting-age populations, underscoring persistent under-engagement relative to peers.^[41] Political party membership provides further evidence of this trend, with absolute numbers and percentages of the electorate dropping sharply in Western democracies since the 1980s. Across Europe and North America, membership rates have halved or more in many countries, falling to under 5% of electorates by the 2010s as parties prioritize professional campaigns over activist bases.^[42] ^[43] This decline correlates with broader civic disengagement, including lower youth participation in formal politics, where apathy stems from perceived inefficacy amid elite capture and policy complexity.^[44] While alternative channels like protests or online activism have risen, they often substitute for rather than complement institutionalized involvement, reinforcing post-democratic hollowing by fragmenting coherent mass influence.^[40]

Causal Mechanisms

Economic Factors and Corporate Influence

The adoption of neoliberal economic policies from the late 1970s onward, including deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization, has concentrated economic power in multinational corporations, diminishing the state's regulatory autonomy and enabling corporate capture of democratic processes.^[28] In Colin Crouch's analysis, this shift empowers "giant transnational firms" to dictate terms to governments, as seen in the post-1980s era where corporate lobbying expenditures in the United States rose from $1.44 billion in 1998 to $3.65 billion by 2022, predominantly advancing business interests over public ones.^[2] ^[45] Such influence manifests causally through mechanisms like campaign finance, where the 2010 Citizens United Supreme Court decision amplified corporate political spending, correlating with policy outcomes favoring deregulation in sectors like finance and energy.^[46] Empirical studies link this corporate dominance to rising income inequality, which erodes democratic participation by amplifying elite leverage. For instance, a 2024 cross-national analysis by Rauhaus and Stokes found that countries with top 1% income shares exceeding 10%—as in the US (20.1% in 2022) and UK (15.3%)—experience a 2-3 times higher probability of democratic backsliding, mediated by increased polarization and reduced voter efficacy among lower-income groups.^[47] ^[48] Neoliberal reforms, such as those under Thatcher (1979-1990) and Reagan (1981-1989), contributed to this by lowering top marginal tax rates from averages of 70% in the 1970s to 25-40% by the 2000s, fostering wealth concentration that funds disproportionate political access.^[49] Globalization exacerbates these dynamics by relocating production to low-regulation zones, pressuring governments to compete via tax incentives and lax labor laws, as evidenced by the EU's state aid rules favoring corporate subsidies totaling €1.2 trillion from 2014-2020.^[1] This corporate-economic interdependence hollows democratic institutions, with business interests out-lobbying all other sectors by a 34:1 ratio in the US as of 2015, resulting in policies like weakened antitrust enforcement that sustain oligopolistic markets.^[50] ^[51] While some analyses contest direct causation, attributing stability to institutional resilience, the correlation between corporate concentration and policy bias toward shareholders over citizens holds across OECD nations.^[52]

Political and Institutional Shifts

In post-democratic conditions, political parties have undergone a profound transformation from mass-membership organizations rooted in social classes and ideological mobilization to professionalized, cartel-like entities reliant on state funding and elite donations. This shift, accelerated since the 1980s, reduces parties' role as vehicles for broad citizen input, as they prioritize managerial efficiency and policy convergence over contentious debate, fostering a homogenized political landscape where alternatives appear illusory.^[5]^[53] Crouch attributes this to the erosion of working-class organizational power amid deindustrialization, with parties increasingly capturing public resources while alienating grassroots bases, as evidenced by declining membership rates in Western Europe—from millions in the mid-20th century to tens of thousands by the 2000s in major parties like Britain's Labour or Germany's SPD.^[54] Institutional power has correspondingly migrated from elected legislatures to unelected networks of corporate executives, financial regulators, and supranational technocrats, enabling elite capture of decision-making processes. Privatization waves, such as the UK's 1980s program under Thatcher which offloaded utilities and railways to private firms by 1990, exemplify how public assets are transferred to entities with minimal democratic oversight, prioritizing profit over public interest.^[53] This reconfiguration sidelines parliaments, as policy formulation occurs in opaque forums like EU commissions or corporate boardrooms, where lobbying expenditures—reaching €1.5 billion annually in the EU by 2010—shape outcomes more than voter mandates.^[5] Such dynamics reflect a causal realism wherein institutional inertia and elite incentives entrench post-democratic equilibria, with elected officials often co-opted as facilitators rather than challengers.^[54] Citizenship itself has been depoliticized, shifting from active participation to passive consumption, with voter turnout in established democracies falling from averages above 80% in the 1950s-1960s to below 70% by the 2010s in nations like France and the US.^[5] Welfare entitlements, once universal rights, increasingly require market-mediated access, commercializing social protections and deepening apathy as citizens perceive politics as a spectator sport managed by distant elites. This institutional hollowing manifests in the rise of quasi-technocratic governance, where central banks and international bodies like the ECB wield de facto authority—evident in the Eurozone crisis responses post-2008, which imposed austerity without direct electoral ratification—further insulating policy from mass pressures.^[53]^[54]

Media and Information Control

In post-democratic systems, media and information control serves as a key mechanism for elites to shape public discourse while maintaining the appearance of open debate. Colin Crouch identifies media corporations as central actors, leveraging their economic power to prioritize narratives aligned with corporate and political interests over genuine contestation of power structures.^[53]^[5] This control manifests through ownership concentration, where a handful of entities dominate content production and distribution, limiting the range of permissible viewpoints and fostering a homogenized information environment that discourages widespread political mobilization.^[55] Media ownership consolidation exemplifies this dynamic, with empirical data showing sharp declines in pluralism across Western democracies. In the United States, as of 2004, mergers had reduced control of daily newspapers, television stations, and radio outlets to roughly six major conglomerates, enabling coordinated messaging that favors deregulation and elite priorities over scrutiny of power imbalances. Similar patterns in Europe, documented in ownership analyses, reveal that by 2020, top firms held over 70% market share in key sectors like broadcasting, correlating with reduced investigative coverage of corporate influence in politics. These structures incentivize self-censorship, as outlets dependent on advertising revenue from concentrated sponsors avoid challenging the status quo, thereby reinforcing elite dominance without overt state intervention.^[58] The rise of digital platforms has amplified information control in post-democratic contexts, shifting power to tech oligarchs who wield algorithmic curation and moderation tools. Crouch observes that social media enables a small cadre of wealthy individuals to bypass traditional gatekeepers, yet these platforms' centralized decision-making—evident in content suppression policies affecting billions of users—mirrors corporate media's role in stifling dissent.^[15] For example, during the 2016-2020 period, major platforms like Facebook and Twitter (now X) altered visibility of political content based on internal guidelines, reducing exposure to non-mainstream perspectives by up to 50% in some cases, as measured by traffic data.^[59] This opacity erodes trust in information ecosystems, with surveys indicating that by 2023, only 32% of Americans viewed social media as enhancing democratic discourse, reflecting its contribution to passive consumption over active participation.^[60] Such controls are compounded by institutional biases in journalistic practices, where reliance on elite sources—government officials, corporate executives, and think tanks funded by the same interests—systematically marginalizes outsider critiques. Studies of news sourcing reveal that over 80% of U.S. broadcast stories from 2010-2020 drew primarily from official channels, perpetuating a feedback loop that aligns media with post-democratic power concentrations rather than amplifying empirical challenges to them.^[61] In Europe, regulatory capture, such as lax antitrust enforcement on mergers, has allowed cross-ownership between media and telecom firms, further entrenching this elite-mediated information monopoly.^[62] Ultimately, these mechanisms sustain post-democracy by framing political agency as consumer choice within predefined options, empirically linked to declining voter turnout and civic engagement metrics in high-concentration markets.^[63]

Empirical Manifestations

Indicators and Metrics

Empirical indicators of post-democracy include measurable declines in mass political engagement, alongside rising economic disparities and elite-driven policy influence that diverge from broad public preferences. These metrics, drawn from Colin Crouch's framework, highlight a formal persistence of elections but a substantive erosion of egalitarian participation and responsiveness. Voter turnout serves as a primary gauge, with Western democracies exhibiting persistently low rates compared to historical highs; for instance, the European Parliament elections averaged around 50% turnout in 2019, reflecting apathy toward supranational bodies perceived as distant from citizen input.^[40] In the United States, turnout among the voting-age population reached 66% in the 2020 presidential election but ranked 31st out of 50 countries in recent national elections, underscoring unequal participation skewed toward higher-income groups.^[41]^[64] Party membership rates provide another key metric of institutional hollowing, with steep declines across Europe and the US signaling a shift from mass-based to professionalized, elite-funded organizations. In Western Europe, aggregate party membership fell from about 10% of national electorates in the 1980s to under 5% by the 2010s, as parties increasingly rely on state subsidies and corporate donations rather than grassroots involvement.^[65]^[66] This erosion correlates with reduced active citizenship, as seen in the rise of "cartel parties" detached from societal bases.^[67] Economic metrics further illuminate post-democratic tendencies through widening inequality, which undermines the social foundations of broad political mobilization. The OECD reports that the Gini coefficient for disposable income rose in most member countries from an average of 0.29 in the late 1980s to around 0.31 by the 2010s, with labor's share of national income declining by 2-3 percentage points over the same period amid globalization and financialization.^[68]^[69] Property ownership concentration has intensified in the UK and US, exacerbating class-based disengagement from politics.^[1] Influence metrics, such as lobbying expenditures, quantify elite capture, with US federal lobbying totaling over $4 billion annually in recent years, predominantly from corporate interests shaping deregulation and tax policies against majority public opinion on issues like wealth taxes.^[45] In Europe, similar patterns emerge through business lobbying for privatization, as evidenced by the outsourcing of public services in the UK, which dilutes accountable governance.^[1] These indicators, while interconnected, do not uniformly predict post-democracy—some nations maintain higher turnout via compulsory voting—but collectively signal a causal drift toward elite-mediated decision-making over mass deliberation.^[70]

Case Studies from Western Nations

In the United States, the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission exemplifies elite influence over democratic processes by allowing unlimited independent expenditures from corporations and unions, leading to a surge in election spending from $5.3 billion in the 2008 cycle to over $14 billion in 2020 and record $1.9 billion in dark money during 2024 federal races.^[71]^[72]^[73] This shift has correlated with policies favoring donor interests, such as the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reducing corporate rates from 35% to 21%, despite public polls showing majority opposition to benefits skewed toward high earners. Voter turnout, measured against voting-age population, has hovered below 60% in most presidential elections since 2000 (e.g., 55.7% in 2016), lower than in peer nations, reflecting eroded mass participation amid perceptions of elite capture.^[74] The 2008 financial crisis further highlighted post-democratic tendencies, as the government deployed $700 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program funds to stabilize banks while unemployment reached 10% in October 2009 and millions faced foreclosures, prioritizing financial elites over widespread public distress—a pattern Colin Crouch identifies as symptomatic of corporate dominance in nominally democratic systems.^[75]^[21] In the United Kingdom, austerity measures implemented from 2010 to 2020, involving £100 billion in public spending cuts and tax increases to address post-crisis deficits, persisted across Conservative and coalition governments despite public discontent, with real-terms local government funding dropping 26% by 2019 and contributing to increased inequality and service strains.^[76] These policies aligned with elite fiscal priorities, as evidenced by sustained welfare reductions even as GDP growth averaged only 1.8% annually from 2010-2019, fostering disillusionment reflected in declining turnout for non-general elections (e.g., 35.7% in 2019 European Parliament polls).^[40] The 2008 bank bailouts, costing taxpayers £850 billion in guarantees, similarly underscored elite insulation, with financial institutions recovering profits while public living standards stagnated, per Crouch's analysis of post-democratic elite entrenchment.^[75] France under President Emmanuel Macron illustrates centralized elite policy-making detached from mass input, as seen in the 2018 fuel tax hike—intended to meet EU emissions targets but sparking the Yellow Vests protests beginning November 17, 2018, which drew 287,000 participants nationwide and evolved into broader demands against perceived elitism in reforms like labor code liberalization reducing worker protections.^[77]^[78] Macron's 2017 election, framed as transcending traditional parties, reinforced a "populism of elites" by prioritizing technocratic agendas, such as pension overhauls in 2023 facing 70% public opposition in polls, amid turnout dipping to 47.5% in 2022 legislative elections.^[78] In Germany, recurrent grand coalitions—such as the CDU/CSU-SPD alliances governing from 2005-2009, 2013-2017, and 2018-2021—have blurred party distinctions, fostering a "cartel" dynamic where policy converges on export-led growth and EU integration, sidelining alternatives despite public skepticism, as membership in major parties fell from 2.5 million in 1990 to under 1 million by 2020.^[1] This contributed to eroded participation, with federal election turnout stable around 76% but non-voting engagement low and regional polls showing volatility, exemplified by the 2024 coalition collapse amid fiscal disputes, highlighting institutional rigidity over responsive governance.^[79]^[80]

Global Variations and Comparisons

The concept of post-democracy, characterized by the persistence of electoral formalities amid elite dominance and diminished citizen engagement, manifests with distinct regional inflections, often blending with broader patterns of autocratization rather than pure post-democratic stasis. In established liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America, these dynamics emphasize subtle institutional hollowing, such as supranational elite coordination via bodies like the European Union, where voter turnout in EU Parliament elections averaged 50.66% in 2019, reflecting apathy amid perceived detachment from policy influence. By contrast, in Latin America, post-democratic tendencies intersect with persistent clientelism and economic inequality, as seen in countries like Brazil and Mexico, where formal elections coexist with oligarchic capture of state resources, evidenced by the Gini coefficient remaining above 0.50 in many nations as of 2023, correlating with low trust in institutions (under 30% in Latinobarómetro surveys). In Asia, variations lean toward hybrid models blending technocratic efficiency with restricted pluralism, diverging from Western post-democracy's emphasis on corporate-media alliances. Singapore exemplifies a meritocratic variant, where elite governance via non-partisan civil service dominance yields high policy efficacy but suppresses mass mobilization, with parliamentary elections maintaining over 90% turnout yet opposition marginalized through gerrymandering and media controls as documented in electoral analyses up to 2020. India's trajectory illustrates populist-inflected post-democracy, with democratic backsliding via executive centralization eroding judicial independence since 2014, as V-Dem indices show a 15-point decline in liberal democracy scores by 2023, amid rising media capture and voter polarization.^[81] Sub-Saharan Africa presents the starkest deviations, where post-democratic elements are overshadowed by overt institutional fragility and autocratization, including military coups in eight countries between 2020 and 2023, undermining electoral integrity more than elite insulation in stable regimes. V-Dem data from 2025 indicates Africa hosts the highest number of autocratizing states (12 out of 45 globally), with processes driven by term-limit evasions and resource rents concentrating power in incumbents, contrasting Europe's subtler erosion; for instance, Nigeria's 2023 elections featured 25% youth abstention rates amid elite pact-making, but recurrent violence and fraud prevent the stabilized formalism of post-democracy. Eastern Europe and post-communist states bridge these, exhibiting "de-democratization" akin to post-democracy, as in Hungary's media consolidation under Orbán since 2010, where Fidesz controls over 80% of outlets, fostering elite entrenchment without full autocratic rupture.^[82]^[83] Globally, V-Dem's 2025 assessment reveals autocracies (91 countries) surpassing democracies (88) for the first time since 2000, with post-democratic traits like participation decline universal but causal mechanisms varying: economic inequality and corporate sway predominate in the West, while patronage networks and security force interventions prevail in Africa and parts of Asia, underscoring the thesis's limited universality beyond affluent polities.^[82]

Criticisms and Debates

Skepticism of the Thesis

Critics contend that the post-democracy thesis, as articulated by Colin Crouch, overemphasizes corporate capture and public apathy while understating the state's proactive enforcement of neoliberal policies, better explained by the alternative framework of authoritarian neoliberalism. In this view, governments actively deregulate economies, impose austerity, and marginalize opposition through legal and institutional mechanisms, rather than passively yielding to private elites as post-democracy implies. This perspective, advanced by scholars like Ian Bruff, highlights how states in Europe and beyond have centralized power to sustain market liberalization amid resistance, preserving formal democratic procedures but prioritizing executive discretion over mass input.^[5]^[84] The thesis also faces methodological skepticism for framing contemporary trends as a novel "post-" phase without sufficient distinction from historical democratic deficits. For instance, process-sociological analyses integrate post-democracy into broader de-democratization dynamics, questioning whether it denotes a discrete stage or merely intensified elite insulation within enduring representative systems. Such critiques argue that low mass participation and policy bias toward affluent interests—evident since the mid-20th century—reflect inherent tensions in liberal democracies rather than an irreversible erosion, as evidenced by persistent electoral competition and institutional reforms in response to scandals like Watergate (1974) or the 2008 financial crisis.^[21]^[3] Empirical challenges further undermine the thesis's universality, with data from consolidated democracies showing adaptive mechanisms that sustain responsiveness despite inequalities. Surveys indicate sustained public preference for democratic governance over alternatives, even amid dissatisfaction; for example, a 2017 Pew Research analysis across 36 countries found median support for representative democracy at 78%, contradicting claims of wholesale disengagement. Critics like Philippe Schmitter attribute apparent declines to post-Cold War liberalization pressures but emphasize democracies' capacity to incorporate feedback loops, such as referendums or party realignments, preventing the total elite entrenchment Crouch describes.^[85]

Counter-Evidence from Electoral Outcomes

In the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 51.9% of voters opted to leave the European Union, defying endorsements from major political, business, and academic elites who overwhelmingly supported remaining.^[86] This outcome prompted the invocation of Article 50 on March 29, 2017, culminating in the UK's formal withdrawal on January 31, 2020, and the establishment of independent trade policies, border controls, and regulatory frameworks, including a points-based immigration system that ended free movement within the EU.^[86] These shifts, implemented despite legal challenges and economic forecasts predicting contraction, illustrate electoral mechanisms enabling substantive policy reversals against prevailing institutional consensus.^[86] The 2024 United States presidential election further exemplifies voter-driven course corrections, with Donald J. Trump securing 312 electoral votes to Kamala D. Harris's 226, alongside a popular vote margin of approximately 1.5 million.^[87]^[88] Trump's victory, following incumbency under the prior administration, reflected widespread discontent with inflation, border security, and foreign policy, leading to executive actions prioritizing domestic manufacturing tariffs and deportation expansions—measures that contrasted with globalist orientations favored by multinational corporations and international bodies.^[88] Official results certified by the Federal Election Commission underscore the integrity of the process, countering narratives of entrenched elite insulation from public mandates.^[87] European parliamentary elections in June 2024 revealed analogous trends, as parties characterized by skepticism toward supranational integration gained significant ground across multiple member states.^[89] In France, the National Rally topped the national vote share at around 31%, while in Germany, the Alternative for Germany secured second place with over 15%, contributing to a bloc-wide increase in populist representation to roughly 25% of seats.^[89] These results pressured centrist coalitions to recalibrate on migration enforcement and bureaucratic reduction, evidencing electoral responsiveness in federal structures often critiqued for diluting national sovereignty.^[90] Such outcomes challenge assertions of post-democratic stasis by demonstrating instances where ballot-box decisions have yielded measurable divergences from prior trajectories, including regulatory repatriation and shifts in resource allocation toward voter-prioritized issues like immigration control.^[90] While implementation faces institutional friction, the recurrence of anti-establishment surges—evident in data tracking populist vote shares rising from under 10% in early 2010s EU elections to over 20% by 2024—affirms the persistence of democratic contestation.^[90]

Relation to Populism and Backlash

In post-democratic systems, where formal democratic mechanisms endure but substantive influence shifts to corporate, bureaucratic, and expert elites, populist movements often arise as a direct backlash against perceived disenfranchisement. Colin Crouch posits that this disillusionment stems from globalization's erosion of traditional class and community ties, creating voids filled by xenophobic or nativist appeals that promise unmediated popular sovereignty through strong leaders.^[54] Such dynamics reflect causal pressures from economic inequality and cultural displacement, where voters reject establishment politics in favor of figures claiming to embody "the people" against distant elites.^[54] Empirical evidence underscores this linkage in Western contexts. In the United Kingdom, the 2016 Brexit referendum resulted in a 51.9% vote to leave the European Union on June 23, 2016, framed by proponents as reclaiming sovereignty from unelected EU institutions—a hallmark of post-democratic critiques.^[91] Similarly, in the United States, Donald Trump's 2016 election victory, capturing 304 electoral votes with 46.1% of the popular vote against Hillary Clinton's 48.2%, was driven more by status threats among non-college-educated whites perceiving elite condescension than pure economic distress.^[92] Across Europe, right-wing populist parties saw vote shares double over three decades, reaching one in three voters by 2023, with surges in nations like France (from ~10% in the 1980s to ~44% in recent first-round presidential ballots) amid dissatisfaction with technocratic governance.^[93]^[94] Debates persist on whether populism validates or undermines the post-democracy thesis. Proponents argue it acts as a corrective, mobilizing empirical backlash against elite capture, as seen in electoral gains challenging incumbents unresponsive to immigration and deindustrialization concerns.^[54] Crouch counters that populism's disdain for checks like courts and parties—evident in attacks on the UK Supreme Court as "enemies of the people" post-Brexit or Trump's institutional rhetoric—poses risks of charismatic authoritarianism, where faith in leaders supplants pluralistic deliberation, potentially entrenching new post-democratic hierarchies.^[54] This tension highlights populism's dual role: a symptom of democratic hollowing, yet a force that may accelerate institutional erosion without addressing root causal deficits in representation.^[54]

Implications and Responses

Societal and Policy Consequences

In post-democratic systems, where formal democratic mechanisms persist amid elite dominance, societal trust in institutions declines markedly, driven by widening economic disparities that disconnect citizens from policy outcomes. Empirical analyses across democracies reveal that macroeconomic income inequality exerts a sociotropic effect, reducing confidence in representative bodies as publics attribute institutional failures to unresponsive governance rather than personal circumstances.^[95] This manifests in measurable drops in interpersonal and institutional trust; for example, in high-inequality contexts like the United States, generalized trust levels have fallen from 58% in 1960 to 24% by 2022, correlating with perceptions of elite capture over democratic accountability. Such erosion fosters civic disengagement, with voter turnout in established democracies stagnating below 70% in recent national elections, as individuals view participation as futile against entrenched power structures.^[70] Social fragmentation intensifies as post-democratic dynamics amplify class divides, prioritizing elite networks over communal solidarity. Studies of unequal societies link rising Gini coefficients—such as the OECD average climbing from 0.29 in 1985 to 0.32 by 2019—to suppressed political efficacy and heightened polarization, where lower-income groups experience relative deprivation without compensatory policy redress.^[96] This causal pathway, evidenced in longitudinal data from Europe and North America, undermines social cohesion, evidenced by surges in populist sentiments as proxies for unmet grievances, though without restoring agency. Colin Crouch's framework highlights how these trends entrench a "spectator democracy," where public discourse devolves into media-managed spectacles, further alienating non-elites and eroding norms of collective deliberation.^[97] On the policy front, post-democracy enables regulatory and agenda capture by concentrated interests, yielding outcomes that favor incumbents over diffuse publics. The OECD documents how special interests infiltrate policy cycles—from agenda-setting to implementation—via lobbying and revolving doors, as in the European Union's handling of financial regulations post-2008, where banking lobbies secured lenient capital requirements despite public bailouts totaling €4.6 trillion across eurozone nations. In the United States, corporate influence has skewed tax policy, with effective rates for top firms dropping to 13.3% in 2020 from 35% statutory levels, subsidizing wealth concentration amid stagnant median wages.^[46] These distortions extend to social policy, where neoliberal paradigms limit redistributive measures; for instance, austerity programs in Greece (2010-2018) reduced public spending by 25% under troika oversight, prioritizing creditor interests over domestic welfare, thereby perpetuating cycles of inequality and fiscal rigidity. Such capture, per Crouch, insulates policies from electoral pressures, embedding global market logics that undermine national sovereignty and long-term societal resilience.^[97]

Reform Proposals and Their Limitations

Colin Crouch proposes restoring the vitality of political parties as a core reform to counteract post-democratic elite dominance, arguing that parties should reconnect with grassroots citizen concerns rather than aligning with corporate interests, as seen in the transformation of entities like New Labour.^[28]^[1] This involves bolstering local government to sustain activist engagement and counter privatization trends that erode public accountability, such as in education authorities.^[1] However, such efforts encounter limitations from declining membership and participation rates, which fell in major European parties by over 50% between 1980 and 2010, exacerbating reliance on elite funding and expert-driven decision-making via focus groups.^[1] Another reform emphasized by Crouch includes implementing stricter regulations on financial and personnel flows between political parties, advisory circles, and corporate lobbies to prevent undue influence, alongside adopting proportional representation systems to foster greater electoral competition and support for egalitarian policies.^[1] Proponents of these measures cite examples like Germany's mixed-member proportional system, which has sustained multiparty coalitions since 1949, potentially diluting single-party elite capture. Yet, limitations persist due to neoliberal globalization, where multinational corporations leverage trade liberalization to resist national regulations, as evidenced by the EU's failure to harmonize corporate lobbying rules despite directives like the 2014 Transparency Register, which covers only voluntary compliance.^[1] Calls for enhanced open government and constitutional reforms, such as mandatory transparency in decision-making, aim to increase accountability but often yield superficial results, with privatization blurring public-private boundaries and inviting corruption risks.^[1] In practice, these face elite co-optation; for instance, direct mayoral elections intended to empower locals have disproportionately benefited wealthy candidates in systems like the UK's, where post-2000 reforms led to higher spending by incumbents aligned with business interests.^[1] Voter apathy compounds this, with turnout in Western elections averaging below 60% in the 2010s, undermining reform mandates amid socioeconomic delivery failures that fuel disillusionment rather than mobilization.^[70]^[98] Broader proposals, including citizen assemblies or campaign finance caps, encounter structural barriers in post-democratic contexts, where entrenched elites control implementation, as observed in the U.S. where post-Citizens United (2010) reforms stalled despite public support exceeding 70% for limits, due to partisan gridlock and donor influence. Reforms risk unintended elite reinforcement, such as through "counter-elite" strategies that merely rotate power without addressing global capital's mobility, which evades national fixes.^[99] Ultimately, these limitations stem from causal dynamics where economic interdependence prioritizes corporate imperatives over democratic renewal, rendering isolated institutional tweaks insufficient without transnational coordination, which remains elusive given sovereignty conflicts.^[1]

Alternative Frameworks (e.g., Technocracy, Illiberalism)

Technocracy posits governance by technical experts selected for their specialized knowledge rather than through electoral competition, offering a potential counter to post-democratic elite capture by emphasizing competence over popular consent. Proponents argue that in increasingly complex societies facing issues like climate change and technological disruption, democratic decision-making often yields suboptimal outcomes due to voter ignorance, short-termism, and interest-group influence, as evidenced by studies showing low public comprehension of policy trade-offs in areas such as fiscal policy or pandemics.^[100] For instance, historical technocratic movements, such as the 1930s Technocracy Inc. in the United States, advocated energy-based resource allocation by engineers to supplant political bargaining, while contemporary variants, including epistocracy models proposed by philosophers like Jason Brennan, suggest weighting votes by demonstrated knowledge to enhance outcomes without fully abandoning elections.^[101] Empirical support draws from non-democratic expert-led successes, such as Singapore's technocratic bureaucracy achieving sustained GDP growth averaging 7% annually from 1965 to 2020 through meritocratic civil service reforms prioritizing technical expertise over partisan loyalty.^[102] However, critics highlight technocracy's vulnerability to expert bias and lack of accountability, noting instances like the Eurozone's technocratic interventions during the 2010-2012 debt crisis, where unelected officials imposed austerity measures correlating with a 25% unemployment peak in Greece by 2013, exacerbating public distrust without mechanisms for reversal.^[100] Academic analyses, often from liberal-leaning institutions, further contend that technocracy reinforces undemocratic hierarchies, as seen in models predicting instability when disadvantaged majorities reject expert policies lacking electoral validation.^[103] Illiberal democracy, a term coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997 to describe regimes with competitive elections but diminished liberal protections for minorities, rule of law, and civil liberties, emerges as another framework addressing post-democratic disillusionment by prioritizing substantive majoritarian outcomes over procedural liberalism.^[104] Advocates, including Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who in a 2014 speech explicitly endorsed "illiberal democracy" as a model drawing from non-Western successes like Singapore, India, Turkey, and Russia—contend it better safeguards national identity and economic sovereignty against globalist pressures eroding sovereignty in post-democratic states.^[105] In practice, Hungary under Fidesz since 2010 has consolidated executive power, reforming the judiciary and media landscape to align with government priorities, resulting in EU funds totaling €37 billion from 2014-2020 despite corruption allegations, while maintaining electoral victories with 49% of the vote in 2022.^[106] Similar patterns appear in Poland under Law and Justice (PiS) from 2015-2023, where judicial reforms prioritized parliamentary majorities, correlating with GDP growth of 4.5% annually pre-COVID, though Freedom House indices documented declines in judicial independence scores from 4.25/7 in 2015 to 2.5/7 by 2020.^[107] Proponents attribute stability to curbing "undemocratic" liberal veto points, such as independent courts blocking populist reforms, but empirical critiques reveal risks of authoritarian drift, with V-Dem Institute data showing Hungary's liberal democracy index falling from 0.68 in 2010 to 0.28 in 2023, akin to trajectories in interwar Europe where illiberal consolidation preceded full autocracy.^[105] Sources critiquing illiberalism often stem from Western academic and media outlets predisposed to liberal norms, potentially understating its appeal in contexts of migration pressures or economic inequality, where surveys like the 2022 European Social Survey indicate 30-40% support for stronger executive authority in Eastern Europe.^[108] These frameworks intersect with post-democracy by challenging the liberal democratic consensus, yet both face causal challenges: technocracy's efficiency gains may falter without democratic buy-in, as modeled in game-theoretic analyses predicting policy reversal under persistent majoritarian opposition, while illiberalism's majoritarian focus can entrench ruling elites akin to post-democratic corporatism, evidenced by Orbán-linked oligarchs controlling 20% of Hungary's media by 2018.^[109] Neither fully resolves accountability deficits, with technocracy risking "expert capture" by vested interests and illiberalism eroding checks that prevent policy errors, as in Poland's 2020 judicial controversies triggering €76 billion in withheld EU recovery funds. Empirical comparisons, such as Singapore's hybrid technocratic-illiberal model sustaining 3-5% annual growth since 2000 with controlled elections, suggest viability in high-trust, homogeneous societies but limited generalizability to diverse Western contexts where polarization amplifies backlash.^[110]

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Sep 23, 2023 · Military coups, leaders abolishing constitutional term limits, and violent conflicts undermining democratic governance have made headlines in sub-Saharan ...
[84]
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08935696.2013.843250
[85]
[PDF] 'POST-LIBERAL' DEMOCRACY - European University Institute
The evidence from surveys of public opinion is overwhelming that it has increased exponentially in recent decades, roughly beginning in the 1980s. While it ...Missing: thesis | Show results with:thesis
[86]
Five key impacts of Brexit five years on - BBC
Jan 30, 2025 · After Brexit took effect, the UK also initially stopped paying into the Horizon scheme, which funds pan-European scientific research.
[87]
[PDF] Official 2024 Presidential General Election Results - FEC
Nov 5, 2024 · Page 1 of 9 -. STATE ELECTORAL. VOTES. ELECTORAL VOTES CAST FOR. DONALD J. TRUMP (R). ELECTORAL VOTES CAST FOR. KAMALA D. HARRIS (D).
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US Presidential Election Results 2024 - BBC News
Donald Trump passed the critical threshold of 270 electoral college votes with a projected win in the state of Wisconsin making him the next US president.
[89]
What the far-right victories in the European Union could say about ...
Jun 11, 2024 · WHAT FUELED THE RIGHT IN EUROPE? All of the EU's countries have different political dynamics, and the EU parliamentary elections are often an ...
[90]
https://www.statista.com/topics/3291/right-wing-populism-in-the-european-union/
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Post-democracy: does populism have a place in Britain? - LSE Blogs
Apr 9, 2019 · ... Colin Crouch. Yet that raises questions about xenophobic populism ... Post-democracy: does populism have a place in Britain? 1 comment ...
[92]
Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential ...
This study evaluates evidence pertaining to popular narratives explaining the American public's support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential election.
[93]
Revealed: one in three Europeans now vote anti-establishment
Sep 21, 2023 · European populist parties have more than doubled their vote share in the last 30 years. Vote share of parties by classification in 31 European ...
[94]
European populist parties' vote share on the rise, especially on right
Oct 6, 2022 · In France, the share of voters casting first-round ballots for a populist party has risen from around 10% in the 1980s to around 44% as of the ...
[95]
Does inequality erode political trust? - Frontiers
This study provides new evidence for a sociotropic effect of macroeconomic income inequality on trust in the institutions of representative democracy.
[96]
Explaining the 'democratic malaise' in unequal societies: Inequality ...
Jun 30, 2023 · Previous scholarship suggests that rising inequality in democracies suppresses trust in institutions. However, the mechanism behind this has ...
[97]
https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail?isbn=9780745633022
[98]
Misunderstanding Democratic Backsliding | Journal of Democracy
One of the most common explanations of the ongoing wave of global democratic backsliding is that democracies are failing to deliver adequate socioeconomic ...
[99]
14 14 Tackling Elite Capture by the 'Counter-Elite' and 'Co-Opt-Elite ...
The success of dealing with elite capture lies in the flexible use of the 'counter-elite' and 'co-opt-elite' approaches together with the need to secure ...
[100]
What's Wrong with Technocracy? - Boston Review
Aug 22, 2022 · Even if technocracy is not the most dire or imminent threat to democracy, its intersections with elite domination and minoritarian rule merit ...
[101]
Technocracy: An Alternative to Democracy? - Għaqda Studenti tal Liġi
Oct 12, 2024 · In some regards technocracy is a stronger alternative system of government to democracy. Democracy has several pitfalls, including lengthy ...
[102]
OAR@UM: Technocracy : an alternative to democracy?
While democracy allows for representation and public participation, technocracy promises efficiency through expert-led decision-making, especially in complex ...
[103]
Against the Technocrats - Dissent Magazine
The latter uprising led to yet another transition to democracy, which also failed, resulting in the rise of a populist dictator—Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (the ...
[104]
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy - Fareed Zakaria
Nov 1, 1997 · Naturally there is a spectrum of illiberal democracy, ranging from modest offenders like Argentina to near-tyrannies like Kazakstan and Belarus ...<|separator|>
[105]
Illiberal Democracy and the Struggle on the Right
At present, the key struggle for the future of liberal democracy appears as if it will be unfolding among parties and thinkers on the right.
[106]
Confronting Illiberalism | Freedom House
What Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary famously hailed in 2014 as “illiberal democracy” is essentially a return to the political practices of goulash ...
[107]
What Is an Illiberal Democracy? How Is It Created? | LibertiesEU
Jul 10, 2024 · Illiberal Democracies in Europe: A Few Examples · Hungary · Slovakia · Serbia · Czech Republic · Greece.
[108]
What Is Illiberal Democracy? - Global Challenges
Consolidation of power in the executive · Charismatic leader · Erosion of the independence of the judiciary · Weakening status of the parliament · Recourse to ...
[109]
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5252694
[110]
Illiberalism: a conceptual introduction - Taylor & Francis Online
Sheri Berman (2017) explained, for instance: “Illiberal democracy is most often a stage on the route to liberal democracy rather than the endpoint of a country ...