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Secularity

Secularity is the state or quality of being separate from religious or spiritual concerns, emphasizing temporal, worldly affairs over divine or eternal ones, with roots in the Latin term , denoting a generation, age, or the present era as distinct from sacred . This condition manifests in institutions, societies, or individuals prioritizing empirical reasoning and neutral over theological authority, often involving the compartmentalization of to private spheres while life operates on non-religious principles. Unlike , which constitutes an active promoting such separation as a normative good, secularity describes the factual neutrality or absence of religious dominance without prescribing endorsement. Historically, secularity emerged from medieval Christian distinctions between sacred and profane realms, evolving through the Reformation's challenges to power and the Enlightenment's elevation of reason, , and individual , which facilitated state-church separations in constitutions like France's 1905 law and the U.S. First Amendment. In the , it expanded globally amid and modernization, with 96 countries enacting secular models by 2022, though implementation varies from strict laïcité to accommodative neutrality. Empirical data indicate ongoing in and , where religious affiliation fell below 50% in some cohorts, yet global religiosity remains stable at around 76% identification with a as of 2020, challenging unilinear decline narratives. Key characteristics include institutional firewalls against religious veto in , such as bans on faith-based laws in secular states, fostering environments for scientific advancement and pluralistic coexistence, as evidenced by correlations between higher secularity indices and innovation metrics in nations. However, studies reveal trade-offs: highly secular societies exhibit fertility rates averaging 1.6 children per woman versus 3.8 in minimally secular ones, potentially straining demographic , while retains links to elevated and cohesion in pluralistic contexts. Controversies persist over causal impacts, with critics citing 's association with moral fragmentation and existential insecurity in rationalized worldviews, countered by evidence that secular rituals can replicate religious bonding effects without commitments. Despite biases in academic theories toward progressive inevitability—often overlooking religion's adaptive resilience—data affirm secularity's role in enabling causal realism, where outcomes hinge on verifiable mechanisms rather than doctrinal .

Definitions and Terminology

Core Concepts and Etymology

Secularity originates from the Latin saeculum, signifying a generation, age, or approximate century-long span of time, which by connoted worldly or temporal existence in contrast to eternal spiritual realms. The term "secular" entered circa 1300 through seculer and saecularis, initially describing exempt from monastic vows and thus engaged in earthly duties rather than cloistered religious life. Over time, this evolved to denote matters pertaining to the present world or , independent of religious doctrine or clerical authority, with "secularity" emerging in the to describe the noun form of this quality or state. At its core, secularity embodies the condition of neutrality or detachment from religious institutions and doctrines in specific spheres of human activity, prioritizing temporal concerns, , and over theological imperatives. This manifests as the insulation of public domains—such as , , and —from mandatory religious observance, enabling decisions based on observable and human welfare rather than scriptural . Unlike or , which actively reject beliefs, secularity accommodates private while enforcing institutional boundaries to prevent dominance by any creed, thereby fostering coexistence amid diverse convictions. Philosophically, secularity rests on the recognition that societal functions can operate effectively through non-theistic mechanisms, drawing from first-hand historical precedents like civic , which distinguished res publica (public affairs) from priestly rites. Empirical data from modern contexts, such as post-1945 constitutional frameworks in Western democracies, demonstrate secularity's causal role in reducing interfaith violence by 40-60% in pluralistic states compared to theocracies, as quantified in cross-national studies of conflict incidence. This framework critiques sources presuming inherent secular hostility to , attributing such views to ideological overlays rather than the term's neutral etymological and operational essence.

Distinctions from Related Terms

Secularity denotes the state or condition of being separate from or neutral toward , particularly in institutional or societal contexts such as , where religious authority does not dictate or law. This neutrality contrasts with , which functions as an ideological or principled for establishing and maintaining such separation, often involving active of non-religious rationales in human affairs and philosophical defenses against religious encroachment. Whereas secularity describes an existing condition—such as a legal framework insulating state operations from control—secularism entails normative commitments to expand or justify that condition, potentially critiquing religious influence as incompatible with modern pluralism. Secularity must also be differentiated from secularization, which refers to the dynamic historical or sociological process whereby religious institutions, beliefs, or practices lose societal dominance over time, often through of social spheres like , , and education from religious oversight. implies transformation and potential decline in religious authority's scope, as observed in from the onward, where metrics like fell from over 50% weekly in the 1850s to under 10% by 2000 in countries like the . In contrast, secularity is static, characterizing a stance or institutional arrangement without presupposing ongoing decline or causation by modernization. Unlike terms denoting personal disbelief, secularity does not entail rejection of theistic claims; it pertains to the compartmentalization of religion from non-religious domains rather than individual . Atheism specifically involves the absence of belief in deities, a cognitive stance independent of institutional preferences—one can be an atheist in a theocratic state or a theist advocating secularity, as evidenced by religious proponents of church-state separation like some deists. Similarly, agnosticism expresses epistemic uncertainty regarding divine existence, focusing on unknowability rather than secularity's emphasis on functional neutrality; agnostics may support secular governance without committing to secularity as a . Irreligion, broader than atheism or agnosticism, captures non-participation in or ritual but includes culturally affiliated non-practitioners who retain beliefs, whereas secularity applies to systemic arrangements irrespective of private adherence. These distinctions underscore that secularity accommodates religious individuals who prioritize institutional neutrality, as in the U.S. First Amendment's , ratified in 1791, which bars government endorsement of religion without mandating personal irreligiosity.

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Ancient Roots

In ancient , the Cārvāka (or Lokāyata) school represented an early materialist philosophy that rejected explanations, Vedic authority, and concepts like karma, rebirth, or an , asserting instead that the consists solely of four perceptible elements (, water, , air) and that emerges from their combination, akin to from fermented ingredients. This heterodox tradition, traceable to at least the 6th century BCE through references in texts like the Sūtra compilations and critiques in orthodox works such as the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (14th century CE), emphasized empirical perception (pratyakṣa) as the sole valid pramāṇa (means of knowledge) and promoted sensory enjoyment (kāma) as the highest good, dismissing or ritual obligations as priestly fabrications. While marginalized and often caricatured by Brahmanical opponents, Cārvāka's denial of transcendent realities laid groundwork for non-theistic reasoning independent of religious dogma. In ancient Greece, pre-Socratic thinkers initiated secular philosophical inquiry by proposing naturalistic explanations for the cosmos, eschewing divine intervention in favor of material processes. Democritus (c. 460–370 BCE) and Leucippus advanced atomism, theorizing that the universe comprises indivisible atoms moving in a void, governed by necessity rather than gods or purpose, with phenomena like thunder arising from collisions rather than Zeus's wrath. This atomistic framework, echoed by Epicurus (341–270 BCE), posited gods as distant, anthropomorphic beings in the interstices of worlds who neither create nor punish, allowing humans to pursue happiness through rational understanding of nature without fear of providence. Sophists like Protagoras (c. 490–420 BCE) further contributed agnostic relativism, declaring "man the measure of all things" and professing uncertainty about gods' existence due to the brevity of human life and obscurity of evidence, prioritizing human laws and conventions over divine commands. These ideas, though often prosecuted as impious—Protagoras's books were burned in Athens around 415 BCE—fostered a tradition of inquiry detached from mythology, influencing later Hellenistic skepticism. Ancient China exhibited proto-secular governance under , which (551–479 BCE) framed as a human-centered ethical system emphasizing ritual propriety (), benevolence (), and social hierarchy without reliance on enforcement or priestly mediation. State rituals invoked () as a moral order, but imperial administration prioritized pragmatic bureaucracy and merit-based examination over theocratic rule, with Legalist influences under (r. 221–210 BCE) enforcing centralized control through laws and incentives indifferent to religious doctrines. This integration of into treated as a tool for social harmony rather than ultimate truth, tolerating diverse beliefs like Daoism and while maintaining secular authority, as evidenced by (206 BCE–220 CE) policies that subordinated shamans and cults to Confucian orthodoxy. Pre-modern saw sporadic secularizing tendencies amid Christian dominance, such as in early medieval Iberian and legal texts from the CE, where rulers like Visigothic kings reclaimed ecclesiastical properties and regulated clerical behavior to assert lay control, framing church assets as conditional on service to the rather than divine ownership. These strategies, documented in councils like the Fourth Council of (633 CE), reflected pragmatic assertions of temporal power against monastic accumulations, prefiguring later distinctions between sacred and profane spheres without fully detaching from .

Enlightenment Emergence and 19th-Century Expansion

The Enlightenment, spanning roughly the late 17th to early 19th centuries, marked the intellectual origins of modern secularity through the advocacy of reason, empiricism, and skepticism toward ecclesiastical authority in governance and knowledge production. Thinkers such as Voltaire and David Hume promoted deism and philosophical doubt, arguing that natural laws operated independently of divine intervention, thereby laying groundwork for separating religious dogma from public policy and scientific inquiry. Voltaire's 1755 Poem on the Lisbon Disaster, responding to the earthquake that killed up to 60,000, rejected providential explanations of suffering, portraying nature as indifferent rather than punitive, which eroded confidence in theological accounts of calamity. This shift prioritized empirical observation over revelation, fostering secular ethics grounded in human reason amid historical religious conflicts. The French Revolution accelerated secular emergence by institutionalizing anti-clerical measures, culminating in the dechristianization campaign of 1793–1794 during the . Revolutionary authorities closed churches, melted religious artifacts for currency, and promoted the atheistic and later as civic alternatives to Christianity, with the Law of 17 September 1793 mandating the suppression of worship and execution of refractory priests. Over 2,000 clergy were killed or deported, reflecting a causal drive to dismantle the Catholic Church's alliance with the and redistribute its lands, which comprised up to 10% of France's territory. Though the campaign waned by 1795 with partial religious restoration, it established precedents for state neutrality toward religion, influencing later constitutional separations. In the , secularity expanded via scientific , positivist philosophy, and organized movements amid industrialization and democratic reforms. Auguste 's positivism, outlined in his 1830–1842 , proposed a "law of three stages" progressing from theological to metaphysical to scientific explanations of phenomena, explicitly rejecting supernaturalism for verifiable laws governing society and nature. This framework, diffused across , supported secular by emphasizing observable data over faith, influencing policies like France's 1880s Ferry Laws mandating non-religious public . George Holyoake coined "" in 1851 to denote a rational for temporal welfare, independent of , which organized British freethinkers into associations advocating divorce from religious tests in and . Charles Darwin's 1859 further propelled expansion by offering a naturalistic account of biological diversity through descent with modification, undermining scriptural literalism and prompting secular reinterpretations of human origins among intellectuals. In and , these ideas correlated with declining state enforcement of orthodoxy, as parliaments reduced religious qualifications for office and courts upheld publications, though religious adherence persisted among the populace.

20th-Century Institutionalization

In the United States, the advanced the institutionalization of secularity in public education through landmark decisions enforcing the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The 1962 ruling in invalidated state-composed prayers recited in public schools, determining that such practices constituted government endorsement of religion despite their voluntary nature. This was followed by (1963), which prohibited mandatory devotional reading and recitation of the in public schools, emphasizing that secular education must avoid promoting religious exercises. These cases reflected broader mid-century efforts to exclude religious content from state-funded institutions, building on earlier tensions like the 1925 , where Tennessee's ban on teaching evolution underscored conflicts between scientific secularism and religious doctrine in curricula. In , Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's reforms from 1923 to 1938 systematically embedded secularity into state institutions as part of . The abolition of the in 1924 severed religious authority from governance, while the 1928 constitutional amendment removed Islam's status as the , replacing it with explicit secular principles. Educational reforms included the 1924 unification of religious and secular schools under a national, laic curriculum managed by the Ministry of Education, alongside bans on religious attire for public officials and the adoption of a to distance from Islamic script traditions. These measures aimed to foster a modern, unitary , reducing clerical influence in law, politics, and schooling. Communist regimes in the institutionalized as a core policy from the onward, integrating it into legal, educational, and apparatuses. By , laws closed over 50,000 churches and monasteries, with the 1932-1937 "atheist " mandating anti-religious indoctrination in schools and workplaces through the of Militant Atheists, which grew to 5.5 million members. This framework treated religion as ideological competition to Marxism-Leninism, enforcing secular via state-controlled curricula that portrayed religious beliefs as superstitious remnants incompatible with scientific progress. Across , post-World War II expansions facilitated secularity's entrenchment in by prioritizing neutral, state-directed curricula over instruction. In , reforms from the 1940s onward shifted primary school from Christian to comparative, non-confessional studies, reflecting fears of ideological and promoting civic . Similar patterns emerged in countries like the and , where denominational school funding persisted but curricula increasingly emphasized scientific and frameworks detached from theological premises, diminishing churches' historical oversight roles. In higher globally, early 20th-century shifts severed ties between universities and religious denominations, with institutions adopting governance models prioritizing empirical inquiry over doctrinal alignment, as seen in the U.S. where Protestant-influenced colleges transitioned to pluralistic, value-neutral research paradigms by the 1920s. French laïcité, codified in the 1905 law, saw reinforced institutional application in the through educational enforcement, such as the 1930s extension of secular oversight to private schools receiving state funds and late-century bans on conspicuous religious symbols in public institutions to maintain state neutrality. These developments collectively marked secularity's transition from philosophical ideal to embedded structural norm, often driven by modernization imperatives rather than uniform societal demand.

Theoretical Foundations

Secularization Theory and Its Assumptions

Secularization theory, a foundational framework in the , posits that societal modernization inherently leads to a decline in the social significance, institutional authority, and explanatory power of religion. Formulated prominently in the mid-20th century by sociologists such as Peter Berger, the theory draws on earlier ideas from Max Weber's concept of Entzauberung (), which describes the replacement of magical-religious worldviews with rational, bureaucratic ones, and Émile Durkheim's observations on the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity in industrial societies. Berger, in his 1967 work The Sacred Canopy, argued that modernization processes erode religion's plausibility structures by introducing and rationalization, rendering faith a private rather than public force. Central assumptions of the include the inevitability of institutional , whereby separates from other societal spheres such as , , and , losing its overarching authority. This is presumed to stem from advancements in science and , which provide empirical alternatives to religious cosmologies; for instance, Enlightenment-era developments in astronomy and supplanted theological explanations of natural phenomena. Another key assumption is the impact of : in diverse, modern societies, exposure to competing worldviews fosters , weakening the taken-for-granted nature of any single religious belief system and confining it to individual choice. Berger emphasized that this leads to , where persists but retreats to the personal realm, detached from or . The theory further assumes a causal link between socioeconomic development and religious decline, predicting that metrics such as urbanization rates, literacy levels, and per capita income inversely correlate with religious adherence. For example, early proponents cited Europe's post-World War II trends, where church attendance in countries like England dropped from around 40% in the 1950s to under 10% by the 1990s in some regions, as evidence of modernization's secularizing effect. Rationalization, inspired by Weber, is assumed to prioritize instrumental reason over traditional authority, diminishing religion's role in legitimizing social orders; this is evident in the theory's expectation that welfare states and scientific education reduce existential anxieties once addressed by faith. These assumptions framed secularization as a unidirectional, universal process, applicable beyond the West to all modernizing societies.

Empirical Challenges and Critiques

Empirical observations contradict the core prediction of secularization theory that modernization inexorably erodes religious vitality across societies. , for instance, the proportion of adults identifying as Christian fell from 78% in 2007 to 63% in 2021, but data from 2025 indicate this decline has slowed substantially, stabilizing around 60-65% in recent years, with no further drop observed between 2019 and 2024 surveys. Sociologists like have argued that such patterns reflect not inevitable decline but fluctuations driven by religious market dynamics, where competition among denominations fosters adaptation and retention rather than atrophy. Globally, religious adherence has expanded alongside economic and technological advancement, undermining claims of uniform . From 2010 to 2020, the population grew by 122 million to 2.3 billion, while increased faster than the global average, reaching over 1.9 billion; even the religiously unaffiliated rose but at a slower pace than overall . In and parts of , high fertility rates and conversions have propelled and Islam's numerical gains, with evangelicals among the fastest-growing segments, comprising about 25% of global by 2025. These trends align with supply-side critiques, positing that and institutional innovation—rather than modernization alone—sustain vitality, as evidenced by the proliferation of new religious movements in urbanizing regions. Measurement inconsistencies further challenge the theory's empirical foundation. Secularization proponents often equate declining church attendance with broader religious disenchantment, yet surveys reveal persistent private beliefs and spiritual practices; for example, U.S. data show stable rates of prayer (around 50-55% daily) despite institutional disaffiliation. Critics like Stark contend the theory rests on a "myth of past piety," overstating historical religiosity in pre-modern Europe based on selective anecdotes rather than comparable metrics, while ignoring how states' religious monopolies stifled competition and attendance historically. In non-Western contexts, rapid modernization correlates with religious resurgence, as seen in Iran's post-1979 Islamic governance or India's Hindu nationalism, suggesting causal factors like cultural identity and political mobilization outweigh predicted erosion. Academic endorsements of secularization have persisted despite these discrepancies, potentially influenced by the secular orientations of scholars in elite institutions, where self-reported is low (e.g., under 20% among social scientists). Empirical rebuttals emphasize that religion's adaptability—through charismatic , outreach, and doctrinal reforms—defies linear decline narratives, with data from 2020-2025 showing atheism's global share stagnating below 3% while aggregate holds at 88% of the . Thus, appears more as a regionally contingent process, limited to parts of and select urban cohorts, than a universal law of social evolution.

Manifestations in Society

Political and Legal Dimensions

Secularity in the political sphere manifests as the institutional separation of religious authorities from governance, prioritizing neutral over doctrinal mandates. This principle underpins modern democratic frameworks by confining to private spheres while ensuring derives from and rational deliberation rather than theological imperatives. In practice, political secularity varies between passive models, which tolerate religious expression in public life without endorsement, and assertive variants that actively exclude religious symbols or influence from governmental functions. Legally, secularity is enshrined in foundational documents that prohibit the establishment of by the state. The United States Constitution's First Amendment, ratified on December 15, 1791, declares "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of , or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," establishing a barrier against federal religious favoritism while permitting individual practice. This clause has been interpreted through rulings, such as (1947), which incorporated the Establishment Clause to states via the , reinforcing prohibitions on public funding for religious instruction. In , laïcité—codified in the Law of Separation of Churches and State on December 9, 1905—mandates strict neutrality, barring state subsidies for religious activities and removing religious influence from public education and administration. Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution affirms this by guaranteeing equality before the law irrespective of . Globally, over 90 countries incorporate secular principles into their constitutions, though implementation differs; for instance, Turkey's 1928 constitutional amendment declared a secular republic, separating religious courts from civil law under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's reforms. India's 1950 Constitution promotes secularism via Articles 25-28, safeguarding religious freedom while curbing practices deemed socially harmful, such as . Empirical analyses of state-religion relations, drawing from datasets spanning 183 countries from 1990 to 2014, reveal that secular governance correlates with lower religious regulation in politics, contrasting with theocratic models where religious laws dictate policy, as in Iran's post-1979 constitution. Challenges arise in enforcement, particularly amid multicultural pressures; European Court of Human Rights cases, such as Lautsi v. (2011), upheld displays of religious symbols like crucifixes in public schools under margin-of-appreciation doctrines, balancing secularity with . In the U.S., recent rulings like (2022) expanded free exercise allowances, permitting public employee prayer if uncoerced, signaling judicial shifts toward accommodating religious expression over strict separation. These developments highlight tensions between secular neutrality and , with data indicating that assertive secular policies can reduce religious participation in but may foster perceptions of state hostility toward faith communities.

Cultural and Educational Influences

Higher education attainment exhibits a consistent with traditional measures of , such as frequency of and belief in , across multiple longitudinal studies in Western contexts. For instance, a 2016 analysis of U.S. data found that individuals with a or higher were less likely to affirm fundamentalist beliefs, though they maintained higher rates of private prayer compared to those without degrees. This pattern holds in as well, where postsecondary exposure correlates with reduced affiliation to , potentially due to curricula prioritizing empirical methodologies over doctrinal assertions. Public school curricula in secular states, by design, integrate , , and without privileging religious narratives, fostering cognitive habits that prioritize evidence-based reasoning. Empirical evidence from German studies indicates that students in compulsory programs show diminished long-term relative to peers in religious schooling, with effects persisting into adulthood through reinforced toward supernatural claims. In the U.S., post-1960s court rulings mandating neutral treatment of in curricula—such as excluding —coincided with generational declines in religious identification, from 90% Christian affiliation in 1972 to 64% by 2020 among young adults. Cultural media, including film and television, have accelerated by normalizing non-religious worldviews and portraying as optional or archaic since the early 2000s. A 2023 review of digital-age content highlights how mainstream productions emphasize and —factors evangelical leaders identify as eroding religious adherence—with surveys showing U.S. "nones" rising from 16% in 2007 to 29% in 2021 amid pervasive secular narratives in . and further this trend by critiquing institutional , as seen in the proliferation of atheist-themed works post-2000, correlating with self-reported shifts toward in cultural surveys. However, mediatization can also hybridize religious expression, complicating unidirectional secular influence. Cross-national data link societal —bolstered by educational and cultural —to measurable outcomes like higher GDP and rates, suggesting feedback loops where prosperous, educated populations sustain low . A global study of 100+ countries found governance and curricula predict greater and , though causation remains debated amid confounders like .

Global Trends and Empirical Evidence

Secularization Patterns in the West

In , secularization has advanced markedly since the 1960s, characterized by sharp declines in , religious practice, and explicit belief in , with the continent often described as highly secularized overall. Surveys indicate that the majority of self-identified in countries like , , and the are non-practicing, with median weekly attendance among Christians at just 10% across 15 nations studied in 2018, and many expressing agnostic or atheistic views on divinity. Cross-national data from 1981 to 2012 further show no evidence of rising attendance rates, but consistent downward trends in religious participation, contradicting claims of religious resurgence. This pattern aligns with broader indicators, such as reduced confidence in religious institutions and upbringing effects weakening over generations, though remains uneven, with higher persisting among older cohorts and in less urbanized areas. In , patterns differ by country but generally reflect ongoing, albeit decelerating, erosion of religious affiliation. In the United States, the proportion of adults identifying as Christian fell from 78% in 2007 to 62% by 2023-2024, driven largely by rises in the religiously unaffiliated ("nones"), who now comprise about 30% of the ; however, Pew Research data from the latest Religious Landscape Study indicate this decline has plateaued since around 2019, with no further significant drop observed in recent polling. Fewer than half of U.S. adults now report as very important to their lives, down from majorities in prior decades, though the U.S. remains more religious than most peers, with states like showing attendance rates comparable to secular nations. In , the shift has been steeper, with the share of people deeming important dropping from 61% in earlier surveys to 35% by the 2020s, mirroring trajectories in English-speaking contexts. Australia and New Zealand exhibit intermediate patterns, with moderate but stable low —around 10-20% weekly—and rising non-religious identification, including nearly half of New Zealand's population claiming no in the 2018 census. These nations align with Protestant in secularity levels, per comparative analyses, though from less secular regions has tempered absolute declines in affiliation. Overall, follows a sequenced decline: first in public rituals like , then in perceived importance of , and finally in self-identification, with and societal differentiation as key correlates accelerating the process across regions. Recent global polls confirm this trend amid stable or growing religiosity elsewhere, underscoring causal links to modernization rather than universal inevitability.

Persistence and Growth of Religion Elsewhere

In , has exhibited robust growth, with the Christian population increasing from approximately 517 million in 2010 to over 670 million by 2020, driven by high fertility rates and youthful demographics that outpace global averages. Projections indicate this figure will reach 1.1 billion by 2050, accounting for more than four-in-ten of the world's Christians, as surpasses as the region with the largest Christian share (30.7% of global Christians in 2020 versus 22.3% in ). Religious unaffiliation remains minimal, with large majorities adhering to or and few identifying as religiously unaffiliated, contrasting sharply with trends in and . Islam has demonstrated the fastest global growth among major religions, expanding by 327 million adherents from 2010 to 2020—more than the combined increase across all other religious groups—primarily in and due to higher rates (averaging 2.9 children per Muslim woman versus 2.6 for non-Muslims) and younger median ages. In the Middle East-North Africa region, where predominates, the grew 24% to 440 million by 2020, with persisting amid political upheavals; surveys show youth increasingly identifying as religious, reversing earlier signals, and engaging more with religious texts. In , maintains dominance, comprising over 90% of the population in most countries as of 2020, with total Christian numbers stable or modestly growing despite some shifts toward evangelical from Catholicism; non-Christian faiths like remain under 1 million regionally. The Global South as a whole hosts 69% of the world's in 2025, projected to rise to 78% by 2050, underscoring 's demographic vitality outside Western contexts where fertility and cultural transmission sustain adherence. These patterns challenge assumptions of universal , as higher birth rates and limited disaffiliation in developing regions propel religious populations forward.

Recent Data from 2010-2025

From 2010 to 2020, the global share of the population with any religious affiliation declined modestly from 76.7% to 75.8%, while the religiously unaffiliated rose from 23.3% to 24.2%, increasing in absolute terms from 1.6 billion to 1.9 billion people. This expansion of unaffiliation occurred amid overall population growth, with the unaffiliated category growing by 17% compared to 12% for the affiliated, though unaffiliated groups exhibit lower fertility rates (1.6 children per woman versus 2.6 for the affiliated). Over 78% of the global unaffiliated resided in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020, largely driven by China's population, where state policies and cultural factors contribute to low reported affiliation rates. In Western countries, unaffiliation accelerated during this period. In the United States, the proportion of adults identifying as religiously unaffiliated climbed from 16% in 2007 to 26% by 2023, with surveys indicating a potential stabilization around 28-29% by 2024 as switching rates among younger cohorts leveled off. nations saw similar patterns, with affiliation drops of at least 5 points in 35 countries worldwide from 2010 to 2020, often beginning with reduced worship attendance among youth before eroding self-identified ties. For instance, U.S. fell from 70% in 1999 to 45% by 2022, reflecting broader disengagement from . Conversely, high-religiosity regions like and the experienced religious population growth outpacing global averages, with increasing fastest at 18% to 1.9 billion adherents by 2020 due to youthful demographics and higher birth rates. grew by 122 million to 2.3 billion, maintaining their plurality status. Post-2020 data through 2025 suggests these countervailing trends persisted, with global religiosity stabilizing as population growth in devout areas offset declines, though unaffiliation continued edging upward in urbanized, educated demographics.
Religious Group2010 Population (billions)2020 Population (billions)% Change
Affiliated~4.5~5.7+12%
Unaffiliated1.61.9+17%
2.22.3+6%
1.61.9+18%
Data reflects absolute growth amid world population rise from 6.9 to 7.8 billion; unaffiliated share increased despite lower retention and fertility.

Impacts and Evaluations

Purported Benefits and Achievements

Proponents of secularity, such as sociologist Phil Zuckerman, assert that societies with high levels of secularity exhibit superior societal well-being, including lower crime rates, higher life satisfaction, and greater equality compared to more religious counterparts. For instance, Nordic countries like Denmark and Sweden, characterized by widespread secularity and minimal religious adherence, consistently rank among the world's lowest in homicide rates—Denmark at 0.8 per 100,000 in 2020 and Sweden at 1.1 per 100,000—while maintaining high social trust and low corruption. Secular nations are frequently correlated with elevated human development indicators. Analysis of global data reveals a negative association between national religiosity levels and the Human Development Index (HDI), with high-HDI countries like Norway (HDI 0.961 in 2022) and Iceland (HDI 0.959) featuring low religious participation rates below 10% weekly attendance. This pattern holds in studies linking secularity to improved education and prosperity, as secular governance purportedly fosters investment in public goods over religious institutions. In terms of happiness and quality of life, strongly secular countries dominate international rankings. The 2024 lists , , , and in the top four positions, all with religiosity levels under 20% identifying as actively religious, contrasting with lower-ranked, highly religious nations like (rank 147). Zuckerman attributes this to secular emphasis on universal systems and individual , which yield higher reported without reliance on religious frameworks. Advocates claim secularity drives scientific and innovative achievements by prioritizing empirical inquiry over doctrinal constraints. European nations, which have undergone significant since the , account for 47% of Nobel Prizes in sciences (, physics, ) from 1901 to 2023, with secular powerhouses like the , , and leading per capita. Patent filings per capita also skew toward secular economies; in 2022, (highly secular, 4% highly religious) filed 1,910 applications per million people at the , surpassing more religious developing nations. Secular governance is credited with enhancing and minority protections, reducing intergroup conflict through neutral state policies. In secular democracies, of and state correlates with higher scores on indices of and , as seen in the 2023 Global Religious Freedom Index where top performers like the (score 3.9/4) enforce impartiality, purportedly minimizing religiously motivated violence. Such frameworks, per Zuckerman, enable diverse societies to thrive without theocratic impositions, fostering economic dynamism via inclusive markets.

Criticisms and Adverse Outcomes

Critics of secularity contend that its emphasis on over transcendent moral frameworks fosters , eroding shared ethical absolutes and enabling societal tolerance of practices once widely condemned, such as or unrestricted , without robust philosophical justification beyond individual . This shift, they argue, lacks grounding in universal principles, leading to inconsistent application of and vulnerability to power-based manipulations rather than truth-derived norms. Empirical data links higher secularity to elevated rates and challenges. A of studies found that religious service attendance correlates with lower rates, even after controlling for , suggesting provides like and purpose absent in secular contexts. Similarly, cross-national analyses indicate rates are lower in religious countries than secular ones, with emerging as a for suicidality in large-scale surveys. In the United States, declining aligns with rising mental illness and , as —often mediated by religious institutions—has decreased over the past three decades, correlating with increased . Secularity correlates with family breakdown and , exacerbating demographic declines. In the U.S., rates among nonreligious individuals fall below 1.5 children per woman, compared to 1.8-1.9 for the general and higher among regular religious practitioners, contributing to a widening religious-secular gap since the . Globally, accompanies lower birth rates, with religious women averaging more children even in prosperous nations; for instance, U.S. data from 1997-2002 projects that very religious women would bear 2.3 children lifetime versus fewer for secular counterparts. This pattern ties to weakened structures, as evidenced by increased single parenthood and male labor force withdrawal in secularizing American working-class communities. Broader societal outcomes include diminished social cohesion and riskier behaviors. Secularization in the U.S. has paralleled rises in economic immobility and isolation since the 1970s, with religious decline implicated in fraying communal ties that once buffered against adversity. Econometric studies suggest growing secularity prompts higher engagement in risky activities, potentially due to forgoing religion's prosocial norms and incentives. In extreme cases, failed secular transitions—where religious demand surges post-initial decline—have fueled , as seen in historical spikes leading to ideological vacuums filled by alternatives. These patterns challenge secularity's purported neutrality, highlighting causal links to where empirical correlations persist across datasets despite confounding variables like wealth.

Causal Analyses of Societal Correlations

Empirical studies have identified correlations between rising secularity and various societal outcomes, including economic prosperity, crime rates, fertility, and metrics, though establishing remains contested due to confounding variables such as levels, cultural inheritance, and institutional quality. For instance, cross-national analyses from 1990 onward show that declines in often precede rather than following it, suggesting secularity may foster and resource allocation unhindered by traditional doctrines, as evidenced by tests on 20th-century data across multiple countries. However, other research indicates that religious beliefs in (e.g., concepts) can positively influence growth by promoting ethical behavior and , while excessive institutional , like high church attendance, correlates negatively, implying causality flows from cultural shifts toward moderate secularity enhancing . In terms of , individual-level meta-analyses of over 75 studies demonstrate that exerts a consistent negative effect on delinquency, particularly among at-risk youth, through mechanisms like internalized moral norms and community supervision, with causal evidence from longitudinal designs showing reduced criminal involvement among the highly religious. At the societal level, however, secular nations like those in exhibit lower homicide rates compared to more religious counterparts, potentially due to strong secular institutions enforcing rather than religious deterrence, though declines in predict rises in specifically in low-IQ nations, highlighting interactive causal pathways involving cognitive and cultural factors. Critics note that academic studies often overlook how secular states substitute for religious social controls, masking potential causal contributions of to informal deterrence. Fertility rates provide a clearer case for causal impact from secularity, with multilevel models across 181 countries (data up to 2015) revealing that societal independently lowers total rates by altering norms around size and roles, beyond mere individual irreligiosity; even religious subgroups in secular contexts exhibit depressed due to ambient cultural pressures favoring over procreation. Recent U.S. data from 2010–2020 confirm this divide, where secular cohorts average 1.6 children versus 2.1 for religious ones, with causal mechanisms traced to eroding doctrinal emphases on pronatalism and marital stability, exacerbating below-replacement in advanced economies. Regarding happiness and suicide, Pew Research surveys from 2019 across 26 countries indicate that actively religious individuals report higher and lower rates, attributable to communal ties and purpose derived from , with causal support from panel studies showing buffering against stressors like economic downturns. Conversely, secular societies display elevated rates in some analyses, linked to diminished and existential as theorized in causal frameworks examining post-1960s trends in Western nations, where declining religious participation correlates with a 20–30% rise in suicides after controlling for GDP and demographics. Yet, challenge a direct "happy places" , as high reported in secular does not uniformly predict suicides when accounting for underreporting and confounders, suggesting causality may involve secular amplifying rather than secularity per se. Overall, while secularity correlates with material advancements, causal evidence points to 's protective role in personal , underscoring bidirectional influences where enables secularity but erodes communal buffers against non-material declines.

Debates and Controversies

Philosophical Compatibility with Human Nature

Philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that secularity conflicts with innate aspects of human cognition, as religious beliefs arise naturally from evolved mental modules predisposed to detect agency, infer purpose, and seek moral order in the world. The cognitive science of religion posits that such intuitions—rooted in hyperactive agency detection and theory-of-mind capacities—render religious concepts "cognitively optimal," emerging spontaneously across cultures without deliberate cultural imposition. This view, advanced by researchers like Pascal Boyer, suggests secularity demands ongoing cognitive suppression of these defaults, potentially straining psychological equilibrium. From an evolutionary standpoint, aligns with social and adaptive needs, fostering cooperation, reducing existential anxiety over mortality, and enforcing group norms through monitoring, which secularity must replicate artificially via institutions like or . Ethnographic surveys indicate as a universal, present in every known , implying a deep-seated propensity rather than a mere . Critics of secularity, including philosophers like Charles Taylor, contend that modern severs humans from transcendent horizons essential for authentic , reducing existence to instrumental pursuits incompatible with the religious orientation evident in historical and anthropological records. Secular humanism, as a philosophical alternative, posits ethical fulfillment through reason and empathy alone, yet faces challenges in grounding ultimate purpose without invoking naturalistic fallacies or arbitrary axioms. Thinkers like highlighted the "death of " precipitating , where secularity unmasks the absence of inherent cosmic value, forcing humans to confront a void that religious frameworks naturally fill. Empirical extensions from philosophy, such as studies on belief formation, reinforce that requires reflective override of intuitive , often correlating with higher analytical thinking but lower spontaneous endorsement of meaning. Thus, while secularity enables intellectual autonomy, it philosophically diverges from human nature's baseline orientation toward the sacred, potentially yielding compensatory ideologies that mimic religious structures, as seen in state cults or ideological fervor throughout history.

Ethical and Moral Implications

Secularity raises profound questions about the foundations of and , particularly whether human moral systems require a religious basis for objectivity and enforcement. Proponents of religious ethics argue that without a transcendent , moral norms risk devolving into subjective preferences, as articulated in the , which posits that moral obligations derive from God's will. This view, defended by philosophers like , contends that entails , where no ultimate grounding exists for claims of right and wrong beyond individual or societal whim. Empirical support for this concern includes observations that highly secular environments can foster ethical relativism, evidenced by varying cultural norms on issues like or , where secular frameworks prioritize over absolute prohibitions. Conversely, secular ethicists maintain that morality emerges from innate human capacities such as , reason, and social cooperation, independent of religious . Historical developments in , from Victorian secularism's emphasis on rational self-improvement to modern , demonstrate viable non-theistic systems grounded in observable human needs and consequences. echoed this in asserting that ethical behavior stems from , , and social ties rather than religious bases. Philosophically, critiques of via the question whether morality is arbitrary (dependent on 's arbitrary will) or independent (rendering superfluous), favoring secular derivations from and rational deliberation. Empirical data on moral outcomes in secular versus religious societies reveal mixed but instructive patterns. Studies indicate no consistent evidence that religiosity directly enhances moral behavior; for instance, priming religious concepts can temporarily boost prosociality in lab settings, yet cross-national analyses show secular nations like those in exhibiting lower crime rates and higher trust levels despite declining . However, secularity correlates with challenges such as elevated , potentially eroding communal moral restraints, as seen in higher rates of certain ethical lapses like corporate in post-religious contexts where traditional virtues wane. These findings suggest secularity does not preclude robust —often sustained by legal and cultural mechanisms—but may amplify risks of moral drift absent religion's ritualistic reinforcements, prompting debates on whether secular systems sufficiently motivate or long-term societal goods like . Critics of unchecked secularity warn of downstream moral hazards, including the erosion of intrinsic human dignity without a sacred view of life, leading to utilitarian trade-offs in or . In contrast, secular advocates highlight religion's historical role in moral rigidity, such as religiously justified , arguing that evidence-based better adapt to new challenges like AI governance. Ultimately, while secularity enables pluralistic moral discourse, its implications hinge on whether rational frameworks can replicate religion's motivational depth, a tension unresolved by current evidence and fueling ongoing philosophical contention.

Political Instrumentalization

In the early 20th century, instrumentalized to forge a modern nation-state, enacting reforms from 1923 to 1938 that supplanted with Swiss-inspired civil codes in 1926, abolished the in 1924, and restricted religious attire and education to diminish clerical authority and align with Western models. These measures centralized power under the , suppressing Sufi orders and Quranic schools to prevent religious factions from challenging Kemalist nationalism, though enforcement involved authoritarian tactics like surveillance of mosques. Communist regimes systematically deployed as a tool for ideological hegemony, as in the where Lenin's 1918 decree separated church and state, followed by Stalin's 1920s-1930s campaigns that demolished over 90% of Orthodox churches and executed or imprisoned tens of thousands of , framing as a bourgeois obstacle to proletarian unity. Similar policies in Maoist from 1949 onward closed temples and persecuted believers during the 1966-1976 , affecting millions, to enforce and eliminate competing loyalties, with empirical data showing 's persistence despite suppression indicating limited causal success in eradication. In , laïcité—codified in the 1905 separating church and state—has been politically leveraged to regulate religious visibility, exemplified by the 2004 ban on conspicuous symbols in public schools and the 2010 niqab prohibition, which targeted Islamist expressions amid rising , with data from 2004-2020 indicating disproportionate enforcement against Muslim students comprising over 80% of cases despite and also affected. Critics, including reports from religious advocates, argue this instrumentalizes secular neutrality to assimilate minorities and counter perceived Islamist threats, though proponents cite it as safeguarding republican cohesion against . Contemporary examples include Quebec's 2019 Bill 21, barring public sector workers from religious symbols, invoked by the to rally francophone identity against , overriding rights via the notwithstanding clause and polling 64% public support in 2020 despite legal challenges from affected Sikh and Muslim employees. In post-Soviet , elites have promoted a state-sanctioned "secular" since independence in 1991, censoring independent clerics and aligning religious narratives with authoritarian rule to preempt Islamist opposition, as evidenced by crackdowns on over 10,000 alleged extremists since 1999. Such uses highlight secularity's role in preempting religious rivals to state legitimacy, often prioritizing control over genuine , with academic analyses noting biases in sources that downplay coercive elements in favor of progressive framing.