CHIPS and Science Act
The CHIPS and Science Act (Pub. L. 117-167) is a United States federal law enacted by the 117th Congress and signed by President Joe Biden on August 9, 2022, appropriating $52.7 billion to strengthen domestic semiconductor manufacturing, research, development, and workforce training while authorizing roughly $200 billion over five to ten years for federal agencies including the National Science Foundation, Department of Energy, and National Institute of Standards and Technology to advance research in priority technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology.[1][2][3] The Act's core CHIPS provisions create a $39 billion fund for direct incentives to construct and expand U.S.-based fabrication facilities, supplemented by $13.2 billion for research consortia, $2 billion for defense-specific needs, and $200 million for education programs, with recipients barred for ten years from expanding advanced node production in China or other nations deemed national security risks.[2][4] These measures address the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing declining to about 12 percent amid supply chain vulnerabilities highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions over Taiwan.[5] Implementation has leveraged public funds to attract private capital, yielding announcements of over $395 billion in investments across semiconductors and electronics sectors and more than 115,000 jobs by mid-2024, including major fab projects by firms like TSMC, Intel, and Micron.[6] Yet, the science authorizations have seen appropriations fall short by billions, with fiscal year 2024 funding for key agencies like NSF trailing targets by 39 percent, potentially undermining long-term innovation gains.[7][8] Critics highlight risks of market distortions from subsidies and regulatory hurdles in execution, drawing on historical evidence that government industrial policies yield inconsistent results, often succeeding more in research support than manufacturing mandates, though proponents argue the Act's targeted approach counters existential supply threats effectively.[9][10][11]Legislative History
Pre-2022 Context and Motivations
By the 1990s, the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity began a marked decline, dropping from 37% in 1990 to around 12% by 2020, as production shifted to Asia due to lower labor and construction costs, alongside the industry's need for massive capital investments in fabrication plants.[12] Taiwan, South Korea, and later China expanded their capacities significantly, with Taiwan capturing over 60% of advanced logic chip production by 2020 through firms like TSMC.[13] This offshoring left the U.S. heavily dependent on imports for semiconductors, which underpin defense systems, consumer electronics, automobiles, and critical infrastructure, creating vulnerabilities in supply chains that policymakers increasingly viewed as a strategic weakness.[14] Geopolitical tensions amplified these risks, particularly Taiwan's dominance in advanced chips, which accounted for 92% of the world's leading-edge semiconductors by 2021, exposing the U.S. to potential disruptions from Chinese military actions or blockades across the Taiwan Strait.[15] China's aggressive industrial policies, including the "Made in China 2025" initiative launched in 2015, poured over $150 billion into semiconductors by 2020 to achieve self-sufficiency and reduce reliance on U.S. technology, raising alarms about technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and military applications that could undermine U.S. advantages in areas like AI and hypersonics.[16] U.S. responses predating 2022 included export controls on entities like Huawei starting in 2019, reflecting bipartisan consensus on curbing China's access to advanced nodes amid fears of eroding technological leadership.[17] The COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 onward exposed these dependencies acutely, as factory shutdowns in Asia, combined with surging demand for chips in electronics and vehicles, triggered global shortages that halted U.S. auto production equivalent to millions of vehicles and inflicted $210 billion in losses on the industry by mid-2021.[18] These disruptions, affecting everything from medical devices to defense electronics, underscored the lack of domestic resilience and prompted calls for policy action to onshore manufacturing, with industry groups like the Semiconductor Industry Association warning that without intervention, the U.S. risked permanent competitive disadvantages.[13][19]Bill Development and Key Negotiations
The CHIPS and Science Act originated from bipartisan legislative efforts to address U.S. semiconductor supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions with China, which controls over 90% of advanced chip production capacity outside the U.S.[20] Early precursors included the Senate's United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) of 2021, which incorporated the CHIPS for America Act provisions introduced by Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Todd Young (R-IN), Ben Ray Luján (D-NM), and John Cornyn (R-TX) to provide tax credits and grants for domestic manufacturing.[21] The science components drew from the Endless Frontier Act, rebranded as part of USICA and co-sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Young, authorizing over $100 billion in research funding for agencies like the National Science Foundation.[22] House efforts paralleled this with the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2021 (H.R. 3599), passed by the House on February 4, 2022, which emphasized competitiveness but differed from the Senate version in scope and funding levels for R&D and workforce programs.[23] Negotiations intensified in mid-2022 amid stalled broader reconciliation talks, with Republican Leader Mitch McConnell initially blocking a standalone CHIPS bill unless decoupled from expansive science authorizations to limit spending.[22] Cantwell, as chair of the Senate Commerce Committee, emerged as a central negotiator, hosting a classified national security briefing for all 100 senators on July 13, 2022, alongside Schumer, to underscore threats from Chinese dominance in semiconductors and secure GOP buy-in.[24] This briefing, featuring intelligence on supply chain risks, helped forge compromises, including guardrails against funding stock buybacks and expansions in China, while expanding the bill to nearly 1,000 pages by integrating science investments to broaden bipartisan appeal.[25][26] Further talks involved Young and Cornyn advocating for semiconductor incentives totaling $52 billion, balanced against Democratic priorities for NSF regional innovation engines and DOE upgrades, with final alignments post the July 16, 2022, Manchin-Schumer deal on the Inflation Reduction Act freeing fiscal bandwidth.[27] The House amended bill H.R. 4346, introduced July 20, 2021, served as the final vehicle, passing the Senate 64-33 on July 27, 2022, after these concessions preserved core R&D authorizations exceeding $170 billion over five years.[23][28] These negotiations reflected causal pressures from industry lobbying by the Semiconductor Industry Association and empirical data on U.S. market share erosion to 12% in advanced nodes, prioritizing incentives over mandates to spur private investment.[29]Passage and Enactment
The CHIPS and Science Act, formally H.R. 4346, advanced through the final stages of the 117th United States Congress in July 2022. On July 27, 2022, the Senate passed the legislation by a vote of 64–33, with the measure reflecting bipartisan support as 16 Republicans joined all Democrats in favor.[23][30] The following day, July 28, 2022, the House of Representatives approved the Senate-amended version by a 243–187 margin, where 24 Republicans crossed party lines to support the bill alongside nearly all Democrats.[23][31] This vote occurred via Roll Call 404, demonstrating the act's ability to secure passage despite partisan divisions on spending and industrial policy.[32] President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law on August 9, 2022, enacting it as Public Law 117-167 and authorizing over $280 billion in investments across semiconductors, research, and science programs.[1][33] The enactment followed months of negotiations reconciling the core CHIPS incentives with broader science funding authorizations, amid concerns over federal spending amid inflation.[34]Core Provisions
Semiconductor Manufacturing Incentives
The Semiconductor Manufacturing Incentives provision of the CHIPS and Science Act authorizes approximately $39 billion in federal grants through the CHIPS for America Fund, administered by the Department of Commerce, to support the construction, expansion, or modernization of semiconductor fabrication facilities (fabs), materials production, and manufacturing equipment in the United States.[21] These grants target "covered entities," defined as semiconductor manufacturers or suppliers making significant investments in domestic facilities, with awards conditioned on factors such as project viability, economic impact, national security benefits, and commitments to workforce development and supply chain resilience.[35] Eligible projects must demonstrate a minimum investment threshold, typically in the billions, and include safeguards like clawback provisions requiring repayment if facilities relocate abroad or fail to meet production milestones within a 10-year period.[36] In addition to grants, the Act establishes a 25% advanced manufacturing investment tax credit under Section 48D of the Internal Revenue Code, applicable to qualified investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities placed in service after December 31, 2022, and before January 1, 2027.[37] This refundable credit covers costs for machinery, equipment, and related infrastructure used in producing semiconductors or semiconductor manufacturing equipment, with eligibility limited to U.S.-based taxpayers whose primary business involves such production.[38] The credit phases out after 2026 but aims to offset high capital costs, estimated at $10-20 billion per advanced fab, incentivizing private investment amid global competition from subsidized foreign producers.[39] These incentives collectively seek to reverse the decline in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity, which fell from 37% of global share in 1990 to about 12% by 2020, by subsidizing an estimated $200 billion in private investments to achieve 20% domestic advanced-node production by 2030.[40] Funding prioritizes leading-edge technologies (e.g., nodes below 10nm) and includes requirements for domestic content in supply chains, though critics note potential inefficiencies in government-directed allocation compared to market-driven outcomes.[20]Research and Development Funding
The CHIPS and Science Act authorizes approximately $170 billion in additional funding over five years for federal research agencies, emphasizing advancements in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and climate technologies to address perceived gaps in U.S. technological leadership relative to competitors like China.[1] These authorizations, contained primarily in Division B of the legislation, support basic and applied research across agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy (DOE), and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), with a focus on translational outcomes to accelerate commercialization.[34] However, these levels represent ceilings rather than mandatory appropriations; subsequent congressional budgets, including the FY2023 omnibus and FY2024 requests, have fallen short by billions, reflecting debates over fiscal sustainability and spending priorities.[41] The NSF receives the largest authorization boost, with $81 billion allocated for fiscal years 2023–2027, potentially expanding its annual budget from about $9 billion to nearly $19 billion by FY2027.[42] This includes $20 billion for a new Directorate for Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships (TIP), tasked with funding use-inspired research in key technologies like advanced communications and robotics, as well as regional innovation engines to foster public-private collaborations.[34] Additional NSF provisions mandate investments in research security to mitigate foreign influence risks and expand STEM education programs, with $13 billion directed toward broadening participation in science.[4] For the DOE, Title IV authorizes enhanced funding for the Office of Science, starting at $7.915 billion in FY2023 and increasing annually to support basic research in areas such as high-energy physics, nuclear physics, and biological systems, with specific initiatives for microelectronics science research centers and fusion energy.[4] The Act also bolsters DOE's Advanced Scientific Computing Research program and establishes new facilities for quantum information science, aiming to sustain U.S. advantages in computational modeling and materials discovery.[43] NIST programs under the Act's Division A receive $11 billion for semiconductor-specific R&D, including the establishment of a National Semiconductor Technology Center to coordinate industry-academia efforts in chip design, metrology, and packaging.[44] Complementary authorizations in Division B provide NIST with up to $2.1 billion annually by FY2027 for core metrology and standards research, extending to cybersecurity and advanced manufacturing standards. DARPA's electronics R&D receives indirect support through expanded authorities for wide-bandgap semiconductors and resilient supply chains, though primary funding flows through defense appropriations.[36] These investments prioritize domestic innovation ecosystems but have drawn scrutiny for potential inefficiencies in government-directed R&D compared to private-sector alternatives.[45]Workforce and Regional Development Programs
The CHIPS and Science Act allocates $200 million to the CHIPS for America Workforce and Education Fund, administered by the National Science Foundation, to support semiconductor-specific training and education programs from fiscal years 2023 through 2027.[21][18] This funding targets short-term labor shortages by financing apprenticeships, technician training, curriculum development for community colleges and universities, and public-private partnerships to build a skilled domestic workforce capable of supporting expanded semiconductor manufacturing.[46][34] Industry collaborators, including companies like Intel and Samsung, contribute matching resources to these efforts, with initial awards totaling $45 million announced in September 2023 for university-led programs in microelectronics workforce preparation.[47] Beyond semiconductors, the Act authorizes broader science agency investments in STEM workforce development, including $200 million for National Science Foundation activities in pre-K-12 education, teacher training, and underrepresented group inclusion to cultivate long-term talent pipelines.[34] These provisions emphasize practical skills alignment with industry needs, such as through the Department of Commerce's strategies for scaling technician programs and addressing projected shortages of up to 90,000 semiconductor workers by 2030.[46][48] On regional development, the Act establishes the NSF Regional Innovation Engines program to fund multi-institutional consortia in advancing key technologies like semiconductors, with initial appropriations enabling $150 million in awards to 10 engines in January 2024, each receiving $15 million to initiate place-based innovation ecosystems.[34][49] These engines support regional strategies for research translation, workforce upskilling, and economic diversification, leveraging private investment to scale prototypes into commercial applications over up to 10 years.[50] Complementing this, the Economic Development Administration's Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs program, authorized up to $10 billion, designates consortia-led hubs in underserved areas to concentrate federal resources on semiconductor-related manufacturing clusters, infrastructure, and talent development.[51][50] As of 2024, this has spurred applications from 71 teams seeking sustained funding to integrate R&D with local economic priorities.[52]National Security and Export Controls
The CHIPS and Science Act incorporates national security provisions to mitigate risks from overreliance on foreign semiconductor supply chains, particularly those vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions in regions like Taiwan, where over 90% of advanced logic chips are produced.[5] These measures aim to secure U.S. access to critical technologies amid tensions with China, which has pursued semiconductor self-sufficiency through initiatives like Made in China 2025, potentially enabling military advancements in areas such as artificial intelligence and hypersonic weapons.[53] By funding domestic fabrication facilities, the Act seeks to reduce supply chain chokepoints that could be exploited coercively, as evidenced by China's prior restrictions on rare earth exports.[54] Central to these provisions are "guardrails" restricting recipients of CHIPS incentives from activities that could benefit foreign adversaries. Funding recipients are barred from using awards to construct, expand, or modernize semiconductor facilities in "countries of concern," defined to include China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.[55] Specifically, for a 10-year period following receipt of funds, companies cannot significantly increase manufacturing capacity for advanced-node semiconductors—defined as logic or memory chips at or below 28 nanometers, or equivalent performance in other categories—in these nations.[54] A limited exception allows up to a 5% capacity increase for routine maintenance or non-federally funded upgrades, provided they do not involve material technology transfers.[55] These rules, finalized by the Department of Commerce on September 22, 2023, and effective November 24, 2023, apply to direct recipients and their affiliates owning at least 25% of voting securities or controlling board majorities.[54] Violations trigger clawback mechanisms to enforce compliance. The "expansion clawback" requires repayment of the full federal investment share, plus interest, if capacity expansions exceed thresholds in prohibited countries.[54] A separate "technology clawback" mandates repayment if recipients engage in joint research or licensing agreements with "foreign entities of concern"—such as those owned or controlled by prohibited governments, on the Commerce Entity List, or involved in military end-uses—that enable advancements in semiconductors critical to national security, including those supporting supercomputing or AI for weapons systems.[55] The Department of Commerce evaluates potential violations case-by-case, considering factors like the entity's intent and the technology's dual-use potential, with pre-approval required for certain arrangements.[54] These guardrails complement but do not directly enact U.S. export controls, which are administered separately by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Export Administration Regulations. BIS has imposed license requirements since 2022 on advanced semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, and software destined for China to curb its high-performance computing capabilities, with thresholds aligned to restrict nodes below 14nm and supercomputers exceeding 480 teraFLOPS.[16] The CHIPS Act's restrictions ensure that subsidized U.S. innovation does not indirectly undermine these controls by bolstering overseas capacities in adversarial nations, though critics argue enforcement relies on self-reporting and may face challenges from global supply chain complexities.[56]Reception and Controversies
Initial Bipartisan Support
The CHIPS and Science Act received broad initial bipartisan backing in Congress, reflecting shared concerns over domestic semiconductor production shortfalls and strategic competition with China. On July 27, 2022, the Senate passed the bill by a 64-33 margin, with 17 Republicans voting in favor alongside nearly all Democrats, marking a departure from strict party-line divisions on industrial policy measures.[57][31] This vote followed months of negotiations merging elements from earlier bipartisan frameworks, such as the 2021 United States Innovation and Competition Act, which had cleared the Senate 68-32. The following day, July 28, 2022, the House approved the measure 243-187, with 24 Republicans defying party leadership to support it, emphasizing the legislation's role in revitalizing U.S. manufacturing and addressing supply chain risks highlighted by global chip shortages.[58][31] Proponents from both parties, including Senate Republicans like John Cornyn of Texas, underscored the act's focus on incentives for private investment in fabrication facilities rather than direct government ownership, positioning it as a targeted response to national security imperatives over expansive federal spending.[59] This cross-aisle consensus stemmed from empirical evidence of U.S. reliance on foreign semiconductor supplies—over 90% of advanced chips were produced overseas in 2021—and the economic disruptions from pandemic-era shortages, which affected industries from automobiles to consumer electronics.[42] The bill's passage, signed into law by President Biden on August 9, 2022, represented rare agreement on industrial policy amid polarized debates, with supporters citing modeled projections of up to 280,000 new jobs and enhanced technological edge as justifying the $52 billion in semiconductor incentives.[31][45]Conservative Critiques on Government Intervention
Conservatives, including organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and libertarian-leaning think tanks like the Cato Institute, have argued that the CHIPS and Science Act exemplifies flawed industrial policy by authorizing approximately $52 billion in federal subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing and research, which they contend distorts free-market incentives and fosters dependency on government handouts rather than innovation driven by competition.[60][61] Heritage Foundation analysts specifically criticized the legislation for risking a erosion of America's economic freedom, asserting that such targeted spending on private firms undermines competitiveness by favoring politically connected industries over broad-based deregulation or tax relief that could spur genuine private investment.[62] Critics further contend that the Act's structure invites cronyism, as evidenced by subsequent proposals for government equity stakes in recipient companies like Intel, which Heritage and others warned could lead to politicized allocation of resources and taxpayer-funded bailouts for underperforming firms, echoing historical failures of government-directed investments.[63][64] Heritage Action for America issued a key vote recommendation against the bill in July 2022, highlighting its potential to balloon federal spending without addressing core supply-chain vulnerabilities through market mechanisms.[65] Former President Donald Trump described the CHIPS Act as a "horrible, horrible thing" in March 2025, urging its repeal on grounds that it represented unnecessary intervention in an industry capable of self-sustaining growth, potentially crowding out private capital and inflating costs without proportionally enhancing national security against competitors like China.[66] Cato Institute commentators have echoed this by framing industrial policies like CHIPS as a "gateway drug to cronyism," where initial subsidies evolve into ongoing protections and distortions, as seen in the Act's $39 billion in manufacturing grants that prioritize domestic fab construction over global supply efficiencies.[67] These critiques emphasize first-principles economic reasoning: government allocation of capital, lacking price signals, historically underperforms private enterprise, with the Act's provisions potentially subsidizing facilities that benefit foreign rivals indirectly through technology spillovers.[63]Progressive Critiques on Corporate Benefits
Progressives have criticized the CHIPS and Science Act for providing substantial subsidies to large semiconductor corporations without sufficient mechanisms to ensure benefits accrue to workers, communities, or the broader public, characterizing the legislation as corporate welfare. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) opposed the bill in July 2022, arguing it represented a $76 billion "corporate welfare payday" to highly profitable technology firms, including subsidies for companies like Intel and TSMC that already generate billions in annual profits, while failing to mandate reinvestment in domestic wages or job quality.[68] [69] A key grievance centers on the absence of restrictions preventing recipient companies from using subsidy-enabled gains for stock buybacks, which critics contend primarily enrich executives and shareholders rather than workers. In 2022, Senators Sanders and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) co-authored an amendment requiring the federal government to receive equity stakes in firms awarded CHIPS grants in exchange for meeting conditions such as prohibiting buybacks and ensuring funds support U.S.-based manufacturing; the amendment failed to pass.[70] [71] A July 2024 analysis by the Institute for Policy Studies estimated that semiconductor firms poised for CHIPS subsidies could have redirected $27,000 in annual bonuses to 300,000 employees using funds otherwise allocated to buybacks, highlighting how lax guardrails allow corporate financial engineering over labor investment.[72] [73] Further critiques emphasize inadequate enforcement of labor standards, including union rights, prevailing wages, and protections against offshoring. By August 2024, Senators Warren, Sanders, Edward Markey (D-MA), and Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) urged the Department of Commerce to impose stringent requirements in grant agreements for worker safety, community benefits, and environmental safeguards, warning that without them, the $53 billion in manufacturing incentives risked subsidizing low-wage, non-unionized jobs or facilities with lax oversight.[74] Progressive Democrats expressed growing disillusionment by November 2024, as the Biden administration appeared to relax initial commitments to these guardrails, potentially allowing subsidies to flow with minimal accountability for public returns.[75] These concerns reflect a broader progressive skepticism that the Act prioritizes corporate expansion—such as Intel's $8.9 billion preliminary award in 2024—over equitable distribution of economic gains, despite the legislation's intent to revitalize U.S. manufacturing.[76]Debates on Protectionism and Industrial Policy Efficacy
Critics of the CHIPS and Science Act argue that its protectionist measures, such as the 10-year prohibition on recipient companies expanding advanced chip production (nodes under 28 nanometers) in China, represent inefficient government intervention that distorts global supply chains rather than addressing root causes like high U.S. construction costs and regulatory burdens.[77] These restrictions, intended to safeguard national security by reducing reliance on foreign manufacturing, have been linked to unintended labor shortages, as tightened immigration policies under prior administrations exacerbated a global semiconductor talent crunch, limiting the influx of skilled workers needed for new U.S. facilities.[78] Proponents counter that such safeguards are essential for resilience against geopolitical risks, including potential disruptions from China-Taiwan tensions, and that empirical evidence from the Act's early implementation shows increased domestic fab announcements without widespread trade retaliation.[79] On industrial policy efficacy, the Act's $52.7 billion in semiconductor incentives have demonstrably catalyzed private investment, attracting over $450 billion in commitments and spurring more than 90 projects across 22 states as of mid-2025, suggesting short-term success in reversing U.S. manufacturing decline from 37% of global capacity in 1990 to 12% by 2020.[80] However, economists at the Tax Foundation contend that these targeted subsidies fail to generate economy-wide investment growth, with nonresidential fixed investment rising only modestly post-enactment and concentrated in subsidized sectors, potentially crowding out unsubsidized innovation through higher taxes and debt.[81] Broader critiques highlight inherent flaws in industrial policy, including government officials' lack of dispersed market knowledge and perverse incentives for rent-seeking, as evidenced by historical U.S. failures like Solyndra, raising doubts about long-term cost-effectiveness despite the Act's leverage of public funds to multiply private capital.[82] Defenders, including analyses from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, assert that the subsidies will sharply elevate U.S. advanced chip production, justifying intervention where private markets underinvest due to externalities like national security and scale economies unattainable without coordinated risk-sharing.[83] The American Enterprise Institute's review acknowledges the Act's role in boosting fab construction but cautions against overgeneralizing success to broader industrial policy, noting that semiconductors' strategic uniqueness—high barriers to entry and dual-use potential—does not validate subsidies for less critical industries, where free-market signals better allocate resources.[84] As implementation progresses, ongoing debates center on metrics like return on investment, with preliminary data showing job creation estimates of up to 100,000 positions but risks of dependency on ongoing federal support amid volatile chip demand cycles.[85]Implementation Progress
Funding Disbursement and Major Awards
The CHIPS and Science Act allocates $39 billion from the CHIPS for America Fund for semiconductor manufacturing incentives, administered through a competitive grant process by the Department of Commerce's CHIPS Program Office (CPO). Awards are structured as direct funding, with disbursements released in tranches contingent on recipients meeting predefined milestones, such as site preparation, construction progress, and equipment installation, to mitigate risks of non-performance. As of June 2025, CPO had finalized 20 awards totaling up to $33.7 billion in direct grants and $5.5 billion in proposed loans across multiple companies and projects, representing a significant portion of the available manufacturing incentives.[86] These funds prioritize advanced node fabrication (e.g., below 5nm) and mature node production for national security applications, with clawback provisions enforcing domestic investment commitments and restrictions on expansion in countries like China.[36] Disbursement emphasizes accountability, requiring semi-annual progress reports, federal oversight, and performance-based payments to ensure taxpayer funds drive verifiable capacity expansion rather than subsidizing existing operations. By late 2024, initial tranches had been released to select recipients upon validation of early milestones, such as environmental clearances and initial capital expenditures, totaling billions in outlays.[87] The process has favored large-scale investments in logic and memory chips, with smaller awards supporting supply chain enablers like equipment and materials. Remaining funds, including a final approximately $6 billion tranche as of mid-2024, target ecosystem suppliers and underserved regions to broaden domestic resilience.[88] Major awards have concentrated on leading firms establishing or expanding U.S. fabrication facilities:| Company | Award Amount (Direct Funding) | Finalization Date | Key Projects and Scope |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intel | Up to $7.86 billion | November 26, 2024 | Supports $100 billion investment in fabs across Arizona, Ohio, New Mexico, and Oregon for advanced logic chips, including 18A process node production.[87] |
| TSMC | Up to $6.72 billion | November 15, 2024 | Funds three Arizona fabs for 4nm, 3nm, and 2nm/1.6nm nodes, spurring $65 billion total private investment in leading-edge semiconductors.[89] |
| Micron | Up to $6.165 billion | December 10, 2024 | Expands memory chip production (DRAM and NAND) in Idaho and New York, including four new fabs to address U.S. memory supply vulnerabilities.[90] |
| Samsung | Up to $4.745 billion | December 20, 2024 | Bolsters Texas facilities for advanced logic and packaging, reduced from preliminary $6.4 billion after due diligence on project viability.[91] |