Social polarization

Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Social polarization denotes the progressive fragmentation of societies into discrete groups with sharply contrasting worldviews, identities, and values, often manifesting as both ideological divergence on policy matters and affective hostility toward perceived out-groups.^[1]^[2] Empirical analyses reveal that while ideological polarization—measured by widening gaps in expressed policy preferences—has advanced gradually in established democracies like the United States and Western Europe, affective polarization, characterized by escalating emotional aversion between partisans, has intensified more rapidly since the early 2000s.^[3]^[4]^[5] In the U.S., for instance, surveys indicate that partisan dislike now rivals in-group favoritism in magnitude, with fewer citizens viewing opponents as legitimate despite limited evidence of mass ideological extremism matching elite cues.^[6]^[7] Key drivers include the sorting of individuals into homogeneous social networks via residential, educational, and occupational patterns, compounded by algorithmic amplification on digital platforms that prioritize divisive content over consensus-building discourse.^[8]^[9] These dynamics erode interpersonal trust across divides, impede legislative compromise, and correlate with upticks in norm-violating behaviors such as protests escalating to unrest, though causal links to outright violence remain context-dependent rather than inevitable.^[10]^[6]

Definitions and Measurement

Conceptual Foundations

Social polarization denotes the process whereby a society's members increasingly sort into discrete, antagonistic groups differentiated by core identities, beliefs, or values, diminishing space for moderation or cross-group consensus. In political contexts, it manifests as heightened partisan divergence, where shared civic norms erode under the weight of group-based loyalties. This phenomenon contrasts with mere disagreement, emphasizing structural bimodality in distributions of attitudes rather than uniform extremism.^[11] Conceptually, social polarization comprises ideological and affective dimensions. Ideological polarization involves measurable shifts in policy preferences, such as greater consistency in party-aligned views on issues like government intervention or social regulation, evidenced by longitudinal surveys showing Democrats liberalizing and Republicans conserving since the 1990s. Affective polarization, by contrast, captures emotional intergroup hostility—positive regard for one's own partisan ingroup coupled with aversion toward outgroups—often decoupled from policy disputes, as demonstrated by rising partisan thermometer ratings in U.S. data from the 1980s onward, where Democrats and Republicans increasingly rate opponents near zero on 100-point favorability scales.^[1]^[6]^[1] These foundations rest on social psychological principles, particularly social identity theory, which posits that categorization into salient groups (e.g., parties as proxies for moral tribes) engenders ingroup bias and outgroup derogation through minimal cues alone, as shown in experiments like Tajfel's 1970 paradigm where arbitrary divisions yield favoritism. Group-level processes amplify this, with norms enforcing consensus and punishing deviation, fostering fragmentation into echo-like factions over time. Empirical models integrate these with computational simulations, depicting polarization as iterative dissent leading to clustered extremism, where initial divisions cascade via biased assimilation of information.^[1]^[11]^[6]

Empirical Indicators and Longitudinal Trends

Empirical indicators of social polarization encompass measurable dimensions such as affective polarization, ideological consistency, and partisan sorting. Affective polarization, gauged through "feeling thermometer" ratings where respondents score political parties or their supporters on a 0-100 scale of warmth (0 being coldest), reveals growing emotional distance between partisans. In the United States, the average thermometer rating for the opposing party has declined steadily, from around 50 in the 1970s to below 30 by the 2020s, according to data from the American National Election Studies (ANES).^[12] Ideological polarization is assessed via the distribution of policy views, with the share of Americans holding consistently liberal or conservative positions on a battery of issues doubling from 10% in 1994 to 21% in 2014, per Pew Research Center surveys tracking responses to 10 political values questions.^[13] Partisan animosity, a subset of affective measures, is captured by unfavorable views of the out-party: in 2022, 62% of Republicans and 54% of Democrats reported very unfavorable opinions of the opposing party, up from 21% and 17% respectively in 1994.^[14] Longitudinal trends indicate a marked rise in these indicators since the late 20th century, particularly in established democracies like the US. ANES data show affective polarization accelerating from the 1980s onward, with partisan gaps in feeling thermometer scores widening from 10-15 points in 1980 to over 35 points by 2020.^[12] Ideological divergence among elites has outpaced mass publics: in Congress, the average ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans, measured via DW-NOMINATE scores on roll-call votes, reached its highest level in over 50 years by 2022, with parties farther apart than at any point since Reconstruction.^[15] At the mass level, partisan sorting—where independents with ideological leanings affiliate more strongly with parties—contributed to this trend, as the proportion of ideologically mixed partisans fell from 49% in 1994 to 23% in 2014.^[13]

Year	% Democrats Very Unfavorable to GOP	% Republicans Very Unfavorable to Democrats	Source
1994	17%	21%	Pew Research^[13]
2014	38%	43%	Pew Research^[13]
2022	54%	62%	Pew Research^[14]

Comparatively, trends vary internationally but show similar upward trajectories in affective divides. A 2023 analysis of surveys across 20 countries from 2014-2023 found increasing cultural polarization, with divides on values like tradition vs. openness widening by 10-15% in nations including the US, UK, and Brazil.^[16] In Europe, longitudinal data from 1990-2022 indicate rising left-right ideological polarization in party systems, though affective measures lag behind US levels.^[17] These patterns persist despite evidence that public ideological polarization is less extreme than perceived, with misperceptions inflating estimated out-party extremism by factors of 2-3 among engaged voters.^[6]^[18]

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Early Modern Examples

In ancient Rome, the Conflict of the Orders (c. 494–287 BCE) represented a protracted class-based polarization between the patrician elite, who monopolized political and religious offices, and the plebeian majority, who faced economic exploitation and legal disenfranchisement. Plebeians staged secessions from the city, such as the first in 494 BCE on the Sacred Mount, to demand representation, culminating in the creation of the Tribune of the Plebs with veto power over patrician decisions and, by 287 BCE, the Lex Hortensia granting plebiscites the force of law across all citizens.^[19]^[20] This divide persisted despite reforms, fostering mutual distrust and occasional violence, as plebeians viewed patricians as oligarchic oppressors while patricians resisted dilution of their hereditary privileges.^[21] Medieval Europe saw recurrent factionalism along kinship, economic, and urban-rural lines, often escalating into localized civil strife that mirrored broader social cleavages. In the Low Countries, such as Flanders during the 14th century, rival clans like the Lelie and Clauw factions mobilized patrician families and guilds against each other, leading to street battles and assassinations over trade control and municipal governance; these groups drew support from disparate social strata, with urban artisans aligning against rural lords or vice versa. Similar dynamics prevailed in Italian city-states, where Guelph (papal-aligned) and Ghibelline (imperial-aligned) factions polarized communities from the 12th to 14th centuries, resulting in exiles, property seizures, and massacres, as kin-based loyalties intertwined with ideological commitments to church or empire.^[22] These conflicts, while not ideologically uniform like modern partisanship, intensified social fragmentation by institutionalizing enmity through vendettas and client networks, often requiring princely intervention to restore order.^[23] The early modern period witnessed acute religious polarization triggered by the Protestant Reformation, which fractured Christendom along confessional lines and precipitated widespread violence. In France, the Wars of Religion (1562–1598) pitted Huguenots (Calvinists) against Catholics, with events like the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572 claiming up to 30,000 Protestant lives amid mutual accusations of heresy and sedition, driven by theological irreconcilability and noble ambitions.^[24] The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) across the Holy Roman Empire amplified this divide, as Protestant princes clashed with Catholic Habsburgs, resulting in an estimated 4–8 million deaths from combat, famine, and disease, while social cohesion eroded through forced conversions, iconoclasm, and peasant revolts against perceived confessional impositions.^[25] These conflicts, blending doctrinal zeal with political opportunism, demonstrated how elite schisms could cascade into societal animosity, with communities segregating along faith lines and toleration emerging only via pragmatic treaties like the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which conceded cuius regio, eius religio.^[26] Such polarization was not merely theological but socially corrosive, as it weaponized identity to justify expropriation and exclusion, foreshadowing later ideological rifts.^[24]

20th Century Foundations

During the first half of the 20th century, American political parties exhibited significant ideological heterogeneity, with conservative Democrats in the South and liberal Republicans in the Northeast enabling cross-party coalitions on issues like the New Deal and World War II mobilization. This structure minimized affective divides, as evidenced by American National Election Studies (ANES) data showing limited partisan antipathy through the 1950s and 1960s.^[27] Bipartisan consensus prevailed on foreign policy and economic regulation, reflecting a depolarized electorate where social identities like region and class cut across party lines rather than reinforcing them.^[6] The foundations of modern social polarization emerged in the 1960s through party realignment triggered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, which alienated Southern white Democrats and prompted their migration to the Republican Party.^[28] This sorting aligned racial attitudes more rigidly with partisanship: individuals with negative views toward racial minorities, previously distributed across parties, concentrated in the GOP following the Democratic embrace of civil rights.^[6] Concurrently, the Vietnam War escalation from 1965 onward fueled generational and cultural cleavages, with anti-war protests and countercultural movements deepening divides over authority, morality, and national identity.^[6] Ideological consistency within parties began solidifying in the 1970s, as ANES surveys from 1972 to 2012 reveal Democrats shifting leftward on social welfare issues (self-placement from 3.8 to 3.5 on a 1-7 scale) and Republicans rightward (from 4.5 to 5.0), doubling the partisan gap.^[7] Correlations between party identification and views on welfare policies strengthened from 0.25 in 1984 to 0.41 in 2012, fostering perceptions of greater out-party distance (from 2.0 to 3.2 units).^[7] Events like Watergate (1972-1974) eroded institutional trust, while economic stagflation in the 1970s challenged post-war Keynesian consensus, amplifying elite-mass tensions over redistribution and government efficacy. These shifts laid causal groundwork for affective polarization by transforming partisanship into a salient social identity, where ideological sorting amplified in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, as measured by ANES feeling thermometers rising from 22.64 degrees of separation in 1978 toward out-partisans.^[27] DW-NOMINATE scores indicate congressional polarization intensifying from the mid-1970s in the House, driven by fewer overlapping moderates and emerging cultural fault lines on issues like abortion post-Roe v. Wade (1973).^[6] Globally, similar patterns appeared in Western Europe amid decolonization and welfare state debates, but U.S. realignment uniquely entrenched race and ideology as enduring social dividers.^[6]

21st Century Acceleration

The acceleration of social polarization in the 21st century has been most pronounced in established democracies, particularly the United States, where empirical measures indicate a sharp rise in both ideological sorting and affective divides following the turn of the millennium. Pew Research Center analyses document that the share of Americans with consistently liberal or conservative ideological positions—defined by alignment across 10 political value scales—doubled from 10% in 1994 to 21% by 2014, with the most rapid shifts occurring after 2000 as partisan coalitions became more homogeneous.^[13] Concurrently, affective polarization intensified, evidenced by partisan "feeling thermometer" ratings: Democrats' mean rating of the Republican Party fell from 42 out of 100 in 1994 to 27 by 2014, while Republicans' rating of Democrats dropped from 43 to 23 over the same period, widening the interparty affective gap from minimal differences to over 20 points.^[13] This trend extended beyond ideology to personal animosity, with 38% of Republicans and 37% of Democrats viewing the opposing party as a "threat to the nation's well-being" by 2014, compared to under 20% two decades earlier.^[13] Elite-level polarization in the U.S. Congress amplified these public trends, with ideological distances between Democratic and Republican members reaching levels unseen in over 50 years by the 2020s; for instance, the average Democrat's score on a conservative-liberal scale diverged further from the average Republican's than at any point since systematic tracking began in the 1870s.^[15] Academic studies confirm this acceleration in affective polarization globally but highlight the U.S. as an outlier: across 12 OECD countries from the 1980s to 2010s, the U.S. registered the largest increase in partisan in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, measured via survey-based partisan differential evaluations, outpacing nations like the UK or Canada by factors of 2-3 in trend magnitude.^[29] In Europe, similar patterns emerged post-2008 financial crisis, with V-Dem Institute data showing rises in societal divisions into "hostile political camps" in countries like Hungary and Poland by the mid-2010s, though less uniformly than in the U.S.^[30] Key inflection points included the post-9/11 era's initial unity fracturing into partisan divides over the Iraq War authorization in 2002-2003, followed by surges during the 2008-2009 Great Recession and the 2010 midterm elections, when ideological consistency among partisans jumped markedly.^[31] By the 2010s, content analyses of media coverage revealed approximately 20% more references to polarization in U.S. outlets than at the century's start, correlating with events like the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit referendum, which crystallized identity-based cleavages.^[27] Despite perceptions of extreme mass polarization—often exaggerated among highly engaged citizens—empirical gaps in actual ideological positions remain narrower than elite rhetoric suggests, with misperceptions fueling further affective escalation.^[6] These dynamics underscore a self-reinforcing pattern, where baseline increases in the early 2000s compounded into heightened societal tensions by the 2020s.^[32]

Causal Factors

Elite-Driven Dynamics

Elite-driven dynamics in social polarization describe processes whereby actors in positions of political, economic, and cultural influence—such as legislators, party leaders, and media figures—initiate or intensify divisions through strategic rhetoric, policy positioning, and intra-group competition, which subsequently shape public attitudes via cue-taking and signaling. Empirical analyses of U.S. congressional voting patterns, using DW-NOMINATE scores, reveal that ideological divergence between Democrats and Republicans began accelerating in the 1970s and has since reached levels unseen in over a century, with average partisan distances exceeding those of the past 50 years.^[15]^[33] This elite-level shift predates comparable increases in mass ideological polarization by decades, as public opinion data indicate more modest ideological sorting compared to the stark partisan realignments among elites.^[6]^[34] Mechanisms of elite influence include partisan cueing, where voters align their views with perceived elite signals, fostering greater affective distance between groups even when underlying policy preferences remain relatively stable. Experimental and survey evidence demonstrates that exposure to polarized elite communications alters public opinion formation, amplifying partisan identities and reducing cross-aisle tolerance.^[35]^[36] In congressional contexts, heightened party unity on roll-call votes—rising from under 70% in the 1970s to over 90% by the 2010s—reinforces these cues, driving mass partisan sorting without equivalent surges in voter ideological extremity.^[33] However, some longitudinal studies of electorates, such as in Britain, find limited direct transmission from elite issue polarization to mass affective divides, suggesting contextual moderators like electoral systems may temper elite effects.^[37] A complementary framework posits elite overproduction as a structural driver, wherein an expanding pool of aspirants for limited high-status positions—evident in the U.S. from rising college graduation rates (from 10% of adults in 1970 to 38% in 2020) and professional degrees amid stagnant elite slots—intensifies zero-sum competition, eroding cooperative norms and spawning factional polarization.^[38] Historical cliodynamic models link this dynamic to U.S. trends since the 1980s, correlating surplus elites with declining intra-elite trust and rising political violence risks, as seen in predictive analyses forecasting instability peaks around 2020.^[38]^[39] Critics argue the theory overlooks demand-side factors like voter preferences, but cross-societal data spanning centuries support overproduction's role in fracturing elite cohesion, which cascades to broader societal rifts.^[40]^[41]

Media and Technological Influences

The proliferation of partisan cable news outlets in the United States, beginning with the launch of Fox News in 1996 and MSNBC's shift toward liberal commentary in the early 2000s, has contributed to ideological sorting among audiences, with conservatives disproportionately tuning into Fox News and liberals to MSNBC or CNN.^[42] Empirical analysis indicates that exposure to Fox News during the 2000 election cycle increased Republican vote shares by approximately 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in affected markets, suggesting a causal link to partisan mobilization and heightened affective divides.^[43] Longitudinal studies of cable news content from 2012 to 2022 reveal increasing partisan divergence, with Fox News content shifting rightward and MSNBC leftward relative to neutral benchmarks, amplifying perceptions of out-group hostility among viewers.^[44] Digital platforms, particularly social media, exacerbate these dynamics through algorithmic recommendations that prioritize engagement-driven content, often reinforcing users' preexisting views via selective exposure. A systematic review of 121 studies found consistent evidence that social media usage correlates with increased affective polarization, though effects vary by platform and user demographics, with heavier users showing greater ideological extremism.^[8] However, large-scale analyses of Facebook interactions indicate that while like-minded sources dominate feeds (comprising over 60% of news consumption for partisans), cross-cutting exposure still occurs frequently enough to mitigate extreme echo chambers, challenging claims of total algorithmic isolation.^[45] Platforms like Twitter (now X) and YouTube have been linked to rapid dissemination of polarizing content, with algorithms favoring outrage-inducing posts that boost retention; for instance, a 2021 study estimated that such mechanics amplified partisan misperceptions by 20-30% during election periods.^[46] Technological affordances, including smartphone ubiquity and infinite scrolling since the mid-2010s, have intensified these effects by enabling constant, personalized news flows that reward emotional reactivity over deliberative discourse. Pew Research data from 2020 shows that Republicans and Democrats inhabit nearly inverse media ecosystems, with 57% of Republicans relying on Fox News versus minimal crossover to liberal outlets, fostering mutual distrust documented in rising unfavorable views (e.g., 72% of Republicans viewing Democrats unfavorably by 2022).^[47] While social media is not the primary driver—cable news exerts stronger per-user influence on voting behavior—its scalability has accelerated polarization trends, particularly among younger cohorts, where daily platform use exceeds 3 hours and correlates with 15-20% higher partisan identity strength.^[48] Cross-national evidence tempers causality claims, as polarization rises in low-social-media-penetration contexts like pre-digital Europe, implying media amplifies underlying elite cues rather than originating divides.^[49]

Cultural and Ideological Divergences

Cultural and ideological divergences manifest in deepening divides over moral foundations, family structures, religious observance, and national identity, exacerbating social polarization by fostering group identities centered on incompatible worldviews. Empirical surveys indicate that in the United States, ideological gaps on these issues are markedly wider than in comparable Western democracies; for instance, 65% of conservatives prioritize adhering to societal traditions compared to just 6% of liberals, a disparity over twice as large as in the United Kingdom, France, or Germany.^[50] These rifts extend to views on national belonging, where U.S. conservatives are far more likely to deem Christian faith (32%) or birthplace (32%) essential to American identity than their European counterparts, while liberals emphasize inclusivity to a greater degree, contributing to mutual perceptions of threat and eroding common ground.^[50] Moral foundations theory elucidates these divergences, positing that liberals disproportionately emphasize care for the vulnerable and fairness as equality, whereas conservatives balance these with loyalty, authority, and sanctity, leading to clashing priorities on issues like immigration and social change.^[51] In advanced economies, such value conflicts correlate with heightened perceptions of societal tension; 50% of Americans report strong divides between religious and secular groups, with conservatives viewing religious discrimination as acute and liberals focusing on minority protections, amplifying affective polarization as individuals increasingly see opposing ideologies as morally corrupt.^[52] Longitudinal data reveal asymmetry in these shifts, with progressive cohorts advancing further on cultural liberalization—evident in rapid acceptance of non-traditional family forms—while traditionalist views remain relatively stable, intensifying sorting into ideologically homogeneous communities.^[53] These ideological chasms drive polarization through selective exposure and reinforcement, as individuals gravitate toward cultural milieus affirming their values, such as urban progressive enclaves versus rural traditional heartlands, resulting in reduced interpersonal contact and heightened out-group animus. Studies of value extremity show that stronger adherence to either progressive egalitarianism or traditional hierarchy predicts greater partisan disdain, independent of policy disagreements, underscoring how cultural signaling becomes a proxy for loyalty tests in polarized environments.^[54] In Europe and the U.S., immigration attitudes further highlight this, with right-leaning groups perceiving threats to cultural cohesion (e.g., 57% of U.S. conservatives valuing shared customs for national identity) against left-leaning advocacy for multiculturalism, fueling populist backlashes and policy gridlock.^[50]^[52]

Economic and Structural Contributors

Rising income inequality has been empirically linked to increased political polarization in the United States, with both phenomena exhibiting parallel upward trends since the 1970s. Measures of congressional polarization, such as DW-NOMINATE scores, have risen in tandem with the Gini coefficient, which climbed from 0.39 in 1970 to 0.41 by 2016, reflecting greater disparities in income distribution.^[55]^[56] Economists Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal argue that this correlation arises from economic sorting, where high-income individuals increasingly align with one party (Democrats) and lower-income with the other (Republicans), amplifying ideological divides through campaign finance and policy preferences.^[57] However, causal direction remains debated, as polarization may exacerbate inequality via policy gridlock on redistributive measures, though time-series analyses suggest inequality precedes surges in partisan animosity.^[55] Deindustrialization and globalization have contributed to polarization by disproportionately affecting non-college-educated workers in manufacturing-heavy regions, fostering resentment toward cosmopolitan elites and trade policies. U.S. manufacturing employment fell from 19.5 million jobs in 1979 to 12.8 million by 2019, correlating with rises in populist voting in Rust Belt states during elections like 2016.^[58] This economic dislocation has widened the "diploma divide," where college graduates—concentrated in knowledge-based sectors—lean Democratic by margins exceeding 20 percentage points, while non-graduates favor Republicans, as seen in 2020 exit polls showing a 12-point GOP advantage among those without degrees.^[59] Peer-reviewed studies attribute this to diverging economic interests: skilled workers benefit from global integration, while unskilled face wage stagnation and job offshoring, intensifying affective polarization through perceived threats to status.^[60] Urban-rural economic disparities further entrench structural divides, with metropolitan areas capturing 85% of U.S. GDP growth since 2000 despite housing only 80% of the population, leaving rural counties with stagnant incomes and population decline.^[61] This gap manifests in partisan realignment, as rural voters—hit by agricultural consolidation and resource extraction volatility—shift Republican by 15-20 points since 1976, viewing urban-dominated policies as neglectful of local economies.^[62] Empirical models show economic threats, such as resource windfalls unevenly distributed, boost affective polarization by 4% per standard deviation increase, as groups in declining areas otherize urban counterparts.^[63]^[64] Structural factors like concentrated innovation hubs in cities amplify this, sorting high-skill migrants into progressive enclaves while rural areas retain conservative demographics, perpetuating policy feedback loops on issues like trade and infrastructure.^[60]

Forms and Manifestations

Ideological Polarization

Ideological polarization refers to the increasing divergence in policy positions and ideological orientations between political groups, such as parties or voter coalitions, typically along dimensions like economic interventionism, social conservatism, and institutional authority.^[65] This manifests as reduced overlap in issue stances, where left-leaning actors favor expansive government roles in redistribution and cultural progressivism, while right-leaning counterparts emphasize market freedoms and traditional values.^[4] Measurements include scaling techniques like DW-NOMINATE for legislative voting, which quantify legislator ideology via roll-call patterns, and survey-based indices of self-reported ideology or policy agreement.^[66] Bimodality in ideological distributions—evidenced by clustering at extremes rather than a bell curve—serves as another indicator, though it requires distinguishing true divergence from partisan sorting.^[67] In the United States, elite ideological polarization has intensified markedly, with DW-NOMINATE scores revealing the ideological gap between congressional parties widening from about 0.8 units in the 1970s to over 1.5 by the 2020s, driven by both parties shifting outward on the primary liberal-conservative dimension.^[15]^[66] This elite drift correlates with diminished cross-party compromise on legislation, as seen in stalled bipartisan bills on immigration and fiscal policy post-2000.^[68] At the mass level, Pew Research data from 1994 to 2014 document heightened partisan divides on issues like government size (82-point gap between Republicans and Democrats by 2014) and social safety nets, yet aggregate public opinion distributions show limited outward movement; instead, ideological sorting has aligned voters more consistently with parties, amplifying perceived gaps without equivalent mean shifts.^[13]^[69] Perceptions of polarization exceed reality, particularly among engaged partisans, fostering misjudgments of opponents' extremism.^[6] European trends exhibit heterogeneity, with party system polarization—calculated as weighted ideological distances between parties—rising modestly in Western democracies since the 2010s, often linked to economic crises and migration surges that radicalized platforms on EU integration and welfare.^[70] For instance, Chapel Hill Expert Survey data indicate stable but punctuated increases in left-right divides, particularly in Southern Europe, where anti-austerity and nativist parties pulled extremes further apart by 2020.^[71] In multiparty systems, this polarization appears asymmetric, with right-wing shifts on cultural issues outpacing left-wing economic radicalism in countries like France and Italy.^[72] Social media analyses of party communications corroborate rising divergence in 27 EU states plus the UK, though institutional fragmentation tempers elite-mass transmission compared to the US.^[73]^[74] Globally, ideological polarization correlates with democratic backsliding risks when combined with institutional weaknesses, as divergent policy visions hinder consensus on governance fundamentals.^[75] Empirical models embedding survey responses in multidimensional space confirm bimodal patterns in advanced economies, underscoring causal roles for elite cues over mass attitude changes alone.^[75] While academic sources often emphasize affective spillovers, rigorous roll-call and expert surveys reveal ideological cores rooted in verifiable policy contestations rather than mere perceptual biases.^[69]

Affective and Identity-Based Polarization

Affective polarization refers to the widening emotional chasm between political partisans, characterized by heightened affinity for one's own group and animosity toward opponents, extending beyond mere policy disagreements to visceral dislike and distrust.^[76]^[77] This phenomenon contrasts with ideological polarization, which centers on substantive divergences in beliefs about governance and issues, as affective divides have grown asymmetrically faster, driven by group-based animus rather than rational evaluation of ideas.^[4]^[78] Empirical measures, such as feeling thermometer ratings from the American National Election Studies, illustrate this trend in the United States: the partisan affect gap—subtracting average ratings of the out-party from the in-party—rose from roughly 20 points in the late 1970s to over 50 points by the 2010s, reflecting a shift from mild indifference to outright hostility.^[27] Similar patterns appear in behavioral experiments, where individuals discriminate against out-partisans in social and economic contexts, such as preferring co-partisans for jobs, dates, or charitable donations, often exceeding biases based on race.^[79]^[78] Identity-based polarization intensifies affective divides when political labels fuse with deeper social identities like race, religion, or socioeconomic status, transforming partisanship into a core aspect of self-concept as outlined in social identity theory.^[80]^[81] Research by Lilliana Mason demonstrates that this "social sorting" amplifies hostility: individuals with overlapping partisan and identity cues exhibit greater out-group derogation, even when policy views align, as group loyalty overrides issue-based reasoning.^[81] For example, symbolic ideology—partisan identity detached from specific positions—predicts affective bias more strongly than actual belief differences.^[81] These dynamics manifest in everyday interactions, eroding cross-partisan ties: surveys show rising reluctance to socialize, marry, or befriend opposite-party members, with partisan cues triggering implicit biases akin to tribal conflicts.^[79] Cross-nationally, affective polarization has increased in OECD countries since the 1980s, though less pronounced than in the US, correlating with elite cues and media fragmentation that reinforce identity silos.^[82]^[12]

Elite-Mass Disparities

Elite-mass disparities in social polarization manifest as pronounced differences in ideological positions, affective animus, and policy preferences between societal elites—encompassing political leaders, business executives, media figures, and academics—and the broader public. Empirical analyses of U.S. data reveal that elites display greater affective polarization, characterized by stronger negative emotions toward political opponents, than the mass public; moreover, elite affective divides surpass their own ideological polarization on issues. For instance, surveys of party convention delegates compared to American National Election Studies respondents show elites expressing more extreme partisan hostility, even as mass ideological sorting has increased modestly since the 1970s.^[83] This elite extremity often outpaces public trends, with limited evidence of elite cues fully cascading to mass attitudes, as seen in British panel data where party polarization weakly predicts public shifts.^[37] Policy-specific gaps underscore these divides, particularly on immigration and economic issues where public concerns prioritize restriction and redistribution more than elite views. A 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey of 2,862 public respondents and 397 elites (from Congress, business, media, and academia) found 60% of the public deeming current immigration levels a "critical threat" to U.S. interests, versus 14% of elites—a 46-point disparity that widened post-9/11 from prior years. Additionally, 55% of the public supported reducing legal immigration compared to 18% of elites, while 70% of the public ranked curbing illegal immigration as "very important" against 22% of elites. Similar rifts appear in elite-public attitudes toward business regulation and globalization, with 2016 surveys showing elites far more favorable to open markets than the public amid rising inequality perceptions.^[84]^[85] These disparities are amplified by elite misperceptions of public opinion, where leaders systematically underestimate mass conservatism on cultural and redistributive issues. A 2018 study surveying 3,765 U.S. politicians across two years documented biases, such as Democratic elites overestimating constituent support for policies like government-funded healthcare expansions by 20-30 percentage points, leading to representational disconnects. Such errors stem partly from self-selection into elite networks and institutional environments like academia and media, which harbor systemic left-leaning biases that skew elite worldviews away from median public sentiments—evident in underrepresentation of conservative viewpoints in elite surveys and hiring data. This perceptual gap fosters policy elitism, eroding trust and spurring mass backlash, as elites advance agendas (e.g., expansive immigration or rapid social change) misaligned with empirical public priorities, thereby intensifying overall societal polarization.^[86]

Societal Impacts

Effects on Democratic Institutions

Social polarization manifests in democratic institutions through heightened legislative gridlock, where partisan divides impede the passage of legislation, particularly in the United States Congress, where gridlock has risen steadily since the 1970s amid growing ideological divergence.^[87] Research indicates that affective polarization—characterized by emotional hostility toward opposing parties—further entrenches this by diminishing incentives for cross-aisle negotiation, resulting in fewer enacted policies on key agendas like budgeting and infrastructure.^[88] ^[89] For instance, a 2024 analysis found that higher polarization levels correlate with prolonged stalemates, slowing legislative output and shifting enacted laws toward more extreme, high-stakes measures when breakthroughs occur.^[90] This dysfunction extends to electoral processes, where polarization incentivizes parties to nominate candidates who amplify divisions to mobilize bases, potentially eroding norms of fair competition.^[6] Evidence from U.S. elections shows that perceived affective divides reduce post-election confidence among losers, fostering disputes over results and straining institutional legitimacy, as seen in heightened challenges following the 2020 presidential contest.^[91] Such dynamics can weaken judicial and administrative impartiality, as polarized publics pressure institutions to align with partisan narratives, contributing to selective norm adherence where violations are tolerated if committed by one's own side.^[6] ^[92] Polarization also correlates with declining trust in core institutions like parliaments and courts, as mutual perceptions of opponents as existential threats undermine the perceived fairness of democratic rules.^[10] Cross-national studies link severe polarization to democratic backsliding, including executive overreach and weakened checks, though causal evidence remains contested, with some analyses suggesting elite actions precede mass divides rather than vice versa.^[92] ^[93] In polarized contexts, this has manifested in events like the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot, where affective animus amplified challenges to electoral certification, highlighting risks to procedural integrity.^[6] Overall, while polarization does not inevitably collapse democracies, empirical patterns show it hampers institutional functionality by prioritizing zero-sum conflict over deliberative governance.^[94] Social polarization, encompassing both ideological divides and affective animosity toward out-groups, correlates with measurable declines in interpersonal trust and broader social cohesion. Data from the General Social Survey indicate that the proportion of Americans agreeing that "most people can be trusted" fell from 46% in 1972 to 34% in 2018, a trend that intensified amid rising partisan hostilities.^[95] Affective polarization exacerbates this by fostering out-partisan hostility, which reduces generalized social trust—defined as confidence in strangers and neighbors—independent of ideological differences.^[96] Empirical analyses of survey data show that perceptions of heightened political polarization predict lower social trust levels, with individuals viewing society as more divided reporting diminished faith in others' benevolence.^[10] This erosion manifests in reduced cross-group interactions and cooperation, as polarized individuals increasingly avoid contact with those holding opposing views, leading to fragmented communities. Studies document that affective polarization promotes intolerance and discriminatory behaviors, such as reluctance to engage in joint civic activities, which undermines communal bonds.^[97] For instance, negative partisan stereotypes contribute to broader mistrust, with Americans' views of the opposing political party's supporters growing more unfavorable over time, further entrenching social silos.^[95] Longitudinal data reveal sharper trust declines among political independents compared to partisans, suggesting that perceived elite-driven polarization spills over into everyday interpersonal skepticism, twice as pronounced from 1972–1979 to 2010–2021.^[98] At the societal level, these dynamics threaten cohesion by amplifying echo chambers and reducing collective efficacy, where groups prioritize in-group loyalty over shared norms. Research links extreme polarization to weakened democratic resilience through eroded social capital, as distrust hinders voluntary associations and mutual aid.^[99] While some evidence indicates that bolstering political trust may mitigate affective divides, the reverse causality—polarization directly diminishing social trust—remains supported by cross-sectional and panel studies, though confounded by factors like media amplification.^[100] Interventions promoting cross-partisan dialogue have shown modest gains in perceived cohesion, improving generalized trust by approximately 20% of a standard deviation in experimental settings.^[101] Overall, unchecked polarization risks long-term fragmentation, as evidenced by stagnant or declining metrics of community engagement amid partisan animus.^[102]

Consequences for Policy and Economy

Social polarization exacerbates legislative gridlock by intensifying partisan divides, reducing the willingness of lawmakers to compromise on cross-aisle initiatives. In the United States Congress, ideological polarization has led to a decline in the passage of bills since the mid-1990s, with enacted legislation dropping as inter-party distances widened, though surviving measures often addressed higher-stakes issues requiring unified action.^[90] This dynamic manifests in stalled nominations, delayed budgets, and obstructed reforms, as evidenced by repeated government shutdown threats tied to polarized spending disputes from 2013 onward.^[6] State-level analyses similarly show that greater party polarization correlates with distinct policy outputs, such as divergent approaches to taxation and regulation when one party dominates, limiting adaptive governance.^[103] Polarization distorts policy priorities toward short-term partisan gains over long-term stability, fostering extremism in areas like fiscal policy and trade. Divided governments exhibit more extreme ideological positions among legislators, complicating consensus on economic stabilization measures and increasing the risk of volatile policy swings.^[104] For instance, affective polarization has politicized ostensibly neutral economic issues, with opposing groups viewing fiscal stimuli or tariffs through lenses of group loyalty rather than efficacy, as seen in divergent partisan responses to post-2008 recovery efforts.^[105] This results in suboptimal outcomes, such as prolonged debt ceiling battles that elevate borrowing costs without resolving underlying fiscal imbalances.^[88] Economically, heightened polarization introduces uncertainty that deters investment and hampers growth by eroding trust in institutional predictability. A 2023 analysis of U.S. real asset markets found that rising polarization reduced mergers between firms with divergent political affiliations, lowering announcement returns by approximately 1% and impairing post-merger synergies due to cultural clashes.^[106] Cross-country evidence links greater ideological dispersion— a proxy for polarization—to slower GDP growth, with a one-standard-deviation increase in polarization associated with 0.5-1% lower annual growth rates through channels like weakened property rights and policy instability.^[107] ^[108] Affective divides further amplify these effects via consumer behavior, as individuals increasingly boycott brands aligned with out-groups, contributing to market fragmentation and reduced efficiency in sectors like retail and media.^[109] Polarization also skews economic expectations, with partisans holding biased forecasts of policy impacts, which in turn influences voter-driven fiscal decisions and perpetuates cycles of suboptimal resource allocation.^[110]

Comparative Perspectives

Polarization in the United States

Political polarization in the United States has intensified since the late 20th century, manifesting in both ideological divergence among elites and growing affective animosity between partisans in the mass public. Ideological polarization, measured by the ideological consistency of public opinions, doubled from 10% of Americans holding consistently conservative or liberal views in 1994 to 21% by 2014, according to surveys tracking issue positions on topics like government role, immigration, and social values.^[13] In Congress, this trend is more pronounced: roll-call voting data show that by 2022, no House Republicans were less conservative than the median Democrat, a stark reversal from 1972 when substantial overlap existed between parties' ideological ranges.^[15] DW-NOMINATE scores, which quantify legislators' positions based on voting patterns, confirm steady partisan divergence since the 1970s, driven by increasing party-line voting on economic, cultural, and foreign policy issues.^[66] Affective polarization—characterized by emotional aversion toward out-partisans—has risen more sharply than ideological divides among voters. Feeling thermometer ratings from the American National Election Studies indicate that Democrats' average rating of Republicans fell from 48 degrees in 1980 to 28 in 2020, with Republicans showing a parallel decline toward Democrats.^[78] By 2022, 62% of Republicans and 54% of Democrats viewed the opposing party very unfavorably, exceeding levels from the 1990s.^[111] This out-party hostility correlates with perceptions of threat, where partisans increasingly see opponents as morally corrupt or dangerous, though empirical studies find that mass ideological polarization remains modest compared to elite levels, with misperceptions of extremity amplifying affective gaps—particularly among highly engaged citizens who overestimate divides by up to 20-30 percentage points.^[6]^[6] Compared to other democracies, U.S. affective polarization has grown faster: over four decades ending around 2020, the U.S. registered the largest increase among nine OECD countries studied, with partisan gaps in social trust and intergroup warmth widening by factors unseen in nations like Germany or Canada.^[112] Ideological sorting—where voters align personal identities (e.g., race, education, urban-rural residence) more tightly with parties—contributes, as college-educated whites shifted Democratic since 1992 while non-college whites moved Republican, creating a "diploma divide" evident in 2024 election data where educational attainment predicted partisan leanings more strongly than in prior decades.^[113] Economic stagnation for lower-education groups, with real median wages for non-college men stagnating since 1979 while rising for graduates, correlates with cultural backlash against progressive shifts on immigration and family structures.^[114] Elite cues exacerbate mass trends: congressional polarization precedes public shifts, with party leaders' rhetoric since the 1990s emphasizing cultural conflicts over economic consensus, as seen in voting unity scores reaching 90%+ by the 2010s.^[115] Media fragmentation plays a role, but causal evidence is mixed; while social media amplifies selective exposure, pre-digital surveys show affective roots in the 1980s, suggesting endogenous partisan incentives over technology as primary drivers.^[49] Gerrymandering and primary electorates favoring extremes explain some elite sorting, yet public opinion data indicate voters reward ideological clarity, not moderation, in candidates.^[116] Key events underscore manifestations: the 2016 election highlighted identity cleavages, with 81% of white evangelicals supporting Trump amid perceptions of cultural displacement, while urban minorities consolidated Democratic support.^[32] The January 6, 2021, Capitol riot reflected affective extremes, with polls showing 20-30% of Republicans justifying violence under perceived electoral threats, though such views remain minority positions.^[6] Recent 2024 data show ideological self-identification stable at 37% conservative and 34% moderate/liberal, but party gaps in policy views (e.g., 70-point partisan divide on immigration enforcement) persist.^[117] Critiques of overstatement note that while Congress exhibits near-total sorting, public compromise willingness endures on issues like trade or infrastructure, with cross-aisle marriages holding at 15-20% despite affective strain.^[118] Nonetheless, sustained trends risk institutional strain, as evidenced by filibuster invocations rising from 35 in 2008 to over 300 annually by 2020, reflecting elite entrenchment.^[119] Empirical consensus holds that U.S. polarization, while real, is elite-led and perception-inflated, differing from Europe's more issue-specific divides or Latin America's clientelist patterns.^[75]

Trends in Europe

In Europe, political polarization has risen markedly since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, as evidenced by analyses of press coverage and legislative outcomes in major economies. A 2025 study focusing on France, Germany, Spain, and Italy found significant increases in a Political Polarization Index derived from media discourse, correlating with events like the 2015 refugee crisis in Germany and the 2016 Catalan independence movement in Spain.^[120] This trend reflects deepening divides on economic inequality, migration, and national sovereignty, though institutional factors such as electoral systems moderated gridlock in Italy compared to France.^[120] Party system ideological polarization has shown a slight but consistent upward trajectory across 30 European countries from 1990 to 2019, primarily along dimensions of the political system, welfare policies, and societal fabric, according to manifesto-based variance measures from the TRUEDEM project.^[121] The emergence of challenger parties, often populist, has amplified this shift by pulling mainstream parties toward extremes on issues like EU integration and redistribution.^[121] Urban-rural divides have also intensified over the same period, with European Social Survey data from 2002-2020 indicating growing partisan and attitudinal gaps, particularly in attitudes toward globalization and authority.^[122] Affective polarization, characterized by emotional aversion toward out-groups, manifests strongly around immigration and climate change, with average polarization indices reaching 4.5 on a feeling thermometer scale in a 2023 multi-country study.^[123] In Italy and Greece, up to 35% of respondents exhibited maximal polarization on these issues, exceeding ideological divides, while right-leaning voters showed heightened negativity toward pro-immigration stances.^[123] Unlike the identity-driven affective gaps in the United States, European variants remain more issue-contingent, yet they correlate with declining institutional trust in polarized domains like democracy and social groups.^[121] Electoral outcomes underscore these trends, with populist radical-right parties gaining ground in the 2024 European Parliament elections, securing around 25% of seats collectively despite a less dramatic surge than anticipated.^[124] National-level shifts, such as the National Rally's strong performance in France's June 2024 parliamentary vote and the Freedom Party's victory in Austria's September elections, highlight polarization on migration and cultural identity, though centrist coalitions often tempered absolute gains.^[125] These developments, amid broader incumbent losses across 2024 polls, signal ongoing fragmentation rather than uniform convergence.^[126]

Global Patterns Beyond the West

In Latin America, political polarization has intensified markedly over the past two decades, with the region exhibiting the highest increase globally according to United Nations Development Programme analysis of perceptual and ideological divides.^[127] This trend manifests in zero-sum perceptions of politics, where cross-cutting social ties erode, as evidenced by rising affective hostility and democratic backsliding in countries like Brazil and Argentina.^[128] In Brazil, empirical surveys reveal asymmetric affective polarization, with supporters of the Workers' Party (PT) expressing greater negative identities toward opponents than vice versa, contributing to 214 documented cases of politically motivated violence during the 2022 election cycle.^[129]^[130] Such patterns correlate with partisan dehumanization and stereotyping, where voters attribute unfavorable traits to out-groups, exacerbating social fragmentation beyond ideological lines.^[131] In South Asia, particularly India, social polarization often intersects with religious and ethnic cleavages, shaping interpersonal relationships and political discourse. V-Dem Institute data indicate elevated levels of political polarization since the mid-2010s, where societal divisions extend into non-political domains, fueled by partisan attachments and media echo chambers.^[132] Surveys show approximately 30% of respondents holding strong partisan identities, resilient amid economic pressures, though lower than in comparable large democracies; this has manifested in reduced trust across communal lines and heightened intolerance toward minorities.^[133] Twitter-based analyses confirm echo-chamber effects in political discussions, with users clustering into opposing camps on topics like governance and identity, amplifying affective divides.^[134] Turkey exemplifies acute polarization in the Middle East, characterized by high social distance between supporters of ruling and opposition parties, as measured by surveys revealing moral prejudices and diminished civility in public discourse.^[135] This has persisted since the 2016 coup attempt, with referendum-style elections reinforcing binary divides and weakening traditional cleavages, per electoral data from 1990–2023.^[136] Polarization correlates with media control and discordant exposure experiments showing limited attitude shifts despite incentives to engage opposing views, underscoring entrenched hostility.^[137] Across sub-Saharan Africa, partisan conflicts are perceived as strong by majorities in surveyed nations, with Pew Research finding 70% of Nigerians and 68% of Kenyans reporting intense disagreements between political groups in 2022.^[138] In South Africa, polarization mirrors inequality-driven tensions, eroding institutional trust akin to patterns in high-disparity contexts, though empirical indices like V-Dem's societal antagonism metric highlight variability tied to ethnic mobilization.^[139] Overall, non-Western patterns reveal polarization amplified by populism, social media algorithms, and identity politics, often outpacing ideological sorting and challenging democratic resilience where measured by expert assessments.^[140]^[141]

Controversies and Responses

Debates on Primary Drivers

Elite cueing theory maintains that social polarization primarily stems from diverging positions among political and media elites, who provide partisan signals that masses emulate through loyalty and selective perception. Empirical analyses of survey data reveal that elites exhibit greater affective and ideological polarization than the mass public, with elite divisions on issues like immigration and trade preceding public shifts by decades. This top-down mechanism is evidenced by experimental studies showing that exposure to polarized elite rhetoric heightens mass partisan animus more than vice versa.^[142]^[143]^[144] Proponents of media-driven explanations, particularly social media platforms, argue that algorithmic amplification and echo chambers foster selective exposure to extreme content, exacerbating divisions. A systematic review of over 50 studies links media fragmentation to rising affective polarization, citing cases where misinformation spreads rapidly within partisan networks. However, empirical critiques highlight limited causal evidence, as randomized exposure to opposing views often fails to reduce polarization and cross-cutting information does not consistently depolarize audiences, suggesting self-selection and pre-existing biases play larger roles.^[8]^[145]^[6] Economic interpretations posit inequality as a core driver, with stagnant wages and wealth concentration breeding resentment that manifests in partisan sorting. Time-series data from the U.S. show correlations between Gini coefficient rises—reaching 0.41 by 2016—and increased partisan gaps on redistribution policies, potentially fueling elite-mass tensions via intra-elite competition. Yet, vector autoregression models indicate no robust Granger causality from inequality to polarization after controlling for confounders like education levels, challenging direct links and pointing instead to mediated effects through policy debates. Structural-demographic theories, such as those emphasizing elite overproduction, extend this by arguing that an oversupply of aspirants for limited power positions—evident in U.S. college degree holders outpacing high-skill jobs since the 1980s—intensifies zero-sum conflicts and institutional distrust.^[55]^[146]^[38] Cultural and identity-based accounts highlight a shift from economic to moral cleavages, where partisan affiliation functions as a primary social identity overriding class or demographic ties. Longitudinal surveys demonstrate that cultural attitudes on issues like abortion and nationalism explain more variance in vote sorting since the 1990s than income, with affective polarization arising from perceived threats to group values. Psychological mechanisms, including motivated reasoning and in-group favoritism, amplify this, as partisan cues trigger emotional responses that sustain divisions even absent policy disagreements. Critics note that academic emphasis on these factors may understate elite agency, given evidence of greater elite ideological divergence.^[147]^[148]^[9] These debates intersect in feedback loops, where elite signals interact with media and identities to entrench polarization, but misperceptions—such as overestimating out-party extremism—affect engaged citizens most, potentially inflating perceived drivers. Ongoing research underscores the need for causal identification beyond correlations, with panel studies revealing that while no single factor dominates, elite behavior consistently predicts mass trends across contexts.^[6]^[149]

Empirical Critiques of Common Narratives

Empirical analyses reveal that public perceptions often exaggerate the extent of ideological polarization, with individuals overestimating the extremism of opposing partisans by margins as high as 78% in surveys of American adults conducted in 2019.^[150] This misperception gap persists across political engagement levels, though it is most pronounced among highly active partisans, leading to inflated narratives of societal fracture despite underlying policy agreements, such as broad consensus on national priorities like addressing climate change, which ranked similarly high across Trump and Biden voters in a 2021 aspirations index.^[151]^[152] Studies further indicate that affective dislike targets partisan elites more than ordinary members of the opposing party, suggesting that elite cues, rather than grassroots animosity, amplify the appearance of mass polarization.^[151] Distinctions between elite and mass dynamics undermine claims of uniform public polarization. Data from the American National Election Studies show activist ideological distances doubling from 1.53 units in 1972 to 3.04 in 2012, while General Social Survey trends reveal stable self-identification as moderates among the general electorate, with minimal shifts attributable to response refinements rather than attitudinal change.^[153] Congressional voting patterns, measured via DW-NOMINATE scores, exhibit stark partisan separation since the 1970s, with no overlap between parties in recent sessions, contrasting with the electorate's consistent ideological distribution.^[153] These findings imply that common narratives overattribute polarization to the broader public, overlooking elite-driven sorting where voters align more consistently with ideologically homogeneous parties without adopting more extreme positions themselves. The attribution of polarization to social media echo chambers lacks robust causal support. Analysis of content exposure among 231 million U.S. Facebook users in late 2020 found that 50.4% of political news came from like-minded sources, yet a randomized field experiment reducing such exposure by approximately 33% for 23,377 participants yielded no significant effects on affective polarization or ideological extremity (null results within ±0.12 standard deviations).^[45] This challenges deterministic views of algorithmic amplification, as decreased uncivil content and modest increases in cross-cutting exposure did not translate to attitudinal shifts, indicating that selective exposure alone does not drive polarization dynamics. Asymmetries in polarization processes critique symmetric portrayals. Experimental and survey data demonstrate greater Democratic affective hostility toward Republicans, linked to perceptions of harm to disadvantaged groups rather than equivalent reciprocal animus.^[154] Ideological self-placement trends, as tracked by Gallup from 1992 to 2024, show steady conservative (37%) and moderate (34%) identifications, with liberals comprising a smaller but increasingly vocal segment, suggesting uneven shifts in party bases that narratives often overlook in favor of balanced extremism claims.^[117] Such evidence highlights how causal assumptions—favoring elite influence and perceptual biases over mass radicalization—better align with observed patterns than undifferentiated alarmism.

Proposed Interventions and Evidence

Various interventions have been proposed to mitigate social polarization, focusing on psychological, informational, and institutional mechanisms. These include correcting misperceptions of outgroup views and norms, facilitating cross-partisan interactions, enhancing media literacy, and reforming electoral systems such as ranked-choice voting (RCV). Empirical evidence, primarily from experimental studies and meta-analyses, indicates modest short-term effects for some approaches, though lasting depolarization remains challenging.^[155]^[156] Correcting misperceptions about partisan opponents' attitudes and ingroup norms has shown promise in reducing affective polarization. A 2024 pilot experiment demonstrated that informing participants of accurate ingroup norms—countering exaggerated perceptions of extremism—lowered negative evaluations of outgroups.^[157] Similarly, a large-scale megastudy testing 25 treatments found that correcting misperceptions of rivals' views on issues like violence endorsement reduced support for antidemocratic attitudes, with effects persisting up to two months in some cases.^[156] Another intervention exposing participants to factual knowledge on policy issues decreased attitude polarization by mitigating motivated reasoning biases.^[158] However, a 2025 meta-analysis of depolarization efforts emphasized that such corrections often yield temporary reductions in animosity, with effects fading without reinforcement.^[155] Cross-partisan dialogues and in-person conversations aim to foster empathy through intergroup contact, drawing on theories of prejudice reduction. Experimental evidence from 2022 indicated that structured online conversations decreased affective polarization, particularly when avoiding contentious topics, though effects were conditional on discussion content.^[159] A 2024 study of in-person interactions during community events provided quasi-experimental support for reduced individual-level polarization, attributing gains to direct exposure countering stereotypes.^[101] Field experiments, such as those involving voter outreach, confirmed polarization drops among both Republicans and Democrats post-dialogue, even on divisive issues.^[160] Yet, a comprehensive review highlighted pitfalls: dialogues confronting hot-button topics can backfire, entrenching divides if participants feel threatened.^[155] Media literacy programs seek to equip individuals with skills to discern misinformation, potentially curbing echo-chamber effects. Studies suggest these interventions improve detection of fake news and biased sources, indirectly addressing polarization drivers like disinformation.^[161] For instance, campaigns raising awareness of algorithmic biases and source credibility have been proposed to reduce reliance on polarizing content.^[162] Evidence from social media exposure analyses shows that cross-cutting information access lowers perceived polarization, implying literacy could facilitate such encounters.^[163] However, direct causal links to sustained depolarization are limited, with systematic reviews noting media's role in amplifying divides often outweighs literacy gains absent broader reforms.^[8] Electoral reforms like RCV, which allow voters to rank candidates, are advocated to favor consensus-oriented politicians over extremists. Proponents argue it incentivizes broad appeals, as seen in analyses of U.S. municipal elections where RCV winners exhibited less ideological divergence.^[164] Evaluations in cities like San Francisco since 2002 suggest reduced vote-splitting and more representative outcomes.^[165] Counter-evidence from ideological modeling indicates RCV may elect candidates farther from the median voter in plurality systems, potentially exacerbating extremes.^[166] Overall, while RCV correlates with moderated rhetoric in primaries, rigorous longitudinal studies on national polarization impacts remain scarce.^[167] Broader assessments underscore the difficulty of scalable, durable interventions. A 2025 meta-analysis of 25 prior studies found no easy fixes for partisan hatred, with most effects dissipating over time due to entrenched social identities.^[168] Successful strategies often combine multiple tactics, such as misperception corrections with contact, but require institutional support to avoid reversion.^[6] Historical cases of depolarization, like post-civil rights U.S. shifts, imply societal-level changes—beyond isolated experiments—are key, though causal attribution is complex.^[169]

References

[1]
Social Psychological Perspectives on Political Polarization - NIH
For our purposes, we define polarization as opposing stances on political issues between political parties. We also propose lines of future research to further ...
[2]
What is Polarization in the Social Sciences? A Scoping Review of ...
Definitions of polarization emphasize the presence of a few, opposing groups engaged in intense conflict, reflecting both affective and social dimensions of ...
[3]
U.S. is polarizing faster than other democracies, study finds | Brown ...
Jan 21, 2020 · Americans' feelings toward members of the other political party have worsened over time faster than those of residents of European and other ...
[4]
Two Tales of Polarization? How Affective and Ideological ...
Mar 18, 2025 · The main distinction between ideological and affective polarization, thus, is the presence of an uncivil and antagonistic element and the ...
[5]
What does the research say about polarization? - Baker School
Sep 11, 2024 · The research on political polarization shows significant levels of affective polarization, an emotional dislike for the other party, but less ideological ...Missing: studies | Show results with:studies
[6]
Polarization, Democracy, and Political Violence in the United States
Sep 5, 2023 · While affective polarization is growing quickly in the United States, it is actually not much higher there than in many European countries. In ...
[7]
[PDF] The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. ...
many of these studies is that social identities and group-based conflicts have had larger roles in inducing affective polarization than ideological disagreement ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[8]
The role of (social) media in political polarization: a systematic review
Sep 21, 2021 · Rising political polarization is, in part, attributed to the fragmentation of news media and the spread of misinformation on social media.
[9]
Polarization is the psychological foundation of collective engagement
May 6, 2024 · Groups based on opposing positions may differentiate themselves from each other, leading to political polarization. This combination of group ...
[10]
Social Trust in Polarized Times: How Perceptions of Political ... - NIH
Mar 18, 2022 · This study examines the consequences of perceived polarization for levels of social trust in the United States.
[11]
A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation ...
Aug 15, 2024 · Extreme polarization in a society emerges through a dynamic and complex process where societal, group, and individual factors interact. Dissent ...
[12]
Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective
Feb 24, 2023 · Our empirical analysis relies on both discussed measures to illuminate on the diverging longitudinal trends in affective polarization among ...
[13]
Political Polarization in the American Public - Pew Research Center
Jun 12, 2014 · Social issues like homosexuality and immigration that once drove deep divides within the Democratic Party are now areas of relative consensus.What Polarization Looks Like · Politics Gets Personal · Polarization in Red and Blue
[14]
As Partisan Hostility Grows, Signs of Frustration With the Two-Party ...
Aug 9, 2022 · About six-in ten Republicans (62%) and more than half of Democrats (54%) have a very unfavorable view of the other party in Pew Research Center ...
[15]
The polarization in today's Congress has roots that go back decades
Mar 10, 2022 · A Pew Research Center analysis finds that, on average, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years.
[16]
Trend Report Polarization - Glocalities
A longitudinal analysis by international research agency Glocalities based on over 300,000 completed surveys in 20 countries between 2014 and 2023 reveals a ...
[17]
[PDF] LONG-TERM TRENDS OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION (1990–2022)
Aug 27, 2025 · 2 – Long-term trends in political polarization (1990–2022) is to identify the quantitative indicators for the comprehensive assessment of ...
[18]
Beyond Polarization: Where We Are Today
Nov 3, 2023 · Both Democrats and Republicans imagine that almost twice as many of their political opponents hold more extreme views than they really do, ...Missing: affective | Show results with:affective
[19]
https://www.historyskills.com/classroom/ancient-history/anc-conflict-of-the-orders-reading/
[20]
Ancient Roman Society - World History Encyclopedia
Oct 23, 2019 · Basically, the Patricians were the aristocracy – one had to be born a Patrician – while the Plebeians were everyone else; but plebeian did not ...<|separator|>
[21]
Social Classes in Ancient Rome: A Detailed Overview
The plebeians demanded more rights and gained them through the creation of the Tribune of the Plebs. This allowed plebeians to hold political office and have ...Patricians and Plebeians · Slavery in Ancient Rome · Women and Social Hierarchy
[22]
Factionalism in the medieval Low Countries - Wikipedia
The parties were normally led by an aristocratic clan (which usually gave the faction its name), followed by patrician families, and eventually several groups ...
[23]
The politics of factional conflict in late medieval Flanders
Feb 10, 2012 · This article develops a perspective that integrates those older traditions through a synthetic discussion of the discourse on factionalism in late medieval ...
[24]
Factional Struggles - OAPEN Home
Factional Struggles explores the dynamics of conflicts among ruling elites within cities, dynastic courts, rural areas and regional noble lineages during ...
[25]
Religious Wars in Early Modern Europe
Aug 31, 2018 · The spiritual divisions created by the Protestant Reformation led to a series of international and domestic conflicts that caused incalculable destruction.
[26]
Lecture 6: Europe in the Age of Religious Wars, 1560-1715
All of these conflicts were inspired by religious differences owing to the Reformation, and all of these conflicts had political, economic and social ...
[27]
Chapter 1: Religious Wars – Europe Since 1600: A Concise History
By 1560, Europe was divided by religion as it had never been before. Protestantism was now a permanent feature of the landscape of beliefs.Missing: polarization | Show results with:polarization
[28]
[PDF] The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the ...
Dec 10, 2018 · We trace the origins of affective polarization to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify ...
[29]
Racial Realignment and the Roots of Contemporary Polarization
When the parties divided on race in the 1960s, pre-existing ties between civil rights and other policy views encouraged the parties to take positions on newly ...
[30]
[PDF] Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization - Stanford University
We measure trends in affective polarization in twelve OECD countries over the past four decades. According to our baseline estimates, the US experienced the ...Missing: global | Show results with:global
[31]
Political polarization score - Our World in Data
Data by V-Dem. Expert estimates of the extent to which society is divided into hostile political camps, and political differences undermine social ...Missing: trends 2000-2020
[32]
Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years
Jun 4, 2012 · Meanwhile, the percentage of Democrats who say their political views are liberal has risen from 28% in 2000 to 34% in 2008 and 38% in 2012 ...Widening Gaps over Social... · Class Divides: No Wider than...
[33]
Polarization in America: two possible futures - PMC - PubMed Central
May 6, 2020 · For example, upon seeing co-partisans disrespect opponents and ignore their views, Americans disidentify with their parties [1,73], instead ...Missing: modern | Show results with:modern
[34]
7 A Test of How Elite Polarization Shapes Mass Political Behavior
The results show that elite-level polarization drives partisan sorting. Thus far, the body of evidence demonstrates that elite context is crucial. The effect of ...
[35]
A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in ...
While it is widely agreed that Congress has polarized over the past 40 years, there is considerable disagreement about the extent of public polarization and ...
[36]
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation
Jan 25, 2013 · We find stark evidence that polarized environments fundamentally change how citizens make decisions.
[37]
Elite communication and affective polarization among voters
We argue that polarized social identities are reinforced by partisan source cues, which bias perceptions of elite communication and result in increased ...
[38]
How do masses react to party polarization? Limited effect of party ...
Dec 8, 2024 · Using British Election Study Internet Panel data, I find limited evidence that elite polarization leads to mass polarization. Overall, neither ...
[39]
How Elite Overproduction Brings Disorder - Peter Turchin
Nov 20, 2013 · This web can fray easily, resulting in a wave of political instability, internal conflict and, sometimes, outright social collapse. Analysis of ...
[40]
Are we overproducing elites and instability? - Niskanen Center
Jun 28, 2023 · Peter Turchin predicted the tumult. He points to our large class of aspiring elites competing for power without advancing the living standards of most ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[41]
The Elite Overproduction Hypothesis - by Noah Smith - Noahpinion
Jul 4, 2025 · From the Wikipedia article on Turchin's theory: Elite overproduction has been cited as a root cause of political tension in the U.S., as so many ...
[42]
[PDF] Modeling Social Pressures Toward Political Instability - eScholarship
Elite overproduction, the presence of more elites and elite aspirants than the society can provide positions for, is inherently destabilizing. It reduces.
[43]
Political Polarization & Media Habits - Pew Research Center
Oct 21, 2014 · The study finds that those with the most consistent ideological views on the left and right have information streams that are distinct from those of ...Media Sources: Nearly Half of... · Social Media: Conservatives...
[44]
[PDF] Bias in Cable News: Real Effects and Polarization
We estimate that removing Fox News from cable television during the 2000 election cycle would have reduced the average county's Republican vote share by 1.6 ...<|separator|>
[45]
Cable News Networks Have Grown More Polarized, Study Finds
Aug 1, 2022 · An analysis of 10 years of cable TV news reveals a growing partisan gap as networks like Fox and MSNBC have shifted to the right or the left of the political ...
[46]
Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing
Jul 27, 2023 · Increased partisan polarization and hostility are often blamed on online echo chambers on social media, a concern that has grown ...
[47]
The echo chamber effect on social media - PNAS
Feb 23, 2021 · According to group polarization theory (23), an echo chamber can act as a mechanism to reinforce an existing opinion within a group and, as a ...
[48]
U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided
Jan 24, 2020 · A new Pew Research Center report finds that Republicans and Democrats place their trust in two nearly inverse news media environments.
[49]
Cable news has a much bigger effect on America's polarization than ...
Aug 11, 2022 · Cable news has a much bigger effect on America's polarization than social media, study finds. “Compared to online audiences, partisan TV news ...
[50]
How tech platforms fuel U.S. political polarization and what ...
Sep 27, 2021 · Widespread social media use has fueled the fire of extreme polarization, which, in turn, has contributed to the erosion of trust in democratic ...
[51]
On culture issues, US more divided by ideology than UK, France ...
May 5, 2021 · Americans are significantly more divided along ideological lines than people in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, according to a new Pew Research Center ...
[52]
Politics, Polarization, and Populism | Jonathan Haidt
My colleagues and I developed Moral Foundations Theory to understand ... C) On how to forgive, co-exist, and get along despite political polarization and ...
[53]
Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies | Pew Research Center
Oct 13, 2021 · In Germany, Canada and Italy, there are ideological divides in the extent to which people see conflicts between those who are religious and ...<|separator|>
[54]
The myth of asymmetric polarization - The Week
Jul 7, 2021 · Progressives have been aggressors, moving left further and faster than conservatives have moved right, on numerous issues wrapped with the country's cultural ...<|separator|>
[55]
Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US
A wealth of research documents the rise of affective polarization, or the increasing disdain for the out-party in American politics.
[56]
[PDF] Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time Series Evidence ...
This section briefly reviews the empirical measures of income inequality and political polarization, and then discusses how are each influenced and driven by a ...
[57]
[PDF] How Rising Inequality Increases Political Polarization - NYU Law
Mar 16, 2016 · Abstract. Income inequality and political polarization have both increased dramatically in the United States over the last several decades.
[58]
[PDF] Political Polarization and Income Inequality - Princeton University
While it makes intuitive sense that economic inequality may breed political conflict (or even the converse), almost no work has been done to explain such a ...
[59]
Premature Deindustrialization and Industry Polarization | NBER
Nov 12, 2021 · We document two key patterns of structural change: premature deindustrialization and rising industry polarization.
[60]
[PDF] Diploma Divide: Educational Attainment and the Realignment of the ...
Abstract: Educational attainment has become a critical determinant of partisanship. The divide between college graduates and non-college graduates is a ...
[61]
Polarization under rising inequality and economic decline - Science
We demonstrate that shifts in socialization strategies analogous to political polarization can arise as a locally beneficial response to both rising wealth ...
[62]
The Development of the Rural-Urban Political Divide, 1976–2020
Dec 27, 2023 · A pervasive stylized fact about the rural-urban divide implies that rural dwellers feel “left behind” by massive economic changes and the harsh ...
[63]
[PDF] The urban-rural polarisation of political disenchantment - LSE
There is a growing political divide between the large urban centres – 'globalised', 'gentrified', and increasingly inhabited by cosmopolitans and 'bobos' ( ...
[64]
Economic Threats, Political and National Identification Predict ...
Mar 21, 2024 · Moreover, affective polarization has been linked to structural economic threats (Funke et al., 2016; Gidron et al., 2019), political identity ( ...
[65]
Resource windfalls, connectivity, and political polarization
Our baseline estimates show that a one standard deviation of resource windfalls induces a 4% increase in the affective polarization of individuals residing in ...
[66]
Charting multidimensional ideological polarization across ... - NIH
Jul 2, 2025 · Ideological polarization refers to individuals having divergent beliefs on ideological issues, such as abortion or affirmative action. Some ...
[67]
Polarization in Congress - Voteview
Oct 23, 2023 · View, map, and investigate congressional votes throughout history, classify legislators as liberal or conservatives.
[68]
[PDF] Understanding Polarization: Meanings, Measures, and Model ...
The common reality of familiar forms of social polarization is that of roughly balanced oppositional groups. Polarization of the type that appears in the ...
[69]
[PDF] Polarization and Lawmaking Effectiveness in the United States ...
Specifically, we multiply each legislator's DW-NOMINATE score by their Legislative Effectiveness Score (yielding an overall. LES-Weighted DW-NOMINATE Score) and ...
[70]
The emergence and perils of polarization - PMC - NIH
Dec 6, 2021 · Her perspective can be broadened to consider how other societal changes might indirectly amplify the influence of political ideologies.
[71]
Full article: Party system ideological polarization in Western Europe
It finds that party system ideological polarization is on the rise in Western Europe, mainly due to a progressive shift in the electoral support from ...
[72]
[PDF] Ideological Polarization and Far-Right Parties in Europe
In contrast, the evidence from CHES suggests that party system polarization has not dra- matically changed across Western Europe as a whole. The differences ...
[73]
One more constrained than the other: Asymmetrical ideological ...
Apr 12, 2025 · This study examines the ideological alignment of beliefs within opposing partisan camps in Europe. Integrating multiple types of research, ...
[74]
Estimating ideology and polarization in European countries using ...
Nov 22, 2022 · In this paper, we model the ideology and polarization of 28 countries (the 27 EU member states plus the UK) using Facebook public posts from political parties' ...
[75]
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-025-02251-0
[76]
Charting multidimensional ideological polarization across ... - Nature
Jul 2, 2025 · There we can gauge ideological polarization by simply measuring the Euclidean distance between opposite political and demographic groups.
[77]
Affective Polarization | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
Jul 16, 2025 · When it comes to measurement issues, this article has clarified that the theoretical foundations of affective polarization have been built ...
[78]
Affective Polarization: Over Time, Through the Generations, and ...
Mar 7, 2022 · Affective polarization refers to dislike and distrust of opposing partisans among members of the electorate, operationalized as a difference in ...
[79]
[PDF] Affective Polarization in the American Public
In this chapter, we review recent research on affective polarization, its causes, consequences, and potential solutions, with a focus on the mass public in the ...
[80]
[PDF] Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group ...
Partisans discriminate against opposing partisans, doing so to a degree that exceeds discrimination based on race. We note that the willingness of partisans to ...
[81]
Social Identity Theory In Psychology (Tajfel & Turner, 1979)
Oct 5, 2023 · Social Identity Theory, developed by Henri Tajfel, explains how individuals define themselves based on their group memberships, such as nationality, religion, ...
[82]
Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of ...
Mar 21, 2018 · This article finds that the identity-based elements of ideology are capable of driving heightened levels of affective polarization against outgroup ideologues.
[83]
[PDF] CROSS-COUNTRY TRENDS IN AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION
Abstract—We measure trends in affective polarization in twelve OECD countries over the past four decades. According to our baseline estimates,.<|separator|>
[84]
Issues versus Affect: How Do Elite and Mass Polarization Compare?
I find that elites are more affectively polarized than the mass public and more affectively polarized than they are ideologically polarized.
[85]
Elite vs. Public Opinion - Center for Immigration Studies
A new poll provides the most compelling evidence yet that there is an enormous gap between the American people and opinion leaders on the issue.
[86]
Survey Finds Growing Trust Gap Between Elite and Mass Populations
Feb 2, 2016 · The survey found that the most profound difference between the elite and the mass population is in their attitudes toward business. For example, ...
[87]
Elites misperceive the public - Niskanen Center
Jan 24, 2024 · Prior research found that elites tend to overestimate conservative policy positions in the American public, but there are wider misperceptions ...
[88]
Polarized We Govern? - Brookings Institution
In the new paper “Polarized We Govern?,” Sarah Binder finds that levels of legislative gridlock have steadily risen over the past half-century.
[89]
Is a Gridlocked Congress Causing More Polarization? - ProMarket
Jun 26, 2024 · We argue (and provide evidence) that legislative gridlock itself can cause polarization by making moderate but partisan voters more willing to ...
[90]
[PDF] How Does Political Polarization Impact Legislative Gridlock And ...
Oct 18, 2024 · Contemporary governance is characterized by a trend toward political polarization resulting in legislative gridlock and policy-making processes.
[91]
Political polarization may slow legislation, make higher-stakes laws ...
Jan 26, 2024 · Partisan polarization may make the passage of fewer but farther-reaching public laws likelier, according to a new study by researchers at ...
[92]
affective polarization and electoral confidence
In this research note, I explore the extent to which affectively polarized voters drive winner and loser effects in electoral confidence.
[93]
Affective Polarization and Democratic Backsliding
Oct 26, 2024 · Evidence is strong that affective polarization and democratic backsliding are interlinked phenomena.
[94]
Does Political Polarization Really Undermine Democracy? Maybe Not
Jul 29, 2024 · My recent research challenges this assumption, finding little evidence that mass polarization leads to democratic decline.
[95]
Polarization harms democracy and society - ICIP
Severe polarization makes democracy vulnerable. In healthy democracies, opposing sides are seen as political adversaries to compete against and at times to ...
[96]
Americans' Declining Trust in Each Other and Reasons Behind It
May 8, 2025 · The share of adults who said “most people can be trusted” declined from 46% in 1972 to 34% in 2018, according to the General Social Survey.
[97]
[PDF] 25. Affective polarization and social cohesion - e-Repositori UPF
Central to this chapter is the notion that out-partisan hostility can affect social cohesion by decreasing general trust in others. Also known as social trust, ...
[98]
Consequences of affective polarization: Avoidance, intolerance and ...
Aug 23, 2023 · This study investigates some of the most mentioned and worrying potential consequences of affective polarization at the individual level.<|separator|>
[99]
Fifty Years of Declining Confidence & Increasing Polarization in ...
Nov 15, 2022 · Based upon our analysis of GSS data, social trust among independents fell from 1972–1979 to 2010–2021 by more than twice as much as among ...
[100]
Othering in politics: how affective polarization undermines ... - Frontiers
Apr 7, 2025 · Affective polarization, characterized by animosity and distrust between partisan groups, threatens democratic resilience and social cohesion ...
[101]
Affective polarization and political (dis)trust - Sage Journals
Sep 2, 2025 · Findings indicate that higher political trust leads to lower affective polarization; however, polarization does not significantly impact trust.
[102]
How in-person conversations shape political polarization: Quasi ...
We provide quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of in-person conversations on individual-level polarization outcomes.
[103]
The Polarizing Impact of Political Disinformation and Hate Speech
The current study employs complexity theory and a configurational approach to investigate the impact of diverse disinformation campaigns and hate speech in ...
[104]
11 - The Policy Consequences of Party Polarization: Evidence from ...
This chapter explores the policy consequences of polarization – asking whether we see different policy choices when parties are more (versus less) polarized.
[105]
Divided government, polarization, and policy: Regression ...
Our findings indicate that in a divided government, legislators tend to hold more extreme ideological positions compared to a unified government. Specifically, ...
[106]
How Affective Polarization Shapes Americans' Political Beliefs
A defining feature of 21st century American politics is the rise of affective polarization – the tendency of partisans to dislike, distrust, and avoid ...
[107]
[PDF] The Economic Effects of Political Polarization
The rise of political polarization affected the landscape of the U.S. real asset market. Mergers between politically divergent firms became less common over ...
[108]
(PDF) Political Polarization and Economic Growth - ResearchGate
Apr 17, 2024 · This study examines the effect of political polarization, measured by the dispersion of self-reported political ideologies, on economic growth.
[109]
The Effect of Polarization on Economic Growth, Social Capital, and ...
This paper explores the effect of polarization on democracy, social capital, education, and economic growth in a cross-country analysis.
[110]
United States: The economic consequences of political polarization
Feb 26, 2024 · In case of affective political polarization, consumers could stop buying products from certain companies on political grounds.
[111]
Does polarization have economic effects? It does on ... - SUERF
Feb 17, 2022 · Polarization could have economic consequences through several channels. Firstly, citizens' preferences and beliefs shape the incentives of their ...
[112]
Political Polarization in the United States | Facing History & Ourselves
Aug 26, 2024 · Political polarization is the movement of political views away from the center toward more extreme views and policies.
[113]
Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization
We measure trends in affective polarization in nine OECD countries over the past four decades. The US experienced the largest increase in polarization over ...
[114]
Ask the expert: Political polarization in US has increased due to ...
Sep 18, 2024 · A key reason is the increasing educational differences between the two political parties, according to a new book from a Michigan State ...Missing: scholarly | Show results with:scholarly
[115]
The great divide: drivers of polarization in the US public - PMC
Oct 28, 2020 · Our empirical and quantitative evidence suggests that political polarization in the US is mainly driven by strong political/cultural initiatives in the ...
[116]
Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?
This trend appears to be driven primarily by the increased extremism of Republican (versus Democratic) and new (versus incumbent) members.
[117]
Polarization, Partisanship, and Health in the United States
Jun 1, 2024 · The causes of the growing divides in American politics are uncertain and disputed (Barber and McCarty 2013; McCarty 2019). Gerrymandering— ...Polarization and Health Politics · Beyond Polarization · Conclusion
[118]
U.S. Political Parties Historically Polarized Ideologically - Gallup News
Jan 16, 2025 · Americans' ideological identification was steady in 2024, with an average of 37% describing their political views as “very conservative” or “conservative,” 34% ...
[119]
Polarization in the United States Reconsidered | FSI
Oct 29, 2024 · The US faces increasing levels of political polarization. Bipartisan disagreements over moral, cultural, and socioeconomic issues have turned into social ...
[120]
What Causes Congressional Polarization: Changing Politics, or ...
Jan 13, 2025 · Historically, polarization in Congress has been measured primarily through roll-call votes, which assess how members of different parties vote ...
[121]
[PDF] Political polarization in Europe 2025. Documentos de Trabajo N.º ...
Our results show that polarization has increased significantly in Europe since the Global Financial Crisis, though its institutional consequences vary by ...
[122]
[PDF] POLITICAL POLARIZATION LONG-TERM TRENDS AND ...
Analysis conducted in this WP will contribute to identifying and reflecting the most important emerging cleavages and polarizing trends related with the general ...
[123]
Drifting further apart? Europe's trends of urban-rural political ...
The analysis draws on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), covering over 300,000 individuals across 25 European countries over the period 2002-2020.
[124]
[PDF] POLARIZATION IN EUROPE - f o r u m - m i d e m . d e
The issues of “climate change” and “immigration” show the highest levels of affective polarization: A particularly high level of affective polarization can ...
[125]
EU Elections 2024: The Unclear Impact of the Shift to the Right
Jun 12, 2024 · The 2024 European parliamentary elections were long expected to deliver a dramatic far-right surge. Instead, what we got was a much more nuanced picture.
[126]
2024 EU elections and French politics: rise of populism ... - Frontiers
This study investigates the impact of the 2024 European Union (EU) elections on France, focusing on the interplay between EU institutions, national governments ...
[127]
Global Elections in 2024: What We Learned in a Year of Political ...
Dec 11, 2024 · Voters in more than 60 countries went to the polls in what turned out to be a difficult year for incumbents and traditional political ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[128]
“With me, or against me”: The intensification of political polarization ...
Feb 28, 2023 · Growing political polarization is a global trend, however, LAC is the region in which polarization has increased the most in the last 20 years.
[129]
Latin America's Polarization in Comparative Perspective
Aug 28, 2024 · Political polarization is a systemic-level and multifaceted process that severs cross-cutting ties and shifts perceptions of politics to a zero-sum game.
[130]
'Them' without 'us': negative identities and affective polarization in ...
By leveraging independently collected survey data (N = 1732) amongst Brazilian respondents, I put forward an innovative empirical measure of negative political ...
[131]
January 8th: Political Polarization in Brazil
Feb 20, 2023 · In 2022, the Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence in Brazil tracked 214 cases of politically motivated violence, including 45 alleged ...
[132]
Partisan Dehumanization in Brazil's Asymmetrically Polarized Party ...
Aug 1, 2024 · To understand patterns of partisan dehumanization in Brazil, let us first describe the “asymmetric” nature of polarization in its party system.
[133]
India's Polarized Society and the Role of Religion - V-Dem
Nov 25, 2020 · Political polarization, in red, covers the extent to which political differences shape social relationships beyond political discussions.
[134]
Partisanship's Striking Resilience in India
Mar 22, 2024 · In India, around 30 percent of survey respondents expressed partisan attachments, lower than comparable large democracies like the United States ...
[135]
Investigating political polarization in India through the lens of Twitter
Jul 31, 2022 · This study aims to examine the presence of polarization on Twitter social media platform with respect to different topics of political discussions among Indian ...
[136]
[PDF] Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey - German Marshall Fund
polarization in Turkey was very high, manifested in social distance between the supporters of different political parties, moral prejudices against each ...
[137]
Polarization, Cleavages, and Democratic Backsliding: Electoral ...
Jan 28, 2025 · He linked these trends to heightened polarization, which weakens opposition forces and reduces the influence of traditional electoral cleavages.
[138]
The Impact of Exposure to Discordant Media on Political Polarization ...
Researchers evaluated the impact of exposure to and incentives to consume discordant media on political attitudes and behaviors in Turkey.
[139]
Most across 19 countries see strong partisan conflict in their society
Nov 16, 2022 · A median of 65% of adults across 19 surveyed countries say there are strong or very strong disagreements in their country between people who ...
[140]
How Inequality and Polarization Interact: America's Challenges ...
Apr 27, 2022 · Both South Africa and the United States wrestle with severe inequality, polarization, and the corrosion of democratic institutions.
[141]
Introduction: The New Polarization in Latin America
May 29, 2024 · Mounting evidence suggests that Latin American democracies are characterized by politics and societies becoming more divisive, confrontational, and polarized.
[142]
Polarization – A Global Threat to Democracy? - V-Dem
Mar 2, 2020 · The first graph illustrates recent democratic erosion in five countries: Hungary, India, Poland, Turkey, and the United States using V-Dem's Liberal Democracy ...Missing: non- western<|separator|>
[143]
Issues versus Affect: How Do Elite and Mass Polarization Compare?
I find that elites are more affectively polarized than the mass public and more affectively polarized than they are ideologically polarized.Skip main navigation · Abstract · Data and Analytical Strategy · Empirical ResultsMissing: drivers | Show results with:drivers
[144]
Polarization and the Political Elite | National Affairs
A more polarized public produces a more polarized elite, which in turn generates further polarization among the public.
[145]
Polarization All the Way Down: How Coverage of Elite and Partisan ...
Feb 7, 2024 · I show that participants believe that the public is both ideologically and affectively polarized, only marginally less than partisans and elites ...
[146]
Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review
Jan 19, 2022 · In this literature review, we examine evidence concerning the existence, causes, and effect of online echo chambers and consider what related ...
[147]
When Does Income Inequality Cause Polarization? | British Journal ...
May 14, 2021 · Conventional wisdom suggests that high income inequality is associated with political parties taking polarized positions as the left advocates ...
[148]
How the culture wars are driving political polarization - LSE Blogs
Apr 1, 2016 · We focused on “ideological identities” and the extent to which the American electorate can be said to be polarized. We find, in contrast to the ...
[149]
The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the ...
May 11, 2019 · We trace its origins to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify partisan animus. We also explore ...
[150]
Elite polarization — The boon and bane of democracy: Evidence ...
Democracy is under threat, while polarization is rising. Empirical evidence to understand a possible link between the two is mixed, with scholars finding ...
[151]
https://time.com/6990721/us-politics-polarization-myth/
[152]
The Myth of Polarization in American Politics - Time Magazine
Jul 2, 2024 · The growing evidence that—even heading into this year's election—Americans are less divided than you may think.
[153]
https://www.hoover.org/research/myth-growing-polarization
[154]
The Myth Of Growing Polarization - Hoover Institution
Sep 16, 2016 · Although assertions about polarization often are made in unconditional form, such claims can be true or false depending on what aspect of ...
[155]
Asymmetric polarization: The perception that Republicans pose ...
May 5, 2025 · Asymmetric polarization: The perception that Republicans pose harm to disadvantaged groups drives Democrats' greater dislike of Republicans ...
[156]
Why depolarization is hard: Evaluating attempts to decrease ... - PNAS
Sep 23, 2025 · The ultimate aim of depolarization research is not simply to reduce affective polarization but to develop interventions that deliver measurable ...
[157]
Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes ...
Oct 18, 2024 · Efficacious strategies for reducing support for partisan violence included correcting misperceptions of rival partisans' views and endorsements ...
[158]
Explanations of and interventions against affective polarization ...
Oct 15, 2024 · Our pilot experiment shows that correcting ingroup norm perception can reduce affective polarization. We elucidate the theoretical underpinnings ...
[159]
Factual knowledge can reduce attitude polarization - PMC
Apr 23, 2025 · It is commonly argued that factual knowledge about a political issue increases attitude polarization due to politically motivated reasoning.
[160]
The promise and pitfalls of cross-partisan conversations for reducing ...
Jun 22, 2022 · We argue that such conversations can reduce affective polarization but that these effects are likely to be conditional on topic.
[161]
Cross-partisan discussions reduced political polarization between ...
Jan 5, 2024 · Recent experimental studies show that these discussions can reduce political polarization. However, little is known about their impact when ...
[162]
[PDF] Political polarization, misinformation, and media literacy
May 8, 2022 · Media literacy and students A recent study found that information literacy, the ability to find reliable sources, was helpful in detecting fake ...
[163]
(PDF) Political polarization, misinformation, and media literacy
One social method of reducing polarisation is raising public awareness through media literacy campaigns. These methods involve informing people of the ...
[164]
Exposure to Cross-Cutting Information on Social Media and ...
Nov 30, 2024 · Findings indicate that exposure to cross-cutting political information in social media is associated with lower levels of perceived polarization ...
[165]
Ranked choice voting lowers polarization in politics - FairVote
Sep 26, 2024 · Winners of RCV elections are the candidates who can build both deep and broad support. To win a majority of voters' support, candidates often ...
[166]
Evaluating the Effects of Ranked-Choice Voting - New America
By Lee Drutman and Maresa Strano. Since San Francisco adopted ranked-choice voting (RCV) for municipal elections in 2002, the alternative voting system has ...
[167]
Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the ...
This analysis shows that IRV tends to produce winning candidates who are more divergent ideologically from their state's median voter than do other forms of ...
[168]
[PDF] What We Know About Ranked-Choice Voting - Democracy
Nov 10, 2021 · Additionally, RCV seems to work well in primaries, the elections where vote- splitting is most likely to be a problem and where extreme ...
[169]
Research Shows There Are No Easy Fixes to Political Hatred
Sep 23, 2025 · To determine if efforts to reduce partisan animosity have a lasting effect, the researchers conducted a massive meta-analysis of 25 previous ...
[170]
Reducing Pernicious Polarization: A Comparative Historical ...
May 5, 2022 · V-Dem's political polarization metric asks country experts to answer the question: “To what extent is society divided into mutually antagonistic ...