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Extreme conservatism


Extreme conservatism, often synonymous with reactionary conservatism, constitutes a strain of that seeks not merely to preserve existing traditions but to restore or reinforce pre-Enlightenment social hierarchies, authoritative institutions, and customary moral orders against the encroachments of rationalist , , and progressive reconfiguration of society. This orientation views societal stability as rooted in organic, time-tested structures rather than abstract universal or democratic experimentation, positing that deviations from such orders lead to and cultural erosion. Unlike , which accommodates gradual adaptations to maintain the , extreme conservatism rejects compromise with reforms, advocating instead for decisive countermeasures to reverse perceived degenerative trends. Historically, extreme conservatism gained prominence as a counterforce to the French Revolution's upheavals, with thinkers like championing , divine authority, and the indispensability of tradition over revolutionary reason, arguing that human society requires unyielding hierarchy to avert chaos. Figures such as exemplified its application in statecraft through policies aimed at suppressing liberal nationalism and reinstating monarchical legitimacy across Europe, thereby engineering a prolonged era of relative continental peace via the . In the , ultra-royalists in , led by statesmen like Jean-Baptiste de Villèle, pursued stringent measures to entrench Bourbon restoration, curtailing press freedoms and electoral expansions to safeguard aristocratic and clerical privileges against republican stirrings. These efforts underscore extreme conservatism's defining characteristic: a willingness to employ authoritarian instruments—such as or limited franchises—to defend what adherents regard as the foundational pillars of civilized order. Notable for its emphasis on cultural particularism and toward universalist ideologies, extreme conservatism has influenced resistance to mass , , and supranational entities, positing that unbridled or undermines national cohesion and moral discipline. Controversies arise from its association with illiberal governance, yet proponents contend that empirical outcomes, including the aversion of revolutionary excesses in restored , validate its causal efficacy in preserving societal resilience amid ideological turbulence. In contemporary contexts, echoes persist in movements prioritizing unyielding fidelity to heritage over accommodationist politics, though mainstream discourse frequently conflates such stances with broader right-wing extremism due to institutional interpretive biases.

Definition and Ideology

Core Principles and Characteristics

Extreme conservatism emphasizes an unyielding commitment to hierarchical social structures derived from historical and divine , viewing them as essential for societal . Proponents assert that inequalities among individuals and classes necessitate authoritative to prevent chaos, often favoring monarchical or aristocratic systems over egalitarian alternatives. This perspective holds that is not a construct but a reflection of transcendent moral principles, where resides ultimately with or rather than . Unlike pragmatic adaptations, extreme conservatives prioritize the preservation of and conventions as repositories of accumulated , resisting rationalist reforms that abstract from historical . Central to this ideology is the rejection of enlightenment-derived and contractual theories of , positing instead an view where communities evolve gradually through rather than deliberate . Constitutions and institutions are seen as providential outcomes, not products of human deliberation, rendering revolutionary changes inherently destructive. Human imperfection demands restraint on innovation, with dictating caution against utopian schemes that ignore the limits of reason and the persistence of vice. Extreme thus critiques as a denial of variety in human capacities and roles, advocating instead for differentiated duties aligned with inherited positions in the . Religion, particularly Christianity, forms the bedrock of moral and political legitimacy, infusing authority with sacred sanction and countering secular rationalism's corrosive effects. Without this foundation, societies devolve into anarchy, as unchecked liberty leads to moral relativism and the erosion of communal bonds. Property rights are upheld not merely as economic tools but as extensions of personal responsibility within a hierarchical framework, fostering voluntary associations under established norms rather than state-imposed uniformity. This approach underscores a realism about power dynamics, where the executioner symbolizes divine retribution against disorder, affirming that stability requires unflinching enforcement of order over sentimental appeals to rights.

Distinctions from Mainstream Conservatism

Extreme conservatism, frequently characterized as reactionary ideology, fundamentally diverges from mainstream in its orientation toward historical reversal rather than preservation of the . Mainstream conservatism, as articulated by thinkers like in his 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in , emphasizes organic, evolutionary adaptation to maintain social stability through existing institutions such as and parliamentary restraint, accepting limited reforms to avert upheaval. In contrast, extreme conservatism rejects such , advocating a wholesale restoration of pre-Enlightenment structures, including and clerical dominance, viewing modern democratic experiments as inherently corrupt deviations from divine or natural order. A core distinction lies in attitudes toward authority and governance. Mainstream conservatives typically endorse and representative systems, balancing tradition with incremental change to foster under law, as seen in Burke's defense of Britain's mixed against radical abstraction. Extreme conservatives, however, prioritize hierarchical , often invoking throne and altar alliances where sovereignty derives from divine right rather than popular consent, dismissing electoral mechanisms like as egalitarian follies that erode natural inequalities. Joseph de Maistre's 1819 Du Pape, for instance, argued for in temporal affairs to counter revolutionary , a position far exceeding Burke's qualified deference to ecclesiastical influence within civil bounds. This divergence extends to social and economic realms, where extreme conservatism exhibits greater hostility to modernity's leveling tendencies. While mainstream variants may integrate with moral traditionalism—evident in 20th-century fusionism's alliance of free enterprise and —extreme forms critique itself as a symptom of atomizing , favoring corporatist or feudal arrangements to enforce communal duties and status-based roles. Reactionary thought thus frames progress as degeneration, demanding counterrevolutions to reinstate agrarian, societies, as opposed to mainstream efforts to conserve amid industrial transformation. Empirically, these distinctions manifest in historical movements: mainstream conservatism aligned with 19th-century reforms in , adapting aristocracy to bourgeois realities, whereas extreme counterparts, such as French legitimists or Spanish Carlists (active 1833–1876), waged insurgencies to revive absolutist dynasties against constitutionalism. In both cases, extreme positions prioritize causal restoration of perceived causal primacy—hierarchies as bulwarks against chaos—over the prudential compromises mainstream ideology permits.

Philosophical Foundations

Influences from Traditionalism and Anti-Modernism

Extreme conservatism derives key intellectual impulses from anti-modernism, a critique originating in the counter-revolutionary era that rejected and the French Revolution's emphasis on human autonomy over inherited authority. , in his 1797 treatise Considerations on France, portrayed the Revolution not merely as a political error but as a providential scourge exposing the perils of abstract reason detached from and divine order, arguing that sovereignty inheres in and priesthood rather than popular will or contractual theories. De Maistre's analysis, grounded in historical observation of revolutionary violence's self-undermining logic, influenced later extreme conservatives by framing modernity's causal trajectory— from hubris to societal —as inevitable decay absent hierarchical restraint. This perspective prioritizes empirical patterns of instability in secular experiments over utopian promises of progress, viewing them as recurrent failures traceable to severed ties with pre-modern organic societies. Building on such foundations, 20th-century Traditionalism formalized anti-modernism into a metaphysical framework, positing modernity as a profound spiritual inversion from primordial, perennial truths embedded in authentic religious traditions. René Guénon, in The Crisis of the Modern World (1927), diagnosed the West's dominance through materialist expansion as symptomatic of the Kali Yuga, the final degenerative cycle in cyclical cosmology, where scientism and individualism erode transcendent principles, leading to quantifiable declines in social cohesion and birth rates. Guénon's perennial philosophy, drawing from Eastern and Western esoteric sources, asserts a universal metaphysical core distorted by modern desacralization, influencing extreme conservatives to interpret phenomena like mass immigration and technological disruption as accelerations of this entropy rather than solvable via policy tweaks. Unlike mainstream conservatism's pragmatic accommodations to industrial and democratic norms, Traditionalism demands wholesale rejection, privileging initiatic elites over mass democracy. Julius Evola radicalized these ideas into activist doctrine, extending Guénon's critique into Revolt Against the Modern World (1934), where he delineated traditional societies' stratified, solar hierarchies—rooted in Indo-European warrior castes—against modernity's telluric, subversive forces of equality and commerce. Evola advocated "riding the tiger" of collapse to forge differential individuals capable of transcending democratic dissolution, critiquing fascism for insufficient radicalism while endorsing authoritarian structures that align with metaphysical aristocracy. This framework resonates in extreme conservatism's causal realism, attributing Europe's post-1945 cultural shifts—such as rising divorce rates from 1.8 per 1,000 in 1960 to 1.9 by 2020 in select Western nations amid secularization—to modern egalitarianism's erosion of familial and national bonds, rather than incidental factors. Such influences equip adherents with a first-principles lens viewing progress as illusory, substantiated by historical regressions from ancient empires to contemporary atomization, over narratives of linear advancement.

Critiques of Egalitarianism and Utopian Progress

Extreme conservatives contend that constitutes an assault on the natural hierarchies inherent in human societies, which arise from differences in innate abilities, , and social roles. They argue that such doctrines, popularized during the and , abstractly deny empirical variations in human capacity, as evidenced by consistent disparities in outcomes across free societies despite equal legal opportunities. For example, twin studies indicate that , a key predictor of socioeconomic success, is approximately 50-80% heritable in adulthood, suggesting genetic factors underpin much of observed rather than solely environmental ones. Imposing through state intervention, they maintain, distorts incentives and erodes merit-based order, fostering resentment and inefficiency, as historical attempts like Soviet collectivization demonstrated through famines and affecting tens of millions. Joseph de Maistre, a foundational reactionary thinker, excoriated egalitarian ideals in the Revolution as a providential scourge punishing France's rejection of throne and altar, insisting that sovereignty derives from divine authority rather than popular will or abstract rights. He viewed the Revolution's push for uniformity as delusional, ignoring the necessity of inequality for social cohesion, where "every nation gets the government it deserves" through historical providence, not rational redesign. De Maistre's critique emphasized that human nature, marred by original sin, resists leveling; attempts to erase distinctions only invite chaos, as seen in the Reign of Terror's execution of over 16,000 by guillotine in 1793-1794 alone. Regarding utopian progress, extreme conservatives reject the Enlightenment narrative of linear advancement toward perfection via reason and reform, positing instead that history reflects cycles of rise and decay driven by unchanging human flaws. Edmund Burke, in his analysis of the French Revolution, warned against "geometric" theories of society that presume malleable human nature, arguing such visions precipitate violence by uprooting inherited wisdom for untested abstractions. He observed that the Revolution's promise of egalitarian utopia rapidly devolved into despotism under Robespierre, illustrating how faith in progress blinds adherents to the fragility of civilized order. Traditionalists extend this to modern welfare states, where expansive redistribution—intended as progressive—has correlated with rising debt burdens, such as the U.S. national debt exceeding $35 trillion by 2024, without commensurate lifts in equality metrics like Gini coefficients remaining stable around 0.41. These critiques underscore a causal : utopian schemes fail because they contravene first principles of limited human rationality and persistent self-interest, often amplifying vices under the guise of virtue. Proponents like de Maistre and prioritize and over speculative , cautioning that egalitarian utopias historically empower elites who wield , as in the Bolshevik regime's purges claiming over 20 million lives in the . Mainstream academic sources, while citing egalitarian frameworks, frequently underemphasize such empirical counterexamples due to ideological preferences for narratives.

Historical Development

Origins in Reaction to Revolutions and Enlightenment

Extreme conservatism emerged as a direct intellectual and political response to the 's promotion of rationalism, individual rights, and challenges to established hierarchies, which gained momentum through the (1775–1783) but reached a radical apex in the beginning in 1789. The 's dismantling of , , and church authority—culminating in the (1793–1794), which executed approximately 17,000 people by and led to broader estimates of 300,000 deaths from revolutionary violence—prompted thinkers to defend tradition, divine order, and organic social structures against what they saw as destructive abstractions. This reaction privileged historical precedent and prescriptive authority over contractual or rationalist theories of governance, viewing revolutionary as a threat to civilizational stability. Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in , published on , 1790, provided an early foundational critique, arguing that societies evolve organically through inherited customs and "prejudices" refined by time, rather than being remade by geometric reason or abstract rights like those in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789). warned that the Revolution's assault on intermediary institutions—such as the and —would lead to , as evidenced by the rise of Maximilien Robespierre's , and emphasized prudence and continuity over utopian innovation. While supported and reform (as in his earlier advocacy for American independence), his emphasis on the sublime authority of tradition influenced subsequent extreme variants that rejected compromise with liberal principles. More uncompromising positions arose among Continental counter-revolutionaries, particularly , whose Considerations on France (1797) portrayed the Revolution as divine chastisement for irreligion and asserted that true sovereignty stems from God's will manifested through and papal authority, not popular consent. De Maistre contended that human societies require coercive power and sacrifice—exemplified by the executioner's role as a sacred instrument of order—to restrain innate disorder, directly countering optimism about human perfectibility. His and advocacy for hierarchical marked a shift toward extreme conservatism's fusion of throne and altar, influencing restorations like the Bourbon monarchy's return in 1814. This strand prioritized providential realism over secular progress, interpreting revolutionary chaos as empirical proof of the perils of detaching governance from metaphysical foundations. These origins crystallized in the post-Napoleonic era, with the (1814–1815) embodying a practical reactionary effort to redraw Europe's map along pre-1789 lines, suppressing liberal-nationalist stirrings to restore legitimate dynasties and balance of power. Extreme conservatism thus differentiated itself by insisting on unqualified restoration of elements, wary of any concessions to revolutionary ideals that might erode authority's transcendent basis, setting the stage for 19th-century conflicts over modernization.

19th and 20th Century Formations

In the 19th century, extreme conservatism emerged as a direct counter to the liberal and revolutionary upheavals following the French Revolution, manifesting in movements that sought to restore absolute monarchy, ecclesiastical authority, and hierarchical social orders. Key formations included the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, which imposed censorship and surveillance across German states to suppress nationalist and liberal agitation, reflecting Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich's vision of a divinely ordained order resistant to popular sovereignty. In Spain, Carlism arose in the 1830s as a traditionalist rebellion supporting the claims of Carlos María Isidro to the throne, opposing the liberal constitutional monarchy of Isabella II; this movement fused Catholic integralism with foral regionalism, leading to three Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846–1849, and 1872–1876) that mobilized rural, clerical support against centralizing reforms. Thinkers like Joseph de Maistre bolstered these efforts, arguing in works such as Considerations on France (1797) that sovereignty derived from divine providence rather than popular will, influencing reactionary policies that prioritized stability through authoritarian restoration over egalitarian experiments. French legitimism, exemplified by ultra-royalists under figures like Jean-Baptiste de Villèle during his premiership from 1821 to 1828, pursued indemnification for émigrés and laws restricting press freedom to safeguard the restoration against revolutionary remnants. These groups viewed the as a temporary concession, advocating a return to pre-1789 intertwined with Catholic . By mid-century, such formations faced erosion from industrial changes and nationalist risings, yet persisted in pockets like the region's clerical resistance, underscoring a causal link between perceived moral decay from and demands for hierarchical revival. Transitioning into the 20th century, extreme conservatism evolved through integral nationalist leagues that rejected parliamentary democracy as corrosive to organic national unity. In , , founded in 1899 amid the , crystallized under Charles Maurras's ideology of "," promoting monarchy, decentralization, and anti-Semitism as bulwarks against republican individualism; by the , it influenced youth militias and intellectual circles, peaking with over 60,000 members in the before condemnation in 1926. Similar currents appeared in other European contexts, such as Portuguese (1914), which echoed Maurrasian themes by idealizing imperial tradition over modernist egalitarianism. These formations, often blending counter-revolutionary thought with anti-communist fervor, positioned extreme conservatism as a defense of civilizational continuity amid total wars and ideological upheavals, though their alliances with authoritarian regimes post-1930s highlighted tensions with pure traditionalism. Despite suppression after , their emphasis on authority and tradition informed later paleoconservative critiques of globalism.

Post-Cold War Evolutions

Following the on December 25, 1991, extreme conservatism shifted focus from anti-communist containment to resisting the cultural, demographic, and institutional changes associated with the global spread of and neoliberal economics. , which emphasized , , and opposition to mass immigration and , intensified its critique of neoconservative dominance, particularly after the 1991 highlighted interventionist tendencies. This strain rejected the post-Cold War "end of history" narrative, arguing instead that unchecked eroded national and traditional hierarchies. In the United States, Pat Buchanan's 1992 Republican presidential primary campaign exemplified this evolution, framing debates over abortion, immigration, and trade as a "culture war" for the nation's Judeo-Christian foundations, drawing 3 million primary votes despite establishment opposition. Paleoconservative thinkers like Samuel Francis and Paul Gottfried further developed arguments against the "managerial elite," portraying post-Cold War institutions as perpetuating egalitarian ideologies that supplanted organic social orders. Their marginalization within mainstream conservatism during the 1990s—evident in the Rockefeller Foundation-funded neoconservative networks' influence on policy—persisted until echoes appeared in Donald Trump's 2016 campaign, which adopted "America First" isolationism and tariffs, aligning with paleocon skepticism of NATO expansion and endless wars. The 2010s saw the coalescence of national conservatism as a broader post-Cold War adaptation, prioritizing the nation-state's role in preserving cultural identity against supranational bodies like the European Union and multilateral trade pacts. Organized by Yoram Hazony, the inaugural National Conservatism conference on July 14-16, 2019, in Washington, D.C., gathered figures advocating for immigration restrictions, family policy incentives, and economic protectionism to counter liberal individualism's erosion of communal bonds. This movement critiqued fusionist conservatism's emphasis on free markets, positing that post-1991 economic integration had widened inequalities without delivering promised prosperity, as evidenced by stagnant median wages in the U.S. from 1999 to 2019 despite GDP growth. Parallel intellectual revivals included Catholic , which reemerged in the mid-2010s as a rejection of liberal secularism's claim to neutrality, asserting that the state must align with for true justice. Pater Edmund Waldstein's 2014 essay "Integralism in Three Sentences" crystallized this view among young scholars, arguing that post-Cold War liberalism's tolerance of moral pluralism undermined the , drawing on pre-Vatican II precedents like the 1929 . Proponents, including Thomas Crean and Alan Fimister in their 2020 book Integralism: A Manual of , advocated under guidance, gaining traction amid declining —from 42% weekly Mass in 2000 to 17% in 2020 per Pew Research—attributed to secular policies. This strand influenced debates on issues like legalization, which 30 U.S. states enacted by 2015, viewed as state overreach into natural order. Globally, these evolutions manifested in reactions to post-1991 migration surges, with Europe's 2015 migrant crisis—1.3 million asylum seekers per —spurring traditionalist critiques of as diluting ethnic cohesion, though empirical data on crime rates varied by host country policies. In non-Western contexts, Russia's Eurasianist under , formalized in his 1997 book , adapted extreme conservatism to multipolar resistance against Atlanticist liberalism, influencing policy under since 2000. These developments collectively reflected a causal : the Cold War's ideological victory unmasked liberalism's internal contradictions, prompting renewed emphasis on , locality, and metaphysical over utopian .

Key Thinkers and Intellectual Figures

European Traditionalists

(1886–1951), a metaphysician, established the foundational principles of the Traditionalist School, positing a underlying all authentic religious traditions that modernity has inverted through materialism and rationalism. His works, such as The Crisis of the Modern World (1927), diagnose the West's decline as a shift from metaphysical to egalitarian subversion, drawing on Eastern doctrines like and to advocate restoration of initiatic knowledge and sacred authority over democratic . 's influence extended to European intellectuals seeking alternatives to secular , though his 1912 and relocation to in 1930 underscored a rejection of Western Christianity's perceived dilution. Julius Evola (1898–1974), an Italian philosopher influenced by Guénon, advanced a more activist variant of traditionalism emphasizing aristocratic differentiation and martial spirituality against modern egalitarianism. In Revolt Against the Modern World (1934), Evola contrasted the Kali Yuga's dissolution—marked by mass democracy, feminism, and economic individualism—with primordial cycles of solar kingship and caste-based order, arguing that true sovereignty derives from transcendent principles rather than popular consent. His pre-war engagement with Italian Fascism and post-war writings on "riding the tiger" of modernity to subvert it from within positioned him as a thinker for radical conservatives prioritizing spiritual virility over compromise with liberal institutions, despite critiques of both Nazism and Fascism for insufficient metaphysical depth. Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998), a Swiss-German perennialist, extended Guénon's framework by integrating Sufi esotericism with critiques of , asserting the hierarchical unity of religions under a divine intellect that modernity fragments through and . Schuon's emphasis on purity and inward , as in The Transcendent Unity of Religions (1948), reinforced traditionalist opposition to interfaith without , influencing European seekers toward authentic spiritual paths amid post-World War II cultural erosion. Similarly, (1908–1984), another Swiss adherent, applied traditional principles to sacred art and cosmology, decrying modern abstraction as symptomatic of a profane divorced from symbolic truth. Earlier precursors like (1753–1821), a , embodied proto-traditionalist conservatism by defending and as bulwarks against rationalism's denial of . In Considerations on France (1797), Maistre attributed the Revolution's violence to severed ties with , advocating inquisitorial authority to maintain grounded in historical continuity rather than abstract rights. These figures collectively underpin extreme conservatism's European strand by substantiating claims of modernity's causal role in societal through philosophical restoration of , though empirical validations remain interpretive amid biased academic dismissals of their antimodernism as reactionary.

American and Anglo-American Proponents

(1918–1994) articulated a vision of conservatism deeply rooted in Anglo-American , emphasizing prudence, custom, and moral order over rationalist reforms or egalitarian abstractions. In his seminal 1953 work The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, Kirk traced the continuity of conservative thought from Edmund Burke's critique of the through nineteenth- and twentieth-century figures, arguing that societies thrive through reverence for the "permanent things"—, , and —rather than pursuit of utopian . He codified this in six canons, including belief in a transcendent moral order guided by divine intent, the preservative role of property and custom against hasty change, and recognition of human imperfection that precludes perfectibility through politics. Kirk's framework rejected modernism's in , viewing it as disruptive to social bonds, and influenced subsequent traditionalists by prioritizing cultural continuity over ideological . Paul Gottfried (born 1941), a historian and philosopher, systematized as a bulwark against neoconservative dominance within American , coining the term in the to describe opposition to centralized power, mass , and . In books like The Strange Death of (2005), he contended that the post-1960s therapeutic state perpetuated egalitarian ideologies under a managerial elite, eroding Western particularism and Christian foundations in favor of globalist uniformity. Gottfried critiqued the conservative establishment's accommodation to these shifts, advocating decentralized governance and cultural preservation to counter what he termed the "soft totalitarianism" of and , drawing on European reactionary precedents adapted to American . Samuel T. Francis (1947–2005) extended paleoconservative critique into socioeconomic analysis, developing "middle American radicalism" as a potential uprising against the "managerial elite"—a class transcending parties, per James Burnham's 1941 framework in The Managerial Revolution, which supplanted bourgeois capitalism with bureaucratic control. Francis argued in columns and Beautiful Losers (1993) that this elite enforced multiculturalism and economic redistribution, diluting the historic American majority's interests; he predicted social fragmentation from unchecked immigration, with non-European inflows projected to reduce white Americans below 50% by mid-century absent restrictions. His work emphasized republican virtue's dependence on ethnic and cultural cohesion, rejecting neoconservative optimism about assimilating diverse populations into a propositional nation. Patrick J. Buchanan (born 1938), a and commentator, operationalized these ideas in electoral politics, launching three presidential bids (1992, 1996, 2000) on platforms prioritizing trade protectionism, non-interventionism, and immigration moratoriums to safeguard . In his speech, Buchanan framed domestic conflicts as a "" for the nation's soul against , , and , attributing societal decay to abandonment of norms. His 2001 book The Death of the West cited data forecasting Europe's Muslim population at 20% by 2050 and America's white majority ending by then, due to fertility differentials (1.2 births per European woman vs. higher among immigrants) and lax borders, urging a return to 1924 Immigration Act levels for assimilation. In Britain, (1944–2020) championed traditional conservatism as stewardship of inherited institutions against ideological disruption, viewing society as an intergenerational trust rather than contractual aggregate. In The Meaning of Conservatism (1980), he critiqued universalism for dissolving loyalties into abstract , advocating "oikophilia"— of and —as to rootless globalism and state-enforced equality. Scruton's Conservatism: An Invitation to (2017) surveyed thinkers from to Eliot, arguing conservatism's empirical realism—grounded in observed human limits and historical precedent—outweighs progressive faith in redesigning society, as evidenced by failed collectivist experiments causing and cultural alienation. He warned of multiculturalism's erosion of social trust, citing studies like Robert Putnam's 2007 findings on ethnic correlating with reduced , and defended and in against modernist .

Thinkers from Other Regions

In , Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira (1908–1995), a Catholic intellectual and Thomist philosopher, developed a framework opposing the egalitarian and modernist tendencies of the revolutionary process, which he traced from the through the to . In his 1959 treatise Revolution and Counter-Revolution, Oliveira argued that societal decline stems from anthropocentric deviations from divine order, advocating a restoration of hierarchical, tradition-bound structures under Catholic doctrine to counter mass egalitarian movements. His establishment of the Brazilian Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP) in 1960 mobilized intellectual resistance against perceived cultural subversion, influencing anti-communist and traditionalist activism across the region until his death. Colombian aphorist Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913–1994) exemplified reactionary thought through terse critiques of democratic egalitarianism and progressive optimism, emphasizing the irredeemable flaws of mass society and the superiority of aristocratic, faith-informed hierarchies. Dávila rejected conservatism as insufficiently radical, defining reaction as an unflinching recognition of modernity's destructive complexity rather than mere preservation of the status quo, as seen in collections like Escolios a un Texto Implícito (1977–1992). His work, shunning political engagement for philosophical isolation, highlighted causal links between liberal individualism and civilizational decay, drawing on pre-modern Catholic and skeptical traditions to argue against utopian reforms. In Asia, Indian thinker (1916–1968) formulated integral humanism as an antidote to Western and , positing an organic, dharma-based social order where individual and collective development harmonize under indigenous hierarchical principles rather than imposed equality. Outlined in lectures from April 22–25, 1965, and adopted as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh's doctrine, his philosophy critiqued atomistic individualism and state-centric planning, favoring decentralized, tradition-rooted governance to preserve cultural authenticity against globalist homogenization. Upadhyaya's emphasis on swadharma (self-realization within one's role) provided empirical justification through historical precedents of stable Indian polities, influencing subsequent nationalist frameworks prioritizing societal wholeness over redistributive experiments.

Religious Dimensions

Ultraconservatism in Christianity

In Catholicism, ultraconservatism appears in , a doctrine asserting that legitimate governments must publicly confess the faith and align social institutions with its teachings, subordinating temporal power to spiritual authority. Integralists reject and freedoms, drawing on 19th-century papal condemnations of , such as Pius IX's (1864), which denounced , civil liberty, and as errors. This view posits that only a confessional order can achieve true justice, as secular neutrality undermines divine law's role in causal social order. Proponents, reviving the idea amid perceived failures of , argue historical Catholic monarchies provided empirical stability through enforced moral unity, contrasting with modern fragmentation. Traditionalist Catholicism represents another ultraconservative strand, emphasizing strict adherence to pre-Vatican II liturgy, doctrine, and discipline while viewing post-1960s reforms as ruptures introducing error. Groups like the Society of St. Pius X, founded by Archbishop in 1970, resist Novus Ordo Mass and , advocating restoration of the Tridentine rite and hierarchical authority to preserve doctrinal purity. Extreme variants, such as , hold that the papal see has been vacant since Vatican II due to alleged in occupants, leading to independent chapels enforcing pre-conciliar norms. These movements claim empirical vindication in higher retention rates among drawn to rigorous tradition amid secular decline, with surveys showing traditional parishes growing faster than progressive ones. Mainstream academic portrayals often frame them as reactionary, reflecting institutional bias toward post-conciliar changes, yet primary texts underscore continuity with patristic and medieval . Among Protestants, ultraconservatism emerges in and , which hold that civil laws remain binding for nations, requiring reconstruction of society under biblical jurisprudence to fulfill the dominion mandate in 1:28. Pioneered by in works like Institutes of Biblical Law (1973), this postmillennial framework advocates applying penalties, including for offenses like and , as perpetual divine standards transcending the Mosaic covenant's ceremonial aspects. Adherents, influencing segments of Reformed circles since the , argue the U.S. Constitution's unsustainability stems from abandoning theonomic foundations, citing historical Puritan colonies' application of as models yielding ordered communities with low deviance rates. Critics within contend it overemphasizes law over grace, but proponents counter with causal evidence that theonomic principles correlate with societal flourishing in scripture and early Christian polities. extends this to cultural spheres, urging to seize institutional power for Christ’s kingship without awaiting eschatological fulfillment.

Intersections with Other Faiths

In , extreme conservatism manifests through movements like and Salafism, which advocate a return to the practices of the first three generations of Muslims (the ) and reject modern innovations as (heretical innovations). , originating in the 18th century with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's alliance with the Saudi family in 1744, enforces strict adherence to , including gender segregation, punishments like amputation for theft, and opposition to secular governance, influencing Saudi Arabia's policies until reforms began in 2017. Salafism's rise in the since the 2000s has promoted ultraconservative interpretations, crowding out more tolerant strains and contributing to societal resistance against liberalization efforts in countries like and post-Arab Spring. These movements parallel extreme conservatism's emphasis on hierarchical order and cultural preservation by viewing Enlightenment-derived as a corrosive threat, though their implementation often prioritizes religious absolutism over broader traditionalist philosophy. Ultra-Orthodox Judaism, known as Haredi, exemplifies extreme conservatism's intersections with Jewish faith through rigorous observance of (Jewish law) and deliberate insulation from secular influences to maintain communal purity. Emerging as a response to 19th-century and , Haredi communities, comprising groups like Hasidim and , reject modern education beyond , enforce modest dress codes, and often oppose as a secular , as seen in the faction's historical boycotts of Israeli institutions. With populations growing rapidly—Israel's Haredi numbered about 1.2 million in 2023, or 13% of there—their emphasis on patriarchal family structures and resistance to aligns with extreme conservatism's causal defense of inherited norms against egalitarian reforms, evidenced by lower integration rates and higher (averaging 6.6 children per woman versus 3.0 nationally). Critics within argue this insularity fosters dependency on , yet proponents cite empirical stability in family cohesion and religious continuity as justifications. In , extreme conservatism intersects with traditionalist ideologies like and orthodox Brahmanical thought, which seek to restore varnashrama dharma (caste-based social order) against colonial and postcolonial . , formalized by V.D. Savarkar in 1923, posits Hindu cultural hegemony as essential for India's unity, influencing the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) governance since 2014, including policies like the 2019 revocation of and Kashmir's to integrate Muslim-majority regions under Hindu-majority rule. Traditionalist strains oppose bhakti-driven and Western individualism, drawing on texts like the to defend hierarchy, as evidenced by resistance to intercaste marriages and , with surveys showing 70% of BJP supporters in 2019 prioritizing cultural preservation over . This mirrors extreme conservatism's first-principles rejection of disruptive equality experiments, substantiated by data on social fragmentation in less hierarchical societies, though intersections remain regionally confined without global doctrinal export like in Abrahamic faiths.

Regional Manifestations

In Europe

![Jean-Baptiste de Villèle, ultra-royalist Prime Minister of France][float-right] In 19th-century France, extreme conservatism manifested in the ultra-royalists, who sought to restore absolute monarchy and suppress liberal reforms following the Bourbon Restoration. Jean-Baptiste de Villèle, serving as Prime Minister from 1821 to 1828, implemented policies including indemnification of émigrés, tightened press censorship, and compensation laws favoring the clergy, aiming to reverse revolutionary changes and reinforce hierarchical order. These measures reflected a commitment to divine-right monarchy and Catholic primacy, viewing the Charter of 1814 as insufficiently restorative. In , emerged in the 1830s as a traditionalist movement opposing liberal , advocating for a Catholic under and preservation of regional fueros (customary laws). The (1833–1840, 1846–1849, 1872–1876) pitted Carlists against forces of modernization, resulting in over 100,000 deaths in the first war alone, underscoring their defense of agrarian, confessional society against centralizing . persisted into the 20th century, aligning with Franco's Nationalists during the (1936–1939), where it contributed to the preservation of traditional Catholic structures amid ideological conflict. Early 20th-century France saw , founded in 1899 by , promote , , and rejection of republican , influencing youth through street and intellectual critique of democratic . The movement, peaking with tens of thousands of adherents by the 1920s, emphasized decentralized authority, family, and Church as bulwarks against revolutionary decay, though condemned by the in 1926 before papal reconciliation in 1939. Contemporary extreme conservatism in aligns with national conservative governance prioritizing cultural preservation, family policy, and sovereignty over supranational integration. In , Viktor Orbán's party, securing a in 2010 with 52.7% of votes, enacted constitutional amendments in 2011 affirming Christian cultural foundations, as heterosexual union, and restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs, empirically correlating with stabilized rates rising from 1.25 in 2010 to 1.59 by 2021 amid pro-natal incentives. Similarly, Italy's , leading to victory in 2022 with 26% parliamentary share, advanced legislation reinforcing distinctions in sports and , countering what proponents term ideological erosion of traditional norms. These manifestations, often critiqued by academic and media sources as authoritarian despite electoral mandates, draw on empirical observations of social fragmentation in systems, advocating causal of pre-modern hierarchies for stability, though remaining marginal compared to mainstream center-right parties. Monarchist and integralist currents persist in niche groups, such as revived circles, but lack mass traction, with polls showing under 10% support for in republican states like .

In the Americas

In the United States, paleoconservatism emerged as a distinct form of conservatism in the late 20th century, advocating for cultural preservation, immigration restriction, and economic protectionism to safeguard national identity and sovereignty. This ideology critiques multiculturalism and globalism, positing that unchecked immigration erodes social cohesion and wages for native workers, drawing on historical precedents like the 1924 Immigration Act that limited inflows to maintain demographic stability. Paleoconservative thinkers influenced the "America First" doctrine revived during Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, which secured victory through appeals to economic nationalism, including tariffs on Chinese imports averaging 19.3% by 2019 and the construction of over 450 miles of border fencing by 2021. These policies addressed empirical rises in unauthorized crossings, peaking at 2.4 million encounters in fiscal year 2022, by prioritizing enforcement over expansive amnesty proposals. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro's 2019-2023 presidency represented a surge in , emphasizing , , and resistance to progressive social engineering. Elected in 2018 with 55.1% of the vote amid public frustration with corruption scandals like , which implicated prior administrations in billions in graft, Bolsonaro's government loosened laws, issuing over 700,000 new firearm registrations by 2022 to counter homicide rates exceeding 50,000 annually. He opposed mandates perceived as infringing liberties during the , correlating with Brazil's data showing varied regional outcomes tied to stringency rather than uniform restrictions. Mainstream outlets often framed these stances as authoritarian, yet Bolsonaro's support stemmed from verifiable reductions in key cities and economic rebound with GDP growth of 4.6% in 2021 post-recession. Across , similar currents manifested in Colombia's 2016 rejection of the FARC peace deal by 50.2% of voters, reflecting conservative wariness toward leniency on responsible for over 220,000 deaths since 1985. In , conservative factions uphold Catholic moral frameworks against secular reforms, influencing electoral outcomes in a nation where 76% identify as Catholic per 2017 data. In , ultraconservative elements remain peripheral, with social conservative advocacy confined to provincial levels, such as Alberta's resistance to federal carbon taxes, though national polls in 2024 showed 36% youth support for the on fiscal restraint grounds. These regional variants prioritize empirical defenses of tradition—rooted in crime statistics, cultural surveys, and economic metrics—over abstract egalitarian ideals, often clashing with institutional biases in and that amplify progressive narratives.

In Asia and the Middle East

In Japan, ultra-nationalist groups known as uyoku dantai have advocated for extreme traditionalism, emphasizing imperial reverence, opposition to pacifism enshrined in the post-World War II constitution, and rejection of foreign influences since the mid-20th century. These organizations, numbering over 1,000 by the 1990s with fleets of propaganda vehicles, promote a return to prewar hierarchical values and have occasionally engaged in confrontations with left-wing protesters. More recently, the Sanseitō party, founded in 2020, gained parliamentary seats in the July 2024 Tokyo assembly elections by campaigning on strict immigration controls and warnings of a "silent invasion" by foreigners, reflecting a resurgence of nativist conservatism amid demographic decline. In , conservative forces have manifested in resistance to liberal social reforms, such as Indonesia's 2022 criminal code revisions imposing penalties for and , driven by Islamic traditionalists within the who prioritize moral codes over individual . In , royalist conservatives, often aligned with military-backed governments, have upheld monarchical absolutism and suppressed pro-democracy movements, as seen in the 2014 coup and subsequent lèse-majesté prosecutions exceeding 200 cases annually in the early 2020s. These dynamics underscore a broader pattern where entrenched elites invoke cultural and religious traditions to maintain hierarchical stability against populist or challenges. In the Middle East, ultra-conservative ideologies often intertwine with Salafi-Wahhabism, as in where clerical opposition to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's 2017-2023 reforms—such as women's driving rights and entertainment liberalization—persists through figures like Sheikh Saleh al-Hakeem, who denounce such changes as deviations from strict interpretations. In , principlist factions, exemplified by the Endurance Front coalition, dominated the 2021 through hardline stances on nuclear policy, enforcement, and anti-Western , though internal fractures led to their parliamentary setbacks by 2024 amid economic discontent. The Taliban's 2021 return to power in represents an extreme enforcement of tribal codes fused with Deobandi , banning women's and public employment, with over 1.1 million girls affected by 2023 school closures justified as preserving societal purity. Across the region, these movements empirically correlate with lower rates of social experimentation, as evidenced by Saudi Arabia's stability post-1979 under Wahhabi guardianship versus the volatility in secular-leaning neighbors, though critics attribute stagnation to suppressed rather than causal preservation of . In both and the , extreme conservatism prioritizes confessional or Confucian hierarchies to counter perceived erosions from , with data from the showing higher public support for in polls—such as 80% approval for in some —amid rising migration pressures.

Achievements and Empirical Justifications

Contributions to Social Stability and Cultural Preservation

Extreme conservatism emphasizes the preservation of traditional structures, which empirical analyses link to enhanced stability through reduced rates. A 2023 study examining the 100 largest U.S. cities found that neighborhoods with higher proportions of two-parent families exhibit significantly lower rates of and , even after accounting for factors like , , and demographics; for instance, a 10 increase in two-parent families correlates with approximately 8 fewer homicides per 100,000 residents. Similarly, longitudinal data indicate that intact married households, regardless of race, maintain crime rates far below those in disrupted environments, attributing this to the supervisory and normative roles of stable parental units in deterring . These patterns underscore how conservative advocacy for marital permanence and familial authority counters the destabilizing effects of family fragmentation, a causal factor in broader societal disorder. In cultural terms, extreme conservatism contributes to preservation by prioritizing continuity of inherited norms, institutions, and national against exogenous pressures like or ideological experimentation. In , under Viktor Orbán's government since 2010, policies reinforcing Christian heritage, family subsidies, and restrictive have sustained cultural homogeneity, yielding the European Union's most politically stable administration amid regional volatility, with uninterrupted governance and minimal coalition disruptions. Poland's (PiS) party, in power from 2015 to 2023, similarly advanced sovereignty-focused measures, including opposition to EU-mandated redistribution, to safeguard ethnic and religious composition, thereby mitigating identity erosion that studies associate with heightened social fragmentation in diverse settings. Such approaches empirically align with higher reported life meaning among adherents to traditional values, fostering in aging populations and intergenerational of cohesive customs.

Countering Disruptive Ideological Experiments

In the case of Chile, Salvador Allende's socialist experiment from 1970 to 1973 resulted in hyperinflation exceeding 300 percent, widespread shortages of basic goods, and a 5.6 percent contraction in GDP by 1972, exacerbated by nationalizations and price controls that disrupted production and trade balances. Following Augusto Pinochet's 1973 coup, which aligned with extreme conservative principles emphasizing hierarchical order and free-market restoration, the implementation of neoliberal reforms by the "Chicago Boys" economists stabilized the economy: inflation fell to single digits by the mid-1980s, annual GDP growth averaged over 6 percent from 1984 to 1990, and poverty rates declined from approximately 45 percent in 1987 to 21 percent by 1990 through privatization, deregulation, and export promotion. These outcomes empirically justified the conservative intervention by averting total economic collapse and laying foundations for sustained prosperity, contrasting with the chaos of Allende's redistributive policies that prioritized ideological equality over causal economic incentives. ![Jair Bolsonaro 2019 Portrait](.assets/Jair_Bolsonaro_2019_Portrait_(3x4_cropped) In , the socialist-leaning policies of the governments culminated in the "" of 1978–1979, marked by over 29 million workdays lost to strikes, peaking at 24 percent in 1975, and an IMF bailout in 1976 due to fiscal deficits and nationalized industries stifling productivity. Margaret Thatcher's conservative administration from 1979 onward countered this through union reforms limiting strike powers, of state monopolies like British Telecom, and tax cuts that reduced top marginal rates from 83 percent to 40 percent; these measures correlated with dropping to 4.6 percent by 1983, GDP growth accelerating to an average of 2.5 percent annually in the 1980s, and unemployment peaking but then declining as new private-sector jobs emerged. Empirical from this reversal underscore extreme conservatism's role in dismantling entrenched collectivist structures, fostering incentive-driven growth that socialist experimentation had eroded through overregulation and welfare expansion. Globally, the exemplified extreme conservatism's proactive stance against communist ideological expansion, providing over $3 billion in aid to anti-communist insurgents in , , and elsewhere from 1981 to 1989, which strained Soviet resources and contributed to the USSR's 1991 dissolution by accelerating military overextension and internal dissent. In , U.S.-backed forces inflicted unsustainable costs on the Soviet invasion from 1979 to 1989, leading to withdrawal and hastening the regime's collapse, while in , Contra support pressured the Sandinista government into electoral defeat in 1990. These interventions, rooted in a rejection of Marxist in favor of traditional sovereignties and free enterprise, empirically validated conservative realism: communist experiments in the Soviet bloc yielded stagnation with per capita GDP growth under 1 percent annually from 1970 to 1989, versus robust Western expansion, demonstrating the causal superiority of preserving decentralized orders over centralized utopian impositions. While critics from often downplay these successes due to institutional leftward tilts, declassified economic metrics and geopolitical timelines affirm the doctrine's disruptive counter to totalitarianism's failures.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Charges of Reactionism and Authoritarianism

Critics frequently accuse extreme conservatism of embodying , portraying it as an ideological drive to dismantle modern egalitarian institutions and restore pre-Enlightenment social orders marked by hereditary hierarchies, religious dominance, and curtailed personal liberties. Political scientists argue that this stems from perceived threats to traditional status arrangements, where advocates prioritize reverting to less permeable social structures over adaptive preservation. For instance, analyses of far-right movements in the describe reactionary conservatism as a response to desegregation and civil rights advancements, fostering opposition to interventions in favor of localized, tradition-bound . Such charges, often advanced by academics examining , contend that reactionism rejects incremental reform for wholesale reversal, as seen in advocacy for monarchical restorations or states in ultraconservative Christian circles. On , detractors claim extreme conservatism inherently favors coercive enforcement of moral and cultural norms, prioritizing hierarchical obedience over pluralistic debate or institutional checks. Empirical studies utilizing the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale correlate stronger conservative orientations with elevated support for submission to perceived legitimate authorities, aggression toward norm violators, and conventionalism, suggesting a psychological predisposition to centralized control in times of perceived disorder. In practice, this manifests in endorsements of "illiberal democracy" models, where leaders consolidate power to safeguard traditions against secular or progressive incursions, as critiqued in examinations of governments blending ultraconservative rhetoric with executive overreach. Notable examples include Brazilian President 's 2019-2022 tenure, during which opponents cited his military background, calls for against judicial rivals, and defense of the 1964-1985 as evidence of authoritarian leanings, amid efforts to politicize . These accusations, while rooted in observable policy pushes like anti-abortion enforcement or immigration crackdowns, frequently emanate from left-leaning academic and media outlets, which empirical reviews indicate exhibit systematic biases in amplifying right-wing threats relative to comparable left-authoritarian dynamics, such as in or historical Soviet contexts.

Rebuttals Based on Causal Evidence of Alternatives

Progressive policies emphasizing reduced funding, such as the "defund the police" initiatives following 2020 protests, correlated with significant increases in affected U.S. cities. In , where the city council cut $8 million from the budget in 2020, homicides rose by 72% that year and by 21%, with subsequent years showing sustained elevations until partial reversals. Similar patterns emerged in , where overtime funding was slashed amid riots, leading to a 83% increase in 2020 and surges; a 2023 analysis of defunding cities found large spikes, attributing them to diminished policing capacity rather than unrelated factors. These outcomes rebut claims that softening enforcement reduces systemic issues, as causal evidence from budget cuts preceding waves demonstrates alternatives exacerbate disorder, vindicating conservative emphases on robust policing. Expansive systems, often advanced as compassionate alternatives to traditional structures, have empirically undermined marital stability and perpetuated cycles. U.S. since the 1965 expansion under the show single motherhood rates climbing from 8% to over 40% by 2020, with studies linking unconditional aid to reduced incentives and higher out-of-wedlock births; children from such face 2-3 times higher risks and elevated future . A review of longitudinal indicates that upbringing doubles dropout rates and triples adult reliance, as subsidies substitute for spousal support, eroding . Internationally, Nordic expansions post-1970s correlated with fragmentation, where generous benefits halved rates in by 1990, fostering isolation-linked social ills. These causal chains—policy incentives preceding behavioral shifts—counter progressive expansions by evidencing their role in destabilizing foundational social units, supporting conservative prioritizations of familial responsibility over state substitution. On immigration, lax progressive approaches in have yielded causal evidence of elevated localized burdens, particularly from low-skilled or culturally discordant inflows. Germany's 2015-2016 surge of over 1 million, predominantly young males from high-conflict regions, preceded a 10% national rise by 2017, with sexual offenses up 20%; a 2023 SSRN study on large-scale waves found no immediate effect but significant increases one year post-arrival, tied to failures. In , foreign-born individuals (19% of population) comprised 58% of suspects in 2018 official statistics, with overrepresentation persisting despite controls for socioeconomic factors in subset analyses. Such patterns rebut open-border alternatives by demonstrating how unvetted strains resources and erodes safety, as pre-policy baselines versus post-inflow spikes reveal direct causal impacts, affirming extreme conservative calls for stringent controls to preserve societal cohesion. Academic denials of aggregate links often overlook subgroup dynamics or underreport due to institutional sensitivities, yet granular data from government records substantiate the risks.

Modern Developments and Debates

Populist Resurgences Since 2016

Since 2016, populist conservative movements have achieved notable electoral successes across multiple continents, reflecting voter dissatisfaction with , immigration policies, and established elites. In the , the June 23, 2016, referendum on membership resulted in 51.9% of voters favoring withdrawal, marking a pivotal rejection of supranational integration in favor of national sovereignty. This outcome, driven by campaigns emphasizing and economic independence, led to the formal exit process under subsequent Conservative leadership. In the United States, Donald Trump's candidacy secured victory in the November 8, 2016, presidential election, capturing 304 electoral votes against Hillary Clinton's 227, despite losing the popular vote by 2.1 percentage points. Trump's platform, centered on trade protectionism, immigration restrictions via border wall proposals, and "" foreign policy, resonated in states, flipping key electoral college battlegrounds. This resurgence culminated in his reelection on November 5, 2024, again prevailing in the electoral college with victories in swing states amid economic and cultural grievances. Across the Americas, Jair Bolsonaro's election as Brazil's president on October 28, 2018, exemplified similar dynamics, with the former military officer winning 55.1% of the runoff vote against . Bolsonaro's campaign highlighted measures, law-and-order policies against urban crime, and conservative stances on , appealing to voters amid and rising violence rates exceeding 60,000 homicides annually prior to his term. In , Giorgia Meloni's party led a center-right to victory in the September 25, 2022, general election, securing 43.8% of the vote and a parliamentary , enabling Meloni to become Italy's first female . Her government's priorities included curbing irregular migration through naval blockades and deals with origin countries, alongside to address Italy's hovering above 140%. These gains paralleled advances by nationalist parties in the June 2024 elections, where groups like increased seats, signaling sustained appeal for sovereignty-focused platforms. Such resurgences, often rooted in empirical concerns like wage stagnation in deindustrialized regions and demographic shifts from unchecked , have prompted policy shifts toward stricter borders and cultural preservation, though mainstream analyses from and legacy media frequently attribute them to rather than verifiable socioeconomic pressures.

Responses to and Cultural Shifts Post-2020

Post-2020, extreme conservatives intensified advocacy for national in response to globalization's vulnerabilities exposed by supply chain disruptions during the , pushing for protectionist measures to prioritize domestic industries over international interdependence. In the United States, continuation of tariffs on imports from , initially imposed in 2018 but defended amid post-pandemic economic recovery, reflected a broader rejection of free-trade orthodoxy, with proponents arguing that globalist policies had eroded bases and wage growth. Similarly, in , governments led by conservative figures implemented reshoring incentives, such as subsidies for critical industries, to mitigate reliance on foreign suppliers, as evidenced by a 2024 analysis of economic nationalism's resurgence in major economies. These policies were justified empirically by data showing pandemic-induced shortages, which conservatives attributed to over-globalization rather than transient shocks. Cultural shifts, including accelerated promotion of identity-based ideologies and remote work's dilution of ties, prompted extreme conservative responses emphasizing traditional social structures and localism. Surveys during the indicated heightened adherence to conventional roles and among respondents facing uncertainty, correlating with conservative critiques of cultural exports via and NGOs. In policy terms, this manifested in legislative efforts to restrict , with countries enacting temporary border closures and pauses that reduced cross-border flows by up to 80% in 2020-2021, framed by nationalists as essential for preserving cultural amid economic distress. Anti-immigration sentiment rose causally linked to -induced , with studies showing increased opposition to migrants as competition for resources intensified, particularly in labor markets strained by lockdowns. Intellectually, extreme conservatism shifted toward postliberal frameworks post-2020, advocating state intervention to reintegrate against globalist , as seen in successful right-wing platforms in and that prioritized family policies and over supranational integration. Opposition to trade liberalization also grew, with U.S. public sentiment turning against imports by 2022, driven by perceptions of foreign dependency risks amplified by the crisis. These responses were underpinned by causal arguments that alternatives—unfettered —had fostered and cultural fragmentation, evidenced by stagnant in deindustrialized regions pre-pandemic.

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