Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

International migration

International migration is the movement of persons who change their country of usual residence for a duration of at least one year, crossing an international border to a destination where they lack nationality. As of mid-2024, the global stock of international migrants reached 304 million, comprising 3.7% of the world's population—a near doubling from 1990 levels—reflecting sustained growth amid economic globalization, conflicts, and demographic imbalances. This cross-border relocation stems from push factors in origin countries, such as poverty, violence, and political instability, combined with pull factors in destinations like higher wages and labor demand, as posited in neoclassical economic frameworks emphasizing expected income differentials. Empirical analyses confirm these drivers, with migration flows responding to real wage gaps and policy regimes facilitating or restricting entry. Recent trends show record permanent inflows to OECD nations, totaling 6.5 million in 2023, alongside surges in remittances exceeding $800 billion in 2022, bolstering origin economies while forced displacement affects over 123 million amid protracted crises. Effects on receiving societies include labor market expansions and innovation gains, with studies finding no native employment displacement and rapid investment responses, though large-scale low-skilled inflows strain public finances and social cohesion in welfare-oriented states. Sending countries experience remittances and diaspora networks fostering trade, offset by skilled labor losses exacerbating development gaps. Debates intensify over irregular migration's scale, cultural assimilation challenges, and policy efficacy, with data revealing elevated unauthorized entries and demographic shifts altering host populations' compositions.

Definition and Conceptual Framework

Core Definitions and Distinctions

International migration refers to the movement of persons who change their country of usual residence, crossing an international border to settle in a destination country for at least one year, distinguishing it from short-term movements such as tourism or business travel. This definition, aligned with United Nations recommendations, emphasizes a durable change in residence rather than transient relocation, excluding those who maintain their original habitual abode. Central distinctions arise between immigrants—viewed from the receiving country's perspective—and emigrants, from the sending country's viewpoint; both describe the same cross-border flows but highlight origin or destination effects on demographics, economies, and policies. International migration contrasts with internal migration, which involves relocation within national borders without crossing sovereign lines, often driven by similar factors like urbanization but lacking interstate legal implications. Migrants are broadly categorized by intent and legality: voluntary migrants pursue economic opportunities, family reunification, or education, entering via regular channels with visas or permits, whereas irregular or undocumented migrants bypass authorized entry, risking exploitation and deportation. Forced migration subsets include refugees, legally defined under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as individuals outside their country of nationality with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, unable or unwilling to seek home-country protection. Asylum seekers apply for refugee status but await determination, distinct from economic migrants who lack such persecution-based claims and thus fewer automatic protections. These categories underscore causal differences: voluntary migration stems from personal agency and opportunity gradients, while forced variants arise from existential threats, with empirical data showing refugees comprising about 26 million of the 281 million international migrants globally as of 2020, per United Nations estimates. Misapplication of terms, such as equating economic displacement with persecution, can inflate protected categories, as noted in critiques of expansive interpretations beyond the Convention's text.

Measurement Challenges and Data Sources

Measuring international migration poses significant challenges due to inconsistencies in definitions across countries and organizations. The United Nations defines an international migrant as someone who changes their country of usual residence for at least one year, or intends to stay that long, but many nations apply shorter durations or exclude temporary workers, leading to non-comparable statistics. This definitional variance results in underestimation of short-term or circular migration, which can constitute a substantial portion of movements in regions like sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Distinguishing between migration stocks (total resident migrants) and flows (annual entries and exits) exacerbates inaccuracies, as flows rely heavily on administrative border records that miss irregular entries and overstays. Censuses and population registers, primary for stocks, often undercount due to incomplete coverage in developing countries or privacy restrictions in others, with gaps identified in analyses of 30 nations showing systematic data quality deficits. Irregular migration, lacking documentation, is particularly prone to underreporting; for instance, U.S. estimates range from 11 million (Department of Homeland Security, 2022) to 18.6 million (Federation for American Immigration Reform, 2025), reflecting methodological differences like residual estimation from surveys adjusted for undercount. These discrepancies arise from reliance on assumptions in survey data, such as the American Community Survey, which may not fully capture hidden populations due to non-response or fear of authorities. Outflows are frequently omitted in origin-country data, while host countries prioritize inflows, distorting net migration figures; for example, residual methods in U.S. Census estimates assume demographic components to infer migration but require adjustments for data limitations. Political incentives can further bias reporting, with some governments minimizing irregular inflows to avoid scrutiny, though independent analyses highlight persistent incompleteness across global datasets. Key data sources include the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) International Migrant Stock dataset, which compiles biennial estimates from 1990 to 2024 using censuses, population registers, and surveys for over 200 countries, disaggregated by sex, age, and origin. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) World Migration Report aggregates these with administrative data and surveys, providing flows and policy insights, though reliant on member-state submissions. The World Bank's bilateral migration matrix derives net migration from UN data, incorporating economic indicators for 200+ countries since 1960. For OECD nations, the International Migration Outlook uses harmonized administrative records to track legal inflows, asylum claims, and labor migration, covering over 90% of member-country movements as of 2024. Refugee and asylum data stem from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which maintains global stock figures based on government reports and field assessments, estimating 36.4 million refugees and 6.9 million asylum-seekers as of mid-2024. Supplementary sources like the Migration Data Portal consolidate these, but users must account for methodological notes on comparability, as no single dataset captures all facets without gaps. Emerging digital trace data, such as mobile phone records, offer potential for real-time flows but face privacy and coverage challenges in low-income settings.

Historical Overview

Ancient to Pre-Modern Movements

Human migration began with the dispersal of anatomically modern Homo sapiens out of Africa, with genetic and fossil evidence indicating initial waves around 70,000 to 50,000 years ago, reaching Eurasia via the Levant and southern routes. These movements involved small groups adapting to diverse environments, facilitated by technological innovations like improved stone tools, and resulted in the peopling of continents over millennia. Earlier dispersals may have occurred as far back as 86,000 years ago into Southeast Asia, though these were limited in scope compared to the main exodus. The Neolithic Revolution, starting around 9600 BCE in Southwest Asia, drove further migrations as farming populations expanded into Europe and North Africa between 9600 and 3800 BCE. Ancient DNA analysis confirms that this spread was primarily demic, with Anatolian farmers migrating and largely replacing or admixing with indigenous hunter-gatherers, rather than diffusion through cultural adoption alone. In Britain, for instance, Neolithic farmers arrived from continental Europe around 4000 BCE, introducing agriculture and megalithic structures. Bronze Age migrations included the Indo-European expansions from the Pontic-Caspian steppes, associated with the Yamnaya culture around 3000 BCE, which genetic evidence links to sudden population influxes into Central Europe via the Corded Ware horizon. These steppe pastoralists, carrying R1a and R1b haplogroups, spread languages and technologies westward to Europe and eastward to South Asia, displacing or assimilating local groups through mobility enabled by wheeled vehicles and horse domestication. Concurrently, the Bantu expansion originated in West-Central Africa around 4000–5000 years ago, with Bantu-speaking groups migrating southward and eastward at rates varying by habitat—slower through rainforests (delayed by ~300 years) than savannas—introducing ironworking and agriculture to sub-Saharan regions. Maritime migrations exemplified by Polynesians involved Austronesian peoples departing Taiwan around 3000 BCE, reaching the Pacific via the Philippines and Indonesia, with Lapita culture bearers colonizing Remote Oceania from 1600–1200 BCE using outrigger canoes and wayfinding techniques. By 830 CE, voyages from Samoa extended to the Cook Islands and beyond, populating islands like Hawaii and New Zealand up to the 13th century, demonstrating long-distance navigation across thousands of kilometers without external aids. In the classical era, the Roman Empire (27 BCE–476 CE) facilitated extensive internal and cross-border movements, with military conscription, trade, and slavery drawing populations from Gaul, Germania, and North Africa to Italy; ancient DNA from Rome shows diverse ancestries peaking in the Imperial period due to these influxes. Urban centers like Rome, estimated at over 1 million inhabitants by the 2nd century CE, relied on migrant labor, while policies encouraged settlement in provinces. Medieval pre-modern movements included Viking Norse expansions from Scandinavia (793–1066 CE), establishing settlements in the British Isles, Normandy, Iceland (874 CE), and Greenland (986 CE), driven by overpopulation, resource scarcity, and raiding economies; genetic traces confirm admixture with local populations. The Mongol conquests under Genghis Khan from 1206 CE onward caused unprecedented displacements across Eurasia, with invasions depopulating regions in Central Asia, Persia, and Eastern Europe—estimates suggest tens of millions affected—through terror tactics and forced relocations, reshaping demographics prior to 1500.

Colonial and Industrial Eras (1500-1914)

The era of European colonial expansion from the late 15th century initiated large-scale international migration, primarily involving voluntary settlement by Europeans in the Americas and forced displacement of Africans via the transatlantic slave trade. Spanish and Portuguese explorers and settlers established footholds in the Caribbean and Latin America starting in 1492, followed by British, French, and Dutch colonization in North America and the Caribbean through the 17th century, driven by resource extraction, religious motives, and territorial ambitions. These voluntary flows were modest in scale, with European migrants numbering in the hundreds of thousands by 1700, often including families, adventurers, and laborers seeking land or fortune. In contrast, the transatlantic slave trade represented the period's dominant forced migration, with approximately 12.5 million Africans embarked on European ships between 1526 and 1867, of whom about 10.7 million survived the Middle Passage to disembark in the Americas. Peak volumes occurred in the 18th century, fueled by demand for plantation labor in sugar, tobacco, and cotton production, primarily to Brazil, the Caribbean, and British North America; mortality rates exceeded 15% during voyages, reflecting brutal conditions including disease, overcrowding, and violence. This trade, orchestrated by Portuguese, British, French, Dutch, and later American traders, decimated African populations and societies while establishing enduring demographic patterns in the Americas. The Industrial Revolution from the late 18th century onward triggered a surge in voluntary European emigration, as population growth—from 188 million in 1800 to 400 million by 1900—outpaced agricultural and industrial opportunities, compounded by enclosures, rural poverty, famines, and political upheavals. Between roughly 1800 and 1900, 55 to 60 million people emigrated from Europe, with the majority heading to the Americas for wage labor in factories, railroads, and agriculture. The United States received nearly 12 million immigrants between 1870 and 1900 alone, predominantly from Germany, Ireland, Britain, and Scandinavia, drawn by industrial expansion and cheap land under policies like the Homestead Act of 1862. Latin America absorbed significant flows, including over 6 million to Argentina by 1914, mostly Italians and Spaniards, transforming it into a high-immigration society relative to population. Post-abolition of the slave trade (British 1807, full emancipation by 1888), colonial powers recruited indentured laborers from Asia to sustain plantation economies, marking a shift to semi-coerced international migration. From 1834 to 1917, Britain transported about 2 million Indian workers to 19 colonies, including Mauritius, Trinidad, Guyana, and Fiji, under contracts typically lasting five years, often involving deception, debt bondage, and high mortality akin to slavery. Approximately 1.5 million South Asians reached British and Dutch territories in the Caribbean and Indian Ocean by the late 19th century, while Chinese "coolies"—around 250,000 to Cuba and Peru—faced similar exploitative conditions in guano and sugar industries from the 1840s. These movements, justified as free labor alternatives, frequently replicated coercive elements of prior systems due to recruiter abuses and colonial oversight failures. Return rates varied, but many remained, forming diaspora communities amid ongoing economic pressures.

20th Century: Wars, Decolonization, and Post-WWII Shifts

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 curtailed mass international labor migration that had characterized the pre-war era, with European governments imposing travel restrictions, border controls, and internment policies that reduced transatlantic flows from peaks of around 1 million annually to the United States alone. Wartime displacements included the forced expulsion of over 700,000 Jews from border regions by Russian imperial forces amid retreats and pogroms. These measures foreshadowed post-war quotas, such as the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, which limited entries based on national origins to preserve domestic labor markets strained by mobilization. World War II amplified displacement on a massive scale, with forced labor programs conscripting millions across Europe and Asia, including approximately 5.7 million Soviet civilians deported for work in Germany. Post-liberation in 1945, Allied surveys identified around 11 million non-German displaced persons in occupied Europe, many requiring international resettlement through organizations like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The International Refugee Organization (IRO), predecessor to UNHCR, facilitated the emigration of over 1 million DPs to countries like the United States and Australia by 1952, amid repatriations and local integrations. Decolonization accelerated migratory pressures through partition and independence conflicts. The 1947 partition of British India into India and Pakistan displaced an estimated 14.5 million people across new borders in months of communal violence, resulting in up to 2 million deaths and long-term refugee settlements. Similarly, Algerian independence in 1962 prompted the rapid exodus of approximately 800,000 European settlers (Pieds-Noirs) to France, straining metropolitan infrastructure and marking one of the largest repatriations from a former colony. These flows reversed colonial settlement patterns, with Europeans returning home while some indigenous elites and laborers migrated outward seeking stability. Post-WWII reconstruction in Western Europe and North America created acute labor shortages, leading to targeted recruitment programs. The U.S. Bracero Program, initiated in 1942 and expanded postwar until 1964, contracted over 4 million Mexican agricultural workers to address farm labor gaps, though it faced criticism for exploitative conditions and wage suppression. In West Germany, bilateral agreements from 1955 recruited Gastarbeiter, initially from Italy and Spain, expanding to Turkey by 1961; by 1973, foreign workers numbered about 2.6 million, comprising 10% of the industrial workforce and fueling the economic miracle. The United Kingdom, facing similar needs, saw the 1948 arrival of the Empire Windrush ship initiate Caribbean inflows, with roughly 125,000 West Indians migrating by 1958 under British Nationality Act rights, primarily for transport and health sector roles. These initiatives shifted migration from wartime chaos to state-managed temporary labor, though many participants settled permanently, altering demographic compositions despite original "guest" intentions.

Contemporary Globalization (1980s-2025)

International migration expanded markedly during the contemporary globalization era, with the global stock of migrants rising from an estimated 102 million in 1980 to 153 million in 1990, and further to 281 million by 2020, representing an 83% increase over the three decades from 1990 alone. By 2024, the figure reached 304 million, nearly doubling the 1990 level and quadrupling the 77 million recorded in 1960, though the share of migrants in the world population remained modest at around 3.6% in 2020, up slightly from 2.9% in 1990. This growth reflected eased transportation costs, expanded trade networks, and liberalized policies in destination countries, alongside push factors like economic stagnation and conflicts in origin regions. Economic globalization fueled labor migration, particularly South-to-North flows, as developing economies integrated into global markets while aging populations in high-income nations created demand for workers. In the United States, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act legalized about 3 million undocumented migrants, spurring further inflows that averaged over 1 million legal immigrants annually by the 1990s. Europe experienced surges following the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, with millions from Eastern Europe relocating westward; the European Union's 2004 enlargement enabled free movement for over 100 million new citizens, leading to net migration gains in countries like the UK and Germany. Gulf Cooperation Council states attracted millions from South Asia for temporary labor under kafala systems, with remittances totaling $83 billion from the region in 2022. Forced migration intensified due to protracted conflicts and political upheavals, contributing to irregular crossings and asylum claims. The 1990s saw outflows from the Yugoslav wars, displacing over 2 million, while the 2011 Syrian civil war generated 6.8 million refugees by 2020, with over 1 million arriving in Europe via the Mediterranean in 2015 alone. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine prompted 6.5 million refugees to flee primarily to Poland and Germany by 2023, marking Europe's largest displacement crisis since World War II. Unauthorized migration rose globally, with U.S. border encounters exceeding 2.4 million in fiscal year 2022, often involving Central Americans fleeing violence and poverty, though official data likely undercounts total irregular stocks due to enforcement gaps. Policy responses varied, with destinations tightening controls amid public concerns over integration and welfare strains, yet inflows persisted. OECD countries recorded 6.5 million permanent immigrants in 2023, a 10% rise from 2022, driven by family reunification, skilled visas, and humanitarian admissions. By 2025, digital remittances from migrants exceeded $800 billion annually, underscoring economic ties, while debates over border security and demographic sustainability intensified in both Europe and North America. Despite growth, migration rates stabilized relative to population, with most movement remaining intra-regional in Asia and Africa rather than long-distance.

Drivers and Incentives

Economic Disparities and Labor Demands

Economic disparities between origin and destination countries serve as a primary push factor for international migration, with individuals seeking higher wages and living standards unavailable in their home economies. In low- and middle-income countries, average per capita incomes often lag far behind those in high-income nations; for instance, GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa averaged around $1,700 in 2023, compared to over $50,000 in Western Europe and North America. These gaps create incentives for labor mobility, as empirical models show that migration flows correlate positively with wage differentials, with unskilled workers potentially earning 5 to 10 times more abroad after accounting for costs. Economic development in origin countries can initially accelerate emigration by enabling potential migrants to afford travel, before tapering off at higher income levels—a pattern observed in historical transitions from Europe and East Asia. Labor demands in destination countries exert a corresponding pull, particularly in sectors shunned by native workers and amid demographic pressures like aging populations and below-replacement fertility rates. Developed economies, including OECD members, face chronic shortages in construction, agriculture, healthcare, and elder care; immigrants filled critical gaps, comprising 15.6% of U.S. nurses and 27.7% of health aides as of 2024. Globally, international migrant workers numbered 167.7 million in 2022, representing 4.7% of the total labor force and rising to 12% in more-developed countries, driven by native workforce contraction. U.S. border crossings have shown positive correlation with labor market tightness, underscoring how job availability amplifies inflows during periods of high demand. Remittances provide quantifiable evidence of economic motivations, as migrants remit earnings to support families, with flows to low- and middle-income countries reaching $656 billion in 2023—exceeding foreign direct investment and equivalent to about 3.9% of their combined GDP. These transfers, totaling $831 billion globally in 2022, reflect the wage premiums captured abroad and sustain origin economies, though they also highlight the scale of labor migration responsive to cross-border opportunities rather than temporary or non-economic factors. In countries like the Philippines, positive shocks to migrant incomes from abroad yield long-term developmental impacts, reinforcing the causal link between economic incentives and sustained migration patterns.

Conflict, Persecution, and Political Instability

Conflict, persecution, and political instability have driven substantial international migration, particularly forced displacement across borders, with an estimated 123.2 million people forcibly displaced worldwide by the end of 2024 due to these factors alongside violence and human rights violations. Of the 65.8 million new displacements recorded in 2024, 20.1 million stemmed directly from conflict and violence, many spilling over into cross-border refugee flows. These drivers often intersect, as ongoing wars exacerbate targeted persecution of ethnic, religious, or political groups, compelling individuals to seek asylum in neighboring or distant countries under international conventions like the 1951 Refugee Convention, which defines refugees as those fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Major armed conflicts have been pivotal in generating refugee outflows since the early 21st century. The Syrian civil war, initiated in 2011 amid protests against the Assad regime, displaced over 6.8 million Syrians externally by 2024, primarily to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, with persistent violence sustaining flows despite partial stabilizations. Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, prompted the largest and fastest refugee exodus in Europe since World War II, with over 6 million Ukrainians fleeing to Poland, Germany, and other EU states by mid-2025, alongside millions more internally displaced. In Sudan, civil war erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, displacing over 2 million externally to Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan by 2024, fueled by ethnic targeting and resource disputes in a context of prior political fragility following the 2019 ouster of Omar al-Bashir. Myanmar's 2021 military coup against the elected government intensified ethnic insurgencies and communal violence, driving over 1.2 million Rohingya Muslims and other minorities to Bangladesh and India, with ongoing clashes exacerbating outflows. Persecution on political, ethnic, or religious grounds forms a core causal mechanism, often verified through asylum adjudications that require evidence of individualized or group-based threats. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's August 2021 takeover reinstated strict Islamist rule, leading to over 500,000 external displacements by 2024, including targeted evacuations of political opponents, journalists, and ethnic minorities like Hazaras facing reprisals. Political dissidents and human rights activists from authoritarian regimes, such as Venezuela's socialist government under Nicolás Maduro since 2013, have sought asylum amid documented repression, contributing to over 7.7 million Venezuelan emigrants by 2025, many qualifying as refugees in destinations like Colombia and the United States due to fears of arbitrary detention or extrajudicial killings. Religious and ethnic persecution, as in the case of Uyghur Muslims in China's Xinjiang region since intensified crackdowns around 2017, has prompted smaller but steady asylum claims globally, though verification challenges arise from state denial and restricted access. Political instability, including coups and civil unrest, disrupts governance and amplifies migration by eroding security and economic viability. In West Africa's Sahel region, military coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) unleashed jihadist insurgencies and intercommunal violence, displacing over 2 million regionally and spurring irregular migration toward Europe via Libya, with apprehensions of Sahel nationals rising sharply in the Mediterranean. Haiti's chronic instability, marked by gang violence and the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, has driven over 100,000 external migrants to the Dominican Republic and the United States by 2024, often fleeing targeted killings amid state collapse. These dynamics illustrate causal chains where initial unrest cascades into broader persecution, with empirical data from UNHCR tracking showing that conflict-induced displacements are less reversible than economic ones, as reconstruction lags and perpetrator impunity persists. While UNHCR data provides robust aggregate figures, individual claims' credibility varies, with asylum grant rates reflecting evidentiary standards rather than uniform truth, as seen in varying approvals for Venezuelan (around 70% in the U.S. post-2021) versus Central American cases tied to gang violence.

Demographic Imbalances and Environmental Pressures

Demographic imbalances between regions with declining fertility rates and aging populations versus those experiencing youth bulges contribute significantly to international migration flows. In 2024, the global total fertility rate stood at 2.2 births per woman, but stark regional disparities persist, with Europe and Northern America recording rates of 1.4 and 1.6 respectively, well below the replacement level of 2.1, while sub-Saharan Africa maintains higher rates around 4.0-5.0. These low rates in high-income countries exacerbate labor shortages; for instance, Japan's working-age population is projected to shrink by 8% by 2035 without sufficient immigration to offset aging demographics. Conversely, youth bulges in Africa and the Middle East—where individuals aged 15-24 constitute over 20% of the population in many countries—generate outward pressures due to high unemployment rates exceeding 25% among young people, prompting emigration for economic opportunities. Such imbalances create a structural pull toward destinations with demographic deficits, as evidenced by policy shifts in countries like Japan, which expanded foreign worker programs in response to acute labor gaps in sectors such as caregiving and construction. In origin regions, the mismatch between rapid youth population growth and limited job creation—particularly in low-skill economies—amplifies migration incentives, with studies linking youth unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa to increased outflows. World Bank analyses identify these demographic trends as key macro-drivers alongside economic disparities, forecasting sustained migration increases unless origin countries achieve faster growth to absorb their labor surpluses. Environmental pressures, primarily from climate change, further intensify migration by degrading livelihoods through slow-onset events like desertification and water scarcity, as well as acute disasters such as floods and hurricanes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has long recognized that climate impacts could displace millions, with vulnerable populations in low-lying or arid areas facing heightened mobility risks. The International Organization for Migration notes that these pressures disproportionately affect those with limited adaptation resources, often resulting in out-migration from environmentally stressed regions like the Sahel or small island states. While much displacement remains internal, cross-border flows emerge when local coping mechanisms fail; for example, recurrent droughts in East Africa have driven pastoralists toward neighboring countries and urban centers abroad. Projections underscore the scale: the World Bank's Groundswell report estimates up to 216 million internal climate-related displacements by 2050 across six regions, with potential spillover to international migration in hotspots like South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa where slowing development exacerbates vulnerabilities. However, empirical evidence indicates climate acts as an amplifier rather than a primary driver, interacting with socioeconomic factors; isolated environmental events rarely prompt long-distance international moves without underlying economic or conflict stressors. In regions like the Middle East, combined water scarcity and youth pressures compound emigration, as seen in Syrian refugee flows partly linked to drought-amplified instability prior to 2011. Overall, these pressures highlight the need for targeted adaptation in origin areas to mitigate involuntary cross-border movements.

Typologies and Categories

Voluntary and Skilled Migration

Voluntary migration involves the intentional relocation of individuals across international borders, driven by personal choice and typically motivated by economic opportunities, family reunification, education, or lifestyle improvements, in contrast to movements compelled by persecution or conflict. This form of migration requires legal entry approval from destination countries and constitutes the majority of global migrant flows, excluding refugees and asylum seekers. Skilled migration, a prominent subset, specifically targets individuals with tertiary education, professional certifications, or expertise in high-demand fields such as information technology, engineering, healthcare, and finance, often facilitated through employer sponsorship or merit-based selection. Destination countries implement targeted programs to recruit skilled voluntary migrants, addressing domestic labor shortages and fostering innovation. Canada's Express Entry , launched in 2015, employs a points-based evaluating applicants on criteria like skilled work (minimum in a qualifying ), skills, and , with invitations to apply issued to top scorers via regular draws. In 2023, Canada admitted over 110,000 principal applicants through economic immigration streams, predominantly skilled workers, representing about 60% of its total permanent resident intake. Australia's Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) and similar pathways under its General Skilled Migration program similarly prioritize occupations on the Skilled Occupation List, with applicants assessed via the points-tested SkillSelect ; in the 2022-2023 fiscal year, Australia granted approximately 195,000 skilled visas, focusing on sectors like engineering and IT. In the United States, the enables temporary admission of skilled workers in "specialty " requiring at least a , with caps of 85,000 visas (,000 plus 20,000 for advanced-degree holders) allocated via due to oversubscription; in fiscal year 2023, over 780,000 applications were received for these slots, primarily from and . The Union's Blue Card directive, revised in 2021, standardizes highly qualified worker across member states, requiring a job offer with salary thresholds (e.g., 1.5 times the national average) and relevant qualifications; by 2023, over 20,000 Blue Cards were issued ly in key countries like Germany, which reformed its laws in 2020 to ease entry for skilled non-EU professionals amid labor shortages in STEM fields. Globally, skilled voluntary migration has scaled with and technological demands, comprising a growing share of permanent inflows to nations—where permanent labor rose to form about 20-25% of the 6.5 million total permanent migrants in 2023, up 10% from 2022. Empirical analyses indicate net economic gains for destinations through boosts and contributions, though origin countries face risks, with high-skilled rates from developing nations exceeding 20% in fields like in some African states. Individual migrants typically realize substantial gains, averaging 2-3 times higher wages post-relocation, underscoring the voluntary structure. These flows are projected to intensify through 2030, driven by aging populations in high-income countries and skill mismatches, though policy selectivity varies, with points systems favoring younger, English-proficient candidates to maximize long-term fiscal contributions.

Forced Migration: Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Forced migration encompasses the compelled of individuals across borders to , conflict, violence, or violations, distinguishing it from voluntary economic or labor . Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is defined as someone outside their of who well-founded of on grounds of , , , membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of that 's protection. seekers, by contrast, are individuals who have crossed an border and are awaiting a decision on their claim for refugee status or other protection, often applying upon arrival in a host . The Convention's core principle of non-refoulement prohibits returning refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened, while also mandating non-discriminatory access to basic rights such as employment, education, and legal aid. By the end of 2024, the for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 123.2 million forcibly displaced worldwide, including 36.8 million refugees and millions more seekers, representing a persistent from pre-2020 levels amid protracted conflicts. Children under 18 comprise about 40% of this population, or roughly 49 million individuals, heightening vulnerabilities to and . resettlement remains severely , with only 188,800 resettled in 2023 against needs exceeding 2 million annually, while pending claims have accumulated for eight straight years due to surging applications outpacing capacities. In the , admissions reached 100,034 in fiscal year 2024 under a ceiling of 125,000, prioritizing cases from conflict zones like Afghanistan and Ukraine, yet backlogs persist. European Union-plus countries recorded 64,000 applications in May 2025 alone, down from 2024 peaks but still straining resources amid geopolitical shifts. Primary drivers include armed conflicts and generalized violence, with Sudan, Ukraine, and Myanmar accounting for the largest new displacements in 2024 through ethnic cleansing, territorial invasions, and civil strife. Persecution based on political dissent, religious minorities, or ethnic targeting—such as Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar or Uyghurs in China—compels flight, often into neighboring low-income states bearing 76% of the global refugee burden. Human rights abuses, including state-sponsored violence and failure of internal remedies, underpin most claims, though environmental disasters and economic collapse exacerbate outflows without qualifying under strict refugee criteria. Asylum processes involve individualized , where claimants must substantiate fears through , yet systems face overload: the UK's backlog grew significantly from 2014 to 2023, delaying decisions and enabling prolonged stays. Concerns over abuse arise as economic migrants, ineligible under the , exploit controls or fabricated narratives to entry, with UK parliamentary inquiries citing widespread fears of "bogus" applications straining and resources. Former immigration officials have described thousands of abusive claims annually, evidenced by high rejection rates—often over 60% in jurisdictions—and patterns like repeated applications after . While UNHCR emphasizes that proportions do not to systemic , empirical patterns of destination selection favoring -rich states over proximate safe havens suggest mixed motives, undermining public trust and prompting policy reforms like accelerated procedures. Host thus grapple with balancing humanitarian obligations against fiscal and burdens, where unresolved claims foster economies and cultural enclaves.

Irregular and Unauthorized Migration

Irregular migration, also termed unauthorized or illegal migration, encompasses the of individuals across borders without required legal , or remaining in a destination after legal entry expires, in violation of the host nation's immigration laws. The (IOM) defines it as "movement that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or agreements governing the entry into or from the , or destination." This excludes forced displacement like asylum-seeking, though irregular entrants may later claim protection; it primarily involves economic migrants, family reunifiers, or others bypassing formal channels due to ineligibility, barriers, or expediency. Quantifying irregular migration remains challenging owing to its clandestine nature, with global estimates relying on indirect indicators such as border apprehensions, visa overstays, and deportation data rather than comprehensive censuses. In the United States, the unauthorized immigrant population reached a record 14 million in 2023, up from 11 million in 2022, comprising about 3.3% of the total population; approximately half entered without inspection via land borders, while the remainder overstayed visas. In the European Union, irregular border crossings detected by Frontex agencies numbered over 380,000 in 2023, predominantly via Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes from North Africa and the Middle East, though total undetected entries and internal overstays likely exceed official figures. Trends show surges post-2020, driven by post-pandemic mobility resumption, geopolitical instability in origin regions like Venezuela and Syria, and perceived enforcement gaps in destinations. Common modalities include surreptitious crossings facilitated by —who charge fees ranging from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars per —and exploitation of weak enforcement in transit zones, such as the between and , traversed by over 500,000 migrants annually in recent years. voyages, including overcrowded vessels across the or Central Mediterranean, account for high-risk entries; in 2023, IOM recorded over 3,100 migrant or disappearances globally during such journeys, with as the leading cause. often expose migrants to , extortion, and abandonment, elevating risks of assault, , and trafficking, particularly for women and children, who comprise a growing share of irregular flows. Upon arrival, irregular migrants typically enter informal labor markets, facing wage suppression, lack of protections, and heightened deportation vulnerability, though some integrate via amnesties or employer sponsorships in destination economies with labor shortages. Distinguishing irregular migration from human trafficking is critical, as the former involves consensual, albeit unlawful, facilitation for economic gain, whereas the latter entails coercion; however, blurred lines occur when smugglers impose debt bondage or force labor. Policy responses vary: the U.S. emphasizes border fortifications and expedited removals, with over 2.4 million encounters at the southwest in fiscal year 2023, while EU nations deploy Frontex patrols and externalize controls through deals with origin countries like Tunisia and Libya. These measures have reduced some flows—e.g., U.S. apprehensions dipped post-Title 42 expiration in 2023 amid stricter asylum curbs—but irregular attempts persist, underscoring enforcement limits against determined migrants and smuggling networks profiting billions annually.

Global Patterns and Flows

Major Origin and Destination Regions

In 2024, Europe hosted the largest stock of international migrants at 94 million, representing diverse inflows from neighboring Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, Western Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, driven by labor demands, family reunification, and asylum from conflicts such as those in Syria and Ukraine. Northern America followed with 61 million migrants, predominantly from Latin America and the Caribbean (27 million via the primary inter-regional corridor), reflecting proximity, economic opportunities, and historical ties like the U.S.-Mexico migration pathway. Northern Africa and Asia ranked third with million migrants, including significant labor to states like ( million migrants) from Central and Southern Asia ( million via the key corridor), fueled by oil economies' demand for low-skilled workers in and services. Asia itself accommodates around 86 million migrants, largely intra-regional, with destinations like the drawing from and for temporary contracts. Other notable destinations include and , attracting skilled migrants from Asia and the Pacific. Major origin regions are concentrated in developing areas with high population growth, poverty, and instability. Asia originates over 40 percent of global migrants (approximately 122 million based on 304 million total stock), led by India (18.5 million emigrants), China (11.7 million), and Bangladesh, primarily to Gulf states and intra-Asian hubs for economic reasons. Latin America and the Caribbean supply key flows to North America, with Mexico as the third-largest origin (11.6 million), alongside Central American countries escaping violence and seeking wages. Sub-Saharan Africa contributes through irregular routes to Europe, with origins in Nigeria, Somalia, and Eritrea tied to persecution and underdevelopment, while Northern Africa and Western Asia export to Europe (13 million corridor) amid conflicts like those displacing 9.8 million from Ukraine (though intra-regional for some).
RegionInternational Migrants Hosted (2024, millions)Key Origin Corridors
94Northern Africa/Western (13M), intra-
61/ (27M)
Northern Africa/Western 54Central/Southern (20M)
(other)~86 (2020 baseline, adjusted)Intra-, to Gulf
Nearly half of all migrants (45 percent) remain within their region of birth, underscoring intra-regional patterns in (64 percent Sub-Saharan) and (74 percent), while inter-regional South-North flows dominate global narratives.

Key Migration Corridors and Routes

The Mexico-United States migration corridor represents the world's largest bilateral flow, with approximately 11 million Mexican-born individuals residing in the as of recent estimates, driven primarily by economic opportunities and . This route, spanning the -Mexico , has recorded over 2 million encounters in fiscal year 2023 before declining sharply to about 1.5 million in 2024 due to policy changes and enforcement measures. It is the deadliest route globally, with 686 documented and disappearances in 2022 alone, often from , , or vehicle accidents in remote areas. In Europe, the Central Mediterranean route from to remains the most perilous sea corridor, accounting for over 24,000 fatalities since records began, with irregular crossings peaking at around 180,000 arrivals in 2023 before dropping in 2024 amid Libyan interdictions and agreements. This , originating from and , carries predominantly sub-Saharan fleeing and , with more than 29,000 West and Central nationals arriving via various Mediterranean routes in 2022. Complementary routes include the Western Atlantic path to Spain's , which saw 36,000 interceptions in 2024, and the from to , with 64,000 irregular entries that year. These maritime corridors involve overcrowded vessels and , exacerbating risks of drowning and exploitation. The South Asia to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states corridor constitutes one of the largest labor migration streams, with over 25 million Asian workers—primarily from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal—employed in construction, domestic service, and oil sectors across Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar as of 2024. Five of the global top 20 corridors originate from South Asia to GCC destinations, facilitated by kafala sponsorship systems but marked by vulnerabilities like contract substitution and wage theft. Air and sea routes dominate legal flows, though irregular overland paths via Iran persist for some. Intra-Asia-Pacific corridors, particularly within and South-West Asia, prominently, with Bangladesh-to-India and Afghanistan-to-Iran flows among the largest, driven by economic disparities and regional . In the broader Asia-Pacific, labor migration from South-East to higher-income neighbors like and involves over 10 million workers, often via formalized programs but with rising irregular post-COVID. The Syria-to-Turkey corridor ranks second globally at nearly 4 million migrants, swelled by the since 2011.
CorridorEstimated Stock/Flow (Recent Data)Primary DriversKey Risks
Mexico-US11 million ; 1.5M encounters ()Economic, , crossings
Central Mediterranean (Africa-Europe)180K arrivals ( ), Drownings,
South Asia-GCC25M+ workersLabor under kafala
Syria-Turkey4M Overland hazards
The number of international migrants worldwide increased from 153 million in 1990 to 281 million in 2020, representing an 83% rise, before reaching an estimated 304 million by mid-2024. This growth outpaced the global population expansion, elevating the migrant share from 2.9% in 1990 to 3.7% in 2024. United Nations estimates, derived from censuses, surveys, and administrative data across 233 countries, indicate that South-South migration constitutes about 40% of total flows, with significant concentrations in Asia and Europe.
YearInternational Migrant Stock (millions)Share of Global Population (%)
1532.9
1732.8
3.2
2813.6
3043.7
Permanent migration flows to OECD countries hit a record 6.5 million in 2023, up 10% from 2022, driven primarily by family reunification (18% increase) and humanitarian admissions amid conflicts in , , and . Temporary labor migration also surged, with over 2 million work permits issued in 2023, reflecting labor shortages in sectors like and healthcare. Irregular crossings, such as Mediterranean sea arrivals tracked by the , peaked at over 186,000 detected entries in 2023, though undercounting remains likely due to clandestine routes. Refugee numbers under UNHCR mandate grew from about 15 million in 1990 to 36.8 million by end-2024, with spikes following the 2011 Syrian civil war (adding over 6 million) and Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine (displacing 6 million abroad). Total forcibly displaced persons exceeded 120 million by mid-2025, including 42.7 million , amid ongoing crises in Sudan, Myanmar, and Venezuela. These trends underscore migration's responsiveness to geopolitical instability, with absorbing 40% of new refugees since 2022 despite policy tightenings.

Economic Impacts

Effects on Origin Countries: Remittances vs.

International migration from developing yields significant remittances, which in 2023 totaled $656 billion to low- and middle-income (LMICs), surpassing (FDI) and (ODA) combined in many cases. These inflows, to reach $685 billion in 2024, primarily support household , , and , with empirical studies showing a positive to GDP in recipient nations like and the Philippines, where remittances constituted over 3% of GDP in recent years. In sub-Saharan Africa, remittances have stabilized economies during crises, funding education and health expenditures that mitigate immediate fiscal strains from emigration. Conversely, refers to the emigration of high-skilled workers, depleting stocks in origin countries, particularly in sectors like healthcare and . For instance, in several African nations, up to 30% of trained physicians emigrate to OECD countries, exacerbating shortages and increasing mortality rates from treatable conditions, as evidenced by studies linking skilled medical outflows to higher in source regions. Empirical analyses confirm direct costs, such as reduced and in small, open economies like those in the Caribbean, where the loss of tertiary-educated workers correlates with slower long-term absent offsetting factors. The net impact hinges on trade-offs between these dynamics, with remittances often partially offsetting brain drain through financial incentives for skill acquisition and return migration. Causal inference studies indicate that migration opportunities can induce "brain gain," elevating education levels in origin countries by 5-10% via anticipated emigration premiums, as seen in randomized evaluations in places like and . However, skilled migrants remit less per capita than unskilled ones, limiting compensation in high-drain contexts, and net benefits skew positive only when diaspora knowledge transfers or circular migration occur, per assessments of Latin American cases. In aggregate, recent evidence from LMICs suggests migration's joint effects favor growth and human capital accumulation over pure depletion, though vulnerable sectors in least-developed states face persistent deficits without policy interventions like bilateral skill-sharing agreements.

Effects on Destination Countries: Growth, Fiscal Burdens, and Labor Dynamics

Immigration to destination countries expands the labor force, which can enhance economic output through increased production and specialization, particularly when migrants possess skills complementary to native workers. A comprehensive review by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) in 2017 found that immigration has contributed positively to long-run U.S. economic growth by augmenting the workforce and fostering innovation, with immigrants accounting for more than half of labor force growth between 1995 and 2015. However, the magnitude depends on migrant selection; high-skilled immigration correlates with higher productivity gains, while low-skilled inflows may yield smaller or context-dependent benefits, as evidenced by meta-analyses showing positive but varying GDP impacts across studies. Fiscal effects of immigration reveal a net burden in many cases, especially for low-education migrants in welfare-heavy economies. The NAS report estimates that first-generation immigrants impose a net fiscal cost of approximately $279,000 over their lifetimes in the U.S., driven by higher use of , , and services relative to taxes paid, though second-generation immigrants generate a surplus of $1,187,000 per person. In Europe, unskilled migrants often result in net costs to taxpayers exceeding contributions, with skilled migrants providing positive fiscal balances, according to analyses of advanced economies. Recent updates, such as a 2025 Manhattan Institute study, highlight escalating U.S. fiscal deficits from recent low-skilled immigration waves, projecting trillions in added costs over decades due to program eligibility expansions. These dynamics underscore that fiscal neutrality or surplus requires selective policies favoring higher human capital. Labor from involve trade-offs in and effects, predominantly negative for low-skilled natives due to . Borjas's indicates that a 10% increase in immigrant supply reduces wages for competing native workers by 3-4%, with stronger impacts on high school dropouts, based on U.S. data from 1980-2000. Meta-analyses confirm small overall wage depression for natives, but disaggregated findings reveal declines of 1-5% for low-education groups, while high-skilled immigration boosts native earnings via complementarity. effects mirror this, with low-skilled immigration increasing native risks in affected sectors, though overall labor force participation remains minimally altered in studies. These patterns arise from supply shocks in segmented markets, where prevents native adjustment.

Empirical Evidence on Native Wages, Employment, and Inequality

Empirical studies on the labor market effects of international migration reveal a consensus that immigration has negligible average impacts on native wages and in destination countries, though effects vary by native skill level and migrant composition. A 2022 meta-analysis of 42 studies found the overall effect of immigration on native wages to be close to zero, with point estimates ranging from -0.01 to +0.01 standard deviations. Similarly, a 2025 review confirmed this null average, attributing it to offsetting mechanisms such as native task specialization, capital adjustment, and geographic mobility that mitigate short-run substitution pressures. However, these aggregates mask heterogeneity: low-skilled immigration tends to exert downward pressure on wages for less-educated natives, while high-skilled inflows often complement and boost native earnings across skill groups. For low-skilled natives, evidence indicates small but persistent negative wage effects from competing migrant labor. George Borjas's analyses, using national-level data and assuming imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives, estimate a 3-5% wage decline for high school dropouts per 10% immigrant supply shock in the U.S. from 1980-2000, with elasticities around -0.3 to -0.4. Critiques of spatial correlation methods (e.g., Mariel Boatlift studies) by Borjas highlight endogeneity biases, as they fail to account for pre-existing trends and assume no native relocation, yielding overstated null results; reanalyses confirm stronger negatives when controlling for these. A 2021 study on U.S. low-skilled immigration corroborated a small wage loss (1-2%) at the native wage distribution's bottom quintile, driven by labor supply increases in manual occupations. In contrast, Giovanni Peri's task-based models posit complementarity, where immigrants specialize in routine manual tasks, allowing natives to shift toward communication-intensive roles, resulting in modest positive effects (+0.5-1%) for less-educated natives; however, this relies on assumptions of rapid adjustment not always empirically robust in low-mobility contexts. Recent European data (2020-2025) show mixed outcomes, with low-skilled inflows depressing unskilled native wages by 2-4% in high-immigration regions like the UK, but positive spillovers in skill-complementary sectors. On employment, meta-analyses report minimal displacement of native workers, with immigration-induced job losses offset by creation in complementary sectors. The IZA World of Labor review of cross-national studies found no significant employment reduction for natives overall, and little evidence for less-educated subgroups, as immigrants fill vacancies without crowding out. U.S.-focused research, including a 2025 compendium, identifies occasional short-term declines in low-skilled native participation (1-3% per 10% migrant influx), particularly for prior dropouts, but long-run neutrality prevails via entrepreneurship and sectoral shifts. High-skilled immigration shows stronger positive employment effects, enhancing firm productivity and native hiring. Regarding , modestly exacerbates by compressing low-end while benefiting higher-skilled natives. Low-skilled surges correlate with a 0.5-1% rise in the U.S. over decades, as bottom-decile native wages fall relative to the , though metrics remain to offsetting top-end gains. Studies assuming perfect native-immigrant substitutability project larger increases (up to 2-3% Gini uplift), while complementarity models predict neutrality or slight via . Empirical patterns hold in , where post-2015 low-skilled flows widened unskilled-native gaps without altering overall distributions significantly, contingent on policies. consensus leans toward small net effects, but methodological disputes—e.g., vs. local variation—persist, with nationally representative designs revealing more adverse low-skill outcomes than localized ones potentially biased by omitted mobility.

Social and Cultural Impacts

Demographic Shifts and Population Dynamics

![Growth in share of foreign-born population by country from 1990][float-right] International migration has profoundly influenced demographic structures in high-income destination countries, where native fertility rates remain below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. In the European Union, the total fertility rate stood at approximately 1.46 in 2023, with native-born women exhibiting even lower rates, while foreign-born mothers accounted for 23% of all births that year. In the United States, the native total fertility rate was 1.73 in 2023, compared to an overall rate of 1.80 influenced by higher immigrant fertility, though immigrant rates have declined over time and converge toward native levels across generations. These disparities highlight migration's role in sustaining population levels amid endogenous decline driven by aging and low birth rates. The influx of predominantly younger migrants—often in working ages—alters age pyramids and in destination regions. Migrants typically arrive with lower elderly ratios than natives, thereby reducing the overall burden on working-age populations to support retirees through and systems. In , this mitigates the fiscal strains of demographic aging, where the old-age continues to rise but at a moderated due to . Similarly, in the , immigrants expand the pool of prime-age workers, lowering age- ratios in the short to medium term and contributing to labor . Without such inflows, many countries would face accelerated and heightened pressures. Population projections underscore migration's pivotal role in future dynamics. Eurostat and UN models indicate that the EU's population, currently around 448 million, would decline by over one-third to 295 million by 2100 in scenarios excluding immigration, reflecting unchecked native aging and . In contrast, with moderate migration assumptions, decline is slower or averted in some nations, though long-term depends on and second-generation fertility convergence. For the , projections incorporate immigration of about 1 million annually, projecting continued to 2055, but zero-net-migration scenarios imply stagnation or decline post-2030s due to similar demographic headwinds. These shifts also entail ethnic and cultural transformations, with foreign-born and their increasingly comprising majorities in younger cohorts in countries like and the .

Integration, Assimilation, and Cultural Changes

Integration refers to the economic and social participation of immigrants in host societies, while assimilation encompasses the cultural adoption of host norms, values, and practices, often measured through language proficiency, intermarriage rates, educational attainment, and residential patterns. Empirical studies indicate that assimilation occurs gradually across generations, particularly in socioeconomic domains, though outcomes vary by origin group and host policy. In the United States, first-generation immigrants from Europe and Asia show progressive language acquisition and economic mobility, with second-generation children often surpassing natives in education but facing selective downward assimilation risks among low-skilled cohorts. Intermarriage serves as a key indicator of social , correlating with improved economic outcomes such as higher wages and better host-language . from the U.S. reveal intermarriage rates with natives reaching 30.4% among immigrants from and Central , compared to lower rates for groups from culturally distant regions like South or the Middle East, where endogamy persists and hinders full . In , assimilation patterns exhibit "" trajectories: selective upward for skilled migrants alongside persistent for , with second-generation outcomes showing lags in national formation and labor entry relative to natives. Cultural changes in host countries arise from bidirectional influences, where immigrants adapt practices while introducing origin-country that alter local norms, structures, and social attitudes. drives cultural convergence between origin and destination via remittances and return flows, but in high-immigration destinations, rapid demographic shifts foster parallel societies—enclaves with limited interaction and adherence to imported customs, as acknowledged by leaders citing failed policies. Sweden's in 2022 attributed riots to two decades of inadequate , resulting in segregated communities resistant to host values. Similarly, UK officials in 2023 declared multiculturalism's of "parallel lives" a , evidenced by non-assimilating groups maintaining distinct legal and social norms. Challenges to assimilation intensify with mass inflows from culturally dissimilar regions, welfare provisions reducing work incentives, and policies prioritizing diversity over cohesion, leading to segmented outcomes where second-generation immigrants underperform natives in education and exhibit weaker host identification. Peer-reviewed analyses confirm that while U.S. assimilation historically succeeds through market-driven selection, European models of state-supported multiculturalism often yield persistent ethnic enclaves and eroded social trust, underscoring causal links between policy laxity and cultural fragmentation. These patterns highlight that effective assimilation demands enforceable norms and incentives favoring host culture adoption over preservation of origin identities.

Social Cohesion, Crime Rates, and Public Service Strains

Empirical research indicates that increased ethnic from correlates with reduced and in the short to medium term. Putnam's of U.S. communities found that higher ethnic leads to lower levels of among residents, including in neighbors and institutions, as individuals "hunker down" and withdraw from . A of 90 studies across multiple confirmed a statistically significant between ethnic and , with explaining variations in levels even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. This pattern holds in contexts as well, where influxes of culturally dissimilar migrants have been associated with declining interpersonal and higher behaviors. While some studies argue that perceptions of rather than objective measures drive these effects, the aggregate evidence points to causal strains on from unassimilated . Regarding crime rates, patterns differ between the United States and Europe, with overall immigrant incarceration rates lower than natives in the U.S. but significant overrepresentation among certain migrant groups in Europe. In the U.S., first-generation immigrants have had similar or lower imprisonment rates than U.S.-born citizens since 1880, and undocumented immigrants show no increase in violent crime at the community level according to fixed-effects models. However, data from sources like the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program suggest higher offending rates for illegal aliens in specific jurisdictions, particularly for offenses like illegal re-entry and drug crimes. In Europe, foreign-born individuals in Sweden were 2.5 times more likely to be registered as crime suspects than Swedish-born in recent data, with overrepresentation up to sevenfold in rape cases and 73% of murder/manslaughter suspects being foreign-born or descendants. Post-2015 refugee inflows in Germany correlated with a rise in non-German suspects to 41% of total suspects by 2023, including sharp increases in violent crimes attributed to migrants, though overall crime victimization of natives did not uniformly rise. These disparities often stem from differences in migrant selection, cultural factors, and enforcement, rather than immigration per se, with non-Western migrants showing higher risks than those from similar backgrounds. Immigration imposes measurable strains on services, particularly in high-reception and U.S. states, through elevated usage and for and healthcare. In the U.S., 59% of households headed by illegal immigrants used at least one program in recent estimates, generating net fiscal costs of about $42 billion annually when including dependents, exacerbating pressures on means-tested systems. Immigrant households overall utilize at higher rates than native-born , per , though per capita figures vary by and . In , rapid has contributed to shortages, with undocumented inflows reducing affordability in areas, and healthcare systems like Sweden's and the UK's NHS facing overload from disproportionate migrant use, including emergency care. These strains are amplified by lower employment rates among low-skilled migrants and family reunification policies, leading to sustained fiscal burdens without commensurate contributions in aging states.

Policy Responses and Governance

National Policies: Selection, Enforcement, and Restrictions

National policies on selection emphasize criteria such as skills, , and economic in like and , where points-based systems allocate visas to applicants meeting thresholds that prioritize labor needs. 's , operational since 2015, requires candidates for the to score at least 67 points out of 100 based on factors including , , work , , and arranged , with to issued to top-ranked profiles via the Comprehensive . In 2024, adjusted its amid and strains, reducing permanent from 500,000 to 395,000 for 2025 and further to 380,000 by 2027, while emphasizing temporary-to-permanent pathways for skilled workers already contributing economically. similarly employs a points test for two-thirds of its permanent skilled migration intake, awarding points for attributes like English proficiency and qualifications in shortage occupations, with reforms announced in December 2023 aiming to streamline processing and introduce visas for critical skills gaps starting in 2024. In contrast, the allocates over % of its permanent immigrant visas through categories, allowing U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents to sponsor immediate relatives without numerical caps for spouses and children, though extended petitions face per-country limits of 7% of the family-sponsored total annually. Employment-based visas, capped at 140,000 per year, favor high-skilled workers via categories like H-1B for specialties and EB-1 for extraordinary , but family preferences dominate admissions, with enabling secondary sponsorships that extend beyond immediate kin. This approach, rooted in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, has resulted in less emphasis on meritocratic selection compared to points systems, though and visa lotteries add further pathways. Enforcement mechanisms include border interdictions, interior arrests, and removals, with effectiveness varying by resource allocation and legal frameworks. Australia's , initiated in , mandates turnbacks of unauthorized maritime arrivals and offshore processing, resulting in zero successful boat arrivals since implementation and enabling rapid deportations or settlements in third countries like . In the United States, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducted approximately 200,000 interior and border removals from January to August 2025 under heightened priorities targeting criminal noncitizens and recent arrivals, building on fiscal year 2024 figures of over 257,000 deportations during the prior administration's final months. European Union enforcement, coordinated via Frontex, intercepted over 380,000 irregular crossings in 2023 but faced challenges in returns, with only 20% of non-admitted asylum seekers deported due to origin country cooperation issues. Restrictions often manifest as numerical quotas, visa suspensions, and eligibility barriers to manage inflows. The U.S. imposes annual caps on family-sponsored (226,000) and employment-based (140,000) green cards, with per-country limits causing backlogs exceeding 20 years for high-demand nations like India and China in skilled categories. The United Kingdom, post-Brexit, raised skilled worker visa salary thresholds from £26,200 to £38,700 in April 2024 and restricted family dependents for most work routes, contributing to a 2024 decline in non-EU work visa grants after pandemic-era peaks. Australia's Migration Program sets fixed planning levels, such as 190,000 places for 2024-25, with recent legislation empowering ministers to bar re-entry for three years to visa overstayers and expanding third-country deportation options. The EU's 2024 Migration Pact introduces mandatory solidarity quotas for member states to relocate asylum seekers or fund external border controls, aiming to distribute burdens while restricting secondary movements within Schengen. These measures reflect causal pressures from fiscal costs and public capacity limits, though enforcement gaps persist where bilateral readmission agreements falter.

International Frameworks and Agreements

The Relating to the of Refugees, supplemented by the , establishes the foundational legal framework for refugee , defining a refugee as someone with a well-founded of based on , , , membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and prohibiting refoulement (forced return to danger). Adopted on July 28, , and entering into force on April 22, 1954, the Convention has 146 state parties, while the Protocol, which removes temporal and geographic limitations, has 147 parties as of 2023. These instruments apply narrowly to refugees amid broader migration flows, often straining implementation as contemporary movements include economic migrants and those fleeing generalized violence not explicitly covered. For labor migration, the (ILO) has promulgated key conventions, including the Migration for Employment (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), which mandates equal treatment for migrant workers regarding employment conditions, social , and trade union , and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) , 1975 (No. 143), which addresses irregular migration by requiring states to combat clandestine movements and promote orderly processes while protecting workers from abuse. Ratified by 49 and 24 states respectively as of 2023, these conventions emphasize non-discrimination but have limited uptake, particularly among major destination countries, reflecting tensions between worker protections and national labor controls. The UN's 1990 on the Protection of the of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families further codifies to fair wages, safe conditions, and family unity but has only 59 ratifications, mostly from origin states, underscoring enforcement gaps due to reluctance from high-immigration nations. The 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 2018, by 164 states, represents the first non-binding intergovernmental agreement addressing all dimensions of migration, including objectives to minimize drivers like poverty, enhance border management, and facilitate return of irregular migrants. Lacking legal enforceability, it promotes cooperation through voluntary commitments, such as data sharing and capacity-building, but critics argue it inadequately addresses sovereignty concerns and may incentivize uncontrolled flows by framing migration as inherently positive without robust deterrence mechanisms. Non-adoption by states like the United States, Hungary, and Australia highlights divisions over its perceived dilution of border controls. Overall, these frameworks exhibit uneven , with treaties like the influencing domestic laws but facing overload from non-traditional pressures, while non-binding pacts like the GCM yield limited measurable outcomes in reducing irregular flows or enhancing returns, as evidenced by persistent global challenges post-2018. Low rates for instruments—often below 50 states—stem from destination countries' prioritization of flexible national policies over universal standards, resulting in fragmented that privileges bilateral arrangements over multilateral . Empirical assessments indicate that while these agreements provide normative baselines for , they rarely constrain actions amid competing priorities like and economic .

Border Controls and Irregular Flow Management

Border controls encompass physical barriers, surveillance technologies, personnel deployments, and legal mechanisms designed to regulate unauthorized entries at national frontiers. These measures aim to deter and detect irregular , defined by the (IOM) as movement outside legal channels, often involving clandestine crossings or overstays. Empirical evidence indicates that fortified barriers can significantly reduce illegal entries in targeted areas; for instance, Israel's 245-kilometer fence along its with , completed in 2013, curtailed African migrant inflows from over 16,000 in 2012 to fewer than 100 annually by 2016, achieving near-total deterrence through razor-wire, sensors, and patrols. In the United States, segments of the with , expanded under various administrations, have yielded localized successes amid broader challenges. U.S. and Protection (CBP) from showed a 79% drop in apprehensions in high-traffic zones post-barrier completion, alongside a 26% overall decline in successful illegal entries from prior peaks of 1.8 million annually. However, nationwide encounters remained elevated at over 2.1 million in fiscal year 2024, with intensified cooperation and U.S. policy shifts contributing to a 53% reduction in irregular arrivals between December 2023 and mid-2025. Studies suggest such controls redirect rather than eliminate flows, increasing risks and smuggling costs without proportionally curbing overall migration pressures. Australia's Operation Sovereign Borders, launched in September 2013, exemplifies offshore interdiction and turnback policies in managing maritime irregular flows. The policy mandates naval interception of vessels, with over 1,000 boats turned back or disrupted by 2022, reducing successful unauthorized arrivals from 20,000 in 2013 to zero sustained entries thereafter. This deterrence, coupled with mandatory offshore processing, has maintained minimal boat ventures into 2025, though critics note humanitarian costs; proponents attribute the halt to credible non-settlement threats disrupting people-smuggling networks. European Union efforts, coordinated via Frontex since its expansion in 2019, combine patrols, aerial surveillance, and third-country agreements to curb Mediterranean and land routes. Irregular crossings fell 22% in the first nine months of 2025 to 133,400, following peaks of over 380,000 in 2015, with declines on routes like the Western Balkans (-56%) linked to fenced borders in Greece and Hungary. Yet, externalization pacts, such as those with Turkey (2016) and Libya, have yielded mixed results, redirecting flows to riskier Atlantic paths while failing to address root drivers; Frontex data underscores that detections capture only detected entries, underestimating undetected irregular migration. Irregular extends beyond borders to interior , including rapid returns and biometric tracking. Globally, IOM estimates irregular migrants comprise a of the 304 million migrants in 2024, but undetected entries persist; effective regimes integrate controls with —e.g., U.S. removals exceeding million annually post-2020—and bilateral deals. While some analyses claim enforcement "backfires" by incentivizing permanent over circular , causal from barrier successes supports that sustained, resource-intensive controls can compress flows when paired with of incentives, though by migrants raises long-term costs estimated at billions for incomplete U.S. wall segments alone.

Controversies and Debates

Net Economic Benefits vs. Real Costs

Empirical analyses of international migration's economic impacts reveal a tension between aggregate gains, such as total GDP expansion through labor supply augmentation, and distributional costs borne disproportionately by lower-skilled native workers and public budgets. Proponents argue that migrants fill labor shortages, spur innovation, and contribute to productivity, with estimates suggesting immigration added approximately 1-2% to annual GDP growth in high-income countries like the over recent decades. However, these benefits accrue unevenly: Borjas's research indicates that while immigration boosts overall U.S. GDP by about $1.6 trillion cumulatively, 97.8% of this increment flows to immigrants themselves via wages and transfers, leaving natives with a negligible per capita gain of roughly $6 billion annually in the 1990s, a figure likely diluted further by population growth. Such outcomes stem from capital dilution and skill substitution, where influxes of low-skilled migrants depress returns on native-held assets and labor. On wages and , meta-analyses of peer-reviewed studies mixed but predominantly negative short-term effects for competing native workers, particularly those without high school diplomas. Borjas's spatial models estimate that a 10% increase in the immigrant share reduces native wages by 3-4% for low-skilled groups, with displacements amplifying . The 2017 National Academies of Sciences, , and corroborates this, finding transient wage declines of 1-6% for immigrants and low-skilled natives during influx periods, though long-run adjustments via occupational may mitigate effects for the overall native . Countervailing claims of negligible or positive wage impacts often derive from instrumental variable approaches that underweight localized labor frictions, as critiqued in Borjas's reexaminations, which reveal stronger in routine sectors. These dynamics exacerbate income , with gains concentrated among high-skilled natives and firm owners via cheaper labor, while low-skilled natives face stagnating real earnings amid rising housing and service costs. Fiscal burdens represent a core real cost, frequently outweighing contributions for low-skilled migration cohorts in welfare-oriented systems. OECD data across member countries show immigrants' net fiscal impact averaging between -1% and +1% of GDP from 2006-2018, with deficits driven by higher expenditures on education, healthcare, and family benefits relative to tax revenues. In the U.S., the National Academies report projects a lifetime net present value fiscal drain of $279,000 per low-skilled immigrant with children, versus a $259,000 surplus for childless high-skilled arrivals, reflecting intergenerational transfers where second-generation descendants initially impose costs before potential offsets. A 2025 update from the Manhattan Institute estimates average legal immigrants yield a $350,000 net fiscal surplus over lifetimes, but unlawful entrants generate deficits exceeding $500,000, compounded by remittance outflows—totaling $80 billion annually from the U.S. alone—that bypass domestic reinvestment. Recent surges, as analyzed by the Congressional Budget Office, temporarily narrow deficits through immediate payroll taxes from working-age arrivals, yet overlook long-term liabilities like aging-related entitlements and strained state-level services. Beyond direct fiscal and labor metrics, unaccounted costs include crowding out in public goods provision and reduced incentives for native workforce participation. Studies attribute 10-20% of housing price inflation in gateway cities to migrant-driven demand, indirectly taxing natives via elevated rents and property levies to fund expanded infrastructure. While high-skilled, selected migration yields clear net positives—evident in Canada's points system, where fiscal contributions exceed costs by margins supporting 0.5-1% GDP uplift—mass, unskilled flows prevalent in Europe and the U.S. post-2010 often invert this, with integration failures amplifying persistent drains amid cultural and skill mismatches. Overall, rigorous first-principles accounting, prioritizing per-native impacts over aggregate illusions, substantiates that real costs frequently eclipse touted benefits absent stringent selection criteria.

Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Cultural Preservation

National encompasses a state's to regulate entry and residence within its borders, a principle rooted in and affirmed in instruments such as the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Irregular international migration, particularly large-scale undocumented inflows, challenges this by straining enforcement capacities and inviting supranational interventions that prioritize migrant over domestic . For instance, during the 2015-2016 migrant crisis, over 1 million arrivals overwhelmed border states like Greece and Italy, prompting internal EU disputes and external pressures from human rights bodies, which critics argue erode unilateral decision-making. The resurgence of in migrant-receiving countries correlates empirically with surges in low-skilled , as native populations perceive threats to and resources. Across 12 nations, an influx of less-educated migrants boosted support for nationalist parties by amplifying cultural and economic anxieties, while high-skilled inflows had or dampening effects. In , the foreign-born share rose from 2.3% in 2002 to 8.5% in , coinciding with gains for parties advocating stricter controls; similar patterns emerged in , Danish, and regions with prevalent low-skilled . This backlash reflects causal links between rapid demographic shifts and demands for sovereignty restoration, as evidenced by the 2016 referendum, where 52% of voters endorsed leaving the partly to reclaim border from free-movement policies. Cultural preservation concerns arise from evidence of incomplete in high-migration contexts, fostering parallel societies that resist host norms and dilute national cohesion. In , where comprise about 6% of the as of 2025, surveys indicate persistent preferences among some immigrant communities for religious laws over secular ones, complicating and prompting preservationist policies. enforcing strict restrictions, such as with its under 0.2% of , maintain cultural homogeneity and low , avoiding the enclaves seen in Europe's banlieues or Sweden's vulnerable areas. bans historically select for migrants aligning with host cultural norms, reducing transmission of incompatible traits across generations and preserving endogenous values like and civic participation. While pro-migration analyses emphasize convergence, empirical failures in and disparities underscore the of limits to safeguard intangible .

Humanitarian Imperatives vs. Capacity and Security Realities

The principle of , enshrined in the and its , compels states to refrain from returning individuals to territories where they face , creating a humanitarian imperative to claims and provide . This has facilitated the resettlement of millions, with UNHCR reporting 1.6 million refugee returns in amid ongoing crises. However, the unprecedented of —reaching 123.2 million by the end of , including 73.5 million internally displaced persons—frequently overwhelms host nations' , as finite resources in housing, healthcare, and education cannot indefinitely without trade-offs. In Europe, the 2015-2016 migrant influx of over 1.3 million asylum applications exposed acute capacity limits, with frontline states like Greece and Italy facing overcrowded reception centers, makeshift camps, and surges in communicable diseases due to inadequate screening and quarantine facilities. Public services buckled under the pressure: Germany's healthcare system reported increased burdens from untreated chronic conditions among arrivals, while schools in migrant-heavy areas saw class sizes swell, exacerbating educational disparities for both newcomers and natives. Similar strains manifested in the United States, where irregular border encounters exceeded 2.4 million in fiscal year 2023, contributing to housing shortages in sanctuary cities like New York, where shelter systems reached breaking points by mid-2023, forcing reliance on temporary measures and straining municipal budgets by billions. Security realities compound these capacity issues, as rapid inflows from conflict zones—such as , , and —hinder thorough , where destroyed records and lack of cooperation from origin governments impede background checks. A 2024 DHS report highlighted systemic screening gaps for seekers, noting risks of admitting individuals with criminal histories or ties to adversarial networks due to incomplete biometric and intelligence data. In , jihadist remains a primary threat, with identifying migration routes as conduits for radicalized individuals; incidents like the 2015 Paris attacks involved perpetrators who entered via channels. Sweden's government has linked a surge in organized crime and gang violence—reaching unprecedented levels by 2025—to failed integration of non-Western migrants, with foreign-born individuals overrepresented in violent offenses per official statistics. While aggregate studies in the US indicate immigrants commit crimes at rates below natives, this masks elevated risks from unvetted subsets, particularly males from high-conflict regions, where cultural incompatibilities and ideological extremism amplify threats absent rigorous selection. The tension underscores a causal mismatch: humanitarian commitments, designed for targeted protection, falter under mass movements driven by economic pull factors alongside persecution, eroding public trust and prompting policy reversals, as seen in Denmark's paradigm shift toward repatriation incentives post-2015. Prioritizing capacity and security—through enhanced border controls and merit-based asylum—aligns with host states' sovereign duties to safeguard citizens, without negating aid via regional processing or third-country agreements.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] UN 12th Inquiry Module III International Migration - the United Nations
    An international migrant is defined as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence for at least a year (12 months).
  2. [2]
    [PDF] International Migrant Stock 2024: Key facts and figures - UN.org.
    Oct 8, 2024 · In 2024 the number of international migrants worldwide stood at 304 million, a figure that has nearly doubled since 1990, when there were an ...
  3. [3]
    International migration | United Nations
    For statistical purposes, the United Nations defines an international migrant as any person who has changed his or her country of residence. This includes all ...
  4. [4]
  5. [5]
    The Causes and Effects of International Migrations: Evidence from ...
    Apr 3, 2009 · We find that immigration increases employment, with no evidence of crowding-out of natives, and that investment responds rapidly and vigorously.
  6. [6]
    International Migration Outlook 2024 | OECD
    Nov 14, 2024 · Permanent-type migration to OECD countries set a new record in 2023 with 6.5 million new permanent immigrants, a 10% year-on-year increase, and ...Executive Summary · Key Findings · In The Same Series
  7. [7]
    World Migration Report 2024 Reveals Latest Global Trends and ...
    May 7, 2024 · With an estimated 281 million international migrants worldwide, the number of displaced individuals due to conflict, violence, disaster, and ...
  8. [8]
    Global Trends - UNHCR
    Jun 12, 2025 · At the end of 2024, an estimated 123.2 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights ...Global Trends report 2024 · Global Trends report 2023 · Français<|separator|>
  9. [9]
    The Impact of International Migration on Inclusive Growth: A Review in
    Mar 19, 2021 · It may lead to loss of human capital, but it also creates a flow of remittances and increases international connections in the form of trade, ...
  10. [10]
    Key Migration Terms
    International migration – The movement of persons away from their place of usual residence and across an international border to a country of which they are not ...
  11. [11]
    International migration – terms, definitions and frequently asked ...
    ONS uses the UN recommended definition of a long-term international migrant: “A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] Key concepts and definitions related to international migration
    Apr 27, 2021 · The resident population should include persons who may be irregular or undocumented, as well as asylum seekers and persons who applied for or ...
  13. [13]
    [PDF] Statistics on International Migration A Practical Guide for Countries ...
    From the perspective of the country of departure the person will be an emigrant and from that of the country of arrival the person will be an immigrant” (UN.<|separator|>
  14. [14]
    Fundamentals of migration
    International migration occurs when people cross State boundaries to live in another country for a minimum length of time. Internal migration is when people ...
  15. [15]
    Types of movements | EMM2 - International Organization for Migration
    This section looks at migration from several dimensions. First, it discusses regular versus irregular migration as modes of entry, transit and stay.
  16. [16]
    Convention relating to the Status of Refugees | OHCHR
    The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, defines a refugee and covers general provisions, juridical status, employment, welfare, and ...Preamble · Article 1 - Definition of the term... · Article 24 - Labour legislation...
  17. [17]
    Refugees - UNHCR
    The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the key legal documents that protect refugees. They provide the universal definition of who is a refugee ...
  18. [18]
    Chapter 4: Introduction to Key Concepts and Definitions
    International migration is broadly defined as a change in residence from one country to another and consists of a spatial (moving from one place to another) ...
  19. [19]
    [PDF] A/CONF.2/108: Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 ...
    The 1951 Convention, a key international refugee protection instrument, defines a refugee as someone fearing persecution for race, religion, nationality, ...
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration and ...
    Mar 4, 2025 · challenges when it comes to measuring international migration, including the lack of an appropriate sampling frame, potential exclusion of ...
  21. [21]
    [PDF] Measuring flows of international migration | IZA World of Labor
    International migration data are highly inconsistent and incomplete due to different measurements and collection methods. The effects of incorrect measurement ...<|separator|>
  22. [22]
    International migration flows data
    Nov 20, 2024 · There are challenges associated with the use of administrative sources to derive statistics on international migration flows: such sources ...
  23. [23]
    Challenges with International Migration Data: An Analysis of the ...
    Oct 9, 2023 · Drawing insights from 30 countries, the study finds that there are significant gaps in the quality and completeness of migration data, ...
  24. [24]
    [PDF] Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the ...
    In summary, the Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS) estimates 11.0 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States on January 1, ...Missing: irregular | Show results with:irregular
  25. [25]
    How Many Illegal Aliens Are in the United States? 2025 Update
    Mar 7, 2025 · As of March 2025, FAIR estimates that approximately 18.6 million illegal aliens reside in the United States. This is 11 percent higher than our June 2023 ...Missing: irregular | Show results with:irregular
  26. [26]
    How Pew Research Center estimates the US unauthorized ...
    Aug 22, 2025 · Between 2021 and 2023, the number of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States grew from an estimated 10.5 million to 14 million, ...Missing: irregular | Show results with:irregular
  27. [27]
    Improved Method Better Estimates Net International Migration Increase
    Dec 19, 2024 · Today, the U.S. Census Bureau announced that a net of 2.8 million people migrated to the United States between 2023 and 2024. This is ...<|separator|>
  28. [28]
    International Migrant Stock | Population Division - UN.org.
    Covering the period from 1990 to 2024, the dataset includes estimates of the total number of international migrants by sex, as well as their places of origin ...
  29. [29]
    World Migration Report | International Organization for Migration, IOM
    World Migration Report 2024 reveals latest global trends and challenges in human mobility. World Migration Report - Director General's MessageInternational migrants · IOM (2024) · Foreword · Reports
  30. [30]
    Net migration - World Bank Open Data
    Net migration. World Population Prospects, United Nations ( UN ), publisher: UN Population Division. License : CC BY- ...<|separator|>
  31. [31]
  32. [32]
    Migration data sources
    Dec 14, 2020 · Information about migration comes from a variety of data sources that have strengths and limitations and can be used to produce different migration statistics.
  33. [33]
    Measuring Migration: Old Challenges, New Opportunities | D-Lab
    Jan 16, 2024 · In this blog post, I examine persistent challenges to measuring migration. I then focus on the opportunities offered by large digital trace datasets.
  34. [34]
    Human Dispersal Out of Africa: A Lasting Debate - PMC
    Unraveling the first migrations of anatomically modern humans out of Africa has invoked great interest among researchers from a wide range of disciplines.
  35. [35]
    In Their Footsteps: Human Migration Out of Africa
    Feb 19, 2025 · Fossil evidence shows that these early humans made crude stone tools. ... It took ancient humans around 50,000 years to migrate from Africa to ...
  36. [36]
    Early Migration Out of Africa (70000 B.C.E to 50000 B.C.E)
    Apr 13, 2025 · Fascinatingly, evidence suggests that even earlier, smaller groups ventured out of Africa around 86,000 B.C.E., particularly into Southeast ...
  37. [37]
    Ancient DNA reveals farming spread through migration, locals slow ...
    Aug 27, 2025 · New research by Penn State scientists shows that migration of farming groups was the dominant factor in the spread of agriculture, while ...
  38. [38]
    Farming spread through migration, not local adoption, ancient DNA ...
    Aug 29, 2025 · Study shows farming spread across Europe mainly through migration, not cultural adoption, reshaping ancestry and genetics.
  39. [39]
    Neolithic Britain: where did the first farmers come from?
    Apr 15, 2019 · The spread of farming. Farming is thought to have originated in the Near East and made its way to the Aegean coast in Turkey. From there, ...
  40. [40]
    Massive migration from the steppe was a source for Indo-European ...
    Our genetic data provide direct evidence of migration and suggest that it was relatively sudden. The Corded Ware are genetically closest to the Yamnaya ...
  41. [41]
    [PDF] Ancient DNA Suggests Steppe Migrations Spread Indo-European ...
    So there is now compelling evidence that the spread of the Yamnaya archaeological culture was the vector that also spread all the Indo-Eu- ropean languages ...
  42. [42]
    Bantu expansion shows that habitat alters the route and pace of ...
    When Bantu speakers did move into the rainforest, migration rates were delayed by on average 300 y compared with similar movements on the savannah. Despite ...
  43. [43]
    The migration history of Bantu-speaking people: genomics reveals ...
    May 5, 2017 · During a wave of expansion that began 4,000 to 5,000 years ago, Bantu-speaking populations – today some 310 million people – gradually left ...
  44. [44]
    The Discovery and Settlement of Polynesia
    --Around 1600-1200 B.C., a cultural complex called Lapita (identified by a distinctive pottery and named after a site in New Caledonia) spread from New Guinea ...
  45. [45]
    Paths and timings of the peopling of Polynesia inferred from ...
    From western Polynesia, Polynesian voyagers reached Rarotonga in the Cook Islands around 830 CE, having passed from Samoa along a route shared with the ...
  46. [46]
    Map of Pacific migrations | History
    Around 2,000–3,000 years before this, the Lapita people, ancestors of the Polynesians, had colonised the far-flung islands of the Pacific from South-East Asia.
  47. [47]
    Researchers use ancient DNA to map migration during the Roman ...
    Jan 30, 2024 · Throughout the thousand-year reign of the Roman Empire, disparate populations began to connect in new ways - through trade routes, economic and ...<|separator|>
  48. [48]
  49. [49]
    Viking Settlements: How the Norse Lived in Conquered Lands
    Jul 3, 2019 · The Vikings who established homes in the lands they conquered during the 9th-11th centuries AD used a settlement pattern that was based primarily on their own ...
  50. [50]
    Mongol invasions and conquests | Military Wiki - Fandom
    " Diana Lary contends that the Mongol invasions induced population displacement "on a scale never seen before" – particularly in Central Asia and ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-<|control11|><|separator|>
  51. [51]
    Mongol invasions and conquests - Wikipedia
    The Mongol invasions displaced populations on a scale never seen before in central Asia or eastern Europe. Word of the Mongol hordes' approach spread terror ...Destruction under the Mongol... · Mongol campaigns in Siberia · Qara Khitai · TibetMissing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
  52. [52]
    European Exploration and Colonization – He Huaka'i Honua
    Between the 15th-17th centuries (1400s-1600s), sea based expansion ushered in a new era of global trade, competition, empire-building, and migrations. This new ...
  53. [53]
    Historical Context: Facts about the Slave Trade and Slavery
    Over the period of the Atlantic Slave Trade, from approximately 1526 to 1867, some 12.5 million captured men, women, and children were put on ships in Africa, ...
  54. [54]
    Estimates: Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade - Slave Voyages
    Explore estimates and assessments of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade ... Totals, 1,999,069, 1,594,543, 1,209,340, 755,509, 388,776, 542,673, 5,694,581 ...
  55. [55]
    Industrialization and Migration - OER Project
    The population of Europe was surging in the nineteenth century. It would double from 188 million in 1800 to 400 million by 1900. As a result, the continent had ...
  56. [56]
    1.3.2 Migration and Diaspora in Modern History (ca. 1800–1900)
    Feb 20, 2023 · In this period, some 55 to 60 million people left Europe. In relative terms, Argentina became the country with the largest immigrant community: ...Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
  57. [57]
    Immigration to the United States, 1851-1900 - Library of Congress
    Nearly 12 million immigrants arrived in the United States between 1870 and 1900. During the 1870s and 1880s, the vast majority of these people were from ...
  58. [58]
    Indentured labour from South Asia (1834-1917) | Striking Women
    From 1834 to the end of the WWI, Britain had transported about 2 million Indian indentured workers to 19 colonies including Fiji, Mauritius, Ceylon, Trinidad, ...
  59. [59]
    Indenture | Global South Studies
    May 13, 2019 · Around 1.5 million South Asian indentured laborers were transported to British and Dutch Guiana, Trinidad, the French Caribbean, Fiji, British ...
  60. [60]
  61. [61]
    International migration patterns amid globalization
    Migration was curtailed with the start of World War I and didn't revive to its previous rate of around 600 per million world inhabitants until the 1990s.<|separator|>
  62. [62]
    August 1914 and the end of unrestricted mass migration - CEPR
    Jun 23, 2014 · By 1915, voyages from Europe to the US had fallen by more than 70% from 1913's level; steerage passenger arrivals had dropped by over 90% ( ...Missing: total | Show results with:total
  63. [63]
    The First World War and Its Aftermath: Displacement and Permanent ...
    Jul 18, 2024 · The Russian military expelled over 700,000 Jews from their homes. More were displaced during the violent aftermath of the war across Eastern ...
  64. [64]
    The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)
    The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants allowed entry into the United States through a national origins quota.
  65. [65]
    IOM History - International Organization for Migration
    ICEM arranges the processing and emigration of over 406,000 refugees, displaced persons and economic migrants from Europe to overseas countries. 1951. At the ...IOM, the Nineties · IOM in the Seventies · The Fifties · The Sixties
  66. [66]
    [PDF] The Big March: Migratory Flows after the Partition of India - Atif Mian
    The partition of India in August 1947 is one such example. Despite being one of the largest and most rapid migrations in human history with an estimated 14.5 ...
  67. [67]
    Pieds-Noirs – Pieds-Noirs
    In the summer of 1962, almost 800,000 French settlers fled Algeria for exile in France, in the biggest mass migration to Europe since 1945. As Europe ...
  68. [68]
    1942: Bracero Program - A Latinx Resource Guide: Civil Rights ...
    Upon its termination in 1964, the Bracero Program had brought more than four million Braceros (arms) to work in U.S. agriculture and on railroads. During World ...
  69. [69]
    There Is Nothing More Permanent Than Temporary Foreign Workers
    May 1, 2001 · Between 1942 and 1964, some 4.6 million Mexicans were admitted to the United States as Braceros or guest workers to fill jobs on U.S. farms.
  70. [70]
  71. [71]
    The Windrush Generation and the NHS: By the Numbers
    Jun 3, 2025 · By 1958, approximately 125,000 West Indians had come to the UK to work. In the same period, 55,000 migrants arrived from India and Pakistan, ...
  72. [72]
    Empire Windrush: Caribbean migration - The National Archives
    By 1948, the Nationality Act was passed which gave people from British colonies the right to live and work in Britain if they wanted. They were citizens of the ...
  73. [73]
    2. Global migration change, 1990-2020 - Pew Research Center
    Aug 19, 2024 · The number of people living outside their country of birth rose by 83% between 1990 and 2020, from 153 million to 281 million.
  74. [74]
    Top Statistics on Global Migration and Migrants
    Aug 26, 2025 · This article draws on the most current and authoritative data sources to provide frequently sought statistics on international migration, ...
  75. [75]
    International Migrants by Country of Destination, 1960-2024
    International migration rose from 77 million in 1960 to 304 million in 2024. Data is based on foreign-born or non-citizens, and includes refugees.
  76. [76]
    Migration - Our World in Data
    Migration has been an important source of economic development and poverty reduction. Explore data on global migration.The great global redistributor... · Recorded deaths and... · Data Explorer
  77. [77]
    Trends in Migration to the U.S. | PRB - Population Reference Bureau
    The United States admitted an average 250,000 immigrants a year in the 1950s, 330,000 in the 1960s, 450,000 in the 1970s, 735,000 in the 1980s, and over 1 ...
  78. [78]
    [PDF] WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 - IOM Publications
    This flagship World Migration Report has been produced in line with IOM's Environment Policy and is available online only.
  79. [79]
    Migration Today | CFR Education - Council on Foreign Relations
    Jun 17, 2025 · In 1990, migrants represented 2.88 percent of the global population. Since 2005, the number of international migrants has shot up. In 2000, that ...Missing: 1980s 2020s statistics
  80. [80]
    Program: International Migration Statistics | migrationpolicy.org
    This feature presents the latest, most sought-after data on immigrants in the United States—by origin, residence, legal status, deportations, languages spoken, ...Missing: patterns 2020s
  81. [81]
    [PDF] Global Wage Inequality and the International Flow of Migrants
    Jan 1, 2010 · In an empirical study of international migration, (9.13) suggests that variables are needed that measure skill prices at destination and ...<|separator|>
  82. [82]
    Higher economic growth in poor countries, lower migration flows to ...
    In this paper we focus on the role of economic growth and investigate whether in developing countries emigration indeed increases with economic progress.
  83. [83]
    Immigrants Are Key to Filling US Labor Shortages, New Data Finds
    Jul 2, 2024 · Immigrants are already playing a vital role filling healthcare workforce gaps. Nationally, 15.6% of all nurses and 27.7% of all health aides ...Agriculture · Construction · Entrepreneurship And...
  84. [84]
    Labour Migration
    There were 167.7 million international migrant workers globally in 2022 and they constituted 4.7 per cent of the global labour force.
  85. [85]
    [PDF] Migrants in the global labor market
    The central theme of this paper is that migrants are a rising 12 percent of more- developed country labor forces. The growth of the global migrant labor force ...
  86. [86]
    Border Crossings and Labor Market Tightness in the US
    Analyzing monthly data, it finds a strong positive correlation, suggesting that increased border crossings align with greater job availability.
  87. [87]
    Migration & Remittances Overview - World Bank
    According to the World Development Report 2023, 184 million people were on the move as migrants around the world, driven by economic opportunities, conflict ...
  88. [88]
    International remittances - World Migration Report
    Migrants sent an estimated USD 831 billion in international remittances globally in 2022, an increase from USD 791 billion in 2021 and significantly more than ...
  89. [89]
    International Migration, Remittances, and Economic Development
    We find that positive shocks to migrant income have substantial and long-lasting economic impacts in Philippine provinces. Increases in migrant income lead to ...
  90. [90]
    Global Trends report 2024 - UNHCR
    At the end of 2024, 123.2 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations and events ...
  91. [91]
    [PDF] global-trends-report-2024.pdf - UNHCR
    Jun 12, 2025 · There were 65.8 million new displacements in total during 2024, including 20.1 displacements due to conflict and violence and 45.8 million due ...
  92. [92]
    Global Trends report 2023 | UNHCR US
    At the end of 2023, 117.3 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations and events ...
  93. [93]
    Top 10 Migration Issues of 2024 | migrationpolicy.org
    Crises in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Ukraine, and elsewhere sent millions fleeing to safety in 2024, where they often encountered increasingly complex ...
  94. [94]
    [PDF] ICMPD Migration Outlook 2025
    Jan 19, 2025 · Despite the complex and multifaceted nature of migration, state fra- gility and violent conflict will remain key drivers of migration trends.<|separator|>
  95. [95]
    Top 10 Migration Issues of 2022 | migrationpolicy.org
    Combined with other events in 2022, including conflict and food insecurity in Burkina Faso and post-coup violence in Myanmar, Russia's invasion pushed the ...
  96. [96]
    Asylum Statistics USA: Approval Rates by States & Top Countries
    Jul 15, 2025 · Asylum is legal protection granted to individuals fleeing persecution in their home countries based on race, religion, nationality, political ...
  97. [97]
    [PDF] World Fertility 2024 - UN.org.
    May 6, 2025 · The global fertility rate in 2024 was 2.2 births per woman on average, down from around 5 in the 1960s and 3.3 in. 1990. • Although this ...
  98. [98]
    5 facts about global fertility trends | Pew Research Center
    Aug 15, 2025 · Currently, Europe and Northern America have the world's lowest fertility rates at 1.4 and 1.6 births per woman, respectively. (In the UN data, ...
  99. [99]
    Ageing Japan needs a drastic shift in migration policy
    Sep 12, 2025 · At this pace of immigration, Japan's working-age population will shrink by 8% by 2035 and 15% by 2045, as it won't be enough to offset the ...Missing: aging labor
  100. [100]
    [PDF] Migration and The Brain Drain - Policy Center
    As the youth bulge is rapidly forming within African and Middle Eastern borders, development plans fail to address the root causes behind the movement of ...
  101. [101]
    Quod vadis? The effect of youth unemployment and demographic ...
    Nov 28, 2022 · Recent trends in international migration reveal increasing migration outflows from Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries.
  102. [102]
    Immigration Systems in Labor-Needy Japan and South Korea Have ...
    Jan 28, 2025 · Amid plummeting fertility rates, rapidly aging populations, and mounting labor shortages, the countries could no longer afford to keep their ...
  103. [103]
    Demographic Change and Youth in the Middle East and North Africa ...
    Unemployment of the younger generations across MENA as a result of the youth bulge is an additional challenge. This has wide-ranging effects on the ...
  104. [104]
    World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies
    Apr 26, 2023 · Migration is a response to global imbalances, such as large welfare differences, and to shocks such as conflict and violence. Some 184 million ...Disseminating Around the World · Data · Team Members · Background Papers
  105. [105]
    Drivers of international migration | EMM2
    Conflicts over scarce resources, most of which are within countries and can lead to political instability; communal, ethnic and religious divisions; and mass ...
  106. [106]
    [PDF] Migration and Climate Change
    In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration—with millions.
  107. [107]
    [PDF] CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAND MIGRATION
    Having fewer resources and options for adaptation in-situ, these groups tend to experience the greatest out-migration pressures as a result of environmental, ...
  108. [108]
    [PDF] pub2024-089-r-climate-change-migration-en.pdf - IOM Publications
    Oct 14, 2025 · It shows that climate change is, at most, an indirect driver of migration which operates on the direct drivers – namely the pre‐existing ...
  109. [109]
    Groundswell Report - World Bank
    Sep 13, 2021 · Climate Change Could Force 216 Million People to Migrate Within Their Own Countries by 2050.
  110. [110]
    Climate-induced migration in the Global South: an in depth analysis
    Jun 14, 2024 · The decision to migrate due to climate change is influenced by changing environmental conditions, migrants' characteristics, and other migration ...
  111. [111]
    [PDF] Managing climate- driven migration
    For example, to strengthen knowledge and information-sharing with new evidence on migration and the environment, IOM has launched a three-year project called.
  112. [112]
    Types of movements - Essentials of Migration Management 2.0
    This section looks at migration from several dimensions. First, it discusses regular migration versus irregular migration as modes of entry, ...
  113. [113]
    Migration - OECD
    The OECD standardises international migration statistics, by category of entry, and monitors the evolution and composition of migrant populations. Learn more ...International Migration Outlook · Economic impact of migration
  114. [114]
    Express Entry: Federal Skilled Worker Program - Canada.ca
    The Federal Skilled Worker Program is for skilled workers who have foreign work experience and want to become permanent residents.
  115. [115]
    International Migration Outlook 2023 | OECD
    Key findings. Permanent-type migration to OECD countries increased by 26% in 2022 compared with 2021. Preliminary figures for 2023 suggest a further increase.
  116. [116]
    Migration to OECD countries hits new record
    Nov 14, 2024 · Permanent migration to OECD countries hit a new record in 2023, with 6.5 million migrants arriving. The number of temporary migrants and asylum seekers has ...
  117. [117]
    Global migration's impact and opportunity - McKinsey
    Nov 30, 2016 · Most voluntary migrants are working-age adults, a characteristic that helps raise the share of the population that is economically active in ...Missing: scale international
  118. [118]
    [PDF] MC/INF/276 - Valuing Migration: Costs, Benefits, Opportunities, and ...
    Nov 15, 2004 · Voluntary individual migrants almost always gain a net benefit by migrating from a poorer to a richer country,1 and the eradication of poverty ...
  119. [119]
    Refugees | United Nations
    Among those were 43.7 million refugees, (32 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate, and 6 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate). There were also 72 ...
  120. [120]
    Asylum-seekers | UNHCR
    Asylum-seeker definition and meaning. An asylum-seeker is someone who intends to seek or is awaiting a decision on their request for international protection.
  121. [121]
    The 1951 Refugee Convention and Key International ... - UNHCR
    The core principle is non-refoulement, which asserts that refugees should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom.
  122. [122]
    Refugee Data Finder - Key Indicators - UNHCR
    Jun 12, 2025 · An analysis tool that contains data on forcibly displaced and stateless populations, their demography and the solutions some of them found.Data Summaries · Data Insights · MethodologyMissing: II | Show results with:II
  123. [123]
    U.S. refugee admissions: How many people are accepted each year?
    Oct 6, 2025 · The United States admitted 100,034 refugees during fiscal year 2024, marking one of the strongest years for U.S. refugee resettlement in ...
  124. [124]
    Latest Asylum Trends
    Jul 17, 2025 · In May 2025, EU+ asylum authorities received 64,000 asylum applications, a downward trend compared to late 2024. Following the ousting of the ...
  125. [125]
    Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024 [EN/AR] - ReliefWeb
    Jun 12, 2025 · The main drivers of displacement remain large conflicts like Sudan, Myanmar and Ukraine, and the continued failure to stop the fighting. Filippo ...<|separator|>
  126. [126]
    Global Trends - UNHCR
    Jun 12, 2025 · 123.2 million. At the end of 2024, 123.2 million people were forcibly displaced. ; 1 in 67. This equates to 1 in every 67 people on Earth. ; x2.Global Trends report 2024 · Global Trends report 2023 · Français
  127. [127]
    Forced migration or displacement - Migration Data Portal
    Jun 20, 2024 · According to IOM, forced migration is “a migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion.<|separator|>
  128. [128]
    Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK - Migration Observatory
    Aug 1, 2025 · Between 2014 and 2023, the average waiting time for an initial asylum decision increased significantly, leading to a growing backlog of cases.
  129. [129]
    House of Commons - Home Affairs - Second Report - Parliament UK
    ... asylum to be restricted. Public concern has been driven by widespread fears that the asylum system is being abused, particularly by economic migrants posing ...
  130. [130]
    What is the evidence of asylum fraud? - Migration Watch UK
    Sep 23, 2021 · There are 'thousands [of] abuse abusive [asylum] applications' each year… [it is] 'a system that is rife with abuse': former immigration ...
  131. [131]
    [PDF] Migration and asylum: - UNHCR
    Nor can the level of misuse or abuse of the asylum system be measured by the proportion of people denied refugee status at the end of the procedure. UNHCR ...
  132. [132]
    Irregular migration
    While there is no universally accepted definition of irregular migration, IOM (2011) defines it as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms ...
  133. [133]
    Record 14 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Lived in the US in 2023
    Aug 21, 2025 · The Census Bureau estimated total net immigration for July 2023-June 2024 at 2.8 million, based in part on the releases and paroles just noted.Missing: undercounting | Show results with:undercounting
  134. [134]
    What we know about unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S.
    Jul 22, 2024 · The unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. grew to 11 million in 2022, but remained below the peak of 12.2 million in 2007.
  135. [135]
    Returns of irregular migrants - quarterly statistics
    In Q2 2025, 28 355 persons were returned to third countries; a decrease of 0.8% compared with the previous quarter, and an increase of 12.7% compared with the ...
  136. [136]
    Key Global Migration Figures, 2019 - 2025
    Jan 31, 2025 · 1-pager from IOM GMDAC summarizing key global mobility figures, updated with data available as of 31 January 2025. Includes key figures on:.
  137. [137]
  138. [138]
    One in Three Migrant Deaths Occurs En route While Fleeing Conflict
    Mar 26, 2024 · More than two-thirds of migrants whose deaths were documented remain unidentified, leaving families and communities grappling with the ambiguous ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  139. [139]
    Migrant deaths and disappearances - Migration Data Portal
    Mar 1, 2025 · The involvement of criminal or government actors in the facilitation of irregular migration may make survivors fearful of reporting deaths and ...
  140. [140]
    Irregular migrant workers in the EU and the US - Migration Data Portal
    Jun 19, 2019 · The US had an estimated 11.1 million unauthorized foreigners in 2014, including 8 million in the US labour force. Some 72 per cent of ...
  141. [141]
    Irregular Migration, Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking
    Irregular migration has been defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as movement of persons outside the laws, regulations, or ...
  142. [142]
    US Undocumented Population Increased to 11.7 Million in July 2023
    Sep 5, 2024 · The estimate for 2023 is below the peak of 12 million reached in 2008. After 2008, the population steadily declined, falling to 10 million in ...Missing: irregular | Show results with:irregular
  143. [143]
    Unauthorized immigrants and the economy | Economic Policy Institute
    Apr 15, 2025 · There are also 1.7 million unauthorized immigrants from South America; 851,000 from Asia; 504,000 from Europe, Canada, and Oceania combined; ...
  144. [144]
    International migrants: numbers and trends | World Migration Report
    In the latest international migrant estimates (dated as at mid-2020), almost 281 million people lived in a country other than their country of birth.
  145. [145]
    International migrant stocks - Migration Data Portal
    Feb 12, 2025 · According to the UN, the estimated number of international migrants was 304 million in 2024. This figure is up from 275 million in 2020.
  146. [146]
    Interactive World Migration Report 2024
    The current global estimate is that there were around 281 million international migrants in the world in 2020, which equates to 3.6 percent of the global ...
  147. [147]
    Migrant encounters at U.S.-Mexico border have fallen sharply in 2024
    Oct 1, 2024 · The Border Patrol recorded 58,038 encounters with migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border in August, according to a Pew Research Center ...Missing: corridor | Show results with:corridor
  148. [148]
    Five Migration and Security Trends at the U.S.-Mexico Border - WOLA
    Nov 12, 2024 · Between the border crossings, Border Patrol's apprehensions of migrants dropped 25 percent from 2023 (from 2,045,838 to 1,530,523). The decline ...Missing: corridor | Show results with:corridor
  149. [149]
    US-Mexico Border World's Deadliest Migration Land Route
    Sep 12, 2023 · IOM documented 686 deaths and disappearances of migrants on the US-Mexico border in 2022, making it the deadliest land route for migrants worldwide on record.
  150. [150]
    Africa - World Migration Report
    More than 29,000 nationals from West and Central Africa arrived in Europe along these various routes in 2022, with most (58%) arriving in Italy, 17 per cent in ...
  151. [151]
    African Migration Trends to Watch in 2025 – Africa Center
    Feb 3, 2025 · With 36,000 African migrants intercepted in 2024, the Atlantic route became the most active irregular passage from Africa to Europe.
  152. [152]
    Western African Migration Rises as Other EU Routes Decline
    Jan 2, 2025 · Irregular entries on the Eastern Mediterranean route rose by 18% in 2024, totaling 64,000. The Eastern Land Border saw a sharp 200% increase, ...
  153. [153]
    Migratory routes - Frontex - European Union
    The Central Mediterranean, Western Balkan, and Eastern Mediterranean routes were the top three migratory routes into the EU based on the volume of reported ...
  154. [154]
    Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States Explore
    With over 25 million Asian migrants living and working in the GCC countries, strengthening migration pathways is essential, not only to safeguard migrant rights ...
  155. [155]
    South Asian Migrant Workers and the Challenges of Gulf Migration ...
    Aug 1, 2025 · Notably, the South Asia–Gulf migration corridor is a major global route, with 5 out of 20 corridors originating from South Asia and converging ...
  156. [156]
    The Evolving Patterns of South Asian Migration to the Gulf States - ISPI
    Nov 21, 2024 · South Asian migration is diversifying, shifting from Gulf labor flows to skilled migration and regional movements, requiring a broader understanding of its ...
  157. [157]
    Migration data in Southern Asia
    Southern Asia, encompassing 1.94 billion people has been shaped by major migratory movements, both within the sub-region and globally.Recent trends · Past (and present) trends in... · Data sources
  158. [158]
    [PDF] Asia-Pacific Migration Report 2024 - International Labour Organization
    Jan 25, 2025 · Asia-Pacific corridors. Workers are tied to employers in the form of their work permits, and restrictions on job changes are often excessive ...
  159. [159]
    [PDF] data-snapshot-largest-migration-corridors.pdf
    This Data Snapshot shows the largest country-to-country migration corridors representing the consolidation of many years of migratory movements. The size of one ...Missing: routes 2020-2025
  160. [160]
    International migrant stock, total | Data
    International migrant stock, total. International Migrant Stock, United Nations ( UN ), publisher: UN Population Division ... 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019 ...
  161. [161]
    Remittances Slowed in 2023, Expected to Grow Faster in 2024
    Jun 26, 2024 · Looking ahead, remittances to LMICs are expected to grow at a faster rate of 2.3% in 2024, although this growth will be uneven across regions.
  162. [162]
    In 2024, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are ...
    Dec 18, 2024 · In 2024, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are expected to reach $685 billion, larger than FDI and ODA combined.
  163. [163]
    Remittances - World Bank
    Sep 18, 2024 · In 2023, remittances back to home countries totalled about $656 billion, equivalent to the GDP of Belgium. In more than 60 countries, ...
  164. [164]
    The Joint Effect of Emigration and Remittances on Economic Growth ...
    Aug 9, 2024 · We provide a consistent empirical framework to estimate the net joint effect of emigration and remittances on the migrants' countries of ...
  165. [165]
    Publication: International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain
    For a handful of labor-exporting countries, international migration does cause brain drain. For example, for the five Latin American countries (Dominican ...
  166. [166]
    Determinants and Consequences of the Brain Drain - PMC - NIH
    Sep 18, 2017 · We review first the evolution of theories of the brain drain as a framework to examine empirical evidence about the recent evolution of these ...
  167. [167]
    [PDF] The Fatal Consequences of Brain Drain
    This paper studies how high-skilled labor mobility affects both origin and destination regions, ... Effects of High-. Skilled International Emigration on Origin ...
  168. [168]
    [PDF] Globalization, Brain Drain and Development
    Based on the fact that the brain drain has both detrimental and beneficial effects for origin countries, its objective was to characterize the conditions under ...
  169. [169]
    Brain drain or brain gain? Effects of high-skilled international ...
    May 22, 2025 · The direct effect is "brain drain"-a decrease in the country's human capital stock. However, there may also be indirect "brain gain" effects.
  170. [170]
    [PDF] Brain drain or brain gain? Effects of high-skilled international ...
    May 22, 2025 · This review summarizes evidence that uses causal inference methods to reveal mechanisms that may lead to brain drain, gain, or circulation.
  171. [171]
    [PDF] Remittances and the Brain Drain: Skilled Migrants Do Remit Less!
    remittances increase with source countries' level and rate of migration, financial sector development and population, and decrease in per capita income and.
  172. [172]
    “Brain drain” or “brain gain”? New research identifies a more ...
    The typical story of brain drain is that the emigration of high-skilled workers depletes human capital stock in origin countries. However, Mobarak and coauthors ...
  173. [173]
    Highly-skilled émigrés offer surprising 'brain gains' for their home ...
    May 22, 2025 · The researchers found that migration opportunities often increase the stock of human capital in the countries of origin and produce other beneficial effects.
  174. [174]
    The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration
    This report concludes that immigration has an overall positive impact on long-run economic growth in the US.
  175. [175]
    Meta-Analysis: The Impact of Immigration on the Economic ... - MDPI
    The results indicate that, on average, immigration has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic performance. The effect varies based on ...2. Literature Review · 2.2. Immigration And... · 2.2. 1. Immigration And...
  176. [176]
    Summary | The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration
    First-generation immigrants are more costly to governments than are the native-born, but the second generation are among the strongest fiscal and economic ...
  177. [177]
    The fiscal impact of immigration on the advanced economies
    Highly skilled migrants normally make a large fiscal contribution, whereas unskilled migrants are likely to impose a net cost on native taxpayers.Missing: host peer
  178. [178]
  179. [179]
    [PDF] Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men
    Our analysis suggests that a 10-percent immigration-induced increase in the supply of a particular skill group reduced the black wage by about 3 percent, ...
  180. [180]
    [PDF] Does Immigration Affect Native Wages? A Meta-Analysis - CEPII
    The impact of immigration on native workers' wages has been a long-standing debate in labour and international economics. This meta-analysis synthesises ...
  181. [181]
    [PDF] Does immigration affect native wages? A meta-analysis - EconStor
    Abstract: The impact of immigration on native workers' wages has been a topic of long-standing de- bate. This meta-analysis reviews 42 studies published ...
  182. [182]
    [PDF] Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Meta-Analysis - Cepremap
    This wage equation predicts that an increase in the availability of type-c labor leads to a decrease in its marginal product (β < 0) if natives and immigrants ...<|separator|>
  183. [183]
    Immigration and the Wage Distribution in the United States - PMC
    Pais (2013) reported that a larger presence of immigrants leads to a decline of wage growth but higher wages at the point of labor market entry, suggesting that ...
  184. [184]
    Immigration and Wages
    small samples of a ...
  185. [185]
    [PDF] Imperfect Substitution between Immigrants and Natives: A Reappraisal
    6 In that paper, Borjas argues that the impact of immigration on the labor market can be measured by examining the wage evolution of workers in narrowly defined ...
  186. [186]
    [PDF] Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages - Giovanni Peri
    This mechanism can explain why economic analyses find only modest wage consequences of immigra- tion for less educated native-born workers. (JEL J24, J31, J61) ...
  187. [187]
    International immigration and its effects on native labor market
    May 18, 2025 · This study aims to investigate the impact of international immigration on the native labor market of host countries.
  188. [188]
    [PDF] Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?
    The meta-analysis study does not identify any significant difference in estimated wage effects between less educated native workers and all native workers [1].
  189. [189]
    A Compendium of Recent Academic Work Showing Negative ...
    Jun 23, 2025 · The findings suggest that immigration restriction benefited less-skilled U.S. workers. Christian Dustmann, Uta Schönberg, and Jan Stuhler ...
  190. [190]
    The effect of low-skilled immigration on local productivity and ...
    Our main finding is that low-skilled immigration had a significant positive effect on the average wage of native Koreans, especially those with medium and high ...
  191. [191]
    [PDF] A Meta-Analytic Assessment of the Effect of Immigration on Wages
    This literature concludes that, by and large, immigration has not been detrimental to the host economy and that in many cases it may have contributed to.
  192. [192]
    The effect of immigration on the wage of natives, combining ...
    Mar 20, 2025 · Although some studies assert that immigration substantially reduces native wages, others indicate no negative effects or suggest small positive ...
  193. [193]
    [PDF] THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR NEGATIVE WAGE IMPACTS OF ...
    A third key difference is that Borjas (2003) assumes that immigrant and native workers with the same education are perfect substitutes, whereas OP and MMW ...
  194. [194]
    Fertility statistics - Statistics Explained - Eurostat
    In 2023, the share of children born to foreign-born mothers stood at 23%. The foreign-born mothers shown in the Figure 7 concern mothers who were not born in ...
  195. [195]
  196. [196]
    The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Fertility
    Feb 20, 2025 · As Figure 1 indicates, the native TFR was 1.73 in 2023, while the overall TFR, which combines both natives and immigrants, was 1.80. The ...
  197. [197]
    [PDF] Immigration, one of the answers to Europe's demographic ageing
    Oct 2, 2024 · Moreover, as average migrants have lower elderly dependency ratios than natives, they also help alleviate the challenges posed by the pension ...
  198. [198]
    The Overlooked Impact of Immigration on the Size of the Future U.S. ...
    Nov 4, 2024 · Because most immigrants arrive when they are younger, they expand the pool of new workers and lower the age-dependency ratio in the immediate ...
  199. [199]
    Europe's population crisis: see how your country compares
    Feb 18, 2025 · The agency projects a population decline of more than a third, to 295 million by 2100, when it excludes immigration from its modelling.
  200. [200]
    An Update to the Demographic Outlook, 2025 to 2055
    Sep 10, 2025 · In the agency's current projections, total net immigration is 1.6 million people smaller in 2025, 960,000 people smaller in 2026, and 160,000 ...
  201. [201]
    New United States Population Projections
    Feb 7, 2025 · New population projections show continuation of status quo net immigration levels of 1.5 million annually will lead to constant population ...
  202. [202]
    Immigrants and their children assimilate into US society and the US ...
    Oct 1, 2024 · We find that immigrants who reported leaving Europe in response to war, violence, or persecution (“refugee migrants”) attained higher English ...
  203. [203]
    Immigrants and their children assimilate into US society and the US ...
    Oct 1, 2024 · We find that the children of immigrants continue to catch up to their peers with US-born parents now as in the past, and that the new waves of ...
  204. [204]
    The Adaptation of the Immigrant Second Generation in America
    The existence of downward assimilation in the second generation can be equated with the series of outcomes outlined previously: school abandonment, unemployment ...
  205. [205]
    Intermarriage among New Immigrants in the USA - PMC
    Oct 27, 2016 · The highest rate of intermarriage to US natives occurs among immigrants from Europe and Central Asia (30.4 percent).
  206. [206]
    Intermarriage and the Economic Assimilation of Immigrants
    This article investigates the assimilation role of intermarriage between immigrants and natives. Intermarried immigrants earn significantly higher incomes.
  207. [207]
    Intermarriage and the economic success of immigrants
    Empirical evidence shows that intermarried immigrants are often better educated, earn higher wages, have better knowledge of the host country language, and ...
  208. [208]
    Open markets, closed societies: The dual assimilation of immigrants ...
    This study proposes a model of dual assimilation, which more closely reflects the Western European context than existing models.
  209. [209]
    National identity and the integration of second-generation immigrants
    This paper examines how first-generation immigrants' origin country identity influences the long-term integration of their children, the second generation.
  210. [210]
    Migration and Cultural Change | Cato Institute
    May 26, 2021 · We show that migration is associated with an increase in cultural similarity between home and host countries over time (ie, cultural convergence).
  211. [211]
    [PDF] Migration and Cultural Change - IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
    Our evidence supports cultural remittances as the main driver behind cultural convergence. Immigrants disseminate the host country's culture to their home.
  212. [212]
    Sweden's failed integration creates 'parallel societies', says PM after ...
    Apr 28, 2022 · Sweden's prime minister has said the Scandinavian country has failed to integrate many of the immigrants who have settled there over the past 20 years.
  213. [213]
    Failed integration and the fall of multiculturalism - HEY World
    Jan 20, 2025 · Second, the compromise of multiculturalism has been an abject failure in Europe. Allowing parallel cultures to underpin parallel societies ...
  214. [214]
    The limits and possibilities of segmented assimilation theory
    Dissonant acculturation is a version of “second-generation decline” in which the children of immigrants do worse than their parents (Gans Citation1992).<|separator|>
  215. [215]
    What Holds Back the Second Generation? The Intergenerational ...
    The children of immigrants lag behind the children of natives in educational and economic achievement. In a nation of immigrants, why this is the case becomes a ...
  216. [216]
    [PDF] Assimilation and the Second Generation in Europe and America
    Our review of the literature shows that the overall observed pattern in both the United States and Western Europe is one of assimilation— the gradual erosion of ...
  217. [217]
    [PDF] Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical ...
    Apr 7, 2005 · We review research on four primary benchmarks of assimilation: socioeconomic status, spatial concentration, language assimilation, and ...<|separator|>
  218. [218]
    [PDF] Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion - Institute for Advanced Study
    Putnam ambivalently lauds the positive long-term effects of immigration for these societies, while contending that it has a corrosive effect on social capital ...
  219. [219]
  220. [220]
    Ethnic Diversity, Social Identity, and Social Withdrawal
    May 25, 2021 · In this paper we draw on social distance and social identity theories to empirically test if ethnic diversity encourages behaviors linked to social withdrawal.
  221. [221]
    Trust is in the eye of the beholder: How perceptions of local diversity ...
    First and foremost, we found no evidence to support Putnam (2007) pessimistic claim that diversity necessarily poses a challenge to social cohesion. Indeed, ...
  222. [222]
    The mythical tie between immigration and crime | Stanford Institute ...
    Jul 21, 2023 · The study reveals that first-generation immigrants have not been more likely to be imprisoned than people born in the United States since 1880.
  223. [223]
    DOES UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION INCREASE VIOLENT ...
    The results from fixed-effects regression models reveal that undocumented immigration does not increase violence.
  224. [224]
    [PDF] SCAAP Data Suggest Illegal Aliens Commit Crime at a Much Higher ...
    The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has reignited a key debate about American immigration policy. Do illegal aliens commit crimes ...
  225. [225]
    Criminal Alien Statistics | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    The term “criminal aliens” refers to individuals who have been convicted of one or more crimes ... Illegal Entry, Re-Entry, 4,502, 3,920, 2,663, 1,261, 6,160 ...Missing: studies | Show results with:studies
  226. [226]
    Facts about migration, integration and crime in Sweden
    Oct 6, 2025 · According to the most recent study, people born abroad are 2.5 times as likely to be registered as a crime suspect as people born in Sweden to ...
  227. [227]
    New Study on Migration and Crime in Sweden - Lund University
    Jan 19, 2025 · University study's stark result: Overrepresentation of individuals with foreign backgrounds in rape cases is up to 7 times higher – marginalization is not the ...
  228. [228]
    Germany: Crime statistics and migration - InfoMigrants
    Sep 22, 2023 · Half of crimes are immigration violations. In 2022, the number of non-German suspects was around 310,062 people. If we do not count violations ...
  229. [229]
    Violent crime rises in Germany and is attributed to refugees | Reuters
    Jan 3, 2018 · Violent crime rose by about 10 percent in 2015 and 2016, a study showed. ... The government-sponsored study showed a jump in violent crime ...
  230. [230]
    (PDF) Migrants and Crime in Sweden in the Twenty-First Century
    Regarding murder, manslaughter and attempted murder, the figures are 73 per cent, while the proportion of robbery is 70 per cent. Non-registered migrants are ...
  231. [231]
    [PDF] The Consequences of Illegal Immigration for Housing Affordability ...
    Sep 25, 2024 · We estimate that 59 percent of households headed by illegal immigrants use one or more welfare programs, creating roughly $42 billion in costs.Missing: healthcare | Show results with:healthcare
  232. [232]
    Welfare Use by Immigrants and the U.S.-Born
    Dec 19, 2023 · Analysis of this data shows both immigrants and the US-born make extensive use of means-tested anti-poverty programs, with immigrant households significantly ...
  233. [233]
    Does health affect attitudes towards immigration? - ScienceDirect.com
    Negative perceptions of immigration putting an additional strain on medical services could be further fuelled by news outlets portraying immigrants' use of ...
  234. [234]
    Immigration and the welfare state | Oxford Review of Economic Policy
    Jun 6, 2025 · This article examines the empirical evidence surrounding three key questions: first, whether generous welfare systems attract immigrants disproportionately.
  235. [235]
    Canada's Long-Standing Openness to Immigr.. | migrationpolicy.org
    Jun 24, 2025 · After a period of rapid growth post-pandemic, Canada adopted a more restrictive immigration approach in 2024, amid public concerns about housing ...
  236. [236]
    [PDF] Review of the points test - Department of Home Affairs
    Apr 3, 2024 · The points test is perhaps the most important part of our permanent skilled migration system. Some two-thirds of our permanent skilled intake ...
  237. [237]
    Australia: Migration Strategy Commits to Simplifying Immigration ...
    Mar 6, 2025 · The Australian government has released its Migration Strategy, which provides a roadmap to the significant long-term reforms to be implemented starting in 2024.
  238. [238]
    How the United States Immigration System Works
    Jun 24, 2024 · U.S. immigration law is based on the following principles: the reunification of families, admitting immigrants with skills that are valuable ...Missing: selection | Show results with:selection
  239. [239]
    [PDF] Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States: Policy Overview
    Oct 1, 2024 · Four major principles underlie current U.S. legal permanent immigration policy: allowing families to reunify, admitting needed skilled workers, ...
  240. [240]
    U.S. Family-Based Immigration Policy | Congress.gov
    Family reunification has historically been a key principle underlying US immigration policy. It is embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
  241. [241]
    Full article: Deter, detain, deport and demonise: should others follow ...
    Jun 13, 2025 · Deportation has been a feature of Australia's migration policy since its federation in 1901, although deportation for criminal offending was ...
  242. [242]
    ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Statistics
    May 30, 2025 · The following dashboards present for the first time information and trends in arrests, detentions, removals and alternatives to detention as of December 31, ...FY 2017 ICE Enforcement and... · FY 2016 ICE Immigration... · Annual Report
  243. [243]
    Deportation in the second Trump administration - Wikipedia
    On August 28, 2025, CNN reported that ICE alone has deported nearly 200,000 people in seven months since Trump returned to office.Deportation from the United... · March 2025 American... · Hardline<|separator|>
  244. [244]
    100 days of immigration under the second Trump administration
    One area where the administration appears to be failing to meet its enforcement goals is in the number of deportations. Deportation statistics include both ...
  245. [245]
    Work visas and migrant workers in the UK - Migration Observatory
    Aug 8, 2025 · After a sharp rise between 2021 and 2023, the number of work visa grants to non-EU citizens declined in 2024. This fall followed policy changes ...
  246. [246]
    Changes to legal migration rules for family and work visas in 2024
    Answers to some frequently asked questions about immigration changes in 2024, including to the minimum income to sponsor a spouse/partner visa.Missing: quotas | Show results with:quotas
  247. [247]
    Migration Program planning levels - Immigration and citizenship
    Sep 4, 2025 · NOM is calculated based on international movements in or out of Australia for 12 months or more, over a 16-month period and includes ...
  248. [248]
    Australia Passes Harsh New Anti-Migration Laws
    Nov 28, 2024 · Under the new laws, the government now has the authority to pay third countries to accept noncitizens, including recognized refugees. Contrary ...
  249. [249]
  250. [250]
    2 . Convention relating to the Status of Refugees - UNTC
    The Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, held at Geneva from 2 to ...
  251. [251]
    [PDF] THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951 - UNHCR
    After the adoption of the 1951 Convention, refugee situations began to arise in different regions of the world, which were not in any way related to pre-1951 ...
  252. [252]
    International labour standards and labour migration
    The ILO has developed two dedicated conventions to regulate labour migration, safeguard the rights of migrant workers, and promote non-discrimination and ...<|separator|>
  253. [253]
    C097 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)
    1. For the purpose of this Convention the term migrant for employment means a person who migrates from one country to another with a view to being employed ...
  254. [254]
    International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All ... - ohchr
    Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart ...
  255. [255]
    Global compact for migration | Refugees and Migrants
    Global Compact. The Global Compact for Migration is the first-ever UN global agreement on a common approach to international migration in all its dimensions.
  256. [256]
    General Assembly Endorses First-Ever Global Compact on ...
    Dec 19, 2018 · The representative of Bangladesh said the Global Compact's adoption marks a paradigm shift in establishing migration as a development phenomenon ...<|separator|>
  257. [257]
    Making the non-binding bindA critical analysis of the Global ...
    Dec 4, 2018 · The GFMD is a voluntary, informal, non-binding and government-led process open to all UN member and observer states to advance understanding and ...How We Got Here · Favourable Reception · From Paper To Practice
  258. [258]
    Opposition To The Global Compact For Migration Is Just Sound And ...
    Nov 13, 2018 · The compact itself says it “fosters international cooperation among all relevant actors on migration, acknowledging that no State can address ...
  259. [259]
    The Global Compact for Migration Six Years On: Time for a Shake-up?
    Oct 25, 2024 · This article critically explores where we are now with the GCM, why it seems to have lost its energy and is lacking meaningful implementation, and what we can ...
  260. [260]
    [PDF] International Agreements Shaping Migration Solutions
    Aug 4, 2023 · 13 International agreements, like the international migration compacts, are used to create frameworks, consensus on principles, or dictate ...
  261. [261]
    Six years after completion, Israel's border fence with Egypt has ...
    Jan 11, 2019 · The barrier has almost completely stopped the mass movement of illegal migration from Africa, Dr. Ofer Israeli, a geostrategist and ...Missing: impact crossings
  262. [262]
    Israel completes bulk of Egypt border fence - Reuters
    Jan 2, 2013 · Israel completed the main segment of a razor-wire fence along its border with Egypt on Wednesday, a barrier against illegal migrants and Islamist militants.
  263. [263]
    The Border Wall System is Deployed, Effective, and Disrupting ...
    Oct 29, 2020 · CBP has seen 79% decrease in apprehensions in this area (Zone 1) since the completion of border wall system. CBP has seen a 26% decrease in ...
  264. [264]
    Can Near-Historic Low Migrant Encounter Levels at
    Jun 6, 2025 · With this ongoing additional enforcement from Mexico, irregular arrivals at the U.S.-Mexico border decreased by 53 percent between December 2023 ...
  265. [265]
    How the U.S. Patrols Its Borders - Council on Foreign Relations
    In fiscal year 2024 (FY 2024), U.S. immigration authorities encountered more than 2.1 million people at the U.S.-Mexico border, only slightly less than the ...
  266. [266]
    Turn Back - Operation Sovereign Borders
    Since 2013, Australia has intercepted every boat attempting to enter illegally. Every vessel is closely watched. There is zero chance of illegal migration to ...
  267. [267]
    Statistics on boat arrivals and boat turnbacks
    This graph shows how many boats and people have come to Australia, been returned to their country of departure, or had their journeys disrupted in cooperation ...
  268. [268]
    EU external borders: irregular crossings fall 22% in the first 9 months ...
    Oct 10, 2025 · Irregular entries into the European Union decreased 22% in the first nine months of 2025, reaching 133 400 according to preliminary data ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
  269. [269]
    Are Crete and the Balearics Revealing Cracks in the EU Migration ...
    Jul 18, 2025 · While some routes have undergone considerable reductions, including the Western Balkans (-56%), the Atlantic route (-35%), the Eastern ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
  270. [270]
    World Migration Report 2024 | IOM Publications Platform
    This new edition presents key data and information on migration as well as thematic chapters on highly topical migration issues, and is structured to focus on ...International migrants · Migration and migrants · Chapter 1 - Report overview
  271. [271]
    [PDF] The High Cost and Diminishing Returns of a Border Wall
    This fact sheet provides context to the border security debate by highlighting some of the existing and imminent problems surrounding the construction of a new ...
  272. [272]
    [PDF] borjas-economics.pdf - Center for Immigration Studies
    Of the $1.6 trillion increase in GDP, 97.8 percent goes to the immigrants themselves in the form of wages and benefits; the remainder constitutes the “ ...
  273. [273]
    The Economic Benefits from Immigration
    The available evidence suggests that the economic benefits from immigration for the United States are small, on the order of $6 billion and almost certainly ...
  274. [274]
    [PDF] Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market
    A negative correlation (i.e., native wages are lower in those markets penetrated by immigrants) would indicate that immigrants worsen the employ- ment ...
  275. [275]
    5 Employment and Wage Impacts of Immigration: Empirical Evidence
    Where immigrants and natives are substitutes, adverse wage and employment effects may result; the more closely immigrants' skills and abilities match those of ...
  276. [276]
    [PDF] the effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives
    wages. There is no evidence that immigrants have a stronger negative effect on their own wages than on those of less-skilled natives.
  277. [277]
    International Migration Outlook 2021 - OECD
    The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants was persistently small during 2006‑18, between ‑1% and +1% of GDP for most countries. The situation is not the ...
  278. [278]
    Effects of the Immigration Surge on the Federal Budget and the ...
    Jul 23, 2024 · The increase in immigration boosts federal revenues as well as mandatory spending and interest on the debt in CBO's baseline projections, lowering deficits.
  279. [279]
    Immigration and public finances in OECD countries - ScienceDirect
    This paper shows that the macroeconomic and fiscal consequences of international migration are positive for OECD countries.
  280. [280]
    [PDF] The state-sovereignty-migration nexus
    Commonly, international human migration is blamed for corroding states sovereignty, especially stemming from policy circles, academic literature and citizens of ...
  281. [281]
    Europe's New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of Nationalism
    May 31, 2016 · Greece and Italy are some of the main entry points in the EU and were put in the impossibility of facing the waves of refugees alone; in fact ...<|separator|>
  282. [282]
    Immigration and Nationalism: A Matter of Degrees? | NBER
    Across a dozen European countries, an influx of less-educated immigrants fanned nationalism, while inflows of highly educated immigrants dampened it. Recent ...
  283. [283]
    Immigration and nationalism: The importance of identity
    In Italy, for instance, the share of foreign-born residents rose from 2.3% of the population in 2002 to 8.5% in 2018. During the same period there was a ...
  284. [284]
    The impact of immigration on EU countries' nationalistic sentiments
    May 25, 2019 · A prevalence of low-skilled immigration increased nationalist voting in Italy, and in several regions in the UK, Denmark, and France (light and ...
  285. [285]
    [PDF] Increasing Migration Pressure and Rising Nationalism - UN.org.
    The new wave of nationalism which has taken over most parts of Europe and North. America, particularly after a large number of people were forced to leave their.
  286. [286]
    10. Religion in Europe - Pew Research Center
    Jun 9, 2025 · Around 6% of Europe's residents are Muslims. In many European countries, there has been a decades-long pattern of religious “switching,” with ...
  287. [287]
    [PDF] Being Muslim in the EU – Experiences of Muslims
    Oct 23, 2024 · The survey captures the opinions of the general population and their views on having a Muslim as a neighbour, having someone in their family ...
  288. [288]
  289. [289]
    Should immigrants culturally assimilate or preserve their own culture ...
    We develop and empirically test a theory concerning host-society natives' beliefs about whether immigrants should culturally assimilate into the host society ...
  290. [290]
    [PDF] Migration and Cultural Change - Projects at Harvard
    We show that migration is associated with an increase in cultural similarity between home and host countries over time (i.e., cultural convergence). We then.
  291. [291]
    Global Report 2024 - UNHCR
    Jun 17, 2025 · Despite system improvements in many countries, pending asylum applications rose by 22% in 2024, reaching 8.4 million worldwide. During the year, ...Missing: irregular | Show results with:irregular
  292. [292]
    [PDF] The Externalization of Europe's Borders in the Refugee Crisis, 2015 ...
    Sep 14, 2016 · In 2015, Europe faced a record 1.3 million asylum applications and a fast-paced migration crisis, with many feeling overwhelmed and demanding ...Missing: strains | Show results with:strains
  293. [293]
    Refugee Crisis As a Potential Threat to Public Health - PMC
    Introduction. The European migrant/refugee crisis in 2015–2016 deeply challenged the political, economic and healthcare systems in the European Union (EU).
  294. [294]
    What are the impacts of migration? - Internet Geography
    Negative impacts on the destination location. Pressure on public services such as schools, housing, and healthcare; Overcrowding; Language and cultural ...
  295. [295]
    [PDF] DHS Needs to Improve Its Screening and Vetting of Asylum Seekers ...
    Jun 7, 2024 · Until the Department addresses these challenges, OHS will remain at risk of admitting dangerous persons into the country or enabling asylum ...
  296. [296]
    Terrorism and violent extremism | Europol - European Union
    The overall terrorist threat to the security of the EU remains acute. The main concern of Member States is jihadist terrorism and the closely related ...Missing: immigration | Show results with:immigration
  297. [297]
    Explainer: Immigrants and Crime in the United States
    A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where ...
  298. [298]
    Terrorism and Immigration | Cato Institute
    Mar 10, 2025 · For instance, the annual chance of being murdered in an attack committed by an illegal immigrant terrorist is zero. The federal government has ...